NAVAL DEFENCE BILL.

HC Deb 06 May 1889 vol 335 cc1297-341

SECOND READING.

Order for second reading read.

Motion made and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."

MR. LABOUCHERE (Northampton)

Mr. Speaker, it is very refreshing after the heated excitement of an Irish debate to fall back into a discussion which only involves an expenditure of £10,000,000 and which is always conducted in a calm and quiet fashion. I respect those gentlemen who devote a great portion of their time and energy to inducing foreign countries to decide their differences by arbitration, and I trust that the seed they are sowing will produce, some time or other, a plentiful crop. But we must look on the actualities of the day. We have not yet reached the millennium. At the present moment the continent of Europe is one great armed camp, and I agree that we ought to provide for our safety by being ready to pay a fair and reasonable amount of what the Chancellor of the Exchequer the other day called fiscal insurance. But we ought to limit the burden of this fiscal insurance to what is sufficient for our safety, and not expend under the guise of fiscal insurance a large amount of money for offensive as well as defensive armaments. I have never known an armament proposed or a war undertaken which was not styled defensive; and in fact, to speak of the proposed increase in the Navy as defensive is as futile as the language of the Chief Secretary for Ireland when he spoke of his battering ram as a defensive weapon. The past history of the nation, which is a long record of meddling and annexation, justifies the people in placing no confidence in the declared defensive policy of a Government. In every war we have undertaken during the last three centuries we have meddled in matters which did not concern us, except in the case of the Spanish Armada, and then that was really a retaliatory attack upon us because of the depredations we at that time committed upon Spanish commerce. During the last forty years the country has spent, irrespective of the normal Budgets, £100,000,000 in useless wars. I have no confidence in the present Prime Minister, who is not a man likely to rise above the traditional folly and wickedness which has characterized this country in its relations with others. I thoroughly distrust him. Many distrust him in his home policy. I assure them they would do well to distrust him equally in his foreign policy. Two years ago he was writing despatches all over Europe imploring the European powers to join in a crusade against Russia, and to put Alexander of Battenberg on the Throne of Bulgaria. Again, we find him indirectly assuring Italy that if she would join in what Prince Bismarck called the League of Peace we would, under certain circumstances, aid her. And at the present moment what is a portion of our fleet doing? It is, at the demand of Bismarck, nominally preventing slaves being introduced into a portion of Africa, but in reality it is protecting German arms while they are destroying the property of British citizens. Yesterday a great function took place in France to celebrate the centenary of the States General. Where was the British Ambassador? He was not there. When France makes a great effort to maintain the peace of the world, we withdraw our Ambassador, and we ask for augmentation of the Fleet. The Times is regarded as the official organ of the Government, and therefore it is important to see how the Times met this proposed augmentation of the fleet. What did the ally or confederate of the Government say? On the 7th of March it said:— The Protean Eastern Question has again assumed a disquieting aspect. It is idle to pretend that we may safely ignore the disturbances thus threatened. We may hug non-interventions as closely as we please; but whether we like it or not, our interest will be more or less directly involved in any struggle that may take place. Unless we are in a position to say "hands off" to all the world, these interests will be deliberately made a part of the prize of success in quarrels, with which we desire to have nothing to do. According to the Times we are increasing our Navy in order to place Lord Salisbury and his colleagues in a position to interfere in the Eastern Question. The House should warily and cautiously look into the proposal put before it. For every single decade the country's normal expenditure upon armaments has increased by leaps and bounds. In 1881, the Budget for armaments was, for the Army £14,680,000, and for the Navy £10,581,000. In 1888 the Budget for the Army was £18,429,000, and for the Navy £12,325,000. This year the House is asked for an addition of £1,500,000 in the normal Budget for the Army and Navy. The value of the Fleet is put down at £35,500,000, and for building a yearly sum of £2,650,000 is granted, while the annual depreciation of the Navy is £1,850,000. Therefore, as the expenditure for building and repairs is to continue until 1895, every year during the interval there will be an increase in the effective force of the Navy equal to £800,000—that is to say, that in 1895 the Fleet will be worth £39,500,000. The House is, however, asked for an expenditure of an additional £10,000,000, which will increase the prospective value of the Fleet to £49, 500,000. Now, it is obvious that the amount of depreciation in the Fleet would increase proportionately with its value; and, to maintain the new standard, a much larger amount will have to be spent annually than is necessary at present. The first Lord of the Admiralty told the House that the new standard of the Fleet was that it should be equal to any two navies in the world. I was shocked when I heard a Minister of the Crown make such a declaration. I have no doubt the hon. and gallant Admiral (Admiral Field) would have supported the First Lord of the Admiralty if he had asked for double the amount. [Admiral FIELD: Hear, hear!] I thought so, but I am not a quarterdeck politician, and therefore I was shocked. This was really a gauntlet thrown down to Europe, threatening, in effect, that "whatever you spend we will spend double." Perhaps some hon. Gentlemen opposite are acquainted with the game of poker. Great Britain is playing a game of poker with all Europe, ships of war being the stakes. It is perfectly avowed that we are throwing down the gauntlet. Lord Armstrong is an authority on this subject. Two or three days ago I was reading an article in the Nineteenth Century, written by Lord Armstrong, in which he suggests that, in order to frighten the world and show them what thorough devils we are, we should spend £20,000,000 instead of £10,000,000. Is it not reasonable to suppose that foreign nations are likely to accept our challenge? We propose to build as much as France and Russia together. I think the only result will be that there will be some sort of alliance between France and Russia, and that they will build against us, or it is very possible that France will do so alone. The noble Lord the Member for Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford) says we want a sufficient force to blockade every port of France, and to sweep the flag of France off the sea. I wonder whether France will say "We must increase the number of our ships to meet your threat." If France does this, is this country to go on increasing its Fleet? If so, where is such a policy likely to end? In my judgment, estimates based on the power and the number of ships of other countries are always erroneous. Since the First Lord of the Admiralty propounded his scheme, the estimate he gave to the House has been found to be erroneous, because since then the Sultan has gone down. I expected the noble Lord to come forward and say "I must ask the House for an additional sum of money to replace the Sultan." If any one wishes to see the absurdity of pitting our Navy against a combination of other countries, it will be seen in what the Continental Powers did with reference to their armies. Russia was supposed at one time by Austria to be increasing her army; Austria followed suit; Germany increased her army because of the action of Austria, but the final result of these tactics was that each Power remained in precisely the same position and as though no increase had been made. I therefore assert that in the present state of European politics it will be found absolutely impossible to maintain a numerical superiority over any two nations, and to declare that no matter what other Powers build, this country will build double the number. This standard of taking a number of ships equal to that of two Powers is a new one. In the last century we had many naval wars. Spain and France were the great naval Powers of Continentals Europe then, but at no time was our navy equal to the navies of France and, Spain united. We had always tried to have a navy equal to that of France. In 1859 we entertained the same views, because in a pamphlet entitled, "Observations on Modern Systems of Fortification," I find that Sir Howard Douglas wrote:— The steam fleet of France has, during the last 10 years, been in a state of progressive augmentation, the Government of that country having steadily acted upon the recommendations proposed in the Enquête Parlementaire (1849), and is now equal, if not superior, to that of Great Britain. Then, Sir Robert Peel said— What is the advantage of one Power greatly increasing its Army and Navy? Does it not seem that other Powers will follow its example? The consequence of this must be that no increase of relative strength will accrue to any Power, but there must be universal consumption of the resources of every country in military preparations. I quote these views in order to show that at that time there was no idea of having a Fleet equal to two of the Great Powers, but only superior to the Fleet of France. And what Sir R. Peel said I and my friends are saying now. We hold to the traditions which governed the conduct of the best, wisest, and most Conservative statesmen of this country. But why do the Government limit the number to two Powers—why do they not say three? If Italy or Germany were to join France and Russia we might as well submit at once, and say that we were vanquished. It would be more logical for right hon. Gentlemen who proposed this doctrine of equal numbers to suggest that our Navy should be equal and superior to the Navies of the entire world. That is the logical outcome of their proposition. Sir Arthur Hood, First Naval Lord, told the Committee on Naval Estimates, "Our Navy is superior to any two navies."

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord G. HAMILTON, Middlesex, Ealing)

Did he say any two nations?

MR. LABOUCHERE

I have quoted the words used by the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone (Lord C. Beresford).

LORD C. BERESFORD

I never said that.

