HC Deb 03 March 1884 vol 285 cc371-93

SIR WILFRID LAWSON, Member for Carlisle, rose in his place, and asked leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, viz., the state of affairs, and policy of the Government, in the Soudan; but, the pleasure of the House not having been signified,

MR. SPEAKER

The hon. Member proposes to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, in order to discuss the state of affairs and the policy of the Government in the Soudan. Is it your pleasure that leave be given?

Not less than Forty Members having accordingly risen in their places,

SIR WILFRID LAWSON

said, that, in his opinion, it would have been discreditable to the House, in the serious circumstances in which they now stood, if, after the events of Friday last in the Soudan, they had declined to discuss the present situation. On Friday certain military operations took place in the Eastern Soudan, and it was stated in to-day's newspapers that some 2,000 lives had been taken away. Surely the House could do nothing better than discuss why that slaughter of men in their own country had occurred. Surely the House was entitled to know what the policy of Her Majesty's Government was, and what was the reason why they were carrying fire and sword among people who had never done us any harm. Personally, he felt that he was entitled to demand an explanation from the Government. The House would remember what took place on the Vote of Censure. The Prime Minister came down to the House and said distinctly that the military forces would be employed solely as a small service to humanity; and he and his Friends near him understood the right hon. Gentleman to mean that the forces were to be employed for the rescue of the garrison of Tokar and nothing else. Within 10 days after the Prime Minister made that declaration and gave them that assurance Tokar fell and the garrison surrendered. Where was now the service to humanity? There was nothing more to be done; and if the Prime Minister had told them in that debate that he was going on further, that he was not going merely to rescue the garrison of Tokar, and that he was going to invade the country of these people, whose independence he had declared, he would not have got the votes of some of the Members who sat below the Gangway. If this terrible slaughter had been carried on for any other purpose than the relief of Tokar the Prime Minister and the Government had obtained the votes of these hon. Members under false pretences. He supposed an attempt would be made by the Government to show that the slaughter on Friday was carried on as a means of defending Suakin. That was an insult to our troops, and he scorned the plea, by whomsoever it might be put forward; but he supposed it was the only excuse the Government could make. No human being in this or in any other country would believe in that defence. It might, however, do in that House; it might do for the time. He dared say that some of his hon. Friends would assume to believe it; but it would only be a "make-believe" belief. What was the action of Friday last fought for? All the newspapers in London said it was fought in order to give a lesson to the rebels, to show our own power, and to maintain our military reputation. But he would say that a more dastardly and cowardly deed had never been done than the commission of this massacre. Long ago, when there was an attempt to carry on a war with Russia for the sake of getting some further military successes, the Prime Minister said— Now, I venture to say, with deep respect, and without imputing motives to hon. Gentlemen who allow such a sentiment to find a place within their breasts, that if they will put down passion and look at it with the calm eye of reason, they would see it is not only indefensible, it is hideous, it is anti-Christian, it is immoral, it is inhuman, and you have no right to make war for what you call success. If, when you have obtained the objects of a war, you continue it in order to obtain military glory, I say you tempt the justice of Him in whose hands the fate of armies is solely lodged—you tempt Him to launch on you His wrath. If this be courage, I, for one, have no courage to take such a course. These were noble words, and the right hon. Gentleman acted in a noble manner a few years ago when our troops were repulsed. On that occasion the right hon. Gentleman came to the conclusion that the war was unjust, and wrote a memorable letter, in which he said that to go on in such a proceeding would be sheer blood-guiltiness. Now, because it was possible that we might be laughed at if our troops came back without a contest, we have committed an unspeakable crime for fear of being called cowards. It was as clear as daylight how the thing had gone on. The Cabinet, yielding to all this military clamour, had cut down thousands of men who were doing nothing more than defending their homes and their country. The whole thing was clearly explained now. The articles they had read this morning showed that the whole of the proceedings was nothing more than mowing down by machinery men who had done us no harm, and who were "butchered to make a Jingo holiday." Their bodies were festering on the desert sands; but the blood of these men cried for judgment upon the nation which committed such crimes and such cruelties, and committed them for the lowest and basest object; for all these attempts upon Egypt had ultimately been based upon a desire to get money. That was the reason which justified him in moving the adjournment of the House. When he came down to the House, he had been told that there was no use in moving the adjournment of the House, because there were orders for the troops to come back. But they had since heard a very different story. The noble Lord the Secretary of State for War had told them that the troops had not been recalled. Therefore, there was every reason to suppose that other atrocities would be committed. Surely the Government had done enough. Surely their foreign policy had gained enough glory, and incurred for it enough infamy. It had been said that our foreign policy of late years had been marked by massacres like milestones on the road. They began at Alexandria; there was a slaughter there. A few months elapsed, and then Tel-el-Kebir followed, with a brutal butchery of men who were unable to defend themselves. Then they had just heard of men, fighting with a bravery unequalled in ancient or modern history, mown down by modern implements of destruction. He asked the Prime Minister whether he could not check this country in its wild career of crime. He did not say that the course which had been followed was unpopular. He was afraid that all that slaughter of weak and helpless people was not unpopular in the country. It was popular enough with all these pliant scribes who cried out for the slaughter of mea much braver and better than themselves. It was popular with the monied classes—with the financiers, who were at the bottom of all the business. It was, too, popular with Gentlemen there—even these who sat below the Gangway—the Radicals in that House. He thought it well to speak the truth, even in that House, sometimes. They were Radicals in name; but he told his hon. Friends that if there was one class upon whom the guilt and responsibility of all this work rested more heavily than upon another it was the Radical Party. They were still Radicals in name; but he sometimes thought they had changed their nature. At one time they were called the Peace-at-any-price Party—now they might be called the War-at-any-price Party. He was not speaking with any force of numbers behind him. He appealed to a higher authority than popular support. The right hon. Gentleman knew that there was a higher Court than the High Court of Parliament, before which these deeds would some day be brought for judgment. He, for one, would on that day rather be in the position of these poor savages who were mown down by our soldiers than in the position of these who dealt death and destruction among them. He hoped the Prime Minister would turn a deaf ear to these evil counsellors who had hitherto been able to lead him, and once more act upon these principles of truth and peace and justice, for which he had so often and so eloquently pleaded, and prove, by withdrawing our troops, that this nation could be merciful as well as strong. He called upon the right hon. Gentleman to sheathe the sword and spare mankind.

