HC Deb 24 June 1918 vol 107 cc743-74

Order for Third Reading read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the third time."

Mr. G. LAMBERT

The present occasion offers an opportunity for some suggestions and possibly some criticisms of the method in which the War has been conducted for the last three months. So far as I am concerned I shall indulge in nothing in the way of criticism that savours of a party character, nor shall I have anything whatever to do with personal recriminations. There is, however, one aspect of national feeling of which, I think, the Government cannot be ignorant—that is, that the country at this moment is irritated, apprehensive, and suspicious; and this House, though it may be constitutionally defunct, is, after all, still the mouthpiece of the people of the country. I hope that the House, and the Government, will not lose touch with public feeling in this matter. We have been fed with bucketsful of pap from the various fronts, though I am very glad indeed to acknowledge the inspiring news from Italy. We cannot, however, at this moment forget that the Germans in France are preparing another great spring—are preparing to launch another great offensive. There is a feeling, I say, expressed to me a few days ago by a very clean-living, honest English workman that it cannot be persistent bad luck that attends our Armies; there must be something behind it. That has been, I think, reflected in various localities and in other spheres of public interest. We have had an election of late which turned upon the question of the internment of aliens. It was a very significant election. Some 40 per cent. of the electors who polled voted against the Government candidate. It will be well if the Government are able to assure the country that they are taking every step to prevent anything in the shape of undue favouritism to Germans and others, born or naturalised, and now resident in this country. The Press at one time formed a means of educating and gauging public opinion. At this present moment, however the Press is gagged by the Censor to a degree which has never been known before. I want in this matter to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who is representing the Government, is he quite sure that the Government have given the soldiers fair play during the last three months? Has there not been some suspicion that the politicians are more or less—I hope less rather than more—conducting the War, and that the soldiers and sailors have been constrained to adopt a strategy which is contrary to their judgment? In the early days of the Dardanelles Expedition we knew that that was so—

An HON. MEMBER

No!

Mr. LAMBERT

I think my hon. and gallant Friend will forgive me if I say that I wish to convey that opinion. The failure of Russia was known last March twelve months. We were told from that bench opposite on 14th January that the Germans would be able to bring 1,600,000 men from the Russian front to attack our troops in the West. The Germans were preparing up to the hilt. Well, there were not many signs of harmonious energies here. On 12th November last we had a speech by the Prime Minister, who was in Paris. It was hardly eulogistic of the strategy of our General Staff. Then, on 21st January, we had a very violent Press attack upon General Sir William Robertson, and on 18th February General Sir William Roberston was dismissed. These are the dates between which the Government was busy preparing to meet the German offensive in the West. But it seems to me here on this occasion, as on all others, that it was a case of swopping horses in crossing the stream. True, it was that we had the Versailles Council But the Versailles Council as an executive authority broke down on the very-first day of the German offensive. General Roberston said it would break down. He refused to be associated with that particular form of executive authority because he thought it was unworkable. So the late Secretary for War stated. I have no doubt General Robertson had read Clausewitz, where, according to his translator, that eminent strategist was clearly of opinion that A Conference generally results in nobody being convinced, and everybody retaining his original opinion. I am not going to say one single word to embarrass the distinguished French general who is the generalissimo of the forces in France.

The French are, indeed, displaying great fortitude. If we had the Germans within 40 miles of London we should require fortitude too. But there is no doubt in my mind, from what has come out, that there have been convulsions between the War Cabinet and the General Staff. We had the letter of General Maurice. He has stated since that on 30th April he wrote to the Chief of the General Staff pointing out certain facts. On 6th May he published his letter. I cannot believe that this great general officer faced the ruin of his military career for the sake of writing an inaccurate letter to the Press. Reading his criticisms as they have appeared in the "Daily Chronicle," they appear to me criticisms of a very sane and level-headed man. I imagine General Maurice acted the part of a very high-minded soldier and decided to ruin his military career for the sake of the Army of which he was a distinguished ornament. An inquiry has been refused, and we have never been able to get at the facts. Other hon. Members as well as myself have questioned the Government, and we have never been able to get at the facts as to why, on 21st March, the Fifth Army was overwhelmed by the German forces by something like three or four to one. According to General Gough himself, there were fourteen divisions of the British against forty German divisions, reinforced by eight or ten German divisions within two days. I want really to ask the Government whether it was really due to action taken in Whitehall that this Fifth Army had to defend this length of line?

4.0 P.M.

We were told in the Chancellor of the Exchequer in answer to a question by myself that Field Marshal Haig took over this line quite willingly and of his own volition. The Chancellor of the Exchequer must know that not once or twice, but more than twice, General Haig pro-tested against taking over this line with the forces he had at his disposal. I will ask still further whether the Government themselves did not, during the latter half of last year and the beginning of this year, neglect and reject the advice they received from their military advisers. I think that if the records of the War Office were searched it would be found that over and over again the General Staff of the War Office asked the Government to strengthen the Western Front and to abandon all secondary enterprises. When this disaster took place in France explanations were given here and also in another place, and perhaps I may be allowed to quote the words of Lord Curzon, a member of the War Cabinet, who said: There Seems to have been a tendency in some quarters to suppose that either from a reluctance to tap the available resources of man-power it this country or from a failure to appreciat military advice the British Army in France hat been allowed to decline numerically to a point fraught with peril. There is no foundation for such a suspicion nor were any apprehensions of such a character entertained or received. Our commanders were equally satisfied with the numbers, the equipment, and the moral of their forces. I ask the Government, Was this really an accurate statement of facts? Were our Commanders in France satisfied with the number of their forces? I hope I may be able to get an answer from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I understand it was common knowledge that the Army in France, on the eve of that critical day, the 21st of March, was actually reduced. The divisions were reduced from twelve battalions of Infantry to nine, and brigades were reduced from four battalions of Infantry to three; and that was done a month before the 21st March, the critical day. Surely that fact shows that our forces in France were not up to establishment at that moment. We have had comparisons as between the 1st January, 1917, and the 1st January, 1918, but they do not matter. The critical date is the 21st March when the Germans attacked. I understand that if the British Army had been at its proper establishment on the 2lst March last there would have been from 100,000 to 120,000 more men there. We were told also by Lord Curzon in the House of Lords that the Eastern Expeditions had not withdrawn strength from the Western Front. Again I will read the Noble Lord's words, if I may— I mentioned these two Eastern campaigns only in order to point out to your lordships that neither of them has been allowed to affect the fighting strength of the forces in France or in Flanders. No British troops have been taken from France for any Eastern theatre of war. That may be true, but did not the General Staff at the latter end of last year and the beginning of this, press for the withdrawal of troops from Palestine in order to strengthen the Western Front. Was not that the advice of the General Staff? I notice that the Chancellor of the Ex-cheques shakes his head. I must say when we get statements like this there ought to be an inquiry into the matter. I think if the archives of the War Office were searched it would be found that the General Staff did make representations to the Government in favour of the withdrawal of forces from Palestine. They were not withdrawn, at any rate, until the 21st of March. I am very sorry to have to arraign the policy of the Government with regard to the East. There is not much doubt that the Prime Minister attached the very greatest importance to the expeditions in the East and so, too, did Lord Curzon, who appears to have played a very prominent part in the War Cabinet. He stated that the Western Front was well equipped to look after itself, and if it had in any respect failed to do so the explanation must be sought elsewhere. It would not be found in denouncing the secondary campaign! of our Army the full value of which wight perhaps be even more visible at the Peace Conference of the future than now. Are we to risk the capture of Calais and Boulogne for the sake of keeping Jerusalem and Jericho. I venture to say it is not a good exchange, and if Lord Curzon wishes to be an Eastern Nabob I would suggest that the Government make him Caliph of Baghdad right away and let him assume his duties there at once. As far as I am concerned I do not wish to engage in any criticism except so far as they will tend to promote the successful prosecution of the War. If the Government would only successfully conduct the War, I would even go so far as to say they could close down Parliament and get on with their work. We have lavished men, money, and munitions; we have made many sacrifices, yet to-day we are back to the position of 1914, and the Germans, still arrogant and powerful, are preparing another great spring.

