SUPPLY—FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (VOTE OF CREDIT).

HC Deb 25 July 1882 vol 272 cc1691-759

[FIRST NIGHT.]

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £2,300,000, be granted to Her Majesty, beyond the ordinary Grants of Parliament, towards defraying the Expenses which may be incurred during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1883, in strengthening Her Majesty's Forces in the Mediterranean."—(Mr. Gladstone.)

COLONEL STANLEY

I do not often venture to place myself before the House, and I trust that on this occasion I shall be allowed to say a few words upon the question now under discussion. In the first place, I may say that I join with those who, both in this House and in "another place," deprecate opposition on the part of persons who are in the slightest degree responsible to the country for their position in this House to warlike measures which may be necessary for the Government to undertake; and I would rather propose, at the present time, to address myself to certain practical points. I think, therefore, I shall be excused if for a moment I turn aside, in order to make reference to one or two statements which the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister made last night, and which I do not think it possible for us altogether to pass by without remark. But though I join in deprecating opposition to the proposals of the Government as far as they have led to Executive measures, I hope that, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, the time of the year, the difficulty, almost forced on us, of having at a short notice to wade through a vast mass of Papers of great importance recently presented to us, we may be allowed, at least, to reserve to ourselves a certain liberty of appreciation as to whether the previous conduct of the Government has been exactly such as we, on the other side, could have approved. Sir, the right hon. Gentleman last night pointed out the gravity of the present state of affairs. Now, the gravity of the present state of affairs is, I venture to say, at least equalled by the gravity of the statement of the right hon. Gentleman. What is the position at which we have arrived? The peace of the East, which it has been the object, not only of English, but of all European diplomacy, to preserve intact during a long series of years, has at last been disturbed. War has begun; the lives and the property of British subjects, and of other Europeans, have been sacrificed, and this is a position which we have to confront hardly with an ally, although we are told that we have an ally up to a certain point. I do not want to follow the right hon. Gentleman into the question as to whether the Government were committed to the existing state of affairs by the policy of their Predecessors. I think the Committee will understand the argument of the right hon. Gentleman to be that, by the establishment of the Control in Egypt, this country was necessarily committed to such interference in the ordinary affairs of that country as inevitably led to the results which have now come to pass. It is only right to point out, on the part of the late Government, that at least for four years after 1876 that policy of Control, according to the admission of the right hon. Gentleman himself, has greatly benefited Egypt, and her condition was yet such as neither to endanger the peace of that country nor the peace of Europe itself. Whether the Controllers at a later period acted politically, rather than with reference to their specific duty, is a question which, for my own part, I will pass by, and will leave it to be dealt with by others better qualified than myself to speak upon the subject. But this I would reiterate, without fear of contradiction—that up to the time the late Government left Office, there was nothing in the slightest degree approaching to the present position, and there was nothing to show that the system of Control would in any way have led to these results. I do not wish to enter more fully into that subject; but I would rather address myself to a question of practical utility. I would venture to ask the Committee, as regards the contention of the Government, to examine their preparations, and, as far as possible, to inquire to what point those preparations are directed. Now, Sir, with regard to the preparations of the Government, I do not think it right to enter into that system of cross-examination which has been for some time frequent in this House as to the particular object for which troops have been sent out, nor the objects with which they were placed there; but, after what was said last night, I should be neglecting my duty if I did not put one or two interrogatories to the Government. It has undoubtedly been difficult to obtain information; and there can be no doubt that, in some respects, information has been withheld. There was a statement which I confess, casually made as it was, filled me and some others with considerable alarm. I mean when the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War was asked for certain details of the Vote of Credit, and when he pointed out that the amount taken for the pay of the Forces was comparatively small. When the right hon. Gentleman was asked on what basis he had arrived at his calculation his answer was most unsatisfactory. We all know that a Vote of Credit is inevitably, from its very nature, obliged to be vague in its terms; but I have always understood that there is to be an approximation to the service demanded in the allotment of the Vote within the limits for which it is asked. Well, the Secretary of State for War was asked why he had taken a sum so low as £100,000—the Vote for Men— because it must be remembered he proposed to add 10,000 men to the Army; and naturally there are those who, placing these two separate figures together, have arrived at the conclusion, cither that the number of men was not such as Her Majesty's Government think they are required to take, or else that the time for which they are required must be extremely limited in its duration. In reply to these objections the right hon. Gentleman said that the calculations had been made on the basis of the employment of the Force for three months. Now, that seems to me, if I may venture to say so, a repetition of the course which was taken before the Crimean War; and there is another point which confirms my impression, in regard to which I may, perhaps, have to say a word presently in connection with the temporary appointment of the Staff. It seems to us that the Government have in their own minds estimated that this is an expedition that is merely to go out; that it would probably not be there more than a fortnight, or perhaps it might remain a month or two in the country, and, therefore, that a three months' Vote would be amply sufficient. But when warlike stores, provisions, forage, and so forth, are taken into account, the sum appears to us to be of such a nature that the amount of the Vote must almost have been already spent in the preparations of Her Majesty's Government, and hence we are driven to the conclusion that the Government must either have under-estimated the cost of the preparations, or this is not a Vote of Credit intended to meet the whole of the emergency, but simply to carry the Government on, and to last for a sufficient time until affairs de- velop themselves and a further appeal to Parliament can be made for an additional Vote. If this is to be the first of a series of Votes, if Parliament, on reassembling in the month of October, is to be again confronted with this, or even a larger Vote, then I can understand why Her Majesty's Government take this small Vote of Credit only. But we must bear in mind that the financial question is not the only question that has to be considered in this matter. There are other eyes upon the Government besides those of their own countrymen; and there are those who recollect that the Vote at the time of the Crimean War was only taken, in the first instance, for the despatch of troops to Malta and back again. [Mr. GLADSTONE: There was no such Vote.] I understand the correction of the right hon. Gentleman that no such Vote in point of form was taken; but it will be in the recollection of the Committee that it was argued that beyond preliminary preparations no actual necessity existed for taking a Vote. I am quite content to be in the recollection of the Committee in regard to the matter. I venture to say that those who are fully competent to judge, and who know our preparations, and know how far those preparations must necessitate cost, will probably have great doubts in their minds whether, after all, this Vote is more than a tentative Vote, meant to meet a temporary emergency. I am not for a moment desiring to impute to the Government that they are asking the country for one thing and meaning another all the time; but, on the contrary, I urge that if this country and the House mean to support the Government in Executive measures, then they should insist upon the preparations being declared. I will not comment on the nature or the constitution of the force that the Government intends to prepare; but perhaps I should be something more than human if I resisted the temptation to congratulate the Secretary of State for War on the fact that his persuasive art has enabled the Home Secretary to forego his frequently-expressed objections to the use of the Island of Cyprus. For my own part, I have never varied in the slightest degree my opinion as to the value of that Island, and I am glad to find that the Home Secretary is about to discover the difference between an armed place and a place d'armes. If he has not, I would leave the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to enlighten him still further. I do not wish to use language which may seem to taunt the Government with having reconsidered their position. I would rather congratulate them on the patriotism which has led them to surrender their private opinions, and to prefer, at last, the doctrine of common sense to consistency. I trust it may now be shown that we were not so short-sighted, or so utterly blind, or so foolish as some right hon. Gentlemen tried to persuade themselves we were in 1878. I do not mean to say that these particular complications could then have been foreseen; but this is perfectly certain—that the possession of the Island of Cyprus was intended then, and I trust still will be intended, to safeguard our road to the East. Now, Sir, I come to perhaps the most serious question of all. What are we to understand is the object to which these military preparations are to be addressed? The right hon. Gentleman last night seemed to me to point out an exceedingly grave and difficult prospect for the Government, for the country, and even for Europe at large. What did the right hon. Gentleman say? He told us, I am bound to say, little enough. Perhaps that was natural, and I do not press for information if Her Majesty's Government think it is desirable to withhold it. He gave us very little information indeed as to the precise points at which the expedition was to be addressed, and the steps it may be necessary to take. I am not in the least degree quarrelling with the course the right hon. Gentleman has taken in the matter; but, unfortunately, the right hon. Gentleman used one sentence which the Committee could not have listened to without the greatest alarm. The right hon. Gentleman said— We do not feel able to be satisfied that we should have fully discharged our duty without endeavouring to bring to bear adequate means of converting the present interior state of Egypt from anarchy and conflict to a state of peace and order. The right hon. Gentleman used other words which I cannot at this moment trace; but his meaning was that the interior anarchy was the disease itself, of which all the other matters were only the symptoms.

MR. GLADSTONE

What I said was, that the Suez Canal was only a symptom of the disease. The disease itself was to be found in the interior of Egypt.

COLONEL STANLEY

Quite so. The right hon. Gentleman does not dispute my point, that the interior anarchy was the cause both of the bombardment of Alexandria and the present preparations, if they be only intended for safeguarding the Canal. It is the interior anarchy which is the disease itself, and all other matters are only the symptoms. The right hon. Gentleman, as the Committee knows, has tried to grapple successfully with many great tasks; but I should think it is, perhaps, one of the largest and one of the widest assumptions ever made by any Minister that, as regards the internal anarchy of Egypt, the preparations made by the right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues at the War Office, based only on three months' calculations, are sufficient to remove this internal anarchy. I am not an alarmist. I would not willingly use one word in this House which could be interpreted as one of alarm, or as more than the most necessary caution; but it does seem to me, and to others also, that it is an exceedingly serious state of affairs. I care not whether it be owing to the misrepresentations of Arabi, or to the preaching of religious fanaticism, or any other cause; but it appears to me that precisely as we move further on, the legitimate system of the country seems to increase its resistance against us. Now, as regards the physical difficulties which will have to be encountered, I do not suppose anyone in this House, certainly no one of culture, would admit that an English force could be baffled by them. But there is a more serious question of the highest importance behind. At what cost—not merely of money and men, both valuable enough in their places— but at what cost are these forces to be crushed? Are they to be crushed by that which even in its appearance is taking the form of a religious war? Are the Government careful that, while repressing disorder, while endeavouring to repress a state of anarchy, they are taking all possible steps in their power to show that this is not in the slightest degree a crusade, and to prove that England, as a great Mahomedan Power, recognizes the rights of a Mahomedan as fully as of a Christian subject, and she is careful to separate the forces of anarchy from those of religious zeal and fanaticism. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Hear, hear!] The right hon. Gentleman cheers that sentiment. It almost follows, then, that that consideration must have been present in the minds of Her Majesty's Government. But something more definite than the statement of the right hon. Gentleman last night is required. I trust it is not only on the assurance given by the right hon. Gentleman last night, but on the strength of something much stronger, that Turkey is to be told to regard the right hon. Gentleman as, after all, her best friend. Well, Sir, I said that the previous Government had not experienced, or, at any rate, had not found the same necessity, for a state of war as that to which it would appear the present Government have arrived; but it must be remembered that the Government of the year 1879, when there was a personal dislike entertained to the then Ruler of Egypt, and difficulties arose, confronted those difficulties, which involved nothing else than a change in the Rulership. But it must be borne in mind that the late Government were not insensible to the Suzerainty of the country; and it was not by their own unassisted efforts, nor by calling the other European Powers into Council, nor by ignoring the Sultan, that the deposition of Is mail Pasha was accomplished, and the appointment of his successor achieved. Though Turkey may have signified so far her assent, in a qualified form, to the right hon. Gentleman's proposals, it must be remembered that conflicting advice has been constantly given, and that at an early period the Sultan, when anxious to send troops to Egypt for the restoration of order, was told, according to one of the Papers presented to us, that Her Majesty's Government did not at all wish to commit themselves to the approval of such a precipitate step, and that the language of Lord Dufferin to that effect was fully approved by Her Majesty's Government at home. At another moment the Sultan was sounded as to his willingness to interfere. One can easily make an allowance for a Sovereign who, I may say— without any wish to offend—has not in the past had any great reason to reckon the right hon. Gentleman among his cordial friends. No doubt, he would look upon such advice with some amount of reasonable suspicion, and hence he would urge on the Government to do all in its power to prevent a Jehad, or a Holy War of any sort, by endeavouring to show that, holding apart from anything which, rightly or wrongly, could be taken for a Crusade, England would treat both Christians and Mahomedans with an equal justice. England, as a great Mahomedan as well as a Christian Power, would, no doubt, endeavour to separate the force of anarchy from the force which might be collected for the purpose of carrying out misplaced religious zeal. There are one or two points of detail which, as the Secretary of State for War is not present, may be postponed. They are minor matters, and other opportunities will arise for asking questions about them. I merely want to say one word in regard to a question which I know has vexed the minds of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who have spoken to mo on the subject. It may seem to be a small point; but it is larger than its immediate dimensions seem to show. It is this—that on the appointment made to the chief command, than whom, I venture to say, no better person could have been selected than my friend Lieutenant General Sir Garnet Wolseley, the Government have left the Home appointments vacant, and have not taken steps, as far as I can learn, to fill up those appointments except by devolution upon others. That, above all things, has produced the impression that the whole character of the expedition is such as to indicate that it has only to go out to strike a blow and to return in time, perhaps, for the Autumn Session. I am quite aware that the German system, which we are so apt to quote, recognizes the same principle, to a certain extent, which the right hon. Gentleman has adopted. It recognizes that a permanently-appointed commander should go to the field, and that there should be others at home employed at the desk, but not in the field, That is precisely the case here, because the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief, between them, as the two great officers, will have to divide between them the duties of the two great offices which are left unfilled. It is a small point, but it is one which is of importance, not only in regard to itself, but in regard to what appears to be the hand-to-mouth policy pursued in this matter. It all comes to the same thing. Are the Government at this moment fully conscious of the gravity of the task they have before them? It may be that what we heard last night was only a rhetorical phrase, that we should be content with restoring order in Alexandria, and that we did not intend in the slightest degree to meddle with the question of order or disorder in the interior of the country. We may find ourselves committed only to safeguarding the ruins of Alexandria, and assisting France in protecting the Suez Canal. I do not quarrel with that decision if it be the decision of the Government. They are the only persons who can know. It is no secret that all the negotiations which have been going on have not yet been presented to Parliament, and the Government are the only persons who can possibly tell us what is going on at this moment. But if the words of the Prime Minister are good for anything at all—and the words of the right hon. Gentleman, on so grave an occasion, cannot be passed by as if they had no special weight— then I venture to say that the preparations made by the Government are wholly inadequate to their task, and I hope before this debate is concluded we may have full explanations from Her Majesty's Ministers on that point. I ask the pardon of the Committee for having intervened on this question. It is a grave matter, not, of course, only in a military point of view, but grave, possibly, beyond all recognition in the consequences that may ensue. If the Government is determined to go straight forward with single-heartedness to preserve British interests, and to keep British interests well before them, while by no means oblivious to those of other Powers, then they would find this country united almost to a man behind them, and they would be able to go forward with a confidence and strength to which they scarcely themselves lay claim. But if, on the other hand, a sudden move forward is to be followed by a course of hesitancy; if, the moment they had taken a forward step, Her Majesty's Government were to look around them to see which of their Allies, if they had any, were prepared to follow them, then I venture to say that the country, as well as your political opponents, and Europe itself, would not be slow in perceiving your weakness and the gravity of the situation, and your difficulties would be, by your own hands, increased tenfold. For this reason, feeling strongly upon the matter, I have asked the Committee to listen to me for a few moments. I earnestly entreat the Government to bear in mind that this is a question on which not only the Committee, but the country, feels strongly. Those who read the papers cannot but see what a strong feeling of relief there is whenever the Government take decided action. If Her Majesty's Government will take strong and decided action, the whole country, whether friends or opponents of the Government, will be ready to sustain them. I only hope that the Government, in the steps they are about to take, have fully calculated the cost—I do not mean the material cost—but that they have fully looked in the face the objects to which they intend to address themselves, and that both their preparations and the objects they have in view will commend themselves to the universal approval and support of the country.