MR. LABOUCHERE

Well, that is the report I have of the noble Lord's statement. Sir Anthony Hoskins said— I am an advocate for building in such a way as to establish a sufficient superiority to any two nations when combined, and I think that we are doing this. The Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Ashmead Bartlett), on April 25th, at Liverpool, said— He had stated more than once that the British Navy never in peace was better prepared for war than it was at present, and that numerically and in character we were superior to any other two nations. The lessons, however, of the manœuvres had shown that the extent of our superiority, in the minds of responsible naval officers, was not so great as to insure our supremacy so absolutely and unquestionably as it ought to be. I take this extract from a précis in the Times, and I claim the hon. Gentleman as a supporter of the views I am now advocating — namely, that our Navy is strong enough. In reality, the scheme proposed is to make our Navy equal to four of the greatest navies in Europe. In the last Returns given by the Admiralty I find that there were 91 armoured and protected ships, exclusive of ships obsolete in type and speed. In 1894, taking the existing number of ships, ships building and projected, France would have 62 ships and Russia would have 31 ships—a total of 93. There is no deduction for ships obsolete in type and speed, but with that deduction our present Navy is equal and superior to the fleets that France and Russia will have in 1894. If deductions be made for obsolete ships the four great navies of Europe only equal unitedly the Navy which the House is asked to vote for, which is to come into existence in 1894. Really this policy of building a Navy to outnumber the four great navies of Europe is not only a recklessly expensive doctrine, but is the doctrine of a nation in. its decadence. There have only been four great naval battles in history—Salamis, Actium, Lepanto, and Trafalgar. Probably the Civil Lord of the Admiralty never heard of them. I shall be glad to tell the Civil Lord privately, afterwards, when they were fought, but he may take it from me now that they did take place, and the victory was in. every case on the side of the navy that was the smaller; therefore, it is not proved that mere weight of ships was to carry everything before it. Lord Brassey cited some observations of the French Deputy, M. Menard Dorien, on what constituted the supremacy of England:— Picture to yourselves the results of the first encounter between hostile fleets. It is probable that both sides will be ill-prepared to renew the engagement. With whom will then the supremacy of the seas remain? With the nation possessing the greatest industrial resources; with that Power which shall be the first to replace the fleet destroyed by the rapid construction of another fleet. Therefore it is that the true strength of England lies in her creative resources. Her yards occupy a position more secure from attack than ours. It is not in our power to create seaports like those of England, far up navigable rivers, combining facility of access from the sea with advantages for the purposes of defence of an inland station. Now let us take a standard of our requirements which seems a more reasonable standard. What are those requirements said to be? To enable our Navy to protect our shores from invasion, and to protect our commerce. This danger of invasion is aired at every moment. We are asked to think what a terrible thing it would be, a foreign army in England, and we are asked, will you refuse to vote a sum of money to save us from this invasion. [Cries of "No."] Sir Arthur Hood says "No," but he said this on April 11th this year:— As to the statement that no organisation existed in preparation for war, he would merely point to the fact that, last July, 68 ships of war were assembled in all respects ready for service within five days of the order being issued from the Admiralty; and in the naval manœuvres this year the number of vessels would be largely increased. As to the suggestion of our fleets being crushingly defeated in the Channel and the country laid open to invasion, he failed to realise for a moment why our superior fleets should meet with a result so widely different from all their glorious traditions. As bad been shown, we could in five days assemble a fleet of 68 vessels ready for service, and with such a fleet and our armoured coast defences, and with a large number of gunboats and torpedoes in reserve which could be maintained at any threatened point, he thought that the scare of invasion might be allowed to drop without further comment. After that I do not think that any gentleman will contend that this great expenditure is asked for as necessary to defend our shores when we have from the first authority, that of Sir Arthur Hood, a clear and distinct statement only a few days ago that the present Navy is amply sufficient to defend our shores against such danger without withdrawing any ships from the numerous squadrons we have in all parts of the world. Then I come to the protection of our commerce. Now there is an idea entertained by some hon. Mem- bers opposite, of making the ocean as safe as the county of Kent if we were engaged in war. It is a perfect chimera; it is an impossibility; it can never exist. Some days ago I was reading something said by Lord Wolseley, who, of course, is a little jealous of this augmentation of the Navy ["No, No."]—Yes, he holds that we might spend this, but we should also spend a great deal on the Army, in case we do have an enemy on our shores; and then Lord Wolseley wants to be there to defend us again. Lord Wolseley pointed out that our naval superiority after the battle of Trafalgar was unquestioned, and yet within a few weeks of that victory 20 ships of our mercantile marine were captured by French ships of war in the Channel. It is asserted that it is far more easy at the present time to defend our mercantile marine than it was in those because of the difficulty of the enemy's cruisers getting coal. This has been asserted again and again by the advocates of increased naval expenditure. Now there is no greater illusion than this about coal supply. I am very sorry that hon. Gentlemen have not devoted some time to the International Law on the subject. It is no merit in me that I have done so, for I was brought up in the Diplomatic Service and was obliged to learn with a view to passing examinations. I will venture to give the House some of the results of my studies. I have seen it asserted again and again that, provided we blockade the ports of France or Russia, or any other country with whom we may happen to be at war, even if the enemy's cruisers escape, they could not get coal, and, therefore, could do us no damage. As a matter of fact, a belligerent ship may put into any neutral port to refit, but not to equip. In 1859, during the Franco-Austrian War, Her Majesty's Government forbade contraband of war, but declined specificially to say whether coal was contraband of war, but only asserted that the carriage of coal might be so in some cases, and, therefore, those who engaged in the carriage, must do so in view of the risk they undertook. In the House of Lords there was a debate upon it, and Lord Granville explained the case. If coal was sent to a port whore there were war steamers with a view of supplying them, the coal became contraband. But nobody ever asserted that coal in Situ so to speak in a neutral port, may not be sold by a private individual to a belligerent ship. We had an exposition of what the law is laid down so recently as 1885, at the time of the war between France and China, in a despatch from Earl Granville to M. Waddington, in which the then Foreign Secretary said:— I have requested Her Majesty's Secretary of the Colonies to inform the Governors of Her Majesty's colonies of Hongkong, Ceylon, and the Straits Settlements that, while carrying out the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act as to equipment, they are not to interfere with any shipments of coal made in the way of trade, and having the character of a commercial transaction. Therefore, I hope I have distinctly shown that it is a delusion to suppose that we are in any better position now, owing to our having a steam fleet to protect our commercial marine, than we were when we had only sailing vessels. We have no more advantages, because the enemy's cruisers can follow our mercantile marine and can obtain coal where they please. The question, however, is of no great importance, because, as a matter of fact, we should have no marine to defend within a couple of weeks after au outbreak of war with any of the great European Powers. That is owing to the Treaty of Paris, in which we assented to the doctrine that free ships make free goods." This simply means that neutrals may convey to the ports of a belligerent everything that is not contraband of war without chance of being captured by the other party, whereas the belligerent itself could not convey to its own ports anything, whether contraband or not, without the chance of capture. The effect of this would be that if we were at war, say, with France, the rate of insurance on British bottoms would be far higher than the rate on neutral bottoms, and the result would be that all our carrying trade to our own ports would he done by neutrals and not by us. It would not he the slightest use for us to blockade foreign ports, because the mere chance of the prospect of capture would be sufficient to send up the rate of insurance on British bottoms higher than that on neutral bottoms, and we should have a result similar to that of the American Civil War. The Confederates had but one or two cruisers that managed to get on the sea from neutral ports, and the United States lost the whole of their carrying trade, which fell principally into our hands. It is asserted that belligerents in all probability would not hold to the Treaty, and that we are not forced to abide by it. [An hon. MEMBER: It is not a Treaty.] Call it an agreement or what you will—a Declaration, I think, is the term. It was in the course of the negotiation of the Treaty of Paris that the Declaration was made to which we, with other Governments adhered, that "free ships should make free goods." Hon. Gentlemen have asserted that belligerents may not stand by the Declaration, and possibly, if it was not to their interest they would not; but do not hon. Gentlemen perceive that it may be impossible for the belligerent to avoid it, because they would immediately have the neutrals to deal with, for it would be for the interest of neutrals to maintain the principle of "free ships, free goods." Suppose we had a war with France and Russia, our carrying trade would in that case be transferred to the United States, which would then become the great carrying power of the world. Do you suppose that in that case the United States would consent to France and Russia throwing over the principle of "free ships, free goods"? Not a bit of it; on the contrary, they would insist on free ships being able to go into any of the ports of the world without hindrance or capture; and if France or Russia were to try to capture any of the ships then sent abroad, depend upon it, the United States would very soon join us in opposing them. Hon. Gentlemen may say the United States were not parties to the Declaration of Paris. Well, Sir, it was not necessary that they should have been because they have always laid down the principle of "free ships, free goods"; and they have announced to both France and Russia that from their view of the matter, free ships are to be regarded as free goods. And why was it the United States would not sign the Declaration of Paris? It was because the United States had proposed that the provision should be extended, and that no private property at sea should be liable to capture at sea. That was called the Massy Amendment, and while all other nations agreed to it there was only one which opposed it. What was that nation? It is England which has always been on the wrong side in such matters. We are the people who would reap more advantage from it than any other country, and yet it is entirely owing to our action that the principle thus recommended was not agreed to by the entire civilized world. So certain is it on these facts that we should have absolutely no sort of commerce if we went to war with any great naval power, that the facts have been met only by two arguments; and I will take the two arguments as used by the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford). I would first say that I can assure the noble Lord, if this were a question of seamanship, and we were really about to be invaded, I should desire nothing better than that he should be at the head of our Fleets, as I am convinced that all which naval ability and knowledge could do the noble Lord would do to defend us; but at the same time I know that the noble Lord and his friends would have no confidence in me if I should be planed in such a position as that. The noble Lord may, therefore, understand what slight confidence I have and the House has in his legal powers. He will perhaps excuse me for saying that I regard him as what is called a "sea lawyer" in relation to these questions; as one, in fact, who does not know much about the law, The noble Lord told us that the total steam tonnage of the world is eleven millions; that of this we have seven millions, and that as it would be impossible to transfer any portion of our seven millions to neutrals in case of war, we should be obliged to provide for the defence of our own commerce, because the three millions or so of the rest of the world would not be enough to bring us food. The error of that is this—that any Englishman having a trading ship would have a perfect right, if we were at war with France or any other country, to transfer it to an American citizen, as absolutely as he now has the right to sell a pair of boots or anything else. Nowhere else but in this House could it be laid down that in case of war an individual citizen of a belligerent state has not a right to sell a mercantile ship to a neutral friend. The other point the noble Lord attempted to make was that food is contraband of war. Where, I should like to know, did the noble Lord get that doctrine from?