The heroism and valour of the British troops are beyond all compare, but is there not something wrong in our system of conducting the War? Are we not waging war with the instruments of peace? Are we not conducting our war as if it were a kind of General Election? We proclaim loudly what we will do after the War, but everything depends on the successful prosecution of the War itself, and to-day, although the news is good from the Italian Front, I am afraid we are very far from that goal of victory which the Allied people are so anxious to reach. We have all sorts of legislation passing through this House. The War Cabinet is engaged, and must be engaged, day by day with many things other than the conduct of the War. There is an Education Bill before us. There is an Emigration Bill. I really cannot follow all the Bills the House is asked to consider. I should have thought that all this litter of legislation might have been left until we had emerged with success from the War. We are told there is to be some legislation with regard to Ireland. What it is to be I do not know. We are told we are to have Home Rule for India. Do let me impress upon the Government the necessity of devoting their minds only and seriously to the conduct of the War itself. The War Cabinet, it seems to me, is engaged in keeping the peace amongst the various Government Departments. It is devoting itself to the price of potatoes, to horse-racing, to rationing, and such matters, but it is no use disguising from ourselves the fact that during the last eighteen months the present War Cabinet has not been successful in prosecuting the War. In shipping last year we lost very nearly 4,000,000 tons, and this year we have had, although I do not like to say it, some of the greatest military disasters in our history. I say respectfully to the Government that however much we may loathe, as we do loathe, Prussianism in time of peace, Prussianism is very effective in time of war. I do not suppose that Hindenburg or Ludendorff are bothering their heads about Education Hills or Home Rule Bills, or similar matters. These two distinguished men, and able men they must be, have pitted against them the strategy of our present War Cabinet. That is a great handicap for the British soldier to carry. I have not the slightest doubt if it came to the question of making speeches the War Cabinet would easily be their superior. But speeches are no substitute for strategy.

I would suggest to the right hon. Gentleman, and he has great power in this matter, that the foundation stone of this War Cabinet should be that whoever carries it on must devote himself solely and wholly to the question of the War. I lay it down, I hope not too positively, that two members of that War Cabinet must be the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War. Their official duties bring them in touch with everything connected with the War. For advising the War Cabinet there must be two men, and two men only—the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the General Staff. You cannot be running about for advice in the highways and byeways seeking the advice that may suit you, because you will only then get sycophantic and not honest opinion, and that sycophantic opinion will have undue weight. Sir William Robertson gave to the War Cabinet considered counsel, but I have not the smallest doubt it did not suit the light and airy strategic castles in the air of some members of the War Cabinet. I think I can show that the members of the War Cabinet have gone outside their Chief of the Staff for advice as to the War. We had a speech here from the Prime Minister on the 20th December last in which he spoke in terms of the highest eulogium of the present Chief of the Staff. He said: Sir Henry Wilson is not merely one of the most brilliant minds in the British Army but in and European Army. A profound student of strategy, he made a great reputation at the head of the Staff College and has had a unique experience in this War, not merely on the British but on the French and the Russian Fronts. Above all he possesses the gift of imagination, a gift which is rare even among soldiers."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th December, 1917, col. 2213, Vol. 100.] I cannot think that the Prime Minister could have eulogised Sir Henry Wilson in these warm terms without having met him. But at that time General Sir William Robertson was the Chief of our War Staff. One thing more I suggest in this connection. Sir Henry Wilson was appointed a member of the Versailles Council on the British side. I would like to ask, Was he appointed with the approval and concurrence of Sir William Robertson? If not, then it is a very serious matter, because it was indispensable that these two people should work in perfect harmony. One suggestion more I make is that in taking the advice of naval officers other than the First Sea Lord at the War Cabinet they should be accompanied by the First Lord himself. I know naval officers who are brilliant men of profound judgment, but they cannot talk, and when they are brought before a body of men whose chief quality is nimble-mindedness they are at a great disadvantage. It seems to me that you must select the best advisers, and you must trust them. In a multitude of counsellors there is not safety, but disaster, as was shown in the case of the Mesopotamia campaign. What I feel is that for any blunders committed at Whitehall our soldiers have to pay in blood, agony, and humiliation. We have never yet been told about the things which have happened on the Western front, and many of us have spent sleepless nights thinking of those poor fellows who are undergoing the barbarities of German imprisonment.

Two units of the German military and naval forces which have done us more damage than anything else are the "Goeben" and the "Breslau." Anyone who reads the description written by the United States Ambassador in Turkey about the arrival of the "Goeben" and the "Breslau" will see with what warmth those two ships were received by the Germans there. I was talking last night in Devonshire with a lady whose two sons went out with the First Expeditionary Force, and one of her sons was killed at Mons, the other being taken prisoner, and he has been a prisoner in Germany ever since the early days of the War, and he is now in Holland She made to me the remarkable statement that the British Government lost the war in the Dardanelles, and they would never have recovered but for the help of America. Be that as it may, the Dardanelles mistake was due to constraining naval opinion to accept advice against their will. We know that Lord Fisher resigned because of the Dardanelles, and he has proved to be right. General Robertson was dismissed on 18th February because he thought the Versailles Council would be unworkable, and he has proved to be right, and because the Government did not accept his advice to strengthen the Western Front in view of the coming German offensive, and in that he has been right. I ask that these two men should be recalled, and then we shall have no fear that our incomparable Navy and our heroic soldiers will render a good account of themselves in meeting the enemy. But they must have leadership, and it is leadership I ask the Government to give to our Navy and to our Army to-day.