SIR WILFRID LAWSON

said, he thought the right hon. and gallant Gentleman who had just sat down was a very great authority upon War Estimates, and he did not wonder that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman was rather afraid that the Government had asked for less money than would be required for the purposes they had in hand, because they would all remember that when right hon. Gentlemen opposite took in hand the invasion of Afghanistan, they told the House that about £3,000,000 was wanted for that purpose, and in the end, he believed, the expedition cost them nearly £20,000,000. He (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) was glad to have an opportunity of making a few remarks upon this Vote. He did not wish to appear there as member of what was called "the Peace-at-any-price Party." He did not know that there was any such Party in the country. They might just as well say that hon. Members who supported any particular war were "War-at-any-price people;" but they did not say anything of the kind. What they said was that there might be those who advocated certain wars because they were for the benefit of the country, and they added that they were opposed to certain wars which were pro- posed because they thought they were injurious to the country. If anybody could tell thorn that any particular war was right, and convinced their reason that such a war was right, then all of them would be quite willing to support such a war. There was a great deal of talk about British interests. He supposed they were all for British interests; but it had been said by one of our statesmen that, after all, the greatest British interest was peace. He and his Friends did not go upon abstract grounds; they took their stand upon the Blue Books and the evidence before them, and on that evidence they said they did not see any reason for what was now going on. That was the way in which the question of the Crimean War was argued, a quarter of a century ago, by Mr. Cobden and by the late Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. John Bright). They were called the "Peace-at-any-price men;" but if the Committee would look back to the speeches those Gentlemen then made, they would find that, over and over again, they denied that they opposed war on those grounds. On the contrary, they said they took their stand on the Blue Books, and because they knew from the evidence before them that the war going on was an unjust and an unrighteous war. He was glad that his right hon. Friend the late Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who was not present in his place at that moment, had not abjured the principle which, with all his eloquence, he had advanced in those days, but had shown that he regarded the present war as an unjust and immoral war. It was necessary for them to look back in order to see how they had got into this trouble, and it seemed to him that it was necessary to go back for about 20 years. About 20 years ago Egypt began the very bad plan of borrowing money, and so proficient in the course of 20 years did the country become in the art of borrowing that it incurred a National Debt of £115,000,000. He thought a more rapid growth of National Debt was never known in any country. And now let them see what was the state of things in 1876, when Sir Stephen Cave went out to inquire into this Debt. What was it that Sir Stephen Cave said? He told the people of this county that for the present amount of indebtedness there was absolutely nothing to show but the Suez Canal, which had cost about £14,000,000 or £16,000,000 out of the whole sum. The rest had been absorbed in the payment of interest and in a Sinking Fund. About that time we lent officials to re-organize the financial administration of the country, but the re-organization did not seem to have been very beneficial to Egypt; because the next thing, as appeared from the Parliamentary Papers, was a Report from the Consul General, dated July 30th, 1877, that the Revenues of Egypt might be greatly increased, without imposing further sacrifices upon the already overtaxed Natives of the country, by putting an end to the abuse which existed, and compelling the Europeans to contribute fairly to the taxation of the country. Not only did they not contribute, but there was a great deal of smuggling carried on by Europeans in Egypt. The country was full of contraband goods, openly smuggled under the very eyes of the authorities. So much for the great benefits we had bestowed upon the country. In the year 1879 it was reported to our own officers that out of a Revenue of £9,600,000 £4,473,000 was taken by the bondholders, leaving, after payment of the interest on the Suez Canal and other matters, only £1,700,000 for the necessary expenses of the country. The Prime Minister spoke of the blessings of civilization to be brought to these people; but the fact was that the Egyptians under this grand Control paid ten times as much taxation as our Indian subjects did, and the Consul General, on the 12th of July, 1877, said— The money required was fully paid up yesterday; but I fear that those results may have been achieved at the expense of ruinous sacrifices of the peasantry by forced sales of growing crops and by collecting the taxes in advance. All this must be ruin in some shape or other for a country already crushed by taxation. Meanwhile, I fear the European Administration may be unconsciously sanctioning the utter ruin of the peasant creators of the wealth of the country, for which I hold that Europeans are incurring a serious responsibility. In February, 1879, a Decree was promulgated by the Cabinet, headed by the European Ministers, whereby— Large numbers of fellahs hitherto exempt from enforced labour became liable to do work, but might purchase exemption by payment of a sum of money. He thought all those things went to show that the people of Egypt had serious grounds of complaint against the way in which we controlled them. Now, he would quote another authority— namely, Gordon Pasha, who, in January, 1882, said— It is reiterated over and over again that Egypt is prosperous and contented. I do not think it is altered at all, except in improving its finances for the benefit of the bondholders. The prisons are as full of unfortunates as ever they were; the local tribunals are as corrupt. Then, again, in April, 1879, our Consul General wrote of an interview between the Khedive and Cherif Pasha— The Khedive took me aside and spoke very seriously about the very great discontent which existed in the country, and the serious consequences which might be likely to ensue. Cherif Pasha, when appealed to, stated that there was no doubt whatever as to the evidence of great discontent among all classes of the population. Those statements, he thought, were very important when they were told about the Control being so beneficial. Then, on the 7th of April, 1879, Cherif Pasha said— It would have been impossible for the Khedive to have put himself in opposition to the will of the nation, which had been so positively expressed. His Highness had, in fact, no choice but to follow the course of action he has adopted in order to allay the discontent, which would have led to disastrous consequences. Then, to show how the Natives regarded our control, on April 12th, 1879, 150 Ulemas and Sheiks of villages subscribed an oath which closed by declaring— I rejoice at the Europeans having been dismissed from the Administration. He next came to the great question of to-day. Arabi Pasha set himself against all this sort of thing, and raised up a party who followed him. Whether it was a large or a small party he would not say; but Arabi had raised up a certain party who were opposed to the Europeans, and he had the Notables with him. At all events, they looked upon his action with approval, and there was no doubt he had the Army with him. That was the head and front of his offending. Anybody who heard the Prime Minister last night would have noticed the great stress he laid on the fact of the Army being with Arabi Pasha. He (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) was not very fond of Armies, but they were not always wrong. At times they had been the friends of freedom, and he believed Arabi had the Army with him. Even if Arabi was wrong in having the Army with him, still it was admitted on all hands that there was a National Army. People were apt to say—"Oh! yes; there is a National Army, but Arabi is not the head of it."There must always be a scapegoat, and the proper thing was to run down Arabi, and make him out one of the greatest scoundrels that ever appeared. That was just like what occurred during the China War. The hon. Member for Longford (Mr. Justin M'Carthy), in his history, described how the Chinese Question arose, and showed that it was clearly proved that we were in the wrong, and how, on a division in this House, by a considerable majority, Lord Palmerston was turned out. Lord Palmerston issued a Manifesto to the country, and the country, being ignorant of the facts and arguments produced in the House, said the British flag had been insulted. That was a capital election cry, and so it was a capital tiling now to run down Arabi Pasha and make him out a villain. Whether he was or was not a villain, he had the Army with him, and what were we fighting for? The Prime Minister, a fortnight ago, said we were not at war, and he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) now did not know if there had been any declaration of war; but he understood we were at war in order to restore the status quo ante. The status quo ante was the grinding down of the people of Egypt to obtain money for the bondholders of this country—nothing more nor less than an effort to pay the interest on the bondholders' money. The status quo ante was a control over the finances of the country, which he maintained belonged to the people themselves; and for the Liberals, of all people, to engage in war to prevent people managing their own affairs was simply disgusting. What spirit, he wondered, would submit to such a proceeding. Could we be surprised at the Egyptians rising against us, and the National feeling being excited against us? What did Lord Granville say about setting up one Government against another? In a despatch, dated the 21st of November, 1881, he said— It cannot be too clearly understood that England desires no partizan Ministry in Egypt. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, a partizan Government founded on the support of a Foreign Power, or upon the personal influence of a Foreign Diplomatic Agent, is neither calculated to be of service to the country which it administers, nor of that in whose interest it is supposed to be maintained. It can only tend to alienate the population from their true allegiance to their Sovereign, and to give rise to counter intrigues which are detrimental to the influence of the State. He did not think that there was ever a more conclusive sentence written than that, and he was astonished that the Government should now be sending troops to keep up a partizan Ministry. Now, he would assume that all these representations about oppression of the people were false. He would assume that the Government and their Controller were Heaven-born Administrators, and could govern the people of Egypt better than anybody else. Still, that would not justify their action. There was such a thing as independence, and liberty, and patriotism. He remembered when the Boers revolted against a power we sought to impose on them, the Government wrote beautiful despatches as to giving them good government, and in one of those despatches it was said— No doubt these are priceless privileges, but they are not liberty. It was liberty the Egyptian people wanted; they believed it was better to manage their own affairs ill than to have foreigners managing them well. That was what was generally called patriotism, and he could not understand why it was not to be regarded as a virtue in the case of these poor Egyptians. We had now begun to promote what we called law and order in Egypt, and how had we begun it? By a bombardment which the Prime Minister described as the application of moral law. He did not think that was a good description of it; he should much rather have called it what the Prime Minister called lawless military violence in Egypt. The Prime Minister said the bombardment was an act of self-defence. What business had we there? Could anybody prove what right we had to send our Fleet into Egyptian waters to overawe the people and setup one party against another? Until that was proved he could see no force in the argument of self-defence. He would allude to one thing which took place in the debate, because the Prime Minister would remember that after he had said it was an act of self-defence, he said— I have, however, given a justification of the act (self-defence); hut there is an important consequence…Does my hon. Friend hear in mind the massacre which occurred in Alexandria a few weeks ago? Does he hear in mind that that massacre remains, down to the present moment, wholly unexamined and unavenged? Does he estimate the effect which a massacre of that kind—unavenged and unexamined—subjected to a pretended examination only, which was a mockery and a delusion and a snare— would have had upon the security, not only of all Englishmen and all British subjects, hut of all European people throughout the whole East? Why did be quote that? Because the other day (July 11th, 1882), before the Prime Minister made that remark, Lord Granville wrote to Lord Dufferin as to the Alexandria riots— Her Majesty's Government have abstained for the present from making any formal demands; but they have announced their intention to demand full reparation and satisfaction for the outrages committed on the Queen's officers, and upon British subjects. As far as he could see, about 10 men supported the Ministry in their conduct, and their argument seemed to be that the Tories had begun this matter, and they must go on with it. He always thought that the present Government had been put into power to alter the Tory policy, and now the argument was that they must go on in the same way as the Tories began. But there was a noble instance of the Government taking a very different tone. He alluded to Afghanistan. In that case the Government found a complication of evils; but instead of going on and making things worse they withdrew from Afghanistan, and this House and the country supported them. He remembered that when a deputation of gentlemen went to the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India and told him a great deal about the policy of cowardice, and so forth, and of leaving Candahar, he asked them what right we had to be there? Many a good speech had the noble Lord made, but he never made a better speech than that. What right had we in Afghanistan; what right, human or Divine, had we to take the management of affairs in a country that did not want us? Then there was the case of the Transvaal. The Ministry, under the guidance of the Prime Minister, took the noble and honourable course of admitting that they were wrong, and withdrew from the evil policy. He could not see why a prin- ciple that applied to Afghanistan should not apply to Egypt. But now what were the Government doing? They were raising up a tremendous conflagration all over the Eastern world. In the newspapers of to-day he saw how from all parts of Egypt people were flocking to Arabi's camp, and there was to be a great religious war. Even now we might withdraw from the evil course we were entering upon. There was no such cowardice as being afraid to say we were wrong. If we were wrong, let us admit it, and leave the Egyptian people to manage their own affairs. That would be a nobler and a braver act than the battering down of forts with our guns. There was, however, another argument that was very much used by hon. Members. They said they must trust the Government because it was such an excellent Government. He would not say anything against the Government; but many of the greatest crimes in history had been committed by the best men. A curious view was taken in the country of the Government. He would read a short account of what took place at a General Committee of the Birmingham Liberal Association, presided over by Mr. G. Dixon. On the motion of Mr. Kendrick, seconded by Mr. Holliday, the following resolutions were unanimously adopted:— That this meeting regrets the National loss occasioned by the retirement of Mr. Bright from the Cabinet; hut, knowing that his resignation has been caused by the same conscientious devotion to the cause of peace which has marked the whole or his career, assures him of the unabated confidence and affection of the constituency which he has served so long and so faithfully. On the motion of Mr. E. W. Dale, another resolution was passed expressing— Deep sympathy with Her Majesty's Government in the difficulties and complications, which are largely the result of the engagements entered into by their Predecessors in Office; and declaring that the meeting— Entirely approved of the earnest efforts of the Government to secure a solution of the questions by means of the European Concert, and had the strongest confidence in its determination to protect the interests of England, while at the same time pursuing a policy directed to secure the peace of Europe, and the permanent welfare and self-government of Egypt. That was one of the most delightful resolutions he ever heard. It reminded him of a good book he once read, called Making the Best of Both Worlds. It was holding with the non - interventionists and hunting with the "Jingoes;" shouting peace with the Ex-Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and glory and gunpowder with the President of the Board of Trade. Although he would not say a word against the Government, yet in what they were doing they were exactly following in the footsteps of the Government they turned out, only, perhaps, in a worse way, because the late Govern-anent never bombarded a town as this Government had done. He was told that was taking a dangerous line—a very dangerous line. Well, he would read the following letter written on July 17, 1882, by a Liberal Member— who was a very excellent fellow, one of the best fellows in the world: — No man is loss aggressive than I am—no man more of a non-interventionist in the Egyptian policy. I have given my warm support to the Government. I have from the first said to my friends that the defence of our fellow - subjects in Egypt, their wives and children and property, was an act of painful necessity. I deeply deplore Mr. Bright's resignation; but I honour his motives, and warmly respect his most earnest wish to avoid blood-shedding. Even if our Government have made a mistake—and I, for one, think they have not—I am not going to withdraw my humble confidence from the best Government this country has seen. I have worked too hard to make, in my humble way, such a Government possible, that I am not going to bring back into power the Salisburys, the Lowthers, and such like. That letter was a type and illustration of the feeling of the country at the present moment. The country did think sometimes, and when it did it was horrified at what was going on; but it said if it voted against the present Ministry back would come "the Salisburys and Lowthers"—and that was the real safeguard of the Liberal Administration. No doubt; but what was his answer to that? If these crimes against humanity were to be committed; if this unjust policy, this dangerous policy, was to be pursued, he would ten times rather it was carried out by his political opponents than by his political friends. Let those who had always avowed this policy have credit for it, but do not let the Liberal Party be disgraced by such a course. He had such an opinion of the Government that he hoped they would yet consider their action and look into this matter. It would be a very sad incident in the noble career of the Prime Minister if he now consented to carry out the policy of carrying fire and sword into Egypt for the sake of usurers who had lent money to that country. That was the real reason of the war. People might say it was not, but they could not bring evidence against that view. The evidence of the Blue Books said it was so. He knew the Prime Minister could carry out that policy; he justly had great influence, and would be supported; and it might be his desire to prove himself as great a Minister of War as he had been a Minister of Peace. He would have no insuperable difficulty, for we had plenty of troops; and he had a majority in the House which, no doubt, would support him, and in any case he was assured of the support of the right hon. Gentleman opposite. The Press was with him, and would shriek with exultation at every case of butchery; but he would say to the right hon. Gentleman that the end was not yet— There's a still small voice that speaks within Above earth's clamour and glory's din. That small voice would speak both to the Government and to the nation upon undertaking so unwise, so impolitic, so ignoble, and unjust a policy as that which the Prime Minister had brought forward.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