LORD C. BERESFORD

I referred to the case of rice.

MR. LABOUCHERE

The noble Lord is entirely mistaken. Food is not contraband of war, unless destined for a besieged town or some place like Malta to victual the ships. It is true that we have tried to make food contraband of war, because when at one time we had the supremacy of the sea, we misused it in order to bully neutrals. In the year 1793 we nearly went to war with the United States who protested against this doctrine. During the Peninsular War, in our long war with Napoleon, the armed neutral Powers held their own against our making the food of foreign countries contraband of war. We have entered into many treaties with other countries, and I defy the noble Lord to show me any one of those treaties in which it is laid down that food is contraband of war. The noble Lord has just said he took his idea that food was contraband of war from the case of France, in regard to her war with China in 1885. Well, what was it that then happened? In that year France being at war with China declared rice to be contraband of war, in the case of ships sailing to the northern Chinese ports, on the ground of the Chinese armies there; but Lord Granville absolutely denied their right to enforce this doctrine. Ultimately France put her claim on this ground: that it was suggested that some of the shipments of rice intended for China were in the nature of a tribute or subsidy to the Court of Pekin, and that under these circumstances rice ships must be stopped, leaving it for a Prize Court to decide whether the rice was public or private property; that is to say that France believed that the Court at Pekin was obtaining certain tributes of rice, and claimed that her vessels might stop rice ships running to the northern ports in order that they might be taken to a Prize Court to decide whether the rice was public or private property. But that is hardly a declaration that food is contraband of war. To this Lord Granville replied that he protested against rice being treated generally as contraband of war, and he stated that Her Majesty's Government would not consider itself bound by the decree of any Prize Court which should uphold a contrary doctrine. I think I have now conclusively shown certain facts. I have shown that at the present moment we have absolute security from invasion, and my witnesses have been Sir A. Hood and other men of weight and authority. I have also shown that our fleets are superior to those of any other naval Power, and my witness in this case has been the Secretary to the Admiralty. I have further shown that if we adopt the plan suggested by the Government, our naval force should not only he made superior to that of any two, but of any four, of the great naval Powers, and my witness to that has been the Government Returns. I have also shown, looking at International Law.—and on this point I could quote Grotius, and others, by the hour, if necessary,—that if we went to war we should have food and raw material brought to us in neutral ships, and that whether we blockade the ports of our enemy or not, we should absolutely, owing to the effect of a differential rate of insurance on our own and neutral bottoms, lose our carrying trade, and, therefore, have no commerce to defend. Now, Lord Salisbury admits all this, being, as he is, an exceedingly able Gentleman. A few days ago Lord Salisbury went down to Bristol and there he was defending this proposal for increasing our Navy. But how did he defend it? He pointed out that we are menaced by a new danger. inasmuch as there is a sort of powerful necromancer—William Ewart Gladstone—who may induce the country to consent to the pernicious plan of Home Rule. And what would be the effect of this? It would be, if we did not assent to the present scheme, that we should have to fight not only our foreign enemies, but Ireland also—that great fleets would be collected in the Irish ports; and consequently he urged the Bristol people to consent to an increase of the Navy, because, if they did not, Bristol might in a short time—you see, he evidently thinks that Home Rule will come—be attacked by an Irish Navy. I say there is no doubt that at the present moment our Navy is amply sufficient for our requirements. The Secretary to the Admiralty observed admirable good sense by insisting on this last year. I should have been glad if he had insisted on it this year, and I only regret that he should have succumbed to the advice of certain distinguished Naval Officers who assert that our naval superiority is not so absolute and certain that it is not desirable to propose a great increase of our Navy. But even admitting for a. moment that it is desirable that we should increase our Navy, there are still a great many objections to the present scheme for securing that increase. I will only enter upon a few of them. The mode of raising the money is in itself most objectionable, and enough to lead every reasonable man to vote against the proposal of the Government for binding future Parliaments; because it is thought that if this Bill should be passed the House of Commons of the future cannot refuse to carry the scheme out. We are dependent on the action of the House of Lords, in which, of course there will always be a permanent and safe majority in favour of any proposal of the present Government, and I object to anything that will pledge the future House of Commons to such an expenditure unless this measure is repealed. Another objection to this scheme is that it is far too large; in the present state of science armaments speedily become useless. In fact we we are now in what I may call a transition stage. Sir Arthur Hood said in reply to a somewhat jingo speech made by the President of the Royal Academy last Saturday, that "it was desirable we should ensure that the vessels of the different classes to be built shall be decidedly superior in all respects to any vessels of similar types built or building abroad." Now, just see what the expense of that would be. Suppose we build ships larger than those abroad other nations will in turn build vessels like them, and we shall then have to build others larger still. This idea is absurd, and, moreover, I think that if we are to spend money on a large increase of our Navy the present moment is badly chosen. We have had a great period of depression in the shipbuilding, trade. In March, 1888, there were 380, ships building with a total capacity of 594,000 tons; there are now 528 building, with a total capacity of 920,000 tons—a far larger number than last year. It is probable that too many ships will be built and there will be a renewed depression in the trade. Would it not have been wiser to have waited a while? Past history shows us, and everything shows us, how little confidence we ought to have in these large expenditures which are periodically asked for. The House will remember the large amount Lord Palmerston asked for and expended in the fortification of the Channel Islands, and then there were £5,000,000 asked for by Lord Northbrook, as to which nobody has yet discovered where it went. [Cries of "Oh."] Hon. Gentlemen cry "Oh," but they should remember that I am speaking of a Liberal First Lord of the Admiralty. We have come to the conclusion that a great deal of that five millions was absolutely wasted. I will go even further. In 1885, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. Gladstone) asked for eleven millions for the Army and Navy. Of this, two-and-a-half millions were handed over to the Admiralty. Does any one know what became of that? [Cries of "Oh."] An hon. Gentleman again says "Oh "; I will enlighten him as to whore a portion of it went. The Auditor General says he cannot make out where most of it went, but he finds that a considerable sum went in buying cables and selling them again for about one-third of what they cost; that some of the money went in decanters and some in stew pans for the officers' messes. I tried to find out where the money went, and that is all I did find; anyhow, the fact that the Auditor General could not find it out ought to make us exceedingly careful in granting these large sums. Let us remember what happened two years ago. At that time, the noble Lord the Member for Paddington, was Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of this House, but he found the extravagance and waste of the Admiralty so great, so scandalous and outrageous, that he honorably preferred to withdraw from the Government and cease to be the Leader of the House and Chancellor of the Exchequer, than accept the responsibility of that expenditure. Last year, a Committee was appointed to look into the Navy Estimates, and that Committee agreed with the noble Lord and found that the expenditure was gross, scandalous, and profligate. [Cries of "No."] I maintain that it did, that being the conclusion I draw from the evidence and the opinion of everybody except my hon. Friend, who shakes his head; and when I say that he has been in the Admiralty I may add that, like others in a similar position, he has lost every vestige of independence in these matters. But, Sir, I say that Gentlemen who are not here to support either old or new Admiralty officials are the best judges; you know that your own Chancellor of the Exchequer accused you of waste and profligate expenditure, and when we have now a Royal Commission sitting to try and put an end to or cheek these monstrous and profligate demands, you certainly ought to check these profligate wasters of eleven-and-a-half millions sterling, at least until that Commission has presented its Report. There is another reason why we should wait, and it is that because by doing so we shall be able to increase the Navy, should it be necessary, from the normal Budget of the year. At the present moment we have 30,000 soldiers in Ireland. What for? Not to defend Ireland against foreign aggression, but to defend it against the Irish people—to defend landlords from their tenants. It will be admitted that it would not be necessary to keep those men there if the Irish people were not, as the Chief Secretary had said, in a state of revolt, but pacified, quiet, and contented. In case of war we could not withdraw a single one of those men, but might have to increase the British garrison there. We should absolutely neutralize the feeling which keeps those 30,000 men in Ireland if we only gave the Irish Home Rule. And when we Liberals come in we mean to give them Home Rule. As this would save three millions per annum on the Budget we ought to wait till the Liberals come in, when, if they think it necessary to increase the Navy, they can do so. What did Sir William Maitland say? Why, that when we were seeking everywhere for troops to fight Napoleon we had during the whole time 60,000 men in Ireland, and were obliged to keep them there because Ireland was so misgoverned that it was disaffected. I must refer to one more plea for this proposal, which seems to be the climax of absurdity. Let hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House who are devoted to political economy hear what Lord Armstrong says on that subject. In defending this expenditure he says:— The money required for the purpose is nothing to a nation which like ours is possessed of superabundant means. All the money required would be spent in the country, None would be withdrawn from productive industry, seeing that the capital and labour are far in excess of our requirements. It is the working classes who would especially benefit by the expenditure, as the wage fund would thereby be increased, and this chiefly at the expense of the wealthy. The shipowners, of whom Lord Armstrong is one, would be benefited. I yield to no man in my desire for the safety of this country; I desire to see the country safe and respected. Why should an hon. Member shake his head at this? Does he suppose anyone in this House wishes to see a foreign army careering about this country? Or that, if we thought this expenditure necessary we should not readily vote it? But I tell the Government that what they ought to do to make the country secure should be to maintain the Navy at its present point of efficiency, which the Secretary to the Admiralty says is greater than at any previous time of peace, and not throw down the gauntlet to all Europe with the braggadocio of saying "If any other country builds one ship we will build two." Also let them give up the habit of meddling with European policy, and of annexing every territory they can put their hands on. Our relations to our Colonies are most peculiar. They are willing to remain with us and to aid us in our defence if we should be really attacked; but I doubt whether they would remain with us and assist us if we plunged into a great European War through our own fault, as in the case of our going to war, as Lord Salisbury proposed, to put some German Prince on some throne in the Peninsula. We are told by the opposite Party that we ignore our position as an Imperial country; that our views with regard to our foreign relations are petty and paltry; but the fact is that we take a far larger view of our position than Gentlemen on the other side of the House. We on this side of the House believe that we are not merely a European Power, but that we are so strong that we can afford not to be frightened every moment at what is taking place in Europe, and ought not to be making treaties and engagements to maintain the balance of power. We believe that these matters do not affect us, and that we ought to give up the idea that we are a mere European country, which is bound to mix itself up in all sorts of questions, because, if we do this, we shall inevitably lose our Colonies. I would suggest that Her Majesty's Government should call together a European Conference, and should propose to it three points—first, that private property at sea should be safe from capture unless it be contraband of war; secondly, that it should be defined by common consent what is contraband of war, and under what circumstances it is contraband of war; and thirdly, that it should settle the position as to belligerent warships when in neutral harbours. If these three points were settled, there would be exceedingly little chance of war; at any rate the chance would be minimized and the safety of the country would be far more assured than it is likely to be by the building of an excessive Navy, thereby exciting the distrust and jealousy of other European Powers. If we were to call together such a Conference as that, should we be listened to, having laid it down that we must have a Navy as great as those of any four Naval Powers of Europe? Why, that would prejudice the whole question. For my part, I should be sorry to see the absolute supremacy at sea which some desire. The European Powers would view such a supremacy with as great objection as the other Powers of Europe would view an absolute military supremacy on the part of any one of them. In the view of these enormous naval preparations, how could we urge other Powers to a general disarmament? The first thing they would say to us would be that we should begin the disarmament by reducing our own Navy. We should answer, "Not in the least; we have a right to a Navy as large as all your navies combined; Britannia rules the waves and ought always to rule the waves." Naturally, then, foreign Powers would say, "Suit your precept to your example, and then we will listen to those perpetual suggestions you are making to us as to disarmament and the blessings of peace." Look at the United States. They have a small Navy. [An hon. MEMBER: They are 3,000 miles away.] But this country has voted money to protect the coasts of Australia, which are farther away than those of the United States. The reason the United States have no Navy is because they do not meddle with other people. They meddle with nobody, and nobody meddles with them. If anyone should meddle with them, Americans are rich and powerful enough to make them rue it. This country has a hard fight to maintain its position in the markets of the world; and in the keen commercial competition of modern times this additional burden of taxation will be a serious hindrance. I can only regret that the most powerful voice which has ever been heard in this House in favour of peace is now hushed, as I am sure that Mr. Bright would have protested in the strongest terms against this extravagant outlay on armaments. Far better would it be than all the eloquent tributes which have been paid to that great statesman if we were to profit by the lessons which he impressed with so much weight and wisdom upon his fellow-countrymen. I move that the Bill be read a second time this day six months.

