HC Deb 01 August 1882 vol 273 cc394-499

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

(1.) £181,089, Admiralty Office.

(2.) £195,416, Coast Guard Service and Royal Naval Reserves, &c.

SIR. JOHN HAY

said, he wished to ask whether the re-engagement of 10 years' service men discharged had been proceeding at the same rate as during the years 1878,1879, and 1880,which was about 1,000 a-year? The Returns before the House only came down to March 15, 1881.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he could not answer the question then, but he would give the information on Report.

CAPTAIN PRICE

wished to ask a question in reference to the Seamen and Marine Pensioners' Reserve. He believed these were paid in this way. The pensioners were induced to come forward for a certain amount of drill each year, and, in consideration for their doing so, were allowed to come upon the Greenwich Hospital Fund for a pension at 50, instead of 55, years of age. But he wished to know why these men, who formed a valuable Naval Reserve, should not be paid from Imperial funds by an ordinary Vote? His hon. Friend the late Secretary alluded to this fund as a sort of charity, but it was being made use of in this way for paying a portion of the Naval Reserve of the country. He should like some information why it should be so, for it was obvious if Reserves were paid out of the Greenwich Hospital Fund, then old men, and those who came upon it at 55 or 60, must proportionately go minus; they must receive a smaller amount, or a smaller number would have the benefit of the pension. He wished to know in what respect this Reserve differed from any other that they should not be paid out of the National Revenue?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he must admit there was an apparent anomaly in this matter, and it did seem somewhat strange that the Greenwich Hospital Fund should pay a part of the Reserve Forces. But it had passed through the hands of successive Boards of Admiralty, so, probably, there was reason for it. He could only promise that he would cause inquiry to be made and see if there was good reason for it or not.

CAPTAIN PRICE

said, he was pressing the point now, because it was only now that the pinch was beginning to be felt. This year there were 1,500; last year there were only 1,000; and two years ago the numbers were only from 600 to 800.

MR. W. H. SMITH

asked whether the numbers of the Reserves were to be kept up somewhat more closely to the numbers voted than had been the case in recent years? Looking at the reduced number of Marines, were the Admiralty prepared to keep up the numbers to the actual strength voted? It was an important matter; and though in times of peace he recognized that it might be reasonable to keep the number lower than 60,000, it was of the highest importance in a time of war to keep up the full strength.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR

said, the War Office issued a statement giving the variations in the numbers of men from time to time. Could not the Secretary to the Admiralty have an abstract for the Navy prepared similar to that in reference to the Army? The information would be very useful and handy to every person interested in the Department. At present it was not easy to ascertain the number of officers and men to be paid—the statements were financial, not numercial.

MR. W. H. SMITH

said, he observed, from the note on page 177 of the Estimates, that in 1881 the numbers were less than those voted—in September by 1,070, in October by 1,177, and in November by 1,352; and now that the numbers voted had been reduced, would the strength be kept up?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, as his right hon. Friend was aware, he had only recently had to do with these matters; but if the number of seamen and marines was allowed to drop below the number on the Estimate, it was probably in anticipation of the reduction about to be proposed. He was quite aware from his Army experience of the great difficulty there was in keeping the establishment right and preventing any excess of the Estimate, and, in doing that, there were periods when the numbers fell short. He should certainly do what he could to keep the number well up to the establishment; but, of course, there were periods of the year when discrepancies would arise. He was informed that, at the present moment, the Marines were less than 100 short of the establishment.

SIR JOHN HAY

Of the reduced establishment?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

Yes. As to periodical statistical Returns giving details showing the variations in the normal strength, he would inquire and see if there would be any difficulty in giving them. He was aware that these were of great convenience in regard to the Army. As far as his experience of the Admiralty went, he could not see there was any deficiency in statistical Returns; but they were rather financial than material. He was disposed to think that a Return, such as his hon. and gallant Friend mentioned, would be of use.

LORD HENRY LENNOX

said, he would add a word to what had been said to impress on the Admiralty the extreme importance of the view of his right hon. Friend the Member for Westminster (Mr. W. H. Smith). It must be remembered that it was not only that the Marines were reduced by 600 this year, but last year the blue-jackets were reduced by 800; and though it might seem that the same strength was being kept this year, that was not really the ease, because the number of men was decreased and the number of boys increased. There was a work to which he would call the attention of the Secretary to the Admiralty—the gold medal prize publication, by Captain L. Blyth, on Manning the Navy. There the objections to the system of manning the Navy were stated. He wished to add his voice in pressing on the Admiralty that the reduced numbers should be kept up to their full strength.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, he would urge on the Government that they should reconsider their decision to reduce the number of Marines. The immediate use of Marines was apparent at this moment, when we were relying upon them. In "another place" the First Lord of the Admiralty said that the object of reducing the number of Marines was to allow an increase of pay to the officers. No doubt they were well entitled to that increase of pay, and in time of peace, no doubt, it was an admirable arrangement to pay the officers what they ought to have. But now that we were engaged, if not in war, in warlike operations, and Marines were being sent out to assist, and did give most valuable assistance, he thought the opportunity ought to be taken to restore that Force to the number considered necessary until in a fit of economy the number of men was reduced in order to pay the officers more. The officers now had received their pay; there was an extra Vote for warlike operations; Marines were being largely employed; and it seemed to be a good opportunity for increasing the number of men to what had always been considered necessary, keeping to the officers the well-deserved advantage of the extra pay.

SIR EDWARD REED

said, he should like to say a few words upon the Return which had been issued, which he considered one of the most valuable and instructive Returns ever produced, showing, as it did, the steady and continual growth of the charges for the non-effective Service from year to year, and bringing into clear light the fact that while successive Chancellors of the Exchequer fixed the aggregate amount of expenditure on the Navy on account of considerations that had nothing whatever to do with the Navy, but with the National Income, we had, on the other hand, this continual growth of charges for the non-effective Service simultaneously with a continual growth of the cost in every ship that was built for appliances and devices that did not exist at all a few years ago, and the nature of which would be illustrated by the Inflexible Return, upon which he would say a word or two later on. He referred to it now to show how, to use a popular phrase, the Navy was being "cornered." He was unable to separate this circumstance from another—namely, the relation of the Expenditure on the Public Service to the National Income; and he was inclined to think there were many signs of a decrease in the National Income, and the annual increase of Expenditure was becoming a subject of grave importance. He mentioned this to put a slight check on the remarks which had come from the opposite side; and he only wished to say now that the suggestions about keeping up the Naval strength in seamen and marines ought to be regarded in the light of the permanent charge for non-effective purposes involved, and the House ought to be careful how they increased the charge for pensions and all non-effective charges. It might be inferred from the remarks of the noble Lord opposite (Lord Henry Lennox), and others, that almost the only thing to consider was the keeping up of the number of men voted by the House; but he would point out that the circumstances of the time justified a gradual reduction of these numbers, and it was not right to assume à priori that any reduction was a mistake. Take the case of the Inflexible. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty told them that a ship like the Inflexible cost, according to the calculations of the Board, over £800,000, and yet there were only about 100 blue-jackets on board of her. Was this to continue to be the case, and yet this enormous increase in the cost of the Navy to go on unattended by any reduction whatever in the cost of the blue-jackets and of the marines? He had no wish to put any obstacle in the way of the proper adjustment of the point raised by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Sir John Hay); but he must say that the undue growth of the non-effective charges was out of all proportion to the complement of the ships and the number of men employed. He would say no more upon the subject; but he certainly thought it was a matter which statesmen were called upon to consider.

SIR MASSEY LOPES

said, his hon. Friend who had just sat down wished to impress upon the Admiralty the propriety of considering the question raised by his right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) in reference to the reduction of th6 Marines. What was that reduction? They were told by the Secretary to the Admiralty that it amounted to something like £24,000, and for the sake of saving that sum 680 men and 35 officers of Marines had been dispensed with. Personally, he would much rather pay the money and retain the services of the men. He was glad to see that there was some probability of the promise being carried out of an improvement in the pay and prospects of the non-commissioned officers. There was certainly some force in the argument recently used that the reason why a force of Marines was not landed after the bombardment of Alexandria was that there was only a very limited number of men at the disposal of the Admiral. He thought the Committee would agree with him that the complement of blue-jackets on board ships of war was so small that none could be spared for landing when an emergency arose; and if it was deemed necessary at any time to send an expedition on shore, there was no force which could be made available for such a purpose. That was an additional reason why the number of Marines should not be reduced. In the present day there were more engineers and stokers and fewer blue-jackets and marines on on board a ship than was formerly the case, and that fact ought to be a very strong argument against any further reduction in the fighting strength.

THE CHAIRMAN

wished to point out that the Marines were not included in the present Vote at all, and the hon. Baronet was, therefore, discussing a subject that was not before the Committee.

MR. D. JENKINS

wished to say one word in reference to the remarks which had been made by the Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Sir Thomas Brassy) in reference to the stokers. He was sorry to hear the hon. Member say there was no intention on the part of the Admiralty to keep up a reserve of stokers for the Royal Navy. He himself considered it quite as necessary to have a body of stokers in the Royal Navy Reserve as a body of seamen, because the boilers were liable to suffer, and it was not possible to place their hands upon a large number of stokers at the moment when an emergency arose. Even in the Merchant Service it was found extremely difficult to put their hands upon thoroughly-trained stokers at a short notice. He hoped the Admiralty would take the matter into consideration, and see whether it was not desirable, in the interests of the Service, to keep a certain number of stokers in the Royal Navy Reserve.

LORD HENRY LENNOX

said, the Chairman was mistaken in supposing that no reference to the Marines was included in the Vote. If he would turn to page 26, he would see that the pensions for Seamen, Marines, and the Reserves were included. Before, however, he went into the question of the Marines, he wanted to draw the attention of the Secretary to the Admiralty to the fact, that when a man who had served in the Army became a pensioner, he entered into the Reserve, and was still available for the service of the country; whereas, when the Marines were made pensioners, they were dispersed, and, not being included in any Reserve, their services were entirely lost to the country. He thought that was a point which the Secretary to the Admiralty would do well to consider. He also desired to make a strong appeal in favour of reconsidering the propriety of reducing the strength of the Marines. He would not detain the Committee further upon these points now, because he was afraid he should have to trouble the Secretary to the Admiralty at greater length when the Marine Vote was brought on.

Vote agreed to.

(3.) £113,691, Scientific Branch.

SIR JOHN HAY

wished to ask, in reference to this Vote, how the Navy stood in regard to the question of surveys this year? There were plenty of unsurveyed coasts, and it had always been the practice to provide a certain sum for the expense of surveys. Although he should be glad to see any reduction made that could be fairly carried out, yet the safety of our Mercantile Marine and our constantly-extending commerce ought to be considered; and he did not think that any harm would result, but, on the contrary, a great amount of good, from requiring the surveys to be continued in future at the very moderate rate at which they had hitherto been carried out. He hoped his hon. and gallant Friend would state what the reduction was.

SIR THOMAS BRASSEY

said, that a very comprehensive Report by the present able official Hydrographer had been laid upon the Table in the course of the present Session, and he thought the statements contained in that Report were exceedingly satisfactory. At present they had no less than 563 officers and men engaged upon the Admiralty surveys, and the work they had carried out was considerably greater than that performed by any other nation. Of course, no other nation had the power of undertaking the same amount of work. He would venture to say that the amount of work done by the Navy year by year very fairly represented the great and acknowledged responsibility of the country in contributing towards the knowledge and information of the civilized world. With regard to the operations of the Hydrographic Department generally, the enormous sale that was obtained for the admirable charts published by the Department, and other indications which it was not necessary to refer to, all tended to prove that the public highly appreciated the work that was being done. And he could assure his right hon. and gallant Friend that there was no disposition on the part of the Board of Admiralty to curtail or deal illiberally with this Vote.

MR. W. H. SMITH

asked if it was to be understood that there was to be a Report presented from the President of the Royal Naval College? It appeared that there had been some change in regard to the inspection of the Naval schools. The inspection was, he believed, exceedingly well conducted, and he hoped it would be as well conducted under any change which might be introduced into the system. Of course, it might be occasionally necessary to make a change—for example, in the case of a new appointment where an officer had served his time; but the inspection was a matter of very considerable importance, and he should like to know if the Secretary to the Admiralty could give the Committee any information on the subject?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he had not heard of any change, at any rate, in the system. The right hon. and gallant Member opposite (Sir John Hay) asked a question in regard to the Coasts Survey under letter P. The reduction was only apparent, and not real, and it arose in this way. The Porcupine, which had been previously employed, with a hired crew, had been paid off, and the Triton, with a naval crew, substituted, the pay of the officers and men being now provided under Vote 1, instead of under Vote 5; but, practically, there was no less amount of money spent in the Service. There had only been a change in the vessel.

SIR EDWAED REED

said, the late First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. W. H. Smith) had drawn attention to the desirability of having a Report from the Royal Naval College. The right hon. Gentleman himself, when in Office, was good enough to present a Report to the House at his (Sir Edward Reed's) request, and that Report was most valuable. In regard to it—namely, the Report of the Hydrographic Department, which had been referred to by his hon. Friend the Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Sir Thomas Brassey), he would take this opportunity of saying that, although this was the first time reference had been made in that House to that annual Report, it was one which was highly appreciated by himself and many others as a Report of very great value. The late First Lord having set an excellent example in showing his readiness to give a Report from the Royal Naval College, he hoped the present Board of Admiralty would carry the matter a step further, and give a Report from each of the training institutions. For instance, he should like to have an annual Report of the training at the cadet ships laid on the Table for the information of the House, and also an annual Report from the training school for engineering students. He had always been in favour of the production of such Reports by the Admiralty for this reason—he was one of those who believed that in the perpetuation of these separate training establishments they were perpetuating in a very unnecessary manner a large and permanent charge for ineffective service. He did not think that the training establishments for the Navy at all recognized the great fact, which was forcing itself every day upon their attention, that the Navy of the country, and our system of fighting, were becoming more and more a matter of engineering. It was rather an alarming thing to find these strong lines of demarcation drawn between the officers of Her Majesty's Navy which the great change occasioned by the use of steam had brought about, and which was forcing itself more and more into the operations of the Navy. The occasion of this Vote at this period of the Session was, perhaps, not the proper moment for enlarging on the subject; but he did think that it would throw light, and very valuable light, upon the future of the question if they had an annual Report from the training schools for Naval cadets and engineering students. He recommended the matter to the Secretary to the Admiralty and the Board as one of considerable importance.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR

said, he was anxious to confirm the statement of the right hon. and gallant Member for Wigtown (Sir John Hay) as to the importance of the survey carried out by the Hydrographic Department. He hoped the change of ships which had been made, would be a change in the direction of improving the survey. He agreed with the statement of the right hon. and gallant Member for Wigtown that the surveys ought to be continued on the same scale as hitherto, and that they should be conducted with unabated vigour. Instead of discouraging the surveys, the Admiralty ought, if possible, to add to them.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, there was a question which he should like to put to the Secretary to the Admiralty, and which would come under this Vote, although the money was not asked for in it—namely, whether there was to be a Supplementary Vote of £5,000 for the Arctic Expedition? He hoped that the expedition of Sir Allen Young would be completely successful; and it would be interesting to the Committee to know the terms on which the grant was to be made, and when the expedition was expected, to return.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, the Vote would be moved by the Secretary to the Treasury, and it did not appear in the present Estimates. He was unable to give any exact information as to the time when the expedition was to be back. One condition upon which the money was granted was, that an equal sum should be proved to have been expended upon the expedition from private sources. The Vote was included in the Supplementary Estimates laid on the Table that morning; and when it came to be moved, he had no doubt if the right hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Sir John Hay) asked for information, that it would be given by the Financial Secretary when he proposed the Vote. In regard to what his hon. Friend behind him (Sir Edward Reed) had stated in reference to an annual Report from the training schools, he might say—speaking not so much as Secretary to the Admiralty as an independent Member—that, in his opinion, it would be a very good thing to have such Reports; and, if there was no objection, and no difficulty in the way, he would do his best to secure that in future they should be laid upon the Table. He could, however, make no promise upon the matter, because he was satisfied that there might be difficulties to contend with. Another point alluded to by his hon. Friend was the social distinction which had existed between different officers in the same Service. The Engineer officers now went for instruction under the same roof as the Naval officers at Greenwich, and the division which had previously existed between the Engineers and the Executive officers was now removed as much as possible.

ADMIRAL EGERTON

wished to say a word or two upon this Vote as to the Naval cadets. He was very much inclined to agree with the view which had been shadowed forth by the hon. Gentleman below him (Sir Edward Reed). He (Admiral Egerton) thought the engineering and training of the Naval officers ought to go very much more together than had hitherto been the case. In the Marlborough a great advance had been made in that direction, and he thought that something ought to be done in regard to the training of Naval cadets. They were told some time ago that there was to be a sea-going training ship for Naval cadets; but he had heard that that intention was to be abandoned. He should be very sorry if that were true, because he believed it would cost very little, and would be of the greatest advantage. He should like to know decisively whether it was intended to abandon the idea, or to carry it out? It was of the utmost importance that the Naval cadets should be supplied with something or other to go to sea in. At present they had nothing except a vessel that was once a sea-going ship, but was no longer so; and they were unable to get the smallest taste of salt water outside Dartmouth Harbour. He wanted to know if it was intended to make some provision for training Naval cadets at sea?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

replied in the affirmative. Provision was made in the Estimates for a sea-going tender.