My hon. and generally facetious Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson)—if I may so call him—in the remarks which he has just addressed to the Committee, made use of some expressions which I cannot but deeply regret and deplore. He hopes the Government "will at last look into this matter," and he speaks as though the matter were not one which had been occupying the most anxious and most painful attention and the undivided energies of the whole Government for a considerable period. I can assure my hon. Friend that the responsibility of the Government, weighty as it must be in such times as these in which we live, has been considerably increased by the present complication, to which no Member of the Government concerned could refrain from giving his utmost care. My hon. Friend said, towards the end of his speech, that the effect of the present policy was "to carry fire and sword into the country of Egypt for the sake of usurers. "Those are terrible words, and I cannot but think that my hon. Friend, in using them, meets with the sympathy of but a very small portion indeed of the Members of this House. I do not doubt that my hon. Friend is persuaded in his own mind that although he has, as he must know himself, the sympathy of but a few Members of this House in the use of those words, he has the confidence outside this House of larger numbers. But I, on the other hand, however, cannot but persuade myself that there must be in this country a very general belief that not only the present Government, but that any Government of this country, would by far rather abandon the position which they hold and retire into private life, than for one moment be parties to a war of the kind which the hon. Baronet describes. Before I come to the remainder of my hon. Friend's remarks I should like to make some allusion to the very careful and measured and well-reasoned speech of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley). In that speech, and towards its close, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman told the Committee that he was alarmed at the news that the Government were making preparations to cope with general anarchy in Egypt. It is the opinion of Her Majesty's Advisers that the present anarchy in Egypt is caused by the pressure of military tyranny, and is not what may be called national anarchy, and that there is good reason to believe that calm in Egypt would follow the liberation of the country from military tyranny. Egypt is an easily governed country, and we are confirmed in that belief, a belief which is founded upon history, by the fact that the body of Notables is as fairly representative of the general feeling of the country as any body that is likely to be got together in a Mahomedan country could well be, and has shown itself to be composed of reasonable men. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman also asked whether we were quite sure that we were not entering upon a religious war. I can assure the right hon. and gallant Gentleman and the House that the Government are fully persuaded that the Khedive, at the present time, has the support of the most reasonable and sensible part of the Mahomedan popula- tion, and of the majority of the leading Mahomedan authorities whose names have been known in the past. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman made a most valuable suggestion, and one which I think ought to be well weighed by all who are concerned in this matter upon the spot—and that is, that the most careful means should be taken to inform those who guide Mahomedan opinion that we are not engaging in any general attack upon Mahomedans, that we have no quarrel with the Mahomedan world, which is represented by so enormous a population in Her Majesty's Dominions. My hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) asked whether we were going to manage the affairs of a country which does not want us? He said that we ought to leave the Egyptian people to manage their own affairs. I think I could not better conclude the remarks I have made in answer to the speech of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire, than by assuring both sides of the House that it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government, after relieving Egypt from military tyranny, to leave the people to manage their own affairs. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire dealt also with the military side of the case, and that, of course, is a matter upon which I am not competent to speak; but, so far as it touches the political aspect of the question, I may make one reference to his remarks on the point. He said it would be a great mistake for us to suppose that a three months' Vote would be sufficient, and he feared repeated applications of this sort would have to be made to the House. But what the Committee have to consider is whether we should be justified in taking more or less than that for which we ask at this time. We have to deal with facts as they are before us, and we have reason to suppose that a three months' Vote is a sufficient Vote for the necessities of the case as they appear to us at the present moment, and nothing more than that can be asked of any Administration. We should be culpable if we were to ask for a three months' Vote, having distinctly in view the probability of further operations being required; but it is the opinion of the highest military authorities that a three months' Vote is sufficient to deal with the case as it stands. An hon. Member said that we were going into Egypt alone, and the Leader of the Opposition used the same phrase last night. "You are about to go alone," said the right hon. Gentleman. Now, it is not yet certain that we shall go into Egypt alone; and although I can say no more upon the subject, it must be remembered that this is one which cannot be regarded as concluded. Her Majesty's Government were bound to submit a Vote of Credit to the House as soon as they saw the absolute necessity for such expenditure, whether they went to Egypt alone or not. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition yesterday, after making use of that phrase, spoke of the attitude of the other Powers towards our action in Egyptian affairs; and he asked what evidence we could give of the moral support of the other Powers which had been named by the Prime Minister? The right hon. Gentleman asked that question in such a way as to seem to imply some doubt on the point. I can only assure the right hon. Gentleman that words which have been used by the Secretary of State (Lord Granville) have been used by him after carefully weighing the words, and having the fullest grounds for his statement. The words used by the Secretary of State on this subject were these— We have the good-will, the good wishes, and, I may almost add, the moral support of the other Powers; and the phrase "moral support" was a phrase which had been used to him on behalf of a great Power. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition asked, immediately after that portion of his speech, whether, in going on with this war, with the doubtful support, as he thought, of the other Powers, we were not endangering the European Concert? We should have been in a very different position at the present time—in an adverse sense—from that which we now occupy, had we not consulted the European Concert on this subject. We are in a very different position, even should we be obliged to act alone —we are in a very different position, and in a far more favourable position, than we should have been had we not consulted the other Powers, had we not exhausted every other means of action, and so proceeded, as we are justified in assuming, with the moral support of Europe.

The right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley) repeated an argument which was used yesterday by the Leader of the Opposition, an argument in answer to the Prime Minister's remarks in his speech of yesterday with regard to the Anglo-French Control. My hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) followed the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire to-day, and on this point read some resolutions which have been passed at Birmingham, laying particular stress upon the passage—"Difficulties which are largely the result of engagements entered into by their Predecessors." The contention of the Leader of the Opposition yesterday was that the intervention of the late Government in Egypt had been only financial and not political. I shall have to tax the patience of the Committee for a few minutes while I go step by step through the action of the late Government in the establishment of the Control. The Control was first established by what was known as the Goschen-Joubert Decree. I am glad I speak in the hearing of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), who will correct me if I am wrong. There were originally to be two Controllers, one for receipts, the other for accounts and public debts. The Controller General of Accounts was, as his title implied, to supervise, check, and audit the accounts and payments of the Treasury; but the duty of the Controller General of Receipts was to watch over the receipt of all kinds of State Revenue in Egypt. His was the more important post, and I think it was the intention of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon at the time that the one post should be more important than the other. The yearly Budget was to be prepared in consultation with the Controllers, and they, in concert with the Minister of Finance, were to watch over the due execution of its provisions. In the first instance they had only a consulting voice. Of the two Controllers, one was an Englishman and the other a Frenchman. Mr. Romaine, the English Controller, was appointed by the Khedive. The French Controller General was designated by his own Government. There was this difference in the functions of the two Controllers, that the functions of the English Controller were much more considerable than those of his colleague. As I have said, the English Controller was appointed by the Khedive, and the French Controller, with less important functions, was designated by the Government of France. In 1879, a very considerable change took place, be-cause while Lord Derby had always refused to appoint a Controller, in 1879, Her Majesty's then Government themselves nominated a Controller General, and Mr. Baring was appointed Controller General of Receipts and Expenditure under the Decree of 1876—that is to say, that the Control remained what it had been hitherto; but the English Controller was appointed by Her Majesty's then Government for the first time. The English Controller still continued to have the superior functions of the two. The Decree of November, 1879, was the one to which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition has alluded, and that was the result of an understanding between England and France, under which the functions of the Controllers were materially modified. The distinction between the two Controllers was then abrogated, and the Controllers became equal, the English Controller losing the superiority of functions. The two Controllers then divided between themselves the Public Services over which they exercised supervision; they received in financial matters the widest power of investigation over all branches of the Public Service. Ministers and public officials were to give them all information or documents that they, or their Agents, might require; they had rank and a seat in the Council of Ministers, and took part in the deliberations of the Council; they were not to be dismissed without the consent of their Governments; they appointed and dismissed the officers of their own Departments. The Decree of 1879 displaced the Decree of 1876; and our contention, which, in my mind, is absolutely justified by the facts, is, that the difference between the two systems of Control is that the Control of 1876 had a merely administrative character, and that the Control of 1879 brought the Controller General in relation with all the political Departments of State. The hon. Member for Carlisle spoke of the Control in another portion of his speech. He described the terrible financial situation of Egypt in 1876 and in 1877, and he led the House to suppose that that terrible financial situation existed immediately before the military outbreak. It is our belief, confirmed, I think, by the whole of the Papers before the House, that this situation had been changed; that that terrible situation had been changed as though by the wave of an enchanter's wand, and all the evil side of it had disappeared, or was disappearing fast, at the time when military violence first appeared. My hon. Friend said the exactions on the people had been made more stringent in 1879. That is simply not the case. He also stated that under the English and French Ministers those who followed the first institution of the Control, and who went before the Control in its later form, a very large number of Natives were made liable to forced labour. The Report to the Government on that subject at the time was that the Decree did not in the least extend the institution of forced labour, but was for the purpose of checking the abuses which had crept into the system. We believe the documents prove to the House that one of the effects of the Control has been to enormously limit, and will be to extinguish forced labour. If I may resume what I have said on the subject of the Control, it is the contention of the Government that the Control, instead of being financial under the late Government, became political. It gradually became political in the highest degree, and it is impossible to leave out of the consideration of this subject the fact that the late Government were the most active parties in the deposition of the late Khedive, and that by interfering, through the Porte it is true, but still interfering themselves to change the occupant of the Throne of Egypt, they did most absolutely and distinctly interfere in the external and political affairs of Egypt. The then English Government were looked upon as being the active parties in those transactions, for they were the persons applied to by other Powers to obtain a share in the Control. Italy, Austria, and Germany applied in 1879 to obtain a share in the Control. It seems to me that the interference by England and France under the late Government in 1879 in the affairs of Egypt was complete. In a speech which I made to my constituents at the time, I said that they had virtually taken the Government of Egypt into their own hands. But whatever might have been the political danger of the Control, it brought about an enormous improvement in the material development of Egypt; it brought about the abolition of vexatious taxation, the establishment of a just basis for the land tax, and an extraordinary increase of material prosperity.