Amendment proposed to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words, "upon this day six months."—(Mr. Labouchere.)

Question proposed "That the word 'now' should stand part of the Question."

SIR W. LAWSON (Cumberland, Cockermouth)

I rise to second the proposal of the hon. Member. This Bill, as we all know, is a Bill for the granting to Her Majesty's Government of £21,000,000 for the building of seventy new ships; and the preamble of the Measure says that we shall grant the money cheerfully. Well I must say I shall grant it with the greatest reluctance, repugnance, and distrust; and I do not think those who are most enthusiastic in supporting the naval policy of the Government can feel cheerful when called on to vote this money. What is it for? Against whom is this proposed increase of our Navy directed? Avowedly against nations who are, we are told, most friendly to this country. It is most humiliating at this period of the world's history to find nations so jealous of one another that whilst we are told they are on friendly terms we find them getting up these great armaments against each other. We all remember that the Queen said in her speech at the opening of Session: "Nothing has taken place to affect the cordial relations between myself and other Powers." Now on the introduction of the Bill I asked the first Lord of the Admiralty against which of the Powers of Europe these preparations are to be made. All the noble Lord said in reply was, "We have heard all this before." But can the noble Lord not bear to hear anything twice? Does he never go to church, where the same thing is said over and over again? The question is not whether I say anything new, but whether I say anything that is true. I say again that I oppose this proposal so persistently because I regard it as a preparation for war. This increase of the Navy is the best way of promoting bad feeling and danger instead of peace. The late Prime Minister only lately wrote one of the best and shortest letters he ever wrote in acknowledging Mr. Dymond's "Essay on War." It was as follows:— I thank you, and am glad that the advocates of peace are active, for militarism is the most conspicuous tyrant of the age, and it is the road to war. If we could only get that into the heads of the people, we should do great good. I am not ashamed to say that I believe that all these great naval standing armaments are nothing more than standing nuisances. But I do not want to argue from that position. I do not wish to be regarded—as were Mr. Bright and Mr. Cobden very unjustly during the Crimean War—as an advocate of peace at any price. I desire to speak on the merits of the case as it stands at present, and on the real necessity of adequately protecting this country. No case has been made out for this extra expenditure, either in the changed circumstances of Europe or in the altered conditions of the Navy. I ask whether the evidence is not sufficient to prove that the Navy is sufficient for all that even Gentlemen opposite want to do. Lord Cross, speaking at Newbury on the 10th of April, said:— By our naval supremacy we shall be able to give effect to the policy which is ours to-day, and by which we are going to insure the peace of Europe and the prosperity of the world, and of all civilization. What an extraordinary idea! The noble Lord, who was responsible for the Government of 200 millions of people, appears to be a little off his head on this matter. Then the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone (Lord C. Beresford) said that our Navy ought to be as strong as any two navies in the world. But is it not so already? It was only two years ago, at the Royal Academy Banquet, that the First Lord of the Admiralty spoke of the Fleet which was about to engage in the Jubilee Review as the greatest which had ever been reviewed by a Sovereign in time of peace. I should like to enter a protest against these Naval Reviews. It is only a short time since the Times' Berlin correspondent wrote as follows:— A great impression has been made on the Emperor by the fact that the House of Commons has now in effect voted the addition of 70 ships of war to the British Navy, and Ills Majesty has followed the debates on the subject with the deepest interest. The Chauvinists—that is to say the Jingoes of Germany—were flattering themselves that their steadily increasing fleet, the wonderful creation of the last 18 years, was gradually beginning to bring Germany alongside of England as a naval Power. But the prospect of this sudden and enormous accession of strength to the British Navy has rather taken away their breath and make them pause in their calculations. The Emperor himself, too, is not unaffected by this feeling of surprise: but he is animated by an earnest ambition to emulate, to some extent the example of England, and doubtless the ambition will only be stimulated by the monster naval review at Spithead in July, to which His Majesty is looking forward as one of the greatest treats and compliments which are awaiting him in England. We were getting up this Fleet for a naval review which the Emperor of Germany was to attend in order that he might pick up a hint as to how he could fight us if ever he wished to do so. It does not seem to me that that was a very sensible proceeding. In May, 1885, a glowing description of our navy was delivered by the hon. Member for Barrow (Mr. Caine). The hon. Member, speaking in Cheshire, said:— He would assume then that, so far as the Navy was concerned, it was not in the history of our country in a more efficient condition than it was to-day. Our Navy was stronger than that of any two Powers combined. When the shipbuilding programme of the Government was complete It would be as strong as that of any three Powers of Europe. We could take every ship in the French fleet and lay alongside her as strong a ship as hers, and find ourselves at the end with a reserve fleet equal to that of every other Power. We had shown that at a week or two's notice we could sweep the seas with merchant cruisers, and could build more ships of war from an ironclad to a torpedo boat in a given time than all the nations of the world put together. That is pretty good for an hon. Gentleman like the Member for Barrow, whom the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian put into Office in order to look after torpedoes. If that hon. Member votes to-night or to-morrow for the present proposal of the Government, either he must have given a misleading account of the condition of the Navy in 1885, or else by his vote he will condemn the present Government as utterly incompetent for having allowed the Navy to fall into such decay that it requires so much renovation. Even the Secretary to the Admiralty a few days after this scheme was announced made a speech at Liverpool at a meeting of the Constitutional Association, in which he said:— He noticed with satisfaction the allusion in the report to the proposed extension of the Navy, Liverpool, the premier shipbuilding port in the world, could thoroughly appreciate the importance and value of naval defence. He had stated more than once that the British Navy never in peace was better prepared for war than it was at present, and that numerically and in character we were superior to any other two nations. The lessons, however, of the manœuvres had shown that the extent of our superiority was not so great in the minds of responsible naval officers"— by the way, was not the hon. Member a "responsible naval officer"?— as to insure our supremacy so absolutely and unquestionably as it ought to be if we are to to secure the confidence in which alone enterprise can flourish. Again, Sir Arthur Hood, Senior Naval Lord of the Admiralty, speaking on the 11th of April last at the dinner of the Institution of Civil Engineers, said: — It had been hinted that in the event of war our fleets might possibly meet with a crushing defeat in the Channel which would leave the country open to invasion. The men who had made these statements had deprecated entirely any idea of creating a scare: but he should like to ask them what surer course they could have taken to do so than this. He denied positively that the Navy was in an inefficient state; further, he asserted that the Navy was at this moment in a better state of preparation for war than it had been at any time for the past 20 years. By July at the latest they would have received the whole of their guns. As to the late manœuvres showing their feasibility in time of war of placing our commercial ports under ransom and destroying our commerce, the important point appeared to have been for- gotten that in the late manœuvres both the attacking and defending forces were provided by our own Navy, and therefore in case of war our defending forces would be at the least double the strength they then were, and would be able to offer double the protection. As to the suggestion of our fleets being crushingly defeated in the Channel and the country laid open to an invasion, he failed to realise for a moment why our superior fleets should meet a result so widely different from all their glorious traditions. I thought we were supposed to be the bravest and most gallant naval people in the world. Then what a lesson this speech is for the hobgoblin Party who sit on the other side. I have given evidence—strong and convincing evidence—to show that our Navy never was so strong as now; and, secondly, that we were never more friendly with foreign Powers. That being the case, I cannot make out why 21 millions more should be wanted. I cannot find out against whom preparation is to be made. Not France, I suppose. General Boulanger came over the other day without opposition. We allow Frenchmen to come in, and it is only French sugar we keep out. We are going to show our Fleet to the Emperor of Germany, and nobody is afraid of Italy, whose condition is a warning against extravagant expenditure on armaments. The scare-mongers have landed this country in a miserable and anomalous position. In days gone by one Englishman used to be reckoned equal to three Frenchmen and five Russians, but the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone now goes up and down the country whining and pining and saying, "I cannot fight unless I am two to one against the enemy." Where is British valour when it comes to that? I say all this is unworthy of this country, and will bring us into contempt. I wish I could get all hon. Members on the opposite side of the House to look on it in that light. I know there is one who does—the noble Lord the Member for Paddington. I appeal to the noble Lord, who has made personal sacrifices and is now boycotted by Birmingham, to respond to the appeal to "come over and help us" to initiate a policy of peace on true Conservative lines. What did Mr. Disraeli say 30 years ago? Why he said, "Let us terminate this disastrous system of wild expenditure by mutually agreeing, with no hypocrisy, but in a manner and under circum- stances which admit of no doubt, by the reduction of armaments, that peace is really our policy." That is the policy of true Conservatives. At any rate it is my policy, and until some honest effort has been made by this or some other Government to reduce armaments, and to get other nations to join us in a sensible and peaceable course, whatever any one else does. I shall offer a most determined opposition to this mad and monstrous proposal for augmenting the burdens of the people by fostering that military spirit, which has been the bane of civilization, of Christianity, and of progress.