Colonel WEDGWOOD

I cannot help thinking that the speech to which we have just listened ought to have been delivered about two or three weeks ago. At that time the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife (Mr. Asquith) failed to make a case, and where the right hon. Gentile-man failed we can hardly expect the case made out in the speech we have just heard to take its place. I wish right hon. Gentlemen on the Front Opposition Bench would understand that in this perpetual bolstering up of the military as against the naval authorities, they are not fulfilling the proper rôle of the Liberal party. Perpetual sniping at the Government may be all right, but when it has got a military background it is, to my mind, unfortunate and likely to have a very hampering effect upon the War Cabinet, which must take a strong line in regard to its military advisers. Everybody knows in this House that the ultimate direction of the War must rest with the Cabinet. If we think it is being directed wrongly, let us get rid of the Cabinet, but to hamper them in directing their military advisers seems to me to be the most fatal attitude that could be taken up by this House or by any official party. I think the right hon. Gentleman opposite said that generals complained that they have not got enough troops. Has the right hon. Gentleman ever met a general who thought he had enough troops? Every general naturally wants to strengthen his own forces beyond their present strength, and there has never yet been a general who did not resist every effort to transfer his forces or anything that would not keep those forces at full strength. It is the common practice of all military authorities to keep their command as strong as possible, and resist transferring any of their forces to somebody else. It is only human nature, and to allege that the Cabinet has not to balance the claims of one campaign or one set of generals against another and has not to decide for themselves which campaign has to be supported is unreasonable.

Mr. PRINGLE

They must take the consequences if they are wrong.

Colonel WEDGWOOD

Certainly, if a Cabinet is wrong, then it should go, but to say that they must not consider all the elements of the case and decide for themselves, even though their decision is contrary to certain military advisers seems to be foolish. Why should we now have a rehash of all the old struggle and controversy regarding Sir William Robertson and other people? Sir Henry Wilson is our Chief of the Staff now and our representative in France, and it can only weaken his hands to be perpetually girded because Sir William Robertson thinks differently. Sir Henry Wilson has all the information at his disposal, and I think the re-echoing of all these old squabbles in regard to the Dardanelles is unfortunate at the present time. The subject I wish to speak about to-day is the question of our relations with Russia. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife, in his speech the other day, made what to my mind was a most important announcement as to which there has been, so far, no reply from the Government Bench. The Member for East Fife took up this case which, I think, is the true Liberal line. He said that we must not on any account write Russia off the slate. He echoed, and I think he was the first British statesman to echo the words which have been uttered by President Wilson, and he took up the line he has taken over the Russian situation. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife said: I am not at all disposed to wipe Russia off the slate, or to assume the attitude of saying to Russia, 'You have failed us; you must now stew in your own juice, and you are no longer any friend to the Allies.' That is a policy of fatal shortsightedness, and in my judgment, with all the reserve of diplomacy and military and naval assistance, we ought if we can before it is too late, build up upon a new foundation the relationship of friendship and intimate alliances with the great Russian people if we can. That ought to be the new call to arms of the democracy in this country. For four or five months now we have been dallying in this country with the idea of a counterrevolution, and with the idea of establishing a Government in Russia to carry on the old attitude of the first revolutionary Russian Government. We have done everything in our power to work with those elements in Russia which were no longer in power failing to realise that all those elements in Russia at the present day are pro-German and not pro-Ally. It is true that in the Ukraine, owing to German bayonets the upper classes have recovered their power, but that recovery has meant a fresh enemy for the masses, and the beating back of the only friends we have got in Russia. The whole of Russia is now divided up into the people who have and the people who have not, but the people who have not, and who have the government of the country, are not the friends of the Germans. It is obvious that they cannot be really the allies of the German autocracy. They are being bullied right and left by the German autocracy. It is probably true that a certain number of their administrators are being bribed by German money, and over and over again, in spite of the efforts of the heads of the Bolshevik Government, no doubt some of their subordinates are selling us to the enemy. I do not think that can be gainsaid. They are people with no money and are peculiarly liable to be bribed, but that is no ground for saying that the Bolsheviks are pro-German. What is happening must make them the potential friends of the Allied power. President Wilson has realised that the only hope of getting on the right side with Russia is to get on the right side of the Bolshevik Government. He has sent message after message to the Russian people, and has taken the strongest diplomatic action to protect the Russian people, so that now the only one of the Allied powers of whom the Russians will speak well and with whom they are in the least intimate is the American nation. This, although it is an advantage to the Allies, ought at least to be a hint to us as to how we might improve our relations with that power. We must first of all get it into the minds of the Cabinet that the assistance of a counter-revolution, however plausible it may appear, is doing far more harm than it can possibly do good. Every minor effort and every assistance given to anybody of enemy opinion, whether it be financial or otherwise, is immediately known to the Bolshevik circle, and is immediately used by them against Great Britain and the whole of the Allies. We must play the game straight with these people over there. Either do not recognise them at all and be man enough to try to turn them out of power or treat them as though they are, I will not say a sensible people, but at any rate a neutral Power with whom our relations had better be good rather than bad.

At the present time you have America standing well with the Russian Power, but America has not as yet recognised Russia I want to know whether the question of the recognition of the present Russian Government has been raised by America, and whether we have checked the recognition of the Russian Government by America. That seems to me to be one of the important things. I want to know next what steps our Government are taking to come to a better understanding with the Russian Government. This is not a question of after the War. It is not a question of some future alliance. It is a vital question of to-day, because Germany, and particularly Turkey, are stretching their influence through Russia, through Caucasus, through Turkistan, and through the borders of our Indian Empire. Their influence in Persia and in the Eastern Provinces of China is increasing at the present time. You have these things going on. It is true that they are not getting much foodstuffs and much economic assistance from Russia at the present time, but all the time that we are dallying with this question, and all the time that we are not on speaking terms with the Russian Government, this filtration is going on, and it is becoming a very serious danger to the whole of the future of the War. It is not merely that they are approaching the Indian Empire. There is nothing in the past history of Prussia, either in this or in previous wars, to lead one to suppose that they will not exploit the man-power of these conquered provinces, just as they would wish to exploit their economic power. Frederick the Great used the people of Saxony to fight his battles. He enlisted them, he controlled them, and he used them against the Austrians. Just in the same way, I am confident, if the War goes on long enough, you will see the Prussian Power enlist the men of the Ukraine and of Trans-Caucasus and bring them on to the Western Front.

All this is possible in the future, and it is to stop this action that we must be on better terms with the Russian Government. I believe the Cabinet know that on this question they are simply drifting. They have sent a fresh Mission to Russia, which I do not think is altogether fortunate. I do not know whether they are leaving it to President Wilson, but in this matter it is our duty to take the lead rather than to follow in anybody's wake. The Russians have over here a representative, M. Litvinoff. He is not recognised by our Government, and communications take place with him through an intermediary, a most indirect and unfortunate way of doing business with any Government. I venture to suggest to the Government that they should appoint a Departmental Committee—I say a Departmental Committee, because it is more likely to be agreeable to the Foreign Office than a Parliamentary Committee, though I think a Parliamentary Committee would be more advantageous—and that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife (Mr. Asquith) should preside over that Committee, and that its duty should be to see how best relations between this country and Russia can be improved. Let them have before them M. Litvinoff, Mr. Marshall, and various other people who have just come back from Russia, and know the people and the conditions there, and even the emigrés who have last their all in Russia, and are naturally bitter against the Russian Government. Let all these parties come before the Committee, and then let the Committee make recommendations to the Government as to how we can improve relations with Russia.