We have now to look to what was the situation when Her Majesty's present Advisors first had to deal with the affairs of Egypt. In 1881 they pointed out that the policy of the Government towards Egypt had no other aim than the prosperity of the country, and the full enjoyment of that liberty which it had obtained under successive Firmans of the Sultan. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle quoted from a despatch words in which Lord Granville stated that it could not be too well understood that England desired no partizan Ministry in Egypt. Those are the opinions of Her Majesty's Government now. I wish to make that statement in the clearest terms. The hon. Baronet has asked whether we are sending troops-to Egypt—in fact, he has asserted that we are doing it to support a partizan Ministry. We are doing nothing of the kind. So completely is the reverse of that statement true, that we have actually recognized within the last few days the Ministry in which Arabi Pasha was formerly the Minister of War, they having recommended the Khedive to issue a Proclamation by which Arabi Pasha is declared a rebel. We are now in actual relation with that Ministry, which certainly cannot be called a partizan Ministry of our creation. Having made that statement with regard to the position of things in the year 1881, I may point out that the Government have repeatedly within the last few days, and in a despatch dated the 11th of July—laid before Parliament on Saturday last—repeated the very arguments in almost the very words which were used in our former despatches on this subject. There has been no change of policy on the part of the Government on that point. In 1881 there arose a considerable ferment or political movement in Egypt. The movement was political at first, but afterwards became connected with, and damaged by, its connection with a movement which was purely military. Her Majesty's Government had no objection whatever to the birth and growth of the National movement until it became military. On the contrary, we distinctly, on several occasions, expressed our preference for such a state of things in Egypt. We believe that this country had not only nothing to fear, but all to gain from such a movement. We believe that it is better for the interests of this country, as well as for the interests of Egypt, that Egypt should be governed by liberal institutions rather than by a despotic rule. The growth of free institutions in Egypt has a tendency to prevent a future return of arbitrary rule, and it is for the interests of this country that Egypt should not at any time be ruled by a purely despotic Ruler. When we have despotic rule in a country in which we have an enormous stake, we are placed at the mercy of a single man, who may be our friend, but who may be our enemy. We believe that this country would gain by the introduction into Egypt of something like Representative Institutions, which form a guarantee against anarchy on the one hand, and against a return to arbitrary rule on the other. In January of the present year, Her Majesty's Government repeated their declaration as regards the past; but this military ferment in Egypt, of which I speak, having considerably grown, we then stated that it was impossible for the Government to be indifferent to events which might plunge Egypt into anarchy, and destroy the results of the efforts made to improve the condition of that country. The power of the Military Party considerably and rapidly increased, and it then became the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that it was possible that force would have to be used to suppress the Military Party, and relieve Egypt from its tyranny, and Her Majesty's Government then expressed that opinion to the other Powders that if recourse to force was necessary to avoid anarchy in Egypt, the safest force to employ would be a Turkish Force, subject to proper conditions, as to the length of time it should be employed, and the like. When, a little later, the French Government came round to this view, which at first they had opposed, the French Government proposed to send an Anglo-French Squadron to Alexandria. The English Government expressed a wish that all the Powers should be invited to have their flags represented there, and that fact alone showed that we tried to secure the concert of the Powers. The Government have, as I have just said, over and over again an- nounced, and they Lave received the support of the whole of the European Powers in announcing, that it is impossible to tolerate the continuance of anarchy in Egypt. The dominance of a purely military faction at Cairo must place our communications with India and the East in permanent jeopardy— that is, we cannot permanently, although we might temporarily, protect the Suez Canal by a force employed on the Suez Canal alone. With regard to the suggestion which has been made that it might have been possible to patch up a peace with the Military Party in Egypt, I must state that, as regards the leader of that party—Arabi Pasha—even the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle did not attempt to defend him. There is no doubt, I fear, that that leader was guilty of complicity in the preparations for the attack on the Europeans in Alexandria on the 11th of June. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle thinks it doubtful whether Arabi Pasha had the people of Egypt with him. The hon. Baronet says it is certain he has the Army with him, and tells us that armies are often the friends of freedom. [Sir WILFRID LAWSON: I said sometimes.] I took the words down, but I accept my hon. Friend's correction, and will give him the benefit of the doubt. My hon. Friend said, therefore, that armies sometimes are the friends of freedom. That is a curious sentiment for my hon. Friend, who does not much like armies, to express. I will not discuss the matter as one of history, or go through all the instances in which armies have proved themselves either the friends or the enemies of freedom. I will, however, say that this particular Army is not a friend of freedom. It is, undoubtedly, the fact that the Egyptian Army during its reign, this military tyranny which it has established in Egypt, has been steadily opposed by those representatives of Egyptian national sentiment, whose opinion my hon. Friend very properly desires we should conciliate.

I have spoken of the position of the Suez Canal, and of the bearing upon it of the Military Government in Cairo, as one reason which leads us to turn our attention to the form of government existing in Cairo, and to object to military tyranny there. Our position seems to arise from necessity, from Treaty right, and from duty—from necessity, because Egypt forms our highway to India and to the East generally; from Treaty-right, because under the Treaty of 1840 for the pacification of the Levant, and the subsequent Firmans and Treaties, we have peculiar rights with regard to Egypt, rights which have always been respected by the Powers; from duty, because it is incumbent upon us to see that the influence in Egypt which our necessities and Treaties give us is used for the benefit of the Egyptian people, and that the reforms introduced for the benefit of the oppressed population are not overturned, and the old state of corruption revived. As regards the Suez Canal, England has a double interest; it has a predominant commercial interest, because 82 per cent of the trade passing through the Canal is British trade, and it has a predominant political interest caused by the fact that the Canal is the principal highway to India, Ceylon, the Straits, and British Burmah, where 250,000,000 people live under our rule; and also to China, where we have vast interests and 84 per cent of the external trade of that still more enormous Empire. It is also one of the roads to our Colonial Empire in Australia and New Zealand. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle, in a speech which he made outside the walls of this House, attacked mo personally for "having asked the working men of England to abandon their principles for the sake of a little better trade." It was in this House that I made the speech to which the hon. Baronet alludes, and I never put forward trade as a ground for intervention; but, having been told publicly that the working men of England were indifferent to the position of their fellow-countrymen in the East, I said I could not desire to see British trade driven away from all parts of the world; and, speaking as the Under Secretary of State, superintending the Commercial Department of the Foreign Office, and speaking as a man whose duty it was to know more than most people about the ramifications of British external trade, I went on to speak of the importance which I must attach in that respect to our position in Egypt. It has been pointed out by one of the Members for Manchester (Mr. Slagg), in a letter which he has written to the newspapers, that the English have not forced themselves upon Egypt; that they have not forced them- solves or their trade upon Egypt, as might be said in the case of China and Japan. The influx of foreigners was fostered by the Egyptian Government, and the result of English immigration to Egypt, and the introduction of English capital into Egypt, has been an enormous advance in the wealth and civilization of the Egyptian people. It is not of material prosperity alone that I speak, though that has enormously increased. Egypt sells us of cotton alone to the value of £6,000,000 every year. Very little of that cotton was grown a few years ago, and all that may be said to be a pure increase in the wealth of Egypt. Intervention, however, is not to be defended '"on trade grounds, but on the grounds of necessity, Treaty right, and duty, which I put forward just now. We have not taken any isolated step in the direction of intervention in Egypt up to the present time. We have acted steadily with the other European Powers; but, if we should be forced to go forward alone, we shall not do so until we have exhausted every means of inducing other Powers to accompany us. From the point of view of necessity, besides our interest in the Canal, it is impossible to permanently acquiesce in any arrangement in Egypt, especially after the massacre at Alexandria on the 11th of June, which would destroy, not only the influence and credit of this country, but of all Europe in the East. Every English Minister must, of course, maintain that England is bound to guard her connection with India from interruption; but it is our desire to be most careful in the steps we take to avoid crushing anything like Egyptian national feeling in favour of Egyptian nationality. There is, undoubtedly, in Egypt a natural desire to see as many Egyptians as possible holding office, and there is a certain amount of real national feeling. That sentiment we might and should conciliate. To suppose, as my hon. Friend (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), in a speech he delivered ten days ago, seemed to suppose, that Arabi Pasha is the Representative of that national feeling, is a very different thing. Arabi Pasha, over and over again, has been repudiated by the authorized exponents of Egyptian national feeling. On the 20th of May, for instance, the Chamber of Notables expressly refused, at the peril of their lives, to support a declaration of confidence in the military leader. The so- called Ultimatum of the English and French Agents, which very much exercised the mind of the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle at the time, was, as is stated on the face of it, drawn up by Sultan Pasha himself, the President of the Chamber of Notables, and it will be remembered that the document insisted upon the withdrawal from Egypt of Arabi Pasha. Arabi Pasha appears to be the ordinary military adventurer of the East, supported not by a nation, but by an army, and an army which he has to bribe by unjustifiable promotion and increased pay, an army whose actions compromise both the liberty and the welfare of the Egyptian people. On the other hand, the Notables have displayed both patriotism and independence, and it is one of our objects to liberate those Notables from military tyranny. Those Notables, I believe, are by so large a majority on the side of the Khedive against Arabi, that the numbers in their Body are represented by the figures of 65 to 9; the determination which they took to oppose Arabi, by all the means in their power, was a determination in which only 9 out of 74 Members refused to concur. We do not wish to impose on Egypt institutions of our own choice; but, as my hon. Friend suggests, rather to leave the choice of Egypt free. We believe that this military pronunciamen to has not the support of the agricultural population, which forms the mass of the Egyptian people; and it is our desire that not only should existing institutions in Egypt be respected, but that no obstacles should be placed by us in the way of a prudent development of those institutions. Guarantees ought, of course, to exist for the security of Europeans living in Egypt, and for the due observance of international engagements; but we do not desire to interfere beyond the strict necessities of the case in the internal administration of the country, or to prevent the government of Egypt by Egyptians. The awakening of national life in Egypt last winter was met with sympathy on the part of this country, and it is the honourable duty of this country to be true to the principles of free institutions which are our glory. It is a very different thing to sympathize with the desperate adventurer who, during his possession of power, used that power to promote officers in ridiculously undue proportion; to enormously raise their pay at the expense of their fellow-countrymen; to allow of the robbery of the public purse by his personal military supporters, and to arbitrarily imprison, exile, or degrade all those who showed the slightest independence of character. Was it possible for Europe to look on quietly while Arabi should depose and assassinate the Khedive, and set up a despotic military Government, regardless of the interests of the Egyptian people, and bent only upon securing for the military leaders the largest possible amount of plunder in the shortest possible time, and that in a country which is the greatest highway of the civilized world? The responsibility of the Powers who, by the Treaty of 1840, set up the present Government in Egypt, and the still higher and more peculiar responsibility of this country under the later Firmans, make it impossible that we should not see that if it is ever legitimate to use what may be called international police power it is necessary in this case.

In his speech outside this House on Tuesday last the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle spoke as if non-intervention was a necessary part of the Liberal creed. The absolute doctrine of non-intervention, under all circumstances and at all times, has never been a portion of the Liberal creed, and has never been a portion of the Radical creed. There are Radicals as extreme as any Radicals in this country, and even as extreme as my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle, who are sound, even in his view, on all English questions, but who have never supported the doctrine of non-intervention under all circumstances. However that may be, it is undoubtedly the case that many of those men hold that intervention under the present circumstances was absolutely justifiable. The hon. Member for Carlisle may contend that it was not; but, at all events, he must admit it is a matter to be debated, and not one to be decided upon abstract general principles.