*THE CIVIL LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. ASHMEAD BARTLETT)

I do not know whether it is owing to any infirmity of mine or to the remarkable prolixity of the preceding speeches, but I confess I was not able to make head or tail out of the remarks of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir W. Lawson). With regard to the appeal the hon. Baronet addressed to the noble Lord the Member for Paddington (Lord R. Churchill) I would answer him in the words of the wife of Lord Fairfix at the trial of Charles the Second, that the noble Lord "is far too wise to be here." In spite of the labours, and sometimes the annoyance, which the hon. Member for Northampton inflicts upon the Government, I am disposed to think his presence and activity in this House are not without their advantages. The hon. Gentleman plays to this country the part which the Helot of Sparta served to the Lasedemonian father in the education of his sons. He is a perpetual warning of the eccentric misfortunes which would befal this country if the Radical Party were to obtain control of its destinies. I do not think it necessary to deal in detail with the speech of the hon. Member for Northampton, though some of his arguments were remarkable; for instance, he thought it a misfortune that the British Navy should be put on such a footing of strength as would enable it to equal any two European Powers, and said "why not to any three?" He also drew this extraordinary conclusion, that if our Navy were equal to the Navies of any two other powers it would be in the power of a third nation to control the destinies of Europe. But he seemed to overlook the fact that if there was any- thing in that argument, the state of things he seemed to desire—namely, that the British Navy should only be equal to that of any other Power, would far more easily control the destinies of England from a naval point of view. The hon. Gentleman also attacked the foreign policy of Lord Salisbury, which has failed to meet with his approbation. But the foreign policy of Lord Salisbury has at least given England an honourable peace, instead of the costly and disgraceful defeats and disasters which marked the administration of the right hon. Member for Mid Lothian. He also objected to our mode of raising the money, and urged that it would limit the power of Parliament to deal with and control policy in future—a point with which I shall deal presently. I would remind him, however, that it is always in the power of Parliament to reverse in the future any decision that may now be come to. What is needed, above all things, in our Naval policy, and in regard to the strength of our fleet, is definitiveness and fixity of purpose; and the object of Her Majesty's Government in placing this scheme in a Bill has been to make it difficult in the future to delay, or to frustrate that policy. Let me ask the House to consider the broad issues that come before it in regard to this great programme. Why have the Government submitted this programme to the country? They have done so, in the first place, to ensure the maritime supremacy of England, which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton has ridiculed. We on this side of the House do not hold with the hon. Gentleman. We believe in the maritime supremacy of the country as necessary, not only for its greatness, but also the magnificence of the Empire, its commerce, and, indeed, for the national existence of our people. Our object has been to make the Naval Power of Great Britain equal, and indeed, superior to the combined forces of any two great Naval Powers. Why, it is asked, is the Naval supremacy of this country essential? I answer that it is needed, first, to secure the safety and prosperity of the people at home; secondly, to maintain the strength of our world-wide Empire; thirdly, to defend the commerce of the country, is the value of which is almost immeasurable; and, fourthly, to protect the food supply of the people, which means our national existence. What are the arguments against the new programme? First, there are the peace at any price party, who say that no preparation is necessary, who would not defend our shores and our commerce till danger appears. That is to say, who knowing that it would take three and a-half years to build an ironclad and that guns take two years, and that other countries are well provided with both, would wait till a hostile fleet was in the Channel, bombarding our forts and sailing up the Thames before they began naval construction? The hon. Member for Shoreditch (Mr. Cromer), who moved the Amendment, has argued that we should undertake no measure of defence till danger is imminent.

* MR. CREMER (Shoreditch)

I never used those words; what I did was to challenge the Government to point out what the danger is, and where it is to be found, or to show that it has any existence at all.

*MR. ASHMEAD BARTLETT

I have the hon. Member's words here. My noble Friend the Member for Marylebone (Charles Beresford) said he wanted to know whether the hon. Gentleman was prepared to say that our commerce, trade, and food supply were not to be defended, and the hon. Gentleman replied, "When in danger, not before."

*MR. CREMER

I am sorry to interrupt, but I would point out that in the observations I had previously made I, when moving the Amendment, over and over again challenged the Government to point out where the danger was to be found, and whether it was not entirely imaginary, and my answer to the noble Lord must be taken in conjunction with those remarks.