CAPTAIN PRICE

asked if there was any intention to abolish a separate mess at Greenwich for the Engineers? He had drawn attention to the subject before, and it might easily be done now. At present there was a large mess in a very large room, and it would be easy to get rid of the social difficulty which sometimes existed.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

said, he wished to put a question in regard to the last item in this Vote—item B—"Expenses connected with candidates for the Naval Medical Service." Those expenses were put down at £415, as compared with £1,815 last year, and the sum of £2,500 the year before. Last year he had moved for a Return showing the number of examinations held in London since 1870 for appointments in the Naval Medical Service, showing the number of vacancies to be filled up, the date of each examination, the number of candidates who presented themselves at each examination, and the number of unsuccessful candidates, together with the qualifications of the candidates. He had got a Return, but he had not caused it to be printed, because it appeared to him that, in all probability, most Mem- bers would be puzzled to know why it should be printed. He was perfectly certain that the Return itself would, puzzle any of the officials, and of the medical world, who chose to examine it. The first portion of it showed that in the year 1870 there were three examinations. At those examinations the vacancies in the Naval Medical Service numbered respectively 11, 10, and 12. At the first of the examinations, 10 candidates presented themselves; at the second, 10; at the third, 7; so that the number of candidates was almost equal to the number of vacancies, and the Government had not much room for picking their men. As time went on from 1870 to 1871, 1872, 1873, 1874, and 1875, the number of vacancies steadily increased, until it went up from 10 in 1870 to 46 in 1875. But, although the vacancies increased, the number of candidates presenting themselves fell off from 10 to as low as five and three, and the Government had to be content with candidates of precisely the same qualifications obtained at the same examination and at the same Universities as other candidates who had been rejected at previous examinations. Such persons were of necessity selected for the Naval Medical Service as efficient medical officers, and it was perfectly plain to anybody who knew anything of the medical world, and of medical qualifications, that these men must have scraped through a merely nominal examination. In August, 1875, although there were 46 vacancies, only three candidates presented themselves; and, although those candidates scarcely possessed the requisite qualifications, the Naval authorities were not able to reject anyone of them. In the year 1874 there were 29 vacancies, and there were only 12 candidates, five of whom were rejected; but three of them were ultimately included, because the Government could not do without them. But, in spite of being compelled to take anybody who offered, the number of vacancies steadily increased from 43 and 46 in 1875, to 50 and 60 in the examinations of February and August, 76 in the February examination of 1880, and 73 in August, 1880. But, although there were 76 vacancies in the February examination in 1880, there were only six candidates, and there were only five for the 73 vacancies in August, and yet the Government dare only reject one of the candidates. He would not say what the qualifications of that gentleman were, because it would be invidious to do so; he would simply state that out of the five candidates who were examined one failed to pass. What struck him as extraordinary, was that, with 76 vacancies in February, 1880, and with only three successful candidates, and with only four successful candidates on another examination at the beginning of the year 1881, with vacancies existing admitted to be 70 in number, they had an item of £2,500 for the expenses connected with the examination of candidates for the Service; but in the following year it was reduced to £1,800, and this year it was brought down to little more than £400. The Auditor General, commenting upon the fact, stated that it was— In consequence of the diminution in the supply of medical officers, which arose from a smaller number of students having attended the course of instruction than was anticipated from the fees of the examination in 1881 not having come in course of payment. Under these circumstances, he failed to understand how it could be possible for the Naval Medical Service to be fully manned. If it was not, then, to a layman like himself, it appeared an extraordinary thing, with possibly a very large war at hand in the immediate future, that the Admiralty authorities should not have made a more adequate provision. If they had made sufficient provision, he could not understand the gradual reduction of this item from £2,500 to £1,800 last year, and only £400 this year. He should be glad if the Secretary to the Admiralty would explain the matter.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, it was well known that both in the Army and Navy of late years there had been great difficulty with regard to the Medical Service; and both in the Army Medical Department and the Navy Medical Department, it had been found necessary to make very large and very important concessions to the medical officers in order to secure a proper number of qualified candidates. He could assure the hon. Member that a good deal had been done for the Naval Medical Service, and the item referred to by the hon. Member by no means gave the entire cost. The sum of £10,520 was provided for in the Estimates for improved full, half, and retired pay to medical officers, besides £5,000 for gratuities on retirement. No doubt, the serious evils which the hon. Gentleman had very properly called attention to had arisen, and there had been in former years a very great deficiency of candidates. The hon. Member asked why it was, if the Admiralty had improved the position of the candidates, that the expenses connected with examinations had fallen off? One reason was that the Naval School at Netley had been abolished. The item really consisted of two parts—the first applied to the examination of candidates, which was the same as it was before; and the other part disappeared this year altogether—namely, the cost of the instruction at the Naval School at Netley. The Naval School at Netley was now abolished, and, consequently, no provision was required under that head. But the sum of £402 was taken under Vote 8, and £1,000 under Vote 12, to provide for the expense of the instructional course now carried on for medical officers of the Navy at Haslar. Instead of using the establishment at Netley, the Naval Medical Training Establishment was now concentrated in the Naval Establishment at Haslar. He thought that would explain the difficulty.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

said, he had overlooked the items on page 48, which accounted for the diminution of £1,400. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would be able to state how many students were now under instruction for the Medical Service, and how many vacancies there were?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, this was not the Vote on which that question would arise, and he was not prepared, at the moment, to give the information asked for by the hon. Gentleman. If the hon. Member would put the question by-and-bye, he would state both the number of candidates and the number of vacancies.

MR. W. H. SMITH

said, he was glad that a change had been made in regard to Haslar, and he thought the Government were making a good use of a really valuable hospital for Naval purposes. He had never really been able to understand why the medical officers were sent to Netley. It was clear that they ought to be sent to Haslar, having regard to the laborious work they had to perform; and he rejoiced to hear that the experience and knowledge of the Inspector at Haslar were to be made use of for the Medical Service.

SIR EDWARD REED

said, that any impediment in the way of carrying out recommendations for the improvement of the condition of the Navy did not come from the Navy officers themselves.

Vote agreed to.

(4.) Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £1,447,258, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Expenses of the Dockyards and Naval Yards at Home and Abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1883.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

I understand it is usual that in moving this Vote a statement should be made, which I shall be happy at once to proceed to make, giving any information in my power as to the state of the shipbuilding programme, and the extent to which it has been carried out. I will do so as briefly and as succinctly as I can. In introducing the Estimates, the ships which my right hon. Friend (Mr. Trevelyan) named as intended for completion during the present year, were the Agamemnon, the Ajax, the Conqueror, and the Polyphemus. I am glad to say that satisfactory progress has been made with all of them. The two first-named, the Agamemnon and the Ajax, will, I expect, be finished in the autumn, although some delay has occurred on account of the fittings for their armament. In the Conqueror, also, which will carry one 43-ton gun, the fittings have caused some delay, and her torpedo armament is being increased; but she will be finished as promised. The Polyphemus is now complete, except for trials of machinery and steering gear. So much for the vessels promised to be completed during the year. Turning next to the ships which were to be advanced during the year, I am glad to be able to tell the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. W. H. Smith), to whose initiation this most useful and effective type of ship is largely due, that the Collingwood is proceeding most satisfactorily, and will be launched, it is hoped, before the end of the financial year. Her sisters, the Rodney and the Howe, are also being pushed forward. The Edinburgh will, it is expected, be ready to leave Pembroke in six or seven months' time, in a forward state, and it will be brought round to Portsmouth for completion, while the Colossus and the two barbette-belted cruisers, Impérieuse and Warspite, are making good progress. Of unarmoured vessels there are only four which require mention, and they are all of the same class. Of these the Amphion is being advanced satisfactorily at Pembroke, while the Leander, Arethusa, and Phaeton are promised to be delivered within the year by the contractor, a promise which was renewed within a few days of the present time. I have thus exhausted the list of ships in progress, and I turn to the "fresh woods and pastures new" of which my right hon. Predecessor accorded the Committee a glimpse a few months ago. The first element in the new projects of the Board of Admiralty for this year is the Benbow, for which vessel tenders have recently been invited.

SIR JOHN HAY

Is the Benbow to be built by contract?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

Yes; she will be built by contract. I am going now carefully through the statements of my right hon. Friend and Predecessor. The Benbow, as is well known, will be of the same type as the Collingwood, Rodney, and Howe, but she will differ from her sisters in having somewhat stronger armour on her barbettes, and she, in common with the Rodney and Howe, will carry four 60-ton guns, as against four 43-ton guns in the Collingwood. The Rodney, Howe, and Benbow will carry the larger gun, but the Benbow will be 5 feet longer than the others, and her weight will be 10,000 tons, as against 9,600 in the Rodney and Howe, and 9,150 in the Collingwood. Besides the Benbow, which is to be built by contract, it was announced that two new iron-clads would be laid down in the Dockyard; but as little more than a beginning was intended to be made upon the ships within this year, there has been ample time for the deliberate consideration of their type. I am not, however, prepared to state any decision on the subject at which the Board has arrived; and I think the Committee will agree that when we have had so recently, for the first time, an experience on a great scale of the qualities, and a test, it may be, of the weaknesses and defects of our fighting ships, it is only prudent to await full details of the result of that experience before proceeding to lay down any new vessels of that degree of importance. The Admiralty look to the opinions of the officers commanding our ships in the East as likely to throw a most instructive light on many problems of practical Naval construction, and thus it is that on this point—as to the type of the new ships to be laid down—I have no communication at present to make to the Committee. The final determination has not yet been made. One other item in the programme disclosed by my right hon. Predecessor remains for me to notice. With a graphic power which belongs to him, in common with few other Members of this House, he described the designs of a new protected torpedo ship, and excited the interest in it of all who heard him. It is now proposed to build, with but slight alteration, from the design laid before the Committee by my right hon. Friend, two such vessels—one at Chatham, and one by contract—the latter taking the place of a corvette, whose building by contract was in the original programme. In the present experimental state of torpedo armament, it is thought advisable that these two vesssels should be capable of carrying either a heavy armament of guns, or alternatively a very powerful torpedo armament and lighter guns. The principal features of the design remain as described—that is to say, there is a strong armour deck near the water-line of a hog-back shape, protecting the magazines and machinery and steering apparatus, while, above this, there will be comfortable accommodation for the crew. There will be a comparatively large coal capacity. Their speed will be from 16 to 17 knots, they will have twin screws, and will depend on steam alone for propulsion. The estimated cost of each of these vessels is about two-thirds of the ascertained cost of the Polyphemus. The dimensions, I may explain, will be nearly those of the Leander class, but in point of protection there is a great superiority. There is but one other matter which I have to bring before the Committee. The Committee are, no doubt, aware of the character of the four vessels of the Cyclops class, which were built about 12 years ago for the purpose of harbour and coast de-fence. They are powerful and effective ships for that purpose; but in the Report of the Committee of Designs in 1871, a doubt was expressed as to their being safe to go to sea in all weathers. I am not going to enter into the contested question whether this doubt is fully justified or not; but the Admiralty have resolved to add to one of these vessels a light super-structure, in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee of Designs, so as to increase her stability, and, therefore, her general usefulness for sea service. These are all the statements I have to submit to the Committee. I have put them as briefly as I could. They complete our proposals for the year; and the Admiralty believe that their proposals for the year, carried out and modified as I have explained, promise a substantial increase to the strength of the Navy, and will do much to maintain that great Service in the position which it ought to occupy, as being really, to so large an extent, the groundwork of the security, the confidence, and the pride of this country. Of course, if there are any questions which any hon. Gentleman wishes to put, or any further details required, I will give them to the best of my ability; but I have described the main features of the several vessels, so far as they have not been described before.

