HC Deb 22 February 1884 vol 284 cc1759-91
MR. E. STANHOPE

, who had given Notice to move an Amendment after Paragraph 2, after the words, "Foreign Powers," insert— Humbly to entreat Her Majesty to direct that Papers will be laid before us relating to the recent advances of the Russian Government in Central Asia, said, it was not his intention that night to criticize the action of Her Majesty's Government in this matter. The time had not come, nor had the House the materials if they desired it, for in any way challenging that action. His present object was one purely of inquiry, with the intention, if he could, of obtaining information on a good many points as to which the country was now altogether in the dark. They were assured, in the Gracious Speech from the Throne, that Her Majesty held friendly and harmonious relations with all Foreign Powers. There were certain facts which, as it appeared to him, were not altogether calculated to improve our friendly relations with one Foreign Power; and he, therefore, thought it was exceedingly desirable that the matter should, as soon as possible, be cleared up, and explanations given in regard to it. It was not necessary for his purpose to go back into ancient history. He would remind the House, however, that at the time of the Candahar debate, in 1881, one of the great contentions made in favour of the policy of withdrawal from Candahar was this. It was said that our presence at Candahar was one of the main reasons why the Russians thought it was so necessary to advance, and that if we only took the step of withdrawing from that place that stop would be accompanied by a corresponding cessation of movement by Russia. The House would recollect that at the outset of the debate the right hon. Gentleman now the President of the Local Government Board got up following him and told them that the first act of the new Emperor of Russia was to withdraw General Skobeleff from Central Asia, and to direct that all further advance should be stopped. That was an explicit declaration, which was received with great interest by this country, and it had undoubtedly a considerable effect upon public opinion in England. But the fact was that from that time the advance of Russia had gone on with accelerated speed; and although he was ready to give all credit to the Russian Government for not always being a willing agent, he thought that it was difficult to escape the idea that there appeared to be an amount of method in their advances which would, at all events, convey to some minds the idea of a settled purpose. First, there was an uncertain frontier; then came disturbances, for the quelling of which a military expedition was required, or else there was a scientific or an exploring expedition; but the result was always the same; territory was always annexed. The debate upon Candahar had taken place in March, 1881; in June of that year we were informed that an Imperial Ukase had been issued announcing the annexation of the territory of the Tekke Turcomans to the Russian Empire, under the name of the Trans-Caspian territory. So vague a statement, which might very well cover any extent of territory, very naturally excited the curiosity, to say the least of it, of the English Government, and on the 27th of July Mr. Wyndham inquired if the Foreign Minister could give him any idea of the territory termed Trans-Caspian. His Excellency replied that "it was all the territory beyond the Caspian;" and he went on to say that the furthest point now was Askabad; but that General Skobeleff had discovered some very fertile country south, where a complete state of disorder existed; that there was Sarakhs also to be considered; and whether it was Persian or not remained to be verified.—[Central Asia (1881), No. 4.] A few days later Mr. Thompson, our Minister in Persia, had informed the English Government that it would take nine months to complete the maps, and that negotiations for the delimitation of the frontier could not begin until the maps had been "officially sanctioned by the Russian Government." In January, 1882, we had received information that a Treaty had been concluded between Russia and Persia, and that Treaty had established and fixed the boundary of the new Trans-Caspian territory. In that Treaty was one most important provision, for it gave Russia the right to nominate agents to reside in the frontier towns of Persia, and the object of this, as stated in the Treaty, was to settle questions of order and tranquillity. Undoubtedly, that was an interference with the rights of Persia, and that it was of great importance to this country nobody would be prepared to deny. Indeed, the noble Lord (the Marquess of Hartington), then Secretary of State for India, had raised the question of the integrity of Persia, and said that it could not be without interest to us. The next step was that we heard of a survey beyond Sarakhs up into Afghan territory, and we heard from the newspapers that Russia was beginning to claim rights beyond the frontier. In 1882 there had been a very remarkable speech made by General Skobeleff, in which he had said that the influence of Russia had never been greater at Teheran than it then was. He (Mr. Stanhope) could well believe it. That was followed by rumours that there was a further secret Treaty between Russia and Persia, by which Russia obtained the control of all the villages, if not up to Sarakhs, at least very close to it. Now Sarakhs had always been regarded as beyond dispute Persian, and was, indeed, up to the present time, garrisoned by Persian troops. But even short of Sarakhs the territory was also Persian, and therefore this action would be an undoubted infringement of the rights of Persia. He wished, therefore, to ask the Government whether they had reason to believe there was any truth in the statement that a secret Treaty of that nature did exist; whether, in fact, they had addressed any representations to the Government of Russia with regard to this portion of the frontier, and how matters now stood? A few days ago they read in the Press an account of the movements of Ayoub Khan, who, it was stated, was leaving Persia and going to seek the hospitality of Russia; and that in order to go from the one place to the other he was about to pass through Afghan territory. He need hardly mention the difficult questions this would immediately give rise to, and the very serious disturbances his passage might occasion. He hoped they might hear from the Government either that Ayoub Khan was not intending to take such a journey, or that if he had intended to take it the journey would not be permitted by Her Majesty's Government. He came now to the most recent information. Quite lately they had heard that Russia had accepted the submission of the Turkomans at Merv, and that an officer representing Russia was to administer the new territory. The history of the Merv question was, he was afraid, only to be called a history of prevarication—he did not wish to use any stronger word. It was even a more melancholy story than that relating to Khiva, which came before the House a few years ago. The first rumour of Russian interference was in 1874, and representations were made to the Russian Government, whereupon Prince Gortschakoff repeated the assurance that they had always given that the Imperial Government had no intention of occupying Merv. After five years, in July, 1879, M. de Giers had again assured Lord Dufferin, in the most positive manner, that there was no intention on the part of Russia to go to Merv. On August 13, 1879, Lord Dufferin had written— Yesterday, in conversation with His Majesty (the Emperor of Russia) he was pleased to assure me that there was no intention of the Russian troops advancing on Merv. Then, there was a despatch written in 1880, at the time of the change of Government in this country, which probably appeared to the Russian Government a very favourable opportunity for withdrawing from its pledges. This despatch the Russian Ambassador had kept in his pocket until a convenient moment might arrive. It had not been shown to Lord Granville till nine months afterwards, but it was referred to by Lord Dufferin, writing on February 16, 1881, in the following terms:— I consider the positive assurance given to me personally by the Emperor of Russia himself (as reported in my despatch of the 13th of August, 1879, and commented upon in my subsequent despatch, on the 26th of August of the same year) to the effect that there was no intention on the part of Russia of advancing to Merv, as still extant and in full force, and as never having been since qualified or withdrawn by His Majesty himself or by any of his Ministers. From time to time, I have taken care to remind M. de Giers that this was the sense in which I continued to regard His Majesty's gracious communication."—[No. 3 (1881), No. 41.] On March 8, 1881, Lord Dufferin again described his assurances as follows:— When the Emperor deigned on two occasions to give me similar assurances, His Majesty made use of the most unequivocal language, and an intimation of this kind proceeding from so august a source possessed a direct and abiding force which, of necessity, endured until it was formally retracted."—[No. 47.] On March 7, 1881, M. de Giers informed Lord Dufferin that— The Emperor had again authorized him to tell me that there was no question of an advance upon Merv. Not only we do not want to go there,"—[Ib.] said M. de Giers, "but happily there is nothing which can require us to go there." On June 15, 1881, M. de Giers had said— With regard to Merv, his Excellency said that there was no question of negotiating a Treaty with the Merv Turkomans or of establishing a Resident there."