§ SUPPLY—considered in Committee.
§ (In the Committee.)
§ (1.) £419,600, Commissariat, Transport, and Ordnance Store Establishments.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, this was a Vote of some considerable importance; and as it involved, more or less, a Department of the Government with which he was for some time connected, and indeed presided over, he wished to make some few observations concerning it. He alluded to the Transport Department in particular; and though he had no intention at the present juncture of going into the whole question, he thought the present was an appropriate occasion for making some remarks on this particular branch of it which had reference to the organization of the body as a whole. He must, therefore, ask the 1717 Committee to bear with him while he went back shortly upon the history of the organization and working of the Transport Department and the Ordnance Stores. The story was an old one, but it was one of some importance; and though very well known to many Members of the Committee, there were some Members to whom it was not so familiar, and it was altogether unknown to a large section of the outside public, who had a great interest in the matter. It would be in the recollection of many Members of the Committee that there was a great breakdown of the Commissariat in the Crimean War; and after that, in consequence of inquiries set on foot, mainly at the instance of Mr. Roebuck, who was then a Member of the House, a great many faults were found, and naturally found, with the way in which the Department had been administered. One of the first reforms that was made at that time was to take away from the Treasury the control of the personnel of the Commissariat Department, and to place it under the control of the War Office. He was not aware that any other reform of great magnitude occurred at the time to which he was referring. There was, however, an opinion prevailing that the matter ought not to stop at the point which it had reached; and at the instance either of General Peel or Sir John Pakington—he did not remember which—a Committee, known as Lord Strathnairn's Committee, was appointed. This Committee went most exhaustively into the whole question of transport, and recommended a certain number of reforms, which were based chiefly on the French model, France at that time being the chief Military Power in Europe. It was not unnatural, under the circumstances, that most of the ideas in reference to the provisioning of our own Army should be, more or less, drawn from a knowledge of the French system. The Report of the Committee to which he referred, and its recommendations, such as they were, were published in the year 1867; but no action was taken upon them until some few years afterwards. If his memory served him rightly, nothing was done in the matter until the year 1870, when the Franco German War was taking place, and when there was a panic in this country, as he was afraid there always had been, and would be, in similar circumstances, It was thought on every 1718 side that, in the event of our having to send an Expeditionary Army to Belgium or elsewhere, the Commissariat and Transport Services would not be efficient for the purpose. The number of men in the Service was few; and though some reforms had been introduced, it was far from being in that state of perfection which everybody who took an interest in the question would have wished to see. Lord Cardwell and Sir Henry Storks then devised a system known under the name of the Control system, which was more or less a system of centralization, and was certainly not popular with the Army, among whose officers the belief existed that the Civilian Head of the Commissariat Department would have power over the military officers in command, to which they objected. There certainly was an objection to the very name of Controller, though he believed there was no intention on the part of the civilian authorities that the Controller should in any way interfere with the proper jurisdiction of General Officers in command. In fact, the name of Controller was so unpopular in the Army that when Lord Cranbrook came into Office, in 1874, one of the first subjects he found pressing—and it was pressed very strongly upon him by the military party of the day—was that the Control system should be at once reconsidered. The name of Controller was almost immediately abolished; but a great deal more was necessary to be done. It was perfectly clear that a system of decentralization, as opposed to one of centralization, was more or less necessary, and there were also questions of difficulty and grievance connected with the personnel of the Department. He perfectly understood the difficulty with which Lord Cardwell and Sir Henry Storks had to deal, and the object which they had it at heart to accomplish. Perhaps, if they had remained longer in Office they would have seen, or fancied they saw, the necessity for still further reforms. This was not the case, however, and to Mr. Gathorne Hardy—the present Lord Cranbrook—it came to find that some further reforms were necessary. Under the administration of the Department by Mr. Gathorne Hardy it was thought necessary that the whole subject of Control—or, rather, of the two Departments of Commissariat and 1719 Ordnance Stores—should be referred to a Select Committee. This was done, and the Committee, which was known as Lord Cadogan's Committee, recommended that the Commissariat at least should be put upon what was called a military basis. It was felt that some change was necessary, especially with regard to the personnel of the Transport Department; but it was not found to be easy, in fact it was very difficult, to obtain the military element, by reason of the fact that officers preferred to serve with their regiments in time of war. This was not to be wondered at, any more than was the suggestion that a combatant officer should be delegated in time of war to the performance of quasi-civilian duties. There was very great doubt, indeed, whether a sufficient supply of officers would be found for this service, and whether, if having volunteered for it in time of peace, they would not, in the event of war breaking out, go back to their regiments as combatants. The experience of the Crimean War was certainly opposed to the view that combatant officers would, in case of war, consent to give up their positions as combatants in order to continue to occupy civilian offices to which they had been appointed. His object in mentioning these circumstances, which must be more or less tedious to many Members, was to bring the history of the Ordnance Store and Commissariat Departments down to the year 1879, when it was attempted to put the Commissariat on a military basis, and, as far as the personnel was concerned, to place the control of that body under the Adjutant General at the Horse Guards. Reforms of this kind must, of course, be more or less experimental, as had been the case in the Egyptian War, when the real responsibility would seem to attach to the General in command. The hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron) had given Notice of a Motion on Vote 16 with reference to a very worthy public officer—he alluded to the Director of Transport—concerning whom he did not think any word of censure could be justly said.
DR. CAMERONsaid, he wished to remark, in explanation, that the Motion of which he had given Notice was not one of censure upon the gentleman now holding the office to which the Motion referred, but upon the system.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, that it was far from his object to suggest that if any official ought to be censured it should be a subordinate, but that the censure should go higher; and in reference to that point he would say nothing as to whether, in his view, the responsibility ought to rest upon the General or his Chief of Staff. In any case, he thought it must be clear that the Department, as a Department, ought to be absolved from blame. He wished to know from the Surveyor General of the Ordnance whether he could give to the Committee any information as to the probable working of the new system which it was proposed to introduce? It was not possible, in the course of a speech which must be limited in its duration, to deal with a subject which had occupied the time of several Committees, and concerning which several Blue Books had been issued; but it must be patent to any hon. Member who had considered the question that the provisioning of an army in the field was a matter of the utmost importance, and that the personnel of the Department on which that duty devolved should be of the very best matériel that could possibly be obtained. He knew that it had been the practice of the officers in the Commissariat Department to do their duty in the best possible manner; but he knew also that it had been the practice, in course of wars in which this country had been engaged, in the public Press and elsewhere, to throw the responsibility of any disasters which had occurred to the Army upon the Commissariat Department, and he thought that very often that had been done with great injustice. The Commissariat Department had very difficult duties to perform; and it had, unfortunately, not many friends either inside or outside of the House of Commons. The result was that the old saying, "Hit him hard; he has no friends!" was acted up to. The difficulties of the Department generally arose, therefore, from the want of sufficient time and materials at its command. He had something to say as to the Medical Department; but this he should defer until the Medical Vote was reached. He wished, however, to ask his hon. Friend to say whether the present system of transport was working smoothly and well, and whether the employment of mules, which had been found of advan- 1721 tags in tropical and semi-tropical climates, might not be extended in countries which were neither tropical nor semi-tropical with a saving of expense? He should also like to have some information on the subject of transport carts, and particularly as to the use of the Flanders waggons, which, though unsuitable for use in Egypt, had, as he was informed, been sent out to that country for use in the course of the recent military operations. They were carts which would have been perfectly suitable for use in countries like France or Belgium, for instance, but were altogether unsuitable for use in a country like Egypt. As a matter of fact, from the first to the last of the Egyptian Campaign, there had been great and unnecessary haste. This country was not ready for the operations which were undertaken; and this was a very serious charge to make, because it was obvious that, in these days, if any country was in a position such as to make it necessary either to declare war or to defend itself from attack, it should be ready to do either one or the other at the shortest possible notice. His own view was, that if it should be found necessary at the present moment, this country could not send out an Army Corps consisting of 20,000 men. If it were necessary to send out a second Army Corps fully equipped, he felt certain that it could not be done in existing circumstances; and, therefore, he ventured to urge upon the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) the importance of paying particular attention to the Departments to which he had been calling the notice of the Committee. It was the more important that this should be done, because, as everyone knew, their Army had to do service in every part of the world, and under every condition of climate. He hoped the noble Marquess, who was actuated by the best motives, and who had a knowledge of the War Office going back for a quarter of a century, would give his best attention to this question. He wished to say a few words in reference to the Reserve Force. This Force was represented by a large number of men on paper, but most of them were simply "men with muskets." In saying that, he did not wish to depreciate the Force, of which he had a very high opinion; but he saw no means, under present arrangements, of putting them in the 1722 field, if it were necessary to do so, in a state of efficiency. What he wished to see was, that the Army of this country should be in a better state of preparation than it could claim to be at the present time. The subject was one which had, without doubt, been talked about ad nauseam, until Parliament and the public had alike lost interest in it. That being so, they had this other difficulty—that the Secretary of State in charge of the Army was so pressed for money that he was anxious to get his Votes through the House as quickly as possible. However desirous the noble Marquess might be to introduce reforms in the Army, he was met with many and diverse opinions as to the best mode of carrying out those reforms. Nothing could be more important than that the country should have, above all, contented Services; but, at the same time, it was an undoubted fact that much jealousy and discontent existed in the Ordnance Store, and unless great care was taken, those feelings would increase, and injury would be done to the efficiency of this important branch of the Service. When he was in Office, he was constantly receiving letters on the subject. It might be a small matter in the opinion of outsiders; but, nevertheless, there was that feeling of jealousy in the Ordnance Store that he had described. It was thought that the Commissariat had been much better treated than they had been. They complained that they had not a military title. This question was thoroughly well considered at the time; and it was found quite impossible, considering the prejudices which existed in the Army generally, to give to the civilians of the Commissariat or the Ordnance Store Department a military title. It would, no doubt, be one of the duties of his hon. Friend the Surveyor General (Mr. Brand) and of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) to see whether it was possible to content the Service by doing something in the way of either making it more military or more civilian, at any rate in the way of making it more contented. He (Lord Eustace Cecil) thought it was quite right he should mention here a grievance that he had previously brought before the House. He asked a Question the other day with regard to the storemen and firemen at Woolwich. These men, like 1723 everybody else, had a great deal to do at the time of the Egyptian Campaign. In the strict letter of the law he believed they were paid for overtime; but, at the same time, he thought that it was only fair to say that it was part of the contract with them, or at any rate it was an understood thing, that that overtime should be only exceptional. When, of course, it was carried on for days, perhaps for weeks, he thought the men had in equity, if not in justice, some sort of claim to extra remuneration. The Ordnance Store officers had a great deal of responsibility put upon them, and an immense deal of trust was placed in them. They were not overpaid, and they rarely got anything in the shape of decorations or remuneration of any sort. However that might be, he believed they had always done their duty most cheerfully and most contentedly; and he wished, as he said before, that that spirit should continue. It was absolutely necessary that any Department of this kind should be perfectly contented with things as they were, if it was possible to arrive at that state. He hoped that, if it were possible, his hon. Friend the Surveyor General (Mr. Brand) and the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) would consider whether they could do anything for these men, who considered that they were very hardly used as compared with the labourers. It would be only a fair and proper thing to see if it were possible to do something for them, considering the immense amount of labour that was put upon them during the Egyptian Campaign. He did not know that he had anything else to say on this Vote at the present moment. He had detained the Committee at some length, and if he had been a little tedious he hoped hon. Gentlemen would forgive him. He was anxious that the country should be in a state of preparation; and he did not think that at present they were in a proper state of preparation, notwithstanding the enormous amount of consideration and inquiry that had been given to the subject.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURsaid, the historical summary of the noble Lord the Member for West Essex did not do justice to the late Lord Hampton; and he (Sir George Balfour) desired to explain that Lord Hampton was entitled to the credit of initiating the Army reforms. The appointment 1724 of Lord Strathnairn's Committee was the first step, and before it he (Sir George Balfour) gave evidence as to the system in India, in regard to the Ordnance, and partly as to the Commissariat. On the proceedings and Report coming before Lord Hampton, he immediately invited Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Henry Storks, and himself to form a confidential Committee to suggest the reforms and the measures for reforming the Military Store and Commissariat system. On submitting their recommendations, Lord Hampton invited Sir Henry Storks to preside over the Department, and, with the assent of the Heads of the Liberal Party, then in Opposition, the appointment was accepted by Sir Henry Storks. He (Sir George Balfour) also was asked by Lord Hampton to aid Sir Henry Storks; and, after pointing out the objections which might be urged against his (Sir George Balfour's) employment in the War Office, he felt he could not resist the reiterated demand for his aid in carrying out the reforms and economies which Lord Hampton desired, and joined Sir Henry Storks. Important changes were proposed and carried out, both in the Ordnance and in the Commissariat; and here he must state that Sir William Power, the then Commissary General, took an active and prominent share in those important changes. He mentioned that able officer's name, because if they searched the roll of Commissariat officers of this century no name more able or better qualified could possibly have been found. The changes which were initiated in Lord Hampton's administration might be justly considered as the groundwork of the many changes since made. He (Sir George Balfour) did not venture to assert that those changes were free from defects; but, considering the difficulties thrown in the way of improvement by the Treasury, and by opposing interests, he did say that the arrangements effected were successful in promoting greater efficiency, and, undoubtedly, vast economy. Anyone who would look at the Army Expenditure would find that in 1868-9 the Army Expenditure amounted to £16,727,503, and in 1870-1 it had fallen to £13,869,882, which, in contrast with the Military Expenditure of the present year, of upwards of £18,000,000, showed most favourable results to the credit of the Control Depart- 1725 ment formed by Lord Hampton, and presided over by Sir Henry Storks. Unhappily, changes were made in the Control Department. The name of the Head was altered from Controller General to Surveyor General of the Ordnance, and Sir Henry Storks was made a Parliamentary officer, instead of remaining at the Department, the Chief of four great branches of the Army, having an annual expenditure of £6,000,000, and stores to the value of £29,000,000 or £30,000,000. He (Sir George Balfour) was then strongly opposed to this alteration of name, and virtually of responsibility, to the Secretary of State, by becoming a Parliamentary officer. And, since then, he had no reason for departing from the opinions he then entertained. He continued to think that the Surveyor General of Ordnance was entirely out of place in the House of Commons. He ought to be in his Office, instead of wasting time in attending to a fow petty Questions, which the Secretary of State could easily deal with. It was impossible for him to be in the House of Commons, often eight or nine hours of the night, and then transact his business in the War Office for an equal time during the day. With regard to what had occurred in relation to the Transport and Commissariat in Egypt, it would be far better if the country had a Report from Lord Wolseley as to what he did, and what he failed to do, and in what direction the Ordnance and Commissariat showed defects. Such a Report was still wanting, before an opinion could be expressed. It was certain that ample means of stores and supplies were at the disposal of that gallant Officer; and with the liberal use of money an abundance of camels, the finest kind of transport for Egypt, could have been obtained. It was a surprise that the 30,000 camels which the Tribes formerly furnished for the transport of baggage and merchandize, before the railway was opened, had not been obtained. Before the operations commenced it was understood that arrangements had been made for securing the transport, and the reason of the failure should be made public.
§ MR. PULESTONsaid, he was not quite certain whether this was the time to call attention to the subject of the Contagious Diseases Acts. His impression was that it might be raised more fittingly on another Vote. At all events, 1726 he should like to know whether he should be in Order in reverting to the subject? The House had been promised a Bill, and the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) had said he might introduce it to-night. Whenever that Bill was introduced, they could only hope to have a discussion upon its principle on the second reading. The second reading of the Bill, however, might be delayed for a considerable time, as there was no knowing what blocks would be put against it. It was essential that the discussion on the subject should not be relegated to the closing days of the Session; and, therefore, he was unwilling to allow this opportunity to go by without having some assurance from the Government that they would have an early opportunity of considering the extraordinary course—an unparalleled course in the history of legislation—which the Government had pursued in reference to the Contagious Diseases Acts.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that if the hon. Gentleman would refer to Vote 15, he would find that under Sub-head H provision was made for the expenses of working the Contagious Diseases Acts. If it was at all necessary to discuss the matter in Committee of Supply, the most convenient opportunity would be when Vote 15 was under consideration.