MR. W. H. SMITH

I have listened with interest to the exceedingly modest statement of my hon. Friend, who has recently joined the Admiralty, and who is naturally not inclined to give any very florid account of the work in which the Department is engaged. This is really the most important Vote of the whole year, and I cannot help expressing my regret that it should be discussed in a thin House at 9 o'clock, on the evening of the 1st of August. It would almost appear as if, in the judgment of the House of Commons, the adequate provision for the material of the Navy is not a subject of very great importance. I myself feel very strongly indeed that in the future no circumstances should be allowed to permit so serious a delay as has taken place in the discussion of the Navy Estimates in the last two years. I do not at all blame the Government for what has occurred; but there can be no doubt that it is a matter of very serious concern to the country that these discussions should be rendered almost useless by delaying them till this period of the Session, when all the interest has been worn out, and a large number of Members who ought to take an interest in the question are away. I trust that, under any circumstances, whatever may happen in future, we may have these Estimates discussed at a period when they can be discussed with advantage to the country. Nearly one-half of the year has now passed and we are discussing the Navy Estimates, which should have been fairly checked, if there was any reason to check them, by the opinion of the House long ago. It would not be possible now for the Admiralty to take advantage of any discussion that may occur. They are obliged to go forward with the work they have taken in hand, and five months of the year having gone they now come to us for the money, which, of course, must be given to them, for the Public Service. My hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty has made some statements to which I am anxious to call attention. He has stated that the Ajax and the Agamemnon will be finished this year. I am exceedingly glad to hear that that is the case, for our reserves are not, I think, such as would justify a longer delay in the completion of any vessel which would add to the strength of the Navy, or which would be available in a time of war. I think it must be felt by my hon. Friend opposite that we are now reaching a condition in which it becomes a matter of concern, whether, if we are to be engaged in a war, we might not find some difficulty in supplying the places of disabled ships. We have, it is true, the Devastation, the Dreadnought, and the Neptune at Portsmouth ready for sea, and the Ajax and Agamemnon at Chatham, which ought also to be ready for sea. There has been a delay with regard to the sighting of the guns of the latter vessels which is totally unexplained, and which has been much greater than could have been expected. Then there are several ships which are in a state of disrepair, and which could not be put to sea for some months, probably a year or two. The five vessels I have named are all that are available in case it was necessary to send an ironclad fleet to sea immediately, and there is not, therefore, such a provision, or such a reserve as is desirable for a country like this. The point to which I am anxious to draw attention is that there has been very great delay in the completion of those ships. This is a point which was driven home to me constantly when I was in Office, and it is a point which I am now anxious to drive home to my hon. Friend and the Board of Admiralty. I know it is a matter of extreme difficulty to get a ship completed. It is an easy matter to build the hull of a ship. It is possible to build ton after ton of hull without delay; you have only got to settle upon the design, to employ a large number of men, and you can add ton upon ton to your building programme without the slightest stint. The delay takes place when you have launched the ship and are talking about her guns, when you have not quite made up your mind as what the magazine requirements will be, and when you are in correspondence with the War Department as to the charge for the guns. So it goes on week after week and month after month, and the ship remains incomplete, and will remain incomplete, unless a very positive will is exercised, and unless some particular individual is made personally responsible for the speedy and absolute completion of the ship. In the programme for 1881–2—that is to say, last year's programme—we were promised that these two ships—the Ajax and the Agamemnon—should be completed. I do not blame my hon. Friend opposite, nor the Government; but it is a grave matter when the House comes to consider that these ships may be wanted, and wanted immediately. We were promised that they should be completed some time ago, and they are not now ready for sea. The absence of these ships from the Effective List is the same thing as if they had never been in existence at all for the purposes of an immediate war. If a ship is not ready you cannot call it a ship on the Effective List, and the Service is short by these ships of its proper strength—a strength which only appears upon paper. I have looked at the Estimates of last year, and I find that the Ajax and the Agamemnon were promised to be completed; but the statement put in our hands of the work still to be done shows that 17 per cent of the work on the Agamemnon, and 27 per cent on the Ajax, remains to be completed. And this percentage is, as I have already said, the kind of work which is the most important, and which takes the longest time possible to complete, such as the fittings and the armament. It takes weeks sometimes to get a decision upon one particular item, and it often happens that the work already done has to be undone and done again. It is this kind of delay which I am anxious to press home upon my hon. Friend; and I repeat that it is work which should be undertaken by an individual, which individual should be made responsible for the completion of the ship by a given time. I think I am speaking in the presence of hon. Members who understand the application of that sort of principle to works of construction. I say nothing about the Polyphemus, because, undoubtedly, the Polyphemus is a vessel of an entirely experimental character, and a delay in her completion might reasonably occur. Whether she proves to be a success or not yet remains to be seen—at present she is only an experiment. She is new in every respect and in every degree. I am responsible for the adoption of the design of that vessel, which may or may not turn out a success, although I hope she will. Whether it turns out one or the other, I hold that it was the duty of the Admiralty to make the experiment, to trust to their scientific advisers, and to put complete faith in them, after informing themselves as well as they could. Undoubtedly, an experiment of the kind must frequently be made for the advantage of the Service, and I have no doubt it will fully justify the expenditure which has been incurred. I will, therefore, make no remark upon the delay in the case of the Polyphemus, because it was purely an experimental vessel. But when I come to other questions, I confess I look at them with something of alarm. I think my hon. Friend and the Admiralty will see that they have not been restricted in regard to money, as far as the House of Commons is concerned. I am glad to see that the Admiralty have taken an additional £280,000 on their Vote this year. Last year they estimated for £10,320,000, but now they have increased the amount to £10,600,000, the difference being £280,000 to the good. I think that the Admiralty have done well in taking more money; but my complaint is, that they have not carried out their programme in one important respect. They have not finished those ships which they should have done, in order fairly to complete their programme in building iron-clads as well as unarmoured ships. They have delayed some of the armoured ships, such as the Ajax and Agamemnon; but my great complaint is with regard to the delay which has taken place in reference to the repairs. I will take the Return of the ships which has been laid on the Table within the last day or two. I do not speak of the valuable Return of my right hon. and gallant Friend behind me (Sir John Hay), but the Return of the state of the Navy for 1882–3, and I will begin at the beginning. I find it was proposed, according to this Return, that the Audacious should be completed in August, 1882. But if I turn to the Estimates for 1881–2, I find that the Audacious was promised to be completed by March, 1882. It is not completed, and a powerful vessel of 6,000 tons displacement, and 14 guns armament, is not available for the Public Service at the present moment. I think the undertaking of the Admiralty ought to have been carried out. No doubt, I shall be told that some other ship bas been completed in place of the Audacious; but the real effect of the delay has been that this vessel and many others are struck out of the effective strength of the Navy at the present time, and thus a considerable reduction in its total strength has been made compared with what it was two years ago. That is the point I am anxious to place clearly before my hon. Friend. Then, as to the Bellerophon, the Government promised in their Revised Estimates, presented in May, 1880, that she should be completed in July, 1881. Last year the present Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant stated that she had been delayed by reason of the breech-loading guns; and now we are told that she will be completed in March, 1883. That promise may be no more fulfilled than the promise of last year. The Invincible was repaired, but I will pass that over. I come next to the Rupert. The Rupert is a vessel of which we were promised that 55 per cent, or more than half, should be completed by the 31st of March, 1882. She has not been touched up to the present time; not a single hand has been put upon her, or, at all events, no effective work of any kind whatever towards her repair has yet been undertaken. I venture to doubt whether the work on that vessel can be finished by the 31st of March, 1883, even if taken in hand immediately. I myself do not think it can. Then I come to the Shannon, which has been standing for repairs for some considerable time. No undertaking or promise has been made this year with regard to that very useful and handy vessel. The Shannon is one of the best vessels for certain service in the Navy. When there was some doubt as to the state of our relations in the China Seas, the Shannon was sent there through the Suez Canal, and from the China Seas, after remaining there for some time, she went to the Pacific, and did good service there. It is a great misfortune that a ship like the Shannon should remain unrepaired for more than a year, and I hope the engagement of the Admiralty will be carried out so far as this ship is concerned. Then I come to the Active, which was promised to be completed by the 31st of March last, and which we are now told will, in all probability, be completed in September this year. Now, I think it is of very great importance to bear in mind the fact that we were promised that these vessels should be in an effective state at this time. There is next the Rover. She was promised to be completed in 1881; then by the 31st of March, 1882, and we are now told she will probably be completed by October next. Then comes the Opal, and next the Sapphire, both of which were promised to be completed by 31st March, 1882; but neither of them is complete at the present moment. They are, however, promised in December. I pass now to a ship which, if she were now effective, would, in all probability, be doing the greatest possible service to the country. I am speaking of the Himalaya. She, as we all know, is a most useful ship. She was promised to be completed by the 31st of March, 1882; but we are now told she will probably be completed in October next. In going through these reports my sole object is to show that there has been a very considerable and serious delay, if not an absolute cessation of progress, in the matter of repairs, the result of which is that, at the present time, the strength of the Navy is a great deal less than the country supposes it to be, or has a right to expect. I do not ask that a single ship should be repaired which is not worthy of repair, or which it is not intended to keep in repair as a thoroughly useful vessel; but I wish to enforce the principle already laid down more than once in the course of the discussions upon the Navy Estimates that if a vessel is intended to be kept in the Service, if she is recognized as a thoroughly serviceable ship, she ought not to be left unavailable for a single day beyond the actual necessities of the case. But it seems to me a mistaken and, if I may say so, a remarkably short-sighted policy to allow a valuable ship to be laid up in harbour, say, at Devonport or Portsmouth for a long period, during which she is sure to be deteriorating from exposure and other causes which are known to everybody connected with ships, when it is intended at some future time to take her in hand for repairs. Leaving out of the question altogether that the vessels of the kind I am referring to are, perhaps, worth £300,000 or £400,000 each, and that there is, consequently, a considerable loss in interest of money while they remain unavailable, there is ultimately an actual increase of expenditure caused by leaving them unrepaired. It is perfectly well known that vessels, if left for any length of time in a state of disrepair, will get daily, monthly, and yearly into a worse condition, and that their repairs, in consequence will cost much more than if they had been taken in hand at once. I have no doubt I shall be told that the exigencies of the Service have compelled the Dockyard authorities to take in hand other ships which have come in for repair, and to deal with them rather than with the vessels to which I am now directing attention; but I venture to impress upon the Committee that if this system be pursued, we shall have such an arrear of repairs as will place us in a position similar to that in which we found ourselves in 1873, when my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) was First Lord. At that period, I believe, my right hon. Friend was almost obliged to stop shipbuilding—the building of armour-clad vessels falling to about 3,000 or 4,000 tons or less, simply because he had no ships to use as reliefs. You must not lose sight of the fact that the number of vessels that require to be repaired will also increase. You will probably next year have to take in hand the Alexandra, which has been in commission six or seven years; you will have the Iron Duke coming home from China, after an absence of four years, as well as the Triumph from the Pacific, besides others which were added to your list of vessels requiring repairs; and, further than that, other ships will have to be found to take their places, or the strength of the Navy will be very considerably reduced. But I have some further observations to make upon this subject. My right hon. Friend the present Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (Mr. Trevelyan), speaking on the 16th of August last year, said— The Shah and one other iron-clad-which are under repairs will be completed this year. …. Finding that there was money to spare, owing to the slow progress' made with the cruisers in private yards, we have thought it right to apply that money to the repairs of the Raleigh, and an order has been given for supplying her with new engines and boilers. The Black Prince and her consort are engaging the attention of the Admiralty, who are considering the best use that can be made of those vessels, and whether it is not desirable to convert them into very powerful and swift cruisers by fitting them with new engines.….Provision has been made for placing 103 6-inch guns on board a number of our corvettes and gun-boats, and the Shah and the Raleigh will be furnished with a full broadside of these beautiful weapons."—[3 Mansard, cclxv. 79–83.] That statement was made just before the Prorogation last year, and we all separated believing that arrangements were made for repairing the Shah and the Raleigh. But the next thing we heard was that it had been decided not to repair the Shah and the Raleigh at all. I want to know what became of the original decision of the Admiralty with regard to the Raleigh, as distinctly stated by my right hon. Friend last year when he said—"An order has been given for supplying her with new engines and boilers;" what has become of the order; who had the order, and how is it that the engagement has not been carried out? How is it that the engagement with Parliament which my right hon. Friend entered into has been totally disregarded, and that we are now told that nothing is to be done at present with the Shah and the Raleigh? In this matter we have been left entirely in the dark; all we know with regard to these two vessels is that they are awaiting repair; but no information of any kind is given with regard to them. Well, Sir, I have made some calculation of the effect of the policy which has been pursued by the Admiralty. I put out of the question the Black Prince, which vessel we were led to believe the Admiralty looked upon favourably last year as a cruiser. My right hon. Friend said distinctly with regard to this vessel that they were considering the proposal to put new engines and boilers into her, to reduce her armament, and make her what I think she would prove to be—a fast cruiser, or a vessel available for any service on which such ships are employed. She would, in all probability, with new engines and boilers, have a speed which would enable her to overhaul any ordinary cruiser, and she could carry, if she were properly handled and properly weighted, a very large supply of coal; at all events, we were led to believe that that was the opinion of the Admiralty. Well, Sir, a ship of that character has dropped out of the list altogether, and it becomes necessary to consider how she is to be replaced. But, putting her aside, as I said before, the calculation I have made of the effect of the policy pursued by the Admiralty is as follows. The Resistance, Shannon, Audacious, Bellerophon, and the Rupert give, of armoured ships, a total of 30,660 tons. That more than equals the tonnage of incomplete ships added to the Navy in recent years, the completion of which is a matter of so much difficulty. Then we come to the unarmoured ships promised to be repaired, and which would now have been effective had the engagements of the Admiralty been kept. These vessels represent a total of 34,823 tons, and they were engaged to be repaired by the 31st of March last; but they still remain for repair, the promise made with respect to them not having been performed. Then my hon. Friend has given me a list of the vessels which properly dropped out of the Effective List during the last two years, and these represent a total of 25,749 tons. The Admiralty have built, in two years, of armoured ships 19,271 tons, and of unarmoured ships 16,000 tons. My contention is, therefore, that the policy of delaying repairs seriously weakens the strength of the Service, and that it requires the most grave consideration; I now pass to the question of guns. My right hon. Friend the present Chief Secretary for Ireland said, on the before-mentioned occasion, in the course of his statement upon the Navy Estimates— When the present Government acceded to power we found a 43-ton gun in course of manufacture at Woolwich; but we did not find any of that competition to which my right hon. Friend opposite refers, but which, had he remained at the Admiralty, would, no doubt, have been set on foot in a short time. The very first act of the present Government was to set this all essential enterprize on foot, and on the 24th of May the War Office wrote to Sir William Armstrong, inviting him to send a 43-ton gun to Woolwich for experiment. He accepted this proposal, but asked for 10 months to complete the task, so heavy and complicated is even the preliminary business in connection with the adoption of a great gun."—[Ibid. 81–2.] But previously to this statement, in answer to a Question which I put to him in the House on the 28th of April, my right hon. Friend said— The breech-loading guns which will be supplied for the service of the Navy during the present financial year will be eight 9.2-inch 18-ton guns, four 8-inch 11½-ton guns, and 103 6-inch 4-ton guns."—[3 Hansard, cclx. 1320.] This statement was made more than once by my right hon. Friend in reply to Questions, and it was repeatedly confirmed by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. Well, Sir, I will ask how many of these 9.2-inch or 18-ton breech-loading guns, of which eight were promised; how many 11½-ton guns, of which eight were promised; and how many 4-ton guns, of which 103 were promised, have been received into the Service during the year ending on the 31st of March last? This was an engagement seriously entered into with the House at a time when it was capable of being fulfilled—that is to say, in April, 1881—and I am anxious to know how many of the very important and useful guns in question have been placed on board Her Majesty's ships. The Committee has been told that a very considerable number of new guns are provided for in the Estimates of this year. I ask whether these are in addition to the 119 guns which were promised to be delivered by the 31st of March last, or whether the 119 guns to which I have referred are included in the figures of the present year's Estimates? My hon. Friend in charge of the Estimates (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman), haying been at the War Office, is, no doubt, able to furnish the Committee with full information on this point, because the War Department has the privilege of sup- plying the Navy with guns. But I am also exceedingly anxious to know whether the 43-ton gun which has been in course of construction for many years is now finally approved; whether the trials have been satisfactory; whether, for endurance, penetration, and range it has satisfied all the authorities; whether the Navy itself is satisfied with the gun; and whether the conditions that were necessary to their reception by the Conqueror, which is to be finished during this financial year, have been complied with? I am sure my hon. Friend will see the desirability of having the gun approved as soon as possible, otherwise the ship which is to carry it will not be finished by the 31st of March next. I have had some experience of the delays that take place in connection with new guns and armament; and I shall be exceedingly surprised—very pleasantly surprised indeed—if it has been found possible to settle upon a gun thoroughly to the satisfaction of those who are responsible for receiving it into the Service, because, as my hon. Friend will understand, the Navy is as much responsible for the weapons it makes use of as the Army Department is for supplying them. The Admiralty is not justified in receiving a weapon into the Service, however great may be the authority which offers it to them, unless that weapon has met with the approval of every officer responsible for its being put on board. Therefore, I ask, what is the position of this 43-ton gun? Has it really been completed; is it an approved gun which the Navy is prepared to receive, or is it only at present an experimental gun; is it a gun from which other experiments are to proceed, and other designs be produced, and which may, perhaps, result in the construction of a gun a year or two hence, intended to be taken into the Service and made permanently useful? A few years ago, when I was in the place now occupied by my hon. Friend, I ventured to lay down the principle that it was essential that the Service should obtain the best gun that could be completed within a reasonable time; it appeared to me then, and it appears to me still, out of the question to wait for the best gun which scientific men can produce in an unlimited time, because the result of that must be that a large number of our vessels will re- main unarmed for want of guns to put into them, and, consequently, of no use to the country. For these reasons it seemed to me right that there should be some limited period fixed within which the selection might be made, and within which those who were responsible for deciding on the design of a gun should come to their conclusion, and then produce, for the consideration of the Department, the best possible gun that could be constructed upon that design. I have a very strong desire to see what I have often spoken of as a genuine competition in the production of guns—that is to say, a competition between the Government Factory on the one hand, and anyone who is capable of producing a gun on the other. When an individual capable of producing a gun has presented himself, I suggest that he should enter into an arrangement which would leave him without any return for his experiment or speculation if his gun failed to equal that produced at the Government Factory; on the other hand, let it be clearly understood that if, at least, the gun is equal to that produced in the Factory, its acceptance shall be insured. I believe that, upon these conditions, men of enterprize would be induced to enter upon the desired experiments, and that genuine competition would result, the private manufacturer having a reasonable chance of reward for his enterprize and expenditure; whereas, if you ask for designs, give directions, and require the performance of these mechanical experiments upon the lines which have already been laid down by the Department, the reverse will be the result. I do not know what are the conditions insisted upon in the case of Sir William Armstrong; but I think I am correct in saying that we are still without the guns intended for the ships I have named, and that no decision has been arrived at, notwithstanding the very long time which has elapsed. Now, there is one circumstance in connection with guns of this kind which must be taken very seriously into account—that is to say, the very great shortening of the life of the gun, which is proved to have resulted from the increased changes to which, in order to secure the necessary results, it has to be very properly subjected. I do not refer to what we have an imperfect knowledge of, but to a fact within our knowledge, when I remind the Committee that two of the guns on board one of the vessels that went to Alexandria have suffered damage from the cause I have described. I am only expressing the opinion of persons well informed upon this subject when I say that the great temperature and force developed will determine the life of a gun within a shorter period of time than is generally supposed, and it is conceivable that a certain limited number of rounds may render it no longer possible to use the gun on the same conditions as before. It may be possible to re-tube it; but five or six years' work, even with practice charges, may result in such injury to the gun that it will be no longer serviceable. I am not now merely speaking of that which may occur, but of what has occurred; and, therefore, I say there is no substantial reason for delaying the adoption of the best gun that can be obtained within a reasonable period. Because, when it is known that a gun will, in all probability, be worn out in five, six, or seven years, the wits of the mechanic will be exercised with great advantage to the Public Service in designing a still better gun; and by the time he has completed his work the existing gun will be worn out, and we shall then be able to avail ourselves of the new design. I regard it as a very grave matter that these guns, as I am informed, are not now ready for the Service, and that the ships for which they are intended, and which were to be completed within this year or the beginning of next, will probably be considerably delayed, because the guns themselves are not ready. Sir, I hope the importance of the subject will be regarded as a sufficient excuse for having taken up so much of the time of the Committee. In concluding, I will just recapitulate the points to which I have drawn attention. I am anxious to receive some assurance—first, that this question of guns will receive most serious and effective consideration at the hands of Her Majesty's Government and the Admiralty, and next, that the promised repairs of the vessels I have referred to will be completed within the time now remaining. I also wish for information with regard to the Black Prince—as to whether the suggestion made by the late Secretary to the Admiralty last year will be adopted or abandoned; and I desire to know, also, whether the Raleigh and the Shah are to remain in their present condition? Finally, I wish to know generally whether the Admiralty fully realize the importance of at once taking into dock for repair those good and serviceable ships which can be made efficient for the Public Service hereafter?

SIR EDWARD REED

said, he objected to the practice of passing compliments freely between the opposite Benches on these occasions as destructive to Parliamentary criticism; but the right hon. Gentleman opposite had made a speech which he considered in every part of it to be most valuable, because it consisted entirely of sound and just criticism without any admixture of exaggeration or Party bias. The speech of the right hon. Gentleman was listened to with the attention which it merited, because it afforded an example of the tone of debate which, he believed, all hon. Members were most anxious to see adopted when Naval matters were under consideration. He would like to make a passing remark upon an observation which fell from the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley). The hon. Member had spoken of our "obsolete ships," and, in doing that, he seemed to have fallen into the very bad habit which obtained both in that House and throughout the country of speaking of every ship which was not of the most recent type as an obsolete vessel. But he would remind the Committee of the fact that in the recent attack upon the forts at Alexandria, very efficient and valuable services were rendered by the Monarch and the Invincible, and other ships of their date, and that these vessels were sent into action for the purpose of achieving a public object with exactly the same readiness and confidence as to their fitness to undertake the work as were the other vessels of more recent construction. He held it to be both unsound and improper criticism to be continually representing to the country and the world that every one of our ships not of recent type was obsolete. On the contrary, he believed, there were very few iron-clad ships which came properly within this category. The right hon. Gentleman had dwelt with very great weight upon the shortcomings of the present Board of Admiralty in the matter of repairs to our ships, and had dealt with that subject very much in the same manner as he (Sir Edward Reed) had dealt with the shortcomings of the Board under the late Administration with regard to the building of ships. He was glad that they were at last becoming conscious of the fact that Boards of Admiralty did not exist simply for the purpose of obtaining from Parliament a certain sum of money year after year, but that they existed in order that they might maintain the Navy in an efficient state for the service of the country. The right hon. Gentleman had very properly drawn attention to the error of allowing a number of useful vessels to remain for a length of time in our ports without repair; and, whatever excuse might be offered by the Admiralty for the existing state of affairs, the thing itself was absolutely indefensible. He could not understand how any responsible Minister could allow a considerable number of vessels, whether iron-clad or unarmoured, to remain for months or years altogether in a state of disrepair without making any attempt whatever to bring them into a state of efficiency. It seemed to him that the First Lord of the Admiralty who should be in Office when the country was involved in war, and discover that a large portion of the Navy was lying in a state of unreadiness in our harbours, without taking immediate steps to remedy that state of things, would be and ought to be regarded very much as a traitor to the country, because he held Office for the very purpose of keeping the Navy in a state of efficiency. The hon. Gentleman in charge of the Estimates would, no doubt, be able to adduce very strong excuses on behalf of the Admiralty for not having carried out the repairs of the iron-clads referred to by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. Now, that was a moment when he, for one, regretted that there was no First Lord in that House with whom they could debate this question, because, notwithstanding the great ability and experience of the two hon. Gentlemen below him who represented the Admiralty, he could not help feeling that neither of them possessed that weight in the Government to be able to shape and carry out a policy of their own in a matter of this kind. The consequence of this was that, although they might agree with the criticisms of the action of the Board which had been made in the course of the evening, they would be unable to give effect to their views. Nevertheless, they occupied very responsible posts, and he had no doubt if they could be made to feel that the House was determined to require the Board Of Admiralty to maintain the Navy in a state of efficiency, they would be able, at least, to convey a forecast of that fact to the mind of the present First Lord. He wished, of course, to add that, in his opinion, all criticism on the points raised should, under present circumstances, be controlled by prudence. At present the amount voted for the Navy was, roughly speaking, a fixed sum year after year; and the effect of that was that each succeeding Administration found itself, after the payment of the non-effective charges, without money for carrying out a reasonable programme at all; and so we had one Administration neglecting the building programme put before Parliament, as he ventured to say was the case when his right hon. Friend opposite was in Office, and another, when a change of Government took place, admirably carrying out the building programme, but neglecting the repairs. This was due to the simple fact that neither Administration had enough money to pay for both building and repairs; and it raised the question whether any Administration was entitled to come down to that House and ask for sums of money which were insufficient to maintain the Navy in a state of efficiency. He was disposed next year to move a Resolution in that House which, he hoped, would receive the support of hon. Gentlemen opposite, and of a good many Members on that side of the House, tending to bring the Government of the day to account for bringing forward insufficient Estimates and neglecting to maintain the Naval Service in an efficient state. He thought the Opposition might be appealed to to vote for a Motion of this kind; at any rate, it was worthy of their consideration, because the system which was going on year after year amounted to absolute imposture, inasmuch as the men who framed the various Naval programmes laid before Parliament knew perfectly well when they were presented that they could not be carried out with the money at their disposal. Having spoken thus frankly on the subjects of ship building and repairs, he wished, with equal candour, to say a few words in praise of the statement of the Secretary to the Admiralty in introducing the Navy Estimates. The hon. Gentleman had, he thought, shown an appreciation of what the Committee of the House naturally desired to have—that was to say, information as to the ships which the Government proposed to build. He (Sir Edward Reed) had never in that House entered upon any small criticisms in connection with the Service; and although there were a great number of things done in the Navy at the present time which he heartily disapproved, most of them were matters of secondary importance, and, as such, he did not regard them as fit subjects for Parliamentary criticism. Moreover, at this period of the year, he should not discuss at any great length even the larger subjects which presented themselves for consideration. It had been said of the Polyphemus that she was an experimental ship. He believed she had been experimental at every stage, and the chances were that she would remain so to the end. Now they were informed that the Admiralty were going to build two additional torpedo vessels; but it appeared that they were undecided as to whether these vessels would be armed with an armament of guns or with an armament of torpedoes.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

It is not at all that the Admiralty are undecided. The vessels are what may be called alternative vessels in this respect—that when they are finished they may have a perponderating torpedo armament or a preponderating gun armament.