The only other statement which I wish to make to the Committee as regards my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle is, that after the bombardment of Alexandria my hon. Friend spoke of that bombardment as having been unjustifiable in the highest degree. I am not sure whether he used the word "crime" in regard to it. That is a statement which demands some answer at my hands. On a former occasion I stated to the House, step by step, the whole progress of events upon the question of the armament of Alexandria. I gave the House a full account of all that had occurred, in order to show how long suffering we had been with regard to the conduct of the Egyptian Military Party towards our Fleet, how earthworks and guns had been mounted directly bearing on that Fleet, and how that had been done against the express orders both of the Sultan and the Khedive. It must be remembered that our Fleet was not there as an isolated act of ours; but it was sent there with the approval of the whole of Europe, and sent there in con-junction with the Fleet of France. England and France had been acknowledged by the whole of the other Powers to have a predominant position with regard to Egypt, and our Fleet was sent to Alexandria for the security of our subjects; and also that it should have a moral effect in support of the Government of the Khedive. That Fleet being there for legitimate purposes, surely it was necessary we should protect it, and not allow it to be driven with ignominy from that place. We had no right to expose our men to daily increasing danger, and I cannot see that there is anything of the nature of a crime, or, indeed, anything contrary to the Radical principles as held by my hon. Friend himself, in striking hard in order to save English ships and men. There are some who believe power should never be used anywhere in a cause however right; but, at all events, in this case the steps taken were absolutely in the nature of self-defence. The Porte, as well as the Egyptian authorities, was thoroughly warned of what would happen, yet after those warnings—after the most distinct statement of the Khedive to the Military Chiefs and the Governor of Alexandria—guns were mounted outside the range of our guns, mounted upon the sea-front and batteries which did not command the harbour or its approaches. We told the Admiral to take no notice of this, and immediately fresh guns were mounted directly bearing on the Fleet itself. It is clear what was intended. My hon. Friend talks about half-armed batteries. It must be remembered that the guns were very heavy and extremely numerous, and were worked by efficient gunners. The armaments of the forts wore of a very formidable kind. Many of the guns were capable of piercing the plates of all the ships with two exceptions; and all could pierce the plates of Her Majesty's ship Invincible. It cannot be said, then, that those guns, worked by a large garrison of men who, undoubtedly, showed personal bravery, could be considered mere toy armaments, as my hon. Friend appears to think they were. Hon. Members opposite have told us that after the bombardment we ought to have cut off Arabi's retreat; we are told we ought to have been prepared to have landed a force. It is our belief that we could not, under the then political circumstances, have landed a force, and that we could not have had on board our ships at sea a sufficient force to land with any military safety. Diplomatically and politically speaking, it is one thing to perform naval operations in self-defence, and it is another thing to undertake isolated action in the face of promises given to Europe. We are asked why we are prepared to take isolated action now. It must be remembered we are looking forward to what will be done in the next week or two. We are bound, at the moment it becomes clear to the Government that they may or will probably have to take isolated action, or action in which they will have to play a leading part, to come before the House of Commons and ask for a Vote of Credit, which will enable them to meet the situation. I am sorry to detain the Committee; but I have had to deal with objections of two classes, and objections coming from both sides of the House on very different grounds. If I have, perhaps, laid most stress on the speech addressed to the House by the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle, and upon the sentiments he has expressed outside these walls, it is because I deeply sympathize with him in his general views, and I am, therefore, personally more bound, when I entirely differ with him, to state my grounds for the disagreement.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, the Committee would, perhaps, grant him their indulgence when he said that he had had a professional acquaintance with the affairs of the Levant for the last 40 years. He was employed in the Levant during the Syrian operations, and as Flag Captain in the Mediterranean during the matters connected with Egypt after the Crimean War; and, having the confidence of the officer commanding-in-chief, he had access to all the information on the subject then under consideration—in fact, he had had his attention directed to this matter more than many other Members who were at present Members of the Committee. He desired to say that while he concurred entirely with the late Government with regard to their action in sending the Fleet to Constantinople with the view of staying the proceedings at San Stefano, and in believing that the early and decided action taken by them prevented a collision which now had, unfortunately, occurred through delay, he was entirely of opinion that the Vote which was now about to be given was a Vote which it was necessary to give, in order for the better protection of British life and property in Egypt, and for the protection of the Suez Canal. He was also of opinion that any desire to interfere with the National arrangements in Egypt itself was beyond the scope of the military operations, which appeared at present to be in the contemplation of Her Majesty's Government. Having said these few words in reference to the political aspect of the question, he wished, first of all, to say that he looked upon the bombardment of Alexandria as perfectly justifiable. He believed that the course taken by the British Fleet at Algiers was identical in character, so far as the operations of Admiral Seymour were concerned; but he did not recognize any parallel case in the operations at Navarino. The operations which occurred at Alexandria appeared to them to be right so far as the Naval attack of the forts was concerned; but he was bound to say that, looking to the massacre of the inhabitants which occurred thereafter, it was not creditable to the Government of this country to engage in such operations without having provided the means of preventing the massacre which was the result of the bombardment. In operations of a similar character on the Coast of Syria in 1848, a large force was embarked in the Fleet which bombarded and captured St. Jean d'Acre. It was not to be supposed for a minute that that unfortunate catastrophe had not been duly announced to the Government beforehand by their officials on the spot. In the despatches which were now in the hands of Members the matter was clearly and distinctly set forth. In the first place, he would ask the Committee to allow him to address himself to the arrangements for the Naval attack on Alexandria, as made and prepared by Her Majesty's Government. The first step in that direction was taken in the month of May—on the 12th of May— and then it was arranged that France and England were each to send ships of war of sufficiently light draught of water to be enabled to enter the Harbour of Alexandria. That was set forth in the despatch of Lord Lyons to Lord Granville, received on May 13. He ventured to call the attention of the House at the time to the fact that of all the ships that were being despatched to Alexandria, only two were of the character which was there laid down; and of the additional ships afterwards sent, none were able to enter the Harbour of Alexandria. The whole of them were ships of such considerable draught of water as to be obliged to engage the batteries of Alexandria in motion, which made their fire most uncertain. He had seen a letter from an officer on board the Sultan, describing the events which occurred on the 11th of June. The Sultan was one of the vessels of large draught which were employed in attacking the batteries of Alexandria from outside. The Sultan, Alexandra, and the Superb were kept in motion; but they would have been much better employed inside, had they been of lighter draught. So unsteady was the Sultan that she was struck SO times, and had two men killed and nine wounded, before she was able, after firing for about two hours, to hit one of the batteries. This showed the risk which those ships incurred. When she had got in a position to hit the battery she was required to fire 11 shots before the gun, which was directed on the Sultan, and did her so much injury, and the management of which displayed so much credit upon the Egyptian gunners, was silenced. It was quite evident that, in operations of that kind, where it was necessary that the shell should be directed against batteries and batteries alone, great risk was run of the shells falling where they were not intended to, and that if the operation had been conducted from the smooth water inside the harbour instead of from outside, as was necessary with the means the Admiral had at his disposal, the result would have been more satisfactory to our arms, and, perhaps, less injury would have been inflicted on the city. He therefore wished, as a considerable portion of that Vote was for the Navy, to point out to the Committee that, however successful had been the Admiral, and however gallant had been the officers and men engaged under him in carrying out the operations with the means at their disposal, if the Government had been better advised as to the class of vessels which should be employed in that operation, the action at Alexandria would have been certainly more rapid, and even still more successful. He wished to point out that very clearly, because the despatches originally intended that the French and English Governments should each send ships of war of sufficiently light draught to enable them to go into the Harbour of Alexandria, and that condition was not fulfilled. In May he called the attention of the Secretary to the Admiralty to the matter. There were in this country the Neptune, the Orion, and the Belleisle, and at Gibraltar the Penelope. The three first-named wore purchased by his right hon. Friend the Member for Westminster (Mr. W. H. Smith); but it was not thought desirable by the Government to use them. The Penelope was under the command of His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh, and she was despatched to Alexandria; but, as far as the operations of the Admiral were concerned, he was relying upon the assistance of the three French iron-clads. On the 29th of May Sir Beauchamp Seymour telegraphed to the Admiralty— Alexandria is apparently controlled this morning by the Military Party. Earthworks are being built rapidly abreast of Her Majesty's ship Invincible. I think an increase of force desirable. There is much panic at Cairo, and some here. I would suggest despatch of Her Majesty's ships Alexandra, Monarch, and gunboat. The arrangements with France were stated in a speech of M. de Freycinet, which was given in No. 15 of the Blue Book. M. de Freycinet stated that the French Government were about to proceed to Alexandria conjointly with England, not for armed occupation, but to protect national interests; to testify to the revolutionary movement which had established itself in that country; and to show to the world that France and England were united; but he declined to give any indication of the means of action which might be resorted to, and declared emphatically that French military intervention was not one of them. Soon afterwards, when a collision was likely to take place, on the 3rd of June, Lord Granville telegraphed to Lord Dufferin, stating "batteries being raised on Alexandria. If not stopped may produce collision." Thus, on the 3rd of June, it was contemplated that a collision might occur between the batteries at Alexandria and the English and French ships in proximity and at anchor there. It seemed to him that there should then have been a definite understanding as to how far the British Admiral could rely upon the French ships for support, because at that moment they were in active alliance with him; but in the end he received no assistance from them whatever. In Paper No. 189, Sir Beau-champ Seymour reported the state of affairs at that time at the Port of Alexandria and Cairo, and the steps taken by himself, and by Pear Admiral Conrad, commanding the French Squadron, to check the construction of earthworks by the Egyptian troops. On the 30th of May, Sir Beauchamp Seymour and Pear Admiral Conrad— Requested their respective Consuls to point out to the Governor of Alexandria that the building of batteries hearing on the European quarter of the city, and on the merchant shipping in the harbour, was calculated to produce or prolong an impression on the minds of the European population that they are in danger. Now, it seemed to him that when Admiral Conrad informed Sir Beauchamp Seymour that French ironclads might be looked for at the same time as further 'English ships, Sir Beauchamp Seymour was misled into believing that in the event of any collision occurring he would be able to rely upon the aid of the three French ironclads. The English Admiral had then three British ironclads inside the harbour—namely, the Invincible, the Monarch, and the Penelope, the ship last despatched; and there were also three French ironclads—the Alma, the Lagalliponiere, and the Thetis. Unfortunately, the information in the Blue Book was only brought down to a period considerably antecedent to the bombardment; and he (Sir John Hay) had no means of knowing how it was that when the supreme moment arrived, the Allied Force on which Sir Beauchamp Seymour ought to have relied, in consequence of the despatches and telegrams from his own Government, as well as the assurances of his brother Admiral, were not available, and he was left to undertake unaided the duty that had been imposed upon him. It appeared that the day before the collision occurred, and in consequence of the probability of a collision taking place, the French Squadron withdrew from the Harbour of Alexandria, and, in so withdrawing, left Sir Beauchamp Seymour with three ironclads too few to undertake the duty he had been called upon to perform. If Sir Beauchamp Seymour had had at his command iron-clad ships which could have entered the Harbour of Alexandria, the withdrawal of the French Squadron would not have been of so much consequence. The result of the withdrawal, and the fact that Her Majesty's Government had not sent out ships of light draught which could take the place of the French ships that were necessary for the completeness of the attack, but which had been withdrawn, laid the Naval administration and the management of affairs diplomatically of Her Majesty's Government, open to considerable challenge. It was right to point out that whatever accident might have occurred in the City of Alexandria, owing to the misdirection of the shells fired from the ships when engaging the forts, which was very possible owing to the motion of the sea, and the distance they were from the batteries, might have been averted if the ships of Her Majesty had been of a class necessary for the purpose, and if the three French iron-clad ships could have been replaced by ships of a class and character which ought to have been sent there. In that case this accident would not have occurred. With regard to another point upon which the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister was good enough to address the Committee last night, the right hon. Gentleman personally alluded to him (Sir John Hay). The right hon. Gentleman said— The question is now raised what ought to have been our conduct, and the answer given by some is that we ought to have sent with the Fleet a sufficient force for the purpose of preventing the conflagration and pillage which occurred. Well, I shall be curious to hear that matter argued out. Now, in his (Sir John Hay's) opinion, a sufficient force ought to have been sent, and he confidently believed that that was the opinion of the House. Of course, the Rules of debate were such that he could not allude to speeches previously spoken; but Her Majesty's Government had been incessantly directing the Admiral to land a force if necessary, and the Admiral as constantly replied that he had no force to land. With the permission of the Committee, and in support of what he had stated, he would point out those despatches which seemed to him to bear on that point. In the Foreign Office Despatch of the 15th of May, No. 206, Lord Granville stated— I have to state to your Excellency that the following' are the instructions which have been sent to the British Admiral in regard to a joint co-operation of the naval forces of the two countries in the present crisis of Egypt:—'Communicate with the British Consul-General on arrival at Alexandria, and in concert with him propose to co-operate with naval forces of France to support Khedive and protect British subjects and Europeans, landing force, if required, for latter object, such force not to leave protection of ship's guns without instructions from home.' It must be remembered that the City of Alexandria at that moment contained, as they were informed, something like 12,000 men; while the force at the disposal of Admiral Seymour—and he presumed the French Admiral would have about the same force—was not more than 300 men. On the 16th of June, Lord Lyons, telegraphing to Earl Granville (Despatch No. 202), said— In spite of the information sent home by Sir Beauchamp Seymour,"— to which he (Sir John Hay) would immediately allude— in execution of the instruction conveyed to me by your Lordship's telegram of last evening, I wrote this morning to M. de Freycinet to inform him that the measures which Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour has authority to take include the landing of men for the protection of British subjects in case of imminent danger to their lives; and I added that Her Majesty's Government feel sure that the French Admiral would concert measures with his English colleague for such an emergency. M. de Freycinet writes, in reply, that he has hastened to communicate my letter to the Minister of Marine, with a request to him to send orders in conformity with it by telegraph to the French Admiral. Now, he would venture to say that the gallant Admiral, the present Minister of Marine in France, would never do anything so foolish. He mentioned these facts to show that Her Majesty's Government were so ill-informed as to the force at their Admiral's disposal that they were constantly enjoining him to land men, and in doing so they were enjoining him to do that which it would be unwise to do, and that which he had not the power of attempting to do. Turning to the despatch of Consul Cookson (No. 133), dated May 30, Mr. Cookson said— The small squadron actually in port could only silence the fire of the Egyptian forts, and when these forts are disabled then would commence a period of great danger for Europeans, who would be at the mercy of soldiers exasperated by defeat, while the English Admiral could not risk his men ashore, as his whole available force for shore operations does not exceed 300 men, although the squadron was sent here to safeguard European life and property. Every day's delay increases the dangerous temper of the soldiery and their growing defiance of discipline. That telegram was sent in answer to a communication from Sir Beauchamp Seymour to Consul Cookson.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

Are those Consul Cookson's own words?