The solution that I have in view, frankly, is simply this, that we should induce M. Litvinoff, by some means or other, to appeal for help to the President of the United States. There are plenty of occasions. The German Imperialists continue to press the Russian Government, and it is quite certain that they will never dare to make a real peace with the Bolshevik Government. It is toodangerous. There are plenty of opportunities for the Russian Government to appeal for help—I do not necessarily say immediate military help—and an appeal to the President of the United States for help would be the first step towards a satisfactory intervention in Siberia and in Russia by the Allies. Intervention that is asked for is as different as chalk from cheese from intervention forced upon a people against their will. The very idea of sending any of the Allies to intervene in Russia against the will of the Russians seems to me absolutely futile and absolutely damaging to the whole of the Allied cause. It is calculated to throw the whole of the Russian Bolsheviks, as well as the Bourgeois, into the arms of Germany to protect them from the Yellow Menace, not only that, but to destroy the moral of the whole of the Allies by attacking the Russian Revolution, just as we did the French Revolution in 1795, would be a disaster to our cause that we should never get over. Intervention which takes the shape of railway assistance—and already America has sent 300 railwaymen to help to organise the Siberian Railway—which takes the shape of financial reorganisation, which takes the shape of the importation of shoes and clothing and seeds, of which they are in urgent need, which takes the shape of any form of reconstruction and which may be followed afterwards, if you like, by military assistance to keep back the German hordes—anything of that sort at the request of the de factoRussian Government would be the best thing for the Allied cause and for the whole of our future in this War. It seems to me to be the only way to prevent Germany from exploiting the man-power, as well as the economic power, of the old Slav Empire.

To my mind, 25,000 American troops diverted from France to Siberia at the request of the Russians, would be worth 500,000 American troops in France. It is not only that it would attract German troops from the Western Front back to the Eastern Front, but it would make for the solidarity of the democratic powers throughout the Alliance, and it would be a nucleus round which an indefinite force of Slavs would rally for the future salvation of democracy against Imperialism. What you want in Russia to-day is a nucleus round which the people will rally. Not a small armed force which will attack the Revolution, but a small armed force to which the Revolution can rally in order to establish some sort of order, even a Revolution order, in Russia. I hope hon. Members will not go away with the impression that any form of counterrevolution in Russia is possible or practicable at the present time. The Revolution has given to the people a vested interest in the Revolution which no counter-revolution can really upset. They have given the people the land, and every man who has acquired land under the Revolution knows that if the Revolution is upset he will lose his land. That constitutes a vested interest in the Revolution far stronger than the vested interest of the French peasant in the French Revolution.

A counter-revolution is impossible as a permanent solution of the Russian problem. Therefore, I think that the Bolsheviks, however deplorable their action may be, and however bad their tyranny, will at least last for a year, and that whatever change comes about, it will not be a change towards the re-establishment of autocratic rule. You will get, through a gradual modifying of Bolshevik tendencies, due to the amalgamation of the present Bolsheviks, with what they call the Social Revolutionaries of the Left, some form of sensible and stable government. You must not suppose that you have complete anarchy in Russia. There is a great deal of control exercised by the Central Powers over even the furthest confines of the Empire to-day. You have most of the towns governed at the present time by commissaries sent down from Petrograd or Moscow. They go down to the various towns right away at the end of Siberia, and they govern and have direct communication with the Central Powers in Moscow. There is not that complete separation from all centralisation that one might imagine from the spread of anarchy in Russia. There is a certain cohesion and that cohesion is probably greater to-day than it was in the time of the Kerensky Government. You have now among these commissaries, who are actually governing the country, that kind of educated Russian Socialist who, although he is corrupt, yet has a vast faith in the social revolutionary doctrines, and a cohesion with his fellow revolutionaries right throughout the Russian Empire, so that at the present time there is, perhaps, more cohesion and more organisation in the Bolshevik Government than there was in the time of Kerensky Government, when there were extreme revolutions going on in the outlying parts and less solidarity of principle among the various governing Juntas. Therefore I come back to my suggestion. The first thing is to get appointed here a Departmental Committee, if possible, with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Fife as Chairman, which shall consider how best we can improve the relations between England and Russia at the present time, hearing all the evidence, and then giving a concise report to the Government upon which the Government should act. That would stop this policy of drift, which has gone on long enough. It would give us a lead. The chairmanship of the right hon. Gentleman would be a pledge both to Russia and to America that the policy of President Wilson, of no hostility to the Revolution, would be the policy of that Committee. That is the first step to take towards improving our relations with Russia.

If we are definitely to stem the German advance in the East, we must also see that our relations with India are improved. The Indian problem is one which becomes daily more important as the German and Turkish power gets nearer the confines of India. It gets more important as British Divisions are withdrawn from Palestine and Mesopotamia to fight on the Western Front. The position of India is becoming more important hourly, one might almost say. We are awaiting next week the considered policy of His Majesty's Government upon Indian Home Rule. I only wish to say this, without prejudging in the least what that declaration will be: If that declaration can get behind it the full support of the Indian Nationalists, we shall have there a barrier against Germany which the Germans will be the last people to despise, and 315,000,000 of people who are willing to back the British Empire, because the British Empire does lead to liberty, will mean a force beside which the small Indian forces we have in Palestine and Mesopotamia at the present time will seem as nothing. You have got there a great people, only too anxious to back us and the French. I beg hon. Members, when this scheme is brought forward next week to try to see in it what will reconcile India, in spite of the past, with the British Empire, and not with jaundiced eyes to try to pick out all those parts in it which seem to detract from the old lordly position of the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy in India. We have now to look on the problems of our coloured fellow-countrymen with different eyes from those with which we used to regard them five or six years ago. We have now got our backs to the wall. We now want their help. When we are asking for help, do not let us ask them for help because-of the British Empire, because of what we have done for them in the past, but let us ask them for help because we, like they, want to win this War and put down-bullying and Imperialism everywhere in order to make the world safe for all democracies.