DR. CAMERONsaid, the noble Lord (Lord Eustace Cecil), who opened the discussion, spoke about different persons giving advice regarding the Commissariat. The noble Lord said that one man gave his opinion, and another his opinion, as to how to do the work; and said that such advice generally amounted to advice as to how not to do it. He (Lord Eustace Cecil) had been a reformer at the War Office; and ho (Dr. Cameron) was sorry to say that the noble Lord's reforms had resulted in about the perfection of how not to do it. The Commissariat Department in the late war broke down in what might have been a very disastrous fashion, and yet the Committee were now asked in this Vote to vote nearly £200,000 for that Department, an increase of £20,000 over the amount voted last year. He did not grudge the money, because he considered it a most necessary Department for an efficient Army; but what ho did complain of 1727 was that the system was such that they had a most inefficient Commissariat. He thought it was but proper that the public should know the extent to which the Commissariat and Transport Services broke down in the late Egyptian Campaign, and why they broke down. The Commissariat and. Transport Staff was in such a condition as to be almost unworkable; it was officered not only by trained Departmental officers, but by regimental officers, who left their regiments temporarily, with a view of returning on some future occasion. Those officers entered into the Commissariat Service at such an age as to be too old to learn the fundamental duties of that Department, and they were retired at such an age as prevented them from looking to that Service as a settlement for life. Men high in the regimental ranks were placed in the Commissariat under men with lower regimental rank. Those men had to work under them the most unworkable materials. In the Transport Service drivers were sent out, selected from Infantry and Militia Reserves, who knew nothing about horses, and who could not even ride. There was no school to train the officers. The auxiliary drivers hired in times of war were even worse than those he had described. In the late Egyptian War, he (Dr. Cameron) understood that the Transport Service drivers were largely composed of the tag-rag and bobtail of the Levant. The most unfortunate thing was that the Department was going from bad to worse; for as the experienced officers who had pulled the Department through all the strain of the Egyptian Campaign retired there was no one to take their places. He did not want to find fault with the Department, and he felt inclined to agree with the noble Lord (Lord Eustace Cecil) that for some of its shortcomings the General in command was responsible. He (Dr. Cameron) did not, however, think it was fair to throw all the blame upon the General in command any more than upon the Commissary General. The fact of the matter was that the evil was attributable to the system of divided responsibility, for which the noble Lord (Lord Eustace Cecil) himself was largely responsible. An Order was issued in 1878 which overturned the old system, and inaugurated the system which now prevailed. Under the present system 1728 there was a Director of Supplies and Transport, who was at the head of the Department. His business it was to be charged with the supervision and control of the Commissariat and Transport Services of the Army. There was also a Commissary General at head-quarters, who was supposed to be the adviser of the Surveyor General on all questions relating to the personnel of the Commissariat and Transport Department. It was laid down in the Order in question that the Commissary General should give the benefit of his Commissariat experience upon all questions on which his advice would be useful. It would be seen that the duties of this officer were not very distinctly defined; but the Committee would infer, from a number of Questions which had been asked in the House upon the subject, that the Commissary General had never been consulted in any of the matters in which his experience would have been most valuable. The Commissary General was a man of great experience and at the head of his Department. The country paid him £1,500 a-year, and it also paid to three other gentlemen £1,095 each yearly for the benefit of their Commissariat experience. When, however, war occurred, and the country needed the advice of these gentlemen, they were thrown overboard. In peace time we pursued a proper and rational system. Let the Committee consider what took place in times of peace. He would give an illustration of flour bought for Aldershot in time of peace, and flour bought in time of war for Egypt. Supposing it was required to buy flour for Aldershot. The Director of Contracts advertised for tenders; tenders were sent in to the Commissary General at Aldershot; he selected his tender, and obtained for it the approval of the General in command. Having done that, the tender selected was sent on to the Director of Contracts, and if he approved of the tender, he intimated the fact. The tender was then accepted, the flour was sent to Aldershot, and there it passed the Commissary General, who gave a voucher that everything was right. That voucher was handed back to the Director of Supplies and Transport, who in this case really acted as auditor. That was what occurred in time of peace, and a better plan could not be devised. Expert Commissariat 1729 officers were entrusted with the purchase, and there was a strict system to see that every precaution was taken that the articles purchased should be all right. But when it came to a time of war all that was changed. What happened in the case of the purchase of flour for Egypt? The Director of Supplies and Transports, who in times of peace really acted as an auditor, went into the open market, and by means of a Government broker, on whose advice he acted, bought flour. Now, the flour purchased for Egypt was American flour, and was sent out in accordance with the advice of the civilian broker in barrels. When it was landed it was found that, to a large extent, it was unfit for food. It had been said that that flour was only for the early supplies; as a matter of fact, two months' supply of flour was purchased by the broker in question. The Commissary General was not consulted; indeed, the flour was bought in defiance of all Commissariat experience. The Commissariat never sent American flour to Malta, because they knew from experience that it would not keep. They had established mills there, and they had proposed the establishment of mills at Gibraltar. In this case they were not even shown the samples of the flour, neither were they consulted as to the mode in which it should be packed. The consequence was that when the flour arrived in Egypt it was bad. He had also asked a question about the mouldy hay that was sent to Egypt; that hay went out in exactly the same fashion as the flour. It was bought by the Director of Supplies and Transport, who was in times of peace a kind of auditor, but who had no Commissariat experience—it was bought by him, not through those experienced Commissariat gentlemen for whose services the country paid £5,000 a-year, but through the agency of a private broker; the hay turned out in large part bad, and had to be used for bedding. He understood that the hay was pressed in some new machine. Now, war time was not a time to make an experiment. They ought not to "swop horses crossing a stream;" indeed, transport was so costly that it was perfectly unjustifiable to resort to experiments in time of war. That however, did not exhaust the matter in connection with the Transport Service. The purchase of mules was 1730 most important, and according to an Order that had been read the Commissary General was to have the absolute supervision of the Transport Service Corps, and yet in this matter again he was thrown overbeard. Mules were purchased in Malta, and for some time they were purchased there by an Infantry officer, without any assistance from any veterinary surgeon. Some mules were bought at Smyrna by an Artillery officer, who had a veterinary surgeon accompanying him. The veterinary surgeon would not pass some of the mules; but the Artillery officer told him that that was not his affair, and he would pass them. The veterinary surgeon complained that not only was the Artillery officer not guided by his advice, but he would not allow him to have any say as to the management of the mules. It was a fact that even the branding irons that were necessary to mark the mules purchased were left comfortably in the hands of the contractor, so that he could do just what he liked with them. The mules were shipped, but the barley could not be got at, so that the poor animals were required to live on chopped straw for nine days. Could people wonder why the wretched beasts did not come up fresh and spirited when they landed? As a matter of fact, two-thirds of them were not fit for work until after Tel-el-Kebir had been taken. What occurred at Smyrna was not exceptional. As a matter of fact, some mules were purchased in Syria, and two-thirds of those were unfit for work for weeks after they landed. That, however, did not exhaust the matter. A quantity of pack saddles purchased abroad for those mules turned out utterly useless; there was nothing to hang the packs on, and the saddles provided were returned to store. The same thing with the waggons. They were sent out, and were intended to be drawn by two horses. As a matter of fact, two horses could not even draw one of the waggons over the sand of the Desert when it was empty. He understood, also, that the wood fuel was sent out in such lumps that it could with difficulty be used. Stationery forms, which were in immense demand in times of war, were not forthcoming for a month, and many of the stores were destroyed in transit. After the purchases were made in the ridiculous fashion he had described, they were 1731 handed over for shipment to the Naval authorities. There was a rule that what was called a cargo book should be kept; but, as a matter of fact, it was given in evidence before Lord Morley's Committee that in several cases the Naval authorities did not know where the cargo was stored. It took two days to find a much-needed consignment of flour, three days to find tea, and five days to find sugar. Although the Commissary General ought to have control of such matters, he was never consulted in regard to any of them. The Commissary General in the field was never told of the removal of the base of operations from Alexandria to Ismailia. It appeared that Lord Wolseley had issued embarking orders, but that some of the regiments had not cared to obey them, and did not bring with them the two days' rations he ordered them to take, and there was no machinery for serving out supplies at Ismailia. There were no weighing machines, no clerks, no nothing. When the men were ordered to march the supplies could not be carried forward, owing to the utter breakdown of the regimental transport; and it was found, in connection with the regimental transport, that there was no shoeing arrangement, so that the mules attached to it were really dependent upon charity for getting shod. The squadron carts, whose service sought to have been utilized in bringing up the supplies, were utterly useless. These squadron carts had been condemned, over and over again, as unfit for anything. An hon. and gallant Friend (Sir George Balfour) had spoken about the camels as the natural mode of transport. He understood that camels were offered to the Chief of the Staff in Egypt, but that they were refused. The Chief of the Staff wanted to hire the camels; but the Egyptians were shrewd enough to see that it would not pay to let out camels in war time. After the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir, the authorities got hold of a number of Egyptian camels, and if they had had drivers they might have been made useful; but until they pressed the Egyptian prisoners into that service they had no drivers. Then again, unfortunately, some of the camels took it into their heads to walk into the Canal along with their baggage. It must, however, be borne in mind that the camels were offered, and could have been purchased, while they were 1732 wasting money in every other direction. If ever anything extraordinary broke down, the Army looked at once to the Commissariat for au alteration; and whenever anything went wrong, there was a general cry of "Hang the Commissary General." No doubt that would be an effective and striking remedy; but on this occasion it would have been totally unfair. It would have been unjust to hang the Commissary General. He was not consulted about the flour sent out; he knew nothing about the bad hay, or the purchase of mules; he had, probably, expressed his condemnation of the carts he was not asked about the saddlery; and he knew nothing about the shipment of stores. He was not even informed about the change of base, and it was no business of his to buy the camels. On the contrary, the Commissary General, considering the system under which he worked, did wonders. He had requisition for all sorts of supplies made upon him, in excess of what was allowed by the Regulations. He (Dr. Cameron) was told that the number of waggons that went up with some of the head-quarters was something astonishing. One-half of the transport, in one case at least, was taken up by the baggage for head-quarters, and the supplies for the Transport and Commissariat Services themselves. He believed that the amount of Transport at the disposal of the Commissariat was utterly inadequate; and it was, to a considerable extent, in consequence of this that the Transport Service broke down. But, be that as it might, the Transport of one Division could not bring up much more than one clay's supply for the men alone. There was no provision made for carrying up forage or fuel, and these indispensable articles had to be carried up at the expense of other things. In regard to hay, it was impossible to obtain forage. The Veterinary Department said—"We want more forage; it is absolutely necessary that we should feed our horses well, while they are doing this hard work." But the Commissary General was obliged to lay down the rule that the further the Cavalry were from the base, the smaller should be their rations. Taking everything into consideration, it was wonderful how the few trained, energetic, and zealous officers belonging to the Transport Service in the Egyptian Campaign 1733 did their work at all. But if they could not hang the Commissary General for the reasons he had stated, then it appeared to him that the only other practical chance of obtaining reform was to oppose the Vote. He did not blame the Government in the matter. He thought they had had thrust upon them a baneful legacy from their Predecessors. He did not propose to move the disallowance of the Vote at the present stage, because he trusted that the hon. Gentleman at the head of the Department (Mr. Brand) would be able to tell the Committee that he contemplated sonic thorough reform of the whole system. In short, there ought to be very little difficulty about it, for what they really wanted was undivided responsibility. It appeared to him that there was no second question in regard to the propriety, as recommended by the Commissary General, of having a supercargo on board ship to see where the supplies were stowed, and to know how to lay his hands upon everything when it was wanted. There could be no second opinion as to the absurdity of retaining Commissaries General at headquarters at a time of peace at high salaries, and dispensing altogether with their services in a time of war. They had seen that the present system did not work well; but if they preferred to go into market, and obtain full value for their money through a Government broker, they must also adopt an entirely different system. They would then save the money that was now wasted upon Commissaries General. At any rate, do not let them keep up this dual system—a system practised in a time of peace, only to be thrown aside in a time of war.
MR. BRANDsaid, he thought the criticism which had been passed upon the Commissariat and Transport Services was one which would be of very great advantage to the Army; and he fully agreed with the statement made by his hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron), that the Commissariat officers in Egypt had done wonderfully good service. The Transport of an Army was, perhaps, the most important branch of it, because without Transport no Army could exist, and certainly could not move. He had no doubt that the Transport Service required careful organization in a time of peace, and 1734 yet it was impossible to have their Transport complete in a time of peace. Therefore, the object they must have in view, in organizing a good system, was to have the Transport Service capable of expansion, so that when war came upon them they might be able to expand the Service and meet the requirements of the time. The difficulty, no doubt, had been felt not only in the case of the Egyptian Expedition, but in all the recent wars in which the country had been engaged. In his opinion, the difficulty as regarded the Departmental Staff of the Commissariat and Transport had been met by the changes introduced into the system some two years ago, by making the Departmental Staff of the Commissariat and Transport more military. He had to say, in answer to his noble Friend the Member for West Essex (Lord Eustace Cecil), that it had been found the system, so far as peace was concerned, worked well. There was no difficulty in obtaining officers in the Commissariat and Transport Corps; and he believed that under the Warrant the Secretary of State had power, if he found it desirable, to make permanent the services of officers who had shown ability and capacity in connection with the Transport Corps. He could not make the same remark in regard to the rank and file. That was a much more difficult question. His noble Friend asked him to let him know what the decision of the Committee was with respect to that portion of the subject? All he could say was that the Committee appointed to inquire into the matter had only recently reported, and their Report was now under the consideration of the Secretary of State; but he believed it would be found possible to carry out some of the recommendations of that Committee, and that they would be able by that means to give the rank and file of the Commissariat and Transport Corps expansion; and that the Secretary of State would be able, by limiting the time of service of the rank and file of the Commissariat and Transport Corps to three years, to form a valuable reserve in connection with that Corps. In that way he thought they would be able to solve the difficulty as regarded the rank and file but he could not say anything further on that point, because, as a matter of fact, the detailed recommendations of the Committee had not at pre- 1735 sent been approved by the Secretary of State. His noble Friend had referred back to the history of the Commissariat and Transport Corps. He (Mr. Brand) did not think at this time it was necessary for them to go further back than the year 1870, when the Surveyor General was appointed, and, under an Order in Council, made responsible for the supply and transport of the Army. At that time a Military Department — the personnel, the control of the personnel, and the discipline of the Commissariat and Transport Corps—was under the Surveyor General. His belief was that the change which was made, transferring the control of the personnel and discipline of the Commissariat and Transport Corps from the Surveyor General, who was a Parliamentary official, to the Commander-in-Chief, was a good one. At any rate, the Commander-in-Chief had control at home; and he considered that the Commander-in-Chief in the field should have complete control of the personnel of the Army in the field.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURsaid, he had never disputed the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in the field having the control; but what he contended to be a mistake was that the Commander-in-Chief at home should have control in a time, not of war, but of peace.
MR. BRANDsaid, he thought that the control of the Transport and Commissariat Service ought, as far as possible, to be assimilated to the general organization of the Army; and as long as the Civil Department had control over the expenditure he thought the nearer they kept to that system the better it would be for the Army. His noble Friend had asked him several questions with reference to the arrangements that were made for the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. The noble Lord had asked him questions as to carts. Two-wheeled carts were provided for the Expedition to Egypt on the demand of the Commander of the Forces; but wheeled carts were found to be of no good in that country, and the whole of the transport in Egypt, except that which was carried by water or rail, was conducted by mules. That mode of conveyance was found to be the best means of transport; and certainly he thought that mules were much better adapted for transport purposes than carts in that 1736 country. The noble Lord asked him a question in reference to the amount of transport they had. They had transport waggons sufficient for one Army Corps at the present time; and, as the noble Lord was well aware, it would not be desirable for them to keep a large store of waggon material in this country, the more especially when they bore in mind the fact that in all wars of recent years they had been obliged to take the transport they could find in the country in which the war took place. His hon. Friend the Member for Glasow (Dr. Cameron) had made an attack upon the present organization of the Department, and the hon. Member had stated that there was a divided responsibility. Now, in 1878, Mr. Halliburton was appointed Director of Supplies, and in the hands of that gentleman also was placed the control of the transport of the Army. At the same time, the grievances of the Commissariat branch were also met. It was urged that there ought not to he officers from that Staff on full pay having control over the personnel and discipline of the Corps. It was evidently inadvisable to place in the hands of a Commissariat officer on full pay the control of questions relating to the allowances to his own forces. As far as regarded the present holder of the office, he could only say that during all the time he had been in that position he had performed his duties in the most admirable manner. There was no officer of the Staff whose services had been more valuable than those of Mr. Halliburton. The result of the system, whatever objection there might be to it in theory, had been good. Since Mr. Halliburton's appointment, in 1878, they had been engaged in four wars—namely, in a war at the Cape, in the Zulu War, in the Transvaal War, and latterly in the Expedition to Egypt; and in every one of those cases the bulk of the supplies sent from this country was sent in sufficient quantity and in good order. When they came to think that 20,000 tons alone were sent to Egypt, and that there was not one single failure in the supply, except in respect of the flour mentioned the other day, he thought the Committee would say that the result of the system in practice had been thoroughly good. He would not refer to the Report of the Departmental Committee further than to state that in two para- 1737 graphs in that Report the Committee acknowledged that the work of supply was well done. They said that there were abundant supplies of meat and plenty of vegetables, and they thought that no complaint whatever could be made against the Department here which was responsible for the despatch of supplies from this country. With regard to organization, his hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron) must remember that there had been a great many changes in the Department. Her Majesty's Government were certainly not responsible for the special organization of the supply and transport branch now in existence; but he thought it would he advisable not to make any further change in the Department until same serious weakness had been found out. The result altogether had been satisfactory; there were certain points, no doubt, brought out by the Egyptian Campaign which deserved the serious consideration of the War Office, and these matters were now under the consideration of the Secretary of State. With reference to the remarks his hon. Friend had made in regard to the mules, his hon. Friend asked him various questions upon that matter. He had already acknowledged in that House that the conduct of the officer sent out to purchase the mules was reprehensible in not acting on the advice of the veterinary surgeon.
DR. CAMERONsaid, he had not complained or mentioned the name of the officer; but he had spoken of the system.