*MR. ASHMEAD BARTLETT

Well, my reply is that the present state of Europe and the state in which it is likely to be for some time to come, constitute the very greatest danger to every Power that is not fully prepared; and I, for one, am waiting until we see other Powers ready to attack us before we do anything to protect ourselves. But there is no use in labouring this question. The Party which used to be in the ascendancy— those exaggerated descendants of the old "Manchester School"—are now weak enough in Parliament; they are weaker in the country. They were defeated the other night by a majority of 176, and have not the smallest chance of carrying their doctrines. I venture to say that those whom the hon. Gentleman and his friends call the democracy, but whom I prefer to call the working classes, understand this question better than he, and those who act with him. The people of this country, especially the intelligent artizan of England, fully understand the vital need that exists for naval supremacy. They regard expenditure on the Navy as an insurance, a prudent necessary insurance just as needful to safeguard their trade, their liberties, and their subsistence as the premiums paid by the householder to guard against loss by fire. There are the second class of opponents, the opposition cavillers, who hardly go to the length of resisting this measure openly because they know the country would hardly stand that, but who complain on one ground or another that this large expenditure is not needful. Some of them say the reasons are not clearly stated; others say that it is a mistake to put it in the form of a Bill and so to remove it from further Parliamentary control; others quote speeches of the present Board of Admiralty to show that in their opinion such an increase as we now propose was not needed a year or more ago. My colleagues are perfectly able to defend their own action and their own language. They have done so, and they will do so again if needs be. When any hon. Gentleman can quote any words of mine deprecating an increase in the Navy, I shall be ready to deal with him. But, Sir, I will go so far as this. If the Board of Admiralty have been mistaken—which I do not admit—in their views upon this great and crucial question, it would be no mistake for them to acknowledge and to repair such a mistake. [Cheers.] The Naval Manœuvres which took place last year on a scale of unprecedented magnitude, detail, and thoroughness, have taught not only the country and the Board of Admiralty, but even the sailors a great many lessons with which they were not before perfectly familiar. This programme is not a sudden or a new discovery. It has been under consideration since the middle of last year. I believe it was on the 1st of July, 1888, that the First Naval Lord, Sir Arthur Hood, drew up his confidential memorandum which embodied most of the present programme. Among other lessons they taught was the extreme difficulty of blockading modern warships of high speed and great facilities for disguise and concealment. The manœuvres proved that the blockading Power must have a considerable superiority of force, and that in the case of England there ought always to be a large reserve squadron in the Channel. Then there were many questions connected with the structural type of ships, their speed, their disposition of armament, their guns, the effect of high explosives, the invention of quick-firing guns, all which render it impossible to submit a complete and finished programme at an earlier moment than has been done. These difficulties have been in the main surmounted, and the ships and guns and armaments proposed in the new programme have the highest naval sanction. The simple question for Parliament and the country is, is it necessary, is it of paramount importance that the naval supremacy of this country should be established; are the ships which we propose wanted or are they not wanted? To these questions I have not the slightest doubt that Parliament and the country will unhesitatingly answer, "Yes, the ships are wanted, and they must be built." Those who object to this programme being put into the form of a Bill, and who allege that it will thereby be removed from the conduct of Parliament, miss the whole object of the scheme of the Government. Parliament can always undo what it has decided to do. But this Bill will, of course, render it difficult that their programme will be reversed, injured or delayed. It will be secured either from the caprice of a snatch vote, or from the exigencies of a Ministry, or from the dissensions of experts, or the selfishness of parties. This programme is the result of much consideration, study, and experience. It has been carefully and deliberately thought and worked out in its size, its cost, and all its details. It is put fully and candidly before Parliament and the country to accept or reject it. The amplest discussion has taken place and is likely to take place upon it. I believe it will be accepted by an overwhelming majority in this House. When thus accepted, it will become law and will be carried out. Those who know how in past times the Navy Estimate have often been the happy hunting ground of greedy Chancellors of the Exchequer in search of a surplus and of a popular Budget, how peremptory orders have come from the Treasury to cut so much off this Vote and so much off that, so much off construction and repairing, or both—to the great detriment of shipbuilding—and so much off guns, will realize what a national boon this fixed programme must be to the Navy, and, therefore, to the country. The great need of naval policy in the past has been definiteness and continuity. This Bill supplies these requisites, and will enable the people to rest assured that their dominion over the seas will be made supreme. Then there is the class who fulminate vague, but none the less violent, charges against the Admiralty, both the permanent officials and the present Board, and who affirm that they are utterly unworthy of confidence. I wish hon. Gentlemen who make such charges would descend from reckless rhetoric and go a little into the sober region of practical details. The present Board has, in its own interest, not made enough public reference to the great and valuable reforms and economies which it has succeeded in making in expenditure and administration. It is now possible to build an ironclad in one of the dockyards at a speed at least 30 per cent quicker than formerly, and at a cost not exceeding that of private yards. Great economies have been effected. The naval members of the Board have been, and are among the ablest men in a great service that can boast a vast amount of brilliant ability, great experience, and unbounded devotion to duty. I should like to add my humble quota of regard and admiration to the well-deserved tribute which my noble Friend has bestowed upon Sir Arthur Hood, the First Naval Lord. Then there are our opponents who criticize the types and armaments of our new fighting ships. Foremost among these is the hon. Member for Cardiff, whose views upon the naval question are of Protean variety. To such critics I need only say that the types that have been decided upon have been most carefully considered; that thee have been submitted to the criticism of the highest practical sailors; that thy approval of them is in the proportion of more than six to one; and that the hon. Member for Cardiff found few, if any, naval experts to agree with him. Lastly, there is the class, represented by my noble Friend the Member for Marylebone, who think we are not doing enough, and who want £20,000,000 extra spent upon the Navy. My noble Friend has the courage of his opinions, and he is very candid. But does he really think the taxpayers of this country would be pleased in time of peace to undertake such an extra burden as that? I sympathize with the noble Lord in many of his feelings and in much that he has done and said. I do not think that his reasons for leaving the Board were adequate; but I do believe that my noble Friend since he has left has done yeoman service in arousing and stimulating public feeling upon this vital question. His conduct has been loyal and considerate to his former colleagues, who so much regretted to lose his aid. I think that my noble Friend will be disposed to admit that a very fair compromize has been come to. The increase in the Navy which the Government propose is by far the largest made in modern times, and it will, I believe, guard our maritime supremacy against all reasonable combinations and dangers. This programme, as compared with the expenditure of former years, shows an increase of £2,044,000, on the average expenditure of the 4 years ending 1889, and had on an average increased £4,500,000, in the 4 years ending 1879. The hon. Member for Northampton has quoted figures which made out that the Navy of this country would in the year 1894, under the present programme, be equal in strength to the combined fleets of four European Powers. That is, I regret to say, not likely to be the case. In the year 1894, according to the existing programmes of this and other countries, the armoured vessels of this country, including belted cruisers, will number 77; those of France 44, and those of Russia 27; that is, we shall have 77 as against 71 Russian and French armed ships. As to protected cruisers of the first, second, and third class and torpedo gun-boats—our total number in 1894 will be 96. France would have 50, and Russia 29.

MR. LABOUCHERE

I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but perhaps he will explain from what source his figures are taken, seeing that they are different from the returns.

*MR. ASHMEAD BARTLETT

I may point out that the difference may be due to the fact that the programmes of foreign countries have been quite lately enlarged. There is also very possibly a difference of classification, as there is considerable vagueness in classifying the great variety of types among modern war vessels. At any rate, my contention is that we should be superior in order to secure our maritime supremacy. Now, Sir, I have referred seriatum to the different arguments which have been used in opposition to this Bill, and I venture to think that none of them are calculated to seriously influence either the House or the country. I believe that this Bill will become law, and that it will give the Empire a sense of peace and satisfaction with regard to its Naval strength, to which it has long been a stranger. I should like, in conclusion, to say one word with regard to the views of the masses of our people. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Bethnal Green, in a speech which he made on a previous stage of this Bill, said that the working classes would look on this as a wasteful and needless expenditure. I venture to differ from that view. We are told that the working classes will condemn this expenditure. In my humble judgment the working classes of this country have a much clearer insight into the needs of the country, and are inspired by a much purer patriotism than many of their flatterers and would-be leaders. The people of this country are not unmindful of the advantages they possess with their brethren among the other nations of Europe. They see the military armaments of other countries increasing by leaps and bounds. They see the flower of the youth and manhood of Continental countries taken off by the conscription, not by scores and hundreds of thousands, but by millions. England' alone is free from this terrible drain, and why? Because of her insular position. To preserve the value of that insular position, the maintenance of our Naval supremacy, of our secure command of the seas is essential. It is, therefore, the fact and most bounden duty of a Government, worthy of the name, to maintain that Naval supremacy. More than half our food supplies are now produced beyond these shores. The loss of a single great battle, one such disaster as befel France at the Nile, or Trafalgar, might deprive this country, perhaps for ever, of her maritime supremacy. These are the days of sudden and fatal blows; of short and decisive campaigns; a. disaster once incurred is too often irreparable. Let this House, let the country reflect what panic, what cost, what ruin, the news of such a catastrophe would inflict upon these islands. If indeed, by great efforts, by great expenditure of treasure and human life, England were to succeed in retrieving such a defeat, how infinitesimal would the cost of timely preparation seem compared with the waste of blood and money that must follow a great naval reverse. It is the object of the present Government to guard against the possibility of such a dread catastrophe. They believe that the present naval programme will, when completed, place the British Navy in that position of strength and predominance which will enable it to guarantee our Imperial power to defend, so far as is possible, our immense and wealth-giving commerce, to uphold the honour of the flag and the repute of the Nation, and to safeguard the food supplies, and the independence of our people.

