§ (2.) £606,000, Volunteer Corps.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid that, in his opinion, the 215,000 481 Volunteers, who were found ready to devote their time to the service of the country, deserved to be assisted in every way. In many instances, at present, the Volunteers had to spend very large sums of money not only for drill sheds, but for rifle ranges, and many of the latter were entirely inadequate. There were two questions which never ought to be lost sight of; one was the discipline of the Force—and he thought every-one would say that the Force had of late improved very much in discipline— and the other was that they should be taught to shoot accurately, because that was one of the main objects for which they were organized. The Volunteers had neither great coats or packs, or any of the things which were essentially necessary should the men be called out. He did not ask his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War (Mr. W. H. Smith) to do anything in a hurry, but to consider what was the best way of dealing with a question which he was perfectly certain would commend itself to every right-thinking man in the country— namely, the question of promoting the efficiency of the Volunteer Force. When they found men willing to give up their time to the service of their country, every assistance should be afforded them to become proficient in the duties they had to perform. He trusted the right hon. Gentleman would give to the Volunteer Force those advantages which they required and deserved.
§ MR. TOMLINSONsaid, he should like to express in a few words a similar view to that of his hon. and gallant Friend (Sir Walter B. Barttelot). He did not think that anyone who looked upon the Volunteer Force as an important element in their national defence could be quite satisfied with the state of things which sometimes occurred. When Rifle Corps or Artillery Corps were obliged to make up their necessary expenses by resorting to bazaars and other expedients of that kind, it did suggest the question whether the country was doing its duty by the Force. And the question of expense had a great bearing on one very important element of the Force— namely, the officers. He believed that if an investigation could be made it would be found that many gentlemen 482 whom it was very desirable should join the Volunteer Force were deterred from accepting commissions because of the great expense in which they would thereby be involved. In the case of most of the Volunteer Corps, it was absolutely necessary for a man who took a commission to be prepared to put his hand in his pocket and spend a considerable sum of money annually. Volunteer officers were now required to undergo a rigorous examination in tactics and other matters, and it was very desirable that no unnecessary obstacles should be put in the way of their serving their country. The wants of the Volunteer Force had been put forth in a concrete form. It had been suggested that a 10s. addition to the efficiency grant would go very far to remedy the existing deficiency; and he suggested to his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War (Mr. W. H. Smith) that between now and next year he should take into his very earnest consideration whether it was not desirable to increase the efficiency grant, and so make the Volunteer Corps less burdensome than they now were on those required to maintain them. As to the numbers of the Force, it would be found that on page 40 the number of Artillery provided for this year was 38,283. Under the heading 188–, ho found that the number was 38,898, showing a nominal decrease in that arm of the Service. Looking at the Volunteer Returns, he could not make out how that decrease could have happened; but now he understood that there was a misprint in the Estimate, and that the number entered for last year should be 36,000 instead of 38,000. As a matter of fact, each arm of the Service except one was in a state of numerical development, the one arm of the Volunteer Force which was not in that happy condition being the Mounted Rifles. Judging from what the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for South Hampshire (Sir Frederick Fitz-Wygram) had said with reference to the importance of Mounted Infantry in the Regular Army, he thought it was a matter of some concern to those who took an interest in the Volunteer Force that the Volunteer Mounted Rifles should be decreasing in numbers. The policy of the War Office had been to bring the Volunteer Force into closer contact with the Regular Army, and if Mounted 483 Rifles or Infantry were to be a portion of the Establishment of the Regular Array, he suggested for consideration whether some attempt should not be made to have a mounted squad or troop in connection with each Volunteer regiment. He thought it was possible that some arrangement could be made by which persons who had horses and liked to devote themselves to military exercises might be induced to join a mounted company in connection with a Volunteer regiment. Those were matters which were worthy of consideration, and he threw it out as a suggestion whether the time had not arrived, when the organization and condition of the Force should not form the subject of an inquiry by a Committee of that House, which should take evidence from the persons most interested in the Volunteer movement. Of course, he did not expect that his right hon. Friend would be able to give any answer that Session to such a suggestion. There was another very important point in connection with the Force—namely, shooting. At the present moment the annual competition was taking place at Wimbledon which was supposed to test the efficiency of the Volunteer Force in shooting. It was open to doubt whether the Wimbledon meeting was carried on in the most business-like way. And it was questionable whether it would not be better that the annual rifle contests should be conducted on similar principles to the meeting of the Artillery Association, and that the Volunteers who attended the camp should be subjected to more strict military discipline. It was suggested some time ago that when the Force came to be armed with the Martini-Henry it would become dangerous to hold the camp on Wimbledon Common, and that, if that were so, arrangements should be made for holding the meeting at Aldershot. Of course, that could not be done without a grant being made for the purpose, because it would then be quite impossible to pay any great part of the cost of the meeting of the National Rifle Association at Aldershot out of the subscriptions of those who came to look on because they took an interest in shooting as a sport. There was also the question of rifle ranges, which was a very serious and important one; and it was very probable that many corps would find that the capabilities of the 484 present ranges were hardly up to the requirements of the new rifle.
COLONEL SEELYsaid, he had a suggestion to make to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. W. H. Smith), the adoption of which might distinguish his term of Office without, at the same time, entailing any appreciable charge on the country. The very existence of the Volunteer Force pre-supposes that they might at some time or other lose the command of the Channel. Unless they were prepared to face that fact, the right hon. Gentlemen would do well to disband the Force and save the money which it cost the country. The Force was raised to defend them against invasion, and it was maintained with that object. There wore people who thought that their invasion was impossible; but he thought after what had occurred within the last year or two that was certainly not the opinion of most Members of the Committee. It was well known that within the last year they had had the greater portion of their Fleet in the Mediterranean, and that for several months it would not have been at all impossible for the French, if they had been inclined to pick a quarrel with us, to have so arranged as to have obtained the command of the Channel before we could get our Fleet there. In the old days, no doubt, that would not have mattered much, because it would have taken France a long time to concentrate a large number of troops on her coast. Since France had been covered with railways all that was completely altered, and there was no doubt that the French could within a very few hours concentrate probably 100,000 or 150,000 Infantry at the ports on the coast. Now, at those ports—at Dun-kirque, Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, and Havre—his impression was that there would always be found a sufficient number of vessels, fishing boats, coasters, screw colliers, and steamers of one sort and another, to convey—he thought ho was moderate in saying—100,000 men in calm weather across the Channel. And there were many parts of the South Coast of England where troops could be landed in calm weather without any difficulty whatever. As the tide was going out, guns, horses, and ammunition could be landed without the smallest difficulty. Now, he would ask the right hon. Gentleman, what would be done in 485 the event of such a tiling happening? The right hon. Gentleman could not withdraw any troops from Ireland— that was clear; and in England there were only at the present time about 30 or 40 battalions of Regular Infantry— he (Colonel Seely) did not know the exact number, but assumed that there were not more than 50 at the most. The right hon. Gentleman dared not remove the garrisons from Dover or Portsmouth or from any of the Dockyards, and his (Colonel Seely's) impression was that the right hon. Gentleman could not tomorrow put more than 25 battalions of Infantry of 600 men each in the field. He doubted whether 15 battalions of Infantry could be put in the field without disturbing the depots of the territorial regiments; and if the right hon. Gentleman wore to disturb those depots he would interfere with the organization of the Reserve and Militia. Well, now, it might be said that the French would have to bring a large train and baggage, and all that sort of thing; but it seemed to him that all the French would want if they attempted an invasion would be plenty of ball cartridges. The whole of the South of England was full of everything that an Army wanted with the exception of ammunition. Granted ammunition, his impression was that an invading Army would find all they wanted—all the horses and carts and provisions which they required would be found ready at hand. What he wanted to suggest to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War was that in the Volunteer Force, for which this Vote was asked, he had a very large number of men who, from the circumstances of the Force, were practically almost as available as troops in barracks. Nearly all the men of a regiment lived in the same town; the officers were practically speaking all resident; the men had their arms and uniforms at their own homes; and there was no reason whatever, as far as he knew, why almost the whole of the Force should not be available for service in a very few hours after notice was given. But it was not at all so at the present time; because, in the first place, the Volunteers had no ammunition. When the shooting season was over, the Volunteers had no ammunition whatever. It might be argued that there was plenty of ammunition in the country; but to issue 100 rounds per 486 man—which was the very smallest allowance which could be made—to 200,000 men, would take up considerable time, not to speak of the confusion which would be created. Then, if there was ammunition, there was nothing provided for its conveyance. The pouches which all Volunteer Corps had held a very small number of rounds. So that what the Volunteers wanted was, first of all, ammunition, which, to the amount of 100 rounds a man, at least, ought to be in store at the different headquarters, ready to be issued when wanted; and, in the second place, stout bags to carry it in. If the men were called upon to march, he did not doubt that they would soon find the horses and carts to carry the reserve ammunition required. Then, again, the Volunteers ought to have some means of carrying food. He would not say anything about great coats, because Secretaries of State must be weary of hearing the question of great coats mentioned. Great coats were not absolutely necessary; but ammunition and food were necessary, and unless the Volunteers were supplied with them it was impossible for them to move. Assuming that ammunition and food were supplied, and that they had the men standing ready to move, there was no doubt that the Railway Companies would be able to move the troops with very great rapidity. Take his own case. He commanded a regiment of 1,000 men, and he should be very disappointed if, on a sudden emergency, there were not 800 men available. He had no doubt whatever that either the Midland Railway Company or the Great Northern Railway Company could have a train ready within an hour to take the men anywhere they might be required. It was necessary, if Volunteers were to be made use of on a sudden emergency, it should be impressed upon them that it was their duty to turn out whenever they received notice. Unless that were done, and unless they had some practice in turning out, they would not, if really required., turn out in the way, he was quite sure, they would on reflection wish to do. If the exceedingly moderate requirements he had alluded to, and which would not involve the country in any cost, were complied with, his impression was that within 24 hours probably not less than 150,000 of the 200,000 men would be found ready at 487 hand. Now, what would the right hon. Gentleman do with them? He would have to tell off a sufficient number to garrison all the fortresses. The 30,000 or 40,000 Artillery Volunteers ought, it seemed to him (Colonel Seely), to be told off to the Dockyards and mercantile ports. Then the right hon. Gentleman would have to tell off a certain number of battalions of Volunteers to replace the battalions of Regular troops doing garrison duty in the country. That would enable the right hon. Gentleman to have all the Regular troops—the Regular Infantry, of which he (Colonel Seely) was speaking—at his disposal, and that in itself would be a matter of the greatest importance. If it were known that in 10 or 12 hours the troops in the fortresses of Dover and Portsmouth and of other places could be vastly augmented or replaced by Volunteers, it would undoubtedly strengthen the confidence of the people in the arrangements which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War could make on an emergency. After the different fortresses had been garrisoned, there would still be left from 100 to 150 battalions of Volunteer Infantry at the disposal of the War Office. It was not for him to suggest what arrangements the War Office should make; but he did maintain that the arrangements should be made now, because the conditions could be just as well thought out quietly in time of peace as they could in time of great confusion and emergency. It might be said there should be a fusion of the Volunteers and the Regular troops. Personally, he thought it would be well if to every two Volunteer battalions there was one battalion of Regular Infantry, and that the commander of the latter should be the brigadier of the three battalions. He should like the right hon. Gentleman to compare for one moment the position he was now in with the position which he might be in with no cost and with very little trouble. At the present time the right hon. Gentleman could not, without disturbing his territorial depot regiments, put 15,000 Regulars in the field; but if proper arrangements were made—arrangements which would involve little or no cost to the country—the right hon. Gentleman would be able to put 100,000 or 120,000 Volunteer Infantry in the field within 24 hours. Now, the posi- 488 tion of the country would be very much strengthened if such arrangements were made; and nothing would so much strengthen and encourage the Volunteers as to make their place in the defence of the country clear and definite. If the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would utilize the peculiarity of the Volunteers' constitution —namely, their immediate availability for service as compared with the men of the Army Reserve and Militia—he would do great service to the country. It might be said that unless they were careful they would throw over, to some extent, the connection which was said to exist between the Volunteers and the territorial regiments. He should like to state very distinctly to the right hon. Gentleman that the connection that existed between Volunteer battalions and the territorial regiments was purely verbal; there was no real connection between the two that he knew of. In conclusion, he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would be able to see his way to consider the matters he had specified.
§ SIR ROBERT LOYD LINDSAYwished to bear his testimony to that of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Nottingham (Colonel Seely) to the value of the Volunteer Force, and he hoped the Government would be able to make some additional allowances or some increase of the capitation grant to that Force. He had listened attentively to his hon. and gallant Friend, and nobody knew better what the Volunteers stood in need of, and he had hoped that his hon. and gallant Friend would have concluded his remarks by, at all events, urging for some additional allowance by which the Volunteers might provide themselves with those necessaries which his hon. and gallant Friend had referred to. He was really at a loss to understand how those various things were to be provided, unless they were supplied out of a capitation grant. His hon. and gallant Friend said the whole could be done without any additional cost of expenditure, and that what was wanted was to make the place of the Volunteers clear and distinct among the Army Forces of the country. That was all very well, but it would not bring them a single step more forward than they were now. He could not agree with his hon. and gallant Friend that the Volunteers were not a territorial force; 489 the place of the Volunteers was in their own territorial district. They were, in fact, the most thoroughly territorial in their character of any of their Military Forces. They were really the only Force that was entirely associated with distinct localities, and which might be said to belong wholly to the district in which they were raised.
COLONEL SEELYsaid, that what he had remarked was, not that the Volunteers were not a territorial force, but that their connection with the territorial regiment was not a real but a verbal connection.