SIR EDWARD REED

said, he was very glad to hear that, in any event, they would carry some guns; and he took that opportunity of remarking what he had already had occasion to say on former occasions—namely, that of all the foolish things that this country could do in connection with the Navy, that of abandoning the armament of guns was, perhaps, the most foolish. On a former occasion, when his hon. Friend (Sir Thomas Brassey) was in favour of substituting torpedoes and rams for guns, he pointed out that for every shot fired from British men-of-war at ships, a thousand shots were fired at the shore. What he wished the Committee to understand from this was, that guns, and not torpedoes or rams, were necessary for attacking the coast defences of the enemy. A torpedo ship would have been of no use whatever in the recent attack on the forts at Alexandria; and although he concurred in the opinion that it was right to build the Polyphemus, he was most anxious to use any little influence he might possess by way of restraining anything like a large multiplication of vessels of that class, at the expense of vessels armed with guns. He regarded the principle which he advocated as essential at all times, but particularly so when it was known that the authorities had not sufficient money to enable them to carry on the Service in a manner that would insure its complete efficiency. His hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty had referred to the vessels of the Cyclops class, which, he said, were about to undergo some alterations, with a view to render them more seaworthy. But he would remind the Committee that the vessels which were built after this type were never designed for sea-going purposes at all. The first vessel of the kind was the Cerberus, which was built for the Australian Government, and was bought by them for the specific purpose of fighting on inland waters, and defending the approaches to Melbourne; and there was, therefore, not the slightest necessity for her being a sea-going vessel. The question then presented itself—how came we to build four vessels of that type? He did not agree at all with the adoption of the Cerberus type of vessels for the defence of our coasts; on the contrary, he held that for this purpose sea-going ships were necessary—that, in fact, the coasts of England could not be defended with vessels that could not go outside. The reason, however, why the vessels of this type were built was that the Franco-German War had broken out at the time, and the Government of the day seized upon a design from which they could build with the greatest rapidity. That was the real cause which determined the construction of the vessels in question; and, therefore, he hoped the Committee would understand, when they heard that these ships required alterations to make them seaworthy, that this was not the result of defective construction, but because they were to be adapted to an entirely new service, as compared with that for which they were originally designed. There were also one or two remarks that he desired to make with reference to the Inflexible. His hon. and gallant Friend opposite would remember that a few evenings ago his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Treasury was not well pleased at being accused of returning discourteous answers to questions put to him in the House. He (Sir Edward Reed) did not exactly know what a discourteous answer might be; but he could not regard it as a very courteous proceeding, when asked for information, to give no information at all. He had asked for information with regard to the Inflexible; and he wished to point out that if his hon. Friend had given certain Returns in consequence, he, or at any rate those behind him, had refrained from giving the information that he wanted. His question was a perfectly reasonable one—namely, What was the actual cost of the Inflexible as an engine of war when she sailed from Spithead? Now, a Return had been furnished which was headed, "Actual Cost of Hull and Stores of Her Majesty's Ship Inflexible;" and innocent-minded Members of that House, seeing the total of £809,594, might possibly consider that this sum represented the total cost of the vessel. But he was compelled to inform the Committee that it was not the whole cost of the Inflexible, inasmuch as it did not include the amount spent on her armament. He asked for this information with no sinister object whatever, nor for any private purpose, but simply for the purpose of enabling him to prepare that argument which, on a future occasion, he wished to place before the House in support of his contention, that it was impossible to carry on the Naval Service efficiently with the present inadequate expenditure. He said it was a most reasonable thing on the part of Members of that House that they should desire to know exactly what the Inflexible had cost the country; and although he had no wish to dwell upon the point more than was necessary, he would ask his hon. Friend to state on a future occasion what that total cost amounted to. He was not going into the whole case of the Inflexible on that occasion; but he wished to say a word or two with regard to the nature of the information which had been supplied, because he could not help feeling that the reason why hon. Members seemed to show somewhat small anxiety in connection with the Navy Estimates was that they were seldom furnished with information which they could thoroughly rely upon. They were in consequence liable to be snubbed if they founded any questions or arguments upon the information they received, and to play into the hands of the Admiralty, as it were, instead of doing any good. Now, the country had avowedly expended in the case of the Inflexible £809,594, in addition to the cost of an immense armament on a single engine of war; and yet the Return which had been furnished did not give so elementary a piece of information as the speed of the ship when fully equipped for sea. It said something about the speed she was intended or expected to have, and it gave the speed she-attained at Malta, where he understood there was no measured mile, although upon that point he was not quite positive. But then the Return went on to say, by implication, that she was not at her load draught at all, because they had been told on a former occasion that her draught was 25 feet 4 inches, whereas it was stated to have been 24 feet 4 inches when she was tried at Malta. As a matter of fact, the only information given in the Return with regard to the steaming powers of this most costly ship related the occasion of her steaming at Malta with something like 550 tons short of her proper allowance of weight. He was inclined to regard it as somewhat unreasonable to expect the House and the country to be contented with such uncertain and unsatisfactory information upon a subject in which so much interest was felt by all. He would like to know what sort of a position his right hon. Friend in charge of the Works Department would feel himself placed in if, after very nearly £1,000,000 had been spent in erecting a public building, he could not say what the total cost of the building amounted to? He ventured further to refer to this Return for the purpose of showing how much light it threw upon another serious question—namely, that relating to the charges which, at the present day, accumulated in connection with our ships—charges of a novel kind which a few years ago had no existence; and he mentioned this without the slightest idea of criticizing the action of the Board of Admiralty, but simply for the purpose of illustrating the difficulties which they had to encounter, and which each succeeding Board had to encounter in a higher degree. Amongst other novel items, there was, for instance, the unwonted charge of £48,000 for hydraulic machinery. If they could induce the Secretary to the Admiralty to give them all the information desired, and which they asked for without any sinister purpose, he thought they would be able, on a future occasion, to show the Admiralty that the time had come for a statesmanlike reconsideration of the whole question of the Naval affairs of the country. Things were proceeding, year after year, in a fashion that was eminently unsatisfactory, a circumstance that, he was sure, no one felt more keenly than the right hon. Gentleman opposite who had presided over the Admiralty Department. He did not wish to anticipate any argument which might he advanced by his right hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Sir John Hay), who was, of course, competent to deal with anything relating to the strength of the Navy; but he desired, in conclusion, to point to one fact, which, in his opinion, demonstrated the unsatisfactory state of our Naval administration at the present moment. With the exception of a few small vessels, they had never been able to get the Admiralty to build any small iron-clads at all. Now, in his opinion, it was most necessary that the country should possess a sufficient number of these useful vessels, the want of which placed us in a most unsatisfactory position; because when we sent a dozen large ships to bombard the fortifications at Alexandria, we did, as a matter of fact, subject almost the whole of our Navy to injury; whereas, if we had possessed, say, three times that number of small ships, they would have done the same amount of work at the cost of, probably, one-tenth of the injury which had been inflicted upon the others.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, he should endeavour not to travel over the same ground which had been covered so well by the right hon. Gentleman below him (Mr. W. H. Smith) and by the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed). There was, no doubt, a good deal to be said upon many subjects connected with the Vote before the Committee; but it was impossible, at that time of the Session, to enter fully into those subjects; and he should, therefore, condense what he had to say as much as possible. In the first place, his hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff had alluded with disapprobation to the term "obsolete," now common in the country as applied to some ships of the Navy. But he would remind the Committee that this phrase was officially introduced to the House last year by the Admiralty in connection with the classification of ships; and, therefore, he hoped he should not lay himself open to criticism if he adopted it in referring to some points which had been already touched upon. When his noble Friend the Member for Chichester (Lord Henry Lennox), some four months ago, discussed in that House the condition of the British Navy as compared with the Navies of other countries, hon. Members had before them very accurate information, which was accepted and confirmed by his right hon. Friend the late Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Trevelyan), with regard to the number of vessels we were building and the number of vessels that were being built in France, as well as with regard to the number of obsolete and non-obsolete ships in the Navies of the two countries. He heard now with the greatest regret that of the 13 armour-clads which were to be built two had disappeared. [Mr. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN dissented.] His hon. Friend in charge of the Estimate shook his head; but he spoke with reference to the new armoured ship that was to he built at Portsmouth and the new armoured ship that was to be built at Pembroke, and. for which certain sums of money had been taken.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he had not intended to convey the idea imputed by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman. A small sum of money was taken in the Estimates simply for the purpose of commencing the ships referred to, one of which was only to be laid down, while with the other very little progress was to be made. All he had said was that he was not prepared on the 1st of August to state precisely the types on which these vessels would be built.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, he quite accepted the explanation of his hon. Friend; but Christmas was coming, and the condition of the country was quite different now from what it was four months ago. One would have thought that the ships in question would have been expedited, instead of its being hardly decided what was the class of ships about to be built, especially at a time when, as they knew, the French were building 14 iron-clads as against our 13, or rather 11, as the number actually stood, after deducting the two vessels he had referred to. But it would be some time before these 11 vessels were available; and looking at the fact that by the year 1885, at the present rate of progress, our Navy would be by no means superior to the Navy of France, it was a matter for grave consideration for the Committee whether the Admiralty ought not to be urged, if necessary, to take an additional sum of money and to go forward rapidly with the building of ships, which were acknowledged now on both sides of the House, and were acknowledged four months ago in the then condition of the country, to be absolutely necessary for the national safety. With regard to the ships we had at present, it must be remembered that since the month of April two ships had to be dropped, because, whatever else might be said of the Black Prince and the Resistance, the House was informed that they were of the obsolete class, but available for public service. Moreover, the Return contained the suggestion, with regard to these vessels, that it was very doubtful whether they ought to be repaired. He remembered the same suggestion was made formerly with regard to seven other ships, which had since had their engines taken out; and he was afraid that the two ships in question would be found similarly unfit for repair, and that they must, therefore, be deducted from the list of British armour-clads. It was worth the while of the Committee to take stock of our ships; and, at the risk of adding what hon. Members might know by heart, he would like to read the names of the non-obsolete and obsolete ships, with a view to indicating some facts which he thought worthy of notice. We had the Alexandra, Audacious, Belleisle, Devastation, Dreadnought, Glatton, Hercules, Hotspur, Inflexible, Invincible, Iron Duke, Monarch, Nelson, Neptune, Northampton, Orion, Rupert, Shannon, Sultan, Superb, Swift-sure, Téméraire, Thunderer, and Triumph. That was 24 non-obsolete iron-clads; and of those, four—the Audacious, Rupert, Shannon, and Thunderer—were under repair, so that we had only 20 efficient non-obsolete British iron-clads. He was aware that the Lords of the Admiralty-included the Cyclops, Hydra, Gorgon, and Hecate as non-obsolete in reference to their armour; but these ships, one of which was about to have some superstructure put upon her, were not seagoing iron-clads; and he thought he was right in saying we had 24 iron-clads, of which 20 were efficient non-obsolete iron-clads; and of the obsolete, but efficient, ships, the Achilles, Agincourt, Bellerophon, Black Prince, Hector, Lord Warden, Minotaur, Northumberland, Penelope, Repulse, Resistance, Valiant, and Warrior. From these the Resistance and Black Prince must be deducted as doubtful; and the Bellerophon, which would not be repaired until March, 1883, if then. So that we had 11 obsolete efficient iron-clads, which, added to the 20 efficient non-obsolete, made 31 sea-going iron-clads of the Navy, and he believed that was all we could rely upon for sea-going purposes. It was true we had, in addition to the four he had mentioned and the non-obsolete list, six others—the Prince Albert, Scorpion, Viper, Vixen, Water-witch, and Wivern—which, neither from thickness of armour, nor heaviness of armament, nor from speed, could be regarded as sea-going vessels or fit for anything but harbour defence. That being so, how were we going to replace them? There were building the Agamemnon, Ajax, and Conqueror, which would be ready, perhaps, next year, the Rodney, Warspite, Colossus, Impérieuse, Collingwood, Edinburgh, and Howe, making 10, and the Benbow, and two other new ships, which would make 13 at present in the course of construction. When these were built the Navy of this country would only by two or three sea-going vessels be superior to that of France in the year 1885. Looking to the duties this country had to perform, that was entirely insufficient for the Navy of the greatest Naval Power. There would be of non-obsoletes—British 24, French 15; of obsoletes, British 14, French 18; for coast defence 10 of each; and building, French 14, and English, including the two to be built, 13—making a total, when all were completed, of 57 French, as against 61 English. If, however, the two ships, not as yet laid down, were included, practically the Navies were equal; and, taking coast defence ships, there were 36 in the English Navy and 33 in the French Navy; and generally we had on foreign stations about 11 ships, and France seldom had more than one, so that it was idle to suppose that we had sufficient defence for home waters. But there was another point more necessary to entertain. Of the ships building, only the Agamemnon and Ajax drew less than 24 feet 8 inches of water. That was the depth of the Suez Canal. He remembered urging, 10 years ago, when the Inflexible was thought of, that she should not, and it was decided that she should not, draw more than the depth of the Suez Canal; but a variety of changes had taken place, and now she could not go into Alexandria Harbour nor through the Suez Canal, where she might be useful. It was a curious matter that the French had a very much larger number of iron-clads which could pass through the Canal than we had. He would give a list, as far as he had been able to ascertain them, of the iron-clads which could pass through the Canal. Of the armour-clad sea-going ships in the British Navy, which could pass through the Canal, there were only the Ajax and Agamemnon, which were not yet built; the Glatton, Hotspur, Rupert, which was repairing; the Audacious, repairing; the Iron Duke, in China; Invincible, Nelson, in Australia; Orion, Northampton, Belle-isle, Penelope, and Shannon, which was repairing. Of these 14 ships six were building or repairing; and if they were required in the Indian Sea or the Red Sea, as the Iron Duke, which was in China, and the Nelson, which was in Australia, might be summoned, we should, therefore, have eight ships available for operations on both sides of the Red Sea. The French had of iron-clads, drawing less than 28 feet 8 inches, which could pass through the Canal, the Alma, Armide, Atalante, Jeanne d' Arc, LaGalis-sonniére, Montcalm, Reine Blanche, Thetis, Triomphante, Turenne, and Victorieuse—11 iron-clad sea-going ships. It was true that many of these were wooden ships; but they were all in commission at the present moment, or had recently been so, and three were ships which would have assisted at Alexandria had political arrangements allowed that to be possible. France had also seven sea-going ships for coast defence—Caïman, Fulminant, Firieux, Indomptable, Requin, Tempête, and Tonnerre, which could pass through the Canal, and were quite as good as our own Glatton, and more sea-going than the Cyclops class; they could steam 10 knots, and drew less than 24 feet of water. It was, therefore, quite on the cards that the French could pass 18 ships through the Canal. Supposing there to be any difficulty, and the British Fleet having pursued them to Port Said, they might slip through and proceed to the East Indies, we could only have eight ships available to follow them. Those 18 ships could go—he would not say to Bombay, where there were possibly sufficient means of defence; but they might go to Madras, and Colombo, and Kurrachee, and after burning those places return by the Canal and get safely back to Toulon. That was not the position we ought to occupy. We ought to have as many light-draught iron-clad ships as the other Powers, whom we hoped to be equal to in the event of hostilities. He had felt this very seriously for many years, and had urged in that House ad nauseam the necessity of building light-draught ships; and the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Peed) had also spoken in the same direction. He was sure that if the Committee and the country understood our present position they would enforce the necessity for strengthening our Naval defences in the way already suggested by the hon. Member for Cardiff. There was always a vague idea that the Navy cost a great deal of money. A few years ago a Conservative Government spent £12,500,000 on the Navy, and then economical statesmen came into Office and reduced that amount to £9,000,000. The amount gradually increased to £ 10,000,000; but, by the present Estimates, it appeared that last year the country had spent very much less on the Navy than ever before since the days of screw line-of-battle ships. If hon. Members who took an interest—he would not say in the safety of the country, for all of them did that, but in the Expenditure of the country, would look at Return 238, laid on the Table on the 26th May last, they would be astonished to find that whereas in 1860–1 the Estimates were £12,028,000, £10,735,000 was spent on the Effective Service of the Navy, and in that year the Non-Effective Service only cost £1,293,000, and although the total of the Estimates might have been diminished in each successive year, the Non-Effective Charge had increased until at this moment, or rather in 1881, of the total of the Navy Estimate, which was £10,115,000, only £8,055,000 was spent on the Effective Service, as against £10,735,000 some years before, and the Non-Effective Charge roseto£2,059,000. If hon. Members would look at the facts as they were, they would know that this charge was plainly increasing, and that all the materials for shipbuilding, the size and cost of artillery, and the cost of every single item in the ship itself, was increasing from day to day, and science compelled us to spend in rivalry with other nations what was of vital importance to us. They would be astonished to find that last year the Effective Charge was diminished from £10,735,000 20 years ago to £8,055,000 now. He was confident that if the country would look into this, and attend to what was said by his right hon. Friend below him (Mr. W. H. Smith) and by the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Peed), and others who understood its importance, and knew what was wanted, and. what it cost, and how the Naval Estimates were framed, and what became of the money, they would insist that the Effective Service should be increased until the ships which were promised in April should be decided upon in August, and until the number of vessels necessary for the service of the State to protect India and England were provided and able to go through the Suez Canal. This was a matter of vital importance to the country, and he hoped his hon. Friends would take it to heart, and insist on the Admiralty spending what was necessary for the defence of the country, and seeing that the Effective Charge was sufficient.