SIR JOHN HAY

said, it was hard to say, after what they had heard yesterday, whether what was published in the Blue Books were Consul Cookson's own words or not. These words appeared in the Blue Book under the heading of a despatch from Mr. Cookson to Lord Granville. He had only read an extract, but he would now give the whole letter— Alexandria, May 30.—I have been requested to telegraph to your Lordship the following, signed by all the principle British merchants:— British residents in Alexandria call upon Her Majesty's Government to provide efficient means for the protection of their lives. During 24 hours, from the 26th to the 27th instant, the town was in continual danger of being stormed by the soldiery, who, as we believe, actually had cartridges served out, in response to their demand, to be used against Europeans. The crisis is only suspended, but all elements of danger which existed yesterday remain to-day. There is every reason to fear the recurrence of perils which will come, as before, without warning, and against which Europeans are absolutely defenceless. They have not even the means of flight, as, in order to reach the ships in the harbour, they would have to run the gauntlet through the streets. The small squadron actually in port could only silence the fire of the Egyptians forts, and when these forts are disabled then would commence a period of great danger for Europeans, who would he at the mercy of soldiers exasperated by defeat, while the English Admiral could not risk his men ashore, as his whole available force for shore operations does not exceed 300 men, although the squadron was sent here to safeguard European life and property. Every day's delay increases the dangerous temper of the soldiery and their growing defiance of discipline. In Inclosure 2, in No. 64, dated May 30th, there was a letter from Consul Cookson to Sir Edward Malet, in which Mr. Cookson stated— In continuation of my despatch of the 28th instant, I have the honour to report that on that morning I called upon Admiral Sir Beau-champ Seymour and conferred with him as to the best means of protecting British subjects in case of an attack on Europeans. He repeated that he had already told me that he was not prepared to land any force, hut that he would protect the embarkation of women and children and others who might seek refuge on board ships in the harbour. This was only an extract; but he would read the whole of the letter if the Secretary to the Admiralty wished it. Further on Mr. Cookson said— This morning I received a note from Sir Beauchamp Seymour, requesting me in the most friendly way to call the attention of the Governor to the erection which had been going on since yesterday of an earthwork battery near Ras-el-Tin, bearing directly upon the European quarter of the town and the merchant ships in the harbour. I immediately saw His Excellency the Governor, who told me that he had already spoken on this subject to the Colonels, and had told them that if the work was not discontinued he would make a representation to the Minister of War that he thought it was likely to create an impression that Europeans were in danger. This afternoon His Excellency told Mr. Huri, whom I sent to inquire what had been done on the subject, that the Colonels had replied to him that they were only repairing the works, but that he was not satisfied, and had written to Arabi Pasha on the subject. The work is still going on. Further on, on the 12th of June, in a despatch signed by Sir Beauchamp Seymour, contained in Inclosure 280, page 109, there was this passage— Neither the French Admiral nor myself have any idea of landing men, nor do we intend making any hostile movement. That was after the Admiralty had desired Sir Beauchamp Seymour to do all in his power to protect the embarkation at all risks. Of course, as far as the boats of the Squadron were concerned, that would be done; but the Committee must remember that whereas, in olden times, a line-of-battle ship of the first class had some 1,200 men on board, and could land 500 or 600, the number of men on board an iron-clad was so much reduced that it was impossible to do this, and it was right to say that the Admiral would not have been able to have landed more than about 100 men from each ship. He thought he had now completed his case that Her Majesty's Government had been mislead into the belief that Sir Beauchamp Seymour had sufficient men at his disposal for landing an adequate force to protect life and property at Alexandria. The Admiral himself repeatedly, in direct communication with the Admiralty and others, repudiated any such power or ability. It, therefore, seemed unfair to allow it to go forth to the country, as it had gone forth, that a great part of the destruction of life and property resulting from the bombardment was due to the British Admiral not having made preparations for landing men for the purpose of protecting life and property, when he had no power whatever of doing so. Her Majesty's Government seemed to think that the Admiral had that power; but if they had put the question to any person who possessed naval experience, they would have been assured that he had no such naval power at all. The Naval authorities had denied it, and it was only in that House and "elsewhere" that any information was given to the contrary. He felt it his duty, as a naval officer, to say that he had satisfied himself it was entirely beyond the power of the Admiral to land men for that purpose, and that the Admiral had done his duty as an officer of Her Majesty, with a full desire to carry out the arduous operations intrusted to him to a successful conclusion. But he ventured to say that, looking through the various despatches which had been placed upon the Table, the preparation of a force to be landed on the occasion of the bombardment was a measure which was absolutely necessary at the hands of Her Majesty's Government. How was it that this terrible disaster to civilization had occurred? How was it that this great city had been pillaged and plundered on account of an attack upon its external fortifications? The Prime Minister, referring to the unhappy scenes in Alexandria, said that the burning of a city by persons deserting it was an operation which had never before been contemplated in civilized history. But surely, if the right hon. Gentleman would go back to the burning of Moscow, he would see that that was a very similar case. In that instance, the Russians thought it right to destroy the city in order to prevent those who were about to occupy it from obtaining the benefit that was to be derived from its occupation. In this case, the warnings of Her Majesty's diplomatic agents— Sir Edward Malet, Consul Cookson, Major Tulloch, and others—were entirely in unison and were disregarded, although they all said—"If you bombard the forts the city will be given up to pillage and rapine." The forts were bombarded, and the city was given up to pillage and rapine; and now the Government said they were not to blame for the catastrophe. The Prime Minister said that 10,000 troops could have prevented it. Then, why were not those 10,000 troops there? The Prime Minister said that it would not have been wise diplomatically for us to have sent ships of war to Alexandria ready to undertake the operation of landing 10,000 men when it was not certain that the forts would fire on us, and when it was not certain that we should have to fire on the forts and disarm them. But a second question arose. If the arming of the forts was continued, then in a certain eventuality the Admiral was to prevent Arabi Pasha from going on with the armament, and from the time the Egyptians commenced to arm the forts down to the massacre of the 11th of June, Her Majesty's Government had plenty of time to send 10,000 men, or any other number of men, in order to protect life and property in Alexandria. He was aware that he was going to touch upon tender ground, and, perhaps, some of the Committee might be of opinion that what he was about to say might savour of Party feeling. He knew that his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Derbyshire (Admiral Egerton) did not agree with him as to the advantage of Cyprus, although, as far as he had already gone, his hon. and gallant Friend, as a distinguished naval officer, did agree with him as to the nature of the operations. But what he now wished to say was this. If these 10,000 men had been at Cyprus, where Her Majesty's Government had a perfect right to place them, they would have been upon an island close to Alexandria and within reach of telegraph operations. If they had been ready with transports at Limasol on the day of the bombardment, they could have been at Alexandria at night ready to protect British life and property in the city. It was asked how they could land them when they were about to attack the forts? His reply was that they could have landed them very readily. They were about to attack the forts of the city, and the garrison, however strong it might be, would have to be withdrawn from the city in order to man the batteries. There were four miles of batteries up to the inner harbour, and three miles of batteries further on. In point of fact, the line of batteries extended from 8 to 12 miles, and that great line of fortifications would require that the whole of the garrison should be taken out of the City of Alexandria and employed upon the forts. The city might have been occupied by 10,000 Englishmen when the Egyptian garrison was withdrawn from the town, and while the ships were engaged in attacking the batteries, steps could have been taken to insure the preservation of life and property when the batteries were destroyed. He was satisfied that no naval or military man in the House would deny what he now asserted. On the very clay after the engagement, and in order that the crews of our ships might be enabled without difficulty to land and spike the guns of one of the forts, the Admiral made a feint by sending three ships down beyond the new harbour. Within sight of the Fleet the garrison were withdrawn from Fort Pharos to the new pier, and marched laboriously round the new harbour. The Squadron then steamed leisurely back, and the forts being empty, our seamen and marines were able to land and spike the guns. That being so, it was quite certain that an English force of 10,000 men could have occupied the City of Alexandria during the bombardment, without any fear of a collision with the Egyptian troops, who had been withdrawn from the town for the purpose of manning the batteries. If an operation of that kind had been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government, the naval operations, which had deservedly obtained great credit, would been further supported, and the disgraceful scenes of pillage and murder, which resulted from a want of prévoyance on the part of the Government, would have been prevented. He thanked the Committee for having permitted him to allude to these points. It did seem to him that when they had a Vote of Credit for £1,300,000 demanded for the Navy, some portion of the discussion might usefully be devoted to Naval matters. He gave the greatest credit to the gallant Admiral, Sir Beau-champ Seymour, for the operations he had carried out with the means at his disposal; but he ventured to repeat that if a force of 10,000 men had been ready at Cyprus, or in transports ready to land and occupy the city, that even after the withdrawal—which on all hands was to be regretted—of the three French ironclads from the place it was understood they were to take on that day—in spite of what had fallen from the Prime Minister, many hundreds of lives would have been saved in Alexandria, and many thousands of pounds' worth of property.

SIR JOSEPH PEASE

said, he would not attempt to follow his right hon. and gallant Friend through the questions he had touched upon, because it seemed to him that the debate would turn, not so much upon questions of detail in regard to the landing of troops or the manner in which the ships were handled, as upon great principles of National policy. They were asked to spend a very large amount of money in carrying out the views of Her Majesty's Government in effecting their policy. The objects to which his right hon. and gallant Friend had alluded were matters of detail well worth inquiring into by his right hon. and gallant Friend as a highly efficient and gallant officer. For his part, he (Sir Joseph Pease) had never heard a doubt raised as to the ability of England to cope with the physical difficulties of landing such a force as might be wanted; but what he doubted from beginning to end was, whether we were pursuing a policy in regard to Egypt—he would not say this Government or the last Government, but both Governments combined— which commended itself to our moral sense. There was an interesting passage of arms the other day between his right hon. Friend the late Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. John Bright) and the Prime Minister, as to the propriety of our action in this particular circumstance. He had been brought up in the same school of morals and religious thought as his right hon. Friend the late Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and his views of morals were very much in accordance with those of his right hon. Friend, although, perhaps, they did not always entirely coincide. It seemed to him that the real matter before them was not the mere question of date3 of landing troops, but whether they were right in pursuing this particular line of policy towards Egypt. In spite of the admirable speech which had been made by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he thought there was a very grave line to be drawn between the policy of intervention and of non-intervention. They had a terrible picture before them—a picture which they must view gravely on whatever side of the House they sat. Our Squadron had bombarded the forts of Alexandria, and within a few hours afterwards—with a scoundrelism hardly ever known previously in the history of the civilized world —the Egyptian soldiers under Arabi destroyed the city they ought to have protected, and gave it over to pillage and rapine. In all human probability the slaughter had been much larger than we had any idea of. The rough troops who had followed Arabi were troops of such a character that, when once let loose, they would be reckless with regard to human life. He wanted to know where all this was to end? He quite believed we should take Egypt: but it seemed to him that the late Government, in commencing these difficulties, and Her Majesty's Government in carrying on the same policy, had hardly considered the question where it was to land them. He doubted whether in the lifetime of any one of them they would see the end of it. In all human probability, before many months elapsed England would be found protecting Egypt, and he doubted whether, in their lifetime, the obligation would ever be got rid of in its entirety. Such a position was one of extreme difficulty and delicacy, and one which was likely to bring this country into conflict with some of the other Powers of Europe. Our troops were now upon the point of leaving this country, and they had, in all probability, as far as any of them could foresee, a long occupation of Egypt before them. A heavy burden would be imposed on the taxpayer at home, and new obligations incurred in Egypt. In 1879—and he would not go any further back than that—there were supposed to be three objects which we had in Egypt. One was the security and maintenance of the Suez Canal; the second, our material interest in Egypt itself, in common with the rest of Europe; and, thirdly, the interests of the Egyptian bondholders in this country. He thought that the importance of the Suez Canal to England tad been much overrated. It was well known that four-fifths of the traffic was carried by the ships of this country, and, therefore, the revenue was assured; but he had always been opposed to the investment of the money of the country in the Suez Canal. Egypt was certainly not the country he should select for the investment of our money. Although the Anglo-French Control had been of essential use to Egypt, yet, by leading to the employment of large numbers of foreigners, and to reductions in the Army, great discontent and dissatisfaction had been caused by it among the Native population by the employment of a large staff of Europeans. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Stafford North-cote), when speaking on the subject originally, had been careful in his comments upon the Mission of the two Commissioners, in stating that they were not acknowledged as Ambassadors, although they held a quasi-official position. They were simply recommended by England and France to assist the Egyptian Government in their financial arrangements. He believed that the appointment of the Board of Control had been of essential use to Egypt—not merely to the Government of Egypt, but to the people of that country; but, as he had pointed out, it filled the Government of Egypt with European appointments. A formidable Return was laid upon the Table a few months ago, showing that salaries of no less an amount than £373,000 were drawn annually by European officials connected with that Government. He believed that the jealousy produced among the Native population by the appointment of these European officers was still further increased by the fact that they were exempted from the ordinary taxation of the country. They were not taxed to the same degree or extent as the Natives were. In addition, this Financial Control gradually produced great uneasiness and dissatisfaction in the Army. The expenditure in the Army was about the first thing the Government of the day, under the Board of Control, ventured to deal with. As the discontent in the Army increased Arabi Bey came to the front, being an officer with considerable force of character, and he at once opposed the arrangements of the Board of Control. His demand for additional payment for his men was resisted by the Board of Control, and he at once attacked the Board, and then it was, in order to keep the Board to the fore, that the English and French Governments began their policy of further intervention. England and France, on the 21st of May, demanded that Arabi Bey and some other officers should be sent away. The Government saw the danger, and asked for ships. Towards the end of May English and French ships began to arrive for carrying out the Convention which had been made between England and France. The object of sending out ships of war belonging to this country and France to Alexandria was to support the demand of the Controllers of Finance that Arabi and his principal officers should be sent away from the country. The English ships were sent down. On the 21st of May they began to arrive; on the 29th it was said they were in danger from the fortifications; and, after that date, our policy had been described as one of self-defence. On the 4th of June Arabi Bey declined practically to alter the position of affairs, and on the 11th of July we bombarded the forts. There was one point which had never been explained— namely, the statement contained in The Times and Standard that, on the morning of the bombardment, an offer was made to disarm the forts. He believed that that had not been corroborated at present by any Government despatch; but he thought it was one of the statements made by the journals he had mentioned which required contradiction. There were only three points in which this country was interested—namely, the safety of the Suez Canal, the safety of our money, and the protection of our bondholders. The Suez Canal had never been more in danger than at this moment, the protection of the bondholders had never been more jeopardized, and the financial condition of Egypt within the last 15 or 20 years had never been worse than it had been within the last three months. In regard to the investment of our money in the Suez Canal, it seemed as if the time would arrive when the future prosperity of England would be secured without the employment of a channel which entailed a heavy penalty upon us for the attempts we made to establish peace and order in Egypt. It was very likely that from 1876 to 1879 Egypt might have drifted into a state of bankruptcy; but he did not know that that fact would have altered or seriously affected the interests of this country in any way. It could not have affected the country in regard to the navigation of the Suez Canal. In all probability that navigation would have been better protected if Egypt had been in a state of bankruptcy; and the interests we had in that undertaking, and our investment in it, would not have been affected. So long as the Suez Canal remained open four-fifths of the revenue came from our own commerce, and the revenue collected from the Canal had been sufficient to pay the interest upon the debt. All that our policy had done had been to occasion further bloodshed in Egypt, and to compel the Government to call upon the taxpayers for a large sum of money, with the probability of a much larger sum being required hereafter. He thought the policy of intervention, as compared with the policy of non-intervention, was entirely fallacious, and both this country and Egypt would have been better and happier if we had left the Financial Control of Egypt alone. It was said that we were obliged now to face the circumstances which had occurred. He contended that they were altogether appalling. The question was one which it was very difficult and very sad to contemplate. We found Egypt in a state of commercial beggary, and we should leave it little better. All our exertions during the last 10 or 15 years would not have improved its financial condition; and so far as the bankruptcy of Egypt was concerned, it could not have been worse at the time his right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) first began to take an interest in those financial affairs than it would be at the end of a war. Upon the whole, he had arrived at this view of the case. He felt that he was surrounded probably by the men who, either on that or the other side of the House, would have the guidance of the affairs of this great country in future days. If one thing struck him more prominently than another, it was that those who undertook to meddle with the financial affairs, and to exercise control over the financial affairs of other countries, ought to consider what was likely to be the result of their interference. The result of our interference in the financial difficulties of Egypt ought to have been foreseen from the beginning. For his own part, at this moment, he so entirely abhorred the policy of intervention in foreign affairs, that he was unable to give his vote for the money now asked for from the Committee. At the same time he did not see how, after the statement which had been made by the Government, he could oppose the Vote.