—[No. 4 (1881), No. 17.] From that time he had no further documents, but he had no doubt that Her Majesty's Government possessed a great many of them. In February, 1884, that very district had been taken under the direct control of the Russian Government. With regard to the importance of Merv to this country, it should be borne in mind that the only possible reason for the advance of Russia was mischief towards this country. He was not afflicted with what the Duke of Argyll had some time ago called "Mervousness;" but, nevertheless, it could not be disguised that Merv was a most important strategical position, and they were told on high authority that when the Russians were at Merv there was not the smallest difficulty in their advancing on the important position of Herat. But the most serious part of the whole matter was one which could be made clear to everyone without strategical knowledge or geographical research. They had the positive assurance that the Russians were now at Merv. This being the case, they were face to face with all the problems that were raised by the immediate contiguity of Russia and Afghanistan, and they must face them, and at once. Under these circumstances, he preferred not to advance his own opinions; he relied on those of a statesman in whom he knew Her Majesty's Government placed great reliance. His first extract was from a despatch from Lord North-brook to Lord Salisbury on June 7, 1875— Much discussion has recently taken place as to the effect that would he produced by a Russian advance to Merv. We have before stated to Her Majesty's Government our apprehension that the assumption by Russia of authority over the whole Turkoman country would create alarm in Afghanistan, and we think it desirable to express our opinion of the course which should be adopted if it should take place. It would then become necessary to give additional and more specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attacks from without. It would probably be desirable to enter into a Treaty engagement with him, and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian frontier."—[Afghanistan (1878), pp. 134–3.] In accordance wish this declaration, Lord Derby sent a Memorandum to the Russian Government on October 25, 1875, of which the following was an extract:— They (the Government) cannot but feel that such an event, for instance, as the occupation of Merv, which would bring the line of Russian territory into direct contact with Afghan territory, would arouse the susceptibilities of the Ameer to the highest degree, and possibly involve him in a common cause of defensive action with the Turkoman tribes upon his borders. Under such circumstances, it is unnecessary to observe how difficult it might be for the Imperial Government to maintain a policy of strict abstention in accordance with its present assurances, or how impossible it might be for Her Majesty's Government to exert any effectual control over the actions of the Ameer, without undertaking responsibilities which they would most reluctantly assume, and which would involve the very result which both Governments desire to avert—namely, the contact of the two Powers in Central Asia."—[Central Asia, No. 1 (1878), p. 60.] On the 13th of June, 1877, Lord Derby wrote to Lord Augustus Loftus as follows:— I have now to instruct your Excellency to make a renewed representation to the Government of Russia on the subject of the movements of Russian troops now taking place on the Turkoman steppe, …clearly, though courteously, pointing out that the occupation of Merv would be held by the general opinion of the inhabitants of the neighbouring regions of Asia to announce a design on the part of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to extend his influence, if not his dominion, into territories with which Her Majesty's Government have understood from the Government of His Imperial Majesty that it is not His Majesty's intention to interfere. Such an impression would impose upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity of making a corresponding advance in order to allay apprehension, and to remove misconception from the minds of the people of those countries. They could not, however, look upon so close an approximation of the outposts of the two Empires as in itself desirable, or likely to facilitate the discharge of the difficulties with which the administrations of each Government are charged. Her Majesty's Government therefore hope that His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will issue to his officers in those countries the strictest injunctions to abstain, in the course of any operations which the misconduct of the Turkomans may render necessary, from advancing into the neighbourhood of Merv."—[Ibid. pp. 112–13.] These were the expressions of statesmen whose opinions would be received with the greatest possible respect by the House. He ventured to point out that the first difficulty suggested by these opinions was the enormous difficulty of an uncertain frontier. If the Government believed the desire of Russia was not to interfere in any way with Afghanistan, it became exceedingly difficult for that or any other Government to keep its engagements when the frontier was in the condition of that of Afghanistan. If the Government did not believe in the intentions of Russia, then it would be easy for that Power to interfere contrary to her professions. The next difficulty was that the influence of Russia might prevail throughout Afghanistan. We knew nothing of the present state of the Ameer's mind, but if he was like the former Ameer he must be alarmed at the near approach of Russia, especially at a time when his authority seemed to be hardly settled throughout his extensive territories. What had the Ameer to rely on? In the first place, upon the engagement made by Russia that there was no intention on the part of that Power to interfere with the internal affairs of Afghanistan. He was afraid they would be trusting to a broken reed if they relied on that assurance. The compact that Russia would not interfere with Afghanistan was an assurance which had been repeatedly given, and as to which there was no guarantee that it would not be broken when the necessity arose. But did the House remember the engagement into which we had entered with the Ameer? It was dated June 14, 1880. It was not one of the engagements of the late Government, but one solely entered into by right hon. Gentlemen opposite. Mr. Griffin, our Envoy, said in his letter to Abdurrahman, in conformity with his instructions— With regard to the position of the ruler of Cabul to foreign Powers, since the British Government admit no right of interference by foreign Powers in Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all political interference with Afghanistan affairs, it is plain that the Kabul ruler can have no political relations with any foreign Power except the English; and if any such foreign Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the Kabul ruler, then the British Government will be prepared to aid him, if necessary, to repel it; provided that he follows the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations."—[Afghanistan (1881), No. 1, p. 47.] Well, he had followed, he believed, the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations; and, therefore, the conditional engagement, guarded by the three "ifs," came into full force. The way in which the Ameer himself regarded it might be seen by his answer of June 22, 1880— You have also kindly written that should any unwarranted (improper) attack he made by any other power on Afghanistan, you will under all circumstances afford me assistance; and you will not permit any other person to take possession of the territory of Afghanistan. This also is my desire, which you have kindly granted."—[Ibid. p. 48.] Now, he repeated, they were face to face with their engagement. The frontiers of Afghanistan and Russia practically touched, and the Ameer might call upon them at any moment to fulfil the pledges they had made. He did not for a moment desire the Government to enter into any detailed account of what course they intended to take; they could not, however, say that they were taken by surprise. Everybody who had followed the question was quite aware of the likelihood of this further step being taken; and, therefore, it had been perfectly open to them to make any preparation they thought necessary. He thought, however, that they were entitled to ask for a frank and unambiguous declaration from the Government that they adhered to that portion of their policy which had been adopted by both political Parties, and which had hitherto remained unbroken—that they adhered, in fact, to that policy which had always been accepted in that country—namely, that British interests must dominate in Afghanistan. There was another question—that of the boundary of Afghanistan—to which he also wished to call attention. Were the Government prepared to adhere to the frontier mentioned by Lord Granville in 1872, and to insist upon it, or to take steps for defining a more accurate frontier? It was not his desire in any way to embarrass the action of the Government; he recognized to the full—indeed, everyone must feel—the extreme gravity of the occasion; but he was not without hope that the Government might furnish them with some clear and explicit declaration to show that Her Majesty's Government had learnt some lessons from the past, and that they were in a position to give some guarantees for our security in the future.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

Sir, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government and the House generally, I have to thank the hon. Member for the speech which he has made—a speech marked by the extreme moderation and sense of responsibility which might be naturally expected from a Member of this House who has held the distinguished position he has when dealing with so delicate a question as that which he has brought before the House. The hon. Member has asked several questions; and while I wish to answer them as well as I can, the House and the hon. Member will see that it is impossible, in present circumstances, for me to go fully into the matter. The hon. Member asked, in the first place, what information we could give in regard to a secret Treaty which he assumes has been concluded between Russia and Persia. To give information as to a secret Treaty is rather a contradiction in terms, and I am afraid that in regard to any secret Treaty of which the hon. Member may suspect the existence it is not in the power of Her Majesty's Government to give any information either to him or the House; but, as far as the limitation of the frontier-line between Persia and Russia is concerned, I think the time has come when the House ought to be put in possession of further information than it already has, and Papers on the subject will be laid on the Table of the House. Then the hon. Member asked what was to be done with regard to Ayoub Khan, and spoke of the danger of allowing him to visit any portion of Afghanistan, and he rather assumed that Ayoub Khan is about to leave Persia and set out on a journey which might lead him to Afghanistan. In regard to that, I may say we have every reason to believe that Ayoub Khan is not about to leave Persia, and the Papers which we are about to lay before Parliament will comprise a considerable number of documents, showing the steps which have been taken by Her Majesty's Government in reference to Ayoub Khan. The hon. Member then proceeded to ask some questions with regard to the Russian action concerning Merv, and he asked for information, not only as to the manner in which Her Majesty's Government had taken steps, but also as to the steps themselves. He pointed out the apparent conflict between what has been done and the language of the Russian Government to the Government of this country, and he showed that he did not expect a full statement on this particular branch of the subject to-night. As he, of course, knows, the matter is now a subject of negotiation, and it is, therefore, not possible for the Government to speak in detail upon it at the present time. It is, of course, our duty to express our views upon the matter at St. Petersburg, and in doing so I may say that we shall be materially assisted by knowledge of the fact, as has been shown to-night, that there is no difference between the Front Benches in the House as to the manner in which the subject ought to be treated. The hon. Member pointed out the danger which might arise from the Afghan and Russian Frontiers being conterminous. He pointed out that Afghanistan is within the sphere of British influence, and that statesmen in this country have always shown a great dislike for the actual contact of British territory or territory under British influence with Russian territory. That is so, no doubt. In regard to this matter, the hon. Gentleman asked whether Her Majesty's Government hold to the assurances which have been given in times past to the Rulers of Afghanistan, and in answer to that question I have to say that we not only hold to the terms of those assurances as originally made, hut I may say that the assurances have been renewed and put in very plain terms between ourselves and the Ruler of Afghanistan. The question of the hon. Member as to what steps have been taken to define the boundaries of Afghanistan leads me to point out to the hon. Member that of which he must be perfectly aware, owing to the position which he has held in a former Government—namely, that there is a danger in defining boundaries in which you may be held to give over to somebody else territories which are not your own to give. There can be no doubt that in defining by an Anglo-Russian Commission the boundaries, for instance, of Northern Afghanistan, it might have been held that we had been handing over to Russia territories which were outside Afghanistan, and, therefore, outside the sphere of our immediate influence. Steps have been taken to ascertain the boundaries of Afghanistan upon the side where these boundaries have always been doubtful, and during the last year preliminary steps, which, I think, it would be undesirable for me to state in detail, have been taken by us for the purpose of ascertaining these boundaries. It is doubtful how far I can state, at present, what future steps are likely to be taken with regard to defining the Afghan boundaries on the North; but I can assure the House that the matter is well within the view of Her Majesty's Government, and that it is being carefully examined at the present time. The hon. Member and the House must be aware that in view of the assurances which have been given and recently renewed to the Ruler of Afghanistan, Her Majesty's Government cannot be indifferent to what is going on, even in the most remote parts of that country. I do not wish to import into this matter any controversial question in the present critical state of affairs, but I may say that it has always been our policy, and was the policy of those who were opposed to the Afghan War, to make Afghanistan, from its friendliness to this country, an advanced post of this country, and to set up in that country a strong and independent Government which should be friendly towards ourselves. We believe that we have met with very great success in that policy, and that at the present moment the Afghan Ruler, although he may not be very secure upon his Throne, is probably more secure than he has been for a great number of years. He is also friendly to ourselves, and every action he has taken during the last few years has been marked by extreme friendliness to this country. He has submitted the whole of his foreign policy to this country, and consulted us upon every act of State which he has undertaken. I think I can only inform the House further that we stand in a stronger position towards Afghanistan and Beloochistan, and in a more satisfactory position on the North-Western Frontier of Afghanistan, than we have probably ever stood in in time past. The recent mission, which has travelled through Beloochistan from end to end, has had a sort of triumphal progress, and our position there is very strong indeed. We have now, by the wish of the people of the country, formally taken over the Government of Quettah, and a formal arrangement has been made. [Mr. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: Hear, hear!] The hon. Member for Eye probably thinks this is an operation similar to that of taking Candahar against the will of the people of Afghanistan. The friendliness of the people of Beloochistan now gives us entire control of the Bholan Pass, and that road is now perfectly assured, and is likely to remain tranquil. We are, therefore, practically assured on the North-Western Frontier of our Indian. Empire. We believe that the policy which ended in the evacuation of Candahar, and the arrangements which have been made in order to secure the tranquillity of Beloochistan have secured to this country a friendliness on the part of the Beloochees and the Afghan tribes which, as I have said, puts us in a much better position as far as the North-West of India is concerned than we have been in before, and I cannot conclude the few remarks I have felt it my duty to make without thanking the hon. Member for the support which he has given to Her Majesty's Government, and promising him that Papers on the subject shall as soon as possible be laid on the Table of the House.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON

said, he thought the remarkable and important statement of the right hon. Gentleman required some notice on that side of the House. It was an absolute and entire reversal of the policy which the Government had hitherto adopted. He ventured, three years ago, when the question of the abandonment of Candahar was under discussion, to point out that; there was a vital difference between the people of Northern and Southern Afghanistan. The people of the North were fanatical, and they hated us; while those of the South did not dislike us; and on that occasion he ventured to suggest that the Government should strengthen their positions in Southern Afghanistan when they had made up their minds to withdraw. That remark, however, was pooh-poohed by the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington), who was then Secretary of State for India, but the Government had now adopted that suggestion. The acquisition of Merv made certain facts clear. In the first place, that the advance of Russia had been steady and continuous; and in the second place, as the right hon. Gentleman, who spoke with all the reserve belonging to one of Her Majesty's Ministers, had been compelled to admit, that the engagement given by Russia had not been kept. In every case there was the same disregard of pledges by Russia, whether they came from an official or the august lips of the Emperor himself. Without making any personal reflection upon the Emperor of Russia, he wished to say that in his view the great mistake always made by Liberal Governments in this country in dealing with that potentate had been to assume that an autocrat was always and entirely master of his own servants. That however, was not the case. The tradition that Russia must get nearer to India was engrained in the minds of the Civil and Military Services of Russia; but opposition to it depended largely upon the will of the particular Emperor, and the stronger the line which was taken by the English Government the stronger would be the power of the Russian autocrat to keep his servants in order. It had always been admitted that there was one point beyond which it would be dangerous to British interests to allow Russia to advance, and that point was Merv. Russia was now there. Merv was in the position of a stepping-stone, and it would be just as easy for a man to remain on a stepping-stone in the middle of a stream as for Russia, having set foot in Merv, to remain there without going forward or making a retrograde movement. Would she go back? If she did not, she would go forward, and he was glad to see that in that respect Her Majesty's Government at last recognized the critical position of affairs. When the other day the Prime Minister was asked if Merv had been occupied, he knew perfectly well that the most solemn pledges had been given that Merv should not be occupied; but all that he said was that if it should turn out that Merv was occupied the diplomatic Correspondence and Papers should be laid on the Table. But that was exactly the way they ought not to deal with the Russian Government, because if they did so they would inevitably encourage disaster, and they would wake up some fine morning and find that an agent of the Russian Government in Central Asia whom they could not repudiate had done something which we could not tolerate, and then there would be nothing for it but war. It had been said by hon. Gentlemen, and he thought, among others, by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright), that the occupation of Merv by Russia would not prove a danger to British interests. He confessed, if the right hon. Gentleman would allow him to say so, that he had not been able to make out his views on the subject, because he had stated that he had no objection to Russia advancing until her boundary became conterminous with our own. If that was so, they would be establishing the principles of protection, which were not in favour with the right hon. Gentleman, or they would be establishing the principles of religious intolerance; and, therefore, it was perfectly apparent that if Russia advanced her territory until it became conterminous with our own, Russia would become possessed of that Afghanistan which it was the policy of every Government to maintain friendly and independent. There was one expression in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down to which he must refer. He had said it had always been the policy of every Government to make Afghanistan an advanced post of this country. Although that might be the intention of the Government now, 11 years ago they had an opportunity of doing that, and they failed to take advantage of it. He desired to read to the House two telegrams. One was a telegram which not very long ago Her Majesty's Government sent to their agent in Egypt; the other was a telegram which 11 years ago was sent by the Viceroy of India. They were not identical in their phraseology, but the same fatal abnegation of responsibility ran through both, and those telegrams had produced exactly the same disastrous results. He would take the Egyptian telegram first. In answer to a message from our agent in Egypt asking for the opinion of the Government as regarded the despairing position of Hicks Pasha, this reply was sent on the 11th of Juno, 1883—"Report decision of the Egyptian Government as soon as you can, taking care to give no advice." What had been the result? Bloodshed and massacre; and the Government were now forced to do in an exaggerated degree that which was done in order to stop further bloodshed. On the 24th of July, 1873, Lord Northbrook telegraphed, on behalf of Shere Ali, stating—"We are alarmed at Russian progress." Shere Ali was a shrewd man, and he was anxious to know that which every ally of the Government was always anxious to know—namely, how far he could rely on their support. What was the reply? It was couched in different words, but was almost identical in substance with the telegram sent to Egypt—"The Cabinet does not share his alarm, and thinks there is no cause for it." When the noble Marquess, the other night, referred to the unnecessary and bloody war, the responsibility of which he put upon the heads of the Opposition, he (Lord George Hamilton) said that war was the necessary and legitimate consequence of the Government telegram. It was a most extraordinary fact that, although Afghanistan was, above most nations, the most greedy of money, after the Government had sent that telegram £100,000 was in the Treasury for years waiting for the Ameer to call upon it. Do not let us repeat the same folly. The Government, he believed, had now wisely recognized the danger that was ahead. They said that they were the exponents of Lord Lawrence's policy. Lord Lawrence's policy was to prevent the approach of Russia; or, if negotiations failed, to inform Russia that when- ever she passed a certain point England would declare war. Let us, if possible, get rid of the word "if." The right hon. Baronet the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had admitted that we had gone a very long way. We had given to the Ameer of Afghanistan that subsidy which previously had been refused to him. We had given that guarantee which 11 years ago had been refused to him, and which, if given, would have averted all disaster. We had now practically annexed Beloochistan, and he thought the Government must reflect on the singular unwisdom of the step they had taken in destroying part of the railway which the previous Government had taken steps to construct. Such being the position of affairs, he was sure the Government would receive the support of almost every section of the House if they would only maintain a straightforward and intelligent policy. Although they had no doubt recently obtained a large majority in a vote of the House in support of their Egyptian policy—[Cries of "No, no!"]—well, a small majority, then. Although they had received that majority, he thought the Government must admit their policy had been in most parts of the world a failure. In every instance they had ultimately to do that which in the first instance they declined to do; and there was this unfortunate characteristic about their policy—that the more bloodshed they had occasioned the further they were from the realization of the objects they had in view. The Prime Minister would excuse him if he ventured to state what he believed now to be one of the great dangers in dealing with a Foreign Power like Russia. They had had the pleasure of listening to him with a natural admiration at the almost superhuman power he had acquired over the English language; but, after all, words were intended to express what a man meant. What he frequently could not help feeling when the Prime Minister spoke—particularly on a question of great importance and in which his Government were largely concerned—was that words with him were simply a loophole of escape from positions of difficulty. The history of the last four years was one record of sanguine expectations on the part of the Government, followed by disastrous results. But in every single instance the extraordinary dexterity of speech, possessed by the Prime Minister had extricated the Government from the difficulties in which they found themselves. The Minister escaped, but the national interests remained in peril. Therefore he wished to ask the Prime Minister—the right hon. Gentleman had plenty of courage—plainly to make up his mind what he would do in reference to the advance of Russia. They did not wish him to state what his views were, but when he had made up his mind he might then state, in unmistakable language, the intention of the Government. Let his intentions be clear to the English people and the Russian Government, and let them be accompanied by such action as would show that he was in earnest. He believed that was by far the best way to avert the consequences which all deplored. His reason for urging this point on the Government was that two-and-a-half years ago the Conservative Party ventured to deprecate precipitate retirement from Caudahar. The President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles Dilke) rose, and, in one of his adroit and dexterous speeches, he put in the very front the statement that the first act of the Russian Government was to recall General Skobeleff to St. Petersburg, and to put a stop to all operations which that General had been conducting in Asia; and then he went on to adduce as a reason for our retirement from Caudahar— That as military men tried to show that England ought to maintain Candahar because Russia was trying to get to Merv, so the Russian military authorities urged on their Government that they should seize on Merv because England remained at Candahar. The policy of these two great Rowers could not be discussed in the abstract. The proceedings of each must bear on the other. They had always done so, and would always do so, until the end of time. This country retired from Caudahar, and the Russians approached to Merv. Let us have no more of such policy, because it was a dangerous one. If the Government would adopt a straightforward and clear policy in the direction of giving a guarantee in reference to Afghanistan, and reversing some of the foolish language that had been used upon the hustings, it would secure the support of the great majority of the House and of the country. It was only, he believed, by such means that we could extricate ourselves from an unquestionably dangerous dilemma—a dilemma which was partly due, no doubt, to the duplicity and the audacity of Russian agents, but also to a considerable extent due to the gullibility and past ineptitude of Her Majesty's Government.

LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE

said, he was inclined to regret the manifest and evident difference in the tone of the observations of the noble Lord who had just sat down from those which fell from the hon. Gentleman who introduced the subject to the House. The tone of the hon. Gentleman who, in the late Government, had occupied the position of Under Secretary of State for India was calm and judicious, and was calculated to extricate the subject from the groove of Party recrimination, and to bring it into the higher region of political discussion. But in the speech of the noble Lord who had once occupied the same position was to be found the tone of those bitter discussions with which, not many years ago, the House was familiar. In his speech old issues were again brought up; old subjects which at the time were fully worthy of discussion were again revived; references were made to Papers and despatches which, no doubt, were technically before the House, and there was altogether a tone of exaggeration. There was, however, in the speech of the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. E. Stanhope) one expression, and one only, on which he would venture to offer a criticism, and that was that the only possible object which the advance of Russia in Turkestan could have was to do mischief to the interests of this country. He (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) had always thought it was well to recollect, whatever their feelings might be on this subject, that there was one great and good work which Russia had done in Turkestan—she had struck a very great blow at one of the most barbarous and cruel systems of the Slave Trade which the world had ever seen. [Opposition laughter.] Hon. Gentlemen might laugh; but it was, nevertheless, a well-known fact, and it had been borne witness to repeatedly by travellers and politicians who could not be suspected of views favourable to the Russian advance. It was well known that the late Mr. O'Donovan, whoso loss he deplored, said— Who shall say whether the conquest of Merv he for the better or for the worse, whether it be in the interests of civilization or not P For my part, I cannot forget the fact that it is not so many years ago that the Muscovite arms arrived at Khiva and Bokhara and sent 40,000 Persian captives to their homes who had long pined in captivity there. This was one great step in progress, something that had never been heard of before in the whole of Central Asian history; and if to-day these devastating Turkomans are wiped out by some who, perhaps, are not as liberal as we should be, who shall say whether it is not for the better? Then, again, before the Royal Geographical Society, in 1881, Colonel Stewart, whose name was well known in the House as one of the greatest authorities on Asiatic geography, had said— No one in England has any conception of the fearful sufferings of this Slave Trade carried on by the Turkomans. I believe the number of slaves in Bokhara, Khiva, and the Turkoman country itself, a few years since, amounted to more than 100,000. Of course, it is difficult to gather statistics on such a point; but 40,000 slaves are said—I do not know with what truth—to have been released by the Russians in Khiva alone. The value of slaves has fallen considerably since the Russians have closed the slave markets in Khiva and Bokhara. The Persian slaves in Bokhara have not been released, but the open sale of captives there has been prohibited; and though a few slaves, especially women, can still be secretly sold in Bokhara, Russia has struck a great blow at the Turkoman Slave Trade. The noble deed performed by that Power in releasing the numerous slaves in Khiva has added very much to her influence in this part of Persia. In almost every village I met liberated slaves, who spoke of the kindness of the Russians in freeing them. Great numbers of the freed slaves were killed by the Turkomans on their return journey from Khiva. He thought that that point, especially just at the present moment, when the subject of the Slave Trade was attracting so much attention and interest in this country, was a very important point for consideration, and he felt certain that hon. Members opposite would feel it was a point well worthy to be borne in mind. He could not help regretting that the noble Lord was not himself inspired by the spirit of the wise observations which, at an early period of the rule of the late Ministry, Lord Beaconsfield had addressed to the House. There were two Motions made on the subject, one in 1875 and one in 1876, by an hon. Member who now adorned "another place," Mr. Baillie Cochrane, when the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) made a very able speech. Lord Beaconsfield, then Mr. Disraeli, used, in replying, some very remarkable words. He had said, alluding to some remarks of Mr. Baillie Cochrane about the discussion between Lord Clarendon and Prince Gortchakoff with reference to the so-called neutral zone— The fact is, that the neutral zone was a speculation in a diplomatic despatch, nothing more. It never was accepted at any Conference or Congress, nor was it ever expressed in any Protocol or Treaty. The idea that Great Britain and Russia agreed to establish a neutral zone between their respective Empires, and that Russia has all this time systematically violated the neutral zone that was agreed upon, is one of those illusions which, having once got possession of the public mind, it is very difficult to terminate. The fact is, that no neutral zone was ever agreed upon by the statesmen of the different Powers."—(3 Hansard, [229] 135.) It had just occurred to him (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) that one of those people whose minds were possessed with that delusion was the noble Lord himself. Lord Beaconsfield then went on to say— I am not of that school who view the advances of Russia into Asia with those deep misgiving's some do. I think that Asia is large enough for the destinies of both Russia and England."—[Ibid. 138.] Again, in the following year, Lord Beaconsfield used similar language of high statesmanship. He said— Whatever may be my confidence in the destiny of England, I know that Empires are only maintained by vigilance, by firmness, by courage, by understanding the temper of the times, and by watching those significant indications that may easily be observed. And he continued as follows—and to this he would call particular attention— Now, far from looking forward with alarm to the development of the power of Russia in Central Asia, I see no reason why she should not conquer Tartary any more than why England should not have conquered India. I only wish that the people of Tartary may gain as much advantage by being conquered by Russia as the people of India from being conquered by this country. That language was of a statesmanlike character, and was not inspired by the feeling of apprehension which seemed to him to run through the observations of the noble Lord. But he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) was quite willing to admit that, although a spirit of what might be called Russophobia was an exceedingly unwise thing, it could, nevertheless, be shown that there had been an agreement amongst statesmen of opposite Parties and different schools that the day when the limits of Russia might become coincident with those of Afghanistan would be one of a certain anxiety, which would require the attention of statesmen with a view to avoiding danger. There was no statesman who bad ever occupied the Foreign Office whose opinions were more respected than those of Lord Clarendon. Lord Clarendon, writing to Sir Andrew Buchanan, on March 27, 1869, said— I have expressed my opinion that abstinence from aggression would, on every account, promote the true interests of Russia, whose territorial possessions needed no aggrandizement, and if the giving effect to this policy depended upon the Russian Government alone, I should not doubt its being maintained; but I was sure, judging from our own Indian experience, that such would not be the case, and that Russia would find the same difficulty that England had experienced in controlling its own power when exercised at so great a distance from the seat of government, as to make reference home almost a matter of impossibility; there was always some frontier to be improved, some broken engagement to be repaired, some faithless ally to be punished; and plausible reasons were seldom wanted for the acquisition of territory, which the Home Government never thought it expedient to reject, and could not, therefore, condemn the motives or the means by which it had been acquired. Such, in the main, had caused the extension of our Indian Empire, and there was reason to apprehend that such was the course into which Russia, however unwillingly, was about to be drawn. The day had no doubt now come when the position foreseen by Lord Clarendon, as sooner or later to come about, had arrived, and the risks which accompanied it. As his right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board had said, they were now face to face with the situation which ought undoubtedly to be met in a spirit of calm and moderation; but, at the same time, looking back upon the controversies of former years, it was not difficult to realize—in fact, it would be impossible not to realize—how very far they had travelled since the time in 1870 when Lord Clarendon and Prince Gortchakoff had these conversations to which he had referred. The intervening regions had fallen under the sway of the Russian Government. Formerly, in order to check the progress of Russia southward it would have been necessary to advance not only for hundreds of miles beyond the English Frontier, but also beyond the Afghan Border itself, leaving behind a scattered population whom it would have been very difficult to control. But the problem now before the Government was, what should be their policy when, notwithstanding the repeated pledges of Russia, the military frontier of Russia either was or was likely to be co-terminous with the frontiers of the territories adjacent to India? The Government were accused by the noble Lord of indifference at one time, of inability to foresee what would happen at another, and finally of an alteration of policy. He did not wish the discussion to degenerate into a Party wrangle over the dry bones of the old Afghan discussions. For convincing proof that the accusations of the noble Lord were baseless he would refer hon. Members to the observations made by the present Secretary of State for War in 1881. How anyone who had read those observations could possibly bring against the Government any charge of want of foresight or of indifference surpassed his comprehension. Replying to the hon. Member for Eye on August 1, 1831, the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) said— I have not the smallest hesitation in saying with perfect plainness that I do not think the annexation by Russia of the Akhal Tekke country is a matter of indifference to us. I will not enter into the discussion of the question whether that annexation was consistent or inconsistent with the pledges given by Russia to this country. I think that a good deal may be said on both sides of that question; but it has not been entered upon by the hon. Member, and I do not wish to enter upon it now. We are not concerned in the independence of the Akhal Tribes. But the recent advances and conquests of Russia have, no doubt, had consequences which do affect us in two points very nearly. The extension of Russian territory along the Northern Border of Persia raises a question of the integrity of Persia which cannot be indifferent to us; and the near approach of Russia to the Borders of Afghanistan is not a matter of indifference to us. The pre-sent Government have admitted as plainly as any other that the integrity and independence of Afghanistan is a matter to them of vital importance, and that they do not intend to permit interference by any foreign Rower with the internal or external affairs of Afghanistan. If Afghanistan were under a settled form of government it might be indifferent to us whether Russia or any other country extended to the very borders of Afghanistan. But that is not the case of Afghanistan. It has not, and perhaps it never may have, what we recognize as a settled form of government.—(3 Hansard, [264] 433.) That language was exceedingly plain. It was spoken with great consideration. It expressed the policy of the Government then, and it expressed the policy of the Government now; and how the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex could found upon that speech, taken in connection with the utterances of the President of the Local Government Board, a charge of want of foresight or inconsistency against the Government, surpassed, as he had already said, his comprehension. There was a complete accord between the policy of the Government now and their policy then. What was their policy in 1881 was their policy in 188–1. The position was this—that Her Majesty's Government did not in the least deny the force of the observations which were addressed by Lord Clarendon to Prince Gortchakoff and also Baron Bruunow, the Russian Ambassador in this country towards the close of his long and eminent career. They recognized that, owing to the occupation of Merv by Russia, or the tendering of allegiance by the tribes to the Russian Empire, which was, perhaps, the more correct description of the operation, a moment of anxiety had come. But it was not a moment for indulging in exaggerated fears or alarm. It was, on the contrary, a moment for calm and moderation both in action and speech. As the President of the Local Government Board had said, it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to lay Papers before the House, feeling as they did that the Government never spoke with greater authority than when Parliament was fully informed of what was going on, and when they had the House of Commons at their back. With respect to the particular step that had attracted the attention of the House—with respect, namely, to the Russian approach to Merv—certain communications would be addressed to the Russian Government; and he hoped and believed that the result of those communications would ultimately be to strengthen those ties of amity and goodwill, which it must be the wish of every lover of peace and goodwill should subsist between the two nations.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

Shall we have the Papers printed soon?

LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE

I cannot give any definite date.

MR. ONSLOW

said, that the subject before the House interested every Eng- lishman and everyone in India. The advance of Russia was mistrusted throughout the length and breadth of India, from Peshawur to Cape Comorin. So far as he could make out of the speech of the noble Lord, he had foreshadowed somewhat of the policy of the Government—that they were to guarantee the present Ameer of Afghanistan protection from external and internal aggression. He could only hope that that was the case, and that Her Majesty's Government would act up to the words of the noble Lord. If a similar pledge had been given to Shore Ali in 1873, there would have been no rupture with Afghanistan, and consequently no war. If the Government now carried out what had been indicated by the noble Lord, it would be an utter reversal of the policy enunciated in the Mid Lothian speeches. The Prime Minister said four years ago that India was safe as long as we retained our mastery on the sea. [Mr. GLADSTONE dissented.] The chief danger with which. India was threatened was an invasion by Russia. If Afghanistan was to be retained as a buffer between India and Russia, that country ought to have our strong support. We ought not to allow intrigues to be carried on under our very noses, and we ought to impress upon the people of Afghanistan and of India that we were determined to maintain intact the integrity of the former country. Our policy in the East had not been aggressive; but Russia's policy was different. Russia's idea was to increase her influence in Afghanistan and South of the Caspian, in order to enable her to strike a severe blow against us should difficulties at any time arise between her and this country. He was one of those who thought that Russia was premature in sending her mission to Cabul; but now that she had got Merv, and was on the high road to Herat, it would be far easier for her to make intrigues with Afghanistan when we were in difficulties than it was in 1878. It was all very well for Her Majesty's Government to say they would write a strong despatch—he hoped in friendly terms—to the Russian Government. The important question for consideration was—Would Russia keep the pledges which she might make? [Mr. WARTON: Hear, hear!] They had never done so yet; and had they any right to think that in the future they would act differently to what they had done in the past? She might give us certain pledges; she might say that she had no intention of going to Herat; but would she keep those pledges? It might not he to-day, or in two or three years; but he believed that Gentlemen now sitting in that House would live to see the Russians in Herat. No one in his senses would wish that we should fight Russia on the Northern side of Afghanistan. What they had to do was to let the Russian Government know in the clearest manner that if they attacked Afghanistan in any way, if they intrigued with the Ameer at Cabul, such action would be detrimental to the interests of this country, and that it would be a casus belli. [Laughter.] Hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway might laugh, and might think that there were many things of greater importance than our foreign policy; but, for his own part, he held that the foreign policy of this country was of greater moment than any domestic question, however important that might be. He knew it was difficult, while negotiations were going on, for the Government to say what they were determined to do; but he hoped the House would get before long Papers which would show the determination of Her Majesty's Government. He wanted to know what were the engagements they had at present with the Ameer? The negotiations had not been conducted by an accredited Englishman, but by a Native at Cabul; and unless great care was exercised in the conduct of these negotiations this country might be involved in the greatest difficulties. He thought they had made the greatest mistake when they left Candahar and did not make the railway to that place which the late Government, had they remained in Office, would have nearly completed by the present time, and which, even commercially, would have been of the greatest advantage to Afghanistan. Without wishing to be a Russophobist, he hoped that the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government would be strong and determined in this matter, and that, if necessary, they would act up to it for the credit of the country.

MR. ARTHUR ARNOLD

remarked, that the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken belonged to that species of politicians who acted in all these matters on. the "key-to-India" theory. If the Government were willing to advance to Herat, these gentlemen would lead them on to Merv; and if they followed such blind guides as the hon. Member for Guildford, the time was not far distant when they might be attacking Russia on the Steppes of Siberia. He happened to meet that morning with a book dedicated to the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett), which described Merv as— Little more than a geographical expression. The huts in the vicinity of the ruined castle offer no temptation whatever to an invader. One of the great difficulties with which the late Government had to contend in respect to Merv was the fear that the Tekke Turkomans might be driven across the Afghan Frontier, and that a difficulty might thus arise between Russia and Afghanistan. Now, however, the position was entirely different, for the Tekke Turkomans, after offering their submission to Persia and consenting that the Persian flag should be raised at Merv, had resolved to seek the Suzerainty of Russia, for they found it absolutely necessary to give themselves up to one Power or the other, and he thought that in choosing Russia they had acted wisely. There was one document for a copy of which he had asked in vain—that was the draft Convention which the late Government proposed to conclude with the Persian Government for the surrender of Herat to Persia. He, for one, was glad that a Government so blind to a wise and prudent policy in Central Asia as to propose to conclude such a Convention were not now in responsible charge of the affairs of this country. On questions affecting this particular part of the world, the late Government seemed to be affected with a diseased appetite for annexation, so much so that they imprudently desired to become responsible for regions that were the most inaccessible to British arms, and therefore the most difficult to defend. He was exceedingly glad to have heard from the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Charles W. Dilke) the clear, important, and reassuring statement of the policy of Her Majesty's Government. It was not true that Her Majesty's Government had changed their policy. Where had been the change in the statement made by the right hon. Gentleman? He had listened to that statement with profound pleasure; and he believed that throughout this country it would give rise to a feeling of satisfaction which would be entertained by all classes of the people.

MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT

said, he was glad to find that the President of the Local Government Board had recurred to the opinions as to the dangers of Russian advance in Central Asia which he held some 12 years ago; but when he at the end of his speech took credit for the retirement from Candahar, and accused the late Government of an inconsistent policy, he was very indifferent to the precise facts of the case. In advocating the retention of Candahar the late Government did not wish to hold a country against the wishes of its people. The inhabitants of Candahar were most anxious to place themselves under the direct protection of this country. The present Government, in abandoning Candahar, broke the solemn pledges they were under to the inhabitants of that district, and the consequences to them had been two disastrous conquests and two successive pillages. The people of that district were different in race from the warlike Pathans of Cabul. They were Parsuvians and Hazaras, a far more industrious and peaceful race than the Hill Tribes of the North. Candahar had generally been independent of Cabul, and was not annexed by Dost Mohamed. About 18 months ago the country had a very narrow escape. It was notorious that the Government were then in favour of the abandonment of Quettah. They were on the point of taking that course when they were restrained by the urgent remonstrances of their advisers in India; and it was the solitary piece of good policy which could be put down to the credit of Lord Ripon's Administration that he allowed the counsel of his political and military advisers in India to prevail. Every day Russia was steadily advancing; she had broken innumerable pledges made to this country. The statement of the President of the Local Government Board with regard to Beloochistan was entirely misleading. It was the late Conservative Government that established friendly relations with that country, and the inhabitants would always be glad to acknowledge the advantages of British rule and protection. He contended that the declaration made by the Government that evening was a perfect justification of the policy which the Conservatives advocated three years ago; and if Her Majesty's Ministers adhered to their statements, and defended Afghanistan against the certain inroads of Russian aggression, they would in less than a decade be back again in Candahar. It was amusing to hear the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs talking about the release of Persian slaves by Russia, when Her Majesty's Government had once more proclaimed the Slave Trade in the Soudan. Had the Government considered for a moment the treatment by Russia of her own population at home? The noble Lord could not with consistency give credit to the Czar for the release of those slaves and hold back the truth with reference to the gross treatment both of subject races and of the mass of its own population by the Russian Government. The railway which was designed by Lord Beaconsfield for the purpose of promoting the interests of this country in Central Asia had been abandoned; but Russia had been steadily advancing her railway towards Herat, Afghanistan, and India. He complained of the wretched state of the information the Government possessed with regard to this railway. Although he had often questioned the Government about it, the then Secretary of State for India (the Marquess of Hartington), with that sincerity of ignorance which was one of his most charming characteristics, had never any information but that which was six or nine months old. He would suggest that the Government should telegraph to our agent at Meshed to know how this railway was going on. It had been by warlike cavalry that successful attacks on India had been made; and the Russians had gained 100,000 horsemen of the finest physique in the Turkomans of Akhel and Merv. In his opinion, a friendly and united Afghanistan was more or less of a fiction; the Afghans were divided into many races having opposite interests; they would always go to the highest bidder, and to the Power which they deemed the strongest. The temptation to plunder India was the greatest temptation they could have held out to them. They had been for centuries the traditional raiders into India. [General Sir GEORGE BALFOUR said, they had kept quiet of late.] Yes; because they had been in the face of a stronger Power; but at the present time the hon. and gallant Member would not dare to ride four miles outside Peshawur. The Russians would go to Afghanistan, not as conquerors, but in the guise of insidious friends. As we knew, Russian officers had visited Cabul and had received every attention from the Ameer, who, it was said, had offered to help them in surveying the road to (Kandahar. They would make specious representations, and tell the Ameer, as General Skobeleff had done in 1878, to treat England with temporizing and with deceit, and that when he got into difficulty the Russian Government would come to his help. Our only security in India was in a strong and invulnerable frontier; the magnificent mountain chain was a scientific frontier, the passes of which could be held by a few men against thousands. Sir Edward Hamley had pointed out in 1881 how fatal a mistake it would be on our part if we allowed Russia to debouch into the plains on the West of the Indus, instead of meeting and checking her in the passes on the frontier. He had to call the attention of the Prime Minister to the telegram of the Vienna Correspondent of The Standard—a paper that commanded the respect of the Prime Minister. That remarkable telegram the other day stated that the writer had been informed, on trustworthy authority, that the belief in Central Asia was that Russia would lead the people of that country down to plunder the rich plains of India, where gold and diamonds and beautiful weapons were lying on the streets. The language of the letter, extravagant as it was, was the language that fascinated an Oriental people. It was the language in which General Gordon's Proclamation to the Soudanese was couched. The same writer went on to say— Everybody in Afghanistan knows what is coming. When you hear that fresh differences have broken out between that country and India, you may feel sure that the Afghans are being used as an advance guard, and that all the available horsemen of Central Asia will follow at their heels to seize the Promised Land. A great danger was threatening our Indian Empire. Words were not sufficient to cope with the Russian Power, which during the time the present Administration had been in Office had advanced 500 miles eastward. They were now within 240 miles of Herat, and they had acquired a new base, supported by steam, from which they Could bring up enormous forces for the invasion of Asia. Russia had in the Caucasus an Army of 200,000 men. By the Trans-Caucasian Railway, by steamers on the Caspian Sea, and by the railways from Teshikislar to Bami, these could readily be conveyed to the Afghan Frontier. In addition, Russia had just conquered the splendid horsemen of Turkomans, who would soon be well-disciplined and armed with breech-loaders, and who possessed horses capable of marching 100 miles a-day. History warranted him in saying that no great foreign invader of India had been ever yet repelled. One of the first things which should be done was to fortify Herat. At present it was not fortified; but there were hills surrounding it which might be made secure. The next step was to complete the railway to Candahar. It was much to be regretted that the Government ever sacrificed that place, for with it they sacrificed £1,000,000 a-year in trade. £1,000,000 a-year might not be much to the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. A. Arnold); but it was by closing these little rivulets of trade that the present depression had been occasioned. They had lost £500,000 in Tunis, £2 50,000 in Tonquin, £500,000 in the Soudan, £750,000 in Madagascar, and so forth. These millions, had they gone to increase the earnings of the Lancashire operatives, might have relieved the depression that district was now suffering from. He thanked the House for listening to him, and took some comfort from the declaration of the Government. He hoped that they would be firm and clear in their Indian policy. It was a question not only where our Imperial interests and trade representing £100,000,000, but the future of 250,000,000 of people in India was at stake, whether she should enjoy the good government which the supremacy of England had conferred upon her, and which had been such a wonderful contrast to long centuries of oppression; or whether she should be subjected to the cruel and oppressive domination of the most backward military despotism in the world.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR

said, that when they contrasted the present state of India with what it was a few years ago during the war with Afghanistan, they might rejoice at the progress that had been made. The time, he thought, had come when the Government might embark upon further improvements, and so bind the people of India still closer to our rule. This was not the first time we had had Russia near Herat, and he thought they might look with some degree of quietude upon the progress that Russia had made. Undoubtedly the action of the Russian Government was a violation of the engagements which they had entered into, and to that extent Her Majesty's Government were justified in calling attention to the matter. He was, however, gratified with the assurance which had been given by Her Majesty's Government that the Russian Government would be dealt with, and he agreed with the noble Lord opposite (Lord George Hamilton) that they ought not to press too heavily upon the Russian Government, because it was difficult to say whether the Government were primarily responsible, or whether the agents of that Government, who had always been most active in Central Asia, were more to blame. With regard to the policy of the late Government, he did not blame the Members of that Administration, because they had acted to the best of their light; but, at the same time, they must remember that their views were in favour of a policy of military occupation by our Army of Candahar and even of Herat—nay, even of the transfer of that city to Persia, than which none could be more difficult and dangerous. Happily these intentions had been set aside through a change of Government, and we had wisely withdrawn from Candahar. The consequence was that our relations with Afghanistan were now more friendly than they had been; while, so far from the trade of Candahar having decreased, it was notorious that that trade had increased, and was still on the increase. After the moderate speech of the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. E. Stanhope) he hoped that the time had come when those questions would cease to be the occasions of Party conflict.

MR. BOURKE

said, that there seemed to be a general desire that the debate should come to an end; but as he had been the first, many years ago, to draw the attention of the House to the question, he hoped to be allowed to make a few re- marks. He agreed with his hon. Friend the Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. E. Stanhope) and the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Charles W. Dilke) that the subject was one which must be approached with a deep sense of responsibility. There was no doubt that the event which had just occurred was one which had been foreseen for many years, and was of the greatest importance. It was important to this country, important to Afghanistan, to India, and oven to Europe. Afghanistan looked upon the event as a step towards its own incorporation with Russia. The expectation of what had now happened had existed long in the minds of the Rulers of Afghanistan, and led Shore Ali to believe that he had been deserted by England. Tremendous effect would also be caused upon many minds in India; because it had been the traditional policy of the Northern neighbours of India to invade India, and anything which disquieted our Northern Frontier disquieted the whole of India. In addition to this, there was not a Court in Europe that was not at this moment somewhat surprised at the calmness with which the announcement of the Russian occupation had been received by England, as this question had always been regarded as a matter of vital interest. He was satisfied with the assurances which the noble Lord (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) had given; but he regretted to see that the noble Lord still seemed to cling to belief in the assurances of Russia. He was glad to hear that the Government were taking measures with respect to the boundaries of Afghanistan; and hoped that those measures would be effective. The boundaries towards the Upper Oxus were quite as important as those connected with Merv; and he, therefore, hoped the Government would attend to that portion of the subject. He would impress on the Government not to be satisfied with diplomatic communications that might pass between the two Governments. He should be glad to see those communications; but he attached very little importance to them, because the question after all was what we were to do in India; and it would be perfectly competent for the Government to say, without consulting any Power, that, as these events had occurred, they would take those steps which they deemed ad- visable in their own interests and in those of India and Afghanistan. It was the duty of the Government to concert measures with the Government of India with respect to the frontier line in Afghanistan. The Government had entered into a very onerous engagement with the Ameer. It imposed a tremendous obligation on the Government; and he should be the last to ask the Government to tell the House how that obligation was going to be carried out at the present moment. The late Government had been accused of being anxious to occupy Herat with a British force; but that was not the ease. There never was any proposal of that hind that he was aware of. The Government were now perfectly free to take what steps they pleased; and though they might appear aggressive, that ought not to give umbrage to Russia.

MR. CAINE

said, that the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) had stated that in consequence of the railway to Candahar they had lost £1,000,000 of trade to the country. He did not see how they could lose what they never had; and, as a matter of fact, their trade with Afghanistan was greater now than ever. In 1873 their exports to Afghanistan only reached £28,000, and they were exporting a great deal more to-day than they did in 1873.