Brigadier-General CROFT

I am not going to follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Wedgwood) in his various wanderings round the world. We should remember, before we take too literally what he says, what I believe is the fact, that he is generally regarded as being a Bolshevik, and has very strong Bolshevik sympathies. I want to deal with the more serious matter which was raised to-day at Question Time, and on which the House heard the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Worcestershire (Commander Leverton Harris), who spoke immediately after questions. The House will understand that anyone who raises a question like-this regrets the necessity of raising a question of such a character. I wish it to be clearly understood that certain references which have occurred in the Press with regard to the right hon. Gentleman have nothing whatever to do with the subject I am raising to-day. I have-nothing to say in regard to certain matters which appeared in the Press with respect to the right hon. Gentleman's relatives visiting German prisoners. As there was a persistent rumour in the Lobby with regard to the fact that the right ion. Gentleman was supposed to be in some way friendly towards the German Metal Trust at an earlier time, I may say I have nothing to say on that matter. Those questions have nothing whatever to do with the point I want to raise to-day. I hope that the House will consider this question apart altogether from those other questions, and will not allow those other questions to be considered in this connection at all. It has been suggested that the easy thing to do with a case like this is to let it go by, and that, as the right hon. Gentleman made a statement, perhaps it would be better not to follow it up. I cannot take that view, because it seems to me to be of vital importance that this House should guard its traditions, and, even if the matter is a small one—I think I can prove it is not—it is equally necessary to take notice of a question which, I find, has been known among many people for some time past. I would ask the House first to consider the question as it was raised by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ludlow (Major Hunt) on 18th March this year. On that date he asked the following question: Whether ill 1915 or 1916 any directions were given by the trade division of the Admiralty permitting to certain firms priority in cabling; and, if so, if he will give a list of these firms to whom priority was granted and the dates on which instructions for such priority were issued? I want the House to notice particularly the answer of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty: Dr. Macnamara: I am informed that no general directions have ever been given conferring priority in cabling. When it has been necessary for firms to send cables on Government business, such cables have from time to time been expedited at the request of the Department affected. Each such case has been judged on its merits, first by the Department making the request, and then by the Chief Censor."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th March, 1918, col. 646, Vol. 104.] The House will see that that directly contradicts the statement of the right hon. Gentleman to-day. He said that he was applying for a privilege which was already extended to certain other firms. Here we have it specifically stated that this had not been done. To-day I received from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty quite a different answer. He made a very frank and perfectly correct statement of the case, so far as I can make out with regard to this subject. This brings me to the fact that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ludlow, who I am sorry to say is indisposed and is not able to raise this question himself, asked another question, and again received an evasive reply. The result is that my hon. Friends and I consider that it is really essential that the matter should be raised in the House In the first place, I want to point out that the right hon. Gentleman as he stated to-day, was very much interested in the house of Harris and Dixon, Limited, which is the firm mentioned in this correspondence. He was, I believe, an original director in 1902. He told us to-day that he sold his shares. I do not know when he sold those shares, but I had information that on 24th October, 1917, there was a statement which said that he was still a shareholder, but he may have sold his shares before that time. At any rate up till recently he was the largest shareholder in a company with twelve directors. I do not think that a great deal of comment is necessary. It will, however, be necessary, if the House will bear with me, to read the correspondence, which itself is the best comment. I must read practically the whole of the correspondence, which comprises four or five letters. The first letter which I have here is written from the Admiralty War Staff on 18th April, 1916, as follows: Commander Leverton Harris presents his compliments to the Chief Censor and has been requested by Messrs. Harris and Dixon. Limited, of 81, Gracechurch Street, E.C., to ascertain whether any arrangement can be made whereby the present delay to their cables to and from Spain can be overcome. He understands that cables to Spain are delayed for about forty-eight hours, and as the messages sent by Messrs. Harris and Dixon mostly relate to freight and insurance rates the time taken to obtain a reply makes business practically impossible. Messrs. Harris and Dixon understands that there is a special list of firms whose cables are allowed to go through promptly, and ask if they can be pleased on this list. They are prepared to enter into any bond or guarantee that all their cables are innocent business messages. The outward cables are addressed to Harris, Bilbao, and inwards to Harris Dixon, London. My comment on that letter is, firstly, that it should not have been written as from a member of the Admiralty War Staff requesting preferential arrangements for his firm, and, secondly, I think there should have been a statement in that letter making it quite clear that the authority asking for this, namely, the right hon. Gentleman, was himself the most largely interested person in that firm. That is the only comment I desire to make on that letter. The second letter is dated 19th April, 1916. It is the reply from the Chief Censor and reads: The Chief Censor presents his compliments to Commander Leverton Harris, Admiralty War Staff, and with reference to his note of 18th April, 1916, preferring a request by Messrs. Harris and Dixon for preferential treatment in regard to their cable correspondence, begs to say that if the delay in telegraphic correspondence to Spain, which has been imposed at the special request of the French Government, is to remain effective, it is absolutely necessary to confine all exemptions within strict and well-defined limits. No exemptions from the delay have hitherto been made in the private interests of particular firms, and to give an exemption on those grounds would make it impossible to resist innumerable demands for similar treatment. If, however, Commander Leverton Harris gives an assurance that the firm's telegrams to Spain are mainly or largely on Government business, and that the delay is detrimental to national interests, the Chief Cable Censor will add the firm to the very limited number of those who now enjoy an exemption from the delay on similar grounds. The only comment I make on that letter is to point out the fact that it is impressed upon the applicant how necessary it would be, if this delay was to remain effective, to keep it within strictly defined limits. I would also point out, following what the right hon. Gentleman said to-day, that the Chief Censor at that time was certainly under the impression that no exemptions from delay had hitherto been made in the private interests of particular firms. The third letter is from the right hon. Gentleman to the Chief Censor and is dated 20th April, 1916: Commander Leverton Harris presents his compliments to the Chief Censor and begs to thank him for his communication C.C./5451 (M.I. 8) regarding the transmission of telegrams from and to Spain. Commander Leverton Harris has received the enclosed letter from Messrs. Harris and Dixon, Limited. Prom this it will be observed: (1) That the cables practically entirely relate to the chartering and insurance of Spanish steamers that are mainly carrying iron ore and food to this country or to the Allies. (2) That they are confined to communications between the firm Harris and Dixon, Limited, London, and Harris and Dixon, Bilbao, which is solely managed by an English manager. Under the circumstances Commander Leverton Harris feels no hesitation in stating that the delay in telegrams passing between the two houses is detrimental, and might be very detrimental, to national interests. If the Chief Censor should desire it, Commander Leverton Harris will gladly see proper authorities at the Board of Trade and Ministry of Munitions and have his opinion confirmed. He quite understands the difficulty of making exemptions in particular cases, but in this ease exemption is asked only for messages passing between two British houses. 5.0 P.M.

I have read that for the simple reason that the right hon. Gentleman read it at Question Time and desires that that point of view should be made perfectly clear. It is also necessary, although it does not add very much, for me to read the letter enclosed from Messrs. Harris and Dixon to the right hon. Gentleman: Cables with Spain. Dear Sir,—In reply to the communication you have received from the Chief Cenor's Department we would respectfully point out that the cables referred to are cables which are exchanged between this firm and our own house, trading in our name, situated in Bilbao, and: which is solely managed by an English manager. The cables practically relate to the chartering of Spanish steamers whose bona fides we are prepared to guarantee, and those charters are mainly for the purpose of engaging these Spanish steamers in carrying iron ore to this-country, in the conveyance of grain and other cargoes from neutral countries to this country and/or the countries of our Allies, and also to the insurance, principally against war risks and marine perils, of the steamers on these voyages and the necessary bunker supplies for the steamers to enable them to perform the voyage. We have found from past experience that the results of the serious delays in getting replies to our cables is that some of these friendly Spanish owners fix their steamers for other businesses and between neutral countries, because they find they have not to experience the delays in exchange of messages with this country and the uncertainty as to the possibility of insuring their interests and securing bunker coals when trading with this country or to our Allies. You will bear in mind that the Spanish owner has no Government war risks insurance scheme into which he can automatically place his steamers when trading to this country, and therefore he is dependent upon our war risk market, which, as you know, fluctuates violently from day to day. Of course there are occasions when he can fix these Spanish steamers with cargoes destined for their own country, Spain, which is neutral, but those fixtures from a minority.—Yours faithfully, Harris and Dixon. The next letter was a reply from the Chief Censor, dated 21st April, 1916: The Chief Censor presents his compliments to Commander Leverton Harris, and is issuing instructions to exempt telegrams exchanged between Harris and Dixon, London, and Harris and Dixon, Bilbao, from the usual delay. The next is a minute from the War Office, Whitehall, S.W., 21st April, 1916: Telegrams exchanged between Messrs. Harris and Dixon, Limited, of 81. Gracechureh Street, and Messrs. Harris and Dixon, Bilbao, will be exempt from the usual delay of forty-eight hours, as they refer mainly to the chartering of Spanish steamers for carrying goods to (the United Kingdom and Allied countries. Arthur Browne, Major A.S., Deputy Chief Censor.

