HC Deb 08 June 1882 vol 270 cc494-610

Clause 4 (Intimidation).

Amendment again proposed, In page 3, to leave out lines 14 and 15, and insert "by acts or threats of violence, or injury to person or property, uses intimidation, or incites any other person to use intimidation."— (Mr. Charles Russell.) —instead thereof.

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

It may be convenient to the Committee that I should state that Her Majesty's Government have been very anxious to consider the suggestions which have been thrown out in reference to this clause in the course of the debate yesterday, and as to whether in any or in what respect we could make any amendment to the clause, so as to make it meet any objections which may appear to be well founded. The character of the difficulties raised by two hon. and learned Gentlemen—the hon. and learned Member for Christchurch (Mr. Horace Davey) and the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce)—was this—that the latter part of the clause was too absolute in its terms, and that it applied to every act of the nature indicated, without giving an indication of any limitation whatever. I would venture to point out to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) that that is not really the case, because the latter part of the clause is really only an interpretation of the word intimidation at the beginning of the clause, and that that word is introduced at the beginning of the clause in respect of the limitation of Sub-sections a and b —that is to say, that those acts will not be offences unless they are done with a view to certain things there mentioned, or in consequence of certain things there mentioned. As I said in answer to a question that was put to me, it is these acts by themselves that are made an offence, having relation to the surrounding circumstances, the intent with which they are done, and the object at which they aim. Now, that was always the intention of the clause. I believe that, interpreted by a lawyer, no other construction could be put upon the words of the clause. But we desire that this should be made perfectly clear, because the latter part of the clause, as has been properly said, is meant to be a declaration of the meaning of the clause, and would so be regarded by the magistrates who administer it, and the public who are to be governed by it. Therefore, that there should be no doubt whatever on that subject, we are willing to add certain words. I have stated that "intimidation" includes—and the suggestion of my hon. and learned Friend was that it was made to include —acts which might not, of themselves, be considered an offence. I perfectly understand what he meant by that; but I object to it, on the ground that it would be a negative declaration. You say it is not by itself to constitute intimidation; but you give no indication to anybody of what are to be the circumstances which are to make the act an offence. I propose to amend the clause by adding at the end a Proviso that the case is only to be regarded with respect to the surrounding circumstances, such as the condition of the district, and so forth. The Proviso I propose to add is as follows:— Provided that the circumstances of the case show that such words are spoken, or acts done, with a view to or in consequence of the matters mentioned in Sub-sections a and b of this section. That will indicate that the act is not to be regarded as an offence unless the surrounding circumstances show the intent with which it is done. It is to be regarded in reference to the circumstances of the case only; and it must be shown that the words were spoken, or the acts done, with a view to, and in consequence of, the matters mentioned in the sub-sections. That will make quite clear what I say is in effect the scope of the clause—that "intimidation" is governed by Sub-sections a and b, and that the interpretation of "intimidation" is also governed by Sub-sections a and b. Then, in addition to that, I am quite willing to accept an Amendment which stands on the Paper in the name of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South-wark (Mr. Cohen), in page 3, line 26, after "done," insert "in order to, and" calculated to put any person in fear, &c. That would provide that the Court should be of opinion that the act was done with the intent to produce the result there defined. Therefore, it is quite proper that the words "in order to, and" should be added before the word "'calculated." These words are entirely consistent with the intention of the clause; and if they serve to make the clause clearer it will be an advantage, although I am of opinion that the section, with the Proviso I have suggested, would make the matter sufficiently clear.

MR. JOSEPH COWEN

asked if the right hon. and learned Gentleman would read the words following, so as to show the exact position of the clause after the Amendment was adopted?

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he proposed to add the Proviso at the end of the clause.

MR. HEALY

asked the right hon. and learned Gentleman to read the Proviso as it would stand in the Bill, if adopted.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

I propose, at the end of Clause 4, to add these words— Provided the circumstances of the case show that such words were spoken, or acts done, with a view to or in consequence of the matters mentioned in Sub-sections a and b of this section.

MR JOSEPH COWEN

In point of fact, that they were done intentionally?

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

The words "in order to and" will be inserted before the word "calculated," in line 26 of the clause. That is a separate Amendment, proposed by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South-wark (Mr. Cohen), but it is an Amendment which I propose to accept.

MR. GIBSON

In order to and calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself," &c.?

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

Yes.

MR. PARNELL

said, it appeared to him that the supposed concession of the right hon. and learned Gentleman was entirely illusory. Indeed, it made the clause almost worse than it was at present. If it was not surplusage, it certainly could only have the effect of making the clause worse.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

I am quite willing to admit to the hon. Member that if he does not wish to accept this Amendment I am not anxious to press it. I believe that the clause, as it stands already, will meet all the circumstances of the case.

MR. PARNELL

said, he was very glad to see that the view of the right hon. and learned Gentleman coincided with his own—that the addition he proposed to make to the clause was already contained in it. In point of fact, the right hon. and learned. Gentleman proposed to repeat words in his Proviso which were already in Sub-section a. Sub-section a commenced in this way— With a view to cause any person or persons either to do any act which such person or persons has or have a legal right to abstain from doing, or to abstain from doing any act which such person or persons has or have a legal right to do. The Proviso provided that the circumstances of the case should require that such word was spoken, or act done, with a view to, or in consequence of, the matters mentioned in Sub-sections a and b of this section. What in the world, then, was the object of this wonderful concession? If it was not intended to throw dust in the eyes of the Committee, he did not know with what intention it could possibly have been brought forward. With the utmost respect for the views of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell), who had proposed this Amendment, and also for those of his Colleagues with whom he was acting in regard to the Bill, he felt bound to give his own impression upon the matter, and he certainly considered that this Proviso would be mere surplusage. It left the clause in all its full mischief, and it did not alter the scope or effect of it in the slightest degree. It still left the tribunal which was to administer the operation of the Bill to be the judge of the intent and of the effect of it. He thought it was necessary that those who undertook the task of putting down combinations in Ireland should know what it was that they really did undertake. Last year they were told that the Government desired to put down crime and outrage and intimidation—according to the law that then existed and which existed now— resulting from combinations among tenants. But this year the Government told them that the result of the combinations among tenants in Ireland had been to produce crime and outrage; and, therefore, that they must now take power to put down the combinations themselves, because it was found by experience that if a certain combination was made, crime, outrage, and intimidation resulted from that combination. What was the attitude of the Government? They might cover it over as much as they liked, and the Home Secretary might pretend that he did not mean to put down combination; but the Committee knew what the results of the protestations of the Home Secretary and other Members of the Government last year had been. They knew perfectly well that if these undefined and vast powers were to be intrusted to the stipendiary magistrates throughout the country, all open combination would be forbidden, and it would be utterly im- possible to carry on any open movement of any kind whatever in Ireland. The Home Secretary said the other day that the tendency of legislation had been to limit the right of combination among Trades Unions. He (Mr. Parnell) denied that altogether. He thought that everybody who had studied Trades Unionism knew that the Trades Unions had been engaged in very much the same sort of struggle as they were now engaged in in Ireland. As a result of this struggle, the Acts of 1871 and 1875 were passed; and those Acts expressly prevented the Law of Conspiracy from being applied to those combinations of workmen, and expressly defined the kind of intimidation and the acts of intimidation for which workmen might be punished if coercion were resorted to in connection with these combinations. The Irish farmers now were very much in the position of the English workmen 20 or 25 years ago, when they were struggling for alterations in the law, and when the Law of Conspiracy was being used to put down those combinations. He would repeat again what he said the other day in that House, that they were perfectly willing that the Government should define the offence of intimidation as regarded the Irish farmers, and all that the Irish Members asked was that it should be defined. They asked that it should be defined according to the Conspiracy Act of 1875, in which there were five distinct grounds of intimidation laid down. In this case the Government might lay down 40 if they liked to apply them to the Irish farmers; but they wanted to know what it was they could really do, and what they were not to do, and they objected to intrust the stipendiary magistrates with these undefined powers. It was perfectly absurd to suppose that the Lord Lieutenant would he able to control the action of the stipendiary magistrates. If he attempted to do so, the result would be that this legislation would be nugatory, and that it would be impossible for the magistrates to act. If he did not do so, the result would be that the magistrates, who were really representative of the landlord class—the class of ascendancy —would act against the people and their rights and privileges. In taking power thus to put an end to "Boycotting," they were practically taking power to put an end to every kind of open combi- nation. The public were told that outrages and intimidation were so much mixed up with exclusive dealing that it was impossible to define what intimidation meant. Now, that he denied; and he said that it was perfectly possible for them to define what intimidation was, so that the tenant farmers and the labourers of Ireland should know whether they were standing within the law, and where the limit outside the law was. What the Home Secretary appeared to object to was the right of the people to combine so as to affect other people who were not parties to the combination; but if they denied that right to the people of Ireland, why did they not also deny it to the mechanics of England? Did the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary mean to assert that the workmen of England could combine and could strike against an employer without affecting that employer, who was not a party to the combination? If the employer was not a party to the combination, he must be affected by the strike; and if, in the words of this Bill, he was placed in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living, then, according to the intentions of the Government, they were not treating the Irish tenant farmer and labourer as they were treating the English mechanic; but they were expressly depriving the Irish labourer of the power which the law admitted an English mechanic to be entitled to. They were told that intimidation was as Protean in its shape as it was impossible to define it. It was, however, defined in the Conspiracy Act of 1875. It was there defined, with five separate definitions, and this clause of the Bill was so cunningly devised by the Government, that it made it almost impossible to introduce any Amendment to it. They had taken the clause out of the Act of 1875, and then, having cut the Bill in two, they had turned it upside down and introduced the definition at the end.

SIR. WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, the hon. Member was in error. The Act of 1875 did not define what intimidation was. There were separate paragraphs dealing with particular offences; but intimidation itself was left without a definition.

MR. PARNELL

Yes; but, practically, the paragraphs were taken as a definition of what intimidation was, and were clearly directed to the magistrates to guide them in the administration of the Act. What would have been the use of putting them in at all, if they were not to be read in the sense of a limitation as regarded the offence of intimidation? No doubt, it was cruel to deprive a person of the means of his existence. He admitted that. He did not wish to prevent the Government taking power to prevent a person, no matter what his station was, from being deprived of the means of his existence. But they did a great deal more in this clause. If, in any part of Ireland, attempts were made to prevent people from obtaining food, or clothes, or fuel, by all means treat it as intimidation, and put it down. But he disputed the expediency of preventing people from entering into a combination. They had a right to do that outside intimidation; and what he claimed was that the Government ought to alter their Law of Conspiracy, so as to make it as permissible for a tenant farmer to do a thing as it was for a workman to do that thing. They ought not to alter the Law of Intimidation in such a way as to make it practically impossible for a tenant farmer or a labourer to do anything at all, either with combination or without combination, in Ireland. The Government desired legislation to put a stop to any action in which crime and intimidation, as now known to the law, were the result. He was quite willing to assent to such legislation. But this clause went to the extent of rendering it penal for a workman to leave his employment. By-and-bye, if a magistrate chose to find that a workman, by leaving the employment of a farmer or a landlord, had given reason to that farmer or landlord to fear injury to or loss of his property, business, or his means of living, would be the result of that workman's act, he could hold the workman to be guilty of intimidation within the meaning of this clause, and send him to prison for six months with hard labour. If the tenant refused to pay his rent, either through inability or in consequence of the rent being an unjust rent, what would be the result? The magistrate might consider that the refusal of the tenant to pay his rent put the landlord in fear of injury to or loss of his property or means of living; therefore, the tenant might be convicted, in such a case, of intimidation, and sent to prison for six months with hard labour. He thought the Irish Representatives had an unanswerable claim to a definition on the part of the Government of what they meant by intimidation. They had waived the right of trial by jury as it existed in England in regard to the offence of intimidation. They had waived the right of trial by jury as long as the Government told them what they meant to prevent. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary had stated in general terms that he desired to prevent "Boycotting." He (Mr. Parnell) should be glad if the right hon. and learned Gentleman would give them a definition of "Boycotting," and of what he wished exactly to check as regarded the evil resulting from "Boycotting." But they had no such information. They had been told by the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant that what he wanted to check was outrage resulting from offences which were now to be called intimidation. The right hon. Gentleman, in his speech the other day in reply to the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Bus-sell), went over a great variety of offences which resulted from intimidation. He spoke of the posting of threatening notices, and the sending of threatening letters, and he stated that some tradesmen in a certain town had received threatening letters warning them not to supply a magistrate with bread. The right hon. Gentleman spoke also of the case of Mrs. Moroney, in connection with which a cruel and dreadful murder was committed in consequence of "Boycotting." In the case of Mrs. Moroney, it was true that the tradesmen of the town refused to deal with her, or supply her with food; but he understood that that was put a stop to, and very properly put a stop to, not by the action of Mr. Clifford Lloyd, but by the common sense of the people. Mrs. Moroney could now obtain food and clothing, if she was willing to pay cash for them, so that that was quite right. If the right hon. Gentleman wished to take power against any refusal on the part of a shopkeeper to supply food, clothing, or the necessaries of life to any person, where the person would suffer in consequence of not having those necessaries of life supplied to him, let him state that as an offence according to law, and they would know where they stood; but at present they had no definition of the kind. They had had definitions given in the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant; but no definition had been given by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary as to what he desired to put an end to in the name of "Boycotting." Until they could see their way to enabling the Irish farmer and labourer to combine, possibly in order to obtain an alteration of the law by Constitutional action, they must do their best to oppose the passage of this clause in its present shape.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

said, there were one or two things which had fallen from the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) which it was necessary he should reply to. The first objection of the hon. Member to this clause was that it was drawn in accordance with the method employed in dealing with a similar class of offences in the Act of 1875, and in support of that view he said there was a definition of intimidation in the 7th section of that Act. Now, he submitted to the Committee that the hon. Member's view was entirely wrong. If the Committee would turn to the 1st sub-section of the 7th clause, they would see that there was a general provision against any person who used violence to or intimidated some other person, or his wife, or children, or did any injury to his property. But that clause was a separate and independent clause. ["No, no!"] He repeated that the clause was a separate and independent clause. [Mr. PARNELL: Certainly not.] It had no connection with the clauses that followed after it, and hon. Members who thought differently would have an opportunity of stating their views afterwards. The words were -not placed there as a definition of intimidation, because there were no words saying that the sub-section was to form a definition; but the sub-section was placed there in addition to the original words "using violence or intimidation." Now, under this 1st sub-section any person could be convicted according to the judgment of magistrates who had to determine a case of any kind of intimidation or violence, according to what that magistrate thought to be intimidation. [Mr. HEALY: NO.] He would not enter into any conflict with the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy). He did not think that the Committee would wish him to do so. If the hon. Member differed from him, the Committee, no doubt, would listen to his views; but in a legal matter of this kind he did not think that the personal views of the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy) would carry very much weight with them. The view which he (the Attorney General) had expressed was one which he thought any man who understood the constitution of an Act of Parliament would entertain. The Committee would see that this was to be a substantive offence, "using any violence or in any way intimidating;" but the intimidation was to be according to the view entertained by the tribunal, and if the tribunal found a case of intimidation established, then the person who committed it committed an offence, and could be dealt with under the Act. In the present case they were dealing with a particular class of offences, and they wished that people who were to be punished should have specific information, from day to day, that they were not to do certain things, and words were inserted, not by way of definition, but for the purpose of pointing to particular acts. Any person who prevented another person from obtaining food or clothing, or did injury to property owned by another person, or prevented a person dealing with another, would be guilty of intimidation. But it was not considered necessary to include such offences in a general definition, because they were to be regarded as specific offences. In this clause the Government had followed the words of the sub-section of the previous Act, as far as intimidation was concerned; and if it was thought that lines 25 to 29, which gave a definition of intimidation, should be struck out, let hon. Members strike them out. But it was thought that in order that there should be no doubt as to "Boycotting" coming with in the words "uses intimidation," the Government thought it should be known that those words should include any of the acts specified in the sub-section from line 25, and that every person should be told plainly that it was the clear meaning and intention of the Legislature that intimidation included any word or act calculated to put any person in fear of injury to himself, or any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of injury to or loss of property, business, or means of living. If the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) wished that to be left entirely open, he was sure the Committee would listen to his opinion; but he (the Attorney General) thought it would be wiser, in relation to the tribunal and the person subjected to it, that it should be clearly understood that such acts would come within the term "intimidation." In this the Government had followed the precedent of the Act of 1875. Hon. Members opposite must not suppose that his right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary was bound to follow the exact wording of the Act of 1875. The Government had now to deal with different circumstances and a different class of offences; and, although it was pointed out in the Act of 1875 that a particular class of offences would come within that Act, they were not dealing with precisely the same class of offences in the present Bill. In the Act of 1875 they had to deal with workmen's offences, with "rattening," and so forth; but they were acting to-day in the same spirit with regard to the particular offences which existed in Ireland at the present moment. The hon. Member for the City of Cork, and other hon. Members, said the words contained in the clause admitted a class of offences which ought not to be punished. The example given by the hon. Member for the City of Cork was that a workman leaving the service of his employer would be liable to be punished under this Act. He thought the hon. Member would consider that if a workman chose to leave his employment he had a free right to leave it; but if he and all the workmen employed with him chose to say to their employer—"We will not allow you to cultivate your land; we insist on leaving you, so that we shall prevent you from cultivating your farm or from paying your rent," what was that but intimidation? Their object was to prevent a combination of this kind, or a combination of persons refusing to deal with a particular shopkeeper, or of hotel-keepers refusing to serve food, or bakers and butchers in a town refusing to allow a person to obtain the necessaries of life. Such a combination as that he understood to be "Boycotting," and the object of the Government was to endeavour to prevent such a combination. In order to put it down effectually, they must deal with all the classes through which it ramified. He certainly could see no difference of principle between this case and that of a direct intimidation expressly rendered illegal under the Act of 1875. What they were dealing with was the evil of preventing a man from obtaining the necessaries of life, or being able to carry on his business. "Boycotting" a man might be to prevent him from obtaining the service of labourers in the conduct of his farm, and was of the same class of evil as they had to deal with in endeavouring to prevent a man from refusing to supply another with food and the necessaries of life. It had been said that, under this clause, if a person were to ask another to give up dealing at a particular shop and to go to another, or to say to a man, "I will never deal with you again," or "I will cease to deal with you because you have given a vote for a certain candidate," he would be liable under this Bill to be punished. Why, at this very moment a person who did that would, under an English Act, be liable to two years' imprisonment for doing it. If they would turn to the 4th clause of the Corrupt Practices Act of 1854, they would find that if such threat were used to inflict loss upon a man in consequence of giving a vote, or abstaining from giving a vote, the man who used the threat was liable to two years' imprisonment. And who had ever complained of the working of that clause? No one, that he knew of. No one asserted that any hardship was inflicted by the Statute. It was of no use to take extreme cases. Every case must be judged by the circumstances of the time at which it occurred. There were hard cases which would occur under the application of every Act, no matter how they might define the law. If they took every extreme case within the definition, they would be certain to find some case in which they would be able to say there was hardship; and if the Government left out all extreme cases of this nature, it would be impossible to carry out any measure for the repression of crime, under any circumstances. The fact was that they must look, not only at what might by possibility be done, but at what the result would be if intimidation, such as that to which he had referred, were left out of the Bill. He would not follow the matter any further than to say that in the clause they had endeavoured to follow the principle, if not words, of the Act of 1875, and he thought the Committee could not do better than accept the clause.

MR. PARNELL

said, he accepted the offer of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General (Sir Henry James), which would strike out the words of the clause from line 25 to line 29, giving the definition of intimidation. But he would invite him, in the process of assimilating the new Law of Intimidation in Ireland to that which existed in England and Ireland at present, to go a step further, and to alter the first portion of his clause, which was altogether differently constructed from the section of the English Act, and which, in fact, left the offence of intimidation entirely different in Ireland from what it was in England. The language of the English section was this—that every person who agreed to do the two things described in Sub-sections a and b, intimidated or used violence to such other person, or his wife, or children. Now, that required that there should be intimidation on the part of some person; but in the present Bill the words employed were, "uses intimidation, or incites any other person to use intimidation," without saying that it was to be the intimidation of any particular person.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

With a view to cause any person or persona either to do any act which such person or persons has or have a legal right to abstain from doing.

MR. PARNELL

But not to "any person." He submitted to the common sense of the Committee that, if they gave up the right of applying to a jury in a case of intimidation in Ireland, surely it was sufficient to leave the Law of Intimidation in Ireland as it was now. The claim of the Government had always been that they had been unable to obtain convictions in these matters; but if it was left to them to get summary convictions before the tribunal established by this Bill, without the right of an appeal to a jury in cases of intimidation, surely the definition of the law that was sufficient to put a stop to intimidation in England or in Scotland, as regarded the operation of the Trades Unions, should be sufficient to enable the Government to put a stop to intimidation in Ireland. He did not want the hon. and learned Gentleman to imitate the words of the English Act. He had always admitted the force of the contention that the offences mentioned in Clauses 4 and 5 were not applicable to this case; but if the hon. and learned Gentleman maintained that in addition to the power given in the 1st sub-section of Section 7 of the Act of 1875—that was to say, a definition of intimidation —namely, using violence to and intimidating such other person—if he wanted anything in the definition to apply to some special offences which he wished to meet, then let him follow the example set in the Act of 1875, and let him put into the sub-section the offences he desired to deal with. If the hon. and learned Gentleman was willing to do that, he (Mr. Parnell) would raise no further objection; but the object of the Government appeared to be to carry this section without informing the Committee of their real reasons for doing it. They appeared to be anxious to obtain a wide and sweeping power enabling them to make use of this Bill in order to put down any combination, however Constitutional, at their own will and caprice, so that it should be utterly impossible for any person to take part in any movement of any kind with any hope that he would escape from the application of this section.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

said, the hon. Member asked him to give in the sub-sections a definition of intimidation; but there would be very great difficulty in doing that.

MR. PARNELL

said, he did not exactly mean that. The hon. and learned Gentleman did not appear to understand his meaning. He accepted the definitions supplied by the Act of 1875 in the 1st sub-section, and what he said was, that if there were any other offences they wanted to meet, or any special practices they wanted to put a stop to, let them put them in a separate sub-section, as in the English Act.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

said, that he quite understood the hon. Member; but what he wanted was quite impossible. They could not define what constituted intimidation. Suppose they were to say that it should be cruelty towards animals, how could they define what was cruelty towards animals? They used the term cruelty to animals, and it was very well understood; but it was impossible to define it. In the same way, in the Act of 1875, it was not attempted to define what was intimidation. It was impossible to attempt to define it in a subsection of the present Act, and it was impossible for him now to accept the suggestion of the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell), and strike out Sub-sections a and b. He did not understand that he had offered to strike out those sub-sections. When he referred to them, he was only endeavouring to convey, by way of argument, that if they were struck out it would be worse for the people who would come under the operation of the Act than if they were left in. He had not intended to make any promise that they would be struck out. If there was an impression, from what he had previously stated, that the Government would consent to strike out these sub-sections, it was an entirely mistaken impression. He had certainly not intended to convey that the Government would for one moment strike them out.