MR. H. S. NORTHCOTE

said, he had one question to ask, and that was, whether the policy which established the Control was seriously impeached by the Government? The Prime Minister had entered something in the nature of a caveat against the Control established in 1879, and the language of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that day, although guarded, was somewhat to the same effect as the language of the Prime Minister. But it was a caveat which made the position of the Government very much worse, because it tended to show that when they took Office they had the question of the Board of Control under their consideration, and that they decided to continue it. If it were otherwise, they had had more than two years to reverse the policy of the late Government, as they had done in the case of Afghanistan and the Transvaal; and if they disapproved the action of the late Government, they were bound to take the same course of reversing it. They preferred, however, to abide by the language they held on the 4th of November, 1881. They then said— The spread of education, the abolition of vexatious taxation, the establishment of the land tax on a regular and equitable basis, the diminution of forced labour, have all received our advocacy and support, and have been accomplished through the action of the English and French Controllers General; and on several occasions—notably on July 11—Lord Granville thus spoke of the Control at the time the Government took Office— It was undoubtedly working well for the material prosperity of the country, and promised to do so for the future. In his humble judgment the Committee had to consider, not if the Control was a good concern, but whether the policy of Her Majesty's Government, since 1881, when they wrote that despatch—which was supposed to be considered the Charter of their Egyptian policy—had been one that was consistent with the policy enunciated in that despatch. It was something more than a mere bondholders' arrangement, and was ben tro-vato, at least as a policy. The objects were stated to be the prosperity of the country, and its full enjoyment of that liberty which it had obtained under successive Firmans of the Sultan, concluding with the Firman of 1879. What means did Her Majesty's Government take to carry out that policy? Outside Egypt itself there were two Powers specially interested in the affairs of Egypt—namely, France and Turkey— besides England, and he would examine briefly what were the specific lines of policy pursued by France and Turkey in the series of events which led to the bombardment. His complaint was that we handed ourselves over, bound hand and foot, to France, and snubbed and mistrusted the Porte. We paid too much deference to France, and did not sufficiently consult the interests of Turkey, or our own interests, beyond continuing our relations with France on good terms. He found, on going through the Correspondence, that throughout France had seemed to hang upon our hands like a dead weight, and whenever Her Majesty's Government entertained an idea which was a reasonable one the French Government persuaded and checked them from carrying it into execution. What return did we meet with from France? On the 12th of September, 1881, the British Government suggested that a Turkish General might be sent from Constantinople to Egypt in order to support and advise the Khedive; but in deference to France we did not insist upon this suggestion being carried out. On the 30th of January, Her Majesty's Government expressed a hope that France would agree with us that under certain conditions armed intervention in Egypt would be the best solution of the difficulty. France, however, declined to join with us. On the 22nd of March we proposed to send financial experts to Egypt to assist the English and French Consuls General; but this proposal was likewise refused by the French Government. He might say, en passant, that the Financial Control in Egypt could not have been considered objectionable, because, so late as March 22, Her Majesty's Government made this proposal for still further intervention in the financial affairs of that country. Again, on the 24th of April, Her Majesty's Government suggested the sending of a Turkish General to Egypt to assist in the financial arrangements, with the concurrence of an English and a French General, the concurrence of both of whom was to be necessary in restoring and maintaining order. But there, again, France declined to act with us. On the 13th of May we suggested that other Powers should be invited to co-operate in a Naval demon-station at Alexandria proposed by the French Government themselves; but again the French Government rejected and refused to accept the suggestion. On the 18th of May we made a singular request to the French Government, because we asked if they saw any objection to our "speaking openly" to the Porte on the subject of possible Turkish intervention in Egypt? The French Government replied that they saw the greatest possible objection to "speaking openly." On the 24th of May we proposed to address a request to other Powers to join in an appeal to the Sultan to hold troops in readiness for despatch to Egypt; but France again rejected our proposal. Finally, the French Government, after suggesting a Naval demonstration before Alexandria, declined as a matter of history to allow the French ships to join us in the bombardment. It would thus be seen that we had been in close conjunction and almost in absolute dependence upon France since September, 1881, and he could not find that the French Government had any sufficient justification for refusing our applications. We had never refused a request that was made to us by that Government except their proposal in September to establish a joint Anglo-French Military Control in Egypt, and their suggestion that we should formally declare that under no circumstances whatever would we tolerate Turkish military intervention in Egypt. In every matter we gave way, with the unfortunate result which had come to pass. He wished to say a few words now as to our dealings with Turkey. He would say, at once, that he could not have supported the Motion which was proposed at the beginning of the Sitting by the noble Lord the Member for Haddingtonshire (Lord Elcho), because he was very far from being willing to pledge himself unconditionally, or even with the conditions which had been suggested, to absolute co-operation with the Porte. He thought we ought to depend as little as possible upon one Power or another. But what did the Prime Minister say yesterday in speaking of our conduct towards Turkey? Having declared that the intervention of the Porte would be absolutely necessary, Her Majesty's Government proposed afterwards to provide that the Porte should have no voice or control as to the mode in which the military intervention was to be exercised. In this they afforded a great contrast to the deference they had always displayed towards Prance. On the 14th of September, 1881, when the disturbances first arose, we cautioned the Porte to use calm and dispassionate language, and not to think of sending troops to Egypt without our assent. The Porte took our advice. Then, in October, we sent iron-clads to Alexandria, against the strongest remonstrance of the Porte. We addressed a Dual Note to the Khedive, in defiance of the protest of the Porte, and without consulting the Sultan. In December Lord Dufferin reported that the Sultan was much irritated at the course taken by England and Prance in sending the Dual Note, and yet, at our advice, he abandoned the intention of sending troops to Egypt. On the 15th of May we made a Naval demonstration at Alexandria, in defiance of the protest of the Porte; and, at the same time, we cautioned the Porte not to take independent action. The Porte thereupon abandoned its design of ordering its Mediterranean Fleet to Alexandria. On the 28th of May the Sultan used language described by the French Ambassador at Constantinople to be most satisfactory with respect to the Khedive's Constitutional position. On June 2 the Porte acceded to the Khedive's request to send Turkish Commissioners to Egypt, and Her Majesty's Government expressed great satisfaction thereat. On the 3rd of June the Porte were told that the Conference would be held at Constantinople, and their protest that the announcement thereof would weaken the hands of Dervish Pasha was disregarded, notwithstanding the fact that most of the Powers supported this view. On the 5th of June the Porte, continuing to act with good faith, telegraphed peremptory orders to Alexandria to stop the construction of forts, and, at all events, temporarily those orders were obeyed. On the 11th of June the Sultan told Lord Dufferin that, strongly as he objected to the Conference, if it became necessary, he would not unconditionally refuse to join it; and, on the 14th of June, Lord Dufferin reported the Sultan as saying that, in the last resort, he would send troops to Egypt. It was true that, on the 19th of June, the Porte said that the time for conciliatory measures was not exhausted, and they would not then agree to send troops. At that time the German and Austrian agents at Cairo shared the opinion that the time for pacific measures had not passed. They deprecated the use of force, and, therefore, it was a little hard that we should strongly object to the Porte taking a different view to ourselves, supported, as they were, by other Powers of Europe. On the 23rd of June the Khedive told Sir Auckland Colvin that, in his opinion, Arabi was losing strength; and this he (Mr. Northcote) thought somewhat justified the Porte's belief that military measures might be dispensed with. If the Committee would allow him, he would attempt to sum up impartially the Porte's position in the matter. It must be remembered that on the commencement of affairs—on the 13th of December, 1881—Sir Edward Malet told the Sultan that he was consulted a good deal by Her Majesty's Government, and he was of opinion that, if intervention was necessary, it would naturally fall to the Sultan to intervene. If the Sultan ever entertained that idea it was speedily dispelled, because the French Government said they would not allow the question of Turkish military intervention to be raised. France induced us to deprecate a Turkish military intervention, and it must be remembered that the language of France had been consistently anti-Turkish throughout. We had, in pursuance of our policy of acting with the most perfect co-operation with France, entirely refused the various propositions which the Porte had made from time to time to negotiate separately with us on Egyptian questions. The Porte showed no such hostility to England as to justify the severe language which was only too often applied to it by public men in this country. He would like to remind the Committee that, when the first Commissioners were sent by the Porte to Alexandria, we protested at the instance of France, and we not only protested, but actually sent ironclads as a menace against those Commissioners, and we forced the Porto, under the pressure of those ironclads, to withdraw the Commissioners from Alexandria. What was our own Agent's opinion of the work the Commissioners were doing? Sir Edward Malet said they were, in his judgment, doing good work, and their presence was desirable; but our reply was, "Send them away." The Government had consistently—it might be justifiably—refused to allow them independent action—in fact, the position of the Porte was summed up, not unfairly, in the protest of the Pashas when they said— That the Sultan's rights of Sovereignty should not be attacked; "but" all intervention, all interference, in the affairs of an Ottoman Province were forbidden. It must be remembered that as matters progressed in Egypt, the Porte had every fair reason to believe they were gradually losing ground in the estimation of the Mussulmen in Egypt. But there were other diplomatic sweetmeats, because, on the 19th of May, they found Lord Dufferin indicated to the Sultan, in a confidential conversation, that if he did not mind what he was about he might very probably lose Egypt. That was an alarming statement to make, and he (Mr. Northcote) did not wonder that the Sultan was not very much disposed to pick the chestnuts out of the fire in favour of the Power whose Representative used such language. On the 17th of June, when we had stopped the intervention of the Porte, Lord Granville told the Turkish Ambassador that we intended to hold the Turks responsible for the outrages at Alexandria. He must point out that the other Powers of Europe had all through been much less hard on the Porte than ourselves. On the 24th of May, for instance, they found Prince Bismarck admitting that the Porte should be allowed a voice in the settlement of Egyptian affairs. Austria objected most strongly to go into the Conference unless Turkey consented to join it; and both Austria and Germany and other Powers refused, in the first instance, to allow the Conference to be summoned elsewhere than at Constantinople, because they said the consent of the Porte was necessary. He did not advocate a complete reversal of the policy of Her Majesty's Government; but he thought a little more consideration should be shown for Ottoman feeling. The action of France in abandoning us at Alexandria, after hindering and hampering us throughout the negotiations, set our hands entirely free to deal with the Egyptian Question simply and solely in our own interest. We ought to settle matters without any special reference or consideration for French interests; let us secure our own, and let France look out for herself. They were told by the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), and by others, that the whole of these troubles were due to the establishment, by the Conservatives, of the Control. He protested against such an assertion. If Her Majesty's Government could not foresee on the 30th of May, when they were warned by their own Agent at Cairo that there would be a massacre on the 11th of June, it was wholly impossible that the late Government could in 1879 foresee that in 1882 a Liberal Government would be bombarding Alexandria. He failed to see why the Conservative Party should accept responsibility for what had happened.