Mr. P. A. HARRIS

Are these official documents, and, if so, how did they get into the hon. and gallant Gentleman's hands?

General CROFT

These documents are official, and they came into my hands. The important part of this letter is that it has the authority quoted at the bottom, and the authority quoted was the right hon. Gentleman himself. The last communication is: Commander Leverton Harris presents his compliments and begs to thank the Chief Censor for his communication, from which he notes that instructions are being issued to exempt telegrams exchanged between Harris and Dixon, London, and Harris and Dixon, Bilbao, from the usual delay. Admiralty War Staff, 22nd April, 1916. It will be seen from these letters that the present Secretary to the Blockade Department when a member of the Admiralty War Staff applied for special preferential facilities for a firm in which he was so largely interested, secondly, that the application was made from the Admiralty War Staff, and, I submit, ought never to have been made; thirdly, that the application, if granted, would give Messrs. Harris and Dixon priority over other competing firms so that they could select the cream of the freights offering and could pick and choose their cargoes, if that was so, obviously to the grave disadvantage of other firms; fourthly, the Chief Censor replied that if the delay in telegraphic correspondence to Spain, which has been proposed at the special request of the French Government, is to remain effective it is absolutely necessary to confine all exemptions within strict and well-defined limits. Further, he said that no exemption from delay had hitherto been made in the interests of private firms. It seems to me that this was a very emphatic statement which made it all the more necessary that a different course should have been pursued. The right hon. Gentleman went out of his way to take an unusual course. No one who is connected with any business whatever should in any official capacity have been permitted to send such a letter. Further, he submitted the letter without stating that he was connected with the firm, and it was most desirable that he should have mentioned that. We are not informed that the Chief Censor could have known it and certainly those in the Department need not have known it. Fifthly, the letter said if the right hon. Gentleman can give assurances that this business is mainly or largely Government business and that the delays are detrimental to national interests special facilities, etc., can be given. No such claim could be made. The whole of the shipping of this country is for the national interests at present. They are all equally concerned over such things as iron and feeding stuffs between the Allies and between this country and neutral countries. The right hon. Gentleman put it on the ground that refusal might be detrimental to the national interest. That is true of every single firm engaged in business at present. The final letter sanctioning the preferential treatment to Messrs. Harris and Dixon was signed by the Deputy-Chief Censor at the War Office, and the authority for this was the right hon. Gentleman himself. I make the specific charge that the right hon. Gentleman, whilst on the Admiralty War Staff, asked for and secured a great trade advantage to this firm with which he had very large connections, and from his official position he exercised influence. He was the authority actually quoted in the final decision. The Government must take action in this case. I hope there will be no attempt whatever to say that this is only a small thing. If we in this House condone what may be small matters in the outset of this description, which might run into enormous financial advantages, there is no hope that you are going to keep the administration in this country on pure lines. Unless we take our stand and say that this thing cannot go on we shall be failing in our duty, and I hope the Government will make no effort whatever to excuse it. We have had a great many vague charges made in recent times, which have been in some cases altogether unwise. The result is that when anything of this kind arises we naturally desire not to discuss it, but we have a duty as Members of this House and as representatives of our constituents, and we have a duty above all others, at this time, when the whole nation is engaged in this great struggle for its existence, that we should see that the standard and position of public life are maintained, and we should expose anything which we consider violates its traditions.

Mr. KING

I do not propose to follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman in dealing with what, though a serious matter, is one of minor importance. I propose to refer to the immense subject which has been so ably treated by my hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Wedgwood). He referred to the very striking words of the Leader of the Opposition on Tuesday last when he said he was unwilling to wipe Russia off the slate, and had no sympathy with that point of view which would say to the Russians, "You have failed us, therefore we will leave you to stew in your own juice." The applause and general sympathy with which that statement was received from all parts of the House demand that the Government should make some reply. We have had three days of Debate on this Vote of Credit, and it has not yet attempted any reply. I hope we shall not assent to the Third Reading of this Bill without some definite statement from the Government as to their policy and aims in this matter. I shall attempt a few criticisms on the past policy and the present position of the Government. I am glad to bear in mind the words of Lord Curzon, which he uttered before he was in office, on the value of criticism, when he declared that criticism during war was just as patriotic and much more useful than silence. I have always tried to carry out that maxim, and though I have not always been very successful, having in my attempt to deal with the Russian question suffered not only being counted out, being closured, being shouted down, having the Government move that my speech be delivered only in Secret Session, and various other incidents, which I need not particularise, I still feel that I have been, in the main, right on the lines I have taken about Russia, and it is because I am convinced that I have been in the main right and can point to my record in support of that that I propose to say a few words more.

The main line I will take up to-day is that our policy with regard to Russia in the past has been too much that of bribing or bullying, just as our policy, I believe, with regard to Irish recruiting at present has oscillated between bribery and bullying. We kept Russia in the War by promising Constantinople, and since she went out of the War we have been inclined to threaten and bully her, and, indeed, we have on many occasions actually bullied her representatives within our gates. I say that definitely, and I feel it strongly, and it can be supported by figures in connection with the recruiting of Russian aliens here. We have, or we had two years ago, within these islands, something like 25,000 Russian subjects of military age. We have, in one way or another, by voluntary or compulsory recruiting, brought about 5,000 of them into the Army. There are perhaps more. Some figures I have intimate that there might have been 8,000 of them brought into the Army. At any rate, large numbers have been brought in, but there is a constant agitation going on against Russian subjects now here who are not in the Army. Although Russia has gone out of the War, we are still continuing to press into our Army and the fighting forces the Russian subjects here. The Russian Government has protested against this conduct in view of the fact that Russia is no longer a belligerent and no longer in alliance with us. I think that policy needs some justification, but may I point out why I particularly condemn this treatment of the Russians within our gates? It is because we are not treating the other alien inhabitants at all on the same basis.

We have here some 13,000 Italians of military age, and capable of bearing arms. How many of these have joined the Army? Only 700, whereas you have probably 7,000 Russians—ten times as many from only twice the number. Of course, there is no agitation against the Italians, because it is not organised and incited by the Press. When you see throughout the Northcliffe and other Press constant agitation got up, you may know that it is part of the suggestion or policy of the Government. Moreover, look at this fact. The Russian Exemption Authority has granted about 1,500 exemptions from military service. How many exemptions has the Italian Ambassador granted? Over 3,000. With half the number of men to deal with, the Italian authorities have granted twice as many exemptions as the Russian, and the case is all the more grossly absurd when you come to think of this. The great majority of Russians here are engaged in two trades, the clothing trades, largely in khaki clothing manufacture, and the wood making—which is at the moment almost exclusively working on packing cases for the Army and such furniture as is required for hospitals, camps, etc. The Russians are working in two necessary trades; the Italians, on the other hand, are mostly cooks, waiters, confectioners, or those who carry on small shops of that class and are not at all engaged in necessary trades or trades in which women or unskilled persons could not take their places. I say, therefore, if you compare the treatment which has been meted out by our Government to the Italians and the Russians within our gates, you see that there has been a persistent attempt to bully the Russians here. For the last year and a half, ever since the Revolution, the policy, which had been one of bribery towards the Russian Government before—handing out any amount of ammunition, of monetary loans, assistance of all kinds and terms of vast territorial aggrandisement, like Constantinople and Northern Persia—the policy which we pursued of bribery to Russia before the Revolution has become one of bullying to Russia since. Let me support my contention by referring to another matter, the treatment meted out to two distinguished Russians here after the Revolution.

At the present time there are very few Russian politicians in power whose names are known—perhaps not more than a dozen. Two of these were recently prisoners within our gates. One of them is Mr. Petroff, who is now the Russian Ambassador to Vienna, and the other is Mr. Tchitcherine, who is the present Russian Foreign Secretary. Of course these men are Bolsheviks, and I am not here to defend them in any particular way, but I do want to point out that when they were here at the beginning of the War they were let alone. Mr. Petroff, indeed, was imprisoned before the Revolution broke out, but it was only after having been here for three years during the War that Mr. Tchitcherine was imprisoned. The treatment that both these men received—and remember they are men at the present time of authority and great influence in Russia—was pitiable. When I asked a question about Mr. Petroff's treatment here in the House the Home Secretary got up and made a statement that one of the reasons why he was interned was that he went about with a German woman. The fact, of course, was that he was married to a German lady, and when he went to Russia later on she was recognised as his wife. But the attempt of the Home Secretary was to ignore the fact that he was married to this woman, and to make it Appear that he was interned for having enemy associations. The whole meanness and absurdity of the Government in regard to the revolutionary Government can be seen in the pettiness of the way in which they persecuted this man. And now, of course, when our Ministers and representatives in Russia ought to be on good terms, at any rate personally, with these men, they have raised personal difficulties in the way of proper negotiation, and have created the suspicion, which is widely spread in Russia, that our country, our Government, and our policy are Imperialist, that they would deal with the Czar and his friends and his policy with a generosity, a wholehearted support which they deny to democratic and free Russia. The reason why I bring up a matter of past history in the way of criticism is that it points a practical suggestion at the present time. I strongly deprecate, and I think the Government ought to deprecate, the vile and unmeasured abuse which is being levied against revolutionary Russia and the leaders of the Revolution at the present time. They may be in manners, in policy, in social matters, and political ideas far away from us; they may be aliens in spirit to us, but, after all, we have got to live in the same world, and I believe that democratic Russia, different though it may be from us, is as worthy of our sympathy and support as was Czarist Russia.

That evidently is the opinion of President Wilson, who, not a fortnight ago, repeated what he had said previously, and has said in fact frequently, that it was the duty of America to stand by Russia at this time as much as it was the duty of America to stand by France or Great Britain. Are we taking steps to stand by Russia in the spirit of President Wilson's speech? I do not see that we are. I cannot imagine what the Government is doing to show it has either the will or intention or any power to act in this way. Possibly we shall hear later on, but almost every act in connection with Russia that is brought to our notice is at the same time one that will make us suspicious rather than support the policy of the Government. I must refer to another matter which I will do very briefly, the way in which our Government, after the Revolution, continued to pay and support the Ministers and representatives and servants of the Czar. We are at the present time supporting and paying here Czarist Ministers, Mr. Nabokoff especially, who have been repudiated by the Russian Government, and who have constant access to our Foreign Office here, while Mr. Litvinoff is not allowed to go anywhere near the Foreign Office, or was not a little while ago. If Mr. Nabokoff is paid by the Government at the present time, with no recognition whatever from the de facto Russian Government, the Russian people can only conclude that we want to turn their present Government out, that our aim is to interfere with the internal relations of Russia, and that we want to set back in power the Ministers whom we continue to pay and support. I mention this matter of history, which is present history, too, for this reason, that it suggests a course of action at the present time. I think what we ought to do at the present time is to ask Mr. Nabokoff to return to Russia or to go to some other country. I do not want in any way to involve him in imprisonment or suffering, and I would not send him to Russia, but the last thing we ought to do is to keep him here continuing his residence at a great house like the Russian Embassy and to continue to pay him his salary. We ought not to continue the salaries of officials of the Russian Government as we are doing. All these things are not helping; they are causing suspicion, irritation, unrest, and, if we are going to get at real relations with the Russian Government that will be helpful and enable us to do, something to strengthen that great territory with all its various inhabitants against German factors and military despotism, it must be by getting some means of contact, some better relations with the representatives of the Russian revolutionary party in power at the present time.

Let me mention one more fact, which will illustrate the impossible position and the unnecessary suspicion which the Government creates in Russia and amongst the Russians in favour of the Revolution. As no one is allowed to enter Russia at the present time without Mr. Litvinoff's passport, you cannot send a merchant to Russia, or a commercial mission like that which has lately gone there, without the signature of Mr. Litvinoff, and there are various other matters of a formal nature which make it absolutely necessary that there should be some sort of touch with the Bolsheviks. The communications, such as have been achieved, have been by means of a messenger, but so suspicious have been the Foreign Office and the Government that, up to recently, this gentleman has not been allowed to go to the Foreign Office. They refused to send communications out to his house, and it was represented to him that if papers were to pass from one party to another it would be necessary that he should meet their messenger somewhere in the street or at a public place, such as a restaurant. The result has been that you have had communications of a regular, unobjectionable and a necessary kind going on between the Russian representatives and our Government under such conditions that he has been unable, because he has not been allowed to go to the Foreign Office door, and he has had to meet a messenger somewhere in the street or elsewhere and deliver or receive papers. I am glad to say that has recently been mitigated, but surely it is indicative of the spirit which lies behind the Government in its relations towards the Bolsheviks?

The Bolsheviks may not have been our choice, but they are at the present time undoubtedly the choice of the people of Russia. When they came into power at the beginning of November, and every week since, Reuter's and the "Times" newspaper have been prophesying their speedy collapse, but I believe the best authorities and the best informed persons who know the state of Russia at the present time have no such anticipations as to the speedy collapse of the Bolshevik Government. It therefore becomes doubly important for us to get away from these old traditions of bad relations and try to treat the Russian people without suspicion, without irritation, and without injustice, on the same basis as we treat other nations, not by bullying, and not by way of penalising them for the disappointment which they have caused. I, therefore, come to the proposal which has been so well put forward by the hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme, that a Departmental Committee should be set up at the Foreign Office, and that, if possible, the right hon. Member the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Asquith) should be in the chair, and that that Committee should report as quickly as possible, after taking evidence from men of business, officials, and such Russians as would attend, on the best means by which we can get into closer and satisfactory relations with the Russian people. I believe that is a very admirable suggestion. At any rate, it is a practical one.

It may not be possible to recognise with all the formalities of established government the Bolshevik Government at the present time, but let me remind the Prime Minister that there are great volumes of opinion in favour of that course. One of the papers which has most strongly supported the Prime Minister in most of the matters of the War, the "Manchester Guardian," has for two months past urged that we should recognise the Bolshevik Government in Russia. Whether that is possible or not, I will not say, but, at any rate, it would have this advantage—that the present impossible condition would be brought to an end, under which our enemies, Germany and Austria, have their representatives at Moscow and the Bolsheviks have their representatives in Berlin and Vienna, while we have no representatives on either side. This impossible condition must come to an end, and I hope that, as this matter was raised nearly a week ago, the Government will be able to give some reply and will be able to tell us that they have a policy, well thought out, that will get the support of the Allies generally, and which will place our relations with Russia upon a new and increasingly satisfactory and a sounder basis.

Mr. PR INGLE

We are delighted to have the Prime Minister with us this afternoon, and it is gratifying to the House of Commons that he can spare from his arduous and exacting duties an hour of his valuable time in order to be present to listen to this Debate. We had hoped that, having come down for that period, he would have been able to intervene before now. Last Tuesday a very important Debate took place in this House, in the course of which, I think most hon. Members will agree, a good deal of valuable criticism was passed on the recent phases of warlike operations. A large number of very important and pertinent inquiries were addressed to the Government. A question was addressed to the Leader of the House as to whether he or the Prime Minister would reply to the criticisms and inquiries, and we were assured that although the reply would not be forthcoming in the course of that discussion that nevertheless on the Third Reading Debate a full reply would be available from the Government. It is obviously inconvenient to attempt to recapitulate the observations of all the speeches made last Tuesday, or in any way to cover the ground which was then gone over, but I think my right hon. Friend the Member for South Molton (Mr. G. Lambert) put in a very strong and clear way this afternoon a great many of the points which have exercised hon. Members in regard to the later phases of the War. We know, of course, the arrangement, for which the Prime Minister is himself very largely responsible, which was made in the first instance tentatively in November, in regard to the Versailles Conference. We were then told that it was only an advisory and not an executive body. There was a further arrangement in January, in which the Council which we had been assured was only advisory was made executive, and then we had what appeared to be a supersession of the Council altogether by the creation of General Foch as the supreme strategic officer—I think that is the right term, and not Generalissimo—in connection with the Allied forces in France.

This House is naturally concerned in regard to all these matters and as to the exact effect which they had had upon the force of the campaign. We are told, for example, that the Supreme War Council never really came into operation; that before the 21st March it had never, to use an American phrase, functioned at all. We should be very glad to be informed by the Prime Minister whether that is the case. A number of questions in regard to what is called unity of command were put in the speech of the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Roch). He asked what effect unity of command was having on the distribution of the British and French forces in the various parts of the line. That question is obviously very important from the point of view of British interests in many ways, not only in view of possibilities if the War takes an adverse direction, but in respect of a matter to which he made very special reference, and that was in regard to the arrangement for dealing with the wounded in the more recent push made by the Germans, which began on Whit-Monday. I think we are entitled to information on all these points. Another question upon which the right hon. Gentleman might give some information to the House is the much canvassed question of the strength of our Armies on the Western Front. I am not going to revive the controversy, which has been dealt with in several Debates, as to the comparative strength in our forces this year and last, and whether, for example, the 1st January this year and on the 1st January, 1917, are the right dates to take for the purpose of ascertaining the relative strength of the forces at the beginning of the respective campaigns. The real essential point, as my right hon. Friend opposite said, is the strength of the Army on the 21st March, and I think he raised a very important point in regard to that as to whether the recommendations of the General Staff with regard to the reinforcing of the Army had been carried out for the purpose of this campaign.

Up to the present we have been left very much in the dark on all these questions, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be able to throw some light upon them. There is another point which I am not sure was made in formal debate, but it is one of relevance, and that is the relative number of our men who are available for Infantry purpose and those who are engaged in other services in France. That is a question upon which men in this country are very anxious to be reassured, because at the present time you are calling up older men all over the country, and there is a great deal of anxiety as to the way in which these men are being called up. If that is so, I think that we should be assured that the men who are actually in the Army are being used in the most effective way possible. I have heard a statement made as to the proportion of Infantrymen as compared with the other Services which indicates that the proportion in our Army is smaller than in any other of the belligerent Armies on the Western Front. I do not know how far that matter has come before the War Cabinet. Some people who have these figures put to them are inclined to lay the whole of the blame upon the Higher Command in France, but I remember that this question was raised more than a year ago by the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Munitions, and at that time he addressed to the Government the advice that the Army should be told to comb itself. We are naturally anxious, now that the Government has no longer to face such a vigorous critic as the Minister of Munitions, to know whether the advice which he gave as an independent Member has been carried out since he joined its ranks. Undoubtedly, if it is true that the number of men who can take their place in the ranks as Infantrymen is so small as I have heard suggested, it is obviously the first duty of the Government to see that more adequate arrangements are made, more particularly in view of the measures which are being taken to call up men in this country.

There is one other question which I think should be answered by the right hon. Gentleman in relation to the calling up of the older men. When the last Man-Power Bill was introduced, both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the House gave us certain calculations as to the number of men who would become available under it. A certain number—I think something like 50,000—were to become available by the operation of the clean-cut. Then he told us that 7 per cent. of the older men were to become available for the Army, and we received varying estimates as to the numbers that were to come from Ireland. I am not going to discuss the merits of the Government action in regard to Ireland, but we were told that four or five divisions were to come from Ireland, and that these were absolutely necessary for the purpose of obtaining the essential reinforcements for the Army during the present campaign. It is obvious that they are not going to be forthcoming during this year. The question which I now wish to address to the Prime Minister is whether the deficiency caused by the failure to enforce Conscription in Ireland is being made up by making more exacting demands upon the older men than he contemplated before? I think that we are entitled to know that. Either the Government, by failing to enforce Conscription in Ireland, are not getting the necessary number, or they are getting the necessary number by another method, and the only other method available is to call up more of the older men. I want to know from the Prime Minister which of these alternatives the Government have adopted.] do not desire to stand any further between, the Prime Minister and the House. I hope that the rather disjointed observations which I have made will serve him as a peg on which to hang the speech for which he is so obviously in need of inspiration, and in the hope that it has achieved that purpose I will make way for the right hon. Gentleman.