*MR. H. H. FOWLER (Wolverhampton)

I must, in the first place, congratulate the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, on having at last broken the long silence he has so rigidly maintained during all these years. Those hon. Members who remember his Imperial speeches between 1880 and 1885 will recognize that the hon. Gentleman still bolds the same opinions. The greater part of his speech, however, has been devoted to a eulogy of the best of all possible Admiralties, in the best of all possible Governments, and. the hon. Gentleman has even extended his benediction to the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone. Sir, I have no disposition to complain that the hon. Member has paid this tribute of admiration to his colleagues and himself. But I must ask the House to give some consideration to the Bill, which it is asked to read a second time. The object of the Bill is twofold. It proposes to make further provisions for the Naval defence of the country, and it proposes to defray the expenses of such provision. I submit that in both aspects the Bill is unprecedented. It is a new mode of voting supplies for the Navy, and a new mode of providing ways and means for meeting Supply. I do not think it is fair to charge hon. Members on either side of the House with want of patriotism. Surely we can afford to admit that both sides are desirous of maintaining the maritime supremacy of the country. The Liberal party—I may go further and say, the Radical party—has accepted during a long series of years Cobden's doctrine that the Navy is our first, second, and third line of defence. It has been, on principle, opposed to a large army. It weighs always in favour of a strong navy to protect our coasts, colonies, and commerce. We have objected to a large military expenditure on the ground that we have no desire nor justification for interfering in Continental politics, but we have supported a sufficient Navy. We are entitled to further explanation of the Government proposals as contrasted with their proposals in 1887–88. Now when they came into office the estimated naval expenditure for 1886–87 was 13¼ millions. What did the noble Lord do? Why in the next year, 1887–88, the noble Lord reduced it to 12½ millions, and in the next year it was further reduced. After twelve months' experience of the Admiralty, what did the noble Lord say? He said that, owing to the exceptionally large outlay of the last three years, it would be possible for some years to come to associate the reduction of expenditure with an increase of naval efficiency and strength. That was the noble Lord's statement in 1887. The noble Lord the Member for Marylebone criticized that speech severely, and the noble Lord (Lord G. Hamilton) in his reply said that, "The policy of the Government was opposed to any wholesale building of vessels." Now, the present policy is to lay down 70 vessels, of which a large number are to be put out to contract. But what did the First Lord of the Admiralty say twelve months ago? "Why, if the Admiralty were to lay down a large number of ships at one time, so rapid are the changes that probably in ten or fifteen years they would be obsolete." Let the House contrast the present financial proposal of the Government with the expenditure of previous years. In 1885–6 the sum spent in new construction was practically £3,750,000; in 1886–7 it was £3,500,000; and in 1887–8 it was £3,000,000; the average of the last three years being upwards of £3,000,000. Ten years ago the country was not spending, as the hon. Member for Sheffield has said, two-thirds as much as of late years; for during the four years ending 1879 the expenditure in new construction was £2,000,000. Now the figure is £3,000,000 per annum, and there is in existence a Navy, the prime cost of which has been something like £44,000,000, while the allowance for depreciation amounted to £1,849,000. With these figures before them, the Government are proposing to spend in shipbuilding and armaments during the next five years £21,500,000; but they do not propose to spend this sum in addition to the normal expenditure. It includes the expenditure which they would incur if the normal rate were continued, and that amount would be £16,250,000 during the five years. Will the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone, who has made speeches in the country maintaining that the Navy is in a state of unpreparedness, and that a large outlay is necessary, be satisfied with the additional expenditure proposed by the Government? Of this £16,250,000, in fairness to the Admiralty, there must be deducted the sum necessary to complete the ships already in progress, and that deduction brings the figures down to about £14,250,000. This leaves something like £7,000,000 for additional ships. Of the proposed expenditure, £11,500,000 is to be spent in the dockyards, and £10,000,000 on contracts during five years while being raised in seven years. The instalments of the £10,000,000 are £1,428,000 each, and so what the Government propose to do is simply to add this sum to the Navy Estimates for the next seven years. Now, Sir, not being an expert, I will not debate the sufficiency or the insufficiency of this amount; but I want rather to deal with the financial aspect of the question. How do the Government deal with that? Assuming that it is a proper sum, by the Bill before the House the Government ask Parliament for authority to provide in the ordinary Estimates of the next five years for £3,000,000 more than they propose to spend, on the chance that some use for it may be discovered. No Government ought to be trusted with more financial power than is necessary, lest a premium should be put upon Governmental extravagance. The whole ten millions is to be spent before the end of the year 1894, and at that date only seven millions of it will have been raised. The first criticism is, then, why spread the expenditure over seven years instead of five, since it is to be spent and will be needed during the five years? The Admiralty is hardly the Department to be trusted with the largest amount of uncontrolled expenditure. The hon. Member who has just sat down stated that the object of the Bill was to make it as difficult as possible to weaken or delay the policy of the Admiralty in the future. That is exactly the point on which. I join issue with the hon. Member. The principles of our finance are opposed to taking the expenditure of the year out of the control of the House of Commons. Those principles are, first, that the income of the year shall be paid into the Treasury; secondly, that the expenditure of the year shall be met out of the income of the year; and, thirdly, that all unexpended balances shall be repaid to the Treasury at the end of the financial year. There are three principles laid down for our guidance applicable to all departments, sound and sensible principles, the financial value of which is apparent. The charges for the year should be met by the income of the year that is a great constitutional principle, though the noble Lord opposite calls it financial pedantry. In the Civil Service Estimates the House will be asked to vote to keep up a great establishment called into existence because people do not appreciate the financial soundness of this doctrine, and so we have a huge bankruptcy system for those who will not live within their means. The principle we apply to individuals should be applied to the policy of nations. Lay by all you can, pay off debt if you can, but do not anticipate your income several years in advance. How do we work our national expenditure? We have three modes of dealing with the National expenditure. All our national expenditure is taken out of the Consolidated Fund. The first payments are permanent grants under certain Acts of Parliament, which, for constitutional reasons, are placed beyond the control of the House of Commons. In this category are included the Civil List of the Sovereign, the salaries of the Judges, and of certain High Officials. There is no precedent for any portion of naval or military expenditure being put upon the Consolidated Fund, and taken out of the control of this House by annual Votes. There is the second mode of meeting expenditure, by annual Votes in Committee of Supply, and this House has always been jealous of its control over the annual Votes for military and naval purposes, so jealous that there is a Standing Order that provides that if Parliament meets before Christmas, then before the 15th January the Military and Naval Estimates should be on the Table, or within ten days of the opening of Supply. Parliament insists that the whole of the Military and Naval expenditure shall be annually submitted, and there has been no variation from that in the financial history of this country. I need hardly say that this, practice represents a vital principle not to be dispensed with in favour of the exigences of Party. The hon. Gentleman says that what Parliament has done Parliament can reverse, but that is exactly what we do not mean.. Parliament does not control the annual expenditure but the House of Commons, the expression Parliament implies that the House of Lords has a voice in the matter, but this the House of Lords has not.

*MR. ASHMEAD BARTLETT

I used the terms convertibly; I meant the House of Commons.