MR. ARTHUR ARNOLD

said, since the admirable speech of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Committee had listened to a speech from the hon. Member for South Durham (Sir Joseph Pease) until, towards the termination of the speech, he had great difficulty in ascertaining what the opinion of the hon. Baronet was. The hon. Baronet, however, had left the Committee in no doubt upon one point, and that a point of enormous importance, for he had said he did not think the Suez Canal was of quite so much value to England as had been made out. It must be remembered that the late Foreign Secretary of France, M. St. Hilaire, took upon himself on one occasion to contrast the position of France and England in Egypt, and, dealing with the position of France in Egypt, he was obliged, in the first place, to have recourse to the historical events of the last century; and the only matter of importance to the French Foreign Secretary was that there was a large French population in Egypt requiring protection. When he spoke of England, M. St. Hilaire said— She it is who furnishes nearly all the custom of the Suez Canal, since her vessels of all sorts which pass through it compose nearly four-fifths of the total traffic. Moreover, the Canal, which joins the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, is henceforth for Great Britain the indispensable route which places her in communication with that incomparable Colony of 250,000,000 subjects which she possesses in India. The hon. Member for South Durham (Sir Joseph Pease) followed in the foot-stops of others, and depreciated the importance of the Suez Canal; but he (Mr. Arnold) held that the Canal, which abbreviated the journey from England to Bombay by 4,000 miles, would never cease to be of importance to the trade of this country. He did not see any reason why the Canal should not be so deepened and widened as to admit of the transit of even larger vessels than were now able to pass through it. Of the import trade of Egypt with the world, amounting to £7,000,000, one-half was received from Great Britain; while of the export trade, amounting to £13,500,000, no less than three-fourths were received in this country. Practically, for us, Egypt was part of the sea; and therefore our interests in Egypt must be regarded in that light. He did not mean to make much of the interest of this country in Egypt against the proposition of his hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson). He wanted rather to consider what was the duty of this country in reference to interference; and upon that point he would ask the permission of the Committee to dwell for a moment or two, because he had the honour to represent a part of that vast population which accepted and endorsed, as he did, the principles and the policy of Mr. Cobden in their entirety, and which believed, as he (Mr. Arnold) did, that the greatest interest of this country was the interest of peace, and which also believed that non-intervention in the affairs of a foreign State ought to be the paramount policy of this country. He had been, as long as he could remember, a respectful student of the speeches of his right hon. Friend the Member for Bir- mingham (Mr. John Bright), and the pride of himself (Mr. Arnold) and the hon. Gentlemen who sat near him, at seeing the right hon. Gentleman sitting in their part of the House, was so great that they were sometimes tempted to forget the pain which they naturally experienced when they thought of the cause that had brought him amongst them. He had been also as attentive to the writings of Mr. Cobden, and he found an important and essential difference between the opinions of these two great men upon the very important subject of intervention. Many years ago a greatly respected Member of that House —a member of the Society of Friends— gave him a volume which had great weight in the Society of Friends—Dymond's Essays —and which was always recommended by the Birmingham School as one expounding the true policy with regard to war. He did not say Mr. Cobden was imbued with the high morality which inspired Dymond's Essays, because he accepted a view of national defence in a far wider sense than it was accepted by that Society—that Society of Friends which, illustrious as it was by the high ideal of morality that it upheld before mankind, had become still more illustrious by the fact that it had given the world such benefactors of humanity as William Penn, Edmund Sturge, and, the greatest of all, John Bright. What was the line of our policy in Egypt with regard to nonintervention? Even among civilized people, he respectfully submitted to the Committee, there was a limit to nonintervention which, to be a legitimate principle, must be a principle accepted by all Governments, or forced upon all Governments. For that purpose, that was to say, to force non-intervention upon Governments, the ships of this country were sent to Dulcigno; and when Prince Bismarck, with regard to the liberation of Thessaly and Epirus, suggested to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) the forcible repression of Turkey by a blockade of the Dardanelles, even that strong proposition was not rejected in principle by Her Majesty's Government. It had been laid down by high authority that intervention to enforce non-intervention was always rightful and moral, though it might not be always prudent. Though it might be a mistake to force freedom upon a people who did not desire to have it, and who did not value it, it could not be right to insist that freedom should be withheld from the people, and that they should be subject to foreign coercion. That was the principle which directed the sending of our ships into Egyptian waters a few weeks ago. But there was this wide distinction to be borne in mind in regard to the principle of non-intervention, that there could not be an observance of that principle between civilized and semi-barbaric States. The rules of international morality implied, so it seemed to him, that they should be accorded on both sides. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright) had said there had been in Egypt a violation of International Law. He (Mr. Arnold) asserted there could be no violation of International Law where one of the parties were a semi-barbaric people, who did not accept the rules which composed International Law. He was not specially concerned against Arabi Pasha because he was a rebel; he would never fire a shot, or send a ship, to subdue the revolted subjects of any Power, and to retain on the Throne of any country any particular Monarch. The state of Egypt appeared to him to be simply one of piracy, and the Law of Nations could not be violated in dealing with people who did not comprehend and accept the Law of Nations. But then came the question, what was the position of such people under the moral law? He submitted that, inasmuch as the rule of International Law did not apply between civilized and barbaric peoples, it must be well known that our relations with such people were these— that the rules of the moral law applied to such people just as the law of morality applied between man and man. That was the guide for our conduct in Egypt. He deprecated most strongly any action on the part of Her Majesty's Government which did not tend to the progress of Egypt towards that time when she would have a greater measure of independence and self-government over her people. But that seemed to him to be not only the signal merit of the speech of the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of the speech of the Prime Minister yesterday but it seemed the merit which ran throughout the Government policy. After many years' reading of State Papers, he declared he never read anything which appeared more absolutely virtuous than the last four paragraphs of Lord Granville's despatch to Lord Dufferin, dated the 11th of this month, and he thought the Government were entitled to say, as they did in Lord Granville's despatch, that this country had— No interests or objects in regard to Egypt which are inconsistent with those of Europe in general, nor any interest which are inconsistent with those of the Egyptian people. That was true. The matter was so important that it, at all events, deserved a moment's investigation. Upon the evidence, it was true, for there was not a trace or a suspicion in the policy of the Government of any aggressive action, or of any desire to intervene in Egypt for purposes of selfish aggrandisement or revenge. Throughout the policy of the Government they appeared to him to have displayed a most loyal deference to the Powers of Europe, and they had prevented the single and uncontrolled action of the Porte. The hen. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) asked again and again, in a thunderous tone, why we did not allow the Egyptians to be independent? He would tell the hon. Baronet what would have happened. The Egyptian people were not comparable in physical force and endurance to the levies of the Porto, and but for the action of England, in conjunction with other Powers, Egypt would by this time have been prostrate under the foot of an Army of the Sultan, and the position of the Egyptian people would have been as wretched as that of the people of the Valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The Sultan could not unsheath his sword against Arabi Pasha in company with Christians. But had England not been there His Majesty would have fought against Arabi just as his ancestor fought against Mehemet Ali, and Halim Pasha, the willing tool of the Porte, would have reigned in Egypt, Tewfik Pasha would have been dethroned, and the tool of the Sultan would have been elevated in his place. Notwithstanding action of a more than dubious character on his par!, the Powers had urged the Sultan to relieve the world of the dangers of anarchy in Egypt, taking, at the same time, due security against any prolonged occupation in Egypt. When the Porte failed, as it had failed, to take any steps for the better order and government of the country, it would in time become the duty of Her Majesty's Government to consider gravely whether some, at all events, if not the whole, of the expenses of this campaign should not be charged upon that large tribute of £681,000 which the Sultan drew from Egypt every year upon the condition of maintaining order and good government in that country? The Prime Minister did not make sufficient admission that the Sultan had never been an independent Sovereign in Egypt. The strongest of all acts against the Sovereignty of the Sultan was, in his (Mr. Arnold's) judgment, taken by Lord Salisbury in 1879. At that time the present Khedive had just acceded to the Throne, and he was ordered to attend at Constantinople to do homage and to receive the Firman of Investiture. Lord Salisbury did not hesitate to advise a refusal, and he telegraphed to Cairo in these terms— His Highness had better await a more tranquil moment for fulfilling this duty towards," not his Sovereign, but "his Suzerain. Explanation was given to the Sultan that this supreme disregard was made in deference to the will of England and France. The next important act against the Sultan's Sovereignty was performed by the present Government last October, when the Sultan's Commissioners were hustled out of Egypt; and, lastly, when the Sultan proposed to send a ship of war to join the Anglo-French Squadron, he was graciously assured that the flag of his Sovereignty would meet with a "favourable reception." It was ridiculous to talk in high terms of the Sovereignty of the Sultan in Egypt, and he had made these observations in order that in future they might be under no delusion on that head. The fact was, the Sovereignty of Egypt had been for many years in commission, and that, Egypt being essentially a Maritime country, the strongest of the Commissioners had been, and should be, the Power which was the first Maritime Power in the world—that Power which held all its Possessions, including India, by this great title. England and France had, with the absolute approval of the Powers, prevented the establishment of the absolute Sovereignty of the Sultan upon the Nile. Now, in regard to the bombardment of the forts of Alexandria by the Fleet, it must be borne in mind what was the meaning of the naval supremacy of this country, concerning which, he begged the Committee to remember, Mr. Cobden wrote to Lord John Russell in 1860 the following words: — I would, if necessary, spend £100,000,000 sterling to maintain an irresistible superiority over France at sea. That was the patriotic observation of Mr. Cobden. The sending of our Fleet to Alexandria was simply an act of duty. When our subjects had been killed and outraged, when the civilized people of every sort and clime had been ruthlessly turned out of Egypt, and when the question came to be whether our vessels should withdraw from the Harbour of Alexandria, he should have been one of the first in that House to condemn the Government had they ordered the withdrawal of the Fleet. He did not know that he had seen all the despatches from the British Admiral; but those he had seen he admired greatly, because they were straightforward and free from the truculent language of conquest which the British Admirals had used in past times. But he had this remark to make about the bombardment, that from the despatches it appeared the British Admiral committed a serious error if he did not inform Her Majesty's Government that he could not destroy the forts which were threatening his ships without throwing shells into and over the town, as had been alleged. If the allegation was true that the shells of the British Fleet fell into and over the town in great number, he could not quite excuse Admiral Seymour for not informing the Government in his despatches that he could not undertake the destruction of the forts without bringing on the town all the horrors of bombardment. Such information should have been clear in the despatches. Lastly, he came to the relations of the Government in regard to Egypt with the other Powers of Europe, and he confessed that during the last 12 months he had often felt some irritation at what appeared to him to be the extreme deference which the Foreign Office of this country was disposed to pay to the Government of France. Reviewing the Papers as a whole, it was impossible to deny that while maintaining that preponderance of England and France which had always been acknowledged by the Powers, the Government of this country had displayed, in circumstances to which the assent of Europe was scarcely applicable, a strong regard for international engagements, and a deference to the Concert of Europe which could not be without a beneficial influence upon the future of this undertaking, whatever that might be. He valued most deeply a full and friendly alliance with the great people of France; but he confessed he should have regarded, and he should regard, a joint expedition to Egypt with some anxiety and alarm. He should regard a joint expedition with anxiety and alarm, because the history of joint expeditions had not been the history of success; it had always been a history of divided purposes and counsels, and they wore always likely to lead to very unsatisfactory results. To France and the world the Prime Minister gave yesterday, in the name of this great country, the most solemn assurance that the people of this country in going to Egypt had no selfish design, that England sought no aggression or aggrandisement. That solemn assurance, he felt confident, would be maintained. We were not making war for an idea, and he should give his heartiest support to all the efforts of Her Majesty's Government to bring about a speedy termination of the present state of things in Egypt.

COLONEL ALEXANDER

assumed that the great majority of the Committee would cheerfully give Her Majesty's Government the sum which they asked for to carry on the war in Egypt. The wonder was not that the sum asked for was so large, but that it was so small. The Government ought not, so to speak, to make three bites at one cherry, because they would have to come again, and that very soon, for an additional sum of money to enable them to carry on this war to a successful conclusion. They ought now to have asked for £6,000,000 instead of £2,300,000. Perhaps they did not ask for £6,000,000 because they were afraid of being called "Jingoes" by the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Law-son). He (Colonel Alexander) would rather be called "a real Jingo" than "a Brummagem Jingo." The difference between a real Jingo and a Brummagem Jingo was this—that whereas a real Jingo, by asking for £6,000,000 and by bringing Indian troops to Malta, succeeded in averting war, a Brummagem Jingo closed the stable door after the horse was stolen, and then asked for a little more than a third of that sum. Yesterday evening the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Mintster spoke of the cruel and wanton crimes, of the barbarous and brutal conduct pursued by Arabi Pasha and his troops. The Government had never been alive to the magnitude of the crisis, had never appreciated the dangers to which the unfortunate European population had been exposed. The deplorable vacillation of the Government reminded him of nothing so much as of the conduct of Pharoah, who, not even under the plagues inflicted on his land, could be aroused from his apathy by his servants, who said despairingly, "Knowest thou not yet that Egypt is destroyed?" He (Colonel Alexander) believed that none of the 10 plagues of old inflicted greater suffering upon the unfortunate population of Alexandria than had the disastrous policy of Her Majesty's present Advisers. If Egypt was not yet destroyed, it was, indeed, on the high road to destruction. Its commerce was paralyzed, its cities had been bombarded and burned, its population murdered and mutilated. If anyone wished to realize the horror of the situation, let them read the correspondence in The Times of to-day. The Prime Minister excused himself for not landing troops on three grounds. The first ground was that he had no force adequate for the occasion; the second was that the landing of a force would have been an act of disloyalty to what the right hon. Gentleman called the European Concert; and the third was that it was not possible for Her Majesty's Government to have foreseen the brutal way in which Arabi Pasha and his Army would act. The Blue Book just presented to the House afforded ample proof of the warning given to the Government as to the probability of a massacre. They had it in evidence that some considerable time before the massacre the Swedish Consul proposed apian of defence which, unfortunately, was not acted upon. The Committee remembered that a Memorial was presented from merchants at Alexandria to Lord Granville, asking that the Government would take steps for a more efficient protection of their lives. After the massacre there appeared a letter in The Times, stating that the father of one of the victims had for some time seen the insecurity of the position of the Europeans in Alexandria, and had directed his son to come home. It was all very well, as the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister said, to be loyal to the European Concert; but it was more important that we should be loyal to our own flesh and blood. If England was not loyal to the Native population of Alexandria, how could they expect the loyalty of the Natives in return? The Prime Minister pointed out yesterday that the European Concert existed in the Conference which was now sitting at Constantinople; but the Blue Book to which he (Colonel Alexander) had just referred showed clearly that it was with considerable reluctance that some of the Powers entered the Conference—they thought very lightly of the Conference. They found the Austrian Chancellor expressing anxiety on the 2nd of June as to the events which might occur before the Conference assembled; and the Italian Government expressed great reluctance to enter the Conference—they thought a Conference would be a dilatory mode of proceeding. Although the Conference was considered by the Italian and Austrian Governments to be too dilatory a mode of proceeding, Lord Granville thought there was yet time to put off the Conference for a few days, in order that it might be seen what would come of the Turkish Mission sent to Alexandria. The action of Lord Granville in that respect was a complete and absolute waste of time; for what was the result of the Turkish Mission? It was that the Khedive was absolutely insulted, and Dervish Pasha acknowledged he was totally unable to protect the European residents in Alexandria. The hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) asked the other day what had become of the European Concert? He thought he could tell the hon. Baronet. It had gone where the Bulgarian atrocities, and all the other rubbish and "shoddy" manufactures of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had gone. The last time they heard of the European Concert was, as the hon. Baronet, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reminded them, two years ago, at Dulcigno, when a few ships sailed up and down like "painted ships on a painted ocean." Even the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister himself must now confess we had entered upon a very serious war, and that if we were to bring this war to a successful conclusion, we must rely upon our own resources, and not upon any European Concert which, in his (Colonel Alexander's) opinion, was an absolute and complete myth.

MR. M'COAN

said, he hoped he was not lacking in respect to the hon. Gentlemen who had already addressed the Committee, when he ventured to say that, with two exceptions, most of the speeches delivered had been rather of an academical than practical interest. The speech of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was an admirable and exhaustive review of the diplomatic aspect of the question, and, to his mind, if he had any sympathy with the hon. Baronet's view, it would have been a very powerful and very convincing statement of fact. The hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Arnold) had made a practical contribution to the debate. The issue before the Committee was something like this. Had we interests in Egypt which justified our military intervention in the affairs of that country, and was the Government justified in asking for this Vote of Credit? As regarded our interest in Egypt, he did not think there would be much difference of opinion, and in venturing to maintain this statement, he must go over well-trodden ground. The Suez Canal was of paramount and national importance to England; indeed, it was a common thing to say that it formed the gate and the key to India. So long, therefore, as we held the Empire of India, we must, of necessity, dominate the Suez Canal. As the Committee had been told by the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 82 per cent, or four-fifths, of the trade of the Suez Canal was carried in British vessels; and, besides that, we had a proprietary interest in the Canal, the market value of which was something like £9,000,000 sterling—an investment, the justice and policy and wisdom of which had been abundantly proved by events. We had a political interest, we had a great and paramount commercial interest, and we had a share interest in the Canal. Next in importance, we had more than three-fourths of the whole foreign trade of Egypt in our hands. The Committee had heard that the foreign trade of Egypt exceeded £13,000,000 sterling a-year.

It being ten minutes before Seven of the clock, the Chairman left the Chair to report Progress; Committee to sit again this day.