MR. PASSMORE EDWARDS

said, he begged to second the Motion of the hon. Baronet.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—(Sir Wilfrid Lawson.)

MR. GLADSTONE

I confess, after the manifestations we have had of sentiment on the other side of the House, I could have wished to have had the advantage of hearing from leading Gentlemen on the opposite side with what motives they supported the Motion of my hon. Friend (Sir Wilfrid Lawson). I quite understand the motive of my hon. Friend, and, however violent his language may be, however sweeping his condemnations upon this and many other subjects, he well knows that I have never used towards him a single phrase except of mildness and respect. That is not on account of the tone of his speeches; but on account of the sacredness of the object he has in view. I wish him now to understand that he is at liberty to discharge upon me and my Colleagues all the vials of wrath he may please to pour out, to make against us the most extravagant assumptions, to put out of view the evidence upon which we have acted, and, in fact, to commit every illogical and argumentative offence that he may please; but for me he is perfectly secure on account of the sacredness of the object he has in view. The indisposition, under all circumstances, to the shedding of human blood, the consistent profession of what may, perhaps, be an ultra-pacific policy, have been the motives which have led my hon. Friend to-night to ask leave to move the adjournment of the House. Am I to understand that concurrence in these motives of my hon. Friend prompted other hon. Gentlemen to support the Motion. [Lord RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: Certainly.] I quite admit that the noble Lord's rising was in entire conformity with many expressions which had fallen from him. I am apologizing for my own delay, because, naturally, I was desirous to know the whole of the case we had to meet, and not the case only as it has been presented by my hon. Friend. I am disappointed in that respect; and, therefore, I have to deal with the case of my hon. Friend. My hon. Friend has taken pains to quote some opinions of mine, given in former debates, one of them, I think, 30 years ago, and another of a more recent date, but still not of a very recent character. I do not know whether I am or am not responsible for the precise words of the quotations; but as regards their substance, I adopt them, and hold by them now, as strictly and as closely as I did when I made use of these expressions. As far as I understand my hon. Friend, he has stated two definite points against the Government; but his speech is founded on a general assumption over and above these two points. His first is that, in addressing the House upon the Vote of Censure, I stated that the relief of the beleaguered garrison was the sole object of the advance to be made by the military expedition for Suakin. That is quite true; but at the time I stated that, be it remembered that the House was, from the first, in the fullest possession of our declaration, that we intended to defend Suakin. It was actually on the day after the House met that, spontaneously, not in answer to a Question, I said that we were taking measures to strengthen the forces of Admiral Hewett for the defence of Suakin. At the time we had no reason to suppose that Suakin was likely to be attacked by any except the most insignificant force; and for all that we then knew, the naval means, which were placed, and which were being placed at the disposal of Admiral Hewett, might have sufficed for the purpose. Since then the case has assumed a different aspect; but I wish the House to understand that, in the first instance, when I said the military expedition was for the relief of the beleaguered garrison, the House was already aware of our intention with regard to Suakin, and that there was no abandonment of this intention. The rest of my hon. Friend's evidence appears to consist of certain articles in newspapers. I do not know what papers they are; but I gather the drift of the evidence from the general spirit of what he has read. But he has not shown, or attempted to show, that one word used by my noble Friend near me, or myself, or Lord Granville, or by any Member of the Government, is in conformity with the spirit of these articles. It is very hard, in these circumstances, that my hon. Friend should bring these severe imputations against us. What is the real basis of my hon. Friend's charge? The real basis is this—that we have been engaged, or are going to be engaged, in what may be called vindictive military operations—punishing these people with no object of necessity in view; but in order either to indulge our own thirst for blood, or else to acquire military glory. Now, my hon. Friend has not produced one shred or tittle of evidence in support of this charge. I do not believe that the operation for the relief of Tokar would have been effected without fighting the action which has just taken place. We have relieved Tokar. We have not made it an object at any time to secure military possession of Tokar; but we have relieved all that portion of the military garrison of Tokar which had not joined the rebel forces. I repeat that this relief could not possibly have been effected without fighting the action that has been actually fought. Therefore, the action which my hon. Friend denounces as massacre was an action necessary for a purpose in which he has himself acquiesced. Under these circumstances, I do not know why he falls with such vehemence upon the Government, and upon Members of the House who do not think with him. But, besides the relief of Tokar, there was the defence of Suakin. Does my hon. Friend say we should give up the defence of Suakin? If he does, let him say so plainly. [Sir WILFRID LAWSON: We ought to get out of the place as quickly as we can.] The House has never expressed that opinion. Gentlemen on this side of the House de not entertain it, Gentlemen on that side do not entertain it, and the Government do not entertain it; and why? Not because they are given to vindictive military operations—operations which, under almost all circumstances, are odious and indefensible—but because they deem that the interests of peace and the interests of humanity require that the