*MR. H. H. FOWLER

I am glad to have that correction, because the hon. Gentleman's words implied a dangerous doctrine. What was the Resolution proposed by Lord Palmerston, as to the control of the House over Supply. That the right of granting Aids and Supplies to the Crown is in the Commons alone as an essential part of their Constitution, and the limitation of all such grants, as to matter, manner, measure, and time is only in them. Now if this Bill passed, both the manner and the time would be transferred from the House of Commons, in whom it alone rests, to the united Legislature to whom it does not belong. Then there is a third mode of voting money, to which I have alluded, and which was mentioned in the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as applied to works of a permanent defensive character, that Bills have been passed making these works a charge on the Consolidated Fund. But such Bills invariably contain a clause providing that the charges in question shall be defrayed out of the moneys to be voted by Parliament. The precedent relied upon is that of Lord Palmerston's proposals with reference to fortifications. The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that it was a legacy, so to speak, from Lord Palmerston's policy. How did Lord Palmerston proceed? He regarded these fortifications as permanent additions to the defences of the country—very much as the Government now propose to regard this outlay. The original estimate, I think, was something like £6,000,000, but that amount was exceeded. Did Lord Palmerston bring in a Bill to vote £6,000,000 from the Consolidated Fund? No. In 1860 a Bill was brought in; the money was to be borrowed; but the Bill provided only for the sums to be expended between August 1, 1860, and August 1, 1861. Parliament provided only for the outlay of the year, although it did so by raising terminable annuities. In 1862 Parliament had another Bill before it. The Government estimated that the cost of the works would be £6,860,000, and the House of Commons sanctioned an expenditure of £1,860,000 in the year. Again, in 1863, in 1864, in 1865, and in 1867 Parliament had Bills before it, and in 1869 the final scheme showed that the total cost was £7,460,000, and. Parliament sanctioned a final expenditure of £1,500,000. No less than seven Acts of Parliament were passed to authorize the expenditure of these £7,000,000. Why? The financier would say why not authorize the Chancellor of the Exchequer at once to raise the whole amount by terminable annuities, and this—apart from constitutional reasons, or what the noble Lord calls the pedantry of finance—would have been the easiest and simplest way; and that is the way a Railway Company would have proceeded. But Parliament wished to keep control of the annual expenditure, and therefore Lord Palmerston proposed the voting year by year of the outlay for that year. I am not arguing the policy of the expenditure of these 21 millions; my argument is that the annual expenditure should year by year be brought under the notice of Parliament. But that is not my only precedent; I have another even more to to the point. I do not know if the noble Lord has had it brought to his attention. In 1865 the Admiralty were anxious to construct certain dockyards by contract, and obtained an Act to empower them to do this; and the Act that was passed, declaring that it was expedient that the dockyards at Chatham and Portsmouth should be greatly extended and that it would conduce to economy if the Admiralty were authorized to give contracts over a series of years, provided that the moneys to meet it should be annually voted by Parliament. Here is a direct precedent in regard to an expenditure of 21- millions for the case now before us. The hon. Member says, in justification of the Government proposals, that it is intended to make it as 'difficult as possible for Parliament to alter them. He said, I think, something about the caprice of party. Well, but party caprice and party Government are the constitution of this country; and may I remind him of an historical fact, and that is that the House of Commons has never refused a shilling to the Admiralty that a Government has asked for. That should be remembered by hon. Members who complain of the parsimony of the House of Commons, and express the fear that the House of Commons will not do what is necessary They must recollect that no responsible Minister ever asked for a vote to be expended on the Navy but he invariably got what he wanted. Now what are the reasons for this proposal? You escape party control, but I do not think that that is the real intention of the noble Lord. I think he has a more practical reason. I believe his real object is to get rid of the surrender of the balances at the end of the year. I admit at once that there is very good ground for complaint on this account. Suppose we vote in the house 12 millions to the Navy—of course that is upon the simple estimate that the executive believe that that amount will be needed, the executive cannot be certain that it will be spent within the year—and if on the 31st of March it is not spent, then the balance, be it half a million or whatever it is, not spent is not carried over for the next year, but very wisely, as I think, is surrendered, and goes to the Exchequer towards the reduction of the National Debt. The noble Lord may ask, for instance, one million; but suppose he is only able to pay away £600,000; well, shipbuilding to the extent of £400,000 is proceeding, and will in a short time be done, but owing to some technical difficulty upon which the engineer has to satisfy himself, he cannot send in his certificate before the 31st of March, then the noble Lord may say I am compelled to surrender this £400,000 and the money will have to be re-voted next year. Thus the Estimates appear to be increased by £400,000, whereas really part of the money voted last year has been diverted towards the reduction of the National Debt. I admit that this is misleading and inconvenient, but I do not think it is necessary to alter our financial system and arrangements to meet a difficulty of that kind, I have a higher opinion of our officials at the Treasury and of their financial ability. I do not believe that they need be driven to such a remedy as this is, and I could myself suggest a scheme by which it could be avoided. That where Parliament is satisfied that the work has actually been performed, the money might be paid into the Bank of England under the joint superintendence of the Treasury, the Admiralty and the contractor and so a surrender of the balance be avoided. We have had no reason to depart from the principles of finance to meet a temporary difficulty of this sort. The noble Lord speaks of the services being hampered by the covert action of the Treasury of the day. Now what could he mean by that? I have watched with great admiration the noble Lord's political career, and I have always noticed that he has a great horror of the Treasury. He has never been at the Treasury himself and that is to be regretted, because he regards that branch of the public service with a strong aversion, entertaining the dread of some mysterious, autocratic, irresponsible, parsimonious, intolerant body, always endeavouring to hamper the public services. Well for the last 170 years and until we arrive at the present Government the First Lord of the Treasury has been Prime Minister. And whether we may think of the wisdom of the departure from this precedent we all entertain the greatest respect for the present First Lord, and I am sure that with his long official experience the First Lord has a firm determination to do justice to all branches of the Service. He is assisted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, they acting together with two Secretries to the Treasury, one permanent and the other political. So I think the Treasury can certainly not be described as being hostile to any branch of the public Service. You are going to sanction an arrangement between the Treasury and the Admiralty. Why should not you carry that out towards other branches of the public Services? Why not have recourse to that dangerous invention of Continental Governments, the principle of Voting a Budget for two or three years in advance? It is because we wish to resist that tendency that we object to this change. There is no reason for departing from the procedure requiring Parliamentary control year by year. You have a majority in this House at the present time as you have in the House of Lords, and you may feel perfectly safe from reversal. Ten years ago there was a Party which had a majority in this and in the other House, but when they went to the country they found that they had not the support of the country behind them. Therefore, without indulging in any prophecy as to the result of a General Election we protest again against our withdrawing from Parliament not only the power over its own annual expenditure, but against interfering with the power of the next Parliament over its expenditure. Principle precedent and prudence alike justify strict adherence to the custom which has hitherto regulated the relations between Parliament and the Executive, securing on the one hand the efficiency of the public Service, and on the other hand maintaining the supreme and final control of this House over the national income and expenditure.

*COLONEL HILL (Bristol, S.)

I will not occupy time with the points the right hon. Gentleman, who has just spoken, has raised. I take it for granted that the Navy is of the first importance to the Empire, nor am I careful to answer those who appear to think lightly of our naval supremacy, and are indisposed to favour any expenditure on the defensive forces of the country. I do not think it would be becoming or that it is necessary for me to attempt to make any defence of the criticism made upon the noble Lord (Lord G. Hamilton); he can very well answer them for himself Nor do I think the country is interested in knowing what he may have said in former days, or with the question of precedent or non-precedent for the manner in which it is now proposed to raise the amount to meet the Government proposal. What the country is interested in is knowing whether the Navy is adequate for the wants of the country, and how the Government propose to make it so if the insufficiency is admitted. I recently heard Lord Rosebery make this remark in a speech to a commercial assembly of considerable importance, that no party that deserves the name of a party would refuse money for an increase of the Navy, upon two conditions, first that a necessity is shown, and secondly that it is judiciously expended. I entirely agree with his Lordship's views on that matter. How are we to ascertain the necessity? The question of policy has to be decided by the Ministry, and they have declared it is necessary that our Navy should be equal to the Navies of any other two countries in the world. That appears to me to be a very moderate proposition, and one that will find favour with the country generally. Then to whom are we to apply for information as to what is required to put the Navy in this condition but to the distinguished naval officers who hold or have held commands in naval service? I know it is sometimes said that naval officers in approaching such matters are disposed to sink national considerations in the desire to advance the interest of the profession to which they belong, but I have faith in the honour and patriotism of naval officers and believe them to be worthy of and true to the great traditions of the British Navy. Well, although the First and Second Naval Lords spoke with a somewhat uncertain voice before the Naval Estimates Committee, there is among naval officers a concensus of opinion that our Navy is seriously deficient in strength for the protection of our shores and commerce. If this be so, the necessity for an increase of strength requires the support of no further argument. It is scarcely necessary to consider the question of what might happen if our fleet were swept away, whether our land fortifications are strong enough to protect our seaports, whether our merchant vessels would be able to bring us sufficient food supplies, or whether if a hostile force were landed, we should be able to repel it. I am greatly mistaken if the British Nation feel otherwise than that none of these disasters must be possible so far as human prudence and human skill can prevent them. I am quite sure my countrymen would deem their rulers traitors to their sacred trust, did they not make such preparations as may be needful to protect them, not only against the actual occurrence of such evils, but also from the more probable, though scarcely less serious, consequences of panics caused by the mere fear of them. The inadequacy of our Navy is universally admitted. The noble Lord the Member for Paddington, notwithstanding his zeal for economy, admits that an increase is required, and my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, who certainly speaks with considerable authority on the subject, not only says we want more vessels, but he emphasizes that by saying that a great many of the vessels we have, are not fit for the purpose for which they were intended. It seems to me quite impossible for us to come to any other conclusion than that the first proposition laid down by Lord Rosebery, viz., necessity has been proved. The British Navy requires to be strengthened. This cannot be done without money, which the British taxpayers must furnish, and I believe the money will be cheerfully provided if the second proposition of Lord Rosebery can be sustained, that the expenditure will be judicious. The question of judicious expenditure divides itself into two heads, first the nature of the additions, and secondly their cost. The first is by far the most important. If the addition is too great there is evidently much waste, and if the addition is too little, the object of expenditure is lost and the waste is greater, and this would also be the case if the additions were of the wrong kind. Now, the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone (Lord C. Beresford) who has done good service in calling the attention of the country to the necessity for strengthening the Navy, makes some objection to the Government scheme because it is not accompanied by detailed Plans of Campaign for meeting every emergency. Well, I do not hesitate to say that an Admiralty which would propose a great expenditure which they advise the Government is needful, and would suffice to bring the Navy up to its proper strength without having given such plans and calculations their most careful consideration would be unworthy of its position. But to publish these details to the world in a Parliamentary Paper would, in my opinion, be most unwise. Some hon. Members say they have no faith in the Admiralty, and I am not here to assert that all administrations in the past have been models of perfection and wisdom, the proof or disproof of such a proposition would serve no good purpose. But having had some opportunity while sitting on the Naval Committee of forming an opinion of the Members of the present Board of Admiralty who are immediately responsible to Parliament and of the chief Admiralty officials, I do say that I feel confidence in their business capacity. I do not at all agree with the hon. Member for Wolverhampton that they are profligate wasters. On the contrary, they have introduced considerable economies in the administration of the Navy, and introduced rules and regulations not only conducing to greater economy in the future, but preventing the repetition of the errors of the past. As an indication of the careful manner in which the Admiralty Programme has been prepared, I would point to what my noble Friend (Lord C. Beresford) has characterized as a useful and business-like paper "Designs for Battleships." When so much care has been taken over the designs, I think it is only fair to suppose that similar care has been exercised in determining the quantity, and it is worthy of remark that the additions proposed by the First Lord came within 4 vessels of the number suggested by the noble Lord the Member for Marylebone (Lord C. Beresford). As to the designs of the contemplated vessels, of course, a man-of-war is such a complicated machine, that there will always be differences of opinion among Naval authorities, but I think the discussion which lately took place before the Society of Naval Architects shows that very great care was taken to come to a compromise among the different qualities that commend themselves to the minds of the different experts.

It being Midnight, the Debate stood adjourned; to be resumed to-morrow, at Two of the clock.