MR. BRANDremarked, that he was coming to that point. The system was, as a matter of fact, a simple one; and if competent officers were sent out, there could be no difficulty in obtaining a supply of mules; but there was great pressure, owing to the shortness of time in which they had to make the arrangements for the force to be sent to Egypt. Nevertheless, the countries in which the mules could be found were well-known, and there was no difficulty in obtaining a supply of mules. An officer was sent to Smyrna for the purpose of purchasing mules; and if he had acted on the advice of the veterinary surgeon, he would not have sent mules to Ismailia in the condition which had been described by his hon. Friend. There could be no 1738 doubt whatever that in that particular case mules were sent out which arrived at Ismailia in a bad condition; and he regretted that in this instance the advice and counsel of the veterinary surgeon were not taken. He did not know that there were any other questions which had been put to him in the course of the discussion which it was necessary for him to answer. If there were, and his noble Friend would call his attention to them, he would be very happy to answer them as far as possible. There was, however, one point alluded to by his noble Friend—namely, the question of gratuities to the storeholders of Woolwich Arsenal; and all he had to say on that point was that the question had been carefully considered by the Secretary of State, and he saw no reason for re-opening it.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, there could be no doubt that this was as important a question as could possibly be brought before the Committee of Supply in connection with the Army Estimates; and he was extremely glad to hear his hon. Friend the Surveyor General of Ordnance state that he was quite prepared to listen to any suggestions, and, if possible, improve the present system, which he himself admitted did not work quite as well as it might do. They knew perfectly well that the hon. Gentleman was quite right when he stated that it was the usual practice not only of this Government, but of all Governments, at the moment a war was over to dispense with all the services as far as possible, and especially to reduce the services connected with the control and discipline of the Transport and Commissariat Corps down to the lowest numbers possible. He contended that that was one of the most unwise courses that could possibly be pursued. They all knew perfectly well what took place in the Crimean War. At that time everybody was outspoken because the alarm was so great. It was felt that they were never in a position to go to war, and were never prepared for what might happen. At that time statements were made in Parliament to show that the same thing could not occur again; but he ventured to say that in every war which had taken place since the same thing had occurred; and they had not 1739 profited by the lesson taught, severe though it was. The hon. Gentleman the Surveyor General of the Ordnance admitted the fact himself, when he stated that no complaint whatever was made about the 20,000 tons of supplies sent out to Egypt. The complaint was that 20,000 tons of supplies might have been received there; but they were not available for the troops. That was the one main point the Surveyor General of Ordnance ought to have directed his attention to. When they recollected the pride with which it was stated to the House that, at any rate, the Expedition to Egypt would be sent out without let or hindrance to its being conducted in the best way, it was disheartening to find, at the very commencement of the operations, although it was perfectly well known, and was stated on authority, that on a certain day the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir was to take place, and although it was perfectly well known that a change of base was to be made from Alexandria to Ismailia, and it was the easiest thing possible to have sent sufficient transports, sufficient medical stores, and all other appliances that were necessary—it was disheartening to find that no care or thought whatever was taken in regard to the supplies, and that the first portion of the Army had to march into the interior of the country absolutely without supplies or the means of transport. He thought the Committee were very much indebted to the hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron) for the great care, pains, and trouble he had been at to collect all the facts he had stated so clearly, showing how the different things had been purchased that were to be sent abroad, and how the supplies were purchased which were obtained from foreign countries; the little care that was taken of some of the articles purchased, and the condition in which they arrived in Egypt. If he (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) was rightly informed, it was an absolute fact that there was no transport at all when the troops reached Ismailia. There were no mules at Ismailia; but camels could have been had for £16 a-piece, with all their kit and packs, and they would have been of the greatest service to the Army as the troops marched up to Kassassin. But there was a General Order issued that, without further instructions, no camels were to be bought, 1740 and no camels were bought. He was informed that the Chief of the Staff, who was the second in command, knew that he could get as many camels as he considered necessary; but he only asked that he might he permitted to hire camels, and on the part of the Egyptians that offer was wisely refused. What was £16 a-piece for camels, when it was necessary that the Army should be sent up in the best condition for fighting? I t was lamentable that such events should have taken place in the Egyptian Campaign. There was one thing more. Everything was supposed to be all right. The railway was said to be in working order, and the Canal was said to be working order; and, therefore, any other means of transport would not be required. But everybody know that the first thing that took place in a war was the destruction of the railway system; and, if there was a canal, it was at once stopped, and they were not able to use it. No provision was made for these sevents; and, if he was rightly informed, the small transport attached to the Medical Service for transporting the stores necessary for the sick and wounded was taken in order to convey to the front the food absolutely necessary for the troops, and the medical stores were left behind. He believed he was correct in making that statement. Then what he had to say upon the matter was that they ought to learn a little wisdom from what had taken place, because if the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir had not been fought when it was, the consequences might have been most disastrous. Let them, in the future, look a little more closely into these matters, and he thought some grave defects might be detected. The Regulations for the Army Transport, as they at present stood, he thought, were objectionable, no distinction being made between the transport required for the equipment of the troops in the field and that wanted for the supplies and stores of the Commissariat Departments. The equipment of the troops on a fixed quantity, and the transport required for tents, tools, baggage, first reserve of ammunition stores, and, say, four days' rations and forage, could easily be calculated. The transport required by the Control Department must always, with an army in the field, be an uncertain quantity; it must vary with 1741 the distance the troops to be supplied were from the Commissariat base of supply. To meet these requirements, there should be two distinct systems of transport—one a military organization, the other more on a civil footing. The Military Transport should be arranged by troops, each troop capable of transporting in war time the equipment of a brigade; whilst the Commissariat Transport should not be a fixed quantity, but must depend upon the nature and extent of its work for its organization. A proper nucleus should be kept up in time of peace on which to form Field Transport when required. He would not go further into detail; but he trusted that such a discussion as they had had that day would do good; because, if there was one thing the country ought to be prepared with, it was a thoroughly organized and efficient Transport and Commissariat Service. He might go one step further, and he would say that the Medical Department ought to have a Transport entirely to itself, which should be totally distinct from any other, so that the men attached to it would be in a proper position to carry up all the stores that were necessary. They were now to have a complete Army Corps at home, always ready for immediate service; but he thought the country ought never to be satisfied until they received a satisfactory assurance that the Army Corps was absolutely and thoroughly complete in every respect—complete in regard to its Control Department, its Transport, its Commissariat, and in regard to its Medical Staff. If they would only place those matters in a perfect state of organization he was sure there would not be 1s. wasted, and that the utmost advantage would be secured whenever a war broke out again. A great country like this ought always to be prepared, and he thanked his right hon. Friend the late First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. W. H. Smith) for all that he had done to place transport ships in a state of readiness for any eventuality. By sea they had everything in good order. No other nation could have touched them in sending out an Army in the way they sent out the Expeditionary Force to Egypt; but as regarded the control of that Army, the Commissariat and the appliances necessary for the comfort and merciful consideration of the sick and 1742 wounded, they absolutely and entirely failed. The defects which had been pointed out were far from creditable to them. He pressed, as strongly as he could, on the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War not to let these things pass by without an attempt being made to remedy them. It was not easy to say when they might be at war again, because, as they all knew, war came when it was least expected, and at a time when they were least prepared for it. All he asked the noble Marquess was that he should be prepared for any future emergency. Hereafter all responsibility would fall upon the Secretary of State for War; there was no longer a dual command; and the noble Marquess was the Minister they had to look to, because upon him the great responsibility would rest. He sincerely hoped that good would result from the discussion which had taken place.
§ COLONEL O'BEIRNEsaid, he thought the Committee should insist on knowing who was really responsible for the mistakes which had taken place in connection with the Commissariat. Who was responsible for the bad flour, for hay that was unfit for use, for saddlery that was of no service, for fuel that could not be made available, and for the other defective stores that were sent out to Egypt? All these matters ought to be known. It seemed to him that the Surveyor General of the Ordnance rather approved of the way in which the Commissariat was carried out in Egypt, because he had nothing more to say than that the supplies were sent out in an adequate and proper manner. It was, however, a very serious question to consider; because it concerned, not only the credit of individuals, but the well-being of the Army. If the Commissariat was not in an efficient state, the Army was perfectly useless. The Surveyor General of the Ordnance had passed over all that the Committee really wanted to know. It was absolutely essential, he thought, that they should be told who was responsible—for instance, for the flour sent out being utterly useles? He hoped that the hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron), in order to make a practical protest against the manner in which the Commissariat's work was carried out in Egypt would take a Division upon the Vote.
COLONEL STANLEYwished to say a few words upon the Vote, in consequence of some of the remarks which had been made in the course of the debate. Undoubtedly, it always had been, and always would be, very easy to find fault with the Transport arrangements, in connection with military operations abroad; but he wanted to bring back to the minds of the Committee the different circumstances under which England was placed from those of other countries. He did not say that there might not be a complaint made here and there; but he thought that that which should be at the bottom of every change was a want of readiness in the country, and a want of means at hand for carrying forward with efficiency the Transport operations connected with a campaign. He would ask hon. Members whether they really saw what that meant if they were to keep up Transport arrangements and a sufficient regimental Transport Service in a time of peace? He entirely concurred in the advantage of regimental Transport; but if it was necessary to keep it up constantly in a state of efficiency it would entail enormous cost upon the State. It would be necessary to incur very large expenditure in maintaining large stores and men for a Transport Corps in a time of peace; and he ventured to say that when they came to this Vote in the Estimates the criticisms which his hon. Friend the Surveyor General of the Ordnance had undergone that day would be as nothing compared to what he would have to undergo hereafter. But that was not all. It was desirable to come to an entire agreement as to what was really required for the Transport Service. A few years ago opinion was in favour of wheel transport as compared with pack; but some time afterwards it was thought to be better to provide pack transport instead of wheel. Then, again, his hon. Friend the Surveyor General of the Ordnance said that the experience of those who had had to do with mule transport led them to the conclusion that it was, in some respects, better than transport by camels. All these were essential points, and it must be borne in mind that the kind of transport that might be suitable to the Cape would not be the sort of transport that would be useful in Egypt. On the whole, if the 1744 Committee were inclined to say that there should be one uniform system of transport, he was rather driven to the conclusion that they should prepare Estimates with a view to the transport in future being probably required to be all by camels. If they could carry it on wholly in that way all the better. Henceforward, he thought they should bear in mind the possibility of having to carry on their transport, or the greater portion of it at all events, upon what was called the pack system, rather than they should be compelled to depend wholly on wheel transport. Then, as regarded the cart and the waggon trains—there, he thought, they bad profited less by their experience than they might have done. A certain portion, and not a considerable portion, of the train which was provided out of the Vote of Credit some years ago, did, as a matter of fact, come into use at the Cape; but he was free to admit that taking a country like Egypt, and other countries of a similar nature, where the Army was obliged to operate, it was an undoubted fact that a large proportion of the transport was a great deal heavier than was found to be practicable or they would care to use if they could possibly find any other. He presumed that the wheel carts alluded to by his hon. Friend were Maltese carts, or some adaption of them. And in a country where there were no roads that would probably be the best kind of transport they could use. Then, again, as to the question of drivers. Of course, it would not be so difficult to keep up a staff of drivers as it would be on account of the expense to maintain a large quantity of regimental transports; but, then, if they kept up the drivers without having the transports on which they were to practise the advantage of keeping up a staff of regimental drivers became really a very questionable one. It would be within the recollection of the Committee that the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War said something about an intention on the part of the War Office to carry out in a time of peace a system of regimental transport. He believed there was some idea of seeing, at all events, to what extent such a system could be utilized in preference to a system of general transport conducted under the Commissariat. But there, again, he must point 1745 out this difficulty—that if they had regimental transports, they must either have a large and unnecessary reserve of animals to replace those which broke down, or, on the other hand, they must have a regimental transport of moderate dimensions. Then, again, until it was known, with some approach to certainty, in what country they were going to operate, and the system under which they were going to work, it was impossible to say what kind of transport was wanted, and there would hardly be any advantage in keeping up a particular kind of service at a very large expense, which in all essentials might fail them at the very moment they required it. He thought it was better to know they were not prepared than to think they were prepared and then find out their mistake when too late. There was another point which had slipped out of sight. It was said, and said truly, that all the stores in connection with the recent Expedition were shipped properly, and that everything was sent out for the use of the Expedition that could possibly be required. That, for the purposes of the moment, was a statement which he was fully prepared to accept; but it was said that the different stores could not be found at the moment they were wanted. That, at all events, was the assertion which was generally made in regard to the question of shipment from one port to another. He did not know whether any appointment was ever made; but it was within his recollection that some person of great experience laid stress on the necessity of having an officer to go out as a sort of supercargo, who should see that the stores were properly shipped, and that they were not disarranged and re-stowed and placed where they could no longer be got at. That question of sea transport brought him to another question. It had been said that they ought to have the transport always with the regiment, and that the two should be kept as far as possible together. That was not a new question, but it was one that was well considered by the Committee which sat upon the Mobilization of the Army in 1878. That Committee came to the conclusion that instead of having wheel transports with the regiments likely to embark it would be better to have it all ready at the port of embarkation,because 1746 they must make certain provision for stowing the stores on board ship. The Committee, therefore, came to the deliberate opinion that instead of having the transport at Aldershot and the Curragh, or such places, it would be better to have it at Plymouth and Portsmouth, and the ports from which the troops were likely to embark. In the criticism which invariably took place upon this Vote these were considerations which he ventured to suggest ought not entirely to be lost sight of. As regarded the organization of the Department, he was glad to hear that his hon. Friend the Surveyor General of the Ordnance, on the whole, approved of the system which he and his noble Friend near him (Lord Eustace Cecil) instituted when in Office. His hon. Friend, who, of course, was on the watch for any defects, would, no doubt, do his best to remedy any that were discovered. But of this he (Colonel Stanley) was certain—that they could have no system of Transport Service capable of expansion, unless, to a certain extent, they admitted into the Commissariat Department for the time being combatant officers. It was necessary that there should be a spirit of contentment among the officers of the Commissariat Department; but the Staff should not be altogether composed of non-combatant officers when a war broke out. The expense would not be very great, because it would not be necessary to keep up in a time of peace an excessive Department. Of course, promotion would be slow, but they would have men of mature age, and a Service in which a great deal of good material could be found when wanted. That was a desirable object to attain, and hence it was felt that they ought to have a system which could be expanded in a time of war, although it might only be a small one in a time of peace. It was also felt desirable that those who were brought into the Commissariat Department should be competent officers, with habits of subordination, and accustomed to look to a military Commander for everything. Although it was not to be expected that they were to lose sight of financial considerations, nevertheless they should make the military duties connected with the Commissariat their primary consideration. These were all the remarks he thought it was necessary to make, and he hoped the 1747 considerations he had brought under the notice of the Committee would not be lost sight of. It was only by taking advantage of the experience of a campaign when it occurred with the determination of remedying the difficulties that were found to exist that they could hope to arrive at that perfection which he was satisfied was the object of his hon. Friend the Surveyor General of the Ordnance.
SIR HENRY FLETCHERsaid, he did not intend in any way to oppose the Vote that was before the Committee; but he had stated, on a previous occasion, that he would take the first opportunity of asking his hon. Friend the Surveyor General of the Ordnance a question about the bedsteads sent out to Egypt. The troops at Aldershot had been deprived. for some considerable time of those useful articles; and he, therefore, thought the present Vote afforded a fitting opportunity to ask whether anything had been done to provide that in the event of another war such as that which had recently taken place in Egypt, the troops at Aldershot should not be entirely denuded of bedsteads, as they were on that occasion.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he rose to answer one or two of the questions which had been put to him by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley). The right hon. and gallant Gentleman had referred to what he (the Marquess of Hartington) had said, in moving the Army Estimates, on the subject of transport. His statement on that occasion was that plans had been prepared by a Departmental Committee to utilize some of the animals sent home from Egypt, and to make provision for the establishment and employment of a larger amount of transports, so that it might be in readiness to accompany the first Army Corps sent out on active service, and that it might be permanently employed in a useful manner in a time of peace. He had stated that the military authorities concurred in the desirability of maintaining a regimental system of transport, and that the matter would be thoroughly considered. It had been considered by a Committee in which the military element was largely represented; but he had only seen the Re- 1748 port of the Committee, without being able to enter into all the details, and there had not been time to arrive at any conclusion upon it. He might, however, say that, although they were extremely desirous of having a system of regimental transport permanently maintained, they could not see their way to recommending any plan by which such a transport system could be usefully kept up in a time of peace. He was afraid that such a system as that suggested by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire, although it would involve a large expenditure in a time of peace, would really be almost useless in a time of war; and it would be found that when war did break out, they were by no means better provided for than they were now. He trusted, however, that it might be possible to extend the number of Commissariat and Transport Companies, and to provide them with useful occupation. That would enable a larger number of men to be trained for the Transport Service; and the value of the system would be more easily developed in a time of war than it could be now. But he had received the Report of the Committee so very recently that he had not been able to arrive at any conclusion upon it, and he thought it would be undesirable to go into details at the present moment. Upon the general discussion which had been raised he would only make one or two short observations. He did not at all acknowledge that the Commissariat or Transport Service in the late Egyptian Expedition had broken down. No doubt, as he had before acknowledged, now and then difficulties did spring up, and some faults and defects might have been disclosed; but to say that there had been anything like a general break down was an entire exaggeration, and an assertion which he was desirous of contradicting. But as there would be another opportunity, upon the Medical Vote, of discussing the question, it was not desirable that he should enter into it now. A great deal had been said about the badness of the flour which had been purchased, and it had been asserted that that circumstance ought to condemn the present arrangements for the supply of food. Now, in the first place, he denied that the flour had failed. The evidence 1749 showed that the flour was not absolutely bad, and one officer stated that the bread made of the flour, although not as good as it might have been, was, nevertheless, perfectly eatable, and that he had himself eaten much worse bread. But, admitting that the flour had failed, it was said that that fact was owing to its having been purchased by the Director of Supplies and Transports, and not by the Commissariat Department. As a matter of fact, he believed that it was purchased in the usual manner, and that flour of exactly the same description in anticipation of operations in South Africa was purchased for Zululand at Malta and sent to Natal. There was nothing whatever to show that, by whatever Department of the War Office the flour had been purchased, exactly the same results would not have followed. What had occurred could not have been foreseen, and must have occurred under any circumstances. Then, a great deal had been said about the alleged failure of transport at Ismailia. Now, he was informed that there was an adequate supply of transport; but the general transport was not landed until after the main body of the troops had arrived, and before it could be landed the troops were marched forward, and, no doubt, suffered hardships for the moment. But he must point out to the Committee the totally exceptional character of the operations carried on by Lord Wolseley. In ordinary circumstances it would not have mattered to Lord Wolseley whether he waited one or two days, or a week, or a fortnight, until he had time to land all his transports and all his supplies, and thoroughly to organize his Transport Corps. But it must be borne in mind that in this particular case time was the essence of the operation, and most vital to its success. Lord Wolseley, therefore, determined at once to seize a considerable length of the Canal, although, in doing so, he know he was acting, to a great extent, independently and in advance of his supplies, and that his troops must be put to a certain amount of temporary inconvenience and temporary hardship. It did not follow that because Lord Wolseley was compelled to act in advance of his transport and in advance of his supplies, that was due to the want of the proper organization 1750 of those Departments. Lord Wolseley would, he thought, be the first to justify, for military reasons, what took place. His hon. Friend the Surveyor General of the Ordnance had said that the present Government were not specially responsible for the particular form of the organization of this Department. The Department had undergone very great changes during the 16 years which had elapsed since he (the Marquess of Hartington) became first connected with the War Office; and the House would not, perhaps, be surprised if he was not in a hurry to embark in any fresh changes in relation to the Supplies or the Transport Department. But he acknowledged that it was the duty of the War Office to watch carefully the results of every campaign, large or small, which the country was called upon to undertake. His hon. Friend had stated that there had, in recent years, been three small wars which this country had had to conduct; and, substantially, the experience of the Egyptian Campaign had not yet been thoroughly sifted and considered. It would, however, be their duty, as soon as they had a little more leisure, thoroughly to examine into the experience which had been gained as to the working of the Transport and Supply Departments, and the control and command of those Departments. With that view it was possible that it might be necessary to appoint a small Committee for the purpose of examining the evidence which could be obtained, and to see what improvements were necessary; but he did not think it would be requisite to have a large Committee. No doubt, if changes were found desirable, they would be carried out; but, at all events, he thought it would be premature to alter at once, and without further consideration, the existing system, and until full opportunity had been afforded to prove that it had in any essential degree broken down.
DR. CAMERONsaid, it appeared to him that the discussion which had taken place on the Front Benches upon this subject had assumed the character of white-washing, pure and simple. None of his charges had been answered. What he protested against was that the system that was practised, and carried on in a time of peace, was overthrown the moment a war broke 1751 out. When they were most dependent upon the experience and skill in purchasing possessed by their officers they required the auditor to act as his own auditor in a time of war; and, in point of fact, what they established was simply a self - contained Department. That was, undoubtedly, wrong financially; but a more serious matter was that they dispensed, at the very time they wanted them most, with the services of those for whom, during a time of peace, they paid so dearly. His hon. Friend the Surveyor General of the Ordnance appeared to treat his charges as if they were not correct. The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War had commented upon the flour. Now, what occurred about the flour was this. There were three consignments of flour. The first was so bad that it was reported by Lord Wolseley to have been unfit for food, and some of the medical officers who gave evidence before the Royal Commission spoke of it as being productive of disease. The second consignment could not be got at for some days after the search for it commenced. To make matters worse, this bad flour had to be made up by bad bakers. They had bakers connected with the regimental establishments, but they had never practised baking in the open; and, consequently, matters were made worse by the employment of bad bakers. In regard to the mules, he had not referred to those purchased in Smyrna only, but to the mules purchased in Cyprus and Syria; and he asserted, as a fact, which could not be contradicted, that one-half of the mules constituting the most important branch of the Transport Services were landed in such a state that they were not fit for work for some weeks after their arrival. The same thing occurred with the saddles. The saddles which were bought in the East were useless, and had to be thrown aside. Then, again, the goods sent out were improperly packed; the siege train did not arrive until too late; the iron huts ordered for Egypt did not reach there until November. He could multiply these charges to any extent; but he would ask his hon. Friend the Surveyor General of the Ordnance to inquire of the Commissariat officers themselves; and, if he wanted a candid opinion, let him go among the retired Commissariat officers. He had 1752 very little doubt that they would tell the hon. Gentleman that the Commissariat Department was in a worse state than it had been in during any previous campaign, and that it was going from bad to worse. When experienced officers retired, there were no properly-trained officers to take their places. As there had been no answer to the charges he had made, and as the gravity of this state of things was fully admitted, he felt very much inclined to emphasize his scruples by dividing the Committee, and by moving to reduce the Vote by £200,000, that being the amount for the Commissariat. He thought, if they were to have a Commissariat at all, they should have an effective Commissariat. It would be much better to have no Commissariat at all than to have one in such a bad condition, and concerning which the military authorities hold out nothing even in the shape of a moderate prospect of reform.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, that, whilst it was incumbent upon the military authorities to take care that mistakes, similar in character to those made recently, did not occur again, it should be remembered that the Commissariat system, as a whole, was upon its trial. He thought that some of the shortcomings that had been put down to the Commissariat branch might, perhaps, more fairly be attributed to the hurried arrangements made in this country. He trusted the hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron) would be satisfied with the discussion that had taken place, without dividing the Committee on the Vote.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURalso appealed to the hon. Member for Glasgow not to divide on this item. The Committee was in a very thin House, and the Government would be strongly supported by Members who had not heard the case as so well set forth by the hon. Member. He believed that, considering the short time allowed for getting ready the Transport and Commissariat supplies at Ismailia, and the urgent necessity for Lord Wolseley to make a movement to the front before preparations had been made by the Departments, that the Commissariat and Ordnance had acquitted themselves exceedingly well. At all events, the first and foremost consideration was to 1753 wait till Lord Wolseley had reported on the arrangements he made for enabling these two Departments to be in readiness at the new base of operations, which was so secretly, and, on the whole, so well established.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTventured to add his appeal in favour of the withdrawal of the Amendment. He had one question to ask the noble! Marquess the Secretary of State for War—namely, Were any deductions to be made in connection with the Police for this service, which were not included in the present Estimate?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, a short time ago a reduction had been made in respect of the Police of £2,270.
DR. CAMERONsaid, after the discussion that had taken place, and the appeals made to him, he should not divide the Committee on the Vote.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURpointed out certain discrepancies between the original Estimate for 1881–2 and the Appropriation Account, which should be inquired into.
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTERsaid, he thought the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir George Balfour) would find, on closer examination, that the difference he had alluded to was apparent only, and not real.
Vote agreed to.
(2.) £3,117,000, Provisions, Forage, &c.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTasked why the cost of provisions was in excess of the Estimate of last year by £105,000? A similar increase also appeared in the charge for forage and fuel, which it was difficult to understand, inasmuch as hay was cheaper. Oats had varied very little, and straw was rather less than it was last year.
MR. BRANDsaid, the hon. and gallant Baronet (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) would see, on reference to page 16, that the increase of £105,000 was due to the large replacement of men which took place in connection with the Egyptian Campaign. The same explanation applied to the excess in respect of forage.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (3.) £784,000, Clothing Establishments, Services, and Supplies.
1754§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he hoped the Committee would receive some full explanation from the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War with regard to any proposal that might be entertained for changing the uniform of the British Army. The noble Marquess had stated, on a former occasion, that no attempt would be made to make any change of the kind until after the discussion of the present Vote. He did not see many supporters of the "dear old red" present on that occasion; but he did hope that there would be many hon. Members, even if they were not soldiers, who would be found ready to stand up for that colour which had been worn by their troops for so many years. They all knew that for a very long period of time their Army had been clothed in red. In looking into some old records he saw that red was the colour of his own regiment, the Royal Dragoons, at the time they were serving in Tangier as long ago as the year 1661. Again, there was no doubt that in the time of Queen Anne that colour was still in use, and he believed that all the troops engaged in the wars of Marlborough fought in red, which colour had been in use from then up to the present time. With these traditions, he asked whether they ought to change that colour? They all knew what the "thin red line" had done in every quarter of the globe. What it had done in India, in the Peninsula, at Waterleo, and at the Alma; in short, throughout the Crimean War, and all the other wars in which this country had been engaged. If his memory was not at fault, he believed that a General Officer, who had served with great distinction in India, was at one time deprived of his chance of getting a command of a Division, because he bad not appeared on parade in red, but in kharkee, or in a suit of white. This was recorded against him; and if it were true, that General Officer was punished for not appearing in the very colour they were now asked to abolish. For his own part, he should protest, as strongly as possible, against any alteration of the colour of the national uniform. It must not be said that they were only going to put men in undress into this grey uniform, because they would soon hear from the military authorities that they could not have two sorts of uniform. He was satisfied that, before long, if this change 1755 were made, the red would disappear altogether, and nothing would be left but that miserable rabbit colour, or slate colour, which was now worn by the Devonshire Volunteers. What was the case with foreign nations? The Prussians made no change in their uniform, which could be seen twice as far off as the red uniform of our troops. And then they were going to change the colour, because some people thought that with the arms of precision now in use it was dangerous to appear in the old colour. The French Army was dressed in blue and red trousers; but it once happened to a regiment of Chasseurs, that their trousers were changed to blue, and when they went into action, the result was that they were fired upon by their own men. He believed that if the Army were polled, 99 out of every 100 men, as well as the whole country, would raise their voices against any change from the national colour. If it was said that the scarlet was not so good on service as some other colours, he recommended that they should go back to the old dark or Turkey red for the undress uniform, which would be more invisible than the scarlet, and because it did not stain so readily, was, therefore, much morn serviceable. For it was, indeed, a most important thing that every General Officer should know his own troops coming up, and the red through a glass, however stained, could always be seen. Such would not be the case with grey. They also had it on the highest authority in the Army that no change of the kind should be made, for His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, presiding at a dinner in the City, had said that he hoped no alteration whatever would take place in the national uniform. They all knew that His Royal Highness was expressing the general sentiment in saying this, and they were glad that he had done so loudly and fearlessly; because in these days of change no one know what the next day might bring forth. But it was felt that the Army was not in the hands of military authorities. He said it with all respect, that there were civilians at the War Office who were dictating to the Government what should be done with the Army, and military officers felt that they were under the dominion of someone whose object in making these alterations was economy, and not what 1756 the requirements of the Service demanded. When he looked upon the Committee which had been appointed, he did not think that the Army had much confidence in it, except so far as one or two names were concerned. To what tests had the rod colour been subjected? It was said that it was very conspicuous in the case of large bodies of troops; but did any Member of the Committee recollect the advance of the Prussians at Spicheren, who could be seen from the moment they moved from Saarbrucken? The same remark applied to the Battle of Gravelotte, which was won at last only by the desperate efforts of three or four regiments of Prussian Dragoons. There was no desire on the part of the Prussians to change the national uniform which, with the spiked helmet, was as conspicuous as anything could possibly be. To say that the enemy would not know the position of the Army when large bodies of troops were moving was an absurdity. They knew this by their scouts, who found out the number and size of the battalions on the march. But it might be that, in isolated cases—patrols, pickets, and small bodies of men, for instance—the men were more exposed in red than in some other colours. But it must be remembered that it was the business of men so engaged to keep out of sight; and he ventured to say that as long as the belts, helmets, and other accoutrements were the same as those now worn, the rod coat would make no difference whatever. They were now asked to destroy the respect which had existed for that colour, and which for centuries had been the national colour in the British Army; and he could not allow any such change to be made without entering against it his most earnest protest.
MR. BRANDsaid, he hoped he should be able to remove, by a very brief statement, the fears which had been expressed by his hon. and gallant Friend with regard to a change in the colour of the Army uniform. In the first place, he thought he had given to a portion of the speech of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, on the introduction of the Army Estimates, a construction which it did not bear. The exact words used by the noble Marquess were—
I do not think it at all desirable to force this change upon the Army. The course which we propose to adopt is to issue a certain amount 1757 of clothing of the new colour as an experiment. I have omitted to state that the Committee do not recommend any change to be made in the colour of the full-dress uniform."—(3 Hansard, [277] 236-7.)The question was simply this. The great increase in the range of modern rifles had made it necessary to consider, as far as they could, the question of the safety of their troops. No doubt, when troops were massed together, it made little or no difference whether they were dressed in grey or red uniforms. When, however, they were engaged in picket duty, skirmishing, or similar operations, the case was different; the individual soldier was very much exposed; and, personally, he thought that, under such circumstances, it would be an advantage to place the men in colours that were less conspicuous. His hon. and gallant Friend had introduced into his speech a reference to the recommendation of Lord Bury's Committee on the subject of the uniform of the Volunteers; but he would point out that the recommendation of that Committee was not made because of any superiority as between one colour and another, but simply on the ground of uniformity, as was stated in the Report. But it did so happen that in 1869 the Committee, over which General Lindsay presided, recommended grey, or rifle-green, for the Volunteers, because it was said that scarlet changed colour, and was easily soiled. The position was this—Certain trials were being made with respect to the kharkee colour, in order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether that colour would be best. His hon. and gallant Friend was wrong in thinking that the military officers were over-ridden in this matter by civilians. All he could say was that the Commanding Officers had been asked to try this experiment in their regiments; and he was informed that the proposal had been accepted in the case of 28 regiments unconditionally. That, he thought, showed that Commanding Officers were anxious that the experiment should be tried. There was no intention, at the present time, to deal with the dress of officers. On the grounds he had stated, and seeing that it was not, in any sense, intended to substitute kharkee for the red uniform, he thought that common sense would suggest that the experiment should be made.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, he was glad the Government were proceeding in this matter in the manner stated by the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down. There were two points to be considered—one of sentiment, and the other of utility. He had no doubt that there was a deep feeling with regard to the red uniform, not only in the Army, but also in the minds of the people and anyone acquainted with their military history would know that ever since their troops had worn that colour it had boon associated with the greatest victories of this country. He believed that Lord Macaulay said that the red uniform originated with the Dutch Guards of King William. It was associated, no doubt, in the minds of their troops with the victories of Marlborough, and the success that had happily attended their arms ever since. With regard to the question of utility, it had been his good fortune to serve in three or four quarters of the world; and he recollected that when his regiment was fighting the Kaffirs in the bush at the Cape, it was found that the red uniform, which alone was worn by officers and men, got soon soiled, and became, in consequence, very nearly invisible. It was, however, very difficult to lay down any rule as to the relative visibility, or otherwise, of colours, so much depending upon atmospheric and other conditions. He could conceive that in Egypt rod would be much more visible than in some other countries. Again, they must not suppose that on service the red coat of the soldier retained that brilliant hue which they were accustomed to see in St. James's Park. There was one advantage possessed by the red uniform—namely, that it did not allow our troops to mistake the enemy for some of themselves; nor, on the other hand, could the enemy mistake our troops. There was some advantage in that, because what had happened in the Crimea was not likely to occur often in the case of our troops—one British regiment would not fire into another, under the impression that it belonged to the enemy. If the troops were dressed in the material now being experimented with, they would be in a colour very much like the Russian grey; and, again, if the atmosphere were thick there would be a resemblance to the bluish grey of the Austrian Army; and, of course, under the circumstances of war with either of those two Powers, 1759 an accident might happen that would be very much regretted. These considerations, he thought, were very deserving of the attention of the Government. He was extremely glad to hoar that the colour was to be experimented upon, and that they were to have the opinions of Regimental Officers with regard to it. He did not wish to cast any slur upon the constitution of the Committee; but he would remark that, although it had amongst its Members four Staff Officers, he did not see that it included a single Regimental Officer. As he regarded that as a misfortune, he could not help thinking it would be well if the Committee were a little enlarged, so as to comprise one or two Commanding Officers actually in command at the time. He thought, however, his hon. and gallant Friend was in error in supposing that this proposal emanated from civilians. As a matter of fact, having read the Report, he could not find that any civilians were on the Committee at all. It was true that Professor Abel was called upon to give his opinion; but he was not a Member of the Committee. A recommendation had been made that the colour of the belts, havresacks, and ornaments should be changed. The present arrangement gave a great deal of trouble to the soldier; and he thought that umber, although not so pretty in effect, would be much more serviceable. He trusted that whatever change did take place it would only be sanctioned after the greatest consideration.
CAPTAIN MAXWELL-HERONsaid, he was glad to hear that if the change suggested was carried out it would only affect the undress uniform. Three General Officers had sat upon the Committee referred to, and two of them had commanded regiments wearing a green uniform. Lord Wolseley never commanded a regiment at all; therefore they might have little sentiment as regards the red colour. With regard to what the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Brand) had said, it would be injudicious on the part of officers commanding-regiments to refuse to accept the experiment, considering the high quarter from which the offer came. He had had experience in India and other parts in regard to the colour of the uniform, and he had never found that red had produced any effects detrimental to the soldier. But unless the shooting of the Army greatly improved, and 1760 became more effective than they knew it to have been in Egypt during the late campaign, it would matter little what colour the British soldier was clothed in. He hoped the British Army would always be clothed in the colour in which all their battles had been fought, and their victories won. They were now 12,000 men under their proper strength, and he believed that the colour of the uniform had great influence in attracting recruits; and he was certain that if the Army was dressed in grey, or green, they would not be able to get recruits until they increased the rate of pay.
SIR HENRY FLETCHERsaid, he had had 30 years' experience in the Army of different coloured uniforms. His objection to even the undress uniform of the Army being grey was this—there were two shades of grey, and it was very difficult to get the shades to agree year after year. When he first joined the Army, 31 years ago, the soldiers were trousers of a grey mixture with red coats; and even in the present day, in the Infantry of the Line, the same difficulty was largely experienced. After the Crimean War that grey mixture was given up, because of this difficulty; and he still adhered to red as the colour of the uniform of the English Army, and would do his utmost to retain that colour for the fighting dress. If the authorities decided that grey was to be the undress uniform of the Army, he would urge that it should be simply undress for fatigue duty and in barracks; but that when the men were out of barracks, or away from the country, they should be allowed to wear the uniform as full dress, for he was certain that the proposed change in colour would be very detrimental to the recruiting for the Army. He felt certain that the reason why recruiting was at the present moment at such a low point was due to the fact that men were parading the streets and the country in grey uniforms. If grey was generally adopted, there would still be further difficulty in obtaining recruits. He happened to be acquainted with the uniform of the 3rd Devon Volunteers, and he was satisfied that that colour would not be altogether serviceable for Her Majesty's Army. It was either too dark or too light; and if it was decided that that should be the colour for the future, he hoped the authorities would take into consideration the advice 1761 he had offered as one who had had 30 years' experience, and make the grey uniform only undress uniform.
§ COLONEL ALEXANDERsaid, there were few military subjects in which he did not entirely concur with the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), and it was therefore with great regret that he found himself compelled to differ from the hon. and gallant Member, to a certain extent, upon this important subject. That regret was the more profound, because, so far as sentiment was concerned, his feelings were entirely in unison with those of the hon. and gallant Member. He admitted that it would be a rude wrench to break with the traditions of so many hundreds of years, and to suddenly give up the familiar scarlet of our uniform which was associated with so many glorious recollections. It was quite impossible to ignore sentiment upon this question; and he was quite prepared to acknowledge that the success or failure of their recruiting would depend, to a great extent, on the retention or discontinuance of the present colour. But, while giving the fullest weight to sentimental considerations, he felt that there was something even higher than sentiment, and that was the paramount necessity of economizing, by every means in their power, the valuable lives of the soldiers composing their small, but very expensive Army. Last year he should have hesitated a great deal before consenting to the discontinuance; but he had reluctantly come to the conclusion that, in the face of the Report of this Committee, there was no alternative but to adopt their suggestion. Coming, as it did, from three very eminent Generals, assisted by the highest scientific knowledge, it appeared to him that the Report of the Committee was absolutely conclusive. The experiments of that Committee were conducted under varying conditions of weather, atmosphere, surroundings, and back grounds, the object being to make the experiments as exhaustive as possible. Experiments were made on six days; three in winter, one in spring, and two in the summer, and the result was to eliminate all the colours now used in the dress of the British Army. The conspicuousness of white or red was demonstrated, and it was shown also that the brickdust uniform was only a shade better than the 1762 present scarlet. It must have caused that distinguished rifleman, General Hawley, a severe pang to be obliged to condemn the scarlet of their Infantry and the blue of their Artillery, as well as the green of the Rifle Brigade and 60th Rifles, and, without hesitation, recommend that the uniform of the 3rd Devon Volunteers should be adopted as the service dress of the British Army. He had no doubt that the Committee came to that decision very reluctantly; but the Report was unanimous. He was extremely glad to find that the Committee, deeming it inadvisable to break with the glerious traditions of the British Army, so far as colour was concerned, recommended the retention for full dress uniform of the present colours; and he sincerely hoped hoped those colours might not be discontinued, for he was fully convinced that a neat and attractive uniform was of great importance in obtaining a steady and continuous supply of recruits. It had been said that this proposal was only the thin end of the wedge, and was a preliminary to the entire abandonment of the present uniform; but he really could not understand why that should be the case. At the present moment, the Guards and the Highlanders had an undress uniform different in colour from the full-dress uniform. Last year, when the Guards went to Egypt they left their bearskins behind them; and no one would, he supposed, propose that for that reason the bearskins should be discontinued. The service uniform should differ in shape as well as in colour from the undress, for the latter should be looser than the former. He hoped never to see the day when the Guards would go on any sentry duty in London in Norfolk jackets. Such an idea was altogether most incongruous, and not in accord with their conceptions of smartness of a soldier; but he could not see how there was any more reason why a soldier should wear full-dress uniform on service than for hon. Members of that House when in the country to dress as they did in London. His own idea was, that the best way to partially retain the present uniform was to adopt the suggestions of the Committee, and he did not see what was the use of appointing a Committee at all if, when they reported unanimously, their recommendations received no attention. The Government would incur grave responsi- 1763 bility by rejecting the recommendations of that Committee, backed as they were by such an overwhelming weight of professional as well as scientific authority.
SIR HENRY FLETCHERsaid, he wished to draw attention to the question of worn-out clothing, which was dealt with by paragraph 146 of the Regulations. That paragraph required that clothing which had been worn for a year, except such as was required to be retained for the use of recruits, should be taken into regimental stores; and under paragraph 147 a soldier who did not return his clothing to the stores after the expiration of the period for which it was issued would render himself liable to be tried by court martial for making away with the clothes. He had been given to understand that these paragraphs were very objectionable indeed to the Army in general, and especially to recruits. The soldier at the end of 12 months was obliged to hand into the store the clothing he had worn during that period, and it then became public property. After that, it was passed over to a recruit as the uniform in which he was to go through his preliminary drills. It was said that the education of the Army was now considerably improved, and that the recruits were of better quality and better education than they had been for many years past. He was informed that these recruits, with this supposed improved education, were very much disappointed and disgusted at having handed over to them for their preliminary drill the garments which had been worn by some other men for 12 months. Besides that objection, this was a matter which involved a great deal of extra trouble to the Quartermaster of the regiment in preparing returns, and looking after all this clothing. This duty was very distasteful to officers of that position. Then, again, some of the clothing issued to recruits was returned to stores by men who had been discharged, and some men returned the clothes in a far cleaner state than others. But, however that might be, it was, he thought, very objectionable that recruits should have to wear old clothing after other men had been wearing it for 12 months. Then there was no doubt, he thought, that the soldier would very much prefer at the end of 12 months to purchase his old and comfortable 1764 clothing; and he wished to urge the Surveyor General of Ordnance to consider whether it would not be possible to revise these two paragraphs. He believed that this present system had prevented a good many respectable and serviceable men joining the Army.
MR. BRANDsaid, the adoption of the principle that the clothing was the property of the State was recommended, in the first instance, by the present Quartermaster General, and, subsequently, approved of by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite, (Colonel Stanley). The hon. Member (Sir Henry Fletcher) had done good service in calling attention to this point, which had, in fact, already engaged the attention of the Secretary of State for War; but there was a misapprehension on this point. Any time-expired articles might be retained for an additional period if the Commanding Officer thought there was any necessity for such retention; and it was further provided that if articles of clothing, not time-expired, were returned to the stores damaged through wilfulness, the necessary repairs would be carried out at the expense of the soldier; but that if they were returned in good condition no charge would be made upon the soldier. Proposals were now being considered for giving to recruits a serge uniform for the purpose of preliminary drill.
COLONEL STANLEYsaid, he was glad to learn that the clothing of soldiers was still to be regarded as the property of the State. There was a twofold object in the adoption of that principle. One was to save the articles which were previously wasted; and the other, and more important, object was to take away any excuse from those who dealt in old clothes, and who, unfortunately, were sometimes only too ready to facilitate desertion in order to get hold of the clothes. If the clothes were declared to be the property of the State the soldier had no right to dispose of them, and in that way a great blow was struck at people who were willing to make bargains with soldiers for their clothes. That was a matter which should be looked on, perhaps, a little in the light of sentiment, as well as by the consideration of how much further wear there would be in the clothes. He had no doubt that soldiers would be very glad to purchase some of the old uniforms at 1765 a low price; but many of the things which were sent back to the stores were in such a condition that they ought to be destroyed, and he hoped that consideration would not be lest sight of.
§ Vote agreed to.
§
(4.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £1,269,500, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge for the Supply, Manufacture, and Repair of Warlike and other Stores (including Establishments of Manufacturing Departments), which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1884.
§ SIR HENRY HOLLANDdesired to bring under the notice of the Committee a matter of some importance which came before the Public Accounts Committee of this year upon Vote 12, when they were considering the Appropriation Account for 1881-2. There was a net deficit upon the Army Vote for that year of £44,197, and it became the duty of the Committee to examine into the reasons why that deficit occurred, and whether it might not have been avoided. In the first place, the Committee had to inquire whether the Department were to blame in not having brought forward a larger original Estimate. They found, however, in this case, as he was bound to say they had found in most other cases, that the Department were not in fault upon this point. They had then, in the second place, to consider whether a Supplemental Estimate should not have been presented, so as to avoid the deficit. It was quite clear that if a Department had any reason to think that there might be a deficit, they were bound to apply for a Supplemental Estimate; because in this way Parliament had practically a better opportunity of examining into the expenditure of the Department than it had after a deficit had been incurred. Now, an inquiry whether a Supplemental Estimate should not have been presented was simple enough in the case of the Civil Service Departments, and for this reason—that those Departments were quite separate from each other, and any deficit upon one Vote could not be met by any surplus that might arise upon any other Vote. For example, a deficit on the Irish Education Vote could not be covered by a surplus upon the English Education Vote. But the case was quite different with the great spending Departments of the 1766 War Office and Admiralty. In those Departments the savings or surplus upon one Vote might be applied, with the consent of the Treasury, to cover the deficit or excess expenditure upon another Vote. Thus savings on the Stores Vote might be applied to meet a deficit on the Works Vote, and so on. When, therefore, the Public Accounts Committee inquired into the cause of the deficit of £44,197, and why a Supplemental Estimate was not taken, they were met by the reply that the Department had expected that the deficit would have been covered by surpluses upon other Votes. The attention of the Committee was then directed to Vote 12, when a remarkable state of things was disclosed, showing that there was a defective system of accounting at the War Office. He would venture to read to the Committee a few paragraphs of the Report of the Public Accounts Committee, in which the point was shortly stated, and in which suggestions were made for an improvement of that system. They report that—
Your Committee were surprised to learn that in addition to these general difficulties in the way of making an accurate calculation of the expenditure, a deficit of £70,000, or there. abouts, was incurred in the Store Vote, upon which Vote it was believed, apparently up to January 1882, that there would have been a surplus, or at all events that there would have been no deficit. This Department is especially under the control of the Office for the larger portion of its expenditure. The Accountant General could give no satisfactory explanation upon the matter, and the officer who had the charge of the expenditure at the time has left the office.It appears to your Committee that if proper steps had been taken for the purpose, there should have been sufficient information in January 1882 to have enabled the Department to make out a sufficiently accurate estimate of the probable expenditure and wants of the Department for the financial year.In truth, the only defence put forward by the Department is that it was believed, as late as January 1882, that the surpluses on the whole accounts would be sufficient to cover the deficits.Your Committee consider that the chances of such miscalculations being made would be, if not altogether removed, yet very much diminished, if a better system of rendering accounts prevailed in the War Office. They would suggest that the accounts should be kept closer up, and rendered at least quarterly, which they are informed was formerly the practice in the Office.The course pursued in the Office with a view to ascertain the financial position of things, and to judge whether Supplementary Estimates will be needed, is fully explained by the Accountant General in his evidence. The state- 1767 ment that has been made out in the Department for the first half year is looked to mainly as a guide as to whether the expenditure is going on at the ordinary rate or not. This information is supplemented by general inquiries of the heads of the Departments whether they think that there is anything likely to arise which will cause a disturbance in the expenditure of their several Departments. Upon that half-yearly statement, and upon those replies, which, it is stated, are general and not in figures, a conclusion is arrived at whether money should be asked for.Your Committee suggest that these inquiries from the heads of the Department and the replies should be more definite; that they should be in writing; and that they should be placed on record.He wished to know whether effect would be given to these suggestions of the Public Accounts Committee, as it would be seen that the matter was one of considerable importance?
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTERsaid, his hon. Friend the Member for Midhurst had alluded to what was the present practice, and to what he hoped would be the future practice of the War Office in regard to the rendering of accounts. One of the recommendations of the Public Accounts Committee, over which his hon. Friend so ably presided, was that the accounts should be rendered, not vivâ voce, but in writing, in order that a more effectual check might be kept over the expenditure of money, and that the Public Accounts Committee might be able to see how the account itself was being kept. He was able to assure his hon. Friend that the Department saw no difficulty whatever in rendering these accounts in writing, instead of vivâ voce, as at present, so that there would both be a record in the Office, and the Public Accounts Committee would be able to have recourse to it. As to the second, the more important point that his hon. Friend had alluded to — namely, the desirability of preparing Supplementary Estimates where there was a deficit, it would be impossible, in the present instance, to state how much was wanted while the war was going on—that was to say, it would have been difficult to tell how much money was wanted within the time at which it would be necessary to give this information. But it was possible to make an estimate within, say, 1 per cent of the total amount; and in the particular case referred to, though it was true that there was a deficiency of £73,000 in spite of its having been 1768 believed, up to January, there would he a surplus, that was to be accounted for by the fact that a war was taking place in a distant country, and the accounts were not rendered so early as they otherwise would have been. The Accountant General had, with him, gone through those matters very carefully; and they thought they saw their way to returning to what was the former practice in the War Office—and that was the point which the hon. Member had specially alluded to—namely, of rendering the accounts, as far as possible, quarterly instead of half-yearly. He could not say, in the event of such wars as that in South Africa again taking place, that the Department of the War Office would always be assured of receiving these items in time to make up the quarterly account; but there was every inclination on the part of the Office to shorten the time over which the accounts extended, and the Accountant General had arranged with him for a return to the former practice, whenever possible, of rendering accounts quarterly, instead of half-yearly, from all branches of the Service under the Finance Department.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, he was sorry to see, during the discussion of such a Vote as this for a sum of £1,269,500, such empty Benches in the Committee. He could recollect, on former Army Estimates, that when the Vote for guns and small arms, and so forth, came on, the Committee was far more crowded than it was at present. He, of course, trusted that they had now got into the "piping times of peace," and that they would not in a hurry have to go to war again. He could not, however, take the view that because they were at peace that, therefore, hon. Members should do nothing, and not seek to inform their minds as to the condition of the Service. He should like to say something, first of all, with regard to the Ordnance Committee. This Committee was instituted by the right hon. Gentleman the present Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Childers), some two or three years ago. That Committee was established in consequence of the alarm that was felt at the difficulties experienced by the Heads of the Artillery and Engineering Department, in carrying out all the various arrangements as to the manufacture of guns, so as to sup- 1769 ply, not only the Military Department, but also the Navy. It was felt that there should be an Ordnance Committee, or some authority of that kind, to whom reference should be made. To his mind, it was a great question whether it would not have been better to adhere to the old system. He know that there was considerable trouble, and he was aware of what the officials at the War Office, especially the Director of Artillery, had to go through, and he knew that an increased responsibility was more or less thrown upon the Secretary of State; but considering what had happened, and that it was two years or more since the Ordnance Committee had been appointed, he must say they had seen very little result indeed from its labours. The Committee was appointed to consider whether any change was necessary in the system of ordnance. It was admitted that in consequence of the vast improvements in powder, especially in pebble powder, it would be absolutely necessary, under any circumstances, to adopt breech-leading guns, especially in the case of the Navy. He could not for the life of him understand why such an enormous delay had taken place on the part of the Ordnance Committee in making known their views, seeing that it might be laid down as a premiss that they must adopt the breech-loading system. The Gentlemen upon the Committee were all men of great experience, and of skill as experts, and they had the advantage of hearing all that was to be said—and there was a great deal to be said—by Members of both Professions of that House. These Gentlemen had all had experience for several years past of the War Office system, and they had, which was the strongest consideration of all, the knowledge that the Navy at the present moment was certainly not very far superior in guns to that of any Marine Power, and that it was absolutely necessary that they should have the best possible gun in the world in the shortest possible time. That matter, he believed, was touched upon in the Naval Estimates, and he trusted it would not be lost sight of, but that it would be strenuously kept before the notice of the Government. That might lead to their discovering whose fault it was that they had not got on faster. He believed that the 43-ton gun was the one decided 1770 upon; but, so far as he knew, none of Her Majesty's ships at that moment were thoroughly armed with this weapon. He believed they would hear more about this matter, however. Well, that was a point upon which he particularly wished to question the Government—as to what progress they were making with the heavy ordnance, and when they could expect to have the pattern of guns finally approved of, and what orders were still outstanding for naval armaments? Then they came to the military question, and it was impossible for him to say, of course, what progress had been made in this respect. When the Conservative Government left Office, in 1880-1, by the following March it was calculated that there should be, at least, four heavy 100-ton guns in position at the various fortresses for which they were intended. Probably they had all been put in position; but he was not quite certain about it. Then, as to 80-ton guns, at that time there were only two. There was a question as to whether there should be any further manufacture of these guns, and that question entirely depended on the Committee. As to field artillery, when the Conservatives left Office, there were completed on the 31st of March, 1881, 579 guns, and there was a siege train of heavy and light guns. Of course, what one world be glad to ask was, whether these field batteries had been kept up to their old strength, and whether breach-leading guns had been substituted in some cases in the batteries? He knew there was a considerable difference of opinion on the subject; but his opinion was at that time that the muzzle-leading gulls did very well, and that before getting rid of them they should adopt the best pattern of breech-loader. However, there was a growing feeling in the House in favour of breach-leaders; and if field batteries were to be revised and re-manufactured in the shape of breach-loaders, it was surely only fair for him to ask what progress had been made in that respect? There was a Committee appointed—one of the hundred Committees at the War Office he was sorry to say—to inquire into the question of machine guns. That question was a very important one to the Navy, and it was also a very important one for the Army. He was glad that they were waiting to obtain the experience of the Americans. 1771 No doubt this experience had been obtained, and he should hope that the Committee had not followed the example of the Ordnance Committee, but had arrived at some result, and were in a position to order machine guns for the Navy in such proportion as to make it at least equal to Franco or Germany. Another gun had been referred to this Committee—namely, the magazine gull. A great deal had been said about these weapons; but when the Conservative Government left Office the question was entirely in embryo. There was a good deal of difference of opinion with regard to these guns, many people doubting whether such complicated pieces of mechanism would ever be useful in time of war; but, at the same time, its rapidity of fire was considered a great point, and there could be no question that in the hands of an expert and skilled marksman it would do a great deal of damage. There might be some Report from the War Office—if there was he had never heard of it—as to the result of the inquiries and experiments in regard to magazine guns. These were all important matters, particularly as far as the House of Commons was concerned, because, sooner or later, he feared they would involve an enormous expenditure. These were questions of 'Ways and Means, and it was for the Executive to decide how these guns were to be introduced, and in what proportion, having due regard to the state of preparation and efficiency which Foreign Powers were in in this matter. It was only the Executive that could decide on these questions, and they in the House of Commons were more or less obliged to follow the lead of the Executive. Considering the present Government had now been three years in Office they had surely had sufficient time to consider all these matters; and looking at the amount of information they had obtained, and the excellent advice they had received from authorities on those abstruse and difficult questions, they should be able by this time to give the House to understand what progress they had made, and what progress they were likely to make. A great deal had been said as to the quantity of stores consumed in Egypt, and a great many people believed that their reserves of stores must have suffered very materially. Many people were of opinion 1772 that, the cost of the war having been only some £4,500,000, it was remarkably economical; in fact, they could not for the life of them understand how it had been done. An idea had got abroad that the reserves of stores had been largely drawn upon. Without making that charge against the Government, he should like very much to know what was the amount of stores left behind by the late Government? He could only say that he should sincerely rejoice to find that everything had been kept up as the late Government had left it. They had the advantage—an advantage he did not at all despise—of taking a considerable sum of money in 1878 for both the Army and the Navy, and they made the best use they could of it by putting the reserve stores in the best possible position. On the 31st of March, 1880, they had something like 503,000 Martini-Henry rifles, of which 212,000 had been issued to the troops and Reserve Forces, and there were in store some 290,000. Of carbines they had issued 32,000 to the troops, and they had in store 19,000, making altogether 51,000. As to ammunition for small arms, it was laid down that the proper amount they should have should be at least 60,000,000 rounds; and it would be very satisfactory to know now that they had that quantity in store to use in case of emergency. Again, as to powder, he did not know—he did not suppose anyone knew — whether they had yet reached the end of invention in this respect. Powder had been steadily improving for some years, and they had now got to pebble powder, which gave, he believed, the greatest amount of force with the least amount of damage to the gun. That, as he had said before, had entailed upon them a fresh expense, as it was absolutely necessary, considering the slow burning properties of this powder, that they should go from muzzleloaders to breech-loaders. When the late Government left Office they had in store of this powder 312,000 barrels, of which 130,000 were "P 2" pebble powder. He need not tell the Committee that of the 312,000 barrels, 130,000 barrels of the "P 2" were of the most efficient kind; because the "L G and L" powder was, after all, a powder that was only useful for salutes, although it could be used in case of emergency; it was not powder they would think of using in connection 1773 with the new and powerful guns they were manufacturing at the present moment, except under great emergency. And, amongst other stores, the late Government had left behind them 380 tons of gun-cotton. They had left also 431 Whitehead torpedoes, 336 meant to be used for naval armament. They left behind also a fair amount of camp equipage, of saddlery, and other stores. He mentioned all those things because they were now in time of peace, and he did not think there would be much danger in the Government stating the quantities of these things they had in store. It would be very satisfactory to learn that they had a large amount of stores. The subject would be discussed again and again in that House in future years. The Estimates were, to a certain extent, larger than they had been since the Crimean War, in consequence of the progress in science and gunnery. The Estimates were large, and were growing larger and larger every year. And they knew very well what the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) had said the other day as to the terms to be offered to recruits; and they were all anxious that the best article should be obtained. All matters of this kind must increase the expense of the Department. He was not at all an economist in the way of wishing to cut down expenditure where expendi.ture was absolutely necessary for the efficiency of the Service; but, at the same time, he thought that great care, caution, and prudence should be exercised in the introduction of anything new, and he was anxious that what was done should be done gradually; because everything new meant greater expenditure. It was very difficult to say what course should be adopted to put an end to these difficulties with regard to the Navy; but he thought it was impossible for one moment to wish that the Navy should have an Arsenal of its own. Persons who advocated that could have very little idea of the enormous cost of such an undertaking, not only with regard to the first cost of arms, but also with regard to the manufacture of different patterns. These who were familiar with the matter well knew that changes of pattern were always going on both in the machinery and carriages of guns; many thousands of pounds, he believed, were constantly being spent in alterations, and he could 1774 not help thinking that there should be some strong central authority able to control the naval demands in that respect. He believed that the time would come when that House would endeavour to reduce this constantly increasing expenditure. When they considered the numerical strength of their Army, and compared its cost with that of the Armies of Foreign Powers, and when they compared the cost of their ships with that of foreign ships, however proud they might be of them, there could be no question that they did not manufacture as cheaply as some of their neighbours. He thought it right to call attention to these subjects, and he regarded it as most useful that there should be a discussion on this Vote. His hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Brand), who took the greatest pains in this matter, would, doubtless, be of his opinion that it too frequently happened that these Votes were brought in at the end of the Session, when there was no opportunity of discussion, when few persons knew whether they were armed or unarmed, or whether they received value for the money spent or not. He hoped to get a reply, before the discussion terminated, on the questions he had felt it his duty to raise.
§ MR. MUNTZsaid, he had no wish whatever to delay the Vote. When he looked at the amounts asked for, he felt it perfectly useless to attempt to do any good by criticizing them; but he wished to enter his protest against the constant increase in the expense of the Establishment, which, to his knowledge, had gone on, year after year, to such an extent, that it was impossible to know what it would result in. When the first proposal was made with reference to the Establishment, it was stated that the annual cost would not exceed £35,000; but the Vote now asked for was £647,000, or £53,000 in excess of the amount for last year. It would seem that these Establishments were a sort of mulch cow, to provide places and jobs for those who were employed in them. He never could get any accounts except from two officers who were employed apparently to do little or nothing. What they required was a debit and credit account for the whole of these Establishments. In making up that statement, there should be a charge for interest on capital at 4 per cent. Then there should 1775 be an account of stock taken, as was done in every commercial business, showing what had been consumed, what had been manufactured, and what remained over at the end of the year. When that was done, then only would they be able to see what was the cost of these Establishments to the country. But all they could get now was a long rambling statement, which he was satisfied no accountant could make head or tail of. He felt it his duty to make these remarks, although he was addressing them to empty Benches; but he would not delay the Vote for a moment longer.
§ COLONEL NOLANsaid, he thought the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Muntz) was mistaken with regard to the accounts. A statement was published every year showing exactly what had been spent in each of the different Offices. He had always looked upon it as a great difficulty, in reference to manufacturing establishments, that they had a tendency to reduce the expenditure in their accounts on all staple articles which they wished to show were produced cheaper by them as compared with the trade. Then they were apt to put the small articles in which the trade could not compete with them at as high a cost as possible. He did not think the hon. Member was right in thinking that the appointments were in the nature of sinecures; because many persons employed in the Establishments had to work very hard and give great attention to the work required of them; and he believed that many of them would, upon examination, show a very fair amount of manufacturing knowledge. He was himself in favour of these Establishments, because, if they did not exist, the Secretary of State for War would be completely in the hands of private manufacturers. The men employed under the existing system acquired technical skill, and the Secretary of State for War had always a staff of officers to advise him. It was, of course, quite possible that the system might be pushed too far; but he thought it a mistake to suppose that they could over do without manufacturing establishments for the Army and Navy altogether. Again, they might be reduced; but he repeated that it was impossible to abolish them entirely. The tendency of private establishments would be, no doubt, to manufacture as cheaply 1776 as possible; while the tendency in the case of a Public Department was to manufacture extremely well without regard to expense.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR, said, he could not allow the misconception of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Galway (Colonel Nolan) as to the meaning of the remarks of the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Muntz) to pass without correction. The hon. Member for Birmingham was quite well aware of the existence of the accounts referred to by the hon. and gallant Member for Galway. Indeed, one of the two accounts annually rendered for the Small Arms Factory at Enfield bore the name of the hon. Member for Birmingham. It showed in minute detail the whole of the charges for turning out small arms, by debiting every kind of conceivable charge, even to the portion of charge which was incurred for Divine Service to the Arms Establishment, besides interest on capital, sinking fund, wear and tear, and other items, such as a private manufacturer would have to show in his books. The other Ordnance Departments, for guns, carriages, and laboratory stores had likewise annual accounts. But what his hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham urged was the exclusion of Vote 12 from the Army Estimates, by converting all the funds now shown therein into a separate manufacturing account, whereby all fully completed stores would be shown, and their cost, as well as the quantities and value of the materials at the opening and closing of the year. By this change, the difficulties about supplying naval ordnance and other supplies for the Navy direct from this manufacturing establishment, and paying for the same out of funds provided in the Navy Estimates, would cease. The Army would, in like manner, pay for all supplies out of funds obtained in the Army Estimates. But even without this change, the Navy could pay for its ordnance and stores by means of voted sums. The Clothing Department, although under the War Office, now provided clothing for India, for police and others, and received from the Departments the value of the supplies, as shown in the Estimates. The continuance of the bad practice for the Navy in obtaining guns, projectiles, and gunpowder free of cost to the Navy, but at the charge of the Army, should be 1777 terminated. It was the cause of great waste. At present the armament of the Navy was again under change, and was the fifth within the past 25 years. Now, this new armament could not be made up of fewer than 3,000 pieces of various calibres, and the capital representing this complete armament might be valued at £4,000,000; and all this large amount must, under the existing bad practice, fall on the charges for the Army, thereby largely swelling the cost of this branch of the Service. At this rate, the five changes in the armaments within 25 years must have swelled the expenses of the Army by from £15,000,000 to £20,000,000. The evil was still greater, for by making the Naval officers depend on the Army for the guns of the Fleet, it not only engendered carelessness in the way of arming the vessels, but, what was a great evil, the scientific questions involved in the description of gun and projectile most fit for naval service were not properly considered by naval officers. No doubt, the Navy Estimates now bore the cost of foreign ship transport of the Army. This practice was equally objectionable, as the money needed for providing transports ought to be voted in the Army Estimates and paid over to the Transport Department, which hired the transports. Looking at the long delay in arming the Fleet, and the urgent necessity for having their first line of defence in the most effective state, he would earnestly advise a special loan of £4,000,000 to be raised, and employed to pay for the guns, projectiles, and gunpowder immediately the stores were available. The loan might be paid off in six or seven years, by an annuity which would appear in the Estimates of the Navy. There was one point to which attention had already been drawn, and that was the large excess on Vote 12 of the Army Charges in the Accounts of 1881-2. The excess of expenditure would have been far larger but for the mistake in the appropriation in aid, which turned out to have been far in excess of the estimated amount. There was no excuse for any excess in the expenditure of Vote 12. A Liability Book of all orders for purchases of stores would effectually protect the Departments which controlled Vote 12 from any excess, and it was to be hoped that in future the excess would be guarded against.
SIR HENRY FLETCHERalso was of opinion that it was very desirable that the supply of naval guns should be taken out of the Army Estimates. They were now spending on the Army a considerable sum of money in connection with the Navy; and, looking at the state of the Army at the present moment, he thought that money which was now voted in the Army Estimates for naval guns should be devoted to raising a further number of men in the Army. There was no doubt that to carry out the territorial system in a proper manner a very large number in excess of those at present would be required; and he hoped the Government would seriously consider the advisability of doing away with this Navy Vote in the Army Estimates, so as to obtain an additional £600,000 for the use of the Army.
§ MR. MACFARLANEwished to call attention to the case of the inventor of the guns in use in the Navy.
THE CHAIRMANThe hon. Member must not avail himself of this opportunity to call attention to the grievances of any inventor. This is a Vote simply for ordnance and other warlike stores.
§ MR. MACFARLANEasked whether, if he moved to reduce the Vote, he would be in Order in calling attention to this matter
THE CHAIRMANThe hon. Member would be in Order in moving to reduce the Vote; but not in discussing the grievances of an inventor.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he was glad to find that the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War agreed with the recommendation of the Public Accounts Committee. He had been rather surprised to find that the Vote had been under-estimated; and, therefore, he thought the noble Marquess had done well in accepting these recommendations, because he thought that, with careful supervision, such a mistake could not possibly recur. With regard to the noble Lord's (Lord Eustace Cecil's) question respecting magazine guns and machine guns, if anything in that direction was going on the public and the Committee were perfectly ignorant of any intention on the part of the Government to introduce a new weapon.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, the Committee was still sitting.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he was aware of it; but he had not heard that anything was going to be done in the way of introducing new guns this year. If there was any such intention, where were the guns to be made? On this Vote hon. Members had a right to know whether the Committee had any such intention. The Martini-Henry, when first introduced, was not a good weapon, but that it was now a good weapon was generally acknowledged; and, therefore, he should like to hear from the Surveyor General of the Ordnance whether it was the intention of the Government to introduce a new arm? If so, he would ask whether that new weapon was to be made at Enfield, and whether new machinery was to be set up at that place? because, as he was informed, the Government had been offered a most advantageous site in Birmingham. They bad a small manufactory at Birmingham already; but it was not equal to their requirements. They were now making all their own arms, just as foreign countries were; but in this country he thought it was advisable that the gun trade should have some share in that manufacture. The Government were quite right to have a manufactory of their own, because they could test the work made elsewhere; but if they manufactured all their guns, and then had to introduce new machinery, it was better that they should set up a new manufactory in Birmingham. He understood that the site and buildings they now had at Birmingham would fetch a very large sum, and that the new site and buildings would only cost the Government one-fourth of its original value; and, by having the manufactory at Birmingham, the Government would keep up the manufacture of military arms of precision, which, he was told, was dying out in that town. He believed the noble Marquess had been pestered to death about this matter; but he did not think it was out of place on a Vote of this kind to state that this site could be obtained, and that if they did not take it they might not have another opportunity of purchasing a site at such a reduced price. He objected to the Government trying to get everything into their own hands. They ought to keep their establishments within reasonable bounds.
MR. BRANDsaid, there were two 100-ton guns now at Gibraltar, and one would shortly be sent out to Malta. Of the 80-ton guns, two had been completed; of the inferior artillery guns, 290 had been appropriated to the field batteries at home; and with regard to the machine guns, 967 had been supplied to the Navy. Of those, 275 were of the Gardner pattern; but the majority were Nordenfeldts. The result of experiments carried out by the Admiralty was the selection of the Nordenfeldt guns, and those experiments showed that there would be no difficulty in constructing the machine guns to throw shells as well as solid shot. The question of changing the rifle of the Army had been referred to a Departmental Committee, who were making experiments both with the Martini-Henry and the magazine guns. With respect to stores, he did not think it was advisable to go into much detail; but, generally speaking, the stores were in a good average condition. They were taking this year money for 40,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. The stores of small arms were a trifle below the average; but that was owing to the issue of the Martini-Henry to the Militia, and the necessity of not very largely increasing the stores pending the decision of the Committee. He was very glad to have this opportunity of saying a few words generally with reference to this question. It would be found by reference to the Estimates that there was a decrease of £20,000; but that was only apparent. There was a transfer from the Army to the Navy Vote of £113,000 for gun mountings and stores; but, on the other hand, there was a transfer from the Navy to the Army Vote of £10,000, leaving a balance of £103,000. Therefore, if they deducted the sum of £20,000, which was the apparent decrease, from the £103,000 balance, there was a real increase of the Vote by £83,000. This increase was mainly on account of the Naval Service. The three principal items were saltpetre, sulphur, and gunpowder, which together amounted to £10,000; but it was well to mark here that the powder issued to the Navy was not charged to the Navy in the Vote. With reference to the cost of projectiles, the increase in the cost for breech-loading ordnance was very considerable. There 1781 was also an increase in the Army Vote of £114,000 for projectiles, and then there was a large increase for wages in the laboratory. There was also an increase on account of ammunition for small arm practice. These various items increased the Vote by £83,000; and, looking to the future, he was sorry to say that he did not think there was any great chance of any large diminution in this Vote. On the contrary, he feared the reverse would take place. With respect to the demands for the issue of Martini-Henry rifles to the Volunteers, and the enormous cost of these breech-loading ordnance for the Navy, it was impossible to suggest that there was any probability of a diminished Vote; but, so far as the Army was concerned, he thought the Committee would agree that the Vote was exceedingly moderate, having regard to all the circumstances. With regard to the production of guns for the Navy, there had been charges made against the Department of delay in respect of those guns. He did not know whether those charges referred so much to the question as between the War Office and private firms, or as between the War Office and the Admiralty; but the policy of the Government had been to encourage private trade as far as possible. It was necessary, some years ago, to establish Government works, because they could not always depend upon private establishments. The Government were able in this way to check the cost of the guns; and he thought, on the whole, the system had resulted in the production of as good guns as, if not better than, those of any other nation in Europe. As to the question between the War Office and the Admiralty, it had been stated that naval opinion was ignored, and that these guns were forced on the Navy; but, as a matter of fact, officers of the Navy had been on every Committee appointed to consider this subject during the last 20 years. There were Naval Officers now serving on the Ordnance Committee, and not a single step was taken which was not directly approved of by the Director of Ordnance. There had been no delay with regard to construction. There had been very difficult questions to settle; but there had been cordial co-operation between the Admiralty and the War Office. The noble Lord the Member for Chichester (Lord Henry Lennox) made a speech in 1782 the House some time ago in which he condemned, in very severe language, the condition of the guns in the Navy. There was, however, no foundation for the statement of the noble Lord. The Conqueror had her guns, and at the time of which the noble Lord was speaking the guns were lying on the wharves. They had been in a state of transition as regarded ordnance in the Navy. There had been an entire change in construction and material, and those changes had raised very difficult questions. Every attempt had been made with regard to this question, both by the Admiralty and the War Office, to overcome these difficulties. The delay, if there had been ally, was owing to the difficulty of completing the designs for the guns; and, for his part, he would frankly say he thought that delay had been advantageous; for there was no more important thing, in his opinion, than that the guns which were provided for the Navy should be such that the sailors who had to serve them should have confidence in them. Last year the whole question of construction, and of the material used, was raised by Sir William Armstrong; and the consequence was that the Committee had to take evidence of a great many skilled witnesses, and upon that evidence they had decided to change the material, and at the present time every gun under construction at Woolwich was being made of steel. It was satisfactory to know that the manufacturing departments were now keeping up with the demands of the Navy. He did not know whether the Committee would care to hear of the condition of the present breech-loading ordnance; but he might say, with reference to the 255 guns that were said to be out.standing, in a Report which was laid on the Table the other day, a considerable number were ready for issue, and that a great many others had been proved. He had no doubt that before long the arrangements for the provision of guns would be in a thoroughly satisfactory state.
CAPTAIN AYLMERsaid, there was one question he would very much like to have cleared up; the more so, since the answer given by the Government just now had made the matter rather more cloudy than heretofore. The hon. Gentleman the Surveyor General of Ordnance (Mr. Brand) had said that the Committee sitting at the War Office 1783 on Small Arms had decided to have 1,000 repeating magazine rifles made for the Navy. The hon. Gentleman also said he would not increase the small arms store, pending the decision of the Committee upon the question that had been referred to it. As he (Captain Aylmer) was a Member of the Martini-Henry Committee, he took a deep interest in that question. He believed the trials the Martini-Henry rifles were put to were the greatest trials that had ever been made since small arms were invented; and he hoped before any change was made in small arms an equally exhaustive trial would be made. At the same time, he thought the magazine rifle was the weapon of the future; and he desired to know whether the object of the Committee now sitting was to examine between the merits of the Martini-Henry and any other rifle brought forward, or whether they had only to examine between the merits of the Martini-Henry as a slighter weapon and the magazine rifle? Supposing that the Committee were only to inquire into the merits of the magazine rifle as against those of the Martini-Henry, and the Committee reported in favour of the magazine rifle, was it intended to issue the magazine rifles to the Army generally?
§ SIR HERBERT MAXWELLsaid, that on page 53 he saw an item of £20,000 sot down for ammunition for the Militia. Now, time after time, he had drawn the attention of the Committee of that House to the absurdity of this Vote. He did not know how many hon. and gallant Gentlemen on the Committee were acquainted with the musketry training of the Militia; but be could assure them, having himself had practical experience, extending over several years, that the money which was spent upon musketry instruction in the Militia was absolutely thrown away. The hon. Gentleman the Surveyor General of Ordnance had told them that a net decrease shown upon page 49 was only apparent. Now, if he were to strike out the £20,000 on page 53, he would make that net decrease a real one, and the Services would not be in the slightest degree the less efficient. He could assure the Committee that he was not exaggerating the case. He was sorry it was so; but 1784 musketry instruction in the Militia in the annual training was not only irk-some to the men, but it was also costly to the officers. It could not be properly carried out in the way in which it was done under the present system, and it interfered with that which could be properly carried out—namely, the ordinary drill and training of the Militia. He assured the Committee that it was in no captious spirit he offered these remarks. It was only in small details that economy could he effected, and he was strongly of opinion that for this expenditure the nation got no return. There was one branch of drill which used to be carried out in the Militia, but which of late years had been discontinued, or rendered optional—namely, bayonet exercise. He could imagine no branch of instruction in which it was more necessary to give young soldiers tuition than to teach them how to handle the bayonet, which was the old English weapon; and it was with great regret he had seen the instruction as to its use discontinued of late years in the Militia. He might remark, in passing, that the bayonets issued to the Militia were 4½ inches shorter than those issued in the Line. He did not know that that was a matter of much importance; but it was rather singular, and he did not know the reason of it. But what was really of importance, and what ought to be attended to, was that the men who carried those weapons should be instructed in their use; and in order to call the attention of the Committee to the matter he would move a reduction of the Vote by £10,000.
§
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £1,259,500, be granted to Her, Majesty, to defray the Charge for the Supply, Manufacture, and Repair of Warlike and other Stores (including Establishments of Manufacturing Departments), which will come in course of payment during the year ending on 31st day of March, 1884."—(Sir Herbert Maxwell.)
MR. BRANDsaid, in answer to the question of the hon. and gallant Member Maidstone for (Captain Aylmer), he had to state that the Committee now sitting at the War Office had not to inquire as to the comparative merits of the magazine rifle and the Martini-Henry. They had had several magazine rifles referred to them for experiments. As to the Martini-Henry, it was proposed to alter the bore in order to get a lower trajec- 1785 tory, and the Committee were asked to report upon that too.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he hoped his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wigtonshire (Sir Herbert Maxwell) would not think it necessary to divide the Committee on this Vote. He did not know whether the hon. and gallant Baronet was present on the last occasion when the question of Militia instruction—especially musketry instruction — was fully discussed. As a matter of fact, in the limited time the Militia were out for training, there was no time for the men to go through a complete course of drill for valuable and practical musketry instruction. That, however, was a matter which must be left in the hands of the military authorities, who were responsible for the training of the Militia Force. So far from recommending that the musketry instruction should be abandoned in the Militia, the Committee who lately inquired into musketry practice in the Army as well as in the Militia had recommended that the Militia as well as the Army should have an increased amount of ball practice.
§ SIR HERBERT MAXWELLAnd a longer training.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that was so, and he thought they also recommended longer training. The question raised by the hon. and gallant Baronet was one deserving of attention, and before that time next year he would be glad to learn the opinion both of military and Militia officers in regard to it. But in the course of the present year it would be impossible to make any alteration in the way in which the training of the Militia was carried out. Therefore, it would be necessary to provide a sufficient sum on this Vote for the ordinary training. The most convenient opportunity of discussing this matter took place the other night. In the absence of a great many of the Militia officers a Vote taken now would hardly be a satisfactory one.
§ SIR HERBERT MAXWELLsaid, the noble Marquess had given an instance of the very little attention that was being paid to the representations of officers and others acquainted with the necessities of the Service. The noble Marquess had stated that he did not know whether he (Sir Herbert Maxwell) was present during the discussion 1786 which took place on a certain occasion with regard to musketry instruction in the Militia. It so happened that he (Sir Herbert Maxwell) was the humble instrument of bringing that subject before the attention of the noble Marquess and the rest of the Committee.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that many other Militia officers spoke upon that occasion, and for the moment he could not recollect who they really were. He recollected now, perfectly well, when he was reminded of the fact, that the hon. and gallant Gentleman did initiate the discussion.
§ SIR HERBERT MAXWELLsaid, he was glad the noble Marquess had re' called the circumstance. It was not only this year that he had brought the question before the attention of the Committee; but every year since he had had the honour of a seat in that House. He was glad to accept the assurance of the noble Marquess that the subject would receive his attention, and he begged leave to withdraw his Amendment.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
Original Question again proposed.
§ SIR HENRY HOLLANDsaid, it was with great pleasure he heard that the War Office was prepared to give a favourable consideration to the Report of the Public Accounts Committee. There was one point, however, on which he had expected that some further information would have been given. On Vote 12 it was supposed, as late as January, 1882, that there would be a surplus; but, as a matter of fact, there was found, in March, 1882, to be a deficiency of £70,000. He had given the noble Marquess an intimation that he should ask the question, and he understood that some explanation would be forthcoming. Perhaps, before they passed away from this Vote, some Member of the War Office would give an explanation as to how the deficiency had been brought about.
MR. BRANDsaid, the hon. Baronet would remember that there had been no excess in the Army Votes generally for 16 years, so that during all that time the expenditure had been kept within the Estimate.
§ SIR HENRY HOLLANDsaid, that fact did not bear upon the deficiency arising upon Vote 12, upon which information was desired.
MR. BRANDsaid, the excess of Vote 12 in the year referred to by his hon. Friend was owing to the abnormal circumstances of that year. There were several causes for that excess. In the first place, there was the war then going on at the Cape, and when the Supplementary Estimates were presented to the House there were five months' accounts due, and an Estimate made for the expenditure which was not sufficient. In fact, there was an excess of expenditure at the Cape of £10,000, and that accounted for £10,000 of the deficiency. In every year, on Vote 12, there was a considerable amount which was expected to fall in that year, but which really had to be carried over, and, therefore, fell in the succeeding year. As a general rule, this carrying over was balanced by an equal sum that was carried over at the end of the same year. But, on this particular occasion, the carrying over was not balanced by the sum of £30,000. This accounted for £30,000 of the excess; but it was quite an abnormal circumstance. Then there was a difficulty in estimating the cost of the new breech-leading Ordnance. As it had turned out, a sufficient sum had not been taken for that purpose. Another disturbing cause was the great pressure put on the Department for expediting the issue of Ordnance for the Navy. He believed he had now explained to his hon. Friend the circumstances which might be considered abnormal, and which accounted for the excess. There was a balance of liabilities, as he had said, to carry over the year to the amount of £30,000; there was excess of expenditure at the Cape amounting to £10,000; there was excess in the cost of guns of £10,000; extra expenditure upon the Navy, £10,000; and, in addition to this, there was a deficiency in the Estimates with reference to the armaments. He agreed that the Vote ought to be controlled, and that this excess ought not to occur in future years.
§ Original Question put, and agreed to.
§ (5.) £739,400, Works, Buildings, &c. at Home and Abroad.
MR. ACLANDdesired to call attention to a point of some importance, which had been brought under his notice in the course of the last few weeks. For the satisfaction of the public, as well as for his own, and that of the persons concerned, 1788 he desired to know whether anything was likely to be done with respect to the improvement of Netley Hospital? He had had occasion to go to Netley a very few weeks age, and he found that the lifts which were originally placed in the building for taking up the patients, and also for carrying up coals, had not been used for 20 years, except on one occasion when the patients' lift was experimented upon with the result that the officer, who was good enough to be the subject of the experiment, was let down with great violence, but, he believed, without any serious consequences. He knew it was the feeling of the medical officers who had been at work at Netley for many years that the power of using a lift would be of great value to them for the sake of the patients brought there. He might say that the lifts, as originally constructed, were so made that no stretcher could be put into them; and, therefore, no man could be carried up if he were lying on his back. Consequently, for about 20 years, the patients bad been carried upstairs at considerable inconvenience, and with great pain to themselves, and much labour to the officers. Not only was this the case, but the coals were required to be carried up weekly by the attendants, and the stairs and passages cleaned afterwards. In his opinion, it was discreditable that such a state of things should have continued for 20 years in a national military hospital like that of Netley. He had taken the trouble to inquire whether, in the loading hospitals in London, there were lifts; and he found that for the last 12 years, in St. George's Hospital, lifts had been in hourly use, not only for the purpose of carrying patients up to the higher wards, but also for lifting up provisions, coals, and other necessaries. This was the case also in St. Thomas's Hospital. Both hospitals were maintained by voluntary contributions, and each, therefore, had to shift for itself. Netley Hospital, however, was supposed to be the school of military medical science; and surely every advantage that could be given to the medical officers there and to the patients should be provided. He had hoped that something would have been done already in the direction indicated. All he knew was, that a few weeks ago nothing had been done, in spite of repeated representations on the subject. There was one other 1789 point, in connection with the same subject, on which he wished to ask a question. It was referred to in the evidence of Surgeon John Longmore, who was one of the Professors at Netley. It was the question of the railway accommodation to Netley. From Mr. Longmore's evidence the condition of things in this respect was anything but satisfactory; and he desired to know whether the Surveyor General of the Ordnance could inform him if there was any scheme in preparation by which men who were brought home wounded could be convoyed without change of conveyance from Portsmouth to their beds at Netley?
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, before his hon. Friend replied to the question put to him, he should like to ask another, about two very important confidential Commissions that were appointed some time ago. The Vote itself was in excess of the Estimate by about £23,000. That was not a large sum; but, still, every little helped, and the Votes went on increasing. The two Commissions were, rather, a Commission in one case, and a Committee in the other. They were appointed on the subject of Home and Colonial Defences. Now, the question of the Colonial Defences was a very important one. He believed his hon. Friend behind him (Sir Henry Holland) was one of the Members. The Committee, of course, did not pretend to know—it would not be advisable that they should know—what were the recommendations of the Commission. At least, they might ask if the Report had been received; and whether the Government were taking active steps to carry it out? And if, also, they would assure the House that such steps, as they in their judgment thought proper, were being carried out in conjunction with the Colonial authorities; and whether the Committee had reason to hope that all the important stations all over the world—most important in case of war—were receiving that attention which they deserved? They knew that in the Australian Colonies something had been done by the Colonists to provide themselves, at all events, with gunbeats, and, he believed, with guns. It would be a good thing generally if the Committee could receive the assurance that something was being done. They did not want an important Commission of this kind to be appointed 1790 to go through a great deal of labour in examining witnesses, and then that their Report should be left in some pigeon hole. Again, there was the question of our Commercial Harbours at home. This was a very important question, and he believed that a Committee of experts had been appointed to inquire into it. A great deal was said on the question in 1878-9, at a time when they thought it was possible that they might be engaged in war. No doubt, if there were any apprehension of war again, the subject would once more come up. At the present moment it was a time of peace; but they all knew how suddenly a panic might arise. They knew, moreover, in what an undefended state Liverpool, Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Hull were. In fact, there was hardly a port they could mention, except some in the South, like Portsmouth and Plymouth, that were fully prepared against any great warlike expedition. The Report of the Committee could not be over-estimated; and he should like to know whether it had been received; whether the Government were going to act upon it; and whether they could give an assurance to the Committee that either now or at some future time active steps were to be taken with regard to Colonial and Home Defences; so that the public might feel that they would not again be left in the helpless state in which they always found themselves when there was a chance of an outbreak of war?
§ SIR HENRY HOLLANDsaid, be was glad that attention had been called to this matter, because the inquiry came very much better from a third party than from one who had served on the Commission, as he had done. The Commission had a difficult task to perform. He (Sir Henry Holland) saw the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his place. They had had the pleasure and the advantage of his services on the Commission on Colonial Defences for a year; and, therefore, he was sure the right hon. Gentleman would not consider he (Sir Henry Holland) was over-rating the importance of that Commission. The inquiries were, of course, strictly confidential; and all he could say was that the Commissioners did all they could to cut down what was considered absolutely necessary expenditure to the smallest amount. He could see, by reference to page 65 of the Estimates, that at present 1791 no effect had been given to any of the suggestions of the Commission; but it would be a great satisfaction, not only to individual Members, but to the country generally, to know that the suggestions and recommendations of the Commission were receiving the serious attention of the War Office.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that the Report of the Commission was more under the consideration of his hon. Friend (Mr. Brand) than himself. The course taken on receipt of those two important and valuable Reports was this—to refer them to the consideration of the advisers of the Secretary of State. Hon. Members opposite would, he was sure, admit that the Report of the Commission on the subject of Colonial Defences, valuable as it was, was rather general in its character, dealing mainly with political considerations, and was hardly one upon which they could act without further examination on the part of their professional advisers. With the view of enabling that further examination to take place, it had been referred by his hon. Friend to the Inspector General of Fortifications, and his recommendations with regard to it had only very recently been received. It now required further consideration from the point of view of the provisions and armaments that would be required. It would be his (the Marquess of Hartington's) duty, when the whole matter had been considered, in consultation with the First Lord of the Admiralty, and others of his Colleagues, to take the opinion of the Government as a whole as to the extent and mode in which these recommendations could be best carried out. he thought the same course would be taken on the Reports of both Commissions; but the consideration of the Report of the Colonial Defence Commission was rather more advanced than the consideration of the Report of the Commission on Commercial Harbours.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOURsaid, he could not allow the further Vote for the battery at the end of the Dover Pier to pass without earnestly calling attention to the way the public money was uselessly spent. That battery now stood on the Estimates at upwards of £142,000; but that was only a small part of the outlay. The armament was to be of the largest calibre of guns, and would need the permanentloca- 1792 tion of a strong detail of Artillery. The annual cost of the guns, projectiles, stores, and pay of the Artillerymen could not be less than equal to the interest on £200,000 of capital sunk. Here they had, then, an outlay of more than a third of £1,000,000 for this one battery. Again, this was the outcome of a much larger expenditure on Dover Harbour. They first began the Pier for a refuge harbour, at an estimated charge of £250,000, and, immediately after the death of the Duke of Wellington, the costly fortifications on Dover Heights were begun, contrary to the views of their great Commander, in order to defend and protect the harbour. These works had already cost more than a third of £1,000,000, and were to be improved and extended as soon as the extension of the Dover Harbour Works justified the plea. Thus they had a Harbour commenced, whose cost no one could guess at, and the cry was still in favour of a large refuge harbour capable of holding their Fleet, and whose cost could not be estimated at less than millions. They also continued fortifications at Dover in spite of the Report of the Defence Commission of 1860, which stated that fortifying Dover Heights was a blunder. Further than this increased demand for works at Dover, a Commission had been sitting to find out places in other parts of the Kingdom where further fortified works could be put up, thus resuming the waste which was begun 25 years ago, and which had ended in an outlay of £7,000,000. He earnestly hoped that the Prime Minister would bring some of the old opposition which he used to feel against Lord Palmerston's former projects to bear against the now outlay. It was now a matter of history that the Prime Minister drew forth from Lord Palmerston the remark that he dearly loved his Chancellor of the Exchequer, but that he would part with three Glad-stones rather than not have the planned fortification. One precaution could, however, be taken, and that was to require all the outlay on new works, and on new guns, to be borne by the Annual Estimates, and not to be made, as formerly, with borrowed capital.
DR. CAMERONsaid, before the Government replied he should like to ask for an explanation of another matter. The hon. Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland) had called attention to 1793 an over expenditure on the last Vote which had come under the consideration of the Public Accounts Committee. He (Dr. Cameron) would wish to state, as illustrating the unsatisfactory condition of the account keeping in this Department, that an excess to which he would refer was not known in the War Office. He saw in the Estimates they had a Vote for Barracks; and he understood that two years ago, owing to the system of account keeping in this Department, under which excesses were not paid back to the Exchequer, that a house was built at Chatham out of savings for "barrack flooring." He did not know whether the Government had any information on this point; but the case could be put in the same category as that referred to by the hon. Member for Midhurst. The peculiarity was that whilst in the Navy they had an independent audit, in the War Office each Department authorized its own expenditure, and then audited its own accounts. That would probably explain the occurrence of the fact he had mentioned, and which he had on first-class authority—namely, that two years ago a house was built out of the savings of "barrack flooring," and the place was only accidentally so found to have been built by some application about its rating.
COLONEL STANLEYsaid, he wished to make an observation or two as to what fell from the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Sir George Balfour), who spoke immediately before the hon. Member who had just sat down. On the subject of the Colonial Defence Commission the hon. and gallant Member had spoken with, perhaps, a natural apprehension that the appointment of this Commission would lead to an increased expenditure on fortifications in various parts of the world. Now, the object with which the Commission was appointed was rather that they had found in 1878, when the country was in a state of tension, and war did not appear to be probably very far distant, that there were a number of small fortifications in various places which took a large amount of stores and not an inconsiderable number of men to defend them, and which would not, under modern conditions, be of any great importance. It was thought desirable that the general question should be con- 1794 sidered, to ascertain what places could be abandoned without harm to the Public Service—that was to say, what fortifications could be given up, so that the forces they possessed in the Colonies could be concentrated rather on those points that were really important. It was with that view that the Commission was appointed, and to the best of his knowledge it was in that view the Commission had conducted its inquiry. He only mentioned that, because it seemed to him that the apprehensions of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, though by no means unfounded in some respects, had no foundation in this respect. It was reasonable to hope that the Report of the Commission, far from being averse to expenditure, would be one more likely to lead to economy than the reverse, and if acted upon would tend to the development of the strength of the Empire.
MR. BRANDsaid, that as to the increase of expenditure it was more apparent than real. Regimental and Departmental pay, which showed an increase of £12,384, was formerly charged under Vote 1, whereas now it was charged under Vote 13. With regard to Netley Hospital, there had been a Report as to lifts there. Shortly afterwards an accident had occurred, but it was not of a very serious nature. A minute inquiry was made, the result of which was to prove that the accident had occurred in consequence of one of the chains slipping. He had now instructed the Inspector General to make a careful inquiry as to the cost of providing lifts on the hydraulic principle. The other point referred to had been brought under consideration.
§ SIR THOMAS ACLANDasked whether, in regard to the new lifts, care would be taken that they should be of an adequate size?
MR. BRANDsaid, he had not yet committed himself to the putting up of new lifts. What he said was that he should inquire as to what would be the probable cost of having them fitted up; if it was decided to adopt new lifts he would take care to bear in mind the observation of the hon. Member.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, there was a point to which he wished to draw attention which, so far as he could see, he should not be able to raise on any other Vote—namely, the question of 1795 the depôt centres which were building, or had been built. It would be in the recollection of the Committee that a sum of £3,000,000 had been voted for these depôt centres when Lord Cardwell was Secretary of State for War. Well, he (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) failed any where to find in the Estimates an account of how that money was expended; they were entitled to know how much of it had been spent, how many barracks had been built, what barracks were still contemplated, and whether it was the intention of the Government to construct all those works which were at first planned? He did not know whether he was in Order in raising the point on this Vote; but he saw no other opportunity of being able to do so. Building of this kind was going on all over the country, and in some places large buildings were being constructed, like those at Bedford; and he thought hon. Members were entitled to know how this money was being expended, particularly as at this moment there was considerable discussion as to the wisdom of such operations. There was great difference of opinion as to whether it was wise to have the men scattered up and down in so many depots, or whether it would not be wiser to have fewer depot centres, and the men more concentrated.
§ COLONEL DIGBYwished to draw attention to the hospital of the Foot Guards. Two years ago the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Childers), in introducing the Army Estimates, stated that he was going to introduce a scheme for building a large hospital in London for the Foot Guards. Perhaps he (Colonel Digby) was wrong in saying for the Foot Guards alone, the undertaking having probably been for the whole of the troops in London. At present the arrangements were in an unsatisfactory condition, and he should like to know what the views of the Government were on the subject?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he was afraid he could not give the hon. and gallant Member any de.tailed information on the point he raised; but he believed the Annual Military Localization of Forces Account showed the expenditure raised for that purpose. He believed that account had been before the Committee. He was sorry he could not go more fully into the matter at that moment.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, that no doubt it was true the noble Marquess could not give them that information at the present moment; but he would point out that the account to which he referred did not tell them what works were going on, but what had been expended. In 1871, he (Sir Walter B. Barttelet) had protested as strongly as he could against £3,000,000 being granted; and he had pointed out that they would never know how much of that was being spent—that year after year would pass without adequate knowledge being conveyed to the House as to what was being done. Surely it would not be too much to ask for a statement as to how the money was being expended, and what was being done every year?
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTERsaid, that perhaps he might state that the whole amount granted—to be raised entirely by loan—was £3,600,000, and that out of that sum there only remained £260,000 unexpended. As to the account, it was laid before Parliament every year, and was placed before the Public Accounts Committee, of which the hon. and gallant Baronet was himself a prominent Member. With regard to what work was being done, he might say that very little at present was being done, since the 70 brigade depôts, the construction of which was provided for in the amount granted, were now nearly complete.
SIR HENRY FLETCHERsaid, the question with regard to the hospitals had not been answered, and that if no statement was made with regard to the item, though they had taken over three hospitals—that of the Grenadier Guards, the Fusiliers, and the Coldstream Guards—they would be entitled to raise the question on the Report of the Medical Committee which had been sitting at the War Office. Sir John M'Cormick had intimated in his Report that it had been recommended that the Guards' hospital should be amalgamated with the general hospital for the whole of the troops in the London district, and that at the present moment the officers of the Guards were the lessees of the existing hospital, their lease extending 17 years. The Report stated that, as yet, nothing had been done.
§ SIR HERBERT MAXWELLwished to know whether the noble Marquess, or his hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Brand), 1797 could say whether or not there was a sum set apart for the insurance of these hospitals?
§ COLONEL DIGBYMay I ask what is the intention of the Government with regard to these hospitals?
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTERsaid, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been misunderstood, for he had only been alluding to the closing of the Stock Purse Fund, and not to the building of a large hospital. There was no intention of building a large hospital for the Guards, and the question pending was whether the War Office should take over the hospitals now occupied by the Grenadier, Coldstream, and Scots Guards? He had had the advantage of communicating with the solicitor of the Grenadier Guards, Mr. Farrer, and with Colonel Moncrieff of the Scots Guards, as to their respective positions. He was able to assure the Committee that, to the best of his belief, the Government would be able to wind up and close the whole question during the present Session. Full compensation would be given to the officers for the unexpired term of their leases, and those who had left the Guards—as, for instance, Major General Gipps—on promotion, while the question was pending, would lose nothing by the delay in settling the matter.
COLONEL STANLEYasked if the hon. Member would be able to give further information—as the Medical Vote was discussed—when Vote 4 came on?
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTERsaid, he should be happy to give fuller information upon that Vote.
§ GENERAL OWEN WILLIAMSwished to have some information as to the amount taken for Dockyard defences. The Estimates seemed to him to be very large.
§ COLONEL TOTTENHAMsaid, it was stated by the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Brand) that it was not the practice to insure Government buildings. Was that the case with all Government buildings?
MR. BRANDYes; the Government does not insure any Government buildings; the buildings insure themselves.
§ Vote agreed to
1798§ (6.) £127,300, Establishments for Military Education.
§ COLONEL ALEXANDERsaid, he wished to call the attention of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War and of the Committee to a point of considerable importance bearing on the examination of the candidates for first commissions in the Army. During last spring, in the month of April, be thought between 200 and 300—nearer 300, he thought, than 200—were competing for some 30 commissions in the Army. It was obvious that, under these circumstances, very few of these candidates could possibly succeed; and what he wished to ask the noble Marquess was whether he would do anything for these young men, or, at any rate, for some of them, who had failed from no fault of their own? Their case was one of peculiar hardship. The examination in which they failed—the present final examination—was a new one. It was introduced, he believed, some two years age, no doubt with the view of still further weeding and eliminating from the list a large number of the already too numerous candidates. He thought most Members of the Committee would be of opinion that this excessive multiplication of examinations was the very curse of the Service. What did they want with three examinations for first commissions in the Army? Surely the preliminary and the second examination should be sufficient to test the merits and qualifications of any candidate for a commission in the Army. Moreover, he had to complain that this last final examination had had on some of these candidates who failed an overdue retrospective action, and in this way. At the time this final examination was first instituted some of these candidates who had failed the other day had already passed the preliminary examination; and, as they had since succeeded in passing the second examination, it necessarily followed that, by the rules prevailing at that time, they would now have been entitled to hold commissions in Her Majesty's Service. The examination of which he spoke was, probably, not very difficult. It consisted, he believed, for the most part, besides a few other subjects, in a certain number of not very difficult questions on military law and tactics. That circumstance was of no avail—it rather en- 1799 hanced the difficulties where the competitors were so many and the prizes were so few. He was told by the Examiners, where all answered well, or, at least, correctly, they were in the habit of placing at the top of the list those candidates whom they said, to use their own expression, "answered in the best form." That system, he maintained, was excessively unsatisfactory as regarded the parents of the candidates. If the parents were called upon to pay large sums of money to "crammers" for the purpose of imparting technical education to their sons, which, in the event of their subsequent failure to pass for the Army, was of no possible use to them in future life, therefore the whole, or most, of the time and money those candidates expended on their preparation for this examination was really thrown away. This system was also exceedingly demoralizing to the candidates themselves, who became disgusted, and lapsed into habits of idleness. When the various regiments of Militia were called out for training the "crammers" suspended their course of instruction, and these young gentlemen, who, with regard to them, stood in statu pupillari, were called upon to join in giving expensive inspection luncheons, in consequence of which they contracted habits of extravagance, and, at the conclusion of the training, they returned with no very great zest or zeal to their studies, which they regarded as not very congenial. But, further, most of these young gentlemen had no interest in the Militia—they were only birds of passage, so to speak, and their only object was to obtain commissions in the Army. Therefore, he would ask the noble Marquess if he would do something for the candidates who were rejected at the last examination from no fault of their own; and whether he would make some changes in the mode in which candidates now entered the Army from the Militia?
§ COLONEL MILNE HOMEsaid, his hon. and gallant Friend had drawn attention to a point of very great interest in connection with the Army at the present time. He wished to call attention to the vacancies which existed in the Cavalry regiments. He believed that some short time ago there were no less than 50 such vacancies, although one might hear from many Cavalry officers that there were plenty of good men 1800 ready to enter the regiments if they could but pass the examinations. He, therefore, recommended that those candidates for Cavalry regiments who were approved in every sense by the Commanding Officers should be permitted to go in, not for a competitive, but a qualifying examination. He was willing that that examination should be made as strict as was necessary; but he was opposed to the candidates being put to an unnecessary expense for cramming and going up to examinations which they could not pass, and which unfitted them for everything else. They had abolished Purchase in the Army, and thereby endeavoured to cheapen the profession of the soldier; but, unless he were mistaken, the cost of cramming for the Army very often cost as much as an ensign's commission in an Infantry regiment. This was a most serious question, so far as the Cavalry regiments were concerned; and he ventured to hope the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War would give it his earnest attention, in order to find some means of filling up the existing vacancies in these regiments. He begged to assure the Committee that the work in the Cavalry regiments pressed very heavily upon those who had to do it, in consequence of its having to be performed by a comparatively small number of officers. Again, after officers were appointed to their regiments they were absolutely pestered with the examinations they were called upon to pass, and the consequence was that the ordinary work of the regiments was thrown upon the other officers. In this way far more than a fair share of the work was thrown upon the officers serving in the regiments. He rose simply for the purpose of asking that something might be done to fill up the vacancies he had referred to.
§ COLONEL KINGSCOTEsaid, he wished to call the attention of the noble Marquess to the disadvantageous circumstances under which young men were examined for the Artillery. He believed that about 120 young men came up last week for the Artillery examination. They were examined in a room in Westminster Palace Hotel, in which he felt sure the President of the Council of Education would not have allowed as many school children to be brought together; the windows had to be kept open on 1801 account of the heat, and the noise of the trains on the Underground Railway and the traffic in the streets made the voices of the Examiners inaudible. Under these circumstances, a great number of the young men, more sensitive than others, did not stand a fair chance in the examination. He asked the attention of the noble Marquess to the practice he had described, and he trusted that in future the examinations for the Artillery would take place at Burlington House, as in the case of the other Army examinations.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that, so far as he was aware, no change of importance connected with the examinations for the Army had occurred since he went to the War Office. His hon. and gallant Friend was under the impression that there was a difference three months ago.
§ COLONEL ALEXANDERsaid, he knew that one candidate was rejected in April who had passed the preliminary examination before this final examination was instituted.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he could only repeat that no change of importance, that he knew of, had taken place since he had been at the War Office. The hon. and gallant Gentleman who had just spoken could hardly expect him to be aware of the system of examination in its details; but he would confer with the Director of Military Education with reference to the points to which his attention had been called, in order to ascertain if any redress could be given.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, some of the existing arrangements were absolutely inconsistent with men who obtained commissions being made into good officers. He was certain they were asking the young men of the present day to do more than was necessary in the way of fitting themselves for the position of officers. The present system, he maintained, would result in the loss to the Service of the best men—men of the class who would make the best officers. Again, going to officers serving in the Army, the regimental officers were kept back, while men who had passed through the Staff College were, in every way, advanced before them. He admitted that it was an advantage for officers who knew their regimental work to go to the Staff College; but 1802 many men, although they had passed through that College well, were quite unfit for regimental service. He regarded a good deal of the education given at the Staff College as useless for practical purposes; it had nothing to do with the duties which the officer had to perform. There were some subjects which, for military purposes, it was more important that a man should learn than all the mathematics in the world; and he said that if men were required to spend their time in learning to measure the distances to the sun and the moon they would never be able to command even a small number of men in the field. It was a mischief to carry that system too far; because it was well known they had not young men to fill up the vacancies in the Cavalry Regiments, and his hon. and gallant Friend on the Treasury Bench knew well that there were men who had passed through the Staff College to whom the authorities at the War Office dared not give a command.
CAPTAIN MAXWELL-HERONsaid, a certain number of Queen's Cadetships were given every year to the sons of distinguished combatant officers of the Army who were living; others were given to the sons of combatant and noncombatant officers who had died in the Service. But none were given to the sons of medical officers who were living. This latter class, however, said that they did not want to die, and they would rather see their sons in the Army before that event took place. He trusted that the gift of the Queen's Cadetships would be extended to the non-combatant officers he had referred to.
§ Vote agreed to.