Port of Suakin should be maintained. My hon. Friend differs from this view, and differs, I presume, in the interests of peace and philanthropy. But would peace and philanthropy be promoted by our abandonment of Suakin? My hon. Friend says that we ought to get out of Suakin as quickly as we can. Well, I am inclined to concur with him; but in adopting the words "as quickly as we can," I mean as quickly as we can compatibly with the fulfilment of our duties to the cause of peace and humanity. If my hon. Friend says that we ought not to remain at Suakin for the establishment of British power there I agree with him. But if we abandoned Suakin at this moment it would be the opening of the greatest vent of the Slave Trade. The Slave Trade seeks a vent across the Red Sea to Arabia; and I do not hesitate to say, in the first place, that it would be the opening up of the country for the Slave Trade, and that event would become perfectly free and uninterrupted were we at this moment to abandon Suakin without making any provision for its prevention. Then my hon. Friend seems to forget that there is a strong political sympathy be- tween these who are taking part in the movement headed by the Mahdi in the Soudan and a large number of tribes in Arabia; and my hon. Friend proposes that we should at once leave open the communications between the tribes in arms in the Soudan and the tribes who, according to the best judgment which we can form, are but too likely ready to take up arms in Arabia. Let my hon. Friend raise the question if he likes—that Her Majesty's Government are in error in declining to order the immediate abandonment of Suakin. [Sir WILFRID LAWSON: Will you give me a day?] I do not think that question is quite worthy of an answer. My hon. Friend puts that question to a man who he knows cannot give him an affirmative answer—a man charged with heavy political responsibilities. If my hon. Friend thinks fit, let him bring the subject forward, and then we shall see whether the state of the question is such as to justify his demand for a day. Am I to remind my hon. Friend of the telegrams that have been read to the House by my noble Friend the Secretary of State for War? My noble Friend has read a telegram, dated February 23, in which he says—"No sanction will be given for a distant expedition." That means a distant expedition in contrast with the expedition for the relief of Tokar. The noble Lord goes on— Could you march to Teb, protect fugitives' bury English dead, and return by land to Suakin? Is that a bloodthirsty purpose? If Suakin threatened, you may take offensive, either from Trinkitat or Suakin. Then, when we had a discussion on this subject a few days ago—we now have debates on Egypt on every other day—we stated distinctly that there might be movements which would be offensive in their military form, but which in their essence and aim would be defensive. That is the view of my noble Friend, and that is the view of the Government. Does my hon. Friend challenge that particular proposal? It is singular that after hearing all the fairly explicit declarations made by my noble Friend my hon. Friend has not challenged one of them. Does my hon. Friend think it unreasonable that if Suakin were threatened a British Force should protect it? My hon. Friend said in his speech just now rather mildly—it was one of the few sentences of his speech that did not contain a highly inflamed epithet—"You can remain at Suakin, and repel them when they come there." Does my hon. Friend think that would really serve the cause of peace to remain there behind such fortifications as there are at Suakin, to remain indefinitely, and as long as these tribes might choose to hang about that district in a menacing attitude? I can hardly think that my hon. Friend thinks that. I know pretty well what would be thought from the point of view of military honour apart from humane and politic objects, and I know what would be said in this House if we were to tell General Graham—"You may remain behind your mud walls in Suakin, and you must wait uutil your opponents fire at you, and if they do so you can fire back at them." That is the policy of my hon. Friend, but it is not a policy conformable with justice. My noble Friend also read a second telegram, in which he said— Tokar having fallen, the main object is now the protection of Suakin from attack. Do not molest rebels if they disperse. Where is the sanguinary declaration to which my hon. Friend objects? He thinks that to allow any amount of organized forces to remain near Suakin would have been, on our part, a proper course; but he objects to my noble Friend's conduct because he says—" Do not molest the rebels if they disperse." Then there was a third telegram— You should, if possible, summon Chiefs to disband forces and attend Gordon at Khartoum for settlement of Soudan before attacking. That was sent on February 27. Thus General Graham was ordered to send a notification that our mission was a mission of peace, and to require that the tribes should desist from threatening us by gathering in the neighbourhood. [Lord R. CHURCHILL: What was the date of that telegram?] The 27th February. But that was only, I must say, a more particular specification of what I conceive to have been involved in the whole of General Graham's instructions, all of which were framed on a basis totally incompatible with the thought of vindictive operations. That was the last declaration of my noble Friend. Then came the answer of General Graham— I am sending letter to outpost with white flag in accordance with instructions. Shall advance to Teb to-morrow, and shall not fight until compelled to do so. Much as I admire the skill and valour of General Graham and the admirable conduct of his forces in this operation, I admire yet more these few simple words, which show that he was not under the domination of a thirst for military glory, and that he abhorred vindictive operations just as utterly as does my hon. Friend. I think I have now met the points raised by my hon. Friend, and shown how completely the ground which I have taken up with regard to this subject is in accordance with the citations made by my hon. Friend from former speeches of mine which he has done me the honour to read.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