LORD HENRY LENNOX

said, his observations would be very much in an interrogatory form, and certainly devoid of all Party spirit, because he was sure, if the Government would only follow his advice that night, they would become the most popular Government that ever ruled in this country. He said that because that course would be the means of allaying the alarm which was justly felt and was increasing in this country, and if they would ask for money for a purpose which was never refused by any House of Commons, and never in the least cavilled at by any class of the constituencies—namely, the Navy. He quite agreed that the Committee was unfortunately placed as to the time and hour at which they had to discuss this very serious matter. An instance in point occurred earlier in the evening. There had been no opportunity of discussing these Votes. He had only interfered on one occasion; but, under the Forms of the House, even the courteous Secretary to the Admiralty was obliged to stop him from making the remarks he should have made on the previous occasion. He was afraid to intervene between the House and the Admiralty in regard to a Vote of Money; but he only mentioned this to show how inadvisable and wrong it was that subjects of this importance should be left to the month of August, when everybody was scrambling away after a laborious and tedious Session. He wished to thank all those who had spoken for the tone they had taken and views they had taken. In every one of those views he concurred, and he thought the Admiralty were to be congratulated on the fact that all who had criticized their conduct were agreed, and that, therefore, in pleasing one they would please all. He thanked his right hon. Friend the Member for Westminster (Mr. W. H. Smith) for calling attention to the failure of repairs for the year. The statement of his right hon. Friend was startling enough; but, in the hurry, he left out one of the most important facts in regard to his argument, and that was that the Thunderer, one of our best and most powerful iron-clads, was under repair at Malta, and was promised to be completed for sea in 1882–3; but, if he was not mistaken, she was nothing like completed, and he should be glad if the Secretary to the Admiralty would state at what stage of repair the Thunderer was now, and when she was likely to be available for the wants of the country, not only for the safety of our shores, but for the safety of the commerce which we monopolized all over the world. Proof that our Navy was insufficient, even for the defence of our Coasts, was given on another occasion in "another place," when the noble Lord, who stood very high in the Councils of the Admiralty, and presided over the Admiralty, rebuked another noble Lord because he had not taken into account the existence of the Reserve Squadron for the defence of our own shores. He should like to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty some questions as to that Reserve Squadron. So far as he could make out, that Squadron consisted of nine ships; but one of them, the Penelope, had been transferred to the Suez Canal, because she possessed a light draught of water. Of the eight remaining, every one was obsolete—and some were extremely obsolete—except the Hercules. What were these ships to which the noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) alluded as a source of security to us on our own shores? The Hector, the Defence, the Warrior, and Valiant were only coated with 4½-inch armour. The Warrior was a patriarch—the first ironclad ever built by the late Lord Hampton; and all the others, the Northumberland, the Minotaur, and the Agincourt had long been condemned as line-of-battle ships. The next point he wished to call special attention to was this—when he was serving at the Admiralty the Repulse and the Lord Warden were called into existence. They were old wooden ships plated with iron. He now came again to the interrogatory form in order to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether the rumour was true that the Lord Warden carried 18 guns, and of those eight were not allowed to be fired; and that on a recent occasion, one of those guns being fired during practice, instead of doing what it would be expected to do to an enemy, it carried away part of the ship's side? Further, he wished to ask whether the hon. Gentleman would inquire if that accident was due to the rotten condition of one of the ships to which the safety of England was intrusted—for these ships were intended for the defence of our Coasts? His next point referred to the Dreadnought and the Devastation class of ships. The Dreadnought and Devastation were, no doubt, very powerful ships, and were nearly ready for service; but, according to what had been heard lately, not much reliance could be placed in the Neptune. Then he wished to ask a question in respect to the Hotspur, and the condition of repair in which that vessel was? He understood that the Hotspur, having a light draught, was ordered into commission seven weeks ago, and that, in consequence of alterations required, she was not yet ready for sea. Supposing the Dreadnought, Devastation, Neptune, and Hotspur were ready for sea, it was necessary, before commissioning them, to have a certain number of seamen and Marines; and he wished to ask whether, if those ships were commissioned, they would have to be manned from the crews of the Reserve Squadron; whether there would be in the Dockyard sufficient seamen and Marines to man these four iron-clads? Another question he wished to ask was whether, with the exception of the obsolete Squadron, aided by one non-obsolete ship—the Hercules—we had any other defence for our own Coasts; and whether we had any ships at Malta, and any at Gibraltar? We were at present carrying on, if not a war, at all events hostile operations, against an Arab Chief; and he wished to know whether the Admiralty would consider this country safe if we were engaged in war against one of the Great Powers? Then there was another point with regard to this obsolete Squadron. The Warrior was thought good enough to take part with this Squadron in the defence of our Coasts; but she was the sister ship of the Black Prince, which was dropped out last year. Why was the Warrior not dropped out, they both having been built at the same time? He feared the hon. Gentleman would think him inquisitive; but he thought it better to ask these questions first, and then to make any statement he thought necessary. The hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed) had spoken of the Cyclops class of ships, and said they were built at a time of great hurry, when we were wanting ships built for a certain sum of money. No statement made by hon. or right hon. Gentlemen to-night so completely condemned that system as the statement that of our ironclad Navy, eight iron-clad ships had been built in the last 10 years or bought under panic. The panic of 1870 gave us the Hecate and Cyclops, which were only fit to go from one port to another in fine weather. The panic, when the Russians were looking into Constantinople, brought us four iron-clads—the Superb, Neptune, Orion, and Pallas. His theory was that in regard to ships, as in regard to other things, they must be made for us, and not bought ready-made, if we wanted them to be good. These ships, however, were bought ready made. If the Secretary to the Admiralty wished to build four ships, leaving the Superb out of the list would he build such ships as the Orion and the Pallas? If so, he would have to use great persuasive powers with the Naval authorities. He himself had every year urged the Admiralty not to promise building and repairing what they could not carry out; and on one occasion, when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) brought in his Budget, he told that right hon. Gentleman that if he carried out anything like what he promised he would be a conjuror. In March of the following year the right hon. Gentleman came down and said—"I am bound to admit that the noble Lord is right, for I am no conjuror." There was no wonder at that, because, as his right hon. Friend had said, the repairs had been allowed to sink to such a low ebb that there was no money for building. He wished to ask whether the Glatton was ever to be made use of again? She was in commission a few years ago, under the command of Lord John Hay. Finally, he must point out that he thought the Secretary to the Admiralty was a little too sanguine in suggesting that the ships, which were only to be advanced 51.8 and 53.4 by 1883, would he launched this year. He thought if the hon. Member would inquire he would find that unless a much more rapid progress was made than was indicated those ships would not be launched this year. Before sitting down he must make a public protest against the programme for the year sketched out by the Secretary to the Admiralty. The programme for iron-shipbuilding for the year, as announced to-night, was one of the most disappointing and perplexing statements ever made by a Government to a House of Commons. With Europe in such a state as at present it came to this. We were to have two ironclad ships built in the Dockyards when half the year was over; but no one knew what they were to be. There were to be two torpedo ships, experimental, and one iron-clad only, of which the details were not known. It appeared to him that this year would be only an experimental year during which certain experimental ships would be advanced to an infinitesimal degree, and in the present crisis he considered that most deplorable. He should very probably be considered an alarmist and a croker; but he was neither the one nor the other. When he saw how splendidly the Fleet, on a recent occasion, had behaved, and how well the officers and men had displayed endurance and cool- headed calmness in the midst of looting, robbery, and riot, which alone preserved order, he thought the Navy had an additional claim on the consideration of the House of Commons and on the national purse. He would conclude by asking the Secretary to the Admiralty to believe that, in the remarks he had made, he had no wish to hamper the hon. Gentleman in the duties he had so recently undertaken. He only wished to impress on the House of Commons once more—and he should go on pressing it unless things wore changed—that, with our vast trade and our immeasurable Colonies, our iron-clad Fleet was utterly insufficient for the work it had to do.

SIR THOMAS BRASSEY

Sir, as I have had no previous opportunity of speaking in the House with reference to the Estimates now under consideration, I hope I may claim the indulgence of the Committee for a few moments now. When these Estimates were in preparation urgent demands were made on the Government to largely diminish the Vote. It is impossible for those connected with the Administration to enter into detailed comparisons of the strength of the British Navy and its relation to the strength of Foreign Navies. I must, therefore, consider it to be sufficient for me to express my own individual opinion that before I joined the Board of Admiralty I had some misgivings as to the strength of the Fleet. It is my duty to say that, having had more ample opportunity of making myself acquainted with the facts of the case, I have arrived at the conclusion that we occupy a commanding position at the present time, and I consider that observation applies more especially to the strength of the British Navy in battle ships of recent typo. The earlier iron-clads, of which we have a large number in a certain condition, have been criticized with admirable knowledge of their structure by the noble Lord opposite (Lord Henry Lennox); but I am sure he will be prepared to admit that although they can no longer be regarded as battle ships, they are still capable of carrying powerful armaments, and of rendering effective protection to our commerce. To put my views into a narrow compass, I would say that on a calm and comprehensive survey of the whole circumstances of the case, we have not thought it our duty to propose any sudden augmentation of the Shipbuilding Vote; but I would claim for the present Board what I am sure will be conceded—that we have done our best to utilize the resources which have been placed at our disposal in pushing forward the construction of iron-clads in the present year. We have increased the wages in the Home Yards by £92,000, and we have made an addition to the Wages Vote, which was much approved by the noble Lord when it was introduced, of £9,000 for wages at Malta. We have made a corresponding addition to the Store Vote to provide materials to be worked up by those additional men; and I claim for the Admiralty that, avoiding changes of an organic character, and all cheese-paring and paltry economies, we have endeavoured to concentrate the resources placed at our disposal on those Services which contribute most directly to the Naval strength of the country; and it is by following with great pains in detail that policy that we have succeeded, with a comparatively small addition to the Estimates, in making a considerable addition to the armoured construction of the Navy. We have raised that construction from 7,427 tons in 1879–80 to 10,748 tons in 1881–2, and in the present year we have confidently reckoned an additional 721 tons, and I venture to say we have made this addition to the armoured construction of the Navy without doing injustice to other Services. The unarmoured construction has been satisfactorily maintained, and I contend that an adequate appropriation has been made to the repairs of the Navy. Of our effective iron-clads, all but seven are either in commission, complete, or completing for sea; and of those requiring large repairs the Bellerophon, Audacious, Rupert, and Shannon are in hand, and will be completed within the financial year. The Hotspur, with her existing armour, will be ready for sea in a short time. Then we have unaccounted for the Black Prince and the Resistance. The Thunderer is in hand, and will be completed at Malta. I must acknowledge that with regard to the Black Prince and the Resistance, we have shared the doubts of our Predecessors as to the expediency of incurring the very large expenditure which is necessary in order to send these ships to sea. Turning to the unarmoured class, I can confidently say we are well prepared to provide reliefs for the ships coming home, and we shall have ready for sea in the present year the Mercury, nine corvettes, four sloops, six gun-vessels, 11 gun-boats and one paddle, the Alecto. With regard to the armoured ships in reserve, or which can be completed within the year, we have six battle ships, three second-class battle ships, and seven special and coast service vessels. In addition to these, we have the Coastguard Squadron of eight ships. I quite admit that in the list of special and coast service vessels there are certain vessels which are not of the most powerful type; but they are all available for certain services. In addition to the ships I have named we have the first reserve ships. The noble Lord asks for ships in many places in which we are bound to admit we cannot provide an iron-clad; but I am sure the noble Lord and the right hon. Gentleman opposite will admit that iron-clads cannot be improvised, and that the present strength of the Navy is the result of the general policy of successive Administrations, and it is impossible to create at a moment a Fleet of powerful iron-clads of that costly type which has been already under discussion. It is not, therefore, a question affecting one Admiralty or another; but the Fleet as it at present exists is the result of the general policy of successive Administrations; and I claim for ourselves that we have done our best and have laboured not unsuccessfully, as I have said, to apply the resources which have been committed to our charge in an effective manner for the purpose of raising the strength of the Navy. In the last discussion which took place on the Navy Estimates, some complaints were made that there had been a depletion of stores. With regard to Naval stores for shipbuilding constituting the larger proportion of our stores, there has been a considerable increase under the present Administration. The payments for Naval stores, as proposed in the present Estimates, are £1,250,000. as against £965,000 in 1879–80. Turning from the proposed expenditure to the value of stores in hand, I will point out that the value of the stores has been fully maintained under the present Administration. It may be taken at £2,028,000 for 1882–3, against an average for 15 years—from 1867–7 to 1880–1—of £2,188,000. It is undesirable to increase the amount of Naval stores beyond the necessities of the case, for it must inevitably occur that a large proportion of stores, if kept long in charge, must become obsolete by lapse of time. Turning to the victual-ling stores, there has been a small reduction from £534,000 to £458,000; and that, I believe, is entirely due to the fact that, in order to make comparison with 1880–1, we had to deal with a time when there was an excess of stores beyond the average, in consequence of the accumulated purchases made under the Vote of Credit. With regard to expenditure on the purchase of victualling stores, the present Board has shown no disposition to cut down the amount. The amount asked for in 1882–3 is £485,000; the amount asked for in 1879–80 was £447,000. Having shown that the iron-clad construction has increased under the present Administration without a decrease of stores, and certainly without reckoning the repairs to the Fleet, I will venture to say that, with regard to the types of vessels, they are such as to command the approval of the House. Viewed as a whole, I would express a feeling of confidence that, ton for ton, the British Iron-clad Fleet will compare favourably with the Iron-clad Fleet of any other Naval Power; and I would venture to say that the high reputation of our British constructors has been worthily sustained in the most recent designs. I know that the time of the Committee is drawing short, and, therefore, I should not think of trespassing on the attention of Members for the purpose of discussing details of designs; and I am glad to notice that in the discussion which has taken place this evening there has been no disposition to challenge the skill of the professional Advisers to the Admiralty; but, perhaps, I may allude to one most important point in design, which has been more or less called in question. In the recent discussions which have taken place in public with reference to the construction of the British Navy, it has been alleged that British ships are inferior in point of speed; and, in pursuance of that, we have seen, not infrequently, the English Naval architecture of the last decade compared with some ship of later design. That is not a fair comparison, and if contemporary ships are selected, a very satisfactory result will be attained. Looking at the ships which are included in the programme now under consideration, we have four ships of the Collingwood type, which should be capable of 15 knots speed, and the two armoured cruisers would steam 16 knots; but with forced draught, which will, no doubt, be universally introduced into the British ships of the Collingwood type, the speed will be raised from 15 to 16½ knots, and the Colossus and Edinburgh from 14 to 15½ knots, and the cruisers from 16 to 17 knots. I do not wish to enter into more details of this character now. If I did, I think I could give a satisfactory statement to the Committee. But I would, in passing, urge, in connection with the discussion on the shipbuilding for the Navy, that we, as a great mercantile and shipowning nation, should not put out of view the enormous resources we possess in the private industry of the country. It is quite true, as I have said, that iron-clads cannot be improvised; but they ought to be attended—that is the view, I believe, of all the higher professional authorities—by numerous smaller vessels, such as those described by my hon. Friend in his interesting speech in moving this Vote. These auxiliary vessels, and even the light draught coast vessels can be produced with little delay by the private industry of the country upon an emergency. Comparisons are drawn between our Navy and those of other countries; and it is contended that our shipbuilding is not adequate; but I may point out that one of the main reasons why, with the generous appropriation made by Parliament to the Navy, we fail to produce what, looking at other countries, might be considered to be a proportionate amount of construction, is this—that it has been a necessary policy of this country to maintain a very large number of ships in commission. That policy has been forced upon us by the necessity for affording protection to our commerce; but incidentally it has produced this great advantage, that it has tended to give an unsurpassed efficiency to the personnel of the British Navy. It may be said that constant practice at sea is less necessary now than in former times, when reliance was mainly placed on vessels propelled by canvas; but I am sure my hon. Friends opposite will admit that steam has not simplified Naval tactics in modern days, and skill and courage are as necessary as ever, and those qualities which we require in sea officers and seamen can only be developed by that constant service at sea which is given in a much larger degree to the officers and men in the British Navy than to those who serve in other Fleets. I think that the timid people who are disturbed by the alleged decay of the Navy should calmly consider how immeasurably we surpass any other Power in the essential elements of Naval strength. The Navy, of course, must lead the van; but the largest force which could be provided by the liberality of Parliament in time of peace is, after all, only at the point of the spear, and the main strength of England, as a Naval Power, must always consist in the commerce and maritime enterprize of the country, and we are all proud to know that in these important elements of Naval power we were never so strong as we are to-day.

CAPTAIN PRICE

said, the hon. Gentleman had given the Committee a statement of the condition of the Navy. There were certain words which the hon. Gentleman used which contained the pith of this statement, and would, in fact, form a key to his argument. The hon. Member, speaking of the strength of the Navy, had said—"We occupy a commanding position at the present time." Well, his (Captain Price's) right hon. and gallant Friend who sat beside him, and his noble Friend who sat below him, had both addressed the Committee on the subject of the present strength of the Navy, and had contended that, compared with the Navies of other countries, Her Majesty's Navy was not what it should be. He quite agreed with this contention; but in discussing the matter they had always to face this difficulty—to separate the obsolete from the non-obsolete ships, and that invariably led to dispute, because hon. Members took opposite views of the subject. And there was another difficulty—namely, in comparing the present state of our Navy with that of other countries, we had to consider the duties our Navy had to perform. It might be said by his hon. Friends that England had much more extensive duties for Her Navy to perform, and, consequently, could not concentrate in her home waters such a Fleet as certain other Powers of Europe could do. That was perfectly true; but, as he had said before, the question led to a considerable amount of discussion, and, after all, what they had to consider to-night was, whether sufficient provision was being made for the future. The question was not so much whether our Navy of the present day was stronger than that of any other Power, but whether the Secretary to the Admiralty was asking them to-night to provide sufficient money to produce a Fleet which, when it was constructed, would be able to cope with the Fleets of other countries. It might be said that "'Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof'—do not let us talk about what our Fleet of 1885 is to be; we want to know what our Fleet of 1882 is." But what were they there to discuss? Estimates, not for the strengthening of the Navy in the present year, but in the future. They were at this moment especially engaged in considering Vote 6, which was a certain amount of money for the production of iron-clads, which could not be ready this year, very few of which could be ready next year, and the majority of which would not be ready before 1885 or 1886. While we were told we must not compare our Navy in detail with that of any other country, at least we might do it in a general way. They might speak of a great Power across the water as "another Power," and they might talk of the preparations there being made as preparations that were being made in "another place." He had put this before the House the other day—and, as it had not been contradicted, he wished to repeat it—that in 1885 or 1886 this other Power would have of iron-clad battle-ships of the most recent types, such as his hon. Friend had referred to—that was to say, the most powerful iron-clads, carrying the heaviest guns, the thickest armour, and possessing all the latest improvements—no less than 18, whilst England could not have more than 10. What did he call ships of the most recent types and of the heaviest and most improved class? It was always a difficult thing to make a classification of our Navy; but he thought he could do this—namely, take a broad line and separate these modern ships from all the rest of our Fleet. He would put in this first class all the ships capable of carrying the new type of guns, because not only had we made vast improvement in our ships, but we had made enormous improvement in our ordnance. He put into the first class ships capable of carrying the new type of guns—that was to say, breech-loading guns of 43 tons and upwards; and all vessels not capable of carrying those guns, and only capable of carrying guns of 38 tons or less, he put across the line into the second or third class. He would show that of such vessels a certain other Power, which he would not name, would, as he had said before, have no less than 18 ready in 1885 or 1886. When he said that these ships would be ready he meant that they were at the present moment building, that the money was voted for them, and that the Government was pledged to have them ready by the date he named. But there was another curious thing that would be observed in this classification—namely, that thickness of armour followed very much the same rule as the size of gun. In these first-class vessels that were intended to carry the heavy breech-loading guns they would find that they all—with, perhaps, one exception—had armour of no less thickness than 16 ½ inches. The vessels dropped, from that, in the second class, to armour of 14 inches thickness and less. He should like to enumerate the 18 vessels which this Foreign Power would have complete in 1885 or 1886; the list was not a long one, and he would read it, in case his statement should, at some future time, be contradicted. The vessels were the Formidable, Admiral Bandin, Terrible, Caïman, Requin, Indomptable, Admiral Duperré, Magenta, Neptune, Marceau, Hoche, Tounant, Vengeur, Foudroyant, and Dévastation. These vessels were either ready, building, or completing; but besides these there were three of the first class to be laid down this year. Now, what had we got on the other side of the same class of vessel? We had the Inflexible, Rodney, Howe, Majestic, Colossus, Conqueror, Collingwood, and the Benbow, and two others which were to be laid down this year—or, at any rate, they were in hopes that they would be laid down, and he would not make a point of throwing any doubt upon that. There were, then, three on each side to be laid down this year. Perhaps he might be asked why he had not put the Agamemnon and the Ajax into the first class of English ships. He had not done that because of the size of their guns. He knew they carried thicker armour than some of the iron-clads of the Foreign Power; but he had relegated them to the second class because of the size of their guns; but he had done the same thing with two ships of the Foreign Power. Unless he were contradicted tonight—and he did not think his facts were capable of contradiction—the Power of which he had been speaking would, in a very short time, as regarded iron-clads of the most recent type, be of almost double the strength of this country. There was another Mediterranean Power which would also have seven ships of a similar type, every one of which would be far superior to anything we had or would have in this country; so that if these two Foreign Powers were put together we should find that they had 25 ships of the first class against our 10. He did not know that he had said what he wanted to say quite so well as he should have liked to do; but he had put forward facts and figures which were of serious import. There was another point which had been slightly touched on to-night, upon which he desired to say a word. They were told the other night, on the introduction of the Navy Estimates, that there was a Reserve we could rely upon. The late Secretary to the Admiralty had told them that in time of war the example of the late Government in 1878 would undoubtedly be followed, and the iron-clads at this time building in the private yards of the country for Foreign Powers would be taken. It was said that in time of danger we could look upon such vessels as these as a Reserve. No doubt, so far as men were concerned, the Government knew how many they had to rely upon; but as to ships he would ask them whether, in case of emergency this year, they could lay their finger on a single iron-clad belonging to a Foreign Power that was building in the private yards of this country? Could he tell them that there was more than one ironclad of this kind that would be available for service next year? They ought to know this, because they had been told distinctly by the late Secretary to the Admiralty that this was a Reserve upon which we could lay our hands in an emergency. As far as he (Captain Price) was informed, there was not one foreign iron-clad building in the private yards of the country that would be ready this year, and, certainly, not more than one that would be ready next year. He would not occupy the time of the Committee any further. The discussion that night, he thought, had taken a practical turn, and some facts had been enunciated, which he and those who thought with him, at all events, thought had not yet been answered, and which, they were afraid, could not be altogether satisfactorily answered by the Secretary to the Admiralty.