§ SIR ROBERT LOYD LINDSAYsaid, that territorial regiments were connected much less than he desired to see with the counties, and certainly there could be no doubt of the fact that the Volunteer regiments were absolutely territorial. They all belonged to the same districts; they were officered to a great extent by gentlemen living in the same county; and, in reality, they were the most territorial force the country possessed. Six or seven years ago, the Predecessor of his right hon. Friend who now held the position of Secretary of State for War appointed a Committee to inquire into the condition of the Volunteer Force, and that Committee made two or three recommendations. Some of them were made to the Volunteer Force itself, and they were in the nature of pointing out how the Force could best economize its resources. There was also a recommendation that there should be a further allowance from the State. With regard to those recommendations which were made to the Volunteers themselves, he thought he might say that every one of them was cheerfully and readily accepted and adopted by the Force. One of them was that the Force should consolidate small regiment3 and small companies into a battalion; and another was that they should assimilate their uniforms, and adopt, if possible, the territorial uniform of the regiment to which they were attached. There were several recommendations in regard to range and drill sheds, one and all of which, he believed, were adopted, and a great amelioration in the condition of the Force was brought about in consequence. There was another recommendation which only went to the extent of recommending an increase of the capitation grant; but, 490 nevertheless, it was suggested that an additional allowance should be given for training in camp. Very shortly after that Committee was appointed, a new Administration came into Office, and he was bound to confess that the new Secretary of State did carry out very loyally the recommendations which had been adopted by his Predecessors. To a certain extent the increased allowance for training in camp was granted to the Force, but it was not done to the full extent of what the Committee had hoped. The recommendation of the Committee which sat at the War Office was that, as the men could, in their opinion, only be made thoroughly efficient by attending Volunteer camps, an allowance of 2s. a-day for six days per head should be made to each man training in camp. A Vote was taken in the Estimates for the number of men whom it was thought probable would desire to go into camp. But the number of men who presented themselves in the following year exceeded the number for whom provision had been made in the Estimates. The Volunteers were accordingly informed at the War Office that more men were seeking to go into camp than there was provision for, and the surplus names were accordingly struck off. The result was that only a limited number of men had received the benefit of camp training, and the advantages, which were hoped to be derived by the Service when the recommendation of the Committee was made, had been much diminished. It was said that the Committee did not recommend any increase of the capitation grant. That was true; but it did recommend an increase of allowance. Since that Committee sat, now nearly seven years ago, circumstances had marched onwards very rapidly. The Volunteer Force itself had become more established in the opinion of the people, and it had become more accepted as one of the institutions of the country. That fact, gratifying and satisfactory as it was in every way, still possessed this disadvantage—that whereas in former days persons were ready to contribute annually to the maintenance of Volunteer regiments, they now considered that the Volunteer Force was established, and, therefore, they did not consider it necessary to make those contributions which they formerly made. They would as soon think now-a-days of contributing 491 to the maintenance of the Yeomanry and the Militia as of making any contribution towards the Volunteer Force. In that way there was a considerable call made on the Volunteers themselves for expenses which were originally subscribed for. In former times great liberality was displayed in lending Corn Exchanges, public halls, fields, and other places where the ordinary drill could be carried on. He could assure the Committee that now everything of that sort had to be paid for. If a Volunteer officer desired to take his men into a field for drill or practice he had to pay hard cash for the use of it. The result was that the Volunteer Force had considerable difficulty in holding its own in connection with the heavy charges which were constantly falling upon it; and it could not be denied that the Force was undoubtedly deficient in many respects. It was deficient so far as being properly equipped was concerned; and when a regiment was required to go out for two or three days, or to camp out for a week, it had no means of carrying the food that was necessary, together with ammunition and clothes. If the Volunteers were to be made really efficient those were matters which ought to be attended to. He would not advocate the giving of eleemosynary relief, because he did not think that was the way to deal with the Volunteer Force; but it was most unsatisfactory to require them, as at present, to carry a heavy burden on their back. It was very distasteful to them; it took away a great deal from a man's strength to make him a beast of burden, and it deprived him of the power of marching with celerity. There were excellent inventions for carrying kits, which were all to be obtained for money, and which ought to be supplied if the Military Authorities had any regard for the health and safety of the Volunteers. At the last Review at Brighton a number of regiments were positively without the slightest protection; and if the weather had been stormy, instead of fine, there would have been many men who would have been exposed for 24 hours to the inclemency of the weather without any protection whatever. What was really wanted was a further capitation grant; and if the Force was to be maintained in a satisfactory position, it would be necessary to increase that grant. They did not ask for any great increase, and what 492 the amount was to be must be left to the decision of those who framed the Estimates at the War Office. At the same time, he thought that some increase was absolutely necessary in order to preserve the vitality of the Force. Then, again, there was great difficulty experienced in obtaining officers. The difficulty arose in this way. Many of the Volunteer regiments were heavily in debt, and it was found that, although it was not a difficult matter to secure the services of officers who were quite ready to give their time and experience, they declined to take upon their shoulders the debts of the regiment, and, in consequence, the country lost the services of many men who were well qualified to command the Volunteer Force. Those were matters which he thought it was due to his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War (Mr. W. H. Smith) that he should have pointed out to him. He did not know whether his right hon. Friend would be able to give any guarantee upon the subject; but he had no doubt that his right hon. Friend would use his knowledge and bring his discretion to bear upon it. He did not advocate the appointment of any further Committee. The question had been investigated already by two or three Committees, and all the information that could be desired was now in the possession of the War Office. He thought his right hon. Friend, on inquiry, would see that the circumstances had materially changed from what they were seven years ago, when the Departmental Committee of the War Office sat, and that the time had now arrived when it was necessary to add to the capitation grant. In dealing with the question, he would deprecate any increase in the amount of money given merely for skill in shooting. It was well known in the Force that the registered work at the ranges was such as they could not altogether rely upon, and the making of the grant dependent upon the register kept by the sergeant at the range would, in his opinion, be much to be deprecated. If they wore to have an increase of the capitation grant, let them have it for efficiency. It was all very well to have increased shooting efficiency, and he should object to the taking away of any portion of the money prizes now awarded; but any increase of the capitation grant that might be given, ho earnestly hoped 493 would be given for efficiency, and that it would not be made to depend upon the men becoming marksmen, or upon high-class shooting.
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTER,said, he was anxious to explain to the Committee the nature of the increase on this Vote. The main increase — namely, £18,600, under Sub-head 15—was for the pay, &c, of Sergeant Inspectors of the Volunteer Corps. It was simply a transfer from Vote 1, and it was a charge made in accordance with the desire of the Public Accounts Committee, who were of opinion, and, he thought, very wisely, that it would be much better to have the pay of the permanent Staff of all the three arms of the Volunteer Service—Rifles, Artillery, and Engineers— included in that Vote. Up to the pre-sent time, the pay of the permanent Staff of Artillery and Engineers was taken in Vote 1, while the expenses of the permanent Staff of the Rifle Volunteers were taken in this Vote. It was thought better to transfer from Vote 1 the pay of the Artillery and Engineers, and include the whole of the pay for the three branches of the Volunteer Service in one Vote. That accounted for an increase of £18,600. The remainder, of course, was due to the increase in the number of the Volunteers. In regard to the other two items of increase—the addition to the capitation grant, £9,400, was explained by the increase of 6,000 men in the aggregate strength of the Volunteers, who were now 208,000 as against 202,000 last year; there was also the increase of £8,500 in the Miscellaneous Charges of the Volunteer Force, which was the increase alluded to by the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Sir Robert Loyd Lindsay) when speaking of the limit placed upon those who desired to go into the country for training, and earn the capitation grant by remaining there for six days. The late Government had thought it best not to limit the number upon a matter which seemed to be somewhat popular among all the Volunteer officers, and which afforded the Volunteers the best chance of learning the discipline taught in the Regular Army, and of becoming efficient. That discipline was far better taught in camp. The camp services were never taught except in camp; and, generally speaking, the popularity of this service was 494 so great that it was thought it might have been better to have granted the full amount last year. That accounted for a further increase of £4,800. He was anxious to say one or two words in answer to the speeches of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Berkshire and of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Nottingham (Colonel Seely), both of whom made, he believed, demands for increased expenditure upon the Volunteer Service. There had been a statement made in "another place," by his noble Friend the Under Secretary of State in the late Government (the Earl of Morley), on this very question. The hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire formed one of the Committee who sat seven years ago, and went into the whole question of Volunteer equipment and the capitation grants. The object of the inquiry of that Committee was to ascertain the host possible means of increasing the allowance made to the Volunteers. When the present Government came into Office, they found that there had been an augmentation of the grant, and substantially they carried out all the recommendations that were made by the Committee. But as to the supply of kits, it was thought that all the requirements would be met if a certain number of articles were kept in store and issued when they were required. It was felt that there would be great difficulty in storing all the articles required; and, further, that if they were issued to the Volunteers, there was a risk of their being used for non-military purposes. That was a point to which he wished to call the attention of his hon. and gallant Friend. His hon. and gallant Friend argued in favour of an increase of the capitation grant to the amount of not more than 10s.; but it must be remembered that the Volunteers were a very largo Force, now numbering 208,000, and if they increased the capitation grant from 30.s. to £2, they would really be putting the country to a cost of £100,000 for that one item of increase. It had always been a difficulty that in any grant to the Volunteers they must make it universal. They could hardly make it dependent upon any condition of efficiency; and if every Volunteer was to receive an additional sum of 10.?., it would be found that there must be an increase in the Estimates of the Secre- 495 tary of State for War of something very close upon £100,000; and as to the desire to have particular articles, as he had pointed out, they could not be sure that their use would be confined to Volunteer or military purposes. For instance, great coats might be used in a variety of ways, and as to water-bottles, they might be very easily supplied by the Volunteers themselves. All they had to do was to procure a soda water-bottle and have it covered with leather. Then, again, with regard to ammunition, it was hardly right that the men should carry ammunition about with them except when on actual duty. They must be treated like the Regular soldiers, who were never entrusted with ammunition except on duty.
COLONEL SEELYsaid, he quite agreed with that; but he thought it ought to be kept in the Volunteer stores.
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTERsaid, the custom of the Regular Army was to issue ammunition through the Quartermaster to soldiers going on duty. That ammunition they carried in their pouches, and re-delivered when they came off duty. It had been found inconvenient to place deadly weapons in the hands of the men without restriction. It would probably be remembered that a number of outrages were committed in 1854, in consequence of allowing ammunition to be indiscriminately carried. For instance, Captain Keate was shot at, and there was a desperate murder at Chatham of two officers; and in consequence Viscount Cardwell, who was Secretary of State for War at the time, issued an order that all unused ammunition served out to soldiers going on duty should be returned into store when they came off duty. He thought the Volunteers ought to be treated in the same way; but there ought to be means of serving out ammunition rapidly in the case of an emergency. His hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Nottingham (Colonel Seely) had referred to the issue of canvas bags to enable the men to carry rations with them. That might be an excellent thing in an enemy's country; but he would appeal to his hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Sir Robert Loyd Lindsay), as an old Adjutant of the Guards to say whether it was not a matter which might safely be placed in the hands of the Quartermaster? A telegram could always be sent to the Quartermaster at the station whence 496 the troops were proceeding, to say when a regiment was about to arrive, and he would be able to provide them with a hot meal and all the provisions they required at the time of their arrival. Of course, there were various things in which by the expenditure of a little money it would be possible to increase the efficiency and comfort of the Volunteers; but where it would be necessary to incur a very great expense, the question they ought to ask was whether it was worth while, considering the enormous outlay which would have to be incurred, to place at the disposal of the Volunteers those appliances which were only really required if they were serving in an enemy's country. He apologized for having detained the Committee; but he was anxious to show that the Department, so far as the late Government were concerned, were fully aware of the interests of the Volunteer Force, but had considered that in many of the requisitions made the cost would more than out-balance the advantage.
THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY, WAR DEPARTMENT (Mr. NORTH-COTE)said, the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Sir Arthur Hayter) had left him very little to say in reference to matters of detail connected with the Office in which he had the honour to be his Successor. But he hoped he should not be misrepresenting the feelings of his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War when he said that all suggestions made with the object of securing the increased efficiency of the Volunteer Force would receive from the present Administration most anxious and careful consideration. It was impossible to speak too highly of the great anxiety of the men who formed the Volunteer Force to become more and more efficient. The General Commanding at Aldershot, in his Report for last year, said—
The Volunteers came down in considerable force towards the close of the drill season. They were put through a short course, beginning with battalion drill, under the supervision of their respective brigadiers, and ending with a sham fight on the Fox Hills. They took the greatest pains with and interest in their drill, and their progress was extraordinary. Their discipline and general conduct were admirable.He thought that that Report, coming as it did from a most experienced Officer, would give the utmost satisfaction in 497 regard to the efficiency of the Volunteer Force. The present discussion had ranged over a wide field, and questions of the utmost importance had been raised in it. The hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Tomlinson) suggested the appointment of a Committee to inquire into the organization of the Force. That suggestion had not been received with general favour; but it was obviously necessary in the first instance to consult the Volunteer officers on the subject. Various proposals for increasing the efficiency of the Volunteers had been made in the course of that discussion by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Berkshire (Sir Robert Loyd Lindsay), and the hon. and gallant Member for Nottingham (Colonel Seely), and without expressing at that moment any opinion as to the propriety of increasing the capitation grant, ho might say that those suggestions deserved and would receive very careful consideration. The question which was raised by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Berkshire as to the increase of the capitation grant, had been fully dealt with by the hon. and gallant Member for Bath (Sir Arthur Hayter), and ho certainly must point out to his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Berkshire that the simple addition of 10s. a-head to the capitation grant would lead to an increase in the entire Volunteer grant of no less than £100,000 a-year. It was obvious that that was a serious demand to make, and one which before it could be adopted would require careful consideration. With regard to camping out and other matters, he thought the House of Commons should take such steps as would assure the Volunteers that they were disposed to deal with the Force fairly and even generously.
§ MR. GREGORYsaid, he must apologize for intruding himself ill the debate; but the Volunteer Force was one of great importance to the country, and was deserving of so much consideration that he had risen for the purpose of making one or two remarks. In the Volunteers the nation had now a Force of 208,000 men, which would cost the country, according to the Estimates, £700,000 in the course of the year. Surely, that was by no means an extravagant sum to pay for their services; and he was of opinion that even some slight increase would not be altogether inappropriate. 498 From year to year they expected the Force to be in a condition of greater efficiency, and to have made rapid progress, and every year it would be found that the Force devoted themselves more and more to the Service with with they were connected. In regard to the increase of the capitation grant, he would not advocate any general increase; but he thought there was one point in which encouragement might be usefully given, and that was in respect of the shooting of the men. There was a discussion upon that subject last year, and the Secretary of State promised that something should be done in that respect. It was well known, particularly in the Metropolitan District, and in some of the large towns, that considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining convenient ranges at which the men could practice. That difficulty did not exist so much in the rural districts, but it did in regard to some of the most efficient and able Volunteer Corps of the country which belonged to the large towns. He could not help thinking that something might be done to provide convenient ranges, so that the various corps might have reasonable facilities afforded them for improving their shooting. He would suggest that there should be some small grant to those Volunteers who showed a higher state of efficiency than the rest, and that for shooting up to a certain standard a certain grant should be given which would enable a corps to meet the expense they were put to owing to the want of a convenient range close at hand, or owing to the difficulty they had in proceeding to and from the shooting ground. If something were done in that respect, he knew, from communications ho had received, that it would give great satisfaction to many Commanding Officers of regiments, and it would not put the country to a very heavy expense. He would submit for the consideration of the Government whether some grant of of that kind might not be made for efficient shooting, so as to relieve the corps from some of the expense and difficulties they at present experienced in discharging very important functions.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (3.) £384,500, Army Reserve Force.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, the number of Reserve men in the Reserve last year was put down at 42,500, 499 and the number put down for 1885–6 was also 42,500. He presumed that there were not that number in the Re-serves at the present moment, because he thought his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War (Mr. W. H. Smith) had said that they had drawn from the Reserves in one case 2,348 men, and in another 969 men. He should be glad if his right hon. Friend could inform the Committee what was the number at present serving with the Reserve? He would also like to ask his right hon. Friend what course he proposed to take in regard to the time-expired men, who numbered 4,100? How long did he intend to retain those men with the Colours? Were they to go into the Reserves, or what was the proposal he intended to make in regard to them? He would also ask his right hon. Friend if he would carefully consider the question of the depot centres and the calling out of the Reserve men belonging to each of those depot centres every year? He saw from a paper that day that it was said that the Government proposed to allow men from the Reserves to volunteer into any regiments they chose. If that were done, it would at once do away with the system of local regiments; and ho was very anxious to know if there was any truth in the statement, because, if it were true, the system of which they had heard so much, and which had been so favourably considered by the authorities at the War Office, was evidently about to fall to the ground? His own opinion had always been that the Reserve men ought to be called out, even if it were only for one day; that they ought to be fitted with their clothing, and that they ought to know their places in the regiment to which they belonged. They should also be put through the necessary drill and rifle exercise to see if they were efficient. If they were found efficient there was not the slightest reason why, when they appeared on parade and showed that they wore up to the mark, they should not be dismissed to their homes. Parliament had given power to call them out for eight days; but if a man showed that he was efficient, and it was known where he could be found, that was all that could be required of him. But if they were to be allowed to volunteer into any regiment they chose the system would inevitably break down. 500 He also wished to ask his right hon. Friend to consider carefully whether the Reserve men ought to be called out on every occasion that they found it necessary to enter upon a small war. It was said, when the Reserve was originally formed, that the men would only be called out in the event of an emergency; but now they seemed to be unable to send a small Force anywhere, without calling-out the Reserves, not only for service abroad, but to do duty at borne. He would ask his right hon. Friend whether he would not give his attention to this matter, which, in his judgment, deserved the most serious consideration?
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. W. H. SMITH)said, he was sure his hon. and gallant Friend would see that, having hold his present position at the War Office for a fortnight only, ho was not yet in a position to lay down principles on which the Army should be governed. He could only say then, with regard to the Reserve Force, that Her Majesty's Government regarded it as exceeding valuable, and one which ought to be treated with the greatest care and judgment, and that any suggestion which his hon. and gallant Friend had to make in connection with it should receive consideration. As to the general principle of calling out the Reserves on every occasion when the slightest strain was placed upon their military system, he had no hesitation in saying that that was not desirable. No doubt, the object of the Reserve was to constitute a Force upon which the country could depend in a time of considerable emergency.
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTERsaid, this was a question of bringing the Reserves together so that when they were called out for service they should be drilled for a certain period, and not receive pay until they could prove that they had attended a certain number of drills. He thought this matter would be very simple, because he understood from a high authority in the Army that it would not be necessary to do more than bring them out and attach them to a Volunteer Corps, with whom they could learn their drill and fire the number of rounds required from efficient Volunteers. The advantage of that was that if they wore attached to a Volunteer Corps they would not interfere with the enrolled members of the corps, while, at the same time, 501 they would learn their drill in the cheapest possible way. With regard to the calling out of the Reserves, it had not been the intention of the late Government, nor was it, he supposed, the intention of the present Government, to call out for small wars the whole of the Reserve. The desire and intention was that there should he a drilled Reserve of 40,000 or 50,000 men in the country. He thought it would be an excellent thing to have the Reserve men attached to a Volunteer Corps with whom they could drill on Saturday afternoons. Ho believed that Colonel I)u Plat Taylor was quite prepared to take 200 Reserve men in his own corps. The expense would only be that of equipping and clothing them, and probably a capitation grant paid to the Commanding Officer of the corps for the men. He understood from an authority of high position at the War Office that if the men were taught to shoot there would be no difficulty whatever in regard to drill. They would be practised both at loose order and close order drill at the butts. Then there was the advantage that they would know to whom they paid the money earned by the Reserve; they would know that the men were efficient and that they were ready, while, at the same time, the arrangements could be carried out at the least possible expense. There were also 6,500 Army Pensioners, all veteran soldiers, to whom he thought it would not be unfair to say that in consideration of the money which they received they should go through a certain number of drills. Not being called out on permanent duty, no further cost of pay or pension would be incurred. Ho hoped the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would carry on the investigation which had been instituted, and carry out the plan of drilling the men with the Volunteers in the cheapest manner possible.
§ MR. TOMLINSONsaid, he could not help thinking that the suggestion put forward by the hon. and gallant Baronet (Sir Arthur Hayter) with respect to putting Reserve men through their drill with the Volunteers was a valuable one, and he believed that if it were carried out it might be of advantage to the men of both Services. But there had been this difficulty felt, both with regard to the Volunteers and the Reserve men— namely, that the employers of those 502 men were not always ready to consent to their attending the drills at certain times. He thought that certain days would have to be fixed for drilling the men together. It was very desirable that the Volunteers, as well as the Reserve men, should be in force on those days, so that the battalions might be of adequate strength; and, looking at the matter from the point of view of the Volunteers, he believed it would be a valuable thing to have the Reserve men paraded with them, especially when in camp. But it had come to his knowledge that, either from not valuing the Force sufficiently, or for other reasons, employers were reluctant to allow men the proper facilities for going into camp; and hon. Members would know that it was a great hardship to them to have to give up for that purpose employments of value, which they could not resume. As the whole country was interested in the efficiency of those Forces, he suggested the consideration whether some penalty should not attach to employers who unduly refused their assent to the men performing their military duty. That question was becoming more and more important every day; the Reserve Forces were increasing yearly, and it was most desirable that the Volunteer Force should turn out in as great strength as possible on certain occasions; and, therefore, he urged the importance of Her Majesty's Government considering how, in some way or other, they could lessen the shortsightedness which it was well known existed among some people on that subject.
§ COLONEL NOLANsaid, he thought that employers ought to be punished if they did not allow the Reserve men in their employ to go out, if it was the law that they should go out. But the real point to be considered was, that if the Reserve men were called out unnecessarily, they were prevented from getting employment, because their employers naturally did not want to lose their services. Ho believed that in Germany and France the Reserve men were never, or almost never, called out for drill, although in Germany they were sometimes called out for a week or 10 days for the purpose of being taught the use of a new arm, and in France he believed that they were only called out, perhaps, once in four or five years for manœuvres only, and not for drill. Why should 503 they want to call out the Reserve men more than the Germans and the French; and why should they worry the men by calling them out, and getting them into difficulties with their employers? It was in that way that the lives of the Reserve men were made burdensome to them, and he had himself received many letters from Reserve men complaining of the loss of employment, which they could not get back again. He hoped that, if the rule were introduced of sending them out with the Volunteers, in Ireland they would not be called out at all—that they would be allowed to go free in Ireland until, at any rate, there were Volunteers there.
§ Vote agreed to.
§
(4.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £464,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge for Commissariat, Transport, and Ordnance Store Establishments, Wages, &c, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1886.
DR. CAMERONsaid, he had to congratulate Her Majesty's Government on the choice they had made in appointing the hon. Member for the North Riding of Yorkshire (Mr. Guy Dawnay) to the Office of Surveyor General of Ordnance. He had been on the Committee with the hon. Gentleman, and it was well known that he had been most zealous in probing every abuse to the bottom, and most sharp in seeing through any attempt to hoodwink the Committee, and therefore he looked forward with great hope to the career of the new Surveyor General of Ordnance. He felt most hopeful that, by the exercise of that zeal and energy which he had shown himself to possess, he would be able to cleanse the Augean stable, the affairs of which he had been called to administer, and to do more good in the Office he held than any of his Predecessors had done for a long time. The examples by which he proposed to make good his reference to the Augean stable would be taken from what had occurred during the Soudan War. He would confine himself to the working of the Department to which the Vote referred during that war. The labours of the Committee which sat last year to investigate the action of the Department had not been thrown away; they had done immense good: and the fact that 504 in many respects the Supply Service of the Soudan Campaign had been efficiently conducted, was due to the fact that publicity had frightened the officials, and that in consequence many recommendations which were before declared to be impossible of fulfilment had been carried into effect. The officials of the Department had come before the Committee, and the Committee were told that certain suggestions could not be adopted, and that they were perfectly unworkable; but he would point out that the number of suggestions which were adopted was very considerable indeed. The Commissariat, for example, had repeatedly suggested that there should be separate ships for stores; that was said to be impossible, but it was carried out. They said that supercargoes should be sent with store-ships; that was said to be impossible, but they were sent. A recommendation was made to reduce the size of the packages for transport; that had been repeatedly ignored, but now the suggestion was adopted, and in the last campaign packages were sent out in a more handy and manageable form than had before been, the case. But while improvements were seen in the conduct of the Soudan Expedition, there were certain vices inherent in the system, as at present organized, which were manifested in the Soudan War, as in every preceding war. He believed that in connection with the Soudan War the Engineering Department urged upon the Government that the construction of the Berber-Suakin Railway should be taken up by military engineers; but it was not. Some time ago he had asked the late Secretary of State for War a Question concerning a quantity of biscuits that were sent up the Nile, and of which, on arrival, large quantities were found to have been rendered useless. It was said that they had been packed in trade cases which were insufficient, and that they had been exposed to wet in going up the Nile. In answer to that Question he was told that the biscuits were not packed in trade cases, but in cases specially recommended by the Mobilization Committee, and that they had been exposed to great dangers in going up the Nile. But, as a matter of fact, that was only found to be the case among what were called "Captain's" biscuits; and the bulk of the biscuit supply, which 505 was obtained from the Naval Stores at Deptford, being properly packed, arrived in perfect order at its destination. He understood that if the "Captain's" biscuits had been properly inspected, the result would have been different, and that they would have arrived in as good condition as the biscuits from Deptford; and he might mention that the reduction he was about to move to this Vote referred to the salary of the official who passed those biscuits. Some person must be to blame in that matter, and ho wanted to know who was responsible? Then there were tea, and sugar, and salt sent up the Nile, and on arrival large quantities were found to have been destroyed. The tea was packed in cases fastened with shellac, not with solder, which would have been effective. The groceries, sugar, and salt were, to the extent of some 25 per cent, destroyed by wet in the passage up the Nile. Did the Committee imagine for one moment that it was not foreseen that those things were to be exposed to wet? That was all foreseen, and he understood that water-proof bags were sent out for the purpose of protecting the sugar and salt; and, therefore, either they could not have been put into those bags, or they could not have been properly fastened in them. The result of that was that the soldiers had to go on short rations. Someone must have been responsible for that neglect also. In order to carry the biscuits, which had to be thrown into the Nile or buried in the desert; in order to carry the bags of sugar and salt, which had not been properly placed in their water-proof coverings, the most necessary stores had to be omitted. In that way no clothes were sent on to the Army, and in the course of a short time the troops were literally clothed in rags. In order that they might be able to carry those damaged biscuits, and the salt and sugar that had been rendered useless in the way he had described, they had to omit the conveyance of boots, which, so far as the necessary equipment of an Army was concerned, ranked next in importance to arms and ammunition. The consequence was that their unfortunate soldiers, who were obliged to make prolonged marches through the desert, found themselves in large numbers walking over the hot, shingly sand, either with bare feet, or with such make-shift substitutes for 506 boots, in the shape of sandals, as they could contrive to fasten round their feet. He thought that that one fact would suffice to show the Committee the importance of sending out the very best articles required for use in a campaign, and taking every possible care that they should arrive in proper condition. Again, in order to carry the things he had described as so very inadequately looked after, it became necessary to omit the requisite supply of corn for the enormous number of camels that had been provided for the use of the Army, and the consequence was that corn was only obtained with extreme difficulty, and the wretched camels for whom it was needed got almost smaller rations than the men, the fact being that they never got more, in the majority of cases, than about 5 lbs. of grain per day. Another result of the impossibility of finding room in the transports for all the things that had to be carried was that the men were obliged to go without their tobacco, the space that would have sufficed for that and other articles being taken up with a lot of rotten biscuits and the improperly packed bags of salt and sugar of which he had already spoken. As he had previously stated, all the difficulties he had enumerated were perceived and recognized beforehand, for it was foreseen that the boats would often be partly submerged, and every provision was consequently made to guard against that contingency; but, notwithstanding that, every preparation that had been made with that object was frustrated owing to somebody's fault. Now, he wanted to know who that somebody was'? This had reference to the Department of the Director of Supply, and they ought to be able to ascertain with whom the fault rested, Then, again, he had to bring under the attention of the Committee what had happened in the case of the purchase of camels. What, he asked, had been there-suit of the camel contracts? Why, that the animals obtained were of the most wretched description, while the management of those purchased was often equally bad. He had been informed by a professional gentleman—a veterinary surgeon—who was on the spot—he did not know whether he was actually at Cairo or not, but he was, at all events, in Egypt at the period referred to—that from 20 to 30 percent of the camels pur- 507 chased at Cairo wore absolutely unfit for service, that proportion of the animals being unsuitable, either through actual disease or physical inefficiency— which was precisely what had been the case in the Afghan War. The same thing occurred at Suez, where, at the depot established at that place, there were upwards of 1,000 of those animals, a large proportion of which, he was informed, were also totally unfit for service. Those animals had, however, been bought for the use of the British Expedition, and in the great majority of cases they were bought without having been subjected to veterinary inspection. There was another matter in relation to the supply of camels to which he was anxious to draw attention. An hon. and gallant Member (Colonel Dawnay) had, on a former occasion, put a Question on the subject, but had failed to elicit an answer; and he (Dr. Cameron) therefore, wanted to obtain an answer now. He referred to the case of a shipload of camels, in regard to which the hon. and gallant Member for Thirsk (Colonel Dawnay) had asked a Question of the late Government. It was reported that a shipload of camels had been received at Suakin, the whole of which were in such a state of unfitness that the entire lot had to be sent back to Suez. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) who was then at the head of the War Department, had promised that the matter should be inquired into; but he (Dr. Cameron) was not aware whether the noble Marquess had instituted an inquiry. They had had general assurances that the camels were excellent; but he (Dr. Cameron) could furnish specific instances of their being nothing of the kind, and he would undertake to prove that assertion if he were afforded an opportunity of so doing. He could also show that when serviceable camels were obtained, they were sometimes mismanaged in the most horrible fashion. The fact was, that they were not put under the management of anyone who knew anything about those animals, but, on the contrary, were placed under the charge of Infantry officers who had had no experience of camels; and he had been informed that in some cases, in order to accustom the animals to desert work, they were ordered to be watered only once in three days. They had, of course, all heard the story of the man who contended that his horse 508 only ate as a matter of custom, and that it could be reduced by careful management to do without food altogether, and who was convinced that he should have carried out successfully the experiment he made in that direction had it not been that, unfortunately for his theory, when he had got the animal down to a straw a-day it died. It ought to have been understood that when the camels were in the vicinity of a plentiful water supply they should have been allowed to have as much as they wanted; but the result of the treatment to which those particular animals were subjected was that when they started on their journey through the desert, after having only been watered once in three days, they were wholly unfit for the work they had to do, and while upon the march they died like rotten sheep. He had been told that in consequence of the exposures before the Committee of 1884, some genius had actually sent out farriers to see to the auxiliary transport employed in the Soudan Campaign—an idea which had not occurred to those who had had charge of the Expedition of 1882; but he was informed that even in the Nile Expedition large shoes, fit only for carthorses, had been sent out for the purpose of shoeing the small horses used by their soldiers in that campaign, the result being that in certain Cavalry regiments the horses had to go unshod, as they had to go unshod in the Expedition of 1882. During the time the war was in progress they had heard a good deal about the swords of two of their Cavalry regiments having been found utterly unreliable, and having been condemned accordingly. That also was a matter connected with the Vote they were now discussing. As to the bayonets served out to their soldiers, and which it was reported had turned out so badly, he was informed that there had been some exaggeration in the statements which had been made. Probably his hon. Friend the Surveyor General of Ordnance, who had been out in Egypt, would say something on that point. There was, however, one other matter to which he should like to draw the attention of the Committee, and that was with regard to the cartridges served out to their men. The cartridges themselves did not come within the Vote he was then discussing, but the officers of the Ordnance Department who were 509 responsible for sending them out did come under it, and, therefore, the matter was germane to the question then before the Committee. They were all aware of the extent to which those cartridges jammed when in use by their soldiers in action with the enemy. It had been stated that 25 per cent of the Boxer cartridges got jammed. If that were so, he asked the Committee could there possibly be anything more disgraceful? He asserted that such a scandal as that ought not to be allowed to pass without the most searching investigation and the most zealous and careful attempt to bring home the blame to the proper parties. A number of those cartridges were not sent out in water-proof cases, and the result was that they were found to have been damaged by wet, and thus to have been rendered useless, in consequence of which they were condemned. The worst part of the business was that a number of the damaged cartridges were served out and missed fire just at the moment when they were most needed. Another point relating to the cartridges was this. The calibre of the Gardner machine gun and that of the Martini-Henry rifle were the same, and it would have occurred to anyone but a genius in the Department presided over by his hon. Friend the Surveyor General of Ordnance that it would have been as well to have made the cartridges interchangeable. But that was not the case; and the consequence was that when the time came at which the Army ran extremely short of Gardner-gun cartridges, although it was, at the same time, well supplied with Martini-Henry cartridges, it was unable to make use of the latter in order to make good the deficiency of cartridges for the machine guns. That, too, was the Department that had sent out for the use of the Navy those wonderful guns of which they had heard so much. No doubt, his hon. Friend below him (Mr. Carbutt) would give the Committee the whole history of those guns, and would explain how it was that when they were fired their muzzles were so frequently blown off. His hon. Friend the Member for Perthshire (Sir Donald Currie), in discussing the Navy Estimates on a former occasion, had called attention to the case of H.M.S. Baring, which was one of the ships they had off Madagascar at the time the French were engaged in 510 hostilities there, and on board which vessel, out of the nine guns she carried, it was only safe to fire one, the remainder being in such a condition that they were ordered not to be fired. There could be no doubt of that fact, as it had been admitted by the late Secretary to the Admiralty, who had replied to his hon. Friend the Member for Perthshire. They would doubtless be told, on the present occasion, that a letter had been received from the Commander-in-Chief stating that everything had been conducted in the most admirable manner in the prosecution of the Soudan Expedition. He would, however, ask hon. Members not to allow themselves to close their minds against the statements he had made simply because that authority would be quoted against him. In the Egyptian Campaign Sir John Adye himself, the Surveyor General of Ordnance, had told them everything was first-rate, and that where anything had gone wrong it was simply owing to military exigencies. He (Dr. Cameron) did not see how that statement could be accepted as justifying the home purchase of unsuitable flour, which had been proved to have been sent out with the Expedition, nor was he able to see in what way it could justify the payment of an enormous price for bad hay. Nevertheless, Sir John Adye had made that statement; and from that day to the present moment, whenever he had brought forward any complaint as to management of the Expedition of 1882, he had been invariably met by the assertion that Sir John Adye, having said everything was all right, it must be so. He should like, before ho sat down, to show the Committee the extraordinary nature of the assertions the War Office officials endeavoured to ram down the throats of sensible men; and he thought that when the Committee saw the kind of assaults which were thus made upon their credulity, they would admit that it was well to be somewhat cautious as to the manner in which they received general statements, and that they ought to exercise their own judgment upon questions connected with the charges brought against the Department. In the Report of the Commissary General concerning the Egyptian War, that officer had stated that, no doubt, candles were more useful than oil lamps, but that if they did send out 511 oil lamps, it was just as well to send out oil to put in them. He (Dr. Cameron) had put a Question on that subject in the Select Committee, and was told that the Woolwich authorities, although they sent out oil lamps, had not sent out oil, but had sent out candles. The matter was, after all, only a trivial one; and they would probably have heard no more about it but for the fact that the Acting Director of Supply and Transport, who had nothing to do with the lamps, but had sent out the candles, thought it incumbent upon him to show the Committee, once for all, that the assertions which had been made with regard to the lamps were not to be believed. That official, consequently, placed a lamp before the Committee. It so happened that the Acting Director of Supplies did not know what sort of lamp was referred to from the technical description given by the Commissary General; and when he appeared before the Committee, he brought with him what was called a "distinguishing lamp," and he showed how, by taking out of the lamp the socket intended for the wick, and by placing a candle in its place, it could be made to burn very well. But the Commissary General said—"That is not what I meant." Accordingly, next day, a witness was sent from the Ordnance Stores to show how little a matter it was that so great a fuss had been made about; and as the lamp he then brought before the Committee lay about the Committee Room for a long time, he (Dr. Cameron) put it on one side in order that he might show it to the House, as he thought hon. Members would agree with him that there was nothing like ocular demonstration. Here (producing a lamp) was the identical oil lamp referred to, and here (pointing to one portion of it) was the place where the wick should be. The witness from the Ordnance Stores had brought with him a candle, and the candle which he (Dr. Cameron) now produced was as near the size of the genuine article as anything he was able to procure. A cut had to be made in the side of the candle to admit the tube intended to admit air to the oil reservoir. The candle was then put into the lamp by the witness, who said—"There you have it." But the Surveyor General of Ordnance (Mr. Guy Dawnay), who was one of the Members of the Committee, was not quite satisfied that an oil lamp con- 512 stituted the Lest means of burning a candle, and he said—"Light it." The candle was then lit by the witness, and it was seen that the top of the candle reached high up into the brass chimney which surmounted the glass globe of the lantern, and that it made the metal almost red hot, so that the lantern could not be held by the hand, while the smell given out was so acrid that the Committee would very soon experience it if he (Dr. Cameron) were now to attempt a similar experiment. The result was that the flame from the candle did not become visible until after the Commissariat candle had burnt down to within an inch of the end, and then the thing became a useful lantern. That was the sort of attempt that was made on the credulity of the Committee. Sir John Adye was produced as a witness, and he was asked—"Had you any trouble about these candles and lanterns?" Sir John Adye replied— "I never used them." "What did you use?" was the next question; and the answer was —"A candle stuck in a bottle;" and then it came out that the lantern was intended for out-door use. The Committee might easily imagine what was to be expected if the men had to go about looking after their horses among hay and forage with candles stuck in bottles. The chances were that under such circumstances they would be very likely to set fire to the hay and roast the horses. His (Dr. Cameron's) experience in regard to matters such as these was that the Parliamentary Representatives of the War Department seemed to become fascinated by the influence of their permanent officials, as birds wore said to be fascinated by snakes. His hon. Friend the Surveyor General of Ordnance had fortunately entered upon his Office with the advantage of a preliminary training that might possibly enable him to resist that fascination; and he (Dr. Cameron) earnestly trusted that that would prove to be the case. If the hon. Gentleman would only apply his energies to the reform of the Department over which he presided, the result would be that his name would be held in veneration by coming generations of the British Army. He now begged to move the reduction of the Vote by £1,000, of which sum £500 was in respect of the salary of the gentleman who sent out the bad biscuits, and the other 513 £500 in respect of the salary of the gentleman who had sent out the cartridges which were improperly pocked.
§
Motion made, and Question proposed
That a sum, not exceeding £463,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge for Commissariat, Transport, and Ordnance Store Establishments, Wages, &c, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1886."—(Dr. Cameron.)
§ THE SURVEYOR GENERAL OF THE ORDNANCE (Mr. GUY DAWNAY)said, the hon. Gentleman the Member for Glasgow had made a very kindly reference to himself (Mr. Dawnay) in the course of his speech; and he must thank him for the manner in which he had done so. It was one of the somewhat curious results of the change of side9 by the two Parties in that House that he should have found himself in the position of having to reply, as Surveyor General of Ordnance, to the remarks of the hon. Gentleman. He did not wish for one moment to conceal from the Committee the fact that he had sympathized most heartily in the course the hon. Member had taken when he had moved for a Committee to inquire into the management of the Commissariat and Transport Service during the Egyptian Campaign of 1882. He (Mr. Dawnay) had himself sat on that Committee, he believed he had attended every meeting of that Committee, and he had certainly come away at the close of the inquiry with a full conviction of the propriety of the action adopted by the hon. Member who had raised this question. His hon. Friend, in the course of the speech he had just made, had alluded to the somewhat unexpected collapse of the inquiry entered into by that Committee; and he (Mr. Dawnay) must say that he had first heard of the collapse of that investigation with feelings of very considerable disappointment, and with a good deal of doubt as to the wisdom of such an issue. But he felt bound to state that during the fortnight that had elapsed since he had first occupied the post he now held, he had considerably modified the views he had at first entertained on that point; and he was fully persuaded, from what he knew of the candour and intelligence of his hon. Friend (Dr. Cameron), that he would have come to the same conclusion, and owned to the same conclusion, if he had been placed in the same 514 position. Under similar circumstances, he was very sure that the hon. Member for Glasgow would have appreciated as fully as he (Mr. Dawnay) did at the present moment the enormous strain put upon the energies of the Heads of Departments, and on the efficiency of the work depending upon those energies which was entailed by constant attendance on a House of Commons Committee during the time Her Majesty's Forces were actually in the field. His (Mr. Dawnay's) only wish, and he believed also that of the hon. Member, had been, not merely to substantiate the charges brought against a Department for the mere sake of substantiating them, not merely to justify their own action, but to secure the permanent improvement of the Services their inquiries dealt with, and, as a result, the increased comfort and the increased efficiency of our Forces in the field. Those results, he was happy to say, had already been attained. The hon. Member for Glasgow had placed upon the Paper several Motions for the reduction of various items of the Estimates; and he understood that the hon. Gentleman had taken that course in order to afford himself those facilities for pressing home the charges he had brought forward, of which the sudden collapse of the Committee's labours had deprived him. He would, however, appeal to the hon. Member not to press those charges further. One of those Motions was for the reduction of Vote 16, with regard to the Heads of Departments; and ho would specially appeal to the hon. Gentleman not to make invidious references to the Heads of Departments, whose energies he (Mr. Dawnay) was in a somewhat better position to appreciate than he had been when he sat on the Select Committee, of which the hon. Gentleman was also a Member. He would briefly refer to certain mistakes which the hon. Member had asserted were made during the last Soudan Campaign. The hon. Gentleman had brought before the Committee the case of supplies in the shape of sugar, salt, and biscuits, which were stated to have been improperly packed. That had occurred during the preparations for the Nile Campaign; and as he (Mr. Dawnay) could not speak upon the matter with any personal knowledge, ho would prefer, for his own part, to say nothing on the subject. He would, 515 however, refer the hon. Gentleman to what had been said by Lord Wolseley in regard to the manner in which the Army was provided. Lord Wolseley said, in his despatch of April 16—
I have never served with, or heard of any Army in the field that was as well fed as that under my orders on the Upper Nile. The quality of the food and the quantity of the ration allowed left nothing to he desired.And he added that, speaking generally, the manner in which the food was packed was satisfactory, and was a great improvement, on the whole, upon the packing in former Campaigns. The hon. Member for Glasgow had also made some remarks on the way in which the camels were watered and managed, and had stated that it was abominable. He (Mr. Dawnay) was sorry to hear the hon. Gentleman make that assertion, because he himself was for some time responsible for that management. With regard to the camels at Suakin, he (Mr. Dawnay) had landed about 4,000 camels himself, and could speak from his own personal experience.
DR. CAMERONsaid, he had referred to the keeping of those camels without water, and for that he did not think the hon. Gentleman was at all responsible.
§ THE SURVEYOR GENERAL OF THE ORDNANCEsaid, the allegation that those camels were kept for three days without water before being sent on the march was one which he could most distinctly deny. He had travelled a good deal with camels, and, speaking from his own experience in desert travelling, his opinion was that those animals should not be watered more than once in two days if they were to do useful work. If he found any fault on this point it was that the camels at Suakin were taken to water every day, though, owing to the difficulties of water supply, it was possible that they did not every day get as much as they wanted. It was, however, true that the camels at Suez had left that place without proper veterinary inspection; but it should be remembered that the circumstances were those of very exceptional pressure, the troops being sent out in a great hurry, and camels having to be got with all possible expedition, so that they were obliged to take such animals as they could; and it being impossible at first to get Indian camels, they were compelled to take the Delta camels, 516 which were the very worst they could have had for the work required in the Soudan. There was, however, no choice in the matter, as it was necessary to send camels to Suakin to meet the troops, and the Delta camels were taken as a matter of necessity in the case. That so many Delta camels should have been sent was, he thought, a mistake, as it would have been much hotter to have waited for camels from Berberah and India; but, under the pressure of circumstances, the course taken was one which was supposed to be unavoidable. He believed there were only two veterinary surgeons in Egypt at the time, and neither of those were available; and, in consequence, camels that could never have passed a proper inspection were sent down the Red Sea from Suez to Suakin. He (Mr. Dawnay), being the Transport officer at the spot, had taken upon himself the responsibility, in conjunction with a veterinary surgeon, and with the approval of the General, of sending back a number of camels that arrived at Suakin suffering from the mange. There were two sorts of mange to which camels were subject—the ordinary mange, and what was called the red mange. The ordinary mange was not a very serious complaint, but the red mange was; and some of the animals, when sent from Suez, were afflicted with the latter disease. The result was that, in the absence of a sufficient veterinary staff at Suez, no proper notice was taken of the cases of red mange, and animals suffering from that disease were put on board with the rest, so that a certain number having it at starting, others caught it on the voyage, and during a detention of five days in the harbour at Suakin, rendered necessary by the inadequacy of the landing stages; and when it became possible to land them, a very great number were found to be suffering from a most virulent form of the disease he had named. Under those circumstances, he certainly did think it far better and more economical to at once reject and send back the whole diseased cargo, rather than risk infecting with so fatal a malady the thousands of healthy camels they had already got on shore. The hon. Member for Glasgow had also referred to another matter as coming under the head of the present Vote—namely, the bayonets with which the troops sent out 517 to the Soudan had been supplied. Upon the whole, he (Mr. Dawnay) believed that those weapons had stood the test to which they were put exceedingly well; but those who had never seen bayonets in actual use could hardly realize the tremendous strain they had to bear. When a soldier bayonetted an enemy with such a weapon as the regulation bayonet fitted to a long Martini-Henry rifle, under certain circumstances the leverage was so great that the bayonet must either bend or break; and, for his own part, he would prefer that it should do the former rather than the latter. As to the jamming of the cartridges, he himself had had no opportunities of seeing the worst cases which seemed to have happened in the Nile Expedition; but he could not help thinking that a great deal of the jamming was due to the men themselves. When a man went into action for the first time he was excited, not unnaturally; and he had himself, not once only, but many times, seen rifles fail to throw out the cartridge cases properly, because the men in their hurry and excitement failed to use the lever with the proper jerk. Now, ho (Mr. Guy Dawnay) was not at all concerned to excuse any mistakes with regard to the Soudan or Egyptian Campaigns. He went through the Campaign of 1882, and he was himself the first to suggest an inquiry into the working of the Medical Department. He shared to the full the hon. Member's (Dr. Cameron's) wish for an inquiry into the working also of the Commissariat and Transport, and he had done so with a view to insuring increased efficiency in those Services in any future campaign; and this now was his answer to his hon. Friend—and it was one he gave, not as happening to hold at the present moment the Office of Surveyor General, but with far better authority than any mere Office could confer—and he asserted that it was a full and sufficient and satisfactory answer, and it was this—that having been present throughout the 1882 Campaign and condemned the arrangements in various points, he had now again taken part as a Transport officer in the very last Expedition that the country was concerned in; and although the Campaign was a short one, and though the distance traversed was but small, yet he could say that never in the his- 518 tory of campaigns was an Expedition ever sent from these shores, or from the shores of any other country, in which. the arrangements for the supply and transport of our troops, and for the care and cure of the wounded, wore more admirably arranged for, or more perfectly carried out. He did not think he was at all a lenient critic in those matters. He thought that all that could possibly be done for their soldiers should be done. His position as a Transport officer—of one who was only a volunteer Transport officer—in the Soudan Campaign did not in any way warp his views; but it certainly gave him unceasing opportunities of observing individuals and of criticizing arrangements; and while he thought that much in the Egyptian Campaign was open to censure, he asserted that the last Expedition reflected the very highest credit both on the Commissariat and Supply Department at home, and on the individual officers who carried out the arrangements. He did not for a moment say that no mistakes were made; he did not deny that there were many points in which matters might have been improved in regard to which there were still lessons to be learnt—if he did that he would be claiming a perfection which was impossible, or would stand convicted of the blindness that would not see. He did not say there were no points of organization, for instance, in which improvement could be effected. He would be very foolish or very hasty if, after so few days' Office, he expressed any decided opinion on such a subject. The inquiries of the Committee which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron) caused to be appointed last year had had a great effect in perfecting the transport and supply arrangements, and he trusted that the hon. Member would now be contented with that effect, and would not press all his charges on the succeeding Votes; and in asking the hon. Gentleman not to press them he would further say—and he said it by no means as a mere idle compliment, but as a frank avowal of his own candid opinion—that the country owed a considerable debt of gratitude to the hon. Member for the manner in which he directed his abilities and energies last year to calling public attention to the points in which the Transport and Commissariat Services could be im- 519 proved. He congratulated the hon. Gentleman and the country on the improvements in those Services which the late Campaign had most clearly demonstrated, and which were, in his (Mr. Guy Dawnay's) opinion, owing not a little to the hon. Member's exertions.
§ MR. BRANDsaid, he wished, in the first place, to thank his hon. Friend the Surveyor General of the Ordnance (Mr. Guy Dawnay) for the generous manner in which he had spoken of the arrangements made for the last campaign; and, perhaps, if he were to leave the matter there, and to be content with the speech of his hon. Friend in answer to the hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron), he should do well. But after the speech of the hon. Member for Glasgow, the Committee, he was sure, would grant him its indulgence for a few minutes. He thought he could prove that the hon. Gentleman's speech was composed of such a tissue of exaggerations as to be almost removed out of the category of a serious speech. The hon. Gentleman had also been extremely clever in the way in which he had proceeded. On a recent occasion he made a speech in the House in which he alleged that there had been a great many failures in the Egyptian War. That speech—one also full of many exaggerations—was made to its very conclusion, and then the Chairman ruled that the whole debate was out of Order. In consequence of that ruling, he (Mr. Brand) had not the opportunity of replying; and now the hon. Gentleman, having made an attack upon the Department, having received no reply, because it was not in his (Mr. Brand's) power to make a reply, carefully abstained from saying one word with regard to the arrangements for the Egyptian War. [Dr. CAMERON: On a later Vote.] He was in possession of the Committee. The hon. Gentleman now made a fresh statement with regard to the arrangements for the Soudan War, many details of which, as stated by the hon. Gentleman, he had no acquaintance with, some of which he had acquaintance with, and with which he should deal presently. He maintained that the hon. Gentleman's speech that night must be judged in conjunction with a speech he made the other day. He had no wish to weary the Committee; but he would take one or two instances to show how the 520 hon. Gentleman had dealt with this case. He had here a statement made by the hon. Member for Glasgow, made not in the heat of debate, but made deliberately—it was contained in a pamphlet which the hon. Gentleman published with a view to instruct the public as to the arrangements made in the Egyptian War. Speaking of what was called the "iron ration," the hon. Gentleman wrote for the instruction of the public—
One topic constantly coming before the Committee was the iron ration. This, Colonel Tulloch explained, was the name given by the Germans to the celebrated erbswurst, or pea soup sausage ration, which each German soldier is compelled to carry, which he is only permitted to consume on an emergency and by order of a superior officer, and which if ho makes away with without permission he is liable to be shot. Tinned erbswurst and tinned tongues were sent out to Egypt as an iron ration. They did not arrive till September 8, then they were carried on to Suez, and they were not available for issue till we got to Cairo. Finally, of 9,300 lbs. of erbswurst sent out only 4,445 lbs. arrived fit for use, the other 4,865 lbs., owing to faulty packing, being so damaged in transit that they had to be condemned.Now, that statement was entirely erroneous. The facts were that complete iron ration for the Force went out in the first ships with the Force itself, and were available from the date of landing. The details were given on Page 68G of the Report. As to the alleged loss of erbswurst the statement was equally erroneous. The condemnation, as shown in the accounts of the Expedition, showed a loss of about 50 lbs., out of a total sent out of about 50,000 lbs., the 50 lbs. amounting in value to a little under £2. All he could say with respect to the speech of the hon. Gentleman was ab uno disce omnes. He did not wish to speak of this matter at all in a personal way. He quite admitted that the hon. Gentleman had shown great public spirit in moving for the inquiry, and that he had shown remarkable ability in conducting it. He would go further, and admit, with his hon. Friend the Surveyor General, that great good had come out of the inquiry; but when he had said that, he still complained that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Glasgow should make statements which were, to say the least, exaggerated. The hon. Gentleman and some of the Members of the Committee never would take into account the evidence of Sir 521 John Adye, who was the Chief of the Staff of the Expedition, and who was also Surveyor General in the War Office. Roughly speaking, Sir John Adye's defence was in this wise—"It is true I took certain decisions at the War Office, which have since been contested; it is true I did not send out the labour which some thought I ought to have sent out; it is true I did not do this and that which you think I ought to have done; but, with my experience as an officer, what I did I did deliberately, and if Iliad to go through the matter again I should do the same. He (Mr. Brand) was not there to say whether Sir John Adye was right or wrong; but he thought that at any rate the hon. Gentleman should bear in mind that if sufficient labour was not sent out to Ismailia it was not owing to any fault of the system, but owing to the decision taken by Sir John Adye himself. Then there was another matter which the hon. Member would never take account of, and that was that Lord Wolseley deliberately kept the base secret; that there was a change of base; that there was an immense pressure in sending out all the supplies for the Egyptian War; and, further, that Lord Wolseley, owing to military exigencies, deliberately advanced in front of his transport, and before the base was organized. If questioned on the point, Lord Wolseley and Sir John Adye would say—"It is true that there was a certain amount of strain during the first seven days; it is true, if you like, that there was a certain amount of discomfort borne by the troops; but in the end we succeeded; in the end we obtained the object which we had in view, and we deliberately went out with less transport than we should have taken in ordinary cases, because we intended to trust to the Railway and Canal, and as soon as they were in operation things went perfectly smoothly." He (Mr. Brand) felt himself in a rather difficult position that night, because the hon. Gentleman the Member for Glasgow had on many occasions touched on the subject of the Egyptian War, of which he (Mr. Brand) imagined the Committee must be very tired. At the same time, ho thought the Committee would allow that he had every claim to answer some of the statements which had been made by the hon. Gentleman. Now, the Committee was appointed for two purposes—to inquire into the failures, if any, in the Egyptian War, 522 and if those failures were proved to decide what changes should be made in the organization of the Commissariat and Transport Departments. Well, when the Committee was appointed, he told the hon. Gentleman the Member for Glasgow that the War Department admitted certain failures; and he warned him at the time that when he got into the Committee upstairs he would not be able to show there were any great failures outside those cases—that wa3 to say, failures connected with the Supply Department of the War Office. The hon. Gentleman had every advantage given to him; he had, as his chief witness, the Commissary General of the Expedition, who spoke without reserve, and gave the hon. Gentleman all the information he could; he also had the evidence of Mr. Lawson, who was the Assistant Director of Supplies; he had the evidence of Mr. Nepean, Director of Contracts; he had the evidence of the Chief of the Staff; indeed, everything was told the hon. Gentleman that could be told, and yet he never discovered anything beyond the three cases admitted—namely, the flour, the Liverpool hay, and the Turkish mules. Well, now, he wished to say a few words with respect to some of the statements which the hon. Gentleman made in the speech he delivered on the Civil Service Estimates. In The Times of the 5th of June the hon. Gentleman was reported to have said—He wished to draw attention to the shameful character of the hay which had been supplied by a Liverpool contractor for the use of our Forces in Egypt.What were the facts with regard to the hay? No bad hay was delivered to the troops in Egypt during the Campaign. The hon. Gentleman would admit, at any rate, that there was no complaint of any hay issued to the troops during the campaign. Only a portion of the hay, or certain portions of the hay, bought in Liverpool was condemned as bad. A great proportion of this hay was found sound and fit for use in Egypt, after it was exposed to deterioration from climate and accidents in transit. A wholesale condemnation of 100 tons was made by the senior Commissariat officer; but, upon detailed investigation, a large proportion of it was found fit. After another condemnatory Report, it was added that the percentage of bad hay could not exceed 3 or 4 per 523 cent. It was North of England hay, which, as a matter of notoriety, was not equal to South country hay. Then the hon. Gentleman said—It was found that the trusses of hay were largely composed of brickbats and other rubhish.[Dr. CAMERON: Will the hon. Gentleman say from what he quotes?] He was quoting from The Times report of the hon. Gentleman's speech. [Dr. CAMERON: I am not responsible for that.] Then where was he to find a correct report? At any rate, what the hon. Gentleman was reported to have said was asserted by one of his witnesses. No corroboration of the assertion could be obtained by the Committee, and he (Mr. Brand) did not believe there was a word of truth in the statement. "Some of the hay," the hon. Gentleman went on to saythat had been condemned as fodder, and which it was intended to use as bedding, smelt so offensively that the men refused to lie upon it.That statement came from the same officer as the preceding one. The facts, if as stated, were explained by the official Report (page 638) of the senior Commissariat officer at Cairo. It there appeared that a quantity of hay was completely perished and black through contact with salt water. He (Mr. Brand) might go on answering one after another the statements of the hon. Gentleman; but he would only deal with the question of flour, to which the hon. Gentleman had constantly invited the attention of the House. What were the facts with regard to flour? The flour which was complained of was sent from this country in the first ship to Alexandria. The same description of flour had been used in Cyprus in 1878, it had been used in the Zulu and Transvaal Wars, it had been recommended by a Committee on which the Commissary General sat. As the base of operations was kept secret, the Department was obliged to send the flour with the troops. Well, the flour was sent to Alexandria, and the Commissary General who was in charge of the Expedition, and who gave evidence before the Committee, knew that the flour was there, and yet it was kept in the hold of the ship for nine days. After that treatment, it was sent round in the hold of the ship to Ismailia, where, no doubt, it turned out to be bad. It was 524 an extraordinary fact, however, that the Commissary General, although he knew the flour was lying unexamined, actually telegraphed to the War Office to send a second supply of the same article. Now, the statement that the bulk of the flour was sold for manufacture into starch was not correct; the supply in the first ship, which was detained at Alexandria harbour, was; but the supply in the second ship was issued and used by the troops. He had mentioned a few of the cases which occurred in the Egyptian War, in order to show the Committee what amount of accuracy the hon. Gentleman was likely to have employed in the statements he had made respecting the arrangements made for the Soudan War. Speaking of the Soudan Expedition, the hon. Gentleman said the Commissary General had made a great many recommendations to the War Office before the Soudan Campaign, none of which were adopted; and he mentioned, amongst others, the recommendation that supplies should be sent out in separate ships. In the case of the Egyptian War, with a few exceptions, separate ships were employed for supplies. As the hon. Gentleman was well aware, it was necessary, when an Expedition left this country, that certain reserves of supplies and stores should go out with the troops. Then the hon. Gentleman said that the packing of the biscuits was bad. Lord Wolseley, in his despatch which was read by the Surveyor General (Mr. Guy Dawnay), said that, generally speaking, the supplies were properly and well packed. [Dr. CAMERON: Oh, oh!] What did the hon. Gentleman mean? Did he mean that Lord Wolseley had written what was not the case?
DR. CAMERONI said the buscuits were so badly packed that when they arrived they were mouldy and unfit for use.
§ MR. BRANDsaid, there was one failure, and that was in the case of certain biscuits bought from a contractor; but they also passed through Woolwich. He was not there to say that mistakes did not occur in every war. There would be a certain percentage of mistakes; but he objected to the hon. Gentleman, on the slightest basis of truth, setting up a large structure of exaggeration. For instance, the hon. Gentleman said that all the tea and sugar went bad. [Dr. CAMERON: I said 25 per cent of it.] The 525 hon. Gentleman became excited in his speech, and he said—for he (Mr. Brand) took down the words at the time—"of the tea and sugar all went bad." He (Mr. Brand) believed that the state of the case was that 5 per cent of the supplies went bad — in this estimate he spoke from memory, and did not include the supplies destroyed by transit. Again, the hon. Gentleman said that all the sugar and groceries wont bad. [Dr. CAMERON: Sugar and salt.] He heard the hon. Gentleman say sugar and groceries. He should like to know if that was the case, what the Army really existed on? The hon. Gentleman made it out that the Army in the Soudan had no supplies at all. Then the hon. Gentleman came to the question of clothes. He (Mr. Brand) knew where the report as to the lack of clothing came from. There were certain articles in one of the daily papers, and he believed the writer of those articles was a correspondent at the front who fell foul of the Ordnance Store Department, because the troops were without clothes and boots. The hon. Gentleman knew very well that the head of the Ordnance Store Department had nothing to do with the transport of the stores to the front. Of boots and clothes there were plenty on the Nile. It rested entirely with the General in command of the communication whether the boots and clothes should be sent up to the front or whether supplies should be sent first; and he (Mr. Brand) presumed the real explanation of the circumstance was that the General in charge of the line of communications considered that at the particular time it was more important that the troops should have supplies and ammunition than boots and clothes. That he believed was the correct explanation of the fact. The Ordnance Store Department had no more to do with the sending of the stores and supplies to the front than the hon. Member himself. And now he (Mr. Brand) thought he need only refer to the statements made by the hon. Gentleman with respect to the purchase of camels. The hon. Gentleman said that the Director of Supply and Transport was at the head of the Department which had to do with the purchase of camels. In the case of the Soudan War that was not so. As a matter of fact, when the base of supply was removed from London to Cairo orders were sent 526 out to the General Commanding in Chief in Egypt to purchase transport animals for the use of the Army. He believed the General did the best he could under very difficult circumstances; but he was not there to deny that there were a great many camels purchased for the Soudan War which were not quite fit for the purposes for which they were bought. The hon. Gentleman said that cartridges had been sent out which were found to be useless; but that was the first time ho (Mr. Brand) had heard of it if it were so. It was true that some of the cartridges had jammed in the rifles and machine guns at Abou Klea; but the reason for it had been explained. With regard to candles for oil lamps, the explanation was very simple. The facts were these. The service lamps were intended to burn oil; but it appeared that the Commissary General had suggested to the Director of Supplies and Transport before the Expedition sailed that candles were preferable to oil; but the Director of Artillery and Stores who supplied the lamps was not referred to. The Director of Supplies and Transport, presuming that the suggestion would not have been made without referring to the Director of Artillery and Stores, sent out candles instead of oil, hence the mistake. He contended that it was not true to say that there had been a breakdown in the transport connected with the Egyptian War; and with reference to the Soudan War, he believed that what the Surveyor General had said was correct —that, considering all the difficulties of transport, the Army was well supplied. In the case of the Egyptian War there had been a great strain. A large body of troops had to be sent out without proper wharfage, and without proper appliances for the landing of the stores. The difficulties were considerably enhanced by the decision taken by Lord Wolseley to advance on account of military exigencies in front of his transport, before his transport was landed, the railway cleared, or his base organized. The strain lasted seven days, as he had said before, and after that everything went smoothly. The Chief of the Staff had declared that no necessary movement had been prevented, that supplies of all kinds had been ample; and, in his opinion, officers and men of all ranks and departments had done their duty remarkably well; and that there had been 527 no breakdown. In judging of this Campaign the Committee must have regard not only to the rapidity with which the Expedition was equipped and launched, but to the rapidity with which it advanced and terminated. No war ever took place without some miscarriages; but neither in Egypt nor the Soudan had miscarriages occurred which would at all justify the language used by the hon. Member. He maintained that if the failures or mistakes which had taken place in Egypt and along the Nile had never been exceeded, the Department might be justified in considering that it had not merited condemnation.
§ MR. CARBUTTsaid, that in saying a word or two on the subject of the Ordnance Establishment, he did not wish to be considered as desiring to make a personal attack on one side or the other. They were all at liberty to express their own opinions—
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILThe discussion on the subject of guns should be taken on Vote 12. This Vote 9 has nothing to do with guns.
§ MR. CARBUTTI am going to speak on the Ordnance Establishment. Am I ruled out of Order?
THE CHAIRMANI think the discussion on warlike stores must come under Vote 12; at least, it would more properly come under that Vote.
§ MR. CARBUTTDo you, Sir, rule me out of Order in raising the subject on this Vote?
THE CHAIRMANI am not prepared to say that the hon. Member would be out of Order, because the subject of ordnance might in some way be connected with this Vote; but guns are specifically mentioned in Vote 12, and it would be more regular to refer to them under that Vote. Vote 12 is for guns and warlike stores.
§ MR. CARBUTTWith all deference to your ruling, Sir—of course I bow to it—I would submit that my references will be to the Establishment at Woolwich and the officers who conduct it, and that I should be perfectly in Order in speaking on the point now.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONBefore you decide the point, Sir, I would draw attention to the fact that the Vote does not cover the salaries of the officers of the Manufacturing Department. The Ordnance Store officers referred to in the Vote are those who have 528 the custody of warlike stores. They are not the officers engaged in the manufacturing of guns. The whole of the service connected with the production of guns, whether by contract or at Woolwich, will come under Vote 12.
DR. CAMERONsaid, ho wished to offer an explanation on a single point contained in the speech of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Stroud (Mr. Brand). The hon. Gentleman had quoted a paragraph concerning the "iron ration" from a pamphlet he (Dr. Cameron) had written. The hon. Gentleman had put it forward as a specimen of his (Dr. Cameron's) statements, and had declared that it was absolutely false and unfounded, and that the other statements were to be taken in the same light. He would refer the hon. Member to page 576 of the Evidence—to the Appendix. It was evident from that that the sausages and the "iron rations" did not arrive at Ismailia until September 8. With regard to the condition in which they arrived, it would be seen from Question 941 of the Evidence, and the answer of the Commissary General thereto—
That not one single case was in proper order when it was received, which statement could he confirmed by the individual Reports of the Commissary officers at the front. The cases were broken, and the inside tins were left knocking about, so that there was scarcely a complete ration opened.
§ MR. BRANDsaid, he could not leave the statements there. The details of this matter would be found on page 686 of the Report; and if the hon. Member would refer to them he would find that the erbswurst arrived as he (Mr. Brand) had stated. As to the condemnation, the accounts of the Egyptian Expedition showed a loss of about 50 lbs. out of a total sent out of about 50,000 lbs.—the loss being of the value of a little under £2.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, he had not been a Member of the Committee that the hon. Member (Dr. Cameron) had moved for. He had not been responsible for the despatch of stores to Egypt or the Soudan; and as one of those who had not initiated the mistakes of the War Office during the past five years, he might be allowed to say a few words in regard to a Department with which 529 he was at one time connected. He thought he could honestly say, so far as the officers were concerned — whether military or civil, and he had had to do with both—he had always found them ready to help him with their experience. They were all very hard working; they thoroughly know their business; and if they committed mistakes they only did what all mortals, high or low, sometimes did in their lives. The Expeditions to Egypt and the Soudan had been of a novel kind. There was no doubt that the transport to that country, although it was understood by those who had been in hot climates, was not altogether familiar to the War Office. There had been an idea of sending Flanders carts, or, more properly, waggons out for the transport of stores; but he believed it was afterwards found that the transport to be obtained in Egypt was far more efficient than anything which could be sent from home. Then, with regard to stores, he had pointed out, at the time the Committee was moved for, that, in his opinion, the only effect of granting the inquiry would be to make a very large Blue Book, which nobody would read, and that it would all end in nothing. He believed, though he did not pretend to be a prophet, that his prediction had turned out to be perfectly true. He had said, when the Committee was moved for, that any mistakes would be prevented by sending with each ship a supercargo, who would take note of the stores and see that they were delivered in their proper order. That would prevent anything like the unfortunate mistakes which took place in the Crimean War, by which stores were found at the bottom of the ship which should have been at the top, and a great many articles which were urgently needed were discovered everywhere but where they should have been, mistakes which excited a great amount of attention and public dissatisfaction at the time. But, on the whole, as had been well pointed out by his two hon. Friends the present and the late Surveyor General of the Ordnance, the mistakes of the Commissariat and Transport Authorities had been comparatively few. He held that whatever their faults were—and, as he had said already, no one could be altogether free from error—those faults must be shared by the General Commanding in Chief in the field. The General Com- 530 manding in Chief was, as everyone knew, supreme in all matters of war; and when the stores were actually delivered, wherever it might be—at Alexandria or elsewhere—the General Commanding in Chief and his Staff became responsible for their due delivery. If, therefore, the troops suffered seriously from any cause—from famine, or from want of proper clothing or want of medical stores—theresponsibility,though not the whole of it, but the responsibility in chief, must be shared by the Military Commander. He thought it only right to say that on behalf of the Commissariat and Transport officials, because he often noticed a tendency not only in that House, but also in the newspapers, to hit them hard because they had no friends. The Ordnance and Stores Department had been spoken of in not very polite terms in one of the magazines the other day—in fact, as utterly rotten, in consequence of some mistake which had taken place in the Department of the Director of Artillery and Stores. No doubt, the work of that Department was very responsible and very heavy; but, in his (Lord Eustace Cecil's) experience, there had never been a better officer at the head of it than the present Director General. He might say that the two officers who had been so much referred to in connection with this subject had had considerable experience in their Departments. He was sure that if any mistakes had taken place they had been unintentional and through press of business. He believed that a certain amount of the responsibility was due, as had been pointed out by the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Brand), to the sudden manner in which the Expedition had been determined on. He knew that, with regard to the Egyptian Expedition, the orders sent out for the troops and the necessary stores wore very sudden indeed; and, no doubt, there had been some mistakes through the absence, on board the ships carrying the stores, of supercargoes to regulate the deliveries. But he thought that before they condemned the unfortunate Commissariat and Store officers, some criticism should be passed on the sudden manner in which they were called upon to carry out duties to which they were not accustomed—such as fitting out an Army with every necessary—nay, almost every 531 luxury. He ventured to say that no troops in the world had so many luxuries as were served out for Her Majesty's soldiers on foreign service. His criticism on all this would be that if any change was effected in any of the Departments, it should take the appointment of additional assistance in the War Office itself under the Director of Artillery and Stores. The Commissary General, as he was then—Sir Henry Gordon, brother of General Gordon— whose services he (Lord Eustace Cecil) had had the advantage of having for some considerable time, had always been very much in favour of having a civilian Director of Stores under the Surveyor General; and there were, no doubt, a great many arguments in favour of such an arrangement. But what he would certainly suggest was that the Director of Stores should be strengthened as far as possible by having an Assistant Director of Stores, as there was an Assistant Director of Artillery and an Assistant Director of Clothing. Such an appointment would be a great advantage to the Surveyor General and the Secretary of State for War. The time was coming, he thought, when they would have frequent changes of Government; and with all the knowledge and zeal that Parliamentary officials might possess—and he could only say that listening to the speeches of hon. Gentlemen, one on the Front Opposition Bench and one on the Front Ministerial Bench, showed how well acquainted they were with the subject—and with all the knowledge and zeal that their successors might also possess, it would be perfectly impossible to prevent these mistakes occurring unless the Departments were well manned. Mistakes occurred in the War Office as elsewhere, because the staff was hardly sufficient for what might happen. Mistakes might be prevented by a little management—by a little extra help and aid, perhaps merely by the payment of an extra salary to a junior officer, and appointing to a responsible office one who was capable of giving assistance in time of need. Because the Departments were undermanned those mistakes were made, and the cry was heard—"Oh, the Ordnance and Store Department is utterly rotten; the boots are all bad, the coats are all in rags," and every sort of complaint was made, the real reason for things 532 being in that condition being the accidents of war, and, probably, the Government having decided upon hostilities suddenly and without due notice to the Departments themselves. He was sure the Departments had done their duty, and he was sure that every Surveyor General of the Ordnance and every Secretary of State for War who had held Office during the past five years would bear him out in saying that the Departments had done all they could do, and that it was wrong and improper to expect them to do that which no mortal man could do.
§ MR. HICKSsaid, that before they went to a vote on this Amendment he begged to ask one question of Her Majesty's Government; and that was whether they would, at the commencement of the nest Parliament, renew the Committee of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron)—a Committee which, by the showing of the Surveyor General of the Ordnance, had effected great good? He could remember, as other Members could, that in the early part of the Session the hon. Member for Glasgow moved for the re-appointment of that Committee. That reappointment was refused by Her Majesty's then Government, he believed on the sole ground that Lord Wolseley was not here. But that refusal was most strongly censured by all the Military Authorities then sitting on the Opposition side of the House. Those authorities pointed out the very valuable information that the Committee had obtained. One after another the same charges of want of provision by the Commissariat Department were reiterated, and the evidence which had been brought before the Committee and before the country was pointed out; and he did think that though the moving of this Amendment might be the only way of raising the question or of obtaining a vote on it, it was not the best way to move in the matter. The question ought to be met by a renewal of the Committee which had been, to his mind, so improperly burked by the late Government.
§ COLONEL NOLANsaid, he quite agreed in the words of the hon. Member, that this Committee had been "burked" at the beginning. The Committee last year had taken a great deal of trouble over its investigations; besides, it had been 533 composed of Members of some authority and experience. It had some distinguished officers upon it; the late Surveyor General of the Ordnance had presided over it; the present Minister of the Colonies (Colonel Stanley) had been a Member of it, and there were many other distinguished persons upon it, including the present Surveyor General of the Ordnance (Mr. Guy Dawnay), who had since been in the Soudan. The first duty which the Committee had addressed itself to had been to find out the faults which had existed in the Commissariat and Transport arrangements during the Egyptian War, and the second part of their investigation would have been to find out the way to prevent those faults from recurring in the future. Well, after they had found out a certain number of faults, which were admitted to be such, they had been prevented from ascertaining the reason for them and the best method of correcting them. It had been acknowledged by the late Surveyor General of the Ordnance (Mr. Brand) that there had been faults in connection with the hay, the flour, the mules, &c, and all those were very important matters. If it had only been for the sake of finding a means to put an end to the faults in regard to those subjects in the future it would have been worth while to re-appoint this Committee. A Select Committee was not an expensive institution—in this case the cost was almost nil. The Committee had done a great deal of good, and he believed it would have done infinitely more if it had been re-appointed. One effect it would have had would have been to have spared them the necessity for the present debate. Of the speakers who had preceded him three had held the Office of Surveyor General of the Ordnance—in fact, all the Gentlemen in existence who had held that post had spoken. It was natural that each of those Gentlemen should have sympathized with his Department, and it was natural that neither of them should want a Committee of investigation. They defended the Department of which they had been the head, particularly the late Surveyor General of the Ordnance, who took upon himself responsibility for everything connected with the Department—who would not tell them that he was not responsible for the things which had gone wrong. The hon. Member 534 could not possibly be responsible for everything which had occurred, for be was not in Office during the whole period over which the complaints ranged. It was mere chivalry on the hon. Member's part to come forward and take all responsibility, and defend the Department for everything that had taken place. Where the organization of the Department was most defective, there those Gentlemen wore more anxious than anyone else to defend it. The attitude of the present Surveyor General of Ordnance (Mr. Guy Dawnay) was most remarkable. The hon. Member had worked most indefatigably on the Committee. He had been convinced of the errors of the Department and of the mistakes committed during the Campaign; but the moment the hon. Member took his seat on the Treasury Bench he told them that his whole opinion had changed. [Mr. GUY DAWNAY: No, no!] At any rate, he had gathered from the hon. Gentleman's remarks that he had changed his opinion. He had understood the hon. Member originally to challenge the working of the Supply Department in the Egyptian Campaign. Not only had the hon. Member's conduct on the Committee, of which he had been a most active Member, impressed him (Colonel Nolan) with the opinion he had stated, but the hon. Member had clearly shown that night that he had changed his views and his opinions. The hon. Member had told them that according to his own experience they had had in the Suakin Campaign the most perfect transport in the world; but that statement on the part of the hon. Member could not amount to much, seeing what a little the transport had been called upon to do. As a matter of fact it had never had to go 20 miles from the ships, except when a small expedition had been sent out about 15 miles from the main body for some purpose or other. It did not seem to him (Colonel Nolan) that the transport had in this campaign had anything like a test applied to it. It was well known that its camel branch was the worst in the world. There might have been some difficulty experienced in having to feed troops 20 miles away from the ships and supply them with water; but when the work had to be done by the worst camels in the world he did not see that there was much to justify the statement of the Surveyor General of 535 the Ordnance that this transport was the best any country could produce. The hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron) had only spoken of one Campaign; but there was a great deal to be said with regard to the transport in connection with other Campaigns. Why the flour was so bad was this. There was one description of flour which was unsuited to hot climates. That was exactly the kind which had been selected by the Authorities to send out to the troops. There had been I plenty of other kinds of flour in the market; but this, that was remarkable for its unsuitability to a hot climate, was the one selected. Then, again, during the Egyptian Campaign there had been an immense quantity of bad hay sent out— hay not only bad in itself, but mixed with rubbish, and containing even brickbats. He did not suppose any of the hay was altogether made up of brickbats, although one witness had said that there were a lot in it. Then it had been shown that the mules had been badly selected, and that no proper system had been devised for servants to attend to them. During the Egyptian Campaign there was really no transport except a railway and a canal, which were in the hands of the enemy. That was clearly shown by Sir John Adye, who had declared as much. Nothing could be worse than the system of transport for this Campaign. Fortunately, the operations conducted by Her Majesty's troops had succeeded, and there was an end of the matter. It behoved them, in his opinion, to see that in the future, in regard to transport, they got good value for their money. It was the fault of the organization that they had not secured that in the past. The idea of several Members of the Committee had been that responsibility in regard to supply and transport was not sufficiently centralized, as it was in the case of the Artillery under the Director General. When they came to supply and transport they had no one responsible. They had a Director of Contracts, and a Director of Supply; but the Commissariat was not under the War Office, and the Director General managed everything. The fact was that no one person was responsible all through. No one controlled the supplies when they were sent out from England, or managed them while they were in transit. The remedy was as simple as possible. There ought 536 to be a Commissariat officer in charge of the Commissariat arrangements at the War Office—he did not mean to say for regulating the prices for large contracts, because that could be done otherwise. But they should follow the precedents of the Artillery and Engineers, and have a Commissariat officer responsible for transit, who would be afterwards responsible, or one of his deputies would be responsible, in the field. As matters stood at present, there was one man managing at the War Office, and somebody else managing in the field. The evidence of Sir Edward Morris showed that when he was told to be responsible in Egypt, he went to the War Office and said—"I should like to see how the stores are packed; "but the War Office officials replied at once—"Oh, no! You must go away from the War Office. You can manage everything in Egypt, but not here. This is our business." Of course, there was a great gap. Things were managed at one end, and at the other end; but there was no connection between the two. And that would have been prevented if there had been someone in the Surveyor General's Department responsible to him, and that man was also responsible in the field, or had a deputy there. The Surveyor General stood in a totally different relation to the Commissariat Department to that in which he stood to the Artillery or Engineers, for in the latter case he had a responsible man to advise him—the Director General of Artillery or Engineers; but there was nobody to advise him for the rest. The Artillery and Engineers were not satisfied to have a man at the War Office under whom the whole thing broke down. They had a man at the Horse Guards who looked after things, who was at hand when things went wrong, and who saw who was to blame. There was no necessity with them for somebody to be continually making speeches to defend somebody else—the late Surveyor General defending Sir John Adye, and the present Surveyor General defending the present official, and all of them combining to defend the whole Department among them. There should really be someone to advise the Surveyor General when things went wrong, and the Surveyor General should not be only politically responsible. At the present moment there was nobody of any kind, sort, or description to ad- 537 vise him. The whole thing was in a state of chaos. The hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. Cameron) had not stated one-half or one-third of what might he stated—he could not bring down all the stores with the same ease with which he had brought down a lantern—and there were half-a-dozen more cases all of which were quite as bad, and which would show the existence of an even worse condition of things than did the lantern.
§ MR. J. W. BARCLAYsaid, he thought there was great reason to be dissatisfied with the explanations which had been offered by the Surveyor General. It was quite true that there always would be accidents in carrying out such extensive transactions; but the complaints which were made were not due to mere accidents, but to absolute incompetence on the part of a certain Department—it was incompetence that was the real cause of complaint. As he understood it, he did not think his hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron) made any complaint of the Commissariat or Transport Service in the field; the fault which the hon. Gentleman found was with the Department at home, and the charge against the Department was that some of its heads had proved themselves to be incompetent. The charge did not arise out of questions of expense; it arose out of questions of judgment. It was indispensable that the persons who were charged with the important duty of supplying stores to an Army ought to be acquainted with what was best for the purpose, and should send only that out. It was true that the General in charge had to be satisfied; but anyone who read the evidence which was laid before the Committee on the Commissariat Department would at once come to the conclusion that the Commander-in-Chief must be easily satisfied if he were satisfied with the arrangements which were made in this case. It was all very well to say that the Army Campaign was successful; but if Lord Wolseley had had an enemy to meet at Ismailia, he would have found a very different state of affairs prevailing. All that the General was able to do was to maintain his Army when they had no enemy opposed to them; and he (Mr. Barclay) did not think there was any great reason to feel proud of such an achievement as that. 538 What the Committee would like to know was, whether any change was to be made in the system, so that all the mistakes that had hitherto been made might be avoided for the future. Large railway contractors who had to conduct operations and send out expeditions to foreign countries always took care to choose competent assistants to see that the work was properly carried out; and if any assistant failed in that duty, the services of that individual were promptly dispensed with. There had been several failures in connection with both the Expeditions to Egypt. In the first Expedition there was a failure in respect both of flour and hay; and as to the case of the hay, the more it was investigated the worse it became. There was not only proof of incompetence in that case, but there was very great reason to suspect that there was corruption also. In the last Expedition it was found that the packing was insufficient for the protection of the stores. Now, that was not a matter which was the result of accident. Proper packing was such an important matter that the officer who neglected to attend to it properly ought to be superseded, and it was only by taking such a step as that that they could hope to have any improvement in their various Departments. If the Select Committee had been allowed to sit for another Session, he thought his hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron) would have been able to prove a very large proportion of his statements. It was very easy for the late Surveyor General (Mr. Brand) to come down to that House, and, with well-simulated indignation, repel charges which had never been made; but was the Surveyor General prepared to defend the hay contract, and would he say that the hay sent out was of sufficient quality and properly sent out, in the face of all the evidence which had been collected? This was not the place for going into details on the point; but if the Select Committee were allowed to resume their labours at some future time, he (Mr. Barclay) had not the slightest doubt that his hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow would be able to prove to the satisfaction of the non-official Members of the Committee that his charges were substantially correct. He (Mr. Barclay) would like to hoar from the present Surveyor General whether he was sa- 539 tisfied with the arrangements of the Departments—whether ho did not think that some improvement should be made—whether there should not be some more condensed responsibility, some means of bringing home to some responsible individual such complaints as those about our stores in both the Egyptian Campaigns. If the Surveyor General of Ordnance would give some indication of that kind to the Committee it would be received with considerable satisfaction; but it was very disheartening and disappointing to the country to find one Surveyor General after another getting up and saying that things were in the most perfect order and condition; that all the arrangements were complete, and that they could not be improved; when at the same time an investigation showed that gross errors had been committed, and that they would be made again and again until there was some really strong man appointed to the Office of Surveyor General—a man who would make himself responsible for the whole of the work of the Department, and for its being conducted with ordinary business despatch and security. He hoped his hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow would proceed to a division, for that was the only resource which the Committee had of expressing its opinion upon those mistakes. Whether the Heads of the Department condoned it or not, the conduct of the Department was not such as to entitle it to the confidence of the Committee.
COLONEL MILNE-HOMEsupposed that the object of the hon. Member in placing this Amendment on the Paper was to enter a sort of protest against the non-re-appointment of the Select Committee on the Commissariat and Transport Services. He (Colonel Milne-Home) well recollected the last debate which took place on this subject, when the re-appointment of the Committee was moved for by the hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron) and the late Surveyor General of Ordnance used as his main argument against the re-appointment the fact that Lord Wolseley was not in this country.
COLONEL MILNE-HOMEsaid, it was probably the noble Marquess the late Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) who used the argument, and told the House that Lord 540 Wolseley was not at that time in this country. Lord Wolseley's was the main evidence required to complete the evidence before the Committee; and, therefore, said the noble Marquess, it was not possible to re-appoint the Committee with any good effect. He (Colonel Milne-Home) was not going to suggest that, because Lord Wolseley arrived in London that afternoon, the Committee should be re-appointed to-morrow morning. The Session had now reached too late a period for the taking of such a step; but he did think, with his hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Hicks), that they should have some kind of announcement from the Government —from the present Secretary of State for War—as to whether it was proposed to re-appoint the Committee next Session to go into the organization of the Commissariat Department. It was well remembered that the Committee had two points to inquire into—first of all, matters of fact which happened in the Campaign of 1882, and, in the next place, the organization of the Commissariat Department; and there was ample evidence brought forward before the Committee to prove that there was great room for improvement in the organization of the Commissariat Department. He believed himself, from all he had heard, that it would give great satisfaction to the officers of the Commissariat Department themselves if some inquiry were made; and he therefore hoped they would have a few words from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. W. H. Smith) to show that that inquiry would be proceeded with next Session. He believed that such an assurance would facilitate the discussion of the Army Estimates, and generally influence himself (Colonel Milne-Home) and others in the vote they would give on the Amendment now before the Committee. If the right hon. Gentleman would give any hope that the Committee would be re-appointed next year, and would go on with the inquiry, and enter into the organization of the Commissariat Department, he (Colonel Milne-Home) should not, on that occasion, vote with the hon. Member for Glasgow; but if the Select Committee was to be allowed to have all its labours overthrown, he should be disposed to vote for the Amendment of that hon. Gentleman.
§ DR. FARQUHARSONsaid, he thought his hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow had done good service by bringing this question again before the Committee; because, although ho had been taunted with making old speeches over again, they could not have too much of a good thing, and the hon. Gentleman, to use an expressive vulgarism, must go on "pegging away" until he attained his point. The hon. Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Hicks) and the hon. and gallant Member for Berwickshire (Colonel Milne-Home) had both impressed on the Government, in the strongest possible way, the necessity of re-appointing the Select Committee either that Session or next. It was said that the only two reasons for the non-appointment of the Committee were, in the first place, that the different Departments had been so extremely overworked of late that it would be hardly generous or just to ask them to undertake the heavy additional labour which would be involved if the Committee resumed its inquiry; and, in the second place, that Lord Wolseley, whose evidence was looked upon as of primary importance, was not here. But those reasons had now happily disappeared. The strain upon the Departments had now been removed, and Lord Wolseley returned to-day. It might be possible to have the Committee re-appointed even for a short time that Session, and if it could not be done that year it might be done next. The noble Lord opposite (Lord Eustace Cecil) had told them that mistakes were made, but that they were few in number. But was it necessary to have any mistakes at all? Was it not possible that they might be avoided by better organization? He did not mean to say that many of those gentlemen who had been working as Departmental officers had not done their work well, loyally, and energetically, and he would admit that the work in the field itself had been done admirably, considering the conditions under which it had to be done. But the question was whether it was not possible to have a better system under which the work might be better done than under the old system of organization? The Select Committee had done good work up to a certain point; but it was stopped before it could report, and therefore its labours were abortive. If it could be appointed again, 542 and recommence its investigations, a great and valuable service would be performed, and many valuable reforms might be brought into being without much friction or clashing.
§ THE SURVEYOR GENERAL OF THE ORDNANCEsaid, it seemed to be thought that he had been guilty of some inconsistency—as if he had attempted to defend now that which he condemned last year. But he altogether denied that he had done anything of the sort, or that he had in any way, as to matters of fact, changed his opinions. He condemned entirely now that which he condemned then, and he thought the hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron) had done good in the course which he had taken. The hon. Member for Forfarshire (Mr. Barclay) had attributed to him an observation he never made, to the effect that it was impossible to improve the organization of the Department. He had said nothing of the sort. What he did say was that he had not been sufficiently long in Office to be able to express any decided opinion upon the subject. His right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War (Mr. W. H. Smith) did, however, mean to take steps to appoint a Committee to consider the lines of communication, and the supply and transport of the Army. That Committee would sit at once, and during the Autumn the Government would look themselves into all the questions involved.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONpointed out that owing, no doubt, to the very short time that the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Guy Dawnay) had held Office, he did not seem to be aware that a Departmental Committee had already been appointed, and it had sat for a considerable time. Its investigations were suspended when Lord Wolseley left this country for Egypt. He (the Marquess of Hartington) thought it was extremely desirable that any Committee of Inquiry into such a subject should be of a very practical character. He himself anticipated much more satisfactory results from the deliberations of the Departmental Committee than from the Report of a Committee of that House; but, of course, if the opinions he had formed should not be realized, it would be competent for any hon. Member to propose the re-appointment of the Select Committee, or the appointment of a new 543 Committee, to go fully into the subject. He had only one other observation to make. He thought that Mr. Haliburton and himself would be the very last to admit that any failure occurred owing to the calamity under which that gentleman suffered. No one had spoken in higher terms than himself of the capacity and ability of the Assistant Director of Supplies. What he (the Marquess of Hartington) contended was that the mistakes which had taken place were extremely few in number, and that it was possible that they might find themselves no better off under any system that could be devised.
§ MR. CARINGTONsaid, they heard that evening of an inquiry which had taken place concerning certain occurrences in the Soudan; but he wished to know whether any inquiry was to be made into the conduct of the gentleman who was intrusted with the buying of the supplies for the Army? That gentleman bought bad hay and bad flour. That was clearly proved before the Committee; and he wished to know whether any inquiry was to be made into that gentleman's conduct? If a man bought bad hay and bad flour for a mercantile firm he would probably not be continued in their service any longer. It was with great reluctance that he asked that question; but he felt it his duty, as a Member of the Committee, to do so.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. W. H. SMITH)said, he trusted that the Committee would be assured, so far as the present Government were concerned—and he believed it might have been said for the late Government—that every effort would be made to place this portion of the Administration on a satisfactory footing. It-would not be contended that no mistakes had been made and that no inefficiency existed; but he did not understand that corruption was imputed to officials in the Service. [Mr. CARINGTON: I did not wish to imply that.] Of course, such a charge ought not to be advanced unless there was good ground for it. Whatever errors had been committed, there was reason to believe that the Public Service was free from corruption. It might be that there was a want of individual responsibility, and if that was the case he would admit that no effort ought to be spared to secure it.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURsaid, that having had for some years the pleasure of serving with Mr. Lawson, the Deputy Director of Supplies in the War Office, he believed there was no one in the Service who would be more willing than the gentleman referred to to assist with information that would clear up this question. In consequence of the illness of the Director of Supplies, the duty of providing the Army in 1881 devolved on the Deputy; and it must be to his honour and credit that the vast stores had been laid in with a rapidity and excellence never previously surpassed.
DR. CAMERONsaid, if had to deal only with the statements of Ministers in that House he should not divide the Committee upon his Motion; but, unfortunately, he had to deal not only with them, but with statements which had come from the present occupants of the Front Opposition Bench. Not many days ago he had been obliged to attack the administration of the Admiralty Transport Department, and had been very sharply taken up by the hon. Gentleman who represented the Department under the late Government (Mr. Caine). He was told that everything was on the most satisfactory footing, and that it was absolutely wicked to bring forward such accusations; but the next day, when his comments were made public, came the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that in the Admiralty accounts, as taken up to a certain date, there had been a mistake of £500,000 sterling. His remarks of that evening had been treated in the same manner; he was reproached with not having repeated what he had said before, just as a few days ago he had been told that he was reverting to ancient history for his illustrations. The speech of the late Surveyor General of Ordnance was in his customary style; the hon. Gentleman said that his statement was absolutely without foundation. Why, that was exactly what the hon. Gentleman said last year when he (Dr. Cameron) moved for the appointment of a Committee. The then Surveyor General of Ordnance (Mr. Brand) on that occasion told him that his statement with regard to camels being offered on the spot was founded on hearsay, although it was shown that he was quite correct in saying that, because the offer 545 was made at Ismailia, and the camels were at a point only 40 miles distant. Again, he had also said, having the Report of the Commissary General in his pocket, that that officer had stated that his Department was altogether in an unworkable condition, and that it was going from bad to worse. That, of course, was too good an illustration of his inaccuracy for the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Brand) not to refer to. All the hon. Gentleman could then say was that the Report was not within his knowledge. But he (Dr. Cameron) would point out that the Report was before the Committee, and that it formed the basis of their deliberations; and he asked whether that Report was too strongly described when he summarized it in the way he had just mentioned by saying that the Department was unworkable, and that it was going from bad to worse? At all events, he knew that the Commissary General considered it a fair description of his Report. He must warn the Members of the late Government that if they wanted hon. Members on those Benches to follow them they must not set themselves up as defenders of everything in the nature of maladministration, but must tight the battle of reforms, and of other popular principles which they professed on the floor of the House, and not only on public platforms.
§ Question put.
§ The Committee divided:—Ayes 48; Noes 121: Majority 73.—(Div. List, No. 221.)
§ Original Question again proposed.
§
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—{Mr. M'Coan.)
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. W. H. SMITH)said, he hoped the hon. Member for Wicklow would not press his Motion, but allow the Vote to be taken.
§ MR. M'COANsaid, he would withdraw for the purpose of allowing the Vote to be taken.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Original Question again proposed.
SIR FREDERICK FITZ-WYGRAMsaid, he wished to bring under the consideration of the Committee the insuffi- 546 ciency of the Transport Service, to which of late years the breakdowns which had occurred with respect to the Army were attributable.
§ MR. M'COANsaid, that he withdrew his Motion on the understanding that Progress would be reported as soon as the Vote was taken. He moved that Progress be reported.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. M'Coan.)
§ MR. ONSLOWrose to Order. His hon. and gallant Friend was speaking on the Vote before the Committee. The hon. Member for Wicklow had said that he agreed to withdraw the Motion as soon as the Vote was passed.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WARsaid, he hoped the hon. Member would not press for Progress then. The Committee had been engaged upon the Vote for three hours. His hon. and gallant Friend had only to make one or two observations, and the Vote would then, he hoped, be taken.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Original Question again proposed.
SIR FREDERICK FITZ-WYGRAMsaid, in a highly-civilized country—full of roads, railways, and canals—like this, it would always be difficult to organize transport in peace time; hence the Commissariat of the country had be6n, and would always be, at the outset, insufficient for the purpose of war. The question, then, was as to how this insufficiency could be best supplied. There was no doubt that the Commissariat and Transport Departments understood their duties very well; but in consequence of the insufficiency of the transport branch of the Commissariat, it became necessary in every war for a number of animals—horses, mules, and camels — to be handed over to Infantry regiments in order to supply the insufficiency of transport. Those animals were handed over to men who knew nothing about their management; and the consequence was, as had been the case in recent wars, that they either died, got sore backs, or in other ways became inefficient. The Committee would be aware that there was great art in saddling a horse, and especially in putting on 547 pack-saddles, which, if not properly adjusted, would be sure to cause a sore back. Then, again, there was great art in properly attending to camels. What occurred in the Egyptian War was that batches of Infantry soldiers were sent down to Cavalry regiments for three days' instruction in the care and management of horses. He asked whether it was possible to conceive any system more likely than that to be inefficient in war? He never wanted to increase the amount of the Estimates, and the remedy he had to propose for this was that 30 men should be taken annually from each of the Infantry regiments at home and sent to Cavalry regiments for instruction. He knew that there might be some objection to that being done in the summer; but he believed the men could be very well spared from their regiments for six months in the winter. It might be thought that the Cavalry regiments might object to being burdened with those 30 Infantry soldiers; but he could say, from his own experience, that there was no jealousy between the two branches, and he believed, on the contrary, that the Cavalry would be exceedingly glad to have Infantry men with them. There was, as a rule, a great scarcity of men in every Cavalry regiment after the winter leaves had begun; and for that reason he thought it would be a good plan to give them the assistance of those 30 men, and he believed that the Cavalry regiments would do their best to turn them out efficient men in the time mentioned. That plan would provide a very considerable number of men who would be able to conduct and efficiently attend to the transport, while the expense would be next to nothing. Indeed, the services of the men would possibly repay the expense altogether, because they would be able to perform a number of services, for which at present transport was hired, such as sending to and from railway stations, and other matters, which had to be paid for. Whether or not his suggestion were adopted by the War Office, at least he thought that some endeavour ought to be made to place on a better footing that branch of the Service, which had not only broken down in every case, but had been the cause of great expense to the country. For those reasons, he commended the question of transport to the attention of 548 the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War.
§ Original Question put, and agreed to.
§ Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.
§ Committee to sit again To-morrow.