Sir, the right hon. Gentleman appears to be surprised that he should be frequently called upon to speak in this House on the affairs of Egypt. I think the House will not share that surprise. The position which we have taken up throughout these transactions is that the conduct of the Government with reference to the affairs of Egypt has been marked by an absence of consistency and steadiness, which has been the cause of a great part of the misfortunes which have occurred, and from all that we can see the same fault that has vitiated their policy hitherto can be traced in their policy now. It appears to us that there is a want of decision and firmness in their action, and they hesitate to make clear the position which they intend to occupy in Egypt; and so long as that position is left undefined, so long will there be openings for lamentable occurrences like these which have recently been seen. I was very much struck with the statement which appears in to-day's newspapers as having been made by some of the prisoners who were taken in the late encounter. They said they were not aware that they were fighting against the English—that they had no wish to fight against the English. Why, there is the reproach against Her Majesty's Government at once. If these people had known that they were fighting against English troops, if the position of England had been such as it ought to have been, if that position had been made clear, we should have had none of that slaughter which has taken place. I say, then, that it is our duty, in season and out of season, to call attention to this matter, and to press upon the Government to tell the world more distinctly than they have hitherto done how far they acknowledge their responsibility in Egypt. We see now what has come of their disclaiming responsibility, when not any action even, but a few words on the part of Her Majesty's Government, would have prevented the difficulties which have followed upon the destruction of Hicks Pasha's Army. We now perceive a new development of the same policy; and therefore I see without any surprise the hon. Baronet rise to call attention to the matter—the hon. Baronet who, having supported the Government in the recent debate, now anxiously, keenly, and with considerable feeling, watches all the proceedings flowing from the conduct which he, with others, has approved. I hope, therefore, we shall not be satisfied with what seem to me to be slight, temporary, and unworthy excuses. The right hon. Gentleman says it was necessary to preserve our hold upon Suakin for the present, in order to keep down the Slave Trade. Why for the present? [Mr. GLADSTONE: They were not my words.] The gist of the right hon. Gentleman's argument was—and I believe it was so understood generally—that they were not contemplating any permanent occupation of Suakin, but that it was important that for the present time we should maintain ourselves there for that particular purpose—to put down the Slave Trade. If he had said it was necessary to remain there until certain forces were dispersed we could have understood him. But when that sort of language to which I have referred is used it is impossible for anyone to understand the position. The right hon. Gentleman can always explain his words in this House, but it is not so easy to explain them in Egypt, and anyone who knows the state of feeling in Cairo will know that there they are utterly bewildered. The right hon. Gentleman gave another reason for remaining at Suakin for the present. He said that the Mahdi in the Soudan is closely connected with the Arabian tribes, and that communication between them may lead to lamentable results. But what are we doing with regard to the Mahdi? Are we his friends or are we his enemies? We are fighting his lieutenant with our left hand, and with our right we are proclaiming him Sultan. Therefore, I say it is nearly impossible for this House, with any due sense of its duty to the country, to abstain, whenever opportunities occur, from pressing the Government to tell us what their policy is, and to take up a clear position. There is, of course, a difference between the position of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) and hon. Gentlemen on this side. But the hon. Baronet will, I believe, agree with me in this—that the conduct of the Government has brought about a position from which it is impossible for us to extricate ourselves without violence, and that that conduct deserves censure. It is in the interest of humanity that we desire and endeavour to impress upon them the importance of taking up a position which may prevent future calamities.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