SIR MASSEY LOPES

said, he had listened with great care and attention to the speech of his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty; and he was bound to say there were two matters on which the hon. Baronet (Sir Thomas Brassey) did not give them satisfaction. The first was the point raised by the late First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. W. H. Smith) that the repairs to the ships had not been completed within the time during which it was understood they would be completed; and then there was the statement that the Estimates were not sufficient to maintain our Navy efficiently. Now, he wished to give every possible credit to the present Board of Admiralty for having honestly discharged their important duties, and for having expended the money granted to them in the best possible way. He made no charge on that head; but he certainly did coincide and sympathize with what had been said this evening—namely, that the Navy Estimates which they had before them, and which, he would say, they had had some years before them, were not sufficient for maintaining the Naval supremacy of this country. He asserted that unhesitatingly, and with some sense of responsibility. For some years he had periodically examined the Estimates, and he was bound to say he had failed to find a purpose on which money could be more efficiently and more economcally expended than on this. Deducting the non-effective and transport items, there only remained £8,291,000 to be spent on the Navy. An hon. Friend of his had called for a Return at the beginning of the Session; and in that it would be found that, notwithstanding the costly improvements which had taken place of late years in the Navy, we were spending less money on the effective part of the Service than we were 20 years ago. He found from a Return of the expenditure in 1860–1 £12,029,000 was voted; in 1870–1, £9,670,000—less by £2,359,000 than the amount spent 10 years before. When they came to 1880–1 they found they were spending £1,914,000 less than they did in 1860–1. And yet he need not remind the Committee that within the period named we had had considerable expenditure of a novel kind to bear—expenditure on torpedoes, the electric light, and other things newly introduced into the Service. The cost of our Navy, therefore, was rapidly increasing, more particularly in ships, because whilst, in 1860–1, a first-class ship only cost £400,000 or £450,000, now-a-days vessels like the Inflexible cost £800,000. It was impossible for us, with our limited means, to build an adequate quantity of tonnage armoured or unarmoured, and, at the same time, attend properly to our repairs. That, he maintained, was not a satisfactory state of things. Then the question of the construction of ships had been raised. It was, as the Committee knew, impossible now-a-days to construct an iron-clad under three or four years. The length of time required in the construction of ships was increasing year by year, and the cost in machinery and everything connected with them was rapidly increasing. The changes which had occurred in the Navy had been most disadvantageous; he did not mean to say that our bluejackets had at all degenerated; but he maintained that our seamanship, good as it was, was not so valuable to us as it was years ago, and we now had to depend more on our ships and machinery than on the physique, skill, and courage of our crews. Many comparisons had been drawn between our Navy and those of other nations, and it would be unwise for us to live in a fool's paradise. It was better for us to know how we stood, and to let the country know how we stood. If the country were made acquainted with the true condition of our Navy, as compared with the Navies of other Powers, there would be no difficulty in getting any amount of money that was wanted to properly strengthen and equip Her Majesty's Fleets. By the year 1885, if we continued as we were doing now, and France continued to do as she was doing, our Navy would not be so strong as that of France. He quite admitted that at present our Navy was as efficient as ever it was; but he would put it to the Committee whether it was relatively so strong, compared with the Navies of other nations, as it was some years ago? Certainly not. That, then, was the difficulty they had to contend with. Look at the duties our Navy had to perform compared with the duties of Foreign Navies. There was, in the first place, our commerce; then there was our Indian Empire, our long line of shore, and last, but by no means least, our daily bread to be protected; therefore, to compare the duties of our Navy with those of the Navies of other countries would be most fallacious. Could we oppose France with anything like an equal Fleet in the Channel or Mediterranean if we were obliged to look upon her as a foe? Certainly not. No one would deprecate more than he a Party or political manner of dealing with Naval expenditure; but he thought that not only the House, but the country, would respond to any call made for an increased expenditure on the Navy. He believed there was no sum they would refuse, provided they knew that it would be properly, judiciously, and economically expended. He was sure, so far as the House was concerned, that they would all be unanimous in doing everything they could to help the Board of Admiralty in maintaining our Naval supremacy. Our supremacy on the sea was our heritage. He hoped we should not rely too much upon our former prestige, for that might fail us, and that we should not lull ourselves into a false security, adopting a fatal parsimonious policy.

ADMIRAL EGERTON

said, the Committee would be much more inclined to vote money for the Navy, if the Naval Advisers of Her Majesty could decide on the type of ship to build, for, as the right hon. Gentleman the late First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. W. H. Smith) had pointed out, there was nothing upon which the Navy now-a-days so much depended as the type of ship and the nature of the guns provided. As all Naval men knew, the Navy depended as much upon the description of armour and the quantity as on the fitting out of the ships. If the type could be decided, much of the time at present lost in the construction of iron-clads would be saved. Everyone knew that in the building of iron ships there was great delay, which was never experienced in the old days in connection with wooden vessels. Once they had decided upon their model, they could proceed rapidly. Everything now turned on the question of expense. Even that vessel which the right hon. Gentleman had alluded to in the course of his speech, the Polyphemus, which had been built just as an experiment, with its armament, cost altogether £250,000. It was only right and natural, when they came to such an expense as that, that Parliament should be chary of giving money in this way. As this discussion had shown, however, the tendency in the future would not be to decrease the supplies for the Navy; and he hoped that if hon. Gentlemen opposite came into Office again, they would remember the opinions they had expressed on the present occasion, and would give them a much larger sum in the Estimate than they had at present. He knew there were different opinions expressed by the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed) and others as to the class of ships which the Government were now building. Some 10 or 12 years ago the class of ship best represented by the Dreadnought was very much deprecated by hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House, who had considerable knowledge of what they were talking about; but, as far as his (Admiral Egerton's) own opinion went—and it was, perhaps, not worth so much now-a-days—the Dreadnought had proved to be about the very best class of vessel we had. It was not a very pleasant thing for an old sailor to see ships built without masts; but he thought the Admiralty should turn their eyes to them, and the more they had the better it would be for the Service.

MR. PULESTON

said, they had had a very interesting discussion—these subjects always were interesting—and the result had been to bring forth a consensus of opinion to the effect that more money should be expended on the Navy, and expended more judiciously. While he concurred in many of the remarks of the hon. Baronet who had spoken a short time ago, and while he believed that many of those remarks were borne out by the facts, there were several other matters under the Vote which should be considered—matters of minor consequence, but still of great importance in regard to the management of the Navy. He hoped that what he had tried to urge on the House and the Board of Admiralty, on more than one occasion, would be now very seriously taken into consideration—namely, that a Departmental Committee should be appointed to inquire into, not only all the grievances, but all the subjects connected with the Dockyards, which were constantly creating a great deal of dissatisfaction by the inequalities which were prevailing, and which most of them believed most unjustly prevailed. He thought that if the Admiralty were to appoint a Committee to make a searching investigation into the circumstances of Dockyard administration, the result would not be to take more from the Exchequer, but to give general satisfaction to all parties concerned in the Dockyards. It would be a very simple matter to institute this inquiry, and he was sure it would be worth while making the experiment. Hitherto the grievances of the Dockyard people had been dealt with piecemeal, and the result of the piecemeal examination and discussion had been to create greater difficulties by making wider differences between the persons employed in the Dockyards. They had heard, both in the House and out of it, of the differences between the fitters and the shipwrights. The duties of these two important bodies had been clashing, and the pay of the one had been thought inconsistent with that of the other. A Committee such as he proposed would, no doubt, be efficacious in discovering a method of doing away with the differences and distinctions of which he spoke. Memorials had been constantly sent to the Admiralty, but they had proved of no purpose. He had tried to impress this on the Admiralty for some time, but without effect. The matter was a simple one, and he was sure he had suggested to Her Majesty's Government a remedy whith would be very acceptable to them, as to all parties concerned. He might refer also to the case of the mechanic writers, now called Dockyard writers. The new scheme which had been adopted, instead of benefiting this important class, had created still more dissatisfaction, because of the wider difference which had been made between that class and others. And so, again, in the case of the hired men—and he must call attention to this question, because he thought there was no question in the Dockyard which was more worthy of consideration. The hired men sought to be placed in a more equal position to the established men. Why, he would ask, should there be such a discrepancy between the two? After 20 years' service the hired man received a bonus of £36; whereas the established man, after 20 years' service, had an annuity of nearly that amount—namely, £29 10s., or a bonus of between £400 and £500, as against £36 in the case of the hired man. He could quite understand that there was a distinction between the two classes; but such a distinction as this, taking all the duties into consideration, ought not to exist. The disadvantage under which these old servants laboured was this—they were too old to be placed on the Establishment, and were discharged at an age when they could not find other employment. Something should be done to improve the position of these men. They devoted the whole of their time to the Service, as did the established men; and he (Mr. Puleston) did not know why they should be turned out, when too old for service, with only the miserable gratuity of £36, whilst the established men were receiving an annuity almost equal to the whole of that bonus. This discrepancy was too great—it was unjust—and he did not think the Admiralty could expect the Naval Service of the country to Be conducted as efficiently as it ought to be, whilst those who discharged the duties of their position quite as well as men employed in private yards, whether in the Merchant Service or otherwise, were treated in this manner. Difficulty had been more than once experienced in times of great emergency in getting a sufficient number of men, for the reason that the only inducement to men to enter the service of the Government was the expectation of being looked after in old age. This expectation, after the men had taken service on the Establishment in the Government Dockyards, induced them to resist the allurements of higher wages held out to them. The Government would find in the future, as they had found in the past, that if they did not give the men proper positions they would lose them when better positions were offered them elsewhere. The question as to the shipwrights, again, was an important one. The established shipwright got 5s. a-day, whereas the established boiler-maker, pattern-maker, and coppersmith had 5s. 6d. and 6s. Why should there be such a discrepancy? The shipwrights employed as draftsmen got extra pay when so employed, and they claimed to have the same hours as the draftsmen. The Memorials sent to the Admiralty rarely had any attention paid to them. When the Chief Commissioner of Works was Secretary to the Admiralty two years ago, he announced to the House that all the men in the various classes in the Dockyards would have an opportunity afforded them, on the annual visit of the Lords of the Admiralty, to mention their grievances to their Lordships. Well, that had the effect of satisfying the men, and the Department was not troubled with Petitions or Memorials after that. He (Mr. Puleston), for instance, told his constituents that the word of the Secretary to the Admiralty was quite sufficient, and that they must not ask him (Mr. Puleston) to do anything further for them in the matter, otherwise they were liable to be hauled over the coals for using undue political influence, or something of that sort. When the Lords of the Admiralty went down to Devonport his constituents were told that they could have no communication with their Lordships, which was in direct contravention of the understanding which had been come to in the House of Commons. The men were naturally dissatisfied—any body of men would have been dissatisfied at such treatment. Their request, made in a most humble and respectful way, having been refused, the expedient was resorted to of asking the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty to receive a deputation of Members of the House; but an answer was received—not by him (Mr. Puleston), but by an hon. Member sittting on the Ministerial side of the House—couched in the most curt language, beginning—"Sir, I decline to receive the deputation to which you refer," consisting entirely of Members of the House of Commons. What was the position of the men, after having been promised an opportunity of pouring forth their grievances to the Lords of the Admiralty on their annual visit? They were refused that opportunity. They then took up one or two cases that they thought specially deserving representation to their Lordships, because they were cases which had been particularly referred to in the Report previously made by the Admiralty—without going so far as to ask on the part of the engineers for so much as was recommended in that Report signed by the gallant Gentleman the First Sea Lord—and memorialized the Board. But that Memorial was not noticed. Their Memorials were not replied to; the men were not allowed to have an audience of the Lords of the Admiralty; and a deputation of hon. Members were curtly refused an interview with the First Lord of the Admiralty. He confessed he had not even had the honour of seeing the First Lord of the Admiralty; and certainly, after what had passed, he should never again suggest, or dream of venturing to ask that functionary to grant him an interview, although hitherto, not merely in the interests of his constituents, but, as it seemed to him, in the interests of the nation, he had been in the habit of making representations to the First Lord. He should, for the future, feel himself barred from intruding on the First Lord of the Admiralty. After the very pleasant and successful administration of the Secretary to the Admiralty, he hoped the hon. Member would allow him to impress on him this one fact—that a great deal of good to the Service would result from the appointment of such a Departmental Admiralty Committee or Commission as the Lords of the Admiralty might select to inquire into questions connected with Dockyard management, and take into consideration some of the many suggestions—such as those he hadjustmade—and the numerous Memorials which had been brought before the notice of the Admiralty. In this way it would be found that the grievances of the men could be removed much more easily than it was supposed they could, and, after all, at very little or no extra cost to the Treasury; for the question was one rather of adjustment than anything else. They all knew that if a man worked by the side of another who was discharging similar duties, working fewer hours, though belonging to the same class, and receiving 6d. or 1s. a-day more pay, he naturally felt unhappy and dissatisfied, and asked—"Why am I not put on the same footing as this man?" If a man had to do the same work as another, but received less pay for it, and worked longer hours, he naturally became dissatisfied, and the Service of the country suffered. Since the science of shipbuilding had made such rapid strides, shipbuilding trades, which were of comparatively little importance a few years ago, now had become of the first consequence, although the position of the men employed in those trades had not changed. It was therefore necessary, he contended, that there should be a re-organization of the Dockyard Service. He could not impress this too strongly upon the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty; and, altogether, he thought the Government would see that he was only asking of them that in which it was in their power at once to acquiesce.

MR. GORST

said, he was much obliged, and he thought the Committee should be much obliged, to the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Puleston) for his courage in venturing, at nearly 12 o'clock at night on the 1st of August, to introduce in Committee of Supply so great a question as that of the re-organization of the Dockyards. There really was something extremely wrong in the way the Business of the Government was managed in the House, because it was impossible at this period of the Session, when everybody was anxious to hurry over the Estimates as fast as they possibly could, that a subject of this kind could have justice done to it. He confessed that if it had not been for his hon. Friend (Mr. Puleston) he should not have been disposed to rise and protest against the conduct of the Government in putting this Vote down at this period of the Session, when the subject of the Dockyards could not be properly discussed. What his hon. Friend had said about the refusal of the First Lord to receive a deputation of Members of Parliament was an illustration of the inconveniences that arose from the First Lord being a Member of the House of Peers. He (Mr. Gorst) was of opinion, and many others agreed with him on economical grounds, that it was most absurd that the head of one of the great spending Departments of the State was not a Member of the popular House of Parliament. If they had a First Lord of the Admiralty in the House of Commons they would not have had to solicit, in the humble, suppliant manner they had been obliged to adopt, permission to come before him at the Office of the Admiralty, in order to tell him what their constituents desired, and they would not have had the curt rebuff which was received when certain Members of the House of Commons intimated that they desired an interview with the noble Lord, and were told that he could not allow them to see him or address him. If the First Lord were a Member of the House of Commons, if he did not desire to see a deputation, they could see him on the floor of the House, and tell him what they thought it to the interest of the Service that he should know. When the First Lord was so far removed from them, when he was in such a high sphere above them, they had no means of approaching him. But, at the same time, they would be guilty of ingratitude if they did not acknowledge that the Secretary, who represented the Admiralty in that House, was remarkable for the courtesy and consideration with which he invariably received every suggestion with regard to the Public Service. He did not wish to pay any unnecessary compliment, and he said this not only to the present Representative of the Admiralty in the House of Commons, but to both his Predecessors, who had shown every possible consideration to Members of that House. He should recommend the Government to adopt some plan or other for making the condition of the Dockyards the subject of independent inquiry. He was not so sanguine as to hope that the Government could be prevailed upon in Committee of Supply to agree to such a course. No doubt next year, just the same as now, the Dockyard Vote would come on for consideration some time in the month of August. He did not believe the Government, whatever good intention they might have, would be able, owing to pressure of Business, to do more than had been done in the past—namely, bring on the Vote some time in August. But it seemed to him that the suggestion of the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Puleston) was a valuable one, which might be adopted by the Government in the meantime—namely, to institute an inquiry into the whole of the organization of labour in the Dockyards, because there was no reason why the Dockyards should be as full of anomalies as they were. It was impossible to enter into detail with regard to these anomalies at this period of the Session; but, speaking generally, he might point out that anomalies, such as men being rated in one class and em- ployed in another—for instance, a man being rated as a hammer-man and employed as a smith—were common in the Dockyards. And it was found, as matters were now managed, almost impossible to redress one set of grievances without giving rise to a fresh crop. It was desirable that the thing should be arranged as a whole, and that the labour should be so laid out and remunerated that the various classes of workmen would be content. There was none of this discontent in the private yards. If inquiries were made on the Tyne and on the Clyde, it would be found that there were not the same number of grievances as there were amongst the men in the Royal Dockyards. There was, to begin with, the great anomaly between the established and the hired men. Originally, the hired men were introduced on probation, and had to remain in that category one or two years, until they had satisfied the authorities that they were steady and industrious, and fit to be put on the Establishment. But men now remained on the hired list for 20 years, and there had come to be two classes of workmen—the hired men and the established men. There was no distinction to be drawn between the men. Many of the hired men had been just as long in the Service, and were just as good workmen and just as much attached to the duties of the position as the established men; but they were in the anomalous position of having no superannuation—nothing but a gratuity, which was given to them as a kind of alms, and depended on the will of the Treasury for the time being. Then the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Puleston) had referred to the position of the established shipwrights. It would be absolutely necessary, sooner or later, to take into consideration the condition of these men. The efficiency of the shipbuilding and repairing in the Dockyards depended upon the skill of the established shipwrights, who had been treated by the Government in the most cavalier fashion. Formerly these men were what their name indicated—they were men who worked in wood and built wooden ships. When iron shipbuilding started, however, these wooden shipbuilders transformed themselves into iron shipbuilders—they learnt a new trade, and now worked almost exclusively in iron or steel. This iron shipbuilding was much less healthy than wooden shipbuilding; and the steel building, which was now coming most into vogue, was a trade that, in the open market, commanded a much higher price than any other kind of shipbuilding. It commanded a higher price, because it required more skill and more endurance, was less healthy, and required far more outlay on clothes and tools than wooden shipbuilding. In the open market the men who, in the private yards, did the same work that established shipwrights did in the Royal Dockyards, got far higher wages. He had made inquiries last year, both on the Tyne and the Clyde, as to how the shipbuilding trade was going on, and he had learned that all the yards were in full work; that they were looking out for men; and that men were being tempted by the higher wages given. The only advantage the men in the Royal Dockyards had was the deferred pay and superannuations; and that surely was not a satisfactory state of things. The Government were not dealing fairly with these men, who had learnt a new trade, and were now doing work worth far more money than the work they originally undertook in the days of wooden shipbuilding. He knew why the claim of these men had been put off from time to time. It was not because it was not a strong claim, but because, the number of shipwrights being considerable, any increase in the scale of pay would increase the Navy Estimates, and cause a demand—not anything like the demands they were accustomed to deal with, but still a substantial demand on the National Exchequer. The Government, therefore, went on year after year refusing to deal with the question, leaving the men with the same pay that they had 20 years ago. It was a fact, he thought, that for the past 20 years the pay of the established shipwrights had not been raised, and that notwithstanding that the work they did 20 years ago was far easier than that they actually performed now. That was not the way in which a Service upon which the well-being of the country depended ought to be treated by a Liberal Government. The Government would have to take the claims of this class into their serious consideration before long he was sure; and whether the First Lord of the Admiralty preferred to listen to the case from Members of the House of Commons, or to read it in the newspapers, it was clear that he would have to give his attention to it, and that something would have to be done. He (Mr. Gorst) was obliged to the Committee for allowing him to run on at this length on the matter. He hoped that another Session they would have an opportunity of bringing such questions on at a time when the House was fresher, and better able to listen to speeches on such subjects of detail; but he could assure the Committee now that he only spoke from a sense of duty, and because he was sure that the matter would have to be dealt with sooner or later.