MR. GIBSON

said, that everything that had occurred in the course of that evening showed the wisdom of the suggestion made last night by the Prime Minister, that they should get rid of the Amendment moved by the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) with the division then taken, and that they should start on a new subject to-day. He regretted that they had not disposed of that Amendment yesterday, and he hoped it would be disposed of as soon as possible, so that they might proceed in something like a business-like way to the discussion of the Amendments of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary. He had not taken any part in the discussion yesterday; but he had confined himself to a close and anxious consideration of the question, with a view of seeing whether any safeguards might be adopted, and he should certainly reserve his criticism until the substantial proposals were made. In reference to what the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) had said, he was unable to follow the argument of the hon. Member. He had listened to it with a great deal of attention, as he had also done yesterday, and he was certainly unable to follow the hon. Member's reasoning. Either the hon. Member for the City of Cork wished "Boycotting" to be put down, or he wished it to be kept up. It was absolutely impossible to "sit on a rail" in this case, and to say, at the same time, "Avoid 'Boycotting,'" when they were not prepared to define it, or to tell the Committee how they were to deal with it. When they came to deal with "Boycotting," it could only be dealt with by a real and vigorous clause. "Boycotting" was a terrible reality and appallingly vigorous in its operation. To ask the Government to deal with this terrible reality in a milk-and-water clause was rank nonsense and an insult to the understanding of the Committee. The way in which the Government proposed to deal with "Boycotting" was on the lines indicated by the hon. Member for the City of Cork himself in his first statement on the question. The hon. Member was now leaving the line he then took. When he first spoke on the matter, the hon. Member indicated that he would be satisfied if the crime of "Boycotting," which was essentially an Irish crime, generated in the recent agitation, were dealt with on the lines which were applied to England in the Acts of 1871 and 1875, with such alterations as were necessary to bring the law into harmony with the altered circumstances of Ireland.

MR. PARNELL

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman repeat what I really did say?

MR. GIBSON

said, he should be glad to be corrected if he had not represented the hon. Member properly, and he was ready to resume his seat and allow the hon. Member to correct him on the point. But he had heard the speech of the hon. Member referred to several times and read, and he had heard no qualification of it made. If he had quoted the words of the hon. Member incorrectly, he was prepared at once to resume his seat and allow the hon. Member to state what it was he really had said. But if that was the canon laid down by the hon. Member for the City of Cork, wherein did that clause, if it was to be a real clause, depart from it? As far as it went, it adhered to the lines of previous legislation, and only departed from those lines when it became necessary to grapple with new developments of crime, such as those which had been developed in Ireland during the last two years. It would not be fair to the magistrates—it would not be fair to those who were called on to administer the law, or those who were to obey the law, to leave them practically without guidance as to what intimidation was. Therefore, he thought it was not only wise, but absolutely necessary, that there should be some paragraph like the last paragraph in the clause. If the Committee consented to modify that paragraph, or to qualify it in a single essential word, the result would be to deprive the clause of a considerable portion of its utility. This fact was present, no doubt, in the mind of the Prime Minister in the course of his speech yesterday, and also in that of the Home Secretary, who pointed out that the object of the Government in introducing the measure was to inform the people clearly and distinctly what the law was, so that when it was passed there could be no doubt on the subject. It was also present to the mind of the right hon. Gentleman the Chief Secretary when he indicated that the closing words of the last paragraph were of vital importance, in order to tell the magistrates how they were to act, and the people what they were to obey. Under these circumstances, he thought they would all agree that the Amendment now before the Committee, and which had been moved by the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell), was not in itself one that would commend itself to any substantial section of the Committee. Therefore, he (Mr. Gibson) ventured to throw out the suggestion that it would be wiser for the Committee now to pass away from that Amendment altogether. Although they had made no great apparent progress with the Bill yesterday, he did not mean to say that they had not made real progress, because the debate which took place was most valuable and instructive. But the discussion on this particular Amendment had been absolutely exhausted; and if any proof of that were wanting, it would be found in the circumstance that the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell), with all his acuteness and ingenuity, had not uttered a single syllable in regard to it. He (Mr. Gibson), therefore, thought it would be wiser and more prudent at once to dispose of the Amendment, and then proceed to consider the suggestions which had been thrown out by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary.

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, he thought the Committee were getting into something of a muddle, and this was pretty clearly shown by the fact that the hon. and learned Attorney General, in the course of his speech, offered to withdraw the last paragraph of the clause, in answer to an appeal from the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Parnell). But while he (Mr. Labouchere) understood the hon. and learned Gentleman to agree to withdraw that portion of the clause in the course of his speech, yet, at the end of his speech, he fell back upon the concession, and said he declined to withdraw it. Now, the Home Secretary had proposed an addition to the clause. That addition might be very useful; but he hardly thought the right hon. and learned Gentleman would say that it was any concession to the views of hon. Gentlemen opposite. The Committee were really in a position of considerable difficulty at the present moment. If his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) withdrew his Amendment, or took a vote upon it, they would not proceed to consider the clause de novo; but the words now objected to would have been ordered to stand part of the clause. That would be the difficulty the Committee would be in. He would suggest to the Prime Minister—solely from a desire to act in a conciliatory spirit—whether he would take this into consideration—that, in view of the muddle into which the Committee had got, and the divers suggestions which had been made, it was not desirable at present to pass over this clause—to go on with the other portions of the Bill, and subsequently to return to this clause. It had. been stated by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson), who, with his right hon. and learned. Colleague, seemed to be the official exponent of the views of the Government in this matter — for, whenever a suggestion was made from the Liberal side of the House, or from the Irish Benches, for the reconsideration of the wording of the clause, up jumped one of these two right hon. and learned Gentlemen and said—"The Government are pledged to make no concession." It had been stated by the right hon. and learned Gentleman that upon this clause the Government could not by any possibility give way. Now, he (Mr. Labouchere) knew what the Government wanted and what hon. Gentlemen from Ireland wanted. They wanted a clause that would define what intimidation was, and that the Government should not use that vague word without a definition; because hon. Members representing Ireland knew very well what sort of persons these Resident Magistrates were, and they did not desire to place any discretionary power in their hands. Now, he would ask the Prime Minister if this Bill had not been met by the Irish Members in a very different spirit from that in which the Bill of last year was met? He had listened just now to the speech of his hon. Friend the Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell). His hon. Friend made a very reasonable suggestion, which amounted to a large concession. His hon. Friend said—"Put into this Bill every single matter you find in the English Bill. And more —put in any definition you like as to what you think right to come within the term definition—beyond what you find in any English Bill." His hon. Friend said he was ready, to a certain extent, to accept the views of the Home Secretary, that the intimidation should be regarded not only as exclusive dealing, but as the system of sending a man to Coventry; and if anyone advised anyone else to do anything that would render it impossible for a person in the neighbourhood to live and pursue his calling, then the hon. Member said—"Put that into the Bill, and I am ready to accept it." He would ask the Prime Minister, who knew all these things as well as he did, why not accept this suggestion? Was it not a fact that in England this system of sending a man to Coventry existed just as much as in Ireland? Surely the Prime Minister knew that before the Ballot Act was passed it was the frequent habit of the voters in a neighbourhood—he would not say Conservatives more than Liberals, for they were just as bad on one side as on the other—to "Boycott" those who did not, but whom they wished to, vote. He knew of cases in which Liberal as well as Conservative voters had been told—"If you don't vote—the Ballot will not protect you—if you don't vote as we wish, then you had better take care of the consequences." In fact, it was almost unnecessary for him to enter into these cases. Every hon. Member knew perfectly well that this sort of Coventry did exist, and that it existed not in regard to electioneering matters, but in regard to Trades' Unions. He would ask hon. Members if it was not the case, if a man went into any shop in England who did not belong to a Trades' Union, and it was a Trades' Union shop, all the other persons employed there would not do the best they could to injure their employer's means of obtaining a livelihood, unless he consented to give that man up? ["No, no!"] The hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. Alderman Lawrence) seemed to pass his existence in saying "No, no!" Perhaps the hon. Member regarded this matter in the same light as he would regard some paltry and insignificant Bill which might be brought in for the abolition of the corrupt Corporation, of which he was a member. These things did exist, and he challenged the hon. Member to disprove them.

MR. ALDERMAN W. LAWRENCE

rose to Order.

THE CHAIRMAN

I really must remind the Committee that we are not getting on with the Amendment.

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, he thought that perhaps one of the reasons why they were not getting on so rapidly with the Amendment as they ought to do was that it still remained before the Committee. He would suggest to the Prime Minister that the Amendment should be withdrawn, and that it should be considered at a later stage of the Bill.

MR. GLADSTONE

said, he did not think the Government had the power to withdraw the clause, for the purpose of postponing it until the end of the Bill. Whether it was expedient to place the clause where it now was, was another matter; but as the Committee had already entered on a discussion of the clause, and an Amendment had been moved, and the Mover of that Amendment—his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell)—had distinctly stated yesterday, at the last hour, that he would not withdraw it, he did not see what course the Government could take in the matter.

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) would be quite willing to withdraw his Amendment, on the understanding that the clause would be brought up afterwards.

MR. GLADSTONE

said, the hon. Member could not expect the Committee to accept from him a statement as to the intentions of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Bus-sell).

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk had authorized him to make the statement.

MR. GLADSTONE

thought it most unfortunate that his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk had moved an Amendment, the effect of which, if adopted, would be to give a Parliamentary sanction to the practice of "Boycotting." The Government were determined to deal with intimidation under a definition which would effectually put a stop to "Boycotting." The question had been fairly raised whether they were to have any legislation against "Boycotting" or not, and he could not see the force of the request made to the Committee to allow the Amendment to be withdrawn now, after it had been moved and discussed at very considerable length. At the same time, he would respectfully point out to the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell), the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell), and to all other hon. Members, that they were not pursuing a rational course in prolonging the debate on this Amendment. Was it too much to say that in a debate of this kind they were bound not only by general rules of courtesy, but of good sense, to make to each other, from their respective positions, such concessions as they could make without any sacrifice of their own views? On this principle, would it not be reasonable that they should dispose of this question at once? It was not a question of giving sanction to the clause, but to a very few of the first words of the clause. All that would be affirmed by the rejection of the Amendment was, that the words "wrongfully and without legal authority uses intimidation" should stand part of the clause.

THE CHAIRMAN

The Amendment also includes the words or incites any other person to use intimidation."

MR. GLADSTONE

asked if it was not correct to state that the only effect of re- jecting the Amendment would be to declare that these words should stand part of the clause.

THE CHAIRMAN

Yes; that is so.

MR. GLADSTONE

said, he had not heard from the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) any declaration that these words wore objected to. What the hon. Member desired to get at was the definition contained in the subsequent part of the clause. Without reference to Party or extreme views, they must all feel that the question was one of great and serious difficulty. The Government were determined to legislate against "Boycotting." It was their first duty to see that that legislation should be efficient and effective; but they were extremely anxious not to carry legislation beyond what was necessary for the purpose. The hon. Member for the City of Cork told them that the clause, as proposed, was a clause forbidding the people of Ireland to combine; that, in point of fact, it would make it impossible for the people of Ireland to combine, or to obtain by Constitutional means any changes in the law. That was not part of the intention of the Government. It was no part of their desire to legislate in such a manner that the clause would have that effect; and the Bill would not interfere in any way with such combinations. The only mode of testing their propositions was to come to a discussion of them point by point; and, so far, they had been passing hours, and even days, upon the preliminary question, whether there should be any interference at all with "Boycotting." That was the question now raised, and all he said was, let them dispose of that question at once, and then proceed to deal with the great practical issues before them.

MR. PARNELL

said, the advantage of the withdrawal of the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) had, he thought, been very clearly stated by the Prime Minister, who had pointed out to the Committee that if they divided on that Amendment and accepted it, they might sanction the principle of "Boycotting." He (Mr. Parnell) did not think that that was quite so, because a division would not be taken on the words of his hon. and learned Friend, but on the question of leaving in the objectionable words which at present stood in the Bill; and the fact that those words were included in the Bill would make the measure a departure from the legislation of 1875. That was one of the chief objects of his objection. He did not see why they should say in this Bill—"Every person who uses intimidation," while in the English Act they only said —"uses violence to or intimidates such other person." Clearly, the power given by this clause was very much wider than the power given by the Act of 1875, and that was one reason why he regarded the clause as objectionable. If the Amendment of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) were withdrawn, or if the Government would agree to support that Amendment as far as concerned the leaving out of the objectionable words which his hon. and learned Friend proposed to leave out, the Committee would then be free to consider the subsequent portion of the clause in the spirit indicated by the Prime Minister. But, with these words in it—words which practically made the clause operate so widely and vaguely, that they considered it almost impossible to limit it—it would be impossible for them to approach the further discussion of the clause with a view to its limitation in any satisfactory manner. He thought that he made a reasonable request to the Prime Minister, and that he asked him a fair question, when he asked him whether, if the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk withdrew his Amendment, the Government would postpone the clause? He took it that if the Committee permitted the withdrawal of the Amendment, the postponement of the clause would then be possible. It was a fair question, then, to ask the Prime Minister whether, in the event of the withdrawal of the Amendment, he would postpone the clause so that it might be further considered by the Government, and by those who opposed it? He could not conceive what possible object could be served by going on with the discussion in the present state of entanglement into which the matter had got. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would not submit to the dictation of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson), as he had done on a former occasion, when the Attorney General was compelled to withdraw a concession he had made to the Irish Members, in pursuance of that dictation.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

said, he hoped the Committee would allow him to put himself right in this matter. He had followed the dictation of no one. He quite admitted that in endeavouring to convey his meaning to the Committee, he had used words which might have been regarded as a withdrawal of part of the clause; but that had not been his intention. He knew that the feeling of his Colleagues was to retain that latter portion of the clause, and he had never intended to give it up. While he regretted that any misapprehension should have arisen, he could assure the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) that he had never the slightest intention of making such a proposition.

LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE

said, he wished to put a question to the hon. Member for the City of Cork, which he thought might somewhat elucidate the discussion. He had not been quite able to follow what the particular words were which the hon. Member for the City of Cork proposed to move. There was a certain amount of ambiguity in the matter, which he wanted to clear up. The words that were really now under consideration, as was pointed out both by the Attorney General (Sir Henry James) and by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson), were— Wrongfully, and without legal authority, uses intimidation, or incites any other person to use intimidation. Was the hon. Member alluding to these words, or was he alluding to the words of definition at the end of the clause, which, as had been pointed out by the Prime Minister, were not now under discussion, and would have to be considered subsequently? He asked this question for this reason—that if the hon. Member alluded to the words at the beginning of the clause, he could quite reconcile what the hon. Member said just now with what had fallen from him in a previous speech. He hoped that he was not misrepresenting the hon. Member. He understood the hon. Member to say that he accepted what he believed to have been an offer made by the Government; but in regard to which he appeared to have been mistaken — namely, the supposed offer on the part of the Attorney General (Sir Henry James) to give up the words defining intimidation. But if the hon. Member was willing to accept the offer, real or supposed, of the Attorney General, there was no reason at all why he should object to the proposition which had been made by the Prime Minister, that the Committee should determine, one way or another, the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell), and then proceed to consider, at the proper time, when they arrived at the last sub-section of the clause, if there was to be any definition at all, and, if so, what that definition was to be? He also wished to ask the hon. Member for the City of Cork this question. Was he correctly understood to say just now that if the offer of the Attorney General wore carried out, that the words relating to intimidation should be abandoned, he was willing to follow the wording of the English Act, leaving the definition of intimidation entirely open, and to add words like those in the sub-section of the English Act, specifically aimed at "Boycotting?"

MR. PARNELL

said, the noble Lord had correctly stated the first portion of his remarks; but with regard to the later portion, what he had intended to convey was, that a proposal should be made by the Attorney General (Sir Henry James) showing what he was willing to accept. He had also asked the hon. and learned Gentleman to make his clause proceed in the same way as the English clause, adopting the words in the English Act, Sub-section 1 of Section 7, which left the definition of intimidation open, and inserting, in addition, such other offences as he wished to guard against. Of course, he did not pledge himself definitely, until he saw the offences that the Attorney General wished to guard against, as to whether they should oppose their insertion in this Bill; but it would put the matter into a clearer and more distinct shape to define those offences as they were in the English Act of 1875.

MR. GLADSTONE

said, that the remarks which had fallen from the hon. Member for the City of Cork showed how reasonable and necessary it was that they should proceed to dispose of the clause. The objection which the Government entertained to the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) was not so much on account of what he struck out as on account of what he introduced. But the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) proposed to replace in the Bill the words—"Uses intimidation, or incites any other person to use intimidation." Both sides of the House were then agreed on the retention of these words, whatever else was to be done, and, that being so, was it not bettor to dispose of this point? There would then be time for the hon. Member for the City of Cork to state his arguments in support of the point raised by him.

MR. BULWER

said, he did not rise for the purpose of prolonging the discussion; but having listened to the speech of the Attorney General (Sir Henry James), he was bound to say he did not understand the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw any single portion of the clause. On the contrary, he understood his hon. and learned Friend to put, by way of illustration, the supposition that a portion of the clause was withdrawn, and then to argue upon that assumption. In justice to the hon. and learned Gentleman, he thought it necessary to make these observations.

MR. O'CONNOR POWER

said, that he had not uttered one word upon this subject of "Boycotting" since the House went into Committee, and he would have remained silent had it not been that he entertained a hope of making one or two observations to the Committee which might be useful. He had noticed with pleasure that his hon. Friend the Member for the City of Cork objected to this clause on very different grounds from those on which it was objected to by the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon). When the hon. Member for the City of Cork said he was anxious that the words of this clause might be so carefully expressed as not to interfere with legitimate combination on the part of Irish tenants, he (Mr. O'Connor Power) heartily agreed with him. But he had said, in the course of the debate on going into Committee, that he also agreed heartily with the wish of Her Majesty's Government to put down "Boycotting." He now desired to state that he was opposed to the modified "Boycotting" sketched out to the House by the hon. Member for Tipperary, because he absolutely denied to any political or trade organization, whether English or Irish, the right to inflict penalties on individuals for doing, or abstaining from doing, that which they had a right to do. He need hardly say that he attached the fullest credit to the disclaimer of the hon. Member for Tipperary in reference to the extreme length to which the practice of "Boycotting" had been carried on in Ireland. But he was at a loss to understand how the logical mind of the hon. Member could not see the difficulty of drawing the line when once a principle of that destructive character was laid down. If it were determined that a man should be cut off from his fellow-creatures, and that these were to shut their doors against him, and have no dealings with him of any kind—and although, at the same time, it was said that all this was done without doing injury or violence to him—he (Mr. O'Connor Power) contended that it was the most cruel, and, in a negative sense, the most distressing violence which any body of men, or any community, could exercise against one whom they might call an erring brother. Although he had stated, on the Motion for going into Committee, that he heartily sympathized with the Government in their endeavour to put down "Boycotting," he felt at the time that the definition in the clause was too wide even for the purpose of carrying out the object of the clause itself. That being so, he agreed with the Prime Minister that the time had arrived for disposing of the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell). He would not say that if he thought the disposal of that Amendment would in any way interfere with the right to amend the sub-section in the direction suggested by the hon. Member for the City of Cork. He thought his hon. Friend, who had considerable skill in framing Amendments in Committee and otherwise, would, with the aid of those Gentlemen who sat around him, be able to frame a modification of the clause which would guard against interference with the right of legitimate combination, and if that were so he should be happy to support him.

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

said, the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had altogether misrepresented the views of the hon. Member for the City of Cork. His hon. Friend had never consented to the retention of the words "uses intimidation;" on the contrary, he absolutely declined to pledge himself to those words; and, so far from the statement of the Prime Minister being correct, his hon. Friend had proposed words of a very different and opposite description. The hon. and learned Member for Dundalk said, in effect, he would not allow the words "uses intimidation" to stand part of the clause; and it was plain that if they were to allow those general words to remain, Irish Members would be pledging themselves to them without any definition. It appeared to him that the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister and his Colleagues had not made up their minds about the clause; and his suggestion was that the Secretary of State for the Home Department should spend a little more time in endeavouring to do so. He was aware that the right hon. and learned Gentleman had taken up the position of standing upon every word in the Bill; but he could assure him that, so far as hon. Members on those Benches were concerned, they were determined not to allow one syllable of the clause to pass until they were assured that it would not interfere with legitimate combination amongst Irishmen.

MR. PARNELL

said, he rose to ask a question on a point of Order, which might, perhaps, facilitate the Business of the Committee. In the event of the Amendment before the Committee being negatived, could he move to add, after the word "intimidation," the words "to any person?"

THE CHAIRMAN

said, the hon. Member would be quite in Order in moving the addition of those words after the second word "intimidation," in line 15.

Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."

The Committee divided: —Ayes 266; Noes 45: Majority 221.—(Div. List, No. 117.)

MR. PARNELL

said, the Amendment on which he had just asked the ruling of the Chairman would have the effect of making the commencement of this clause, as far as it could be made, similar to the 7th section of the Conspiracy Act of 1875. He presumed the Government would not object to the addition of the words which he begged to move.

Amendment proposed, in page 3, line 15, after the word "intimidation," to insert the words "to any person."—(Mr. Parnell.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he did not quite understand the purpose for which this Amendment was proposed, nor had the hon. Member who moved it been very explanatory with regard to it. Did the Amendment mean to say that intimidation must necessarily take place against individuals? Because, if that were so, Her Majesty's Government were unable to agree to that limitation. There was, he need not remind the Committee, both general and particular intimidation. It went under many forms; and, without an act of intimidation towards any single person, a whole village might be intimidated. In short, intimidation was so Protean in its character that it must be dealt with by the most general words, and it was in view of that that the general words "using intimidation" were employed.

MR. CARBUTT

I wish, Sir, to ask the Government if there is any truth in the bad news which has arrived from Ireland?

THE CHAIRMAN

Unless the question is one of extreme urgency, it is not one which can now be put.

MR. CARBUTT

I considered it would be a question of extreme urgency. The rumour is that Mr. Bourke—

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

I rise to Order. Is the hon. Member in Order in referring to any matter which cannot properly come under the consideration of the Committee?

THE CHAIRMAN

I must point out to the hon. Member that this is the stage of Committee on a Bill.

MR. PARNELL

said, in answer to the observations of the Home Secretary, he did not quite understand the meaning which the right hon. and learned Gentleman himself attached to the Amendment before the Committee. The meaning which he (Mr. Parnell) attached to it was that it must be shown that intimidation had been used against some person. The right hon. and learned Gentleman might wish to put in some limitation; but it seemed to him that, as the Amendment stood, its meaning was perfectly obvious. Irish Members said that in the English Conspiracy Act it was necessary to show that some person had been intimidated; and they contended that that condition should be in this Bill also. That was the point which he urged upon the right hon. Gentleman. Of course, the Amendment would not interfere with the application of the Bill to the case referred to by the Home Secretary of a whole village being intimidated.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

asked if the Amendment meant that it should be necessary to prove that some person had been intimidated? Her Majesty's Government could not agree to that, as he had before said in the most distinct manner. He repeated that if you carried intimidation far enough you could prevent the proof of it—it could be carried against a man so far that he dare not say he had been intimidated. In point of fact, by requiring proof you gave licence to intimidation; and this was one of the greatest difficulties they had to contend with; because, as he had already stated, the Act of 1875 applied to Ireland as well as England; and, as it contained the words moved by the hon. Member for the City of Cork, they could see how far it was useful in restraining "Boycotting." The fact was, it had completely failed in that respect; and if the proposed limitation of the clause were permitted the object of this Bill would be defeated also. The act of intimidation prevented proof of its effect. If a man went out with a loaded pistol, and said to another—"If you don't do so and so, I'll blow your brains out," in such a case as that clearly it ought not to be necessary to call upon a man to prove that he had been intimidated.

MR. JESSE COLLINGS

asked if a person who denounced landlordism at a meeting would come under the operation of the clause?

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

Clearly not.

MR. HEALY

said, it was difficult to reconcile the statements of the right hon, and learned Gentleman with regard to public speeches. He now stated that the denunciation of landlordism did not come under the Bill. But the right hon. and learned Gentleman had previously said that a man who made a speech of a similar character to the tenants of an estate would be committed for six months to prison, and that it was necessary to prove intimidation.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, clearly it would not; but if a man were to say to A, B, C, and D, that if they did not leave their farms next day they would be shot, it would not be necessary to prove that those people had been intimidated. A speech of that character would be "using intimidation," whatever the result of it might be.

MR. HEALY

said, Irish Members were quite with the right hon. and learned Gentleman when he said that the person who was intimidated ought not to be made to come forward. Their contention, however, still remained, that it was necessary to prove that somebody had been intimidated.

MR. NEWDEGATE

said, that the offence was in the attempt to intimidate —a whole family might be intimidated by the head of that family being threatened. Further, if a man so far yielded to intimidation as not to seek redress, the offence would go unpunished if these words were inserted in the clause. He repeated that the offence was in the attempt to intimidate—not in the act of intimidation.

MR. GIBSON

said, this was an attempt to re-open the question, which had been fully discussed and decided on the first Amendment proposed to the clause. When the matter first came before the Committee, the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell), or one of his Colleagues, suggested that the clause should so run as to make the person intimidated accountable for bringing the charge forward. It was to rest upon his information. That, of course, implied that the individual intimidated should come forward at once, his name and residence being published, to prove that he had been intimidated. All that, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite had pointed out, was in the Amendment. The Committee should never lose sight of the fact that"Boycotting"—or, in other words, the terrorism now existing in Ireland—lived by the generality of its operation—by the creation and spreading of terror; and if it were necessary to prove that some person had been intimidated, prosecutions for intimidation would be rendered impossible.

MR. O'KELLY

said, it seemed to him that the object of the Amendment was to require, when the prosecution was begun, that some special act of intimidation should be proved. After carefully considering the matter, he arrived at the conclusion that unless the words were introduced into the clause there would be prosecutions instituted against persons in Ireland for all sorts of imaginary offences — offences that existed only in the minds of magistrates and the police. How was it possible to approve a special offence unless it was proved by whom the offence was committed? Under the clause, as it stood, every Resident Magistrate in Ireland would be at liberty to assume that the words of anyone politically opposed to him amounted to intimidation. The liberty of the people of Ireland would, therefore, be at the discretion of the Resident Magistrates. If the Government wished to deal with and put down actual and not imaginary crime, what possible objection could they have to accept the Amendment before the Committee, which simply called for a clear statement of the act of intimidation and the person against whom it was perpetrated? One would think it was impossible to prove an act of intimidation without proving against whom that act was committed. If, then, that was not proved, by what right was this law to be put in force?

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, the words, "uses intimidation," were deliberately employed, in order that, whether a person was or was not intimidated, intimidation should be reached by this Act. As ho had before stated, he was ready to meet any Amendment that was a fair one. Intimidation, no doubt, must be against somebody; this was involved in the very idea of intimidation; and it seemed to him quite unnecessary that the clause should say that intimidation should be against somebody. However, if the words, "to or towards any person or persons," would make the clause any clearer, he was willing to agree to their insertion.

MR. T. C. THOMPSON

said, that, even with these words in the clause, there must be proof that somebody had been intimidated. They would be obliged to fall back on the principle of law, that the best evidence should be given, and the best evidence was that of the person intimidated.

MR. PARNELL

said, he was willing to accept the words of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary, and, with the leave of the Committee, to withdraw his Amendment.

MR. GIBSON

said, he had no objection to the hon. Member for the City of Cork withdrawing his Amendment. He readily accepted every syllable of the statements of the Prime Minister and the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary as to the way in which they wished the clause and the Amendment to be dealt with; but, at the same time, he had some doubt as to whether the words of the Secretary of State for the Home Department could be added to the clause without some grave consequences resulting therefrom. Unquestionably, "Boycotting" had been carried out by wide, general, and insidious operations. Offences were sometimes committed, words spoken, and acts sometimes done, which might not appear to be directed against any particular individual, but which were intended to have a substantial effect in creating and spreading an atmosphere of terror. That was the difficulty in the present case; and if words were put into the Bill in the sense that acts, and incitements, and words had been used towards A, B, C, and D, it might be that by this limitation Her Majesty's Government would be prevented from reaching the crime, which he fully recognized that the Government sought to put an end to. Therefore, he could not give his assent to the words suggested by the right hon. and learned Gentleman, although they should receive his earnest consideration. Without troubling the Committee any further, he wished to be understood to reserve his right of raising the question subsequently.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, there was a case which had some bearing upon this question, and which might meet the objection of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson). He referred to the trial of Most, the publisher of The Freiheit. In that trial it was alleged that the prisoner had not recommended the assassination of any individual because he had recommended the assassination of Sovereigns generally. The contention did not prevail, and it was understood that to recommend to assassination of Sovereigns generally was to recommend the assassination of persons.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY

said, he wished to put the case of a district in which there were only two landlords, and where hon. Gentlemen who approved of "Boycotting" gave the same advice to the people as they had so frequently done in the course of the last year or two—namely, that landlords were obnoxious, and should be got rid of. Let it be supposed that the people were recommended not to buy from these two landlords, work for them, or sell to them, and suppose, also, that tradesmen in the town where the landlords obtained their necessaries of life received a notice saying that any shopkeepers who sold to them were persons who deserved punishment. Now, he pointed out that although no names might be mentioned, either of landlords or shopkeepers, in such a case as he had instanced, it would be perfectly well known who were the parties intended. If, therefore, the clause were limited in such a manner as to make it apply only to the intimidation of individuals by name, he ventured to say that the advice given to the people in the case he had supposed would be taken, and that the shopkeepers would be ruined, and that the most dire condition of things would be brought about in the district.

MR. WARTON

said, that under the words proposed to be admitted into the clause by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary, the persons who committed the offence of intimidation would go entirely free. He hoped the Committee would not admit the Amendment.

MR. W. E. FORSTER

said, it was important that they should not lose sight of the legal bearing of the alteration. The clause, as it stood, began thus— Every person who wrongfully, and without legal authority, uses intimidation, or incites any other person to use intimidation. Now, supposing, after the last word "intimidation," the words were added, "or towards any person or persons," what would be the position with regard to the Bill of a person who made a speech in any district very strongly recommending "Boycotting?" Would such speech be, or not be, an incitement to use intimidation?

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

said, that general terms of speech which a person might use in a philosophical mood would not be sufficient to bring such person within the clause. The clause would, however, apply the moment he made use of particular words, although no name might he mentioned. It was intimidation to tell people not to deal with the shopkeepers in a district without mentioning names. The words suggested by his right hon. Friend were perfectly consistent with the words in the following Sub-sections (a) and (b), and the same rule of construction would be applied in both instances.

MR. O'CONNOR POWER

said, he endorsed the interpretation given by the Attorney General, for this reason. If it were the intention that intimidation should be used towards a particular individual for the purposes of the Bill, then the word "specified" would be put in, and the words would run, "to or towards any specified person or persons." If the words of the right hon. and learned Gentleman were adopted, the clause would remain quite as general as before; but the proof required would be more ample, and the possibility of escape for the persons charged more frequent.

MR. W. E. FORSTER

said, he presumed, if the words of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department were added, that it would not be required for the purpose of prosecution that the name of any person should be given; but that it would be required that some person or persons should have been intimidated, or put within the possibility of being intimidated.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, that was so.

MR. T. D. SULLIVAN

asked whether trade strikes would be legal in Ireland under this clause? It was impossible that there could be trade strikes without mechanics and tradesmen advising one another as to the employment of particular persons, and this was calculated to cause loss to some individuals. These strikes were not made illegal in England, for the House of Commons appeared to be tender with regard to every form of popular liberty in England. The plain question he wished Her Majesty's Government to reply to was—Would, this clause render trade strikes in Ireland illegal?

MR. JOSEPH COWEN

said, he had been unable to reconcile the replies of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary, and the hon. and learned Attorney General, to questions asked in the course of this discussion with regard to the application of the clause. He understood the Secretary of State for the Home Department to say that it was not illegal for a man to denounce landlordism as a system—in point of fact, that a man could do this if he liked. This was in reply to the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Jesse Collings). On the other hand, he understood the Attorney General to say, if anyone condemned a class of people in a village, that this was illegal. It seemed to him that one of these propositions must be untrue. Now, it was a common thing, when workmen in a district were on strike, that the word was passed that a certain number of tradesmen should not be dealt with. He understood that that could be done, and was done constantly in this country, and it would be done in Ireland.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, combinations and Trades Unions would be possible, because they were distinctly protected by the 3rd section of the Act of 1875, and that Act applied to Ireland in exactly the same way as to England.

MR. T. D. SULLIVAN

said, that, while Trades Unions were protected by one Act, they were rendered illegal by another. Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman explain that? Certain combinations and a certain line of action were protected by one Act, but were rendered illegal by a subsequent one. On which of these Acts would, the Government stand?

MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY

said, he wished to point out a verbal difficulty in the clause, which, as it was now proposed to amend it, would run in these terms— Every person who wrongfully, and without legal authority, uses intimidation, or incites any other person to use intimidation to any person or persons. And then followed Sections a and b but if Section a was omitted for the moment, then the clause would run— Every person who wrongfully, and without legal authority, uses intimidation, or incites any other person to use intimidation with a view to cause any person or persons in consequence. That was a duplication of words, and it would be very difficult to give them any-meaning. He was anxious to see some words introduced which would make intimidation clear.

MR. CHARLES RUSSELL

said, he thought the question put by the hon. Member for Westmeath (Mr. T. D. Sullivan) was deserving of consideration —namely, whether Trades' Unions would be possible under this Act? The Home Secretary's reply was that the Act of 1875 applied to Ireland; but the right hon. and learned Gentleman seemed to forget that if the proposed Act was construed by itself as rendering Trades' Unions illegal, then, being later in date than the Act of 1875, it would control that Act. Therefore, assuming that the Home Secretary meant to guard the right of Trades' Unions, which was legal in England, and to make it legal in Ireland, it would be necessary in some part of the Bill to introduce a Proviso that "nothing in this Bill should affect the right of combination under the Act of 1875."

MR. SERJEANT SIMON

said, he did not agree with this Amendment. According to the Bill as it at present stood, the use of intimidation, or the inciting of others to use intimidation, with a view to cause any person or persons to do or abstain from doing what he had a right to do, would be an offence created by the Statute; and any words calculated to put any individual in fear of any injury or danger to himself would be an offence. The words "to or towards any person" would limit the clause. The intimidation need not be general, such as words spoken or acts done towards a class, but towards some particular person. Now, intimidation might be applied to the whole class of landlords or tradesmen, or any other class, and to every member of that class, and they might be kept in terror and prevented from exercising their lawful rights. It seemed to him that the words proposed would considerably limit the operation of the clause. He did not at all object to any definition which would so define the offence of intimidation as to make it easily ascertainable by a Court of law; but if the offence of intimidation was to be created by words generally spoken against a class or a particular section of a community, putting each individual of that class in fear and terror, then the operation of the clause would be limited if the words proposed were adopted. That was what appeared to him to be the effect of the Amendment, and he thought that if it were adopted they ought to add, "to or towards any person or persons or class of persons." Unless that was done, the great evil under which Ireland was now labouring would still exist.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, there was one thing which would dispose of these fears and doubts. The section under which the man Most was prosecuted—namely, the Act of 1851— made it criminal to encourage or persuade, or endeavour to persuade, or to propose to persuade, any person to murder any other person. That definition included classes.

MR. JUSTIN M'CARTHY

said, the question of the hon. Member for Westmeath had not been answered to his satisfaction; but it had been answered in anticipation by the Attorney General, who stated that, in case a number of workmen formed themselves together, they would come under the terms of the Act.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

I never said that; I said if they became members of a League that would come under this Act.

MR. JUSTIN M'CARTHY

said, if for any purpose of their own—if they quarrelled with their landlord, and struck against him, and left him as the result of that strike, they would come under the law.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

No.

MR. JUSTIN M'CARTHY

asked under what conditions could a number of labouring persons work together under this Bill?

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

said, the Bill had nothing to do with combinations. There was nothing to prevent combinations under the Act of 1875; but there was no inconsistency between the two Acts.

MR. WARTON

said, he thought there was considerable objection to the proposed addition by the Home Secretary. The first was that the person or persona should be named who were being intimidated; and the second and greater objection was that classes were left quite unprotected. A speech might be made advising the shooting of all landlords, or of a whole class, or of all Englishmen. If ingenious agitators availed of that, they would be able to terrorize over any person.

MR. T. D. SULLIVAN

asked whether the Attorney General would object to insert these words— Provided always, that nothing in this Act contained shall interfere with the right of combination secured under the existing Statutes to persons working for wages?

THE CHAIRMAN

We must get rid of this Amendment first.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed, in page 3, line 15, after "intimidation," to insert "to or towards any person or persons."

MR. GIBSON

said, he was disposed to think that the words suggested by the hon. and learned Member for Dews-bury (Mr. Serjeant Simon) were more entitled to consideration, and that these words now proposed should not go into the clause in this place, as they would confuse the drafting.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

said, he thought it would be necessary to carry out this Amendment, and to add, in line 23, "to or towards." That, he thought, would meet the objection of the right hon. and learned Member opposite.

Amendment agreed to.

MR. HEALY

said, he wished to move the Amendment standing in the name of the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell). The Chief Secretary for Ireland had stated the other night that there were a number of cases in which it was desirable that the Government should have power to act. So far as they could, Irish Members had endeavoured to find out from the Government what particular cases it was desired to strike at by this Bill. They gathered from the Chief Secretary for Ireland that these offences were chiefly four, and if the Government could show that it was desirable to enlarge that list they would be willing to agree to that. The Chief Secretary was especially strong on the posting of circulars and threatening notices, and said if 20 notices were posted the man against whom they were directed could not be expected to go into the witness-box and give evidence. For the purposes of this section an Amendment had been withdrawn providing that magistrates should act summarily in regard to the circulation of threatening notices. Then came the question of "Boycotting" by public proclamation. If a man made a public proclamation that it was desired to "Boycott" a certain person, he might be dealt with under the Act, and also if a person sent round a bellman to announce a ban upon a man in a particular locality he might be dealt with. Then the third class of offence mentioned in the Amendment of the hon. Member for the City of Cork was intimidating by wrongfully or illegally holding up any person to public odium. That definition was of so wide a character that it was very liable to abuse, and the hon. Member for the City of Cork was so anxious to meet the objections of the Government that he had taken on himself to propose another Amendment. He himself looked rather askance at that, because he thought it was an exceedingly wide proposition. He thought that holding up persons to public odium was a very wide matter. If a man was opposed at an election he was held up to odium, and while he was willing to assent to the words his hon. Friend proposed, he confessed that he regarded them with some apprehension. Then the fourth instance was by using violence, or threats of violence, to any person or persons. To discover what were the offences which the Government desired to meet under this Act had caused the Irish Members anxious deliberation; but if the Government did not consider the offences mentioned in his hon. Friend's Amendment sufficient they would be willing to amend it. What they objected to was that the word "intimidation" should stand unqualified. They had asked the Government to recite in this Bill, as they did in the English Bill, what it was with which they desired to cope. It was all very well to say that these offences were of such a Protean character that it was impossible to grapple with them definitely. The Home Secretary put the case of cruelty to animals—everybody knew what that was. But there was no possible case of cruelty to animals which could not be fairly dealt with; and, furthermore, there was the consideration that nobody was interested in cruelty to animals. England was the only place which was disgraced by cruelty to animals, and it compared badly with Ireland in that respect. It could not be said that a magistrate belonged to a class opposed to a prisoner in such offences in England. But that was what was alleged against the Resident Magistrates in Ireland. If a Resident Magistrate in Ireland was not a landlord himself, he was tinged with landlord views, because in Ireland there was no other society for persons of his class. Society in Irish villages generally consisted of magistrates, bank-clerks, sub-inspectors of police, and local agents. The magistrate had nobody else to mix with, and he must decide as they desired, or they would not ask him to their balls and parties, and in that way they would "Boycott" him. He was shut out from all the local society and was bound to go with those classes. There was no middle class with whom the magistrates could mix as belonging to their own creed, and accordingly they strained the law in order that the landlords should not "Boycott" them. Magistrates in Ireland must have some society, and as there was no other class for them they must mix with the landlords. He was exceedingly jealous of these gentlemen getting powers of this exceptional character without any reservation. If the Home Secretary or the Attorney General were sitting on cases in Ireland he should expect justice at their hands, and should believe their sentences would be correct, and if the Prime Minister had the carrying out of this Bill he would not have the smallest hesitation in allowing the right hon. Gentleman to exercise it. But he should be sorry to give any person power over his liberty, and he should have some suspicion with regard to the Attorney General for Ireland after some of his recent declarations. The suspicion with regard to magistrates was well justified, and he hoped the Government would limit this clause in such a way that the magistrates should have some direction as to intimidation.

Amendment proposed, in page 3, line 15, after "intimidation,"insert—

  1. "(1.) By posting or circulating notices of an illegal character;
  2. (2.) By making public proclamation by bell or otherwise inciting others to place any person or persons under a ban;
  3. (3.) By wrongfully and illegally holding up any person to public odium or;
  4. (4)By using violencs or threats of violence to any person or persons."—(Mr. Healy.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir HENRY JAMES)

said, he was glad that the hon. Member had only objected to the tribunal; but this Amendment was seeking to alter the Bill, apart from the question of the tribunal; and, although he would be repeating what had been so often said, he must point out the objection to this Amendment and to accepting the offer, which was apparently genuine, with regard to definition. He thought the Committee would see at once that the attempt to define intimidation within these four sub-sections would fail, because if the four sub-sections were accepted, not any other "Boycotting" that could be resorted to would be illegal besides these four definitions. There were many other methods which were used, and which, under this Amendment, could be legally employed. He could give numerous examples of "Boycotting" that did not come within these four sub-sections. Suppose a person refused to supply necessary food to other people, that would not come under any of these sub-sections. The Government were endeavouring to stop that cruel "Boycotting" which the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon) said ought to be punished. They did attempt to define "Boycotting" with violence only. They were endeavouring to deal with that cruel evil of preventing people obtaining the means of living. They ought to deal with the more general view as to whether there should be any definitions at all. It was an offence to use violence or intimidation to another person, and there was no attempt to define the use of violence or intimidation, and if an act amounted to violence or intimidation, that would be an offence not included in these four sub-sections. Then came the alternative—"or persistently does these things;" but that was distinct from using violence or intimidation, which was only expressed in general words, and not by particular definitions. These four sub-sections were conditions of intimidation covered by the 1st subsection. The hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy) asked that the Government should do what could not be done under the Act of 1875. They were not giving a different law to Ireland in respect to the principle upon which this clause was framed. They were doing exactly the same thing, or rather they were doing more, because in the English Act the words "uses violence or intimidation" were omitted. He could not give a better example than he had already given when he spoke of the impossibility to define the general term, than that which represented, not a particular act, but represented what might be carried out by many acts—cruelty to animals, for instance. The hon. Member for Wexford said everybody knew what that was; but everybody did not know the different methods, and if it was detected in one way other ways would be adopted. Then the hon. Member argued that the tribunal must be looked at separately from the enactment. In 1875 he (the Attorney General) had said that the Act was going to give powers, with regard to workmen, to employers of labour who were themselves magistrates. [Mr. HEALY: You have public opinion here.] There was public opinion here; and it would have been more properly applied if it had been properly appealed to. It was impossible to define intimidation in general terms.

MR. DILLON

said, he strongly supported the view that there should be some definition introduced into the Bill in regard to what was legal and what was illegal. He recollected, at the outset, saying to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary—"Let us know what is the law and what is not, and we will obey the law." The right hon. and learned Gentleman said he would do so; but what the hon. and learned Attorney General (Sir Henry James) now said was that the clause was drawn on the same lines as the English Act. Now, that was the chief basis of the argument of the Irish Members. If that were so, it was unnecessary to take out the first two lines of Sub-section 1, Clause 7, of the English Act, and replace them by the lines they complained of in the present Bill. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman said that the definition of intimidation was to be left as open in the Irish Act as it was in the English Act, why not use the same words? If they did not do so, the Committee were driven to the inevitable conclusion that there was some object aimed at by the Government in altering the wording of this Act from that of the English Act; and it was not a frank and honest statement of fact to say that intimidation was left undefined in the Irish Act as it was in the English Act. To his mind, the magistrates, or anybody administering the law, must look very carefully at the context in interpreting the word intimidation. They had no other guide to go by. One man might intimidate another by firing at him, or he might intimidate him by saying that he did not like the cut of the clothes supplied by his tailor. There were a hundred ways in which a man might be intimidated, and the magistrate who was administering the law must be guided by common sense and also by the context of the Act. Now, what was the context of the English Act? It was that any man who "uses violence or intimidates" was guilty of an offence — it was that intimidation meant using violence. [The ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir Henry James): No.] At any rate, it must mean something approaching violence. The words were, "uses violence or intimidates any such person or his wife or children." How could a man intimidate the wife or children of another man, except by an act of violence? The Act went on to say, "or injures his property." They had a definite act mentioned, and this would inevitably influence the mind of the magistrate in saying that intimidation meant an act of violence, or something which created an apprehension of violence in the mind of any person, or injury to property, or a threat to injure property. He had said already that the Irish Members were perfectly prepared to take the Attorney General at his word; and if the hon. and learned Gentleman said that his only intention was to assimilate the present Bill to the English Act, then let him take the words of the English Act.

THE CHAIRMAN

Is not the hon. Member really discussing the Amendment we have already decided, and not the definition, which is now placed before the Committee?

MR. DILLON

said, he did not propose to discuss that in the least. He was only pointing out where it was that the Irish Members dissented from the opinion of the Attorney General (Sir Henry James) in the argument he had used against the insertion of a definition—namely, that in the English Act the question was left open. The hon. and learned Gentleman had used that argument, and he had used it as his chief argument. He (Mr. Dillon) was doing his best to reply to that argument by showing, first, that the question of intimidation was not left open in the English Act; and, secondly, that the Irish Members were prepared to give up their opposition if the Government would transfer the words of the English Act to the Irish Act. What they said was, that if the clause was left in its present position, it would materially influence the minds of the magistrates who had to administer the Act. An attempt had been made by several Members of the Government to induce the Committee to leave out of the question altogether any consideration in regard to the tribunal; but it was utterly out of the question that they could remove from their minds the consideration of what the tribunal was to be which was to administer the law. Very frequently the law was drawn entirely in reference to the tribunal which had to administer it. They might leave the clause quite open if they had perfect confidence that it would be administered impartially; but if there was a strong feeling on the part of a large section of the people that it would not be administered impartially, then they were the more entitled to press for a clear definition. This, he thought, was perfectly sound reasoning. What had they got in the English Act? The Attorney General (Sir Henry James) asserted that that Act contained an open Intimidation Clause. He (Mr. Dillon) did not admit that it was an open Intimidation Clause. There was a reservation contained in the 9th clause. Why was that reservation inserted in the English Act? It was inserted because it was said and felt that there might be employers of labour in a Court of Summary Jurisdiction who might be inclined to strain and misinterpret their jurisdiction, and, therefore, that the accused was entitled to object and to claim to be tried by a jury, so that the case might be removed from the prejudices of local magistrates. Now, if the Government would give them here this reservation clause of the English Act, so as to give to every prisoner the right to be tried under this Act by a jury instead of by a bench of landlords, he should have no objection to make.

THE CHAIRMAN

The hon. Member is really discussing the Amendment of the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell), at the bottom of the third page.

MR. DILLON

asked what that Amendment was?

THE CHAIRMAN

That the case may be withdrawn from the Court of Summary Jurisdiction and tried by the Court of Quarter Sessions.

MR. DILLON

said, he respectfully submitted that he was not discussing that point, but another question altogether. He said that was one of the strongest arguments in the minds of the Irish Members, in favour of their insistance on this Amendment for a strict definition as to the nature of the Court before which the case would have to be heard. It was not at all in reference to an Amendment on any other part of the Bill, but in reference to the fact that the Government had informed them that they proposed to have these cases tried before a Court of Summary Jurisdiction. That constituted, to his mind, a strong argument against the definition of the offence, and in favour of leaving it an open clause. If these cases were all of them to be tried by the Court of Quarter Sessions, he should not lay so much stress upon his objection. Although he should still be in favour of the definition, he should not consider it of such vital importance as he did now, seeing that they were threatened with a trial on an open clause, which left it to a bench of magistrates to put whatever interpretation they chose upon it. There was a common expression in Ireland that if they "looked crooked" at a man they intimidated him. The Committee would recollect that a Question was asked in the House that day in regard to the case of a man named Joseph Johnson, at Dundalk. The Question asked of the Attorney General for Ireland in regard to this ease was what the offence was that Mr. Johnson had committed; and the right hon. and learned Gentleman refused to state. Now, the fact was— and he was ashamed to say so—that the offence laid against Mr. Johnson was this. A constable went up to him and said, "Good morning," and Mr. Joseph Johnson did not say, "Good morning" in return. The Committee must recollect that this had all been sworn in open Court. This was the first offence. The second offence was that he walked, over and stared at a photographic machine. Mr. Joseph Johnson began to laugh, and said something about the power of dynamite. It was sworn by several witnesses that the constable laughed also, and seemed to look upon the matter as a good joke. There was no evidence of any other act produced in Court, and yet the man was now lying in Dundalk Gaol on a charge of intimidation, having been committed by a bench of Irish magistrates. No offence was alleged against Mr. Johnson, except the two he had mentioned. The constable was asked in Court—"Were you afraid?" and his reply was—"Yes; I was somewhat frightened." He (Mr. Dillon) thought he was entitled to argue that what had been done by a local bench of magistrates in this case might be done again by a Commission Court under this Bill. The only difference was that whereas Mr. Joseph Johnson was lying as an untried prisoner, under the rule of bail, in Dundalk Gaol, if this Bill had been passed he would have been tried in some way before some tribunal under this clause, and might have been committed for six months with hard labour, a punishment which, by the way, was a most savage one, as it would be an undeserved one, as he had had some opportunity of studying cases in which that punishment had been inflicted. His argument was that as long as the Government employed this tribunal it was the duty of the Irish Members to insist to the utmost of their ability on having laid down, in black and white, what the grounds were on which a man might be sent to six months' hard labour in Ireland. He refused to make it an open clause, or to leave it for the body of men represented by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson) to carry out in an obnoxious manner. By this clause, as it stood, any man who made himself obnoxious to the landlord class would render himself liable to six months' hard labour, and that was the reason why the right hon. and learned Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson) and his friends liked the clause so much. The answer the Irish Members received in the House, when they brought forward facts such as those which had been mentioned that evening in respect of Mr. Joseph Johnson, was that it was not the business of the Executive to interfere between the magistrates and the discharge of their duties. Further than that, the Queen's Bench in Dublin had systematically refused relief, and an obsolete Act of Parliament was brought forward, under which it was contended that the magistrates had acted legally. Although such decisions would have been upset at once in England, this was the sort of jugglery played off in Ireland, and the Court of Queen's Bench would not interfere to restrict the eccentricities of the magistrates, and the people against whom the power of the magistrates was brought into force could get no satisfaction at all. Without committing himself to any definition, he would say that he was prepared to the utmost of his ability to insist, as long as the Government provided that prisoners charged with these offences should be tried before a Court of Summary Jurisdiction consisting of landlord magistrates, that there should be a clear definition of what was to be a crime, and what was not to be a criminal act.

MR. GIBSON

said, he only desired to say one word in support of the clause; but he was bound to say that he concurred in the view which had been put forward by the learned Attorney General (Sir Henry James) in reference to the Act of 1875, especially when he found the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon) dissenting from that view. With all the other qualifications possessed by the hon. Member for Tipperary, he had not had the misfortune of a legal education. If he had had, he would have felt that the natural construction of the clause was that which the Attorney General (Sir Henry James) had put upon it, and it would require a great deal more argument than he had yet heard to twist it so as to make it bear the construction suggested by the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon). He (Mr. Gibson) had carefully examined the clause during the observations of the hon. Member for Tipperary with an anxiety to see if he was able to give any support to the doubt which existed in the hon. Member's mind. He felt himself unable to do so, and it was only proper that, as a member of the Legal Profession, he should say that he found it impossible to arrive at a conclusion differing from that stated by the Attorney General (Sir Henry James) in reference to this matter. There was one observation which ought to be made in reference to the speech which had been delivered by the hon. Member for Tipperary. The hon. Member had demonstrated the absolute necessity of the last paragraph of the clause, because the hon. Member said that to ordinary minds the word intimidation would only import threats by violence.

MR. DILLON

said, that was not what he had stated at all. What he had said was that, placed in conjunction with the context of the English Act, that impression was created in his mind.

MR. GIBSON

said, that if the hon. Member for Tipporary had not been speaking in reference to this clause, ho would have passed the matter by altogether. He wished, however, to say one word in reference to the particular Amendment of the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell). Anyone who had recognized the ingenuity of the Irish intellect would readily see that if the four particular modes of "Boycotting" which had been mentioned were put in the Bill, the Government would soon find it necessary to define six or seven other methods which would not be covered by the clause. He, therefore, ventured to think that the Amendment of the hon. Member threw an amount of responsibility upon Her Majesty's Government which was scarcely fair and reasonable; and after the discussion which had taken place he hoped the hon. Member would withdraw the Amendment, or, as the hon. Member was not present, somebody authorized on his behalf would withdraw it. The hon. Member seemed to be anxious to have it declared that those matters which were clearly criminal should be made crimes. He (Mr. Gibson) had no objection to these four offences being declared to be crimes within the meaning of the Bill; but he did not think that an exhaustive definition of intimidation ought to be introduced.

LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE

said, he wished to point out to the Committee that there was an inconsistency, if not a difference of opinion, between what had fallen from the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon) and what had been said by the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) at an earlier stage of the proceedings. It would be in the recollection of the Committee that a short time ago he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) had specifically asked the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) this question—whether, assuming that he had correctly understood the Attorney General (Sir Henry James) to offer to withdraw the words defining intimidation at the end of the clause, he would be willing to accept that offer on the part of the Attorney General; and also to add to the clause certain words, not in substitution or in limitation of the expression "intimidation," but constituting a description of those offences which he considered should be specifically made criminal, in the same way as in the English Act, or, rather, in the General Act known as the Employers' and Workmen's Act? In that Act intimidation had been loft as an open offence in the 1st sub-section. While certain specific offences—such offences as those popularly known as rattening, and others— were rendered criminal and punishable in a certain manner by the subsequent provisions of the Act, there was no other definition of intimidation. In reply to the question he had put to the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell), the hon. Member, after consulting those whom he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) felt he did not misdescribe as his Law Officers, said that ho (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) and others who sat on the Liberal side of the House were mistaken. Now, ho was glad he was speaking in the presence of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Southwark (Mr. Cohen), who heard what passed, and who, in a matter involving rather complicated points of law, was better able to follow the questions that were raised than he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) was, because he need hardly say that on questions of law he was only able to speak with very great submission. Now, the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy) came forward—as he had a perfect right to do —and, in the absence of the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell), moved the Amendment which stood on the Paper in the name of the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell), in the shape and in the very words in which it stood on the Paper; and it was because he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) observed a discrepancy and an inconsis- tency between what had fallen from the hon. Member for the City of Cork in the first instance and the words which had been placed on the Paper that he desired to see a little light thrown on the question. How did the matter stand? What were the admissions and intentions of hon. Members opposite? Did the hon. Member for Tipperary Mr. Dillon) represent the wishes and desires of hon. Members opposite, or did the hon. Member for the City of Cork; or had the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon) moved the Amendment in order to elicit the opinion of the Committee generally? He knew that the hon. Member had a perfect 'right to move the Amendment as it stood on the Paper; but what he wanted to get at was the views and intentions of hon. Members opposite, because they had the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) rising in his place, and stating, in reply to a question, one particular view, and then they had the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon), who was also high in the confidence of hon. Members opposite, immediately afterwards taking an entirely different view. The result was that those who were most anxious to do all they could to meet the legitimate views of hon. Members opposite on Irish questions were naturally placed at a very great disadvantage.

MR. DILLON

rose to explain the difficulty in which the noble Lord opposite (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) appeared to be placed. The noble Lord seemed to be under the impression that because his hon. Friend the Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) accepted the declaration of the Attorney General (Sir Henry James) he had got all he wanted, and that that would have been a sufficient alteration of the clause. Now, the hon. Member for the City of Cork did not intend to say anything of the kind. They understood from the speech of the Attorney General (Sir Henry James) that he would be willing, on behalf of the Government, without exacting any condition whatever, to withdraw the definition of intimidation contained in the latter part of the clause, from line 25 to line 29; and his hon. Friend the Member for Cork stated, on behalf of the Irish Members generally, that they would be prepared to accept that withdrawal.

LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE

said, that that was not quite the objection that was raised. It was correct as far as it went; but what the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) said was that he wished to follow the analogy of the English Act, and the English Act constituted specific offences, in reference to what was popularly known as rattening and other matters. These offences were not included in the definition of intimidation, but were made distinct and separate offences. He wished to know whether, if the Committee added these words relating to specific offences, following the analogy of the English Act, hon. Members opposite were prepared to stand by the Amendment on the Paper, when an intimation had been given that the Government were prepared to follow, in that respect, the analogy of the English Act?

MR. DILLON

said, he understood now the point that was raised. He had supported the Amendment as it stood on the Paper; and he had explained his views at the time, stating why he thought there was a necessity that as strong a definition should be given in the present Bill as in the English Act. The hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) had expressed himself as inclined to withdraw his demand for a definition of intimidation, if the Government would follow the analogy of the English Act; but he had gone on to explain that reasons existed in Ireland why there should be even a more strict definition than in England, among those reasons being the difference in the tribunal by which the offence was to be tried.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, he had not happened to be present when the dispute arose about the nature of the Attorney General's (Sir Henry James's) offer, and therefore he would not venture to make any remark on the subject; but he considered it highly probable, without any disrespect to the hon. and learned Gentleman himself, but simply from the general action of the Government in regard to this Bill, that the offer of the Attorney General was one that was not worth accepting. At the same time, he (Mr. O'Donnell) was afraid he could not quite support the whole of the Amendment of the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell). This clause pro- posed to make liable to the provisions of the Act any person who used intimidation, or incited any other person to use intimidation, and the hon. Member for the City of Cork proposed to insert after "intimidation," the words, "by posting or circulating notices of an illegal character." Now, who was to say whether the notices were or were not of an illegal character? Illegality was a very wide term, and if the illegality of a notice was to be determined by an irresponsible Bench of magistrates, acting summarily, he was afraid there would be but small guarantee for the liberty of the subject. Again, the hon. Member for the City of Cork proposed to make penal a public proclamation by bell or otherwise inciting odium against persons, and placing them under a ban. He altogether denied the right of any Government to interfere in a matter of this kind. If a number of persons considered that there was another person, who was an enemy to the community, and who was acting injuriously to the interests of the community, he said it was the common right of such persons to point out the wrong-doer, and exhort all good citizens to enter into a league against him; and if they did no act of violence, but simply struggled to send him to Coventry, to black-ball him, to avoid his society, and to make him feel that he had earned the detestation of honest men, he failed to see why they should be punished in consequence. Suppose, for instance, they had to deal with a notorious usurer in a district. He believed there were a good many of these notorious usurers in London. Well, there were some usurers in Ireland also, and if that fact were known to the community, and if it could be shown that there were persons who were likely to be victims of a scoundrel of this description, it was not only right, but it became their duty to make a proclamation, either by bell or otherwise, so as to put the country on its guard against that usurer, and to advise all honest men to send him to Coventry, and to hold aloof from him, simply as a protection of the interests of the rest of the community. It would be perfectly monstrous that putting a usurer under a ban of this kind should be an offence punishable with six months' hard labour. It was the right and duty of everyone to single out a public offender, even although he might not technically be a criminal, as offending against the general body of the community. Then, again, under this Amendment, it was proposed to make an offence, to be punished under the powers of the Bill, of wrongfully and illegally holding a man up to odium. Who was to interpret the wrongfully and illegally hold a person up to public odium? The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. John Bright) had held up a good many persons to public odium in the course of his life; but he (Mr. O'Donneli) should be sorry if any act of that kind rendered the right hon. Gentleman liable to six months' imprisonment with hard labour. Nevertheless, under this Bill a man would be liable to six months' imprisonment with hard labour for doing the same thing as had obtained for the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster no small portion of his political eminence. If a man was held up to public odium, in most cases, if the odium was not deserved, it would not fall upon him, and where it did fall upon him it very often happened that it was very well deserved. The fourth section of the Amendment of his hon. Friend the Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) he could heartily support. In that section his hon. Friend proposed that there should be an explicit offence under the Bill in every case where violence or threats of violence were used to any person or persons. There he was entirely with his hon. Friend the Member for the City of Cork. Violence or threats of violence were things to be put down; but he said it was right, and very often must be a duty, to hold up persons to public odium, that it was often right, and might be a duty, to make a public proclamation calling upon the community at largo to place a certain person under a ban. Persons of infamous character or of infamous houses, ought rightly to be placed under the ban of the community generally; and, as to circulating and posting notices of an illegal character, he was not prepared to allow one of the magistrates who were to form the proposed tribunal to have the power of declaring notices to be illegal, and of thus creating, under the general provisions of the Act, as many separate offences as there might be separate notices on which they had to adjudicate in the fulfilment of their functions. He did not think that the adoption of the proposed Amendment would really amount to the promotion of public liberty, and he would suggest that a safer and more regular way of testing the bona fides of the Government would be by specifically inserting in the clause extracts from the general law relating to intimidation in England, and allowing the Irish people to practise the same kind of intimidation as was allowed to the English people to practise. These provisions ought to be taken bodily out of the Act of 1875, and inserted in the present Bill, and he had no doubt they would then have the satisfaction of seeing the Government voting against granting to the Irish people the same power of combination as had been granted to the English people. He had said on the first reading of this Bill that he did not think it could be materially amended, but that the Irish Members ought to make use of every means in their power of exhibiting the true character of the Bill. He did not think the Amendment proposed by his hon. Friend the Member for the City of Cork was sufficiently well calculated to expose the character of the Bill, because it went too far in the way of concession, which, he thought, was one of the worst things Irish Members could assent to under present circumstances. He should not vote for Sub-sections 1, 2, and 3, but he should be happy to vote for Sub-section 4. He hoped Irish Members would do as little as possible towards meeting the views of the Government, and that they would contest and exhibit in the strongest light the general character of this Bill, and after that they would trust to all the resources of their nation and race at home and abroad to bring it and its author into hatred and contempt.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he thought the speech of the hon. Member who had just spoken would be very convincing to the Committee.

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

asked whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman, who regarded the hon. Member's speech as convincing, would accept the three sub-sections?

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

The hon. Member disapproved of three out of the four, and supported only the fourth.

MR. LEAMY

said, he thought the disapproval of these sub-sections would be a recommendation of them to the Home Secretary. The hon. Member for the City of Cork, by the Amendment, wished to test the desire of the Government to effect a real prevention of intimidation. The Home Secretary had admitted that he proposed to create perfectly new offences in Ireland. If that was to be done, Irish Members had a right to ask that the new offences should be strictly defined. Under this clause it was quite possible that any -single word a man might say, respecting the character, or conduct, or business of another, would be held to be a crime, for which the man might be sentenced to six months' imprisonment. The only Gentleman who spoke in favour of the clause, as it stood, was the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson), who was quite satisfied with this clause. Any magistrate would be safe who held that any word spoken in hostile criticism against a person was an offence against the Act. The Government had promised to give the right of appeal to persons convicted under the Act by magistrates, and that was a very considerable gain, and he was sure that it would be a right that would bo used by people who had the means of appealing; but a great many of the people likely to come under the Act were too poor to appeal, and, consequently, they would be at the mercy of the magistrates. Under this Amendment a magistrate would be able to put down every case which the Home Secretary said ought to be put down in Ireland; but the Government had refused to accept the Amendment, and appeared to be resolved to give to the magistrates powers which they never before possessed, and ought not to be intrusted with. It would be much more honest if the Government proposed a clause that it should be lawful for every Resident Magistrate to send any man in his district to prison for six months with hard labour. When the hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon) said that if the people were to be expected to observe the law they should be told exactly what the law was, the Home Secretary said "Hear, hear!" as if he agreed in that opinion; but when he rose to speak later on he contended that intimidation was of such a Protean character that it was utterly impossible for the Committee to define it. How, then, could the poor Irish people know what it was? It would be impossible for any man to say a word about his neighbour without running the risk of six months' imprisonment. If the magistrates in Ireland were like those in England, and had sympathy with the people and with public rights, and would not strain the law against the people, they might be trusted; but it was very well known that there were magistrates in Ireland who would go into Court prejudiced against the people, and the paid magistrates of the Government were always desirous of obtaining convictions. Anyone who had ever attended Petty Sessions Courts in Ireland had seen how the unpaid magistrates were often inclined to let the accused people go away; but the Resident Magistrates nearly always insisted on a conviction. The magistrates under this Act would feel bound to justify the confidence which the Government reposed in them, and to procure as many convictions as possible. That would create disaffection. Hon. Gentlemen often said they wished to bring about a state of things in Ireland under which the people would respect the law; but how could they expect to get that respect when the law was to depend on the magistrates who administered it? Everybody know it would depend on the class of magistrates who were appointed; yet, at the same time, the people were expected to have respect for the law which they knew would be turned into an engine of oppression against them by the men set over them. He, of course, supported the Amendment of his hon. Friend, which went very far indeed. He was convinced that under that Amendment the magistrates would be able to put down every offence that ought to be put down. He was convinced that under at least one or two of the sub-sections of the Amendment magistrates who were opposed to the people could go very far to oppress them; still, as the Amendment would, to some extent, define the offences, and inform the people what would not bring them under the Act, he should support the Amendment.

DR. COMMINS

said, he was inclined to support the Amendment on the principle of choosing the least of two evils, although, in it self, he thought it would be a considerable evil. With regard to the first section, the decision whether a document was legal or illegal was generally one of the most difficult tasks that the Superior Courts had to perform; and, consequently, it would be a question almost beyond the capacity of the Justices who would have to administer the Act. Then, with regard to public proclamations by bell to place persons under ban, there were plenty of people who might very properly and justly be placed under a ban—persons whom every moralist in the pulpit would place under a ban. Under the second section of the Amendment, no person in the world could denounce the instigators of vice and immorality, and no clergyman could exercise what everybody expected him to exercise—namely, full power of condemning vice. Then, again, with regard to holding people up to public odium, that would be liable to the same objection; but the fourth section he could support, and although the other sections were open to many objections, the Amendment was far superior to the clause itself. He should desire to look at this matter from the point of view of a lawyer, and a more severe condemnation had not been pronounced on the clause than by the Attorney General. When asked to define the offences which this clause proposed to create, he simply said, "Intimidation being a general term, it could not be defined. "He (Dr. Commins) would not go into the logic of that statement, but there did not exist a general term in our language which did not admit of a definition; and the Attorney General must have forgotten all his logic when he laid down that proposition. Probably the Attorney General meant the offences could not be defined; but there, again, there was no offence known to the English law-—say, from assault, which was probably the smallest of all kinds, up to treason or murder—which was not already defined in the most rigid way, and the definition of which did not form a guide to the Judges whenever appeals were made or cases were reserved. Therefore, by the words of the Attorney General himself, this clause was condemned. Suppose intimidation could not be exactly defined; suppose intimidation was a kind of loose term; or that the offence was composed of a number of acts, even a thing that could not be logically defined might be described; and even where description might be at fault, it could be pretty well met by an enumeration of instances, as inductive logicians were in the habit of saying. In the 4th clause there was no definition at all. It merely said that any condition of what everybody would understand to be intimidation, according to the ordinary meaning of the word in a dictionary, ought to include a number of things. That was neither description, enumeration, nor definition, but only made confusion worse confounded; because, in addition to the indefinite meaning that might be attached to the word intimidation, it included a number of things, the very nature of which might give rise to a dispute. Here was the gravest condemnation of the indefinite character of the clause pronounced by the Attorney General when he said it was incapable of definition. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson) said that was exactly what he wanted. That was an extraordinary' declaration to make, but it was practically what he meant— that the clause should be left indefinite. Surely, in this country, with our centuries of liberty, and our Acts, and our system of regulating conduct by law, we knew what was the difference between having people subject to arbitrary power and subject to law. The object of law was to restrain arbitrary power, and if he was to take the object of this Act from the right hon. and learned Member, it was to go contrary to all the traditions of English law and liberty for the purpose of establishing arbitrary power in the hands of men who were hostile to those whom they might have to try, and who would be strongly tempted to abuse that power. He could not conceive anything more iniquitous than that a person should be brought under the lash of the law for an offence which he never contemplated, which he was unconscious of doing, against which the law had not warned him beforehand, and which no human ingenuity could have discovered to exist. The whole scope of this section tended to the establishment of arbitrary power; to give to magistrates the power of convicting for offences which the law did not define or describe. It had been said that the clause would be interpreted by the Act of 1875, but that was not so. Section 7 of the Conspiracy Act of 1875 actually evaded, and effectually evaded, the very evil that this Amendment was directed against. That section provided that— Every person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing wrongfully, and without legal authority, uses violence or intimidates such other person. Under that Act there must be a corpus delicti. That was one of the first principles of the Criminal Law. No person could be convicted of an offence until it was proved that the offence was committed. There must be a corpus delicti. In this Bill there was no corpus delicti. There need be no person whatever against whom an act of intimidation was intended. In other words, there need be no corpus delicti, and there need be no offence. That was like convicting a man for the murder of a man who was still alive. That had happened in England. This Bill would punish people for intimidation without any intimidation having taken place, and without the necessity for any person to come and say that he was intimidated, or to show that an act of intimidation was intended against any particular person or persons. That would leave it entirely in the power of the magistrates to convict anybody whatever of an act of intimidation. Then it would be open to Irish criticism that the Court of Queen's Bench, which was supposed to see that the law was properly administered, would have no power to interfere with such convictions. The hon. Member for Tipperary (Mr. Dillon) said he could not understand why the Court of Queen's Bench refused to interfere in cases of that kind; but if the hon. Member had been learned in the law, he would have understood that there was in the law a principle by which Courts never interfered, under any circumstances, to overrule the discretion of magistrates. It was an especial rule in the law that where discretion was given by the law to inferior magistrates it was assumed to have been exercised correctly, and no Court would overrule that discretion. Therefore, the Court of Queen's Bench was not only within its rights, but was acting within laws prescribed by the Act of Edward III. in not interfering with the discretion of magistrates. Neither could that Court interfere with the magistrates in committing people to six months' hard labour upon what they might find to be an act of intimidation, but which nobody else could find to be such an act. Upon those grounds he considered the clause without modification, without either enumeration or description of what "Boycotting" was, or what was to be an act of intimidation, would simply establish by law arbitrary power to be placed, not in the hands of an Emperor or a Loris Melikoff, or men of such high position and character as would furnish a guarantee that they would exercise the power in a judicious way, but in the hands of men who had the strongest temptation to use that power for the persecution of the people. Therefore, although he considered the Amendment imperfect, he should support it on the whole.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he wished to appeal to the Committee with regard to this Amendment. He did not think that it had received very strong support from even the Benches opposite; but, at all events, the Committee was in a position to decide upon it. The hon. Member opposite (Dr. Commins) urged that there should be a definition of intimidation in the Bill; but the Amendment provided no definition. Lower down, however, there was a proposal to define intimidation, and that could be discussed when it was reached. The Amendment did not give what the hon. Member desired, and nobody but himself had the courage to attempt it. All that the Amendment touched was the question of the method by which intimidation was not to be carried out. The fault of that was that if half-a-dozen methods were included, there might be a dozen methods behind which were left out. It was generally admitted by the Committee that intimidation ought not to be allowed, and he would give an instance of the practice. A blacksmith, having shod a horse for a policeman, might be "Boycotted" by everybody else in the village, and in that way he would be ruined.

MR. O'DONNELL

asked if the right hon. and learned Gentleman could give an instance of a blacksmith who had rendered himself unpopular to a whole village; and, if so, what the Government proposed to do with the whole village?

SIR. WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, the people who persecuted the blacksmith would be proceeded against, and he should like to be able to deal with those who incited the people of the village. Those were the persons against whom the Bill was specially directed. If ho could catch the person who advised the whole village not to deal with the blacksmith who had shod the horse for the policeman, that was the man he should like to deal with, and that was the sort of man against whom this clause was directed. It was those who incited men to wrong others against whom this Bill was principally directed, and it was quite plain that if the Committee consented to include two, three, or four methods of ruining other people they would leave many other methods outside the Bill.

MR. DILLON

said, he thought this Amendment really touched the whole question. He would give an illustration of the subject which had come within his own experience. A certain lawyer had made himself exceptionally obnoxious to the people by putting himself forward as the agent for cruel evictions; and he (Mr. Dillon), speaking at a large meeting in the country, recommended the people to withdraw their patronage from that individual, and he was informed that he had now left the country.,: Should he, for giving that advice, come within the Act?

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, as the Home Secretary could not define intimidation under this Act, he would put two cases, and ask whether they would come under the general definition of intimidation. It was admitted that there were a great many instances in which landlords had charged such rents that the tenants were unable to live and thrive under them. Supposing that the tenants of such a landlord were to agree that they would rather throw up their holdings than pay the rent, and further agreed that, if any one of their number should refuse to throw up his holding, they would decline to hold any further social intercourse with him; would these people be rendered liable to penalties under the Act? There was another case which would come home to the Home Secretary and the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General. It was the habit of the Bar in England and in Ireland to refuse to hold any social intercourse, and to refuse to hold any brief with any man who advertised that he was prepared to take under one guinea for his opinion. He would like to know whether that was not "Boy- cotting, "according to the explanation of it that the Home Secretary himself had given. Perhaps the Home Secretary would tell them, a poor tenant joining with others to prevent unfair rents being refused, and to refuse to hold social intercourse with anyone who would not join with him. was to he subject to six months' imprisonment, and whether if a barrister, or an assembly, or an association of barristers, called, he believed, "the Mess Circuit," were to declare that he or they would absolutely round on anyone of the mess who advertised he was prepared to take half a sovereign for his opinion, which, very likely, was not worth twopence, they would be subject to six months' imprisonment.

THE CHAIRMAN

I must point out to the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) that not one of the cases he has mentioned has anything to do with the Amendment. We are now upon a distinct Amendment, and we must keep to it.

MR. METGE

said, he would not have ventured to address the Committee had it not been for some observations which had fallen from the Home Secretary. The right hon. and learned Gentleman objected to these words being introduced, and said they had not come to the part of the clause where a definition of intimidation could be entertained.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, he did not mean to say that. What he said was, they had not come to any Amendment which professed to be a definition of intimidation until they came to- the Amendment of the hon. Member who last spoke.

MR. METGE

said, he understood the present Amendment to be in the direction of the manner in which they wished to limit the construction of the clause. The Committee must remember that only a few nights ago the Attorney General for Ireland said, in reply to a question which was addressed to him, that nobody in the world had any control of the magistrates in Ireland, and he afterwards qualified his answer by saying "except the Queen's Bench." They knew that in the majority of cases the control of the Queen's Bench was entirely delusive. The Home Secretary had said, in answer to a question of the hon. Member for Dungarvan (Mr. O'Donnell), that in case of extreme "Boycotting"—in the case, for instance, of a blacksmith to whom the whole village refused to give work—he would hold the man who originally incited the people of the district to "Boycott" the man, he would hold him to be the man against whom they ought to proceed. He (Mr. Metge) would say that such a man could be proceeded against under any of the subsections which the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) wished to introduce in the clause. No one seemed to think that the sub-sections of the hon. Member were not wide enough. What the Irish Members felt, and what he himself felt very strongly, was that there should be some distinct definition of the crime of intimidation. He did not wish to defend extreme "Boycotting;" but he certainly would like to know how far the people of Ireland were justified in using what he must say was the only weapon they had with which to defend themselves in the agitation which now existed in Ireland. Certainly, his political career had been short; but he had never said a single word, in or out of Ireland, in favour of "Boycotting." He had never done so, because he felt it would be a dangerous weapon; yet he felt it was the only weapon with which the tenant farmers of Ireland could maintain their position in the war they were waging with the landlord class, backed up, as that class was, by the police and all the moral force of opinion in the House of Commons and in England. He had asked himself the question—"Are the Government really in earnest in their desire to put down crime in Ireland?" Did the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. John Bright) imagine for one moment that by passing measures of this sort they could put down a crime with which the whole people of Ireland had a certain sympathy with? No one could deny that that sympathy existed. The way to meet the difficulty was not to debate what intimidation was, and what use could be made of "Boycotting," but to lay down a distinct line within which the people of Ireland could proceed.

MR. BARRY

said, he rose to emphasize the point raised by his hon. Friend (Mr. Metge). The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary, in replying, a few moments ago, to the hon. Member for Dungarvan (Mr. O'Donnell) said that, in the case of a tradesman who was "Boycotted" by an entire village, the effect of the Act would be to punish the man who incited to the "Boycotting." That being the opinion of the right hon. and learned Gentleman, he could fairly ask him to support the portion of the Amendment which said that a man should be guilty of intimidation who— By making public proclamation by bell or otherwise inciting others to place any person or persons under a ban. It was perfectly clear that the Amendment of the hon. Member for the City of Cork would bring within the operation of the Act any person who incited the people of a town to place a blacksmith or any other tradesman under a ban. It would be generally admitted there was nothing more dangerous to personal liberty than an indefinite definition of the Criminal Law; and certainly nothing could be more indefinite than this clause as it now stood. As the clause was at present framed, every man, woman, and child in Ireland was liable to be imprisoned for six months for any word spoken or any act done, no matter how innocently they might have spoken or acted, if, in the opinion of the presiding magistrate, their words or acts brought them within the purview of the Act. If it was necessary in the English Act of 1875 to safeguard the liberties of the people by a series of definitions, it was certainly ten times more necessary that that should be done in the case of Ireland. In England, the magistrates, on the whole, were in general sympathy with the masses of the people; but no one would contend for a moment that the same condition of things existed in Ireland. It was notorious that the magistrates in Ireland were openly and bitterly hostile to the people; and, therefore, he repeated that if it was considered necessary in the English Act of 1875, dealing with Trades' Unions, to insert for safety a series of definitions, it was ten times more necessary to do so in the present case. There seemed to be an idea on the part of some hon. Members that the sub-section of the 7th clause of the Bill of 1875, instead of defining intimidation, created a new offence. He was of opinion that that was an entirely wrong interpretation of the Act of 1875. By the defini- tions which were contained in the Act of 1875, it was rendered impossible for magistrates to possess the wide and discretionary power which the Irish magistracy would possess under the clause they were now discussing. Under this clause it was possible for a magistrate to send anyone to prison upon any conceivable pretence—any word spoken in haste, any angry gesture; in fact, any conceivable act or word would bring a man within the operation of the clause, and they knew from very recent experience what peculiar notions and ideas the Irish magistrates and Irish police had as to what constituted crime. A short time ago, in one part of Ireland, a number of children were sent to prison, and a number of others fined, simply for whistling a tune in the street. He believed that in one instance a policeman swore solemnly that the whistling of a tune amounted, in his mind, to abusive language. Knowing that cases of this kind had occurred, not in the remote past, but quite recently, and knowing how prone the Irish magistrates were to take a hostile view of anything the people did, the Irish Parliamentary Party were bound to insist upon the adoption by the Government of some such definitions as were now proposed by the hon. Member for the City of Cork. A great deal had been said in the course of the debate upon the practice of "Boycotting." One would imagine that no such thing as "Boycotting" existed in England. He knew very well that in connection with Trades' Unions in England "Boycotting" was in force every day. It was not' an uncommon thing when a strike took place that a minority of the workmen in the particular trade in which the strike occurred were opposed to the strike. He had relatives of his own who were workmen, and he knew that they had been opposed to a strike; but they dare not for their lives resist the dictum of the trade with which they were connected. Would anyone tell him that certain practices of Trades' Unions did not involve "Boycotting" of a far more sweeping nature, and of a far more perfectly organized nature, than any "Boycotting" which existed in Ireland? He thought it might shorten the proceedings of the Committee very much if the Government made an open and frank declaration that the object of the Bill was not so much to deal with "Boycotting" and other crimes, as it was to put down political combination of any kind in Ireland. If the Government insisted upon carrying the clause without introducing a definition of any kind, it would be impossible for the Irish people to come to any other conclusion than that the real intention of the Government was to put down political combination of every and any kind in Ireland. During the short time he had been a Member of the House he had heard it frequently hurled at the Irish people that one of their greatest failings was their disrespect for the law. Wherever the law was disrespected it was a lamentable and deplorable fact; but how could England hope there to be any respect for the law in Ireland when the whole range and scope of the law was vested in men who were known to be bitterly opposed to the people? How could they expect respect for law when a Resident Magistrate, upon the mere word of a policeman, could send to prison a man who it was well known had committed no crime at all? Under this clause, not only was a magistrate empowered to determine whether certain acts sworn to had been committed, but he was given power to determine what was the intention of the man who was alleged to have committed the offence. When they were brought face to face with facts like these, and when they listened to the balmy platitudes about the spirit of justice in which this Act was framed, and when they were told that in regard to intimidation the people of Ireland were being dealt with in the same spirit in which the people of England were dealt with, he confessed he was very sceptical indeed. Although the Amendment of his hon. Friend the Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) went a very short way indeed to meet the necessities of the case, he would support it, because it was the lesser of two evils; he would support it, because it would help to circumscribe the discretionary power which was given to the magistrates as it now stood.

MR. JESSE COLLINGS

said, he thought that the request of the Irish Members, as embodied in the Amendment, was a very reasonable one, and one which ought to receive attention by a Liberal Government, especially when the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) had expressed his willing- ness to amplify the sub-sections he had proposed almost to any extent in the direction of securing what the Government had stated was their object to attain. The Irish Members, and, indeed, all the Members of the House, expressed themselves willing to put down "Boycotting" as far as it led, or was likely to lead, to outrage; but what the Representatives of Ireland objected to was that any expression of opinion, unaccompanied by violence, might be construed to be "calculated" to intimidate some person or persons, and thus the speaker might be brought within the action of the clause. The Irish Members simply asked that the law which Irishmen were expected to obey might be defined, and that the crimes for which they were to be punished might be explained to them so that they might know what to avoid, and thus escape the punishment which the clause provided. It was evident from the speeches they had heard that the Government wished to include in the clause exclusive dealing of a very simple character. Any doubt as to that point was removed when the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy) put a question directly to the Home Secretary as to whether a grocer who refused to sell a pound of sugar to a man would be affected by the clause. The reply of the Home Secretary was that it would depend upon the surrounding circumstances whether the men would come within the purview of the clause. That was an almost incredible statement to come from a Member of the Government, especially when they knew who were to be the judges of the surrounding circumstances. Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman name any circumstance that would justify a grocer in refusing to supply a pound of sugar to anyone? How was the grocer to know what were the surrounding circumstances which would make his action a crime or not a crime, as the case might be? It seemed to him that if they required a person to keep himself free from crime they were bound to give him some direction as to the manner in which he must do it. Surely the statements of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell) and the hon. and learned Member for Christ-church (Mr. Horace Davey) ought to have some weight with the Government, for these Gentlemen were legal authori- ties of no mean order. These hon. and learned Members were of opinion that any word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, &c, would include every case of exclusive dealing apart from the circumstances. Were the Government, in the face of such opinion, going to create a crime which would revolt the common sense of the people? If so, to what extent did they expect their law would be obeyed? They had been told during this debate—and it had almost become a truism—that if the laws of a country were to be obeyed they must "square" with the moral sense of the people of the country, and all legislation would be in vain unless it proceeded in that direction. If exclusive dealing could never be made a crime in the eyes of the Irish people, the Government would find that the effect of making it so, in a legislative manner, would be to bring the law into contempt. They were told by the Home Secretary that the English people had been treated in the same way. That had been disputed; and there could be no doubt that the Act of 1875 rather seemed to define, or to give some direction to the people as to the crimes which they must avoid in order to escape punishment. It must be well known to every Member of the Government that no such clause as this could possibly be applied to English or Scotch legislation. The people would not have it, and no Government dare introduce it. In the present instance the Government were relying upon the anti-Irish feeling in the country, and somewhat upon their own popularity—both of which, he was bound to say, if they continued in their present courses, they would soon use up—to create a crime in Ireland which would never be regarded in England as a crime, and which would never be regarded in Ireland as a crime. When the clause was understood in England'—and it was becoming more understood day by day—he was persuaded the common sense of the people would revolt. The common fairness of the English people would shrink from inflicting such a law on the Irish nation. Again, it was stated by a Member of the Government—he believed by the Home Secretary—that they wanted to put nothing more on the Irish people than had been put on the English people. Upon that statement an influential Mem- ber on the Irish side of the House immediately challenged the Home Secretary by saying they would be content if the same rights were given to the people of Ireland as were now enjoyed by Trades Unionists in England. If the professions of the right hon. and learned Gentleman were sincere, he would accept the challenge, and make the two laws agree. Surely a man ought to know the law which he had to obey; at any rate, he ought to be able to find out what it was. It was quite true that the definition of intimidation was to be left in the hands of the Resident Magistrate; and it was equally true that the Irishman had no faith or confidence in the fairness and honesty of the men who had to try him. Now, as to exclusive dealing, unaccompanied by violence, or any threat of violence; because he took it that was what they were arguing about. He ventured to say there was more "Boycotting" in that sense in England than in Ireland. [Mr. Alderman LAWRENCE: No, no!] The hon. Member for the City of London said "No, no!" but that did not alter the fact. Any hon. Member who had lived in rural districts of England must know that in many districts people lived in an atmosphere of "Boycotting," in the sense ho had described—namely, "Boycotting" unaccompanied by violence or any threat of violence. He had known Sunday school treats from which children of Dissenters had been "Boycotted," and he knew of many instances in which tradesmen had been "Boycotted" because they did not vote at elections for certain sides. He knew that at elections in which he had taken a part there had been published and circulated throughout the district a printed list of all the tradesmen who had voted for the opposite side. All these things were "Boycotting" in the sense he had described; and how could it ever be put down? Let him put a case to the Committee. Suppose such a scene as that enacted at Ballina were to take place here. There would be a public meeting held to express indignation at the action of the police; yet the people who met would not be in terror of being cast into prison for six months with hard labour. The people of Ireland, however, under this Bill, could not assemble to criticize the acts of the police, as such acts ought to be criticized, without fear of imprisonment. Suppose an eviction of a more than ordinarily severe character had taken place, and suppose the men who could not look upon this sentence of death— as an eviction had been described by the Prime Minister himself—with perfect coolness, were to describe it in the same terms as the Prime Minister described it, what would happen? They would be subject to the penalty of this clause. In fact, after the passing of this Act, that House would be the only place where Irish grievances could be ventilated; and when there were about 80 or 90 Home Rulers returned that would not be a very bright outlook.

THE CHAIRMAN

I must point out that the hon. Member is discussing the whole clause, and not the particular Amendment before the Committee.

MR. JESSE COLLINGS

said, he was trying to show the necessity for a proper definition of what would constitute intimidation; and he was pointing out that such a definition was necessary in the case of a man who spoke about evictions in a manner in which, he believed, most men in the House—at any rate, those on the Liberal Benches—would speak of them if they occurred in England. The examples he had given were, to his mind, sufficient to show that the Government should assent to the request of the Irish Members, as embodied in the Amendment. He would not, however, refer to evictions further; but he would ask what would be the effect of the clause without some amendment? The hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy) might put some of his points in a very rough and, perhaps, an exaggerated manner; but the Committee had nothing to do with that; they had simply to ask them whether what he stated was true or not? What did the hon. Member say would be the effect of the clause if it passed without the Amendment, or some such Amendment, as that now before the Committee? He said the people, having no protection from the law, would seek to protect themselves; and outrage would be the direct consequence of the clause as it now stood. If that be true, it was obviously the duty of the Government to afford such protection to the people as would prevent a resort to outrage as a means of gaining their ends. He trusted the Government would make some concession on this point. Up to now they had made no sign that they intended to make the slightest concession; and, that being so, he did not know how they could blame the Irish Members for the delay which had taken place in the prosecution of the measure, or how they could expect the Irish Members to permit such a clause, unamended by some such Amendment as the present, to pass without the most strenuous endeavour on their part to prevent its enactment. Such a clause would not be permitted to apply to England, Scotland, or Wales; and he was inclined to think that as soon as the English people thoroughly understood its meaning — and he was happy to say they were fast comprehending it—they would protest against it, especially when it was proposed by a Liberal Government.

MR. CARTWRIGHT

said, he listened to the speech of the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Jesse Collings) with great regret. The hon. Gentleman had completely mistaken English Liberal opinion when he said that English Liberals would turn against the clause and against the Bill the more they understood their meaning. He had listened most attentively to the debate on this clause, and he believed that he had never heard more finespun definitions evolved with regard to anything than had been evolved in the course of this discussion. Let them look at the clause in the light of common sense, and it would be in the light of common sense that it would be administered by the magistrates upon whom the duty devolved. He maintained that in the definitions which were embodied in the 1st and 2nd sub-sections of the clause would be found everything that was necessary in order to arrive at what really came within the four corners of the process called "Boycotting." It had been said other definitions were wanted. They could not have an elaborate definition of a process which was so subtle, so insidious, and so ingenious. How could they cope with such a process except by a definition which was not specific? What he wanted to impress on the Government was, that the further they lost themselves in elaborate definitions, the less they would be able to meet the system of "Boycotting," which was the invention of the authors of the Land League. The Land League Leaders wanted, by some means or other, to preserve to themselves the practice of "Boycotting," and that was what he held it was the duty of the Government to resist. If there was any justification for a Bill like the present, it was that it should give the authorities in Ireland the power to meet with the specific danger which now existed in that country. He trusted the Government would not be induced to give way by such appeals as that just addressed to them by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Jesse Ceilings'), who, in this matter, did not represent the true Liberal, or even the true Radical, feeling of the country.

MR. R. T. REID

said, the attempt of the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) was, by certain sub-sections, to define the offence of intimidation. If the offence of intimidation was defined, the effect would be that the definition would be used, or might be used, by the persons against whom the clause was directed for the purpose of inventing modes of intimidation not included in the clause. He would ask any hon. Gentleman to consider whether the term "intimidation" was capable of exhaustive definition by any human being? In ordinary legal phraseology, such terms as fraud were not defined, and were never sought to be defined, for the very reason that if they kindly gave a fraudulent person a definition of the term fraud, he would immediately invent some method by which he could commit the offence without bringing himself within the words of the definition. He could not think for a moment that when the hon. Member for the City of Cork reflected, he would desire to insist upon his Amendment, which could not be an exhaustive definition of intimidation. He would tell the hon. Member that it was the opinion of many Gentlemen who desired to repress intimidation, and to include "Boycotting" in intimidation, that the words of the section were too wide, and would strike at some things which were not offences. They, however, did not think the proposal of the hon. Member for the City of Cork was the best that could be made to avoid the evil. The best way to meet the evil would be to adopt an Amendment which stood in the name of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Christchurch (Mr. Horace Davey). It was felt that by that, or some similar provision, it would be possible to prevent anything that was bond fide or honestly done coming within the purview of the clause.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

said, he quite agreed with the hon. Member (Mr. Reid) that it was impossible to define intimidation. It was precisely because it was impossible to define the term intimidation, and terms of that kind, that the English law had provided the protection of trial by jury for anybody charged with the offence. The Irish people were denied that protection by this Bill, and that was why he and his hon. Friends were urging the Government to assent to some limitation of the terms of an Act which the magistrates and police were to administer. The Home Secretary had informed the Committee that the great object of the clause was to put down "Boycotting." It appeared to him that there had been a good deal of nonsense talked about "Boycotting;" there had been far more twaddle talked about "Boycotting" than about anything else. He was in favour of "Boycotting." He believed that "Boycotting" was a natural, proper, and necessary remedy under certain circumstances, and he believed the people of Ireland were perfectly justified in having recourse to that weapon. But there was "Boycotting" and "Boycotting." The "Boycotting" which he justified was not the "Boycotting" which had been described by the Home Secretary or by the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant. Those right hon. Gentlemen had described the abuse of "Boycotting," and he would be anxious, as he believed every Member who sat around him would be anxious, to prevent "Boycotting" being used in the manner which had been so described. What was "Boycotting?" It was a social penalty for a social offence. If a man in this country committed a murder, or committed fraud, or committed perjury, or committed any disgraceful act which was a crime in the eye of the law, he was punished accordingly. The offender was "Boycotted" pretty effectually, for in some cases he was sentenced to solitary confinement. There were, however, offences outside any legal definition which worked as much injury as any of the crimes known to the law, and in Ireland those offences were committed with impunity by men whom the Government —soldiers, police magistrates, and Chief Secretary, with their suspecting power-were only too ready to assist. What could the people do to defend themselves against these offenders if they were prohibited from using the natural weapon of "Boycotting?" A man who deceived his fellows by first of all joining an organization, or urged other men to join an organization, and take up a certain attitude against their oppressors, and then renounced his promises, was a traitor, and deserved the term of traitor. A man who went to bid for a farm— ["Oh, oh!"] Yes; he did not say one thing in Ireland and another thing in that House, and what he had said elsewhere he was prepared to say here. A man who went behind the back of his neighbour and bid for his farm, although he might have promised the organization to which they both belonged that he would take a totally different course, was a knave and a scoundrel. Such a man ought to meet with his deserts; he had been guilty of a social offence, and deserved a social penalty. If he knew such a man, and he had a flour store or a meal store, or a butcher's shop, he was justified in refusing—and he would refuse—to have anything to do with him, and if the man came to his store for food, he would refuse to serve him. He maintained that no law could compel him to serve a man against his will. It mattered nothing to him that other butchers, or bakers, or grocers in the same district did the same as he did. It might be that the man could not get food in the district—so much worse for the man —it was no reason that he should serve him. If the fellow chose to be a traitor to his neighbours, let him go elsewhere. But while he maintained the right of communities to adopt measures of that kind, he was perfectly free to confess that the man who used personal violence, or threats of personal violence, against the offender, or against anyone belonging to him, or against his property, was acting in a totally different way; he was abusing "Boycotting," and ought to be punished. He did not propose to screen a man who abused "Boycotting;" but he maintained that a reasonable and proper use of a natural and necessary weapon ought not to bring a man within the purview of this law. The Home Secretary told them he meant to put down "Boycotting" of every description, and he brought in this clause to effect that object. But would he effect that object? Not a bit. The Home Secretary knew perfectly well that no Act of Parliament could put down "Boycotting." If "Boycotting" was a natural outcome of the public sentiment of a district, they might pass a hundred Acts of Parliament, and they would never put it down. It went over a district searching in every part like the breeze; public opinion was formed gradually and imperceptibly, like the dawn of the morn, and they could not catch it in any part. They could not, by Act of Parliament or by police regulations, prevent it; and though they might attach great importance to the clause, in the hope of putting down "Boycotting," they would miserably fail. They would enable the magistrates and the police, and the landlord classes, whose creatures the Government were, to trample upon the people of Ireland; they would enable the authorities to terrorize most vexatiously over the people amongst whom they were stationed; they would give the power of a tyrannical search into every department of life, and to scrutinize every action, however innocent; they would enable them to interpret every look, and every word, and every action of every man, woman, and child as intimidation. It was this tyranny that the hon. Member for the City of Cork wished to guard against. He proposed to do that by defining what the offences were which should be considered to fall under a fair interpretation of the clause. It did appear to him that the definition or explanation which his hon. Friend proposed to insert were sufficiently comprehensive. The hon. Gentleman, however, was prepared to go further, and to accept any further explanation or modification which the Government might choose to propose. His (Mr. Arthur O'Connor's) principal objection to the proposal was, that it still left the people without that protection which was afforded by the English law to an English offender under like circumstances; in England they were so anxious to protect the man who was charged with an undefined offence, that they guaranteed to him the protection of trial by jury. Years ago, when an offence was committed which would come under this clause, the House of Lords consulted the Judges as to whether the meaning of a threatening letter should be decided by the Judge or by the jury —it was on the occasion of the House of Lords' Committee on Fox's Bill. The Judges gave it as their unanimous opinion that the matter should be left to the Judge, and not to the jury; but Fox's Bill provided, in a special clause, that it should be loft to the jury to decide the meaning of a threatening letter. If the British were so anxious to secure these safeguards for offences in their own country, why did they refuse the Irish people the same protection? They told the Irish people that they were anxious the same laws should prevail in Ireland as in England, and the Attorney General told them the other day that this clause was drawn on the lines and in the spirit of the English law. It was an entire departure from the spirit and lines of the English law; it created new offences, and it dealt with them in a much more summary, arbitary, and cruel way than offences of a like character were dealt with in England. These were the objections he had to the clause as it stood, and it seemed to him that the Amendment of his hon. Friend the Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) was a very moderate one.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

said, no one could deny that the hon. Member for the City of Cork was within his right in making the proposal which had now for some considerable time been under discussion by the Committee; but he thought they must feel that the merits of that proposal had been now canvassed very fully, and that they, after all, were as likely to be able to come to a decision upon that particular proposal at this moment as they would be after any number of hours of further discussion. The real truth was, they were not discussing the proposal of the hon. Member for the City of Cork. Upon that almost everything had been said that was likely to be said, and for a long time it had been merely taken as a point of departure. They were engaged in discussing the merits of the whole clause, and the advisability of dealing with the offence of "Boycotting." The natural feelings of vexation which must be felt at the waste of time by a long discussion in trivial points would be very much aggravated if it was felt that an opportunity was taken, and an excuse was made, upon each and every small point which was raised in this way to discuss and re-discuss so large a question as that which was now before the Committee—he meant the question of stopping "Boycotting" altogether. Such speeches as those of the hon. Member for Queen's County (Mr. Arthur O'Connor), and of other hon. Gentlemen near him, were in direct opposition to that which had been declared to be the will of a very large majority of the Committee—namely, that effective measures should be taken to put down the offence of "Boycotting." Not only was that the feeling of a vast majority of the Committee, but it was unmistakably the feeling of the people of this country. They were not encouraged by what they heard, day by day, from Ireland; they were not encouraged to think that the reign of terror was at an end, so that they were likely to be able to dispense with exceptional legislation. Neither the accounts of crime committed, nor the failures of justice in cases where crime was brought before the tribunals in the ordinary way, encouraged them to believe that they could dispense with such legislation. Arguments which were founded upon an objection to exceptional legislation were arguments which men must take with this qualification—that the Committee had decided that they would adopt exceptional legislation, and that it was not enough to be told that this or the other point was contrary to the ordinary spirit of our laws, because they knew they were passing an exceptional Act in view of an exceptional state of circumstances. It was not right that the speeches that were made by hon. Gentlemen, in apology and praise of what was called the excellent system of "Boycotting," should be allowed to go unchallenged; it was not right that hon. Gentlemen should be allowed to take up the time of the Committee with such speeches when they were endeavouring to deal with such a question as the present. They knew perfectly well that the Government had undertaken this matter very much against their own natural inclination. ["No!"] Well, ho assumed that a Liberal Government disliked anything in the nature of exceptional law, or what was called coercion; but, whether that be so or not, he thought the general feeling would be that they would not have undertaken such a matter as this, laying aside, as they had been obliged to do, a great deal of other Business which they felt to be important and they were anxious to proceed with, if they had not been strongly convinced, in the responsible position they occupied, that a measure of this kind was necessary for the maintenance of peace in Ireland. He earnestly trusted the Committee would support the Government in carrying through the measure they had proposed, allowing, of course, a fair and full discussion of all proposals of a bona fide character, but disallowing time to be wasted by discussions, which all tended to the same point, and which, in point of fact, were all directed against that which the Committee had already decided upon—namely, to put down the offence of "Boycotting."

MR. MITCHELL HENRY

said, he thought the Committee was very much indebted to the hon. Member for Queen's County (Mr. Arthur O'Connor) for the speech he had delivered, because that speech showed how irreconcilable was the difference between the House of Commons and the hon. Members who advocated and justified "Boycotting." He (Mr. Mitchell Henry) took it that this clause was, in reality, a clause which, if carried in a proper and workable form, would prove the safeguard of the poor people of Ireland, who were suffering terrible tyranny from this very system of "Boycotting." He took it that the House of Commons, and the people of England and Scotland, and the respectable people of Ireland, were determined that "Boycotting" should be put down and rooted out from the face of the earth. "Boycotting," as it had been practised in Ireland—and he had said it before —indicated to his mind a condition of morality in that country, and on the part of those who adopted it, totally different from that which obtained amongst people who knew the real meaning of liberty. It seemed to him that many hon. Members who had talked loudly of liberty knew nothing of it, other than liberty to carry out their own laws, and to determine who should and who should not obey them. The hon. Member for Queen's County had said there were abuses of "Boycotting," and that he himself advocated a beneficial use of it. Well, he (Mr. Mitchell Henry) should like to ask the hon. Member who was to be the judge of what was an abuse? The only Judge in this country, or any country where the law was obeyed, was the law itself; and the very way in which the liberties of this country had been maintained had been by altering the law to suit the particular circumstances of the moment. The hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) and other hon. Members had frequently spoken of what they called the "English" Trades Union Act. There was no such thing as the "English" Trades Union Act. The "English" Trades Union Act was the "Irish" Trades Union Act. It applied equally to Ireland as to England, and it defined exactly in the same way for that country as for this the offence of intimidation. He had always held that if that Act had been put in force at the commencement of "Boycotting," things would never have come to the pass to which they had arrived. But that Act had not been put in force, and the consequence was that the ingenuity of those who avowed the system had devised new forms of "Boycotting" which were calculated to carry out their own views, but which had resulted, at the same time, in destroying freedom of contract and freedom of nearly every other kind in Ireland. He knew tradespeople in Ireland who had been ruined for no other reason than because they had paid their rents; and he had received, from Ireland the most pitiable and heartrending accounts of the condition of these men and their families, owing to that practice which the hon. Member had described as so praiseworthy. As for the poor tenants, hon. Members knew that there had been numbers of them who had been not merely ruined in their circumstances, but had been mutilated and even murdered under that system. "Boycotting," to be effectual, must be enforced, as they knew, by penalties. ["No, no !"] The hon. Member for Dungarvan (Mr. O'Donnell) said "No;" but he maintained the contrary. The first penalty, as had been said, was social ostracism; but when social ostracism did not answer, what followed? An hon. Member had spoken of "the dawn of the morning" when "Boycotting" commenced; and his reply was, whenever it had commenced, it was in the dead of the night that it finished and its terrible penalties were inflicted. His intention, in the best interests, as he believed, of the county he represented and the people to whom he belonged, was to support the Government in making this an effectual clause; and here he wished to point out a great inconsistency on the part of the hon. Member for the City of Cork, -who, a short time ago, professed himself ready to accept what he repeatedly called the "English" Act—but which they knew was not exclusively an English Act— and its definitions. The hon. Member, then, was willing to accept "intimidation," leaving it without definition.

An hon. MEMBER

A prisoner can claim a jury.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY

said, that was a practical example of the evil of referring to another Act of Parliament, when hon. Members did not know anything about the penalties in that Act. They were not enforced by juries at all; they were imposed by—

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

The 9th clause enables a man to claim a jury.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY

said, the great majority of the penalties were imposed summarily by the magistrates.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

They are not of necessity.

MR. MITCHELL HENEY

said, ho was not sure that he was right upon the point. But it was perfectly clear that in Ireland, if the Act was to be made workable at all, the cases must come, not before a jury, but a Court of Summary Jurisdiction; and what he would endeavour to do would be to make that Court of Summary Jurisdiction satisfactory. He would not intrust the provisions of this Act to ordinary magistrates sitting in all parts of Ireland; he had all along protested against the idea of intrusting these functions to the ordinary magistrates, and he would go any length to improve the status and qualification of the stipendiary magistrates who were to enforce the clause. It was a monstrous thing that a man who was not a lawyer—

THE CHAIRMAN

The hon. Member is now dealing with the 19th clause, which is not before the Committee.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY

said, he was discussing the actual terms of the 19th clause, it was true; but, in doing that, he was only following the example set him by right hon. Gentle- men on the Front Opposition Bench, who had made considerable observation upon that section. But he would pass away from that subject, and would say that the hon. Member for the City of Cork should, in the spirit of his declaration, accept the word "intimidation," and then follow with the series of offences which he thought ought to be punished, as was done in the Trades Union Act, which was applicable to both countries. But what the hon. Member proposed to do now was something that would limit the meaning of the word "intimidation," and that would, of course, enable hon. Members who approved of "Boycotting" to invent new methods of carrying out the principle which they thought so desirable. Do not let the Committee forget that they had had frequent declarations from the other side of the House that it was the intention of hon. Members to drive a carriage and four through this Bill when it became an Act. They knew every effort would be made to defeat the operation of the measure and to render it nugatory, and this would succeed unless the House of Commons took good care that the determination of the people of this country was carried out; that "Boycotting" should cease to exist in Ireland.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, he hoped he should not imitate the example of the Leader of the Opposition, who, after having been absent from the debate a large part of the evening, had proceeded to give the Committee a lengthened lecture, not a single word of which had referred to the Amendment of the hon. Member for the City of Cork now under discussion. The hon. Member for the County of Galway (Mr. Mitchell Menry) had stated that he was in favour of the clause passing the House as amended, as it put the law for preventing that objectionable intimidation in a good and workable form. Now, he (Mr. O'Donnell) was not in favour of the exact wording of the whole of the Amendment of the hon. Member for the City of Cork; but he was in favour of the clause being so amended as to make it more definite; or, in the words of the hon. Member for the City of Cork, more workable. He entirely agreed with the hon. Member for the County of Galway in saying that all kinds of violence, whether they went the length of mutilation and murder or not, should be rendered as impossible as any amount of ingenuity at the disposal of both sides of the House could make them; and, though the hon. Member for the county of Galway said that "Boycotting" could not be enforced without penalties, he (Mr. O'Donnell) held that the Committee ought to pass such a law which would entirely prevent the continued subsistence of all that part of "Boycotting" which depended upon penalties. Let no "Boycotting" subsist except that which consisted of opinion and not of violence. With these limits, the proposal of the Government would be admirable; without them, they could only be described, in the words of the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Jesse Collings), as consisting of an expression of anti-Irish hate which was too prevalent in England at the present moment. There was no question that the hon. Member for Ipswich was right; that this Bill would be regarded, if this unamended clause was accepted, as, above all things, a monument of anti-Irish prejudice, and that it represented nothing but the baser instincts of the English nature. He (Mr. O'Donnell) had been pleading, a short time ago, for a more exact limitation and expression, and, in fact, for a more workable form of the clause; but the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary had only replied to him with some jocose evasions. He had asked the right hon. and learned Gentleman what was he to do in the case of an individual in any community, say, in a village, becoming intensely unpopular, and the whole of the community "Boycotting" him? How could any provision of this Bill—how could the clause under discussion, in the slightest degree, deal with that situation? "But," said the Home Secretary, "we should take care to deal with the incitors to the 'Boycotting' of that individual." The Committee must know, however, that there was such a thing as "Boycotting" without incitement, and that was the most universal form of "Boycotting" in Ireland. He would tell the Home Secretary of one kind of "Boycotting" that would become universal when this Bill passed into law. The instant a summary magistrate—a coercionist magistrate — put the coercionist provisions of this Bill into operation, in order to protect some individual in the community, that individual would be a ruined man. He (Mr. O'Donnell) was perfectly certain of this—that if there could be one way more than another in which the Government could insure the ruin of the business of any man in Ireland, it would be by putting in force the provisions of this law for his protection. That would not be the case if the Government were to amend this clause, so as to make law and morality coincident—so as to make the provisions of the law find an echo in conscience and human nature. For instance, if they restricted "intimidation" to "bona fide intimidation" by violence and brutality, the Government would be able to put their law in operation by the conscience of the community; but if they wished to introduce into the Bill words to make it depend upon the arbitrary will of a magistrate to say that a man should be imprisoned for six months on a charge of intimidation, unless the sentence was ratified by the conscience of the community as well as the judgment of the Court, from that moment the man they sought to protect was a ruined man, as far as his business was concerned, whether he were a blacksmith, a grocer, a small trader, or a large trader. If they did not accept the reasonable Amendments of the Irish Party, and bring their Bill in a line with conscience and morality, then their attempts, by the exercise of gross tyranny, to protect particular individuals would only result in the complete ruin and "Boycotting" of those individuals. He was certain he could speak for the opinion of large districts in Ireland, and he was sure that there was not an Irish Member on those Benches who would not tell the Government the more severe they made their law the less efficient it would be, and the more indiscriminate they made this provision the more sure were they of failure; and that unless they accepted Amendments—he did not defend the exact words of the Amendment of the hon. Member for the City of Cork— but unless they accepted reasonable Amendments, distinguishing those combinations which were necessary for the protection of popular interests and that brutality which they all detested, the man they wished to protect would be a ruined man. The very fact that a man, deemed innocent and honourable by the rest of the community, was working out his terrible term of six months' hard labour, without trial by a common jury, would be enough to excite all the neighbourhood to "Boycotting" more effectually than if all the organs of the Land League had been preaching it up for months. Therefore, if the Home Secretary would condescend to take notice of the observations of so infinitely an inferior being as himself, he would ask him to remember this, and to recall the statement in 12 months' time—that he would see in every case, or in 99 out of 100 cases, in which this tyrannical clause was brought into operation for the protection of an individual, that, instead of protecting, he would only have ruined that man.

MR. MITCHELL HENRY

said, he wished to make a personal explanation. He had been too ready a short time ago to apologize to the hon. Member for Queen's County (Mr. Arthur O'Connor) on the subject of the Trades Union Act, for he found that he had been quite right in all he had said. The penalties under the Trades Union Act were without appeal if they were under a fine of £20. When the penalty was £20, or imprisonment without the option of a fine, an appeal was allowed. If, then, a man was fined £5 or £10, he would have to suffer suitable imprisonment without appeal, unless he paid it. The prisoner could only appeal to a jury in the more important eases; and in practice the majority of the cases were undoubtedly settled in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction.

Mr. O'KELLY

said, the hon. Member for the County of Galway forgot that men who were convicted in England had been convicted by juries of their countrymen—[Mr. MITCHELL HENRY: No, no !] —at any rate, by magistrates who were in sympathy with the people of the country, and were not the representatives, as in Ireland, of a class. The men who would be trying these cases in Ireland would be men most willing to convict— men who would strain the law against the prisoners. Instead of using the law to effect justice, they would use it as a method of vengeance, not so much against men guilty of any offence, as against men who might have made themselves obnoxious in their districts for political reasons. If the Government honestly wished to put down crime, what objection could there be to their defining what the crime was which they wished to put down? What did they want with an Act which practically left the magistrates the judges of the crime —not merely judges of the effects, but judges as to whether the crime had been committed—and who would magnify in their own minds perfectly innocent acts into crimes? What the Irish Members wanted was that these crimes, whatever they might be, should be put down in black and white in this Act, so that every man might know what the law was. If the Act passed in its present shape no man would know what intimidation meant, what the limits of the law were, and whether certain action was within the law or outside it. As a matter of justice, and as a protection to the subject, it ought to be the desire of this Committee, and of those who administered justice in Ireland, that the law should be so defined that every man should know what it was, and would not have to be brought before a tribunal that would be regarded with suspicion by the general community, and tried for an offence that would exist principally in the imagination of the men who tried the cases. If the Government simply wished to exact justice, if they wished simply to protect the peace of the country and the freedom of each individual, he, for one, should be just as anxious that the law should be passed for the complete protection of each individual in the country as anyone in this House could be; but what he objected to was, that they wore proposing to pass a law so wide, so undefined, that no man would know whether he was committing a crime or not, that no man would know whether the simplest word of criticism he might speak of his neighbour, or of an obnoxious person in his district, might not, in the imagination of a local magistrate, be constituted into a crime. Even the hon. Member for the county of Galway (Mr. Mitchell Henry) would admit that the magistracy of Ireland was not regarded with confidence by the people; and now, after the passing of this Act had conferred upon them extraordinary and exceptional powers, that magistracy would be regarded with more suspicion than ever. It was necessary, then, in the interests of peace and justice, that the people should be convinced that this Act was administered with the strictest justice and the strictest respect for the law. If they left it in its present condition, that opinion and that belief would not exist in Ireland; and, so far from its ever conducing to the establishment of peace and order, it would come into Ireland as a firebrand to increase the detestation and the suspicion with which the vast majority of the Irish people regarded the English laws—and so far from leading to the suppression of serious crime, it would have a tendency to increase it.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

said, ho would appeal to the Committee to come to a division. They had been for three hours discussing the Amendment put down by the hon. Member for the City of Cork, but in which, he was bound to say, that hon. Member did not seem to have taken a very deep personal interest; in fact, the Amendment had been moved by the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy), and he was not aware that the hon. Member for the City of Cork had said a single word in support of it. It had been supported by several hon. Gentlemen who described themselves as supporters and friends of "Boycotting;" but these Gentlemen, he ventured to say, were hardly likely to recommend the Amendment to the majority of the Committee, as the great majority were not in favour of "Boycotting." The hon. Member for Queen's County (Mr. Arthur O'Connor) had said he was all for "Boycotting," and the hon. Member for Dungarvan (Mr. O'Donnell) had said very much the same thing, and had pointed out all the forms of "Boycotting" that would be adopted when this Bill was passed. Surely, that could not be an argument for an Amendment to define the particular shape and form in which "Boycotting" should be illegal. He (Sir William Harcourt) ventured to point out to the Committee that the subjects which naturally arose on this Amendment had been exhausted over and over again in this discussion. The point before them was not whether they ought to have some clause against "Boycotting," because that question hon. Members would have an opportunity of discussing when the clause was put; but the question they had to determine was, whether, assuming, as they did assume, that this clause would be passed, that was a proper way to define the offence of "Boycotting." If they were to have nothing like a bond fide discussion on the matter, they ought now to be allowed to come to a decision.

SIR JOSEPH M'KENNA

said, that if this clause merely aimed at the suppression of that kind of "Boycotting" that was practised against Captain Boycott, no man on the Conservative side of the House would support the clause more strenuously than he should; but he thought it went a little further, and that they really did require some such Amendment as that proposed by the hon. Member for the City of Cork to be taken into consideration at this stage. It must not be assumed that those hon. Members on either side of the House who supported the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk, or who might vote for this Amendment, in the least degree supported the principle of "Boycotting." But "Boycotting" was a very loose sort of phrase, and was capable of a thousand definitions or explanations. He wished, however, that the Committee would confine itself to the question before it. What they wanted was to have the offence so specifically pointed out that the people would know it. If it could be shown that the clause, as it stood as proposed by the right hon. Gentleman, would be effective in putting a stop to "Boycotting," he would support it without amendment; but he did not think it was sufficiently comprehensive, and rather justified the demand on their part.

MR. BYRNE

said, that, up to the present time, he had not intruded himself on the House; he had not said one word since the Bill had been in Committee. He, however, felt it to be his duty to support the Amendment, and to express his abhorrence for the manner in which these clauses were worded. He was surprised that Her Majesty's Government had thought it their duty to use such language in the Bill, especially as they were a Government representing a free country. He should have thought that the people of any civilized country would have been astonished, and that every Member of this House would have been astonished, to find such language used—to find it said in a Bill of this kind that any act or word spoken in any manner should give power to the officers of the law to lock up a man for six months without the option of a trial by jury. Hon. Members might wonder why the Irish Representatives were contesting the Bill, and sticking so pertinaciously, clause by clause, to their at- tempts to get it modified in some degree; but he thought they would not be so astonished if they had had as much experience of the tribunals under which these offences would be tried as the Irish Members. He had some knowledge of the tribunals in England and Ireland, and he could not disguise from himself this fact, that whatever degree of fair play was given to criminals in England, fair play under all circumstances could not be obtained from the same tribunals in Ireland; and, with the permission of the Committee, he would give one or two short illustrations to show how the law was administered by the stipendiary magistrates and others in Ireland. It was well known that in Ireland the stipendiary magistrate went through a count}', visiting the petty sessional towns here and there from time to time. In course of time he visited every petty sessional district in his county, and it was well known that whatever opinion was expressed or entertained by the Resident Magistrates was acted on by the stipendiary magistrate. There was one offence which was committed in England as well as in Ireland, but which occurred in Ireland, he was sorry to say, much oftener than it should—namely, the simple crime of drunkenness—

THE CHAIRMAN

I beg to remind the hon. Member that the subject he is now referring to is not in the least germane to the Amendment before the Committee.

MR. BYRNE

said, that before the right hon. Gentleman ruled him out of Order, he would ask his permission to give one or two illustrations. He trusted that the Chairman would be fair enough to give him this opportunity.

THE CHAIRMAN

The hon. Gentleman is giving illustrations of the action of magistrates in cases of drunkenness, and that, I would remind him, is not the subject before the Committee.

MR. BYRNE

said, he was mentioning decisions where men were brought forward for being drunk in order to show how irregular was the dispensation of justice.

THE CHAIRMAN

The hon. Member, I say, is out of Order, and he cannot discuss those subjects.

MR. BYRNE

said, that being the case, he would refer to another matter— namely, as to whether the law was properly administered in Ireland. If the right hon. Gentleman would allow him, he would give an illustration taken from the Registration Courts. [Cries of" Question!"and "Name !"1 Ho thought it would be fairer to the Chairman to give him a distinct statement of what he intended to say, and he now proposed to deal generally with the subject. He objected to this clause, because, when the Act came before the tribunals in Ireland, he feared that persons unfortunate enough to be brought before the Resident Magistrate would not have the same fair play, and the same justice meted out to them, as they would if they were in England. If they were certain that the law, especially Criminal Law, would be administered in Ireland by Resident Magistrates and other officials in as fair a manner as it was in England, they would not be so ready to fight this clause, the language of which was most extreme. With regard to what had been discussed so fully this evening— namely, "Boycotting," he altogether denied that it was an Irish institution or an Irish offence. The first time his attention was drawn to "Boycotting" was in an English newspaper, where, after an advertisement for some individual who was wanted to perform certain services, these words wore added—"No Irish need apply." That was the first illustration of "Boycotting" he had ever noticed. But they need not go far to find that "Boycotting" was practised by almost all the Professions, even the learned Professions, and even the Clubs in London practised it. It was well known that not only in one, but in many Clubs in London was "Boycotting" practised; and as to the Professions, he had heard of cases where one doctor refused to meet another doctor in consultation because he had not a sufficient number of letters after his name.

THE CHAIRMAN

I must ask the hon. Gentleman to deal with the Amendment before the Committee.

MR. REDMOND

said, that on the point of Order might he be allowed to submit that the hon. Member was only illustrating the practice of "Boycotting," and that similar illustrations had been allowed to be given by other Members.

THE CHAIRMAN

The question before the Committee is the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for the City of Cork, and I ask the hon. Member to keep to that Amendment.

MR. BYRNE

said, he was always ready to submit to the ruling of the Chairman, and he was speaking literally to the point. He could not advocate the Admendment without, in the strongest language, condemning the original text of the clause. If they were to improve that clause, he must comment both on the advantages of the Amendment and the disadvantages of the clause; therefore, he would ask the Chairman, as he had asked him before, to allow him to illustrate his argument as hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House had been permitted to do. When ho said that he himself had never advocated "Boycotting," he was entitled to some little respect and consideration on the subject. Although he had never advocated "Boycotting," considering the circumstances of the country, he agreed with some hon. Members that there was no other course left open to the Irish people but to defend themselves when there was no one else to defend them. He might say, in passing, that the Government themselves practiced "Boycotting." They "Boycotted" the Irish Members and the Irish people. There was not a single Irish Member in the Cabinet, and all the magistrates of Ireland were either land agents, bailiffs, or persons appointed from the landlord class. London was a place where "Boycotting" was carried out to perfection; and if the Bill were to pass as at present worded, he ventured to say that no one in Ireland would be able to speak to his neighbour, or anyone else. In point of fact, a third party must never be mentioned, because if one person were to speak to another about a third person's crops, or his tillage, or advise the people to pay rent, some official or policeman would be able to bring him before the magistrates and have him tried without a jury. One of two things must happen if the Bill passed in its present form— either the people, rather than fall into the traps prepared for them, must leave Ireland; or they must avail themselves of those disorderly practices he had never approved of, and never would approve of, and take the law into their own hands. He would ask hon. Members to be just to his country, and not to legislate for it in hot haste, not to legislate for it in the panic and passion which possessed them at the present moment. If they did so, as certain as they sowed the wind would they reap the whirlwind. They had just passed a clause doing away with trial by jury; but he would venture to say to the Executive that it was not short of juries they were, but short of witnesses. If public speaking was put a stop to in Ireland, if a man was not allowed to speak to his neighbour in the most legitimate manner, if a shopkeeper was obliged to serve every one in his town or village that a policeman said he must serve, the people of Ireland would find the means, as other people had found the means, of evading the oppressive laws. If a policeman in Ireland was to be able to say to a shopkeeper—"If you refuse to sell a loaf of bread, or a stone of flour, to such and such a person, I will prosecute you, "he (Mr. Byrne) did not see why those shopkeepers should not follow the example set them in London, and adopt the cooperate system, turning their shops into co-operative stores, and selling only to members. They could then have what members they pleased, and sell to whom they pleased. The Irish people were now fully aware that they had rights, and they would, under all circumstances, find the means of maintaining those rights. Do not let Parliament make this Act too stringent—let them make it so that it would apply only to evil-doers. For his own part, he did not care how much they punished evil-doers; but do not let them arouse the temper of the whole Island simply because they wanted to prosecute a few men.

MR. JUSTIN M'CARTHY

said, he did not intend to keep the Committee very long; but he had not taken any part for the last few nights in the debate, and he felt inclined to say a few words on this Amendment and clause. The Amendment, to his mind, seemed to endeavour to lay down some definition of a certain class of offences. They had heard a great deal in the course of the discussion about the desire of the Government, as nearly as they could, to act on the lines of the Act of 1875; but in this clause the Government not only did not keep to the principle of that Act, but in one or two instances they went directly in opposition to it. What were the principles of the Act of 1875? One great principle of that measure was that it placed the employer and the workman exactly on the same level as to these laws. The other great principle was that it declared no act to be illegal when done by a combination of men which was not illegal when done by a single man acting on his own account. Those would be allowed to be the material principles of the Act of 1875; and he would ask the Committee whether the present clause did not go directly against these principles? It did not place the two classes on an equality before the law. The Irish landlord corresponded with the employer in the English Act, and the Irish tenant corresponded with the workman. The Bill before the Committee made that an offence when committed by one class which would not be an offence if committed by the other, and it made a thing illegal when done by a single man which was not illegal when done by a combination of men. This was a grave defect in the clause, and, added to that, was the serious defect that it did not define the new offences. In some parts the clause had a vague and shadowy meaning that might cover almost every word, or deed, or look. The Amendment of the hon. Member for the City of Cork was an honest endeavour to improve the clause by, at least, setting up some definition of the offence; but it hardly seemed to him to be the business of the Irish Members to supply definitions. It was the duty of the Government to do it, and it was only when they would not that someone else had to come forward and do their work for them. It seemed to him most monstrous to wish to retain in the clause words like these— In this Act the word 'intimidation' includes any word spoken or act done calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself, or to any member of his family, or to any person in his employment, or in fear of any injury to or loss of his property, business, or means of living. There was hardly anything which a person might do which could not be included under that clause—a sullen look, a significant glance. Take the offence of "Boycotting." No matter how stringent they made the clause, in order to put a stop to exclusive dealing, they would never be able to prevent it. A man might simply announce that he was himself determined not to deal with a particular tradesman; he might give no advice to others, but the hint might go round, and exclusive dealing might be established as effective and general as any other form of that practice. He held that the clause was most objectionable, and that the Irish Members were bound to oppose it.

MR. PARNELL

said, the reception this Amendment had met with at the hands of the Government represented the true spirit which underlay their action in regard to the clause. Nothing, he thought, could be fairer than the proposition he had made in asking that some definition of intimidation should be given. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary had, practically, a choice of two courses so far as the Irish Members were concerned. He could either adopt the construction of the Trades Union Act—the Conspiracy Act of 1875—which stated that intimidation was to be of a personal character, or else define the intimidation which he wished to provide against. The right hon. and learned Gentleman, however, would do neither the one nor the other. He insisted upon retaining these very wide and sweeping provisions, which could only have the effect of placing it in the absolute power of the stipendiary magistrates throughout the country to deal as they pleased with any movement or organization for any purpose whatever which might be set on foot in Ireland. They had had a definition of what the Government desired to put down. They had been told that the Government desired to put a stop to notices of a threatening and illegal character, to put down the "Boycotting" of persons by having them followed through the town by a bellman. They had offered the Government that. They had been told that the Government wished to prevent the holding up of persons to public odium. They offered the Government that. They had been told the Government wanted to prevent violence being used against any person. They offered the Government that. And they said, moreover—"If you desire any other definition of intimidation, place it on the Paper, and we will be most happy to consider it in the fairest possible manner, and yield to it if we possibly can; but we object to a clause which gives such enormously wide and vague powers as this." The Irish Members contended that these powers were unprecedented in the history of the government of any country, and that no Government ever before sought from any legislation such powers for the purpose of putting a stop, not to intimidation, but to combination. They had in India a Government of an autocratic kind, a Government in which the people were absolutely deprived of any representation whatever, and there had been a land question in India, just as there had been a land question in Ireland; and yet, even in India, where they did not require the assent of any Representative Assembly to their legislation, they had never ventured, with so many millions of people under their control, constituting a power and a danger far greater than the Irish people—they had. never asked, against these teeming millions in India, the power they were now asking against the few insignificant millions in Ireland. They had shown, by the demand they made, an absence of all trust and confidence in themselves, and a desire to repress and trample on the Irish people, which would assuredly re-act upon themselves. They had cast to the winds all desire to be pacific, to trust to the honour of the people, and they had determined to rely upon brute force and the exertions of a section of men who were hated and detested, and that with good reason, by the great majority of the people of Ireland. It appeared to him to be useless to appeal to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary. The right hon. and learned Gentleman might have his own reasons for the attitude and the course he had taken, but he (Mr. Parnell) believed that the result of his action would be that the Cabinet, of which he was a Member, would be dragged to destruction; and the Government might thank themselves if this and other results which he had ventured to predict should come to pass. They might thank themselves for retaining amongst their number a right hon. and learned Gentleman, who, if he had any Liberal instincts at all, had only the instincts of the official and the man who desired to retain his seat at any price. To the right hon. and learned Gentleman, by the attitude he took up last Session in reference to this whole matter, were attributable, quite as much as to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford, the misfortunes that had come on Ireland and the Government of Ireland during the last 12 months. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman knew the real state of things in Ireland and in America— and he had stated that he did know-he had deceived the House. If he did not know, he had no right to speak about it. It appeared that he had not, even in 12 months, got rid of his scare about O'Donovan Rossa; and he said he was constantly reading columns and columns of seditious literature in the American newspapers. He (Mr. Parnell) could only say he wished the right hon. and learned Gentleman would read instead the Irish-American newspapers. Instead of finding them full of sedition, he would find them even more moderate than the Irish newspapers at home. Surely, it was not too much to hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman would allow himself to be instructed, even at the last moment, and would take some trouble to inform himself as to what was the opinion of the Irish people at home and abroad, and that, having so informed himself, he would become a true repeater of that opinion. It was one of the most lamentable things that the Irish people had to face—that on an occasion like the present, when they were seeking to introduce reasonable Amendments, the Government would make no concession to the popular voice of Ireland.

MR. MACLIVER

said, he rose to Order. He apprehended that the Committee would feel that the hon. Member was travelling very wide of the clause now under discussion. The Chairman, he thought, might very fairly call on the hon. Gentleman to address himself to the subject before the Committee.

THE CHAIRMAN

I was very much relieved to find that the hon. Gentleman was coming to the clause.

MR. PARNELL

continuing, said, he thought that what he had said previously was a fair and proper introduction to what he should have to say now. He said it was most unfortunate that when Irish Members were asking the Committee to agree to the insertion of an Amendment to a Bill of this character, which would allow the Government in Ireland to treat the people as reasonable beings, as people of some self-control, and entitled to some confidence, and not as brute beasts, they had to contend with the crass ignorance of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary. They had been very fair in placing these definitions be- fore the Committee. They were put forward for the purpose of inviting expressions of opinion; and although they had not been met specifically, the conduct of the Government had been sufficient to show their hand. He could see no hope for Ireland, and no hope for the Government, or success for their policy of conciliation, so long as Ministers continued to reject every reasonable Amendment which Irish Members asked them to accept in reference to this Bill. He could see nothing but disaster for Ireland and this country, for he conceived the Government were doing the lowest and dirtiest work that had ever been done with regard to Ireland.

MR. NEWDEGATE

said, the hon. Member for the City of Cork must believe that the House had a very short memory. He would read a portion of a speech delivered by the hon. Member last year, in which he described the state of Ireland as being totally exceptional, and alien from the condition of any other part of Her Majesty's Dominions. But he now rose and expected the House to treat Ireland as if it were similar in its condition to Yorkshire. That was totally unreasonable, and he would prove it by the hon. Member's own words. On the 3rd June, 1881, the hon. Member said—

MR. BORLASE

rose to Order. He asked whether the speech of the hon. Member for the City of Cork was relevant to the debate?

THE CHAIRMAN

said, he had not yet heard the speech.

MR. NEWDEGATE

said, he trusted that as the hon. Member for the City of Cork had been permitted to conclude his speech, a similar indulgence would be extended to himself, for it was a rule of that House that an hon. Member had a right to answer any speech that had been permitted by the authority of the Chair.

THE CHAIRMAN

said, he had pointed out to the hon. Member for the City of Cork that his speech was rather wide of the Amendment. He trusted the hon. Member for North Warwickshire would speak to the Amendment.

MR. NEWDEGATE

said, he should certainly speak to the Amendment, and he claimed nothing more than the right of speaking on the topics which the hon. Member for the City of Cork had been permitted to enter upon. He said that when that hon. Member asked the House to extend to Ireland the same principles of government as were involved in the Act of 1875 with respect to disturbances in trade, he should first prove that the condition of Ireland was similar to the condition of Yorkshire. That was, in his opinion, but a reasonable proposition, and he therefore desired to quote the description given by the hon. Member last year of the condition of Ireland. The words of the hon. Member were that— There had never yet been open rebellion in Ireland which was taken up by more than a small section of the population. In 1798, only three counties were up, and it taxed all England's resources to put them down. He believed if, at the present moment, any revolutionary party made a determined appeal to the Irish people every county would join in a rebellion against English rule."—[3 Hansard, c clxii. 96.]

MR. BORLASE

said, he rose to make another appeal to the Chairman as to whether this speech was relevant to the question before the Committee?

THE CHAIRMAN

said, he could not see the slightest relation to the question before the Committee in the speech of the hon. Member.

MR. NEWDEGATE

said, he would not oppose his opinion to that of the Chairman. They had been for a day and a-half debating this clause; and the difference between the hon. Member for the City of Cork and the great body of the Committee was that he claimed that the same principles should be applied to the government of Ireland that were applied in 1875 to the government of Yorkshire. He thought he had read enough of the speech of the hon. Member to show that the condition of Yorkshire during the strike and during the great disturbances there was totally different from the description given by him of the condition of Ireland in June last. At a time like the present, when this important Bill was before the Committee, it was simply absurd to compare the state of Ireland with the state of Yorkshire. Seeing that the Amendments proposed struck at the very principle of the clause, and tended to render it totally inefficient under the circumstances of Ireland to which it was to be applied, he said that the opposition directed against the clause was really opposition to the Bill itself, which, by repeated and enormous majorities, had received the sanction of the House. He would give the Committee, very shortly, the specific which the hon. Member suggested as an alternative to the coercive legislation which he had done so much to render necessary. He (Mr. Newdegate) had adverted before to the speech of Archbishop Croke, and he would now furnish the House with the observations of the hon. Member on that subject. He said— The Government would do well to try the advice of Archbishop Croke, and see what would happen if they withdrew their troops and police from Tipperary for a single month; he felt sure that the priests would be responsible for the peace and order of the county, and there would be an entire cessation of outrages."—{Ibid. 97.]

MR. MACLIVER

rose to Order. He appealed to the Chair as to whether it was not time that this remarkable speech should come to an end?

THE CHAIRMAN

said, he must point out to the hon. Member for North Warwickshire that he was again travelling beyond the question. He had spoken for some time towards the Amendment, but was now altogether outside it.

MR. NEWDEGATE

said, he had endeavoured to speak on this subject within the ordinary rules of debate. He asked hon. Members if they approved the specific of the hon. Member for the City of Cork, because it was clear that the Amendment before the Committee and every Amendment he had proposed were strictly in accordance with the spirit announced by him on the 3rd of June last year. The opposition of the hon. Member was against the Bill itself, and that alone was the meaning of the present Amendment.

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

said, he thought the condition of demoralization at which the Committee had been reduced did not argue well for the disposal of the remaining clauses of the Bill. The hon. Member for the City of Cork attributed to the Home Secretary a profound degree of ignorance upon the question under discussion, and he went on to speak also of the general attitude of Her Majesty's Government. Now, he did not want to say anything disrespectful of Her Majesty's Ministers; but he was bound to say that the position at which the Committee had arrived, to use the most moderate language, was due to the imbecility of Her Majesty's Government.

MR. HENEAGE

asked if it was in Order to use the term imbecility toward any Member of the House?

THE CHAIRMAN

said, the expression was not altogether un-Parliamen-tary.

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

said, he had used language neither un-Parliamentary nor irrational. What was the position of Her Majesty's Government? They said they were willing to limit and define the clause; nevertheless, they did not bring forward any limitations or definitions, from which it was clear that they had come before the House when their minds were not made up. Ministers were generally absent when these questions came up, and the Home Secretary, in consequence, became master of all he surveyed. But the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister was conspicuous not merely by his absence, but still more so by his silence on every part of the Bill whenever a question of importance was being discussed. Now, he put a fair challenge to Her Majesty's Ministers. They said they were in favour of the limitation of this clause, and in favour of having a definition in the clause, but, at the same time, they objected to the words proposed by the hon. Member for the City of Cork. Well, let them produce words of their own, and not keep the Committee any longer in ignorance of their intentions in this matter. He thought it was time for the Prime Minister to take the Bill out of the hands of the Home Secretary, whose incompetency to deal with it had already been abundantly proved, and for the right hon. Gentleman himself, or one of his Colleagues, to come forward and state the Government intentions. If they were to be left to the mercy of the two right hon. and learned Gentlemen the Members for the University of Dublin, he thought the hon. Member for the City of Cork had better retire altogether, because it appeared that all the Amendments emanating from Radical and Irish Members had been put forward in vain. Not a single definition had yet been given by the Home Secretary; and, therefore, he appealed to the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government not to take refuge in melancholy silence, but to say whether he would agree to an Amendment necessary for securing the confidence of the people of Ireland.

Question put, "That those words be there inserted."

The Committee divided: —Ayes 36; Noes 247: Majority 211.—(Div. List, No. 118.)

MR. HEALY

proposed, in line 16, to leave out the word "any," and insert the word "such." The hon. Member pointed out that the clause provided "that every person who should, wrongfully or without legal authority, incite any person;" and he proposed to substitute "such" for "any" in that case. Somebody must be intimidated, somebody must make a speech or commit an action; and it seemed to him necessary, for the grammatical sense of the clause, to make that more clear by introducing the word "such."

Amendment proposed, in page 3, line 16, leave out "any," and insert "such."—(Mr. Healy.)

Question, "That the word 'any' stand part of the Clause," put, and agreed to.

MR. BRYCE

said, he was very sensible of the difficulty which any Member would have in bringing an Amendment before the Committee at that time of the night, especially after such an exhaustive discussion as had taken place; but he would not detain the House long in stating the case for the proposal he had to make. The Committee was now at not only one of the most difficult parts of the Bill, but one of the most knotty points in the whole field of law. It was because he despaired of finding any definition of "intimidation" which had any chance of being accepted by the Committee that he proposed to do without a definition altogether. He did not bring forward his Amendment in the interest of any particular section in the House, and he did not know what view would be taken by Irish Members. He brought it forward in the interest of the Committee itself, which saw before it a long and tedious list of Amendments to the definition in the clause, which must occupy a very considerable length of time. He thought that difficulty would be best met by leaving out the definition, or rather the attempt at a partial definition, proposed by the Government altogether. If they could not untie the knot, they had better cut it. As to the concession made by the Home Secretary to add certain words to the definition, he thought they would make no real difference at all. It appeared to him that the proposed addition would only express a second time over what was already sufficiently expressed in Sub-sections a and b He did not understand the Home Secretary to say that any substantial difference would be made by the words he proposed to add; in fact, the legal effect of the clause would be precisely the same. He entirely agreed that everything in the definition was governed by Sub-sections a and b; but even so, the definition went much beyond the natural and ordinary meaning of the word "intimidation." That was illustrated by the fact admitted by the Home Secretary, that he would make unlawful things which were perfectly lawful when done by trades unions. The right hon. and learned Gentleman admitted that these words would make the acts of trades unions unlawful; but he also argued that the Act of 1875 would protect trades unions, and, therefore, it would not apply to such cases. Surely it was very singular that Acts which were admittedly legal when done by trades unions in England should become, under this clause, punishable in Ireland with a penalty of six months' imprisonment when done by others than trade unionists. What cause could be assigned for such favour being given to trades unions, which were not very long ago held to be dangerous associations? Any words would come under this definition which caused fear to any person or injury to his business. Any person who uttered a word, or did any act, which was calculated to put a person in fear of injury to his business, or living, would come within the Act; and it was easy to imagine an immense number of words which might be spoken, or things which might be done, which would put a person in such fear, and therefore come under this clause and yet which would not be, in any fair or natural sense, offences deserving punishment. Not long ago, a proposition was made in this country by a society of philanthropic ladies that customers should not deal with shopkeepers who did not supply counter seats for their assistants. If, however, any lady went into a shop, say, in Dublin, where seats were not provided for the assistants, and, finding that the young women who acted as shop-assistants were suffering from fatigue, declared she would not deal with that shop, because seats were not provided, she would come under this clause. Now, was it desirable to bring under the terms of this Act words which would be far from culpable, and might be dictated by the highest motives, though they undoubtedly threatened an injury to the shopkeeper in his business? Anybody could imagine a large number of similar cases which would come under this clause, but which nobody would think of condemning or desire to punish. It might be said that a reasonable interpretation must be allowed, and that it was not fair to argue upon extreme cases. He admitted that; but if they had such confidence in the magistrates and the Court to which appeal lay, as to hold that they would not press this definition strictly, why should they not be trusted a little further, and left to put a proper meaning on the term "intimidation" without having this elaborate and difficult, yet incomplete definition? He was aware there were objections to that; but it seemed to him that if the Judges were trusted to interpret the word "intimidation" with the partial and unsatisfactory definition in the clause, they might be intrusted to interpret it without any definition. The words in this clause, in fact, carried the word "intimidation" far beyond its natural sense, which meant what put a man in serious terror —such terror as would be too much for a man of firm mind. That, however, was not the meaning which would be attached to the word as defined in this clause. It was here extended to fear which would not necessarily affect a man of firm mind—that was, it was given an extension which the Courts had never yet given it. It was admitted that the principle of the English Act ought to be followed. Section 7 of that Act contained the words—"Any person who uses violence towards or intimidates such other person." The word "intimidates" had been found amply sufficient under that Act, and he did not see why it should not be sufficient under this measure. Why was it necessary to incur a difficulty which might be avoided by omitting the definition? He quite agreed that "Boycotting" must be stopped, and he had given the best proof of his holding that view by voting against the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell). To put down the really pernicious forms of "Boycotting," including the extremer cases of exclusive dealing, they had better proceed by adopting the language of common sense, without any definition at all. No doubt, the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson) would say that they could not abandon the definition; and any attempt to amend the definition would be, no doubt, resisted by those hon. and learned Gentlemen who represented that a perfectly harmless and, indeed, nominal change proposed by the Home Secretary, some time ago, would involve a serious danger. He might be told that the magistrates were unfit to administer the Bill, and that a definition was, therefore, necessary; but the answer was that there was to be a power of appealing to another Court, by which any wrong done would be corrected. He submitted that the simplest way out of this difficulty would be by abandoning this imperfect definition altogether.

Amendment proposed, in page 3, line 24, to leave out from the word "Act," to the end of the Clause.—(Mr. Bryce.)

Question proposed, "That the words 'in this Act the expression' intimidation "stand part of the Clause."

DR. COMMINS

said, he cordially supported the Amendment, because he believed that this portion of the Bill would do a great deal more harm than good, no matter from what point of view it was regarded. Looking at the Bill as one which was necessary, and which ought to be framed so as to meet the evils it was designed to meet, this clause went a great deal further than was necessary. No warning could be given to people; no active advice could be given of the most innocent kind which would not fall within this definition of "intimidation." "Any word calculated to put any person in fear of injury to his property, or business, or means of living," were the words of the clause. Supposing a person was going out in a boat, and someone else advised him not to do so, because the boat was rotten, that person would come within the four corners of this definition; or, if a man advised another not to go out without an overcoat, because there was likely to be rain, when he might get wet and catch a cold, he would also come within the Act. No word of advice or warning could be given to guard a person from danger, which might not be construed as coming within this definition. There were still worse faults in the clause. Attention had already been called to the fact that the framers of this Bill seemed to delight in "running amuck" against all the most cherished principles of English jurisprudence. One of the most cherished principles of jurisprudence in every civilized country was that no act could be criminal unless the intent with which that act was done was criminal itself. That was one of the oldest maxims; but here was a definition deliberately repealing that, and, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the Dublin University (Mr. Plunket) had said, insidiously repealing it. Why was the word "calculated" substituted for "intended?" Because it was intended to make acts criminal where there was no criminal intent. The word "view" was used instead of the word "intent" for the same purpose— namely, to make an act criminal in which there was no criminal intention on the part of the doer. That was such an innovation on the principles of our jurisprudence that he could only characterize as atrocious. It would lay snares for the people, and no person who acted with a philanthropic spirit could escape this Act. This clause was designed to do away with one of the greatest principles of law, which was to protect persons who were guiltless of criminal intent; and it was so wide as to embrace and catch every act of warning and advice, however innocent might be the intention, and however much it might be for the benefit of the parties to whom it was addressed.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

thought the hon. Member might have spared a good deal of his indignation upon the deliberate proposal of the Government, if he had attended to his (Sir William Harcourt's) statement, that the Government intended to omit "intent" for the expressed purpose of providing that the intention of the act should be criminal. With reference to the Amendment now proposed, the Committee had already discussed the question whether or not the definition should be omitted. He quite admitted that if "intimidation" was to be interpreted only by professional men, any exposition of "intimidation" would be superfluous, not because, in his opinion, there was anything in this clause which ought not to be there, but because he believed that to the professional mind the word "intimidation" would convey everything that was in the clause Therefore, the mere question was, whether or not it was better to have this exposition of "intimidation" or not? He believed that a Judge would find that "intimidation" would contain everything contained in the latter part of the clause; but he was satisfied that this part of the clause could not be dispensed with. First of all, it was not merely constructive, but, as had already been pointed out, there must be some indication given to the people of Ireland as to what responsibility was upon them. The ordinary people of Ireland might not understand, as a Judge would understand, that the word "intimidation" included actions which involved an injury to a man, or a loss of business or means of living. If they did not understand that, they would not understand how the word "intimidation" was intended to strike at "Boycotting;" and he considered the value of this section of the clause was, that it made it clear and intelligible to every man in Ireland that the clause was intended to strike at "Boycotting." That was the whole question, and he did not think it introduced anything not already contained in the word "intimidation," which was useless for public purposes.

MR. LEAMY

said, the right hon. and learned Gentleman might, from his point of view, have very good reason for objecting to any Amendment made on that side of the House in favour of limiting the offence of intimidation. The proposition of the hon. Member opposite would enable any intelligent man in Ireland to know what intimidation was, and he (Mr. Leamy) thought it was the duty of Parliament in this matter to so word the clause that the magistrates who had to administer the law would be able to say what was intimidation and what was not. The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that this paragraph would be an indication to the people of Ireland of what intimidation was, and that it would explain to them what they must not do. It appeared to him (Mr. Leamy) that if they left that paragraph in, any man in Ireland would see he could hardly do anything or say anything without being brought within the purview of the clause. Suppose one tradesman was in the habit of dealing with another, and he said to him—"If you do not deal with me for bread, I shall not deal with you for grocery; and not only will I cease to deal with you, but I will endeavour to get other men not to deal with you." If a man wore to make a remark of that kind, under this Act ho would be liable to a charge of intimidation. The hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Bryce) who had just spoken, yesterday evening pointed out that if a number of tradesmen in a town agreed to close their shops and give a holiday to their assistants on a certain occasion, and that one man refused to act as the others did, and a number of his customers went there and said—"If you refuse to give a holiday like the rest, we shall not any longer deal with you." The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Plunket), commenting on that case, said it was an extreme one, and that it was a thing that could hardly occur; that it was an illustration not worth considering. Now, he (Mr. Leamy) wished to put a question. Ho was perfectly certain that if the Lord Lieutenant were to come to a town in Ireland, and if a number of people agreed to close their shops, and to illuminate their premises in honour of the visit of the Lord Lieutenant, and if a certain number said—"We will not close our shops; we will not illuminate;" and if the others were to go to these shopkeepers who refused to close, and say—"If you do not close and illuminate your premises, we shall not deal with you," he was sure that in such a case the magistrates would not hold a man guilty under this Bill. But, if the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell) went down to an Irish town, and a number of shopkeepers were to say—"We shall not close our shops, and we shall not illuminate in honour of Mr. Parnell's visit," and if a number of people said to those men—"If you do not illuminate we shall 'Boycott' you, or, in other words, we shall not deal with you," he was perfectly certain that, as persons using a threat, they would be sent to prison under this Bill. That was the way this Bill would be worked out. Prom the right hon. and learned Gentleman's own point of view, there was good reason for saying—"I shall accept no definition of intimidation which will tie the hands of the magistrates in dealing with cases of 'Boycotting;' "but that was not the proposition of the hon. Member opposite. The hon. Member opposite was quite willing that a man guilty of intimidation should be sent to gaol; but what he wanted was that words so vague and of so extravagant a character should not be put in the clause, which would prohibit mere criticism upon any man's conduct in Ireland. That was the reason why he (Mr. Leamy) supported the Amendment. He felt perfectly convinced and satisfied that they were giving the magistrates a power they ought not to have. In his opinion, it was proposed to give them too large a discretion; and he thought that by accepting this Amendment they would certainly enable magistrates to deal with all cases of "Boycotting."

MR. PUGH

said, one could not but feel that the clause, as it stood at present, was too wide. He was not going to discuss the question of what the precise meaning of intimidation might be; but he agreed with the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary that it was desirable, having regard to the want of knowledge on the part of the people of Ireland on the subject, and having regard to the possible lack of professional learning on the part of those who had to administer the law—it was desirable to lay down some rules for guidance in this matter. If that was so, it appeared to him that the rules should be as correct as they could frame them. They ought not to be so wide as to include as offences things which no one in his senses would consider offences. Many illustrations were put to the Committee on this subject, and he would venture to put one more, which he thought would come home to hon. Members. He would ask the Committee, whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman himself would have been safe, supposing that at the time of the last General Election a law of this kind had been in force in England? They all read the many eloquent speeches made by the right hon. and learned Gentleman at that time, and he (Mr. Pugh) had not the slightest hesitation in saying that a great number of electors were restrained from voting for the Conservative candidates, because they believed the speeches of the right hon. and learned Gentleman, and because they felt that if they did vote for Conservative candidates, they would not only risk their own means of living, but the prosperity of the country. He did not think that there was any doubt that a great many people voted for the Liberal Party owing to such a fear on their part. They felt that if they returned Conservatives to this House the prosperity of the country would be imperilled, and thereby their own means of living would be imperilled. He would not discuss whether that was the right view or not; but he had no doubt that was the reason why many people at that time voted for the Liberal candidates. Now, under the clause of this Bill, as it stood, if it applied to England, anyone who used arguments of that kind would be guilty of intimidation. The words were so very wide that any word, or any gesture, or any act, would be sufficient to cause the imprisonment of a man. Ho did not think that that was right; but, at the same time, he could not vote for the Amendment, because he agreed with what the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary had said— namely, that it was desirable that some guide should be laid down. What he would venture to suggest was this —to leave out the words "word spoken or act done," and insert the words— Conduct which, having duo regard to the circumstances of the case, shall be deemed to have been intimidation, and. So that the clause would read— Calculated to put any person in fear of any injury or danger to himself," &c. His reason for that suggestion was, that ho wished, if possible, to point out to the magistrates in Ireland that no isolated word, and no isolated act, would be sufficient to bring men within this section; that they must have regard to his conduct or to the circumstances under which he spoke or acted. The word conduct was a word with which they were all familiar. They continually heard of riotous conduct and disorderly conduct, and it was by conduct that men must be judged. He thought they might fairly make a man's conduct the test of whether he was to be found guilty or not. Under these circumstances, he should have to vote against the Amendment of the hon. Member; but he trusted that his suggestion, or some other suggestion, would find favour with the Government, so as to limit the very wide application of this clause as it at present stood.

MR. SYNAN

said, that the word "includes" would enable a magistrate to go outside the definition of the clause altogether, and say that intimidation might comprehend other matters than those mentioned in the definition. Then the definition included innocent things, except so far as they were qualified by the words proposed to be inserted by the Government, making it the "intent" to put a person in fear; and in consenting to the insertion of these words they were admitting the Amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Sussex. He confessed he was rather inclined to vote for the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce). He thought it would make the case stronger for the accused, and it would give less power to the magistrates to go outside the terms "wrongfully and without legal authority."

MR. BRYCE

said, before they divided, ho trusted the Committee would allow him to say one word in explanation. Ho accepted, with pleasure, the remarks of the Home Secretary, but must repeat that his object in desiring to strike out the words at the end of the clause was that he firmly believed they would be misunderstood, and used in a manner which the Government did not intend.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, he confessed he was not present when the hon, and learned Gentleman who had just spoken moved his Amendment, and when the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary was informing the Committee as to the sense in which this portion of the clause would be understood in Ireland. He was extremely sorry that he and a large number of Irish Members were not present when the right hon. and learned Gentleman was giving that very valuable information, because, in his opinion, there would be nothing more interesting than to hear from the Home Secretary how the words would be understood in Ireland. As an Irish Representative, he believed that these five lines would be exactly understood in the same sense as if that part of the clause ended at the word "done;" and if in that Act, the expression "intimidation" included any word spoken or act done. All the rest of the clause might be left out, because any word spoken or act done might, at the whim of a magistrate, be held to be intimidation. If the Home Secretary thought that the clause would be taken in any other sense, he was quite mistaken; and the only effect of passing the clause, which would literally forbid every expression of free sentiment and every expression of opinion with regard to the conduct of any man, no matter how vile that conduct might be—the only effect of this clause would be to make "Boycotting" a natural virtue in Ireland. If this clause became law he would not give much for the popularity of any man who was not a pronounced and conscientious "Boycotter."

MR. HORACE DAVEY

said, he did not think that anyone could accuse the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets of a desire to exclude from the operation of the clause the offence of "Boycotting." They had the statement of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary and of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General that even without this definition the word intimidation itself would cover everything that was intended; and if he (Mr. Horace Davey) might express an opinion, he should say that it would cover everything which was intended to be included in the definition. His hon. Friend who had proposed this Amendment did carry a certain number of hon. Members on that side of the House with him when he said that the definition was apt to be misunderstood, and that it was apt to have a larger interpretation given to it than was intended by the Government. The magistrates or the Judges who would have to administer the Act must be credited with judicial discretion and with common sense, and, that being so, they must be trusted to interpret this Act in a rational way. That being so, it occurred to him that if an Act were placed in their hands which told them that if any person, wrongfully and without legal authority, used intimidation against certain persons, and committed an offence under that Act, he could not suppose for a moment that they would not include the offence of "Boycotting" under the term intimidation. Undoubtedly, there was an extreme difficulty in arriving at a definition which was satisfactory from every point of view to include the offence of "Boycotting," and to exclude which everybody, so far as he understood the feeling of the Committee, wished to be included. He confessed that, after much consideration, he must vote for the Amendment, not because he disagreed with the definition as the Committee understood it, but because he thought that the terms of the definition would be misunderstood by the country, and because the definition would go beyond what was intended by the Government, and, at the same time, was not necessary for the purposes of the clause. If he understood hon. Members opposite, they were also of opinion that the word intimidation itself would, in fact, give a stronger and wider authority to the magistrates than if the definition remained as at present. He was not of that opinion, but he thought it would give a discretion to the magistrates to say in any case what was intimidation.

MR. O'KELLY

said, that, in view of the lateness of the hour, he begged to move that the Chairman do now report Progress, and ask leave to sit again. This was one of the most important clauses of the Bill, so far as the Irish Members were concerned, and he did not think that the Committee had full opportunity of discussing it in all its bearings at the present time. The Irish Representatives had devoted much time to the work of the Committee, and he thought that they had now arrived at such a time when the Government ought to assent to the Motion.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."— (Mr. O'Kelly.)

MR. GLADSTONE

said, the Amendment before the Committee at the present moment was not whether the definition should be adopted by the Committee in the terms which it was framed; but it was whether there should be any definition, and for that purpose the Question put from the Chair only embraced the adoption of the very first word of the subsection. Now, he did not submit that the question whether there should be a definition or not had been sufficiently discussed. It had been considered essential to a very great extent during the evening, and his hon. and learned Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets, who had introduced the subject in a clear manner to the Committee, had fully stated his views, and was perfectly prepared to divide upon the subject. He (Mr. Gladstone) was very anxious that the Committee should have the fullest opportunity of considering the terms of the definition; but as to whether there should be one or not, he thought the Committee were quite determined. He hoped they would be permitted to go to a division now, and after that they would immediately consent to report Progress.

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

said, that the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets did explain his views in the most clear and lucid manner; but he addressed them to a Committee one-third of which was asleep. ["No, no!"] Well, it might be one- fifth of the Committee; but, at any rate, there was a considerable proportion of hon. Members present at the time who were either asleep or not paying the slightest attention to the remarks of the hon. and learned Member. ["No, no!"] Well, that was a matter of opinion, and those were the observations he had to make with regard to the matter. Now, the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury dealt rather unfairly with the Committee. The question before the Committee was whether or not they should really define this clause in the Bill. If they accepted two words of the clause, they pledged them selves partly to the clause, and he and his hon. Friends wished to get rid of the clause altogether. It was very unreasonable on the part of the Prime Minister, and still more unreasonable on the part of the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets, to ask them to divide on so important a question at this early stage of the discussion. He hoped his hon. Friend (Mr. O'Kelly) would press his Motion to report Progress to a division.

MR. BRYCE

said, he ventured to make a strong appeal to the hon. Member who moved to report Progress, to allow the Committee to divide now. He submitted to hon. Members opposite that if they wished to have any Amendments moved from the Liberal side of the House, which they might desire to support, they certainly offered no encouragement to Liberal Members to move them. They would make it very difficult for English Members to propose Amendments of any kind if their Amendments were found to be laid hold of for pro- tracting discussion to an inordinate length. He (Mr. Bryce) was satisfied with the discussion on his Amendments, and he did not think that much more now remained to be said in the matter. He was satisfied with the attention his own remarks had received, and he did very earnestly appeal to the hon. Member for Roscommon (Mr. O'Kelly) to allow the Committee to come to a division at the present moment.

DR. COMMINS

said, that there were two Amendments, one in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk (Mr. Charles Russell), and the other in the name of the hon. Member for Wexford (Mr. Healy), proposing to do exactly the same thing as the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets; so that, to say the least of it, it was hardly complimentary for the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Bryce) to say that all had been said on the subject that could be said. He believed that the hon. and learned Member for Dundalk would be able to add a good deal to what had been said on the subject, and he also believed that the hon. Member for Wexford would be able to address many very pertinent observations to the Committee. He certainly thought his hon. Friend was justified in moving at this hour to report Progress.

MR. REDMOND

said, he trusted the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Bryce) would not proceed to a division, and his reason for saying that was that this Amendment, although it might have been discussed sufficiently to satisfy the hon. and learned Gentleman himself, it had not been discussed sufficiently to satisfy the hon. Members who were mostly interested, and who sat with him (Mr. Redmond) on those Benches. He should be very sorry that any action taken by Irish Members should have the effect of preventing hon. Members such as the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets from taking part in the discussion of this Bill, and from endeavouring to mitigate its severity as much as possible; but it was impossible to forget that the efforts of such men as the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets to mitigate the severity of this Bill met with not one particle more of success than the efforts of hon. Members from Ireland. He and his hon. Friends welcomed any efforts to mitigate the severities of the Bill; but he confessed that when these efforts were made and uniformly rejected by the Committee, appeals like that made by the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets could not have very much weight with them. The Amendment raised the whole important question of the definition of intimidation, and he did not think they would be justified in allowing it to be discussed to-night. For these reasons, he sincerely trusted his hon. Friend beside him (Mr. O'Kelly) would proceed to a division on his Motion to report Progress.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, he would venture to remark that, although this Amendment had been discussed sufficiently to satisfy the section of English Liberals who hoped to obtain the votes of the Irish electors in their constituencies—

MR. BULWER

rose to Order. He wished to ask whether the hon. Member was in Order in imputing such motives to hon. Members?

THE CHAIRMAN

I think it is not a proper thing to impute such motives to hon. Members in the discharge of their duties in this House.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, that he was referring to the class of intimidation going on between Representatives and represented. He was simply referring to the desire of hon. Members to consolidate the votes of their constituents, and that was precisely one of the motives which influenced every Member of the House. With regard to the discussion of the clause, he was sorry to say a very large proportion of it was passed in the Committee when there were comparatively few persons present; and, considering the enormous importance of the question involved—an importance which the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister would be ready to conceive in Bulgaria or in Egypt, he thought there ought not to be any attempt to hurry the discussion upon a matter changing the whole social and political condition of Ireland. He had no doubt a short discussion conducted under more favourable circumstances would conclude the debate on this particular clause. He was certain, for his own part, that the passing of this clause would complete the disrepute into which the British connection had fallen in Ireland.

Question put.

The Committtee divided: —Ayes 24; Noes 183: Majority 159.—(Div. List, No. 119.)

Original Question again proposed.

MR. PARNELL

said, he now moved that the Chairman do leave the Chair. On an important Amendment of this character, which the Government, through the mouth of the Attorney General for England, practically agreed to—or, at any rate, according to the opinion of everyone on that (the Opposition) side of the House below the Gangway—but upon which, owing to directions received from the Front Opposition Bench, they had been obliged to change their action, the Committee, he considered, required more time for consideration. The sense of the Committee ought not to be taken upon the Amendment until there had been ample opportunity afforded for discussion.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do now leave the Chair."({Mr. Parnell.)

MR. GLADSTONE

said, he did not think it would be much use to prolong the contest. He regretted that such a disregard for the feelings of the large majority of the Committee—as shown by the division they had just taken— was shown by hon. Members opposite; but if they were determined to persist in the line they were adopting, if the Motion that the Chairman do leave the Chair were withdrawn, he would not resist the Motion for reporting Progress.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.

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