Sir, for the Government to sit silent after the speech just delivered by the Leader of the Opposition is to plead guilty. There has been absolutely no reply to the right hon. Gentleman. He has asked them once more, for the hundredth time since Parliament met, to make a clear statement of the Government policy. That is the demand which the Opposition makes. But it is not only the demand which the Opposition makes; it is the demand which the whole country makes—which the whole of Europe makes. What are you doing in Egypt? What do you intend to do? It is in the power of hon. Members on this side—and I believe they will receive support from hon. Members opposite—to insist upon an answer from Her Majesty's Government. It is in our power to exercise control over the proceedings of this House. In spite of the regulations of the right hon. Gentleman, minorities are not altogether impotent. Her Majesty's Government are not only spending immense sums of money on military operations, but they shrink from bringing forward the Estimates with regard to these operations, and any appeals on the subject from their own side they meet with an absolute and inviolable silence. Let the House recollect the indignation of the right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues at the policy of the late Government, and the imprecations which, at the most critical times, the right hon. Gentleman showered down, because, as he said, the late Government did not give full information. You are now in occupation of Egypt, and, in part, of the Soudan; you are committing the country to Heaven knows what, and no power on earth can extract information from you. What is the policy of the Government? That is the question the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) asked, and I hope he will continue to ask it. I was surprised, when the hon. Baronet rose to move the adjournment, to notice that only two other Members of the Radical Party rose to support it. After a battle, without exception the bloodiest which this country has fought for years, a battle absolutely unprovoked except by Her Majesty's Government, the Representatives of the Radical Party in this House positively let the only sincere man among them stand up alone. I have said in the country, and I will say over and over again, that the Radical Party is humbug. Could I desire a stronger proof of that assertion than the conduct of the Radical Party to-night? Where, I should like to know, after this frightful slaughter, is the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright), the apostle of peace? Ah! he stood at that door; he looked in for a moment, he saw the subject was an awkward one, and he ran away. I should like to know where is the hon. Member for Merthyr (Mr. Richard)? Ah! the hon. Member is there. Was he in the House when the hon. Baronet stood up to call attention to this subject? ["Question!"] I say it is in the right of any Member of the Opposition, at a moment like this, to call the attention of the country, in every possible way, to the attitude of these who demand its confidence. The hon. Member for Merthyr was there, the President of the Peace Society, who wishes to settle all matters of dispute by arbitration, and who a short time ago made an appeal to the Prime Minister to do so; and yet he did not get up to support the hon. Baronet when it was a question of the most ruthless slaughter brought about by Her Majesty's Government. Let Her Majesty's Government explain why they thought proper to censure the late Government in the strongest terms for the expedition to Zululand, which was undertaken for the purpose of protecting a British Colony, and why they themselves, having pronounced that censure in terms which, I venture to say, were often more than un-Parliamentary, attacked the Arab Chief in the Soudan—with whose master they have made peace—although there was no British Colony, no British station to protect, but only a post which you admit you are going to abandon. Will Her Majesty's Government explain why they thought proper to make peace with the Transvaal Boers, after having sustained three disgraceful defeats, after having sacrificed a thousand or more British lives, and after having incurred more disgrace than any British Government ever incurred before? You made no attempt to retrieve these reverses, and yet now, for no object whatever, you make an absolutely unprovoked attack upon this Arab Chief, slaughtering with your superior weapons 1,000 or more of his followers. Will you explain that inconsistency in your policy, because it is an explanation which the country is demanding from you? Now I will point out the hypocrisy of the Government; now I come to this flag of truce. I asked the noble Lord the Secretary of State for War on Tuesday whether General Graham had power to negotiate with Osman Digna, and he told me that he supposed he had the usual powers which British Generals possessed. I had to be content with that reply; but it is quite clear now that he had no power to negotiate with Osman Digna, because on Wednesday the Government despatched a telegram to General Graham, instructing him to enter into negotiations. Now, what are these negotiations? Observe the way in which the Government have been endeavouring to blind not only their own eyes, but also the eyes of the country. A British officer—a gallant officer, no doubt—is sent out with a message, in all probability written in English, which he sticks in the sand two or three miles from the fortifications, and then retires, and the Government considers that it has done all that is necessary to enter into negotiations. The Government, after having satisfied the demands of humanity by this extraordinary and ridiculous course of action, proceed with perfect equanimity to slaughter Osman Digna's forces. General Graham is not responsible to this House except that he is acting under the instructions of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for War, and he merits nothing but thanks from this House for the bravery, courage, and endurance which he has displayed in upholding the sadly tarnished honour of this country. Was that the kind of negotiation which the Government meant to carry out? There were lots of people in the camp who, if it had been really desired to enter into negotiations with Osman Digna, could have explained to these unfortunate Natives that they were no longer fighting against an effete and corrupt Government, but against the British Forces. How can you say that you have satisfied the claims of humanity by sending out this message which was written in English and stuck in the sand? Now, Sir, about this defence of Suakin, I want the House to remark what the Prime Minister says. He wishes the House to believe that this expedition of General Graham was necessary for the defence of Suakin. Then I ask why was it not undertaken weeks and weeks ago, because this is certain, that the Government would never have sent the expedition had they not been forced to send it by the House of Commons. Now, the right hon. Gentleman has stated that if we had defended Suakin in the way the hon. Baronet suggests, we should have had to leave a garrison in the place, which would have been left there for an indefinite period. What is the conclusion which we must draw from that? That they intend to get away from the place? If they do, it makes their con-conduct hopelessly guilty, for in defending a town which they avow they intend to evacuate they have wantonly slaughtered 3,000 or 4,000 Arabs. The Government may think this a matter unworthy of their notice, but the country does not think so. Brighton did not think so. A day will come, and it may be very soon, when Brighton will not be the only constituency which will have to give its judgment on the policy of the Government. The Government may then, when it is too late, regret that they did not yield to the entreaties of the hon. Baronet and the Leader of the Opposition to state frankly their policy. The pretext thought good enough by the Prime Minister to give to the House only proves to me how extraordinarily the House of Commons has sunk in the eyes of the right hon. Gentleman. He says it is well known in war that movements which are offensive in their nature are sometimes defensive in their essence. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Offensive in their form.] What does that come to, that the attack of General Graham was offensive in its form, but not in its nature? What? Three thousand men or more slaughtered as a matter of form by movements which were not offensive in their nature! That is a species of destruction which I venture to say has never been witnessed before in the history of the world. From sources of information which are open to us, and which seem to be more reliable than these of the Government, from a Reuter's telegram, we gather that Osman Digna, with a large force, is encamped in the neighbourhood of Suakin, so that it becomes all the more necessary that we should have a frank statement from the Government. The Prime Minister the other night accepted with much enthusiasm the policy of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle—"Rescue and retire." Whom have you rescued? The 300 soldiers of Tokar! Why, the greater part of that garrison fought against England at Teb, and they were perfectly happy among the followers of Osman. It was only after the victory of General Graham that they thought it more prudent to express some kind of satisfaction with Her Majesty's troops. They were not, I say, rescued, and I call it, not the relief, but the recapture of Tokar, which has been effected by General Graham, for Tokar had already fallen. I would now ask whether the phrase "Retire" governs the policy of Her Majesty's Ministers? Do they intend retiring from Suakin and Khartoum; and, if so, when; and when do—they mean to carry out the policy of retiring from Egypt Proper? The whole of Europe and this country are under the impression that Her Majesty's Government are going within a short time to retire from Egypt. Will they state that intention openly and take the judgment of the House upon it. If, again, they mean to occupy Egypt, with all the resources of the Empire, and set up a stable Government, then let them get up and say so, and take the judgment of the House upon that policy. Until we do get a definite statement embracing one or other of these policies, I do earnestly hope that the House will absolutely refuse to grant the Supplies necessary to carry on the Government.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

Sir, the noble Lord who has just sat down expressed great astonishment that no Member of the Government rose to reply to the Questions put by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition as to the present policy of the Government in the Soudan. Well, Sir, these Questions were not put to the Government in so definite and precise a form as to invite, or make it possible to give, succinct answers. What has happened which should make it necessary for the Government to give any further explanation of their policy in regard to the Soudan than was given by several Members of the Government at great length in the recent debate? The policy which the Government were endeavouring to pursue in the Soudan, in Egypt, and on the shores of the Red Sea, was clearly and distinctly stated during the progress of that debate. A part of that policy, which was then announced—the sending out of an expedition to relieve Tokar, and for the defence of the Red Sea ports—has been carried to a successful issue; but what is there in that fact to make it necessary for the Government to volunteer further explanations than these they gave a short time ago? I do not think the time has arrived when the Government can advantageously make any further announcement. At all events, if there are any definite Questions to be put to the Government upon any particular point in relation to this matter, the time to put them would be when the Votes for the Supplementary Estimates are brought forward, which would not be later than Thursday next. The noble Lord has repeated in still stronger language the charge made by the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) that the battle on Friday last was an unprovoked slaughter. I entirely deny that allegation, whether it comes from the noble Lord or from the hon. Member. I say that every step which could be taken by the Government to prevent the necessity for that loss of life was taken by the Government and by General Graham and Admiral Hewett, and no part of the responsibility for that loss of life can be justly charged to the Government or to their officers. The noble Lord ridiculed what took place in the sending of a flag of truce, and he says that General Graham had not authority to conduct negotiations. Of course, General Graham had perfect power and authority to do anything of the kind, and long before he was there not only did the officers on the spot have authority, but they were distinctly given authority by the Government. On the 13th of February, the day after the expedition was ordered, a telegram was sent to Admiral Hewett in these words— You are at liberty to enter into communication with the rebels before Tokar and Suakin, and to tell them that we do not want to go to war with them, and to tell Osman Digna that if he does not let the garrison go we will relieve it. The noble Lord has asked a great many questions, but he does not appear to pay the slightest attention to the answers. After these instructions were given, messengers were sent both to the garrison of Tokar and to the force which was besieging Tokar, repeating these instructions; and the result was stated in one of the telegrams I read in answer to the Question of the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) this evening. On the 18th of February, Admiral Hewett telegraphed that, in reply to letters sent to the rebel Chiefs outside Tokar stating that the English intended relieving the garrison and to protect Suakin, Osman Digna had coolly informed him that all these who did not believe in the Mahdi would receive the same fate as the others, and that after the fall of Tokar he would go through Suakin and drive the English into the sea. He added—"I therefore do not intend sending him any more messengers." Does the noble Lord believe that after these instructions had been given to the Admiral, who was working in concert with the General, the General would not consider himself authorized to send messengers if he thought it would have any effect? But it is asked—Why did not you give more precise instructions to the General at an early date? Well, I do not think it is necessary to be constantly worrying officers with instructions to do that which they are perfectly competent to do of themselves. The only reason why the telegram I have read was sent last week was, that I was surprised and anxious at not having received any answer to my telegram to General Graham, in which I had asked him to report fully upon the measures he proposed to take in the event of Tokar having surrendered. Can it be said, after the receipt of such a message as I have read, that any measure likely to be efficient was neglected in order to enable the Arabs to know that we were anxious not to fight them unless we were compelled, and can it be for one moment contended that the battle which was fought on Friday was unnecessary both for the purpose of relieving any of the garrison which might be remaining at Tokar, and also for the protection of Suakin? The right hon. Gentleman has referred to something he has read in one of the newspapers about the Arabs not knowing that they were fighting against English troops. It would have been better if the right hon. Gentleman had referred to the whole passage. My recollection of what I read is that the soldiers said they were not aware that they were fighting against English troops; but the rebel Chiefs did know it, and had concealed it from their followers. That is the statement I read in the papers this morning, and it is not fairly referred to in the observations of the right hon. Gentleman. A great deal has been said about our intentions with regard to Suakin. It has been asked whether we intend to retire; and criticisms have been made upon the statement of my right hon. Friend that it would have been impossible for the British Forces to defend Suakin behind mud walls. Of course it is not possible; it could not be garrisoned for an indefinite time by a great British Force, in a climate rapidly becoming quite unfit for a large number of British troops, and pent up in a small, unhealthy town. But do you suppose that 3,000 or 4,000 men could be kept in camp at Suakin waiting until it might please Osman Digna, or whoever the Arab leader might be, to attack them? It is evident that that was perfectly out of the question. When there were two large opposing forces in the field, one of which had gained over the garrison of Tokar, while another had captured Sinkat, and they were threatening to advance on Suakin and sweep the British into the sea, the only way that Suakin could be defended was by attacking these forces. The right hon. Gentleman says there is yet a force under Osman Digna a short distance from Suakin. That is strictly true according to the last intelligence; but how does he know what may be the effect upon them of the battle which was fought last Friday? The hon. Member for Carlisle has assumed throughout his speech that that action was fought solely for the purpose of vengeance and inflicting a blow on the rebel Chiefs. I maintain that he has not justified that assertion by one particle of proof. He has not been able to quote one single passage of the instructions to the General or the Admiral which bears out the supposition that that was the intention of the Government. I am sure that nothing could be more unfair to the Admiral and the General than to suppose that they have taken upon themselves to enter upon operations which were not sanctioned by the instructions of the Government. As to Tokar itself, it appears to me that until General Graham arrived there on Saturday, it was possible he might have been in uncertainty as to whether the Egyptian garrison was still holding out there; and would anyone have thought it right and proper that an expedition which had been sent to relieve Tokar, if possible, should retire without having ascertained for certain that the object of that expedition was no longer attainable? I think the service which has been rendered, although not so great as it might otherwise have been if the Egyptian troops had not surrendered, is still not one to be despised. General Graham reports that the Egyptian men, women, and children whom he found in Tokar had been grievously oppressed and ill-treated by their Arab captors, and that they received him with great rejoicings, and that it is probable that the women and children would have shared the fate of these at Sinkat if Tokar had not been relieved by General Graham. I do not know what Question there is that it is necessary for the Government to answer on this point. The Government are now anxious to bring forward the Supplementary Estimates, and if any further question arises it can be discussed on these Estimates. I fail to see why the success of an expedition, the sending out of which was universally approved, makes it incumbent upon the Government to offer any further explanation as to their policy in Egypt or the Soudan.

LORD JOHN MANNERS

The interesting speech of the noble Marquess is entirely of a retrospective character. He has not said a single word about the future; but the object of the Motion and of the strong speech of the noble Lord (Lord Randolph Churchill) is to press upon the Government questions relating to the future and not to the past. The noble Marquess has asked what has happened since the Prime Minister spoke in the great debate on the affairs of Egypt, which could justify these questions being put. A good deal has happened. The vote of the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) was gained in the belief that the expedition would not be too late for the relief of Tokar, and it was too late. The vote of the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) was given under the impression that there would be no fighting, and that Tokar would be relieved without bloodshed. Tokar was not relieved, and there has been a great deal of bloodshed. Those are among the events which have occurred since the debate to which the noble Marquess referred with such complacency. But since then has nothing happened in another part of the Soudan? Have we no disquieting news from Khartoum? Why did not the noble Marquess himself tell us earlier this evening that a great part of the new Egyptian Army is ordered up to Assouan? And—although it is not certain whether instructions to that effect will or will not be sent—it may be that instructions will be sent for a portion of the British force to follow them in that direction. All that has happened since the debate of a week or 10 days ago. But, besides that, we now hear a little more of General Gordon's proceedings at Khartoum. Are we to take no notice of these proceedings? Colonel Stewart's expedition on the White Nile has turned out to be unsuccessful. Is that to be set aside and not considered? Do Her Majesty's Government think that the House of Commons and the country are to be as deaf and as blind to all that takes place in the Soudan as they have proved themselves to be? No; the noble Marquess may take it for granted that until Her Majesty's Government state clearly and explicitly what is their policy in Egypt and in the Soudan, they will—if they please so to call it—be persecuted by Questions from both sides of the House. As to the occupation of Suakin, what do we hear from the Prime Minister? Suakin is to be occu- pied, and to continue to be occupied, with the view of putting down the Slave Trade, until some other or better arrangement can be made with that object. Can the right hon. Gentleman really give us the slightest indication of the period in which the Slave Trade will be put down on the shores of the Red Sea except by the maintenance of British power on the littoral? Neither the right hon. Gentleman nor the noble Marquess has given us the slightest satisfaction on this branch of the question. I would remind the House how it is that the British Government suddenly find themselves responsible for the putting down of the Slave Trade on the shores of the Red Sea. It is in consequence of their own inaction and fatuity in respect to the Soudan. If it had not been for the mischievous misconduct on the part of the Government in permitting Hicks Pasha to go to his doom, we never should have heard of this new and frightful responsibility upon the British Government of maintaining positions on the Red Sea in order to suppress the Slave Trade. These are among the matters which the House will have to consider, and the country will not be content that Her Majesty's Government should maintain their present silence on all these important questions.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 103; Noes 150: Majority 47.—(Div. List, No. 25.)