MR. BROADHURST

said, he was glad the condition of things in our Dockyards had been brought under the notice of the Committee, for it was true, as the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) had stated, that a large number of anomalies there existed. He was of opinion that a Committee would be altogether unable to grapple with the anomalies. Of course, he had seen very little of the Dockyards; but so far as he had been permitted to see into them he was convinced that no good could be done until there was a thorough investigation—an investigation that could only be conducted by an independent Commission. A Departmental Committee would not give satisfaction. If the Government would get together a Commission composed of men fitted for the task, and charged with full powers to go thoroughly into the question of the working of the Dockyards, to visit all the Yards, to take the evidence necessary to be taken on the spot, to take their own time, and to present a thorough and complete Report to that House, the means would be discovered whereby an important work might be done not only better than at present, but at a far less cost; hundreds of thousands of pounds would be saved to the country. He was convinced that much larger sums than he dare mention could be saved by proper management—by a thorough reorganization of the system observed in the working of the Dockyards, and by putting men to do the work for which they had been trained all their lives. The hon. and learned Member for Chatham had to-night imported into his remarks some controversial matter. He regretted that the hon. and learned Gentleman should have done so; but it was a matter upon which they were very much inclined to dispute with him. What he (Mr. Broadhurst) would like would be that the Commission should thoroughly settle what was a shipwright's work and what were shipwrights. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chatham had told the Committee to-night that there was a class of men called shipwrights, who now formed the backbone of our Dockyards, and that these were the men who originally worked in wood, but who were now transformed into workers in steel and iron. That they worked in steel and iron was perfectly true; but he was sure the hon. and learned Gentleman did not intend to lead the Committee astray, though the effect of his remarks was to do so. The fact of the matter was that the Dockyards were to-day alive with properly-trained iron workers, the very class of men who were to be found on the Tyne and Clyde, and who were called our shipbuilders. These men were in the Dockyards by thousands. The shipwrights were a distinct body, and their work was as different from that of the iron shipbuilders as it could possibly be. What was wanted was an inquiry that would thoroughly exhaust all the anomalies existing in the Dockyards. The difference existing between the established men and the hired men was one that was not reasonable or just to the men concerned. This was a matter which could never be disposed of by a Vote in Committee in that House; indeed, there was only one efficient way of dealing with the question. It was not by a Select Committee. A Departmental Committee would be equally weak and ineffective. There would be red-tapeism and officialism in another form, and the Members of the Committee would go into the matter with pre-conceived ideas, and with the object of maintaining things to a great extent as they were now. What was wanted was a thorough overhauling of the whole system of extravagance, of abuse, of waste, and of inefficiency with which our Dockyards bristled from the gate to the furthermost part. He had seen, untrained as his eyes were in Dockyard matters, such a condition of things in the Royal Dockyards that would ruin any half-dozen of the largest firms of shipbuilders on the banks of the Clyde if carried on in their yards for three months. He did not want to say that the work done in our Dockyards was altogether unsatisfactory; but it could be said with truth there was a very great deal of unsatisfactory work. There were a great many weak points; there was a great deal of inefficient workmanship in our iron-clads. That workmanship ought to be above suspicion; it ought to be the very best that skill could produce; but it was not, simply because the Dockyards were the centres of disorganization and anomalies of the most alarming description. He could not expect that the Secretary to the Admiralty would to-night say he would appoint a Commission to inquire into the system of working the Dockyards. There was a great necessity for inquiry, and he hoped that as soon as the hon. Gentleman got clear of his foreign engagements he would turn his attention to this subject, and order such an inquiry to be made as would do justice to the nation, and to the men employed in the Dockyards.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he was afraid he must, for the moment, leave the question of the Dockyard artizans, and deal with the speeches which occupied the Committee at the early period of the evening. His right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. W. H. Smith) began by saying something with which he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) was entirely in harmony. The right hon. Gentleman expressed regret that this Vote should be taken at so late a period of the Session. He need hardly say he shared that regret. The right hon. Gentleman, moreover, had said that the Admiralty would be able to alter or to modify their suggestions and their proposals according to the suggestions made in that House; that, at any rate, they had the advantage of the suggestions thrown out in debate in considering their own proposals. He (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) confessed he was present tonight, in his own estimation of his position, rather to learn something from the right hon. Gentleman and others who had addressed the Committee, than to give any instruction or information to the Committee, although that, of course, was part of his duty. It was most instructive to those who were concerned in the administration of the Navy to listen to such speeches as they had heard tonight. Many things had been said which it would be well if the Admiralty took to heart; but, at the same time, a great deal had been said with which he did not altogether agree. His right hon. Friend (Mr. W. H. Smith) pointed out the great loss and inconvenience and waste caused by delay in completing ships. He was entirely at one with his right hon. Friend in that respect. He could conceive nothing more wasteful than that any ship should be delayed longer than was absolutely necessary, because, as the right hon. Gentleman showed, once they had commenced spending money on a ship, the money they had expended was absolutely ineffectual, or unremunerative, until the ship was ready to go to sea. There was every necessity for the greatest urgency in the completion of ships. It was well known that in the course of the time which was occupied in the construction of a ship new discoveries were made, new ideas occurred to the builders, and all these were the cause of endless expense. On every ground he was quite convinced—and he was sure his hon. Colleague (Sir Thomas Brassey) agreed with him—that the one great object to be aimed at was the completion of the work they took in hand as rapidly as possible. While saying this he was free to admit that the principle was not carried out so far as could be wished. As the right hon. Gentleman knew, there were many difficulties in the way. It was, in fact, the last work about the ship which was the most difficult. All the fittings connected with the gunnery and torpedo arrangements, and everything of that sort, were of a very procrastinating nature. In many cases much of the delay that had been experienced in getting ships ready had been due to a change of armament being decided upon at the last moment. These changes were almost unavoidable, and he merely mentioned them because they were a great source of delay. The right hon. Gentleman pointed out that although the Votes had gone up nearly £280,000, and, therefore, there was no stint of money on the part of the House of Commons, we had not got that complete and satisfactory position that we were entitled to hold in regard to Naval matters. He quite agreed with many speakers as to the willingness of the country to grant very large sums of money for the support of the Navy. But, at the same time, it must not be forgotten that there were other claims on the country, and that it was the duty of all to see that they did not unnecessarily, or in too great a degree, yield even to the natural and patriotic desire those who administered the Navy might have to increase its efficiency. With the increase of money which they had received at the hands of the House of Commons it could not be said they had done nothing. In the first place, that dreadful dead weight of the non-effective portion of the Estimates went on by leaps and bounds; it increased at the rate of £40,000, £50,000, and £60,000 a-year. It was all very well for hon. Members to denounce that dead weight, and to say that it was almost a scandal that it should take up so much of the money voted for the Navy. A great part of it consisted of pensions which had been granted by former generations, by former Boards of Admiralty, and that was a debt which they could not get rid of. It must be borne in mind that by the system of pensions, however people might object to it, the present taxpayers were relieved of a certain burden in the shape of the wages they would otherwise have had to pay. If anything could be done with perfect justice to individuals and to classes to diminish the rate of pensions a great service would be done to the Navy. But the Admiralty had not only had to deal with this increase of dead weight; they had spent an increased amount upon shipbuilding. If the Committee took into account the three years during which the present Board of Admiralty had held Office, and compared them with the previous three years, they would find that no less than 10,000 tons were constructed in the latter period more than in the former three years, or, practically, the size of a large iron-clad. If they took into account the unarmoured ships the result was about the same; therefore, something had been done with the money voted by the House. This was sufficient to show that the present Board of Admiralty had not neglected the duties devolving upon it. Hon. Members might think the Admiralty ought to have done more; but, at all events, they had kept well in advance of what was considered necessary in former times. His right hon. Friend (Mr. W. H. Smith) made a great point of the Admiralty being behind, as he thought, with their repairs, and he had said that many ships were mentioned in the programme for repairs which were not completed in the year in which they were promised. The Audacious would be finished in a few weeks; the Rupert would be finished within the present financial year. The Bellerophon was promised to be finished as a gunnery instruction ship, available for general service; but if she were not completed within the present financial year, it would be because, for the purposes of a gunnery instruction sea-going ship, she would require to have armaments of a new type given to her. So far as the repairs to the ship herself were concerned, she would be ready. As to the Shannon, it was understood a short time ago that she would be finished; but he could not speak positively. The Thunderer, as to which the noble Lord (Lord Henry Lennox) asked, was to have been finished this year; but it had been discovered that more had to be done to her than was expected. There was a point with regard to her turrets which would cause delay. However carefully a programme of repairs might be considered, it was always liable to be altered. Ships were named in a programme to be completed within a year, or to be finished at a certain date; but in the very act of repairing them it was often discovered they required more than it was expected they would, or changes were proposed of a very serious character, or our Naval Advisers desired to have one ship finished before another, though that other might have been named in the programme. For these reasons it was almost impossible, as his right hon. Friend knew, to carry out precisely any programme of repairs. To show that it was not peculiar to the present Administration to name vessels for completion in their programme which were not completed, he was obliged to quote, not with any idea of finding fault, what was done during one or two years of the late Administration. His right hon. Friend had—and he thanked him for it—avoided infusing the least Party spirit into the remarks he had made, and he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) was the last man in the world to do so. He simply intended to show that, strongly as his right hon. Friend felt on the subject, he himself, when he was at the Admiralty, was unable to do that which he found fault with the present Board of Admi- ralty for not doing. In 1877–8 there were six iron-clads promised in the programme and not completed in the year. One was promised to be completed, but it was not taken in hand. Eight screw frigates and corvettes were promised to be completed; one was not taken in hand, two were not completed, two were completed early in the next year, and three much later. In the next year three vessels were promised and completed; but four others were promised and not completed, and one was not taken in hand. In the next year two—the Audacious and the Wivern—were promised and completed; but the Sultan and two others which were promised were not completed. He attached no blame at all; on the contrary, he was rather glad to find that the right hon. Gentleman was subject to the infirmities of other people, and that, even in his day, such things occurred as now. It was only natural and proper that delay should occur, because, as he had said, two things happened in the course of the repairing of ships—it was found they required more repairs than it was at first expected, or it was found that the armaments required changing. He could give the right hon. Gentleman the unqualified assurance that the Admiralty would do all they could to complete within the year the four iron-clads promised. His right hon. Friend had asked about the Black Prince and the Resistance. These were ships about which there had been much consideration by successive Boards of Admiralty, and nothing had been fixed. He understood the Black Prince required new compound engines, and twin screws—that, in fact, she could not be repaired under £150,000, which was enough to make one pause and consider seriously before touching her. The noble Lord opposite (Lord Henry Lennox) asked why the Black Prince was not placed in the same category as the Warrior. They were, no doubt, similar ships, and when she had served her time the Warrior would be in exactly the same position as the Black Prince—it would have to be seriously discussed whether she should be repaired or not. As he had just alluded to the noble Lord, he might, perhaps, be permitted to answer some of the other interrogatories which he put. He had already answered the question about the Thunderer. The noble Lord spoke of a number of ships as obsolete; but that was a word which one or two other speakers greatly objected to. He did not wish to draw any hasty conclusion from our recent experience; but it seemed to him that ships which were sometimes called obsolete might do effective and good service. The noble Lord asked whether it was true that of 18 guns which the Lord Warden carried, eight were forbidden to be fired. He (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) did not know that any such information had reached the Admiralty. The Hotspur was nearly ready. She had been fitted with 6-inch Nordenfelt guns. The Glatton was now in commission as tender to the Excellent at Portsmouth, and the Collingwood, he had said, would be launched this year. He had made further inquiry, and he was informed that, although only certain progress in regard to her was announced in the Estimates, that rate was in the act of being exceeded; and, as a matter of fact, she would be launched in order to get her engines before the end of the year. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. W. H. Smith) had also said, speaking of the general condition of the Navy, and of the large number of ships needing repairs, that there were 30,000 tons dropped out of the Effective List, and that these were more than equal to all the tons that we were building. It was very difficult to make any comparison of this kind, or to answer figures stated in a speech; but he had made the best inquiry he could into our position in this matter. He found that since the present Administration came into Office there had been ships removed from the Effective List to the extent of 25,749 tons, which was about the amount stated by the right hon. Gentleman. If they added the tonnage needing repairs, which he set down at 35,620 tons, the total would be 61,000 tons—that was tons displacement. Now the tons building were 35,000; but there was a great difference between the tons weight of hull and tons displacement. He believed that usually a third was added, so there was no great discrepancy between the two figures. Even admitting all the ships waiting repairs were to be put on the Non-Effective List in any comparison of this sort, it must be remembered there were always ships waiting repairs, and that, at the commencement of the date of the comparison, there would be a large num- ber of ships waiting repairs. He did not think, on that ground, there would be such a great discrepancy as his right hon. Friend anticipated.

MR. W. H. SMITH

said, his argument was not that there were ships waiting repairs. As the hon. Gentleman had said, there always would be ships waiting repairs. His argument was that the ships requiring repairs were those which, according to the undertaking of the Admiralty, ought to have been completed before this time. He had only given the tonnage of the ships which, according to the programme of 1880–1 and 1881–2, ought now to be effective ships, but which had not been completed.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he presumed there were as many ships in the Non-Effective List at the commencement of the period of comparison as there were at the end. The fact the Committee might go upon was this—that 25,000 tons displacement had been removed from the Effective List of the Navy, and that 35,000 tons weight of hull had been added. He made these observations not from any failure to appreciate the absolute importance of hurrying the repairs as much as possible. His hon. Friend (Sir Edward Reed) had questioned him about the cost of the Inflexible. He thought he had made a most complete Return; but he admitted his hon. Friend did ask some time ago for the cost of the armament of the vessel. He would give him on Report the cost of the armament, which was to be added to the cost of the ship. The right hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for Wigton Burghs (Sir John Hay) and the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Captain Price) entered on a comparison of the strength of our Navy and that of France. He was not prepared to follow them in that line of argument. His (Mr. Campbell-Banner-man's) right hon. Predecessor (Mr. Trevelyan) made a statement of his views on that subject in a very exhaustive speech in answer to a Motion of the noble Lord (Lord Henry Lennox). That having been done, he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) did not think it was desirable to follow in that line of argument, especially in the present circumstances. He could perfectly understand the desire of hon. Gentlemen opposite to bring these points before the Committee, and he did not blame them—indeed, he had no right to do so—for introducing them. He only hoped the hon. and gallant I Gentleman the Member for Devonport (Captain Price) would not consider that, because these statements had not been directly contradicted, they were therefore accepted as correct. The truth was that one nation might be more active than others. It was the firm conviction of the Admiralty that what they were doing at present was—he would not say all that everybody could wish to be done—but sufficient to cause such an addition to the strength of the Navy as, at all events, to keep abreast with the requirements of the day. He was not prepared to go into an elaborate comparison between ourselves and the French. Comparisons were often misleading and inexact. He had no doubt a good case might be made out on the one side, and on the other. He did not think it was desirable the matter should, be treated by way of comparison, although he fully admitted it was a subject which might well occupy the time and attention of the House, and of those who took an interest in Naval matters. As to the general cost of the Navy, it was not for him to express any opinion whether in future years the Estimates ought not to be increased; but he could assure the Committee that the points which had been indicated so clearly and kindly in the course of the debate would not be lost sight of by the Government. He had to make an apology and a confession to the right hon. Gentleman who made some observations on the subject of guns. He listened to those observations with the deepest interest, and with the great part of them he agreed; but he was sorry to say he was not prepared to give the right hon. Gentleman the information he asked for. He took the blame entirely upon himself. He was under the impression that as no money was voted in the Navy Estimates for guns, the proper time to discuss the gun question was when the Army Vote for Guns was brought on; and, therefore, he did not come down prepared with statistics and figures, which it was necessary he should have, in order to give the right hon. Gentleman an answer. He had thought of interrupting the right hon. Gentleman in his interesting remarks; but he confessed he was disposed to hear what he had to say. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would forgive him for the neglect of duty he had displayed. He would endeavour to give the right hon. Gentleman the information he desired on Report. He did not think he had anything else to do except to reply to the speeches of the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) and the hon. Member for Stoke (Mr. Broadhurst). It had been said it was a very simple matter to appoint a Committee. So it was a very simple matter to appoint a Committee; but it was not always a very simple matter to meet the recommendations of a Committee, or to make sure that the recommendations of a Committee were very wise and good. He was not disposed to hold out any hope that such a course would be adopted, and still less that the course suggested by his hon. Friend the Member for Stoke (Mr. Broadhurst)—namely, the appointment of a Commission, would be pursued. The hon. Gentleman spoke of inequality and anomaly in the Dockyards. It was true there was a great deal of anomaly, and he could promise the hon. Gentleman that he would give his own personal attention to the subject during the autumn and winter; but he would not hold out any elaborate hope as to what would be done. He and his hon. Friend (Sir Thomas Brassey), who was very well acquainted with all the circumstances of the case, would look carefully into the matter, and see whether any real adjustment could be recommended in accordance with the interests of the public. In conclusion, he had to thank the Committee for the kind manner in which they had treated the proposals of the Government, and for the many excellent suggestions that had been made.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF

said, the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty had promised to look into the questions with respect to the Dockyards which had been submitted to him. What the Committee had a right to complain of was the constant change of the Secretaries to the Admiralty. During this Parliament two able Gentlemen had filled the Office of Secretary to the Admiralty; indeed, so able were they that they had been promoted. The Committee had no guarantee that their hon. Friend (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) would retain his Office sufficiently long to inquire into the subjects which had been put before him. He trusted the hon. Gentleman would seriously turn his attention to the great anomalies which existed in the condition of the Establishment men and hired men. Memorials and Petitions, which showed there was considerable dissatisfaction amongst these men, were constantly being sent to the Gentlemen connected with Dockyard constituencies. These documents were very respectfully worded, and they put forward the claims and grievances of the men with great plausibility. He asked a Question a day or two ago with regard to the sum which was levied on hired men when they were made Establishment men; and the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty told him the matter did not concern his Department, but that of the Secretary to the Treasury. He then asked the Secretary to the Treasury, and he said the Admiralty had to do with the question. He then repeated his Question to the Secretary to the Admiralty, and he said he knew nothing about the matter. This case was a particularly hard one, and really emphasized, more than anything else, the difference between the hired and the Establishment men. Hitherto hired men, when they passed into the Establishment, had undergone examination; and now, by some Order in Council, they were subject to a fee, to be paid to the Civil Service Commissioners, simply because they were transferred from one Department of the Public Service to another. The men were in a very different position from the Civil servants. It was only fair that if men wished admission to the Public Service they should pay a fee to the Civil Service Commissioners who were appointed to make the necessary examination. The men in question, however, were already in the Public Service, and they had simply to be transferred from one Department to another. He trusted this would be one of the questions which the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty would look into during the autumn, because it had given rise to a great deal of sore feeling on the part of the men. No one who was connected with the boroughs in which Dockyards were situated had reason to be pleased with the present administration of the Dockyards. It would be far better if the First Lord of the Admiralty had a seat in that House, or that the Secretary to the Admiralty should have a far higher position than he now enjoyed. In past times there used to be what was called a Secretary at War, who occupied very much, with regard to the War Office, the position which the First Lord occupied in the other House. The Secretary to the Admiralty was not responsible for the Estimates, he was not a Privy Councillor, and he could not undertake to make an alteration of the Estimates, and he could not at any time undertake to bring them forward. He trusted that between this and next year there would be some change made in the position of the Secretary to the Admiralty.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, that, with respect to the question of fees raised by the hon. Gentleman, the position of things was this. The Civil Service Commission charged certain fees, which were supposed, more or less, to pay for the expenses of the examinations which they held. In the ordinary Civil Service the fees were fixed according to the highest salary to which the person admitted could rise. In the interest of Dockyard men an arrangement had been made according to which they only paid a sum charged upon the actual scale of wages to which they were then admitted, and practically, in the majority of cases, the fee did not exceed 1s. The grievance, therefore, was not an enormous one. One shilling was charged on admission, and then, as the men were promoted, they paid proportionately for their rise. The ordinary Civil servant would pay £5 or £6 straight off on the supposition that some day or other he would rise to a certain salary.

CAPTAIN PRICE

said, they had had a fair promise from the Secretary to the Admiralty that he would look into all the matters connected with the Dockyards; but he hoped one point which the hon. Gentleman would take into consideration would be the suggestion which had been made to-night—namely, that a Committee should be appointed to examine into all the subjects. The personnel of the Dockyards was divided into a great many classes, most of whom had grievances which they wished to make known. It was no easy task for the Representatives of the Dockyards to bring those grievances constantly before the House. In what way were the grievances of the various classes of Dockyard men to be made known? The Committee had been told to-night that the First Lord of the Admiralty declined to receive deputations from Members of Parliament on the subject, and the Representatives of the Admiralty had deprecated discussions of these matters in the House. He did not say that had been done by the present Secretary to the Admiralty, but it had been done before he took Office. The men themselves were not allowed to go in deputation to the Admiralty. How, then, were the grievances of the Dockyard employés to be made known? It had been pointed out to-night that a promise was made by a former Secretary to the Admiralty that the various classes of the employés in the Dockyards should have an opportunity of representing their grievances personally to the Board of Admiralty when they came round to visit the Dockyards in the autumn. That promise, however, had not been fulfilled. He made the statement deliberately. The promise was elicited by a Question which he himself put in the House—in fact, he would like to remind the Committee of what actually occurred two years ago. He had been referring to certain grievances which had been mentioned to-night—grievances created by the disparity in the position of the hired and Establishment men; and the then Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) said— It was the wish of the Board of Admiralty to postpone the consideration of such questions until the Board of Admiralty visited the Dockyards in the autumn. They would then hear all that could he said on the subject by the various classes of workmen and decide what could he done."—[3 Hansard, ccliii. 1049.] There was, therefore, a distinct promise from the Admiralty to the Committee, that when they went their round in the autumn these questions should be thrashed out, that the men themselves should have an opportunity of bringing their grievances personally before the Admiralty, who would hear all that had to be said on the subject. The promise was a considerable consolation to him; but what occurred? The Admiralty went round the Dockyards in the autumn, the various classes of workmen asked to be able to lay their grievances before the Admiralty; but the Admiralty declined to have anything to say to them. He had received a letter from an employé who was connected with one of the leading classes in the Dockyards—the class of shipwrights. The writer of the letter said— The Secretary to the Admiralty promised you that at their annual inspection the Admiralty would receive deputations of workmen; and upon the faith of that reply we made the usual request through the heads of our departments at the time the Admiralty were here last year; but their Lordships said they could not receive any deputation. The following Session he asked, as he asked now, what facilities were to be afforded for the employés of the various departments in the Dockyards to lay their grievances before the Admiralty; and the reply he then got from the Secretary to the Admiralty was— Every person employed in the Dockyards is allowed to make any representation he pleases by letter to the Admiralty.….It is quite evident, from the great mass of applications made, that the time at the disposal of the Admiralty would not admit of their personally receiving deputations during their annual visit of inspection."—[Ibid., cclviii. 250] They, therefore, had a distinct promise from one Secretary to the Admiralty that the Admiralty would personally inquire into the grievances of the men, and they had the statement from his Successor that the time at the disposal of the Admiralty was too short, and that they could not receive any deputations. He desired to know from the present Secretary to the Admiralty whether the Admiralty would take the matter into consideration again, and whether they would now receive deputations of the men? Lord Northbrook would not let Members of Parliament put the matter before him, and the Committee had neither the time nor the inclination to listen to the matter in the House. In point of fact, these discussions were deprecated by the Government. Some of the grievances had existed for many years; he believed the shipwrights had not had an opportunity, either by deputation or otherwise, of personally laying their grievances before the Admiralty for upwards of 10 years. Eight or ten years ago it was a regular thing for the Admiralty to receive deputations when they went round, and he wanted to know whether they would receive deputations now? He wished to know if this particular part of the Naval policy was to be continuous in its operation?

MR. AKERS-DOUGLAS

said, he had no wish to detain the Committee at any length; he had merely to ask a question of the Secretary to the Admiralty upon a subject which had escaped particular reference on the part of the hon. and gallant Member for Devenport (Captain Price). His hon. and gallant Friend, in impressing on the Secretary to the Admiralty the importance or desirability of the appointment of a Departmental Committee to inquire into the management of the Dockyards, had mentioned some grievances under which the officers employed at those establishments laboured; but he thought he had forgotten to draw attention to the fact that the riggers in the Dockyards had not received the increase of pay which had been extended to other employés in the Dockyards. There had been a general increase of wages in the Dockyards in 1876; but he was informed that the riggers had not in any way participated in that advance of pay, and that they complained of being hardly treated in being excluded from certain benefits conferred on men in similar positions in other departments by the Dockyard Regulations of 1875. He knew that this grievance on the part of the riggers had been before the Admiralty for some two or three years, that the riggers had presented Petitions to the Admiralty, and that the prayer of those Petitions was supported by their chiefs; and, as he believed, was not unfavourably regarded by the Board of Admiralty themselves. He would, therefore, be glad if his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty would give him some assurance that the case of the riggers should be considered.

MR. PULESTON

said, he could not allow one statement of the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Broadhurst),with reference to the quality of the work and the manner in which it was turned out at Her Majesty's Dockyards, to pass unchallenged. He had, as a rule, great respect for the statements and opinions of the hon. Member; but when he said that the work done at Her Majesty's Dockyards was inferior in quality and done in an inferior way, why, the statement carried its own refutation with it. His hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty, and the Civil Lord now present, could testify most fully that all the work done in the Dockyards was executed in the most efficient manner, and that had been the character of the work at all times. So far from its being true that the work done at Her Majesty's Dockyards was inferior in character, it was a fact when, on a former occasion, a large amount of work had been entrusted to private yards, that the arrangement was found to have been carried out at the expense of efficiency. However, his principal object in rising was to refer to another subject. The Secretary to the Admiralty had mentioned, not long ago, that he would cause to be printed and published a scale of the pensions granted to the widows of seamen. He (Mr. Puleston) had addressed one or two Questions to his hon. Friend since that statement was made, as to the time at which this scale would be published; and his hon. Friend had replied that it would probably be ready for printing at the end of the Session. Perhaps his hon. Friend would state whether it was ready now? He had to express his thanks for the way in which his suggestion with reference to the appointment of a Committee had been received; and he frankly admitted that he desired no better Committee than would be constituted by the appointment of the two Gentlemen who had undertaken to act in that capacity. He was sure that in expressing confidence in the two hon. Gentlemen who were to take the matter in hand, he was simply expressing the views of his Colleagues and of the constituency he had the honour to represent. All he asked was that the Department should be as good as their word. In saying that, he did not imply that any pledge had been given, because he was quite aware that this was not the case. The grievances were of a kind that inquiry would find a cure for, and a little attention would remedy them, and secure efficiency in this branch of the Public Service.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he feared he should not be able to take any step in the direction of furnishing the scale of pensions alluded to by the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken before the end of the Session. As this would deal with the widows of men killed in action, his hon. Friend would perceive that the question by analogy affected other Departments in the Service than that to which he had referred. With regard to the question raised by the hon. Member for East Kent (Mr. Akers-Douglas) relating to the position of the riggers, he should be quite ready to listen to all that could be urged in their behalf, although he could, of course, give no pledge upon the subject, and had no wish to give rise to any undue expectation on the part of those employés.

MR. BIGGAR

said, he took this opportunity of bringing forward the claims of Mr. John Clare upon the Admiralty Department in accordance with the Notice he had placed upon the Paper. He had, on former occasions, had a great difficulty in getting at any responsible official to whom he could make application with reference to these claims; and in bringing forward the matter in that House he had been in this unfortunate position, that the hon. Gentlemen on the Treasury Bench, to whom his observations were addressed, always said that they did not of their own knowledge know anything of the subject, but that the question had been decided against Mr. Clare at some very remote period, and was consequently disposed of. Now, he was disposed in this matter to do what hon. Members had done with regard to other questions brought forward that evening—namely, to ask the hon. Gentleman representing the Admiralty to investigate the claims of Mr. Clare on their merits, and to make an examination into the facts of the case. He would, in order not to detain the Committee unnecessarily, very briefly point out the grounds on which he based his application for an inquiry. Mr. Clare, some years ago, patented an invention in connection with iron shipbuilding, into the details of which he would not enter, and offered his patent to the Admiralty Department. The Board of Admiralty of the day obtained plans from him, and supplemented that, from time to time, by obtaining information as to how the plans were to be worked, and there was no doubt that they constructed vessels in accordance with the plans. Now, Mr. Clare had sent into the Admiralty a claim for a very much larger amount than he (Mr. Biggar) thought the Admiralty would have been right to pay him; and, moreover, in his opinion, he had acted injudiciously in declaring that this sum should be paid in full, instead of endeavouring to compromise with the Government and accepting a lump sum in final settlement. The natural result of this action, on the part of Mr. Clare, was that the Admiralty resisted the claim and fought the case in a Court of Law. The evidence given at the trial against Mr. Clare's claims was exceedingly unsatisfactory; and, in his (Mr. Biggar's) opinion, the verdict was an improper one, Mr. Clare having been afterwards able to show that the evidence on which the Court decided proceeded from witnesses who were—he would not say intentionally dishonest, but mistaken with regard to the facts which they laid before the Court. Since then Mr. Clare had communicated with various Members of Parliament, and his case had been brought forward in three successive years. Having made this brief statement, he asked that the Board of Admiralty should cause the case to be investigated, and if they found there was no justice in the claims of Mr. Clare that they should say so, and he should then feel that he would not be justified in again bringing the subject forward. On the other hand, he thought he should be justified in doing so as long as the Government said simply—"We will not go into the merits of this case, nor consider Mr. Clare's claim." As he had before remarked, he did not wish unduly to occupy the time of the Committee, and for that reason he had not entered upon the merits or demerits of Mr. Clare's invention, or the details of the evidence which Mr. Clare was able to give at the trial in opposition to the evidence given against him; he simply asked that an unbiassed investigation should take place, and that a Report should be made to the House, which should take the place of the opinions expressed upon the case by hon. Gentlemen on the Government Benches.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, his right hon. Friend the late Secretary to the Admiralty had last year made an explanation in reference to the claims of Mr. Clare, with which he believed the hon. Member for Cavan had expressed himself satisfied. From that time to the present those letters from Mr. Clare which constantly arrived at the Admiralty, intimating that he was dissatisfied, had ceased; and the authorities were, therefore, under the impression that Mr. Clare also was at last satisfied, although he had not obtained what he wanted. In view of these circumstances, he was somewhat surprised that the hon. Member for Cavan should have brought the subject forward again. As the hon. Member might imagine, he should not go into the matter farther than to say that the case of Mr. Clare had been tried before a Court of Law, and decided against him. The Lord Chief Justice, who presided at the trial, remarked that in the whole course of his experience he never heard of a claim so wild and so extravagant. The result was that the jury found a verdict for the Crown on every point raised in the claim. Proceedings were subsequently commenced by Mr. Clare against two witnesses whom he alleged to have perjured themselves; but they were abandoned. He thought that nothing need be added to that statement, which, in his opinion, completely disposed of the matter; and, in concluding his remarks, he would merely express his regret that the favourable impression seemed to have been removed which was created by the explanation given by his right hon. Friend last year.

MR. H. G. ALLEN

wished to draw the attention of the Secretary to the Admiralty to a subject he had brought forward on a former occasion. He referred to the proportion which the established men bore to the hired men in Her Majesty's Dockyards, and particularly in the Dockyard with which he was connected, where there had been an addition of 500 hired men, the number of the established men remaining less than it was before the 500 hired men were introduced. He ventured to express the opinion that, under present circumstances, and with the acknowledged shortcomings of late years in keeping up our Naval strength, there ought to be a considerable addition to the number of the established men; and he trusted the Secretary to the Admiralty would be able to say that he would include this question amongst the others of a kindred character which he had promised to con-eider.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he believed there was, at the present time, an abnormal number of hired men employed at the Dockyard referred to by the hon. Member who had just sat down; but he was unable to see that this constituted any ground for increasing the number of the established men. He believed the number of established men at Pembroke Dockyard compared favourably with that of the established men at the other Dockyards. However, he would look into this along with other questions that had been submitted.

CAPTAIN PRICE

said, that there was an increase under the sub-head relating to wages to policemen. This increase, although small in itself, was sufficient to show that an additional sum of money was required for this purpose year after year. He had, on a former occasion, called the attention of the late Secretary to the Admiralty to the suggestion that the services of a number of the police employed in the Dockyards at home and abroad might be dispensed with, and a considerable saving of cost thereby effected to the country; and he now asked the hon. Gentleman the present Secretary to the Admiralty whether he would look into the whole question of the Dockyard Police? The cost of this force in the Dockyards at home and abroad constituted a very considerable item of charge, and amounted to something like £50,000 a-year. He had not one word to say against the Dockyard Police; on the contrary, he believed there was not a more efficient force in existence; but it had often struck him that they might utilize for the purposes of the force the seamen and Marine pensioners, who were in every respect fitted to perform the duties of policemen. He remembered that some years ago in some of our Dockyards abroad, where no policemen could be had, a number of pensioners were appointed, who discharged the duties most satisfactorily, and answered exactly the same purpose as the police of the present day. Therefore, he thought that a large number of the seamen and Marine pensioners might now be occupied in the same way. He did not think he should be wrong in saying that the Police Force by this means might be reduced to one-half of its present dimensions; while the effect of having a force of 25,000 police and 25,000 Marine pensioners would be a very considerable reduction of charge in the Estimates. Another great advantage of this plan would be that a force would be almost always ready on which the Admiralty could lay their hands to act as an additional reserve to the Fleet. For these reasons, he again drew the attention of the Admiralty to this question, which he regarded as a very important one, and which he trusted would meet with their favourable consideration.

MR. BIGGAR

said, he thought the Secretary to the Admiralty had given a rather indiscreet reason for supposing that Mr. Clare was satisfied with the way in which his claim had been dealt with by the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant (Mr. Trevelyan) when he occupied the post of Secretary to the Admiralty last year. The hon. Gentleman had rested his supposition on the fact that Mr. Clare had not since written to the Admiralty Department; but he (Mr. Biggar) was afraid that when the correspondence was transferred from him the Admiralty were likely to have a considerable amount of trouble in connection with it. He should have been glad if the hon. Gentleman had been able to say that there should be an investigation of the case upon its merits. As far as he could remember, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant made rather a vague reply to the question last year, which was sufficient to show that the merits of the case had not been considered, and that he had no personal knowledge of the facts.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he had himself personally gone into the case, and was unable to give any promise whatever on the subject of a further investigation.

Question put, and agreed to.

(5.) £70,787, Victualling Yards at Home and Abroad.

(6.) £64,465, Medical Establishments at Homo and Abroad.

(7.) £22,016, Marine Division.

(8.) £1,122,500, Naval Stores for Building and Repairing the Fleet, &c.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, he observed on page 116 a considerable decrease in the Estimate for paint, oils, and other materials. It would be in the recollection of the Committee that a particular kind of paint called xerotine-siccative, which was considered to be very economical, had been made use of by the Admiralty, and that it was supposed to have blown up one of Her Majesty's ships. An inquiry had been held into the circumstances of the explosion, and, two months ago, he had asked a Question with regard to experiments that had been made with this curious material. The result of the inquiry had not been communicated to Parliament; and he thought hon. Members would be glad to know what conclusion had been arrived at—that was to say, whether the xerotine-siccative or the Fenians caused the explosion to which he had alluded.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he was unable to make any statement with reference to the explosion. The cause of the reduction in the Estimate for paint, oils, &c, arose from the circumstance that the stocks were large, smaller quantities being required for the current year.

SIR JOHN HAY

Will there be any more xerotine-siccative used?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

No.

Vote agreed to.

(9.) £767,153, Machinery and Ships built by Contract, &c.

SIR JOHN HAY

asked whether tenders had been invited for the building of an iron-clad by private persons, and whether any information could be given to the Committee as to the conditions of contract?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, that tenders had been sent in, but no contract had been entered into.

Vote agreed to.

(10.) £479,603, New Works, Buildings, Yard Machinery, and Repairs,.

MR. W. H. SMITH

wished to know the state of the barracks at Keyham, and whether their completion might be looked for next year in accordance with the promise which he believed had been given? He would also like to know whether the necessary machinery had been provided—whether, in fact, seeing that a much less sum was asked for this year, the works were actually progressing? He wished, also, to have some information as to the progress of the Works at Haulbowline, on account of which a smaller sum than last year was placed in the Estimates? There was also an item in connection with which he thought some further expense would shortly be required—namely, the works at Malta. He believed the Admiralty had very properly provided for the repairs of several ships at Malta during the coming year, and they had also very properly provided for the increased cost of wages which would have to be paid. But he thought it would be found that further mechanical appliances would he required in the Dockyard at Malta, in order that full use might he made of that estahlishment, and it seemed to him that a very small provision had been made for the purpose in the Estimates. He should like to see a new dock constructed at Malta, where there was at present only one dock in which a good-sized iron-clad could be placed. If we were to be engaged in severe work in the Mediterranean at any time the dock accommodation there would be found totally insufficient for the Fleet; and therefore he felt that another graving dock at Malta would, in time of need, be of the greatest possible advantage to the country. The existing dock accommodation at Malta had already been used for ships on the Indian Station, which had been repaired there instead of being sent home. For the reasons he had given he trusted the Admiralty would consider whether the present dock accommodation could not be enlarged.

SIR THOMAS BRASSEY

said, in reply to the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, he was able to inform him that the number of men employed on the works at Haulbowline was precisely the same as that employed last year. He believed the works would be completed in about three years from the present time. The works at Keyham, he believed, would be finished next year or the year after.

MR. W. H. SMITH

said, that only £94,241 was taken this year as against £134,589 in the last Estimates.

SIR THOMAS BRASSEY

said, the larger sum included the charge for a number of supplementary works. With regard to the dock accommodation at Malta, provision would be made next year for completing a repairing shed at the cost of £25,000. A larger sum had not been proposed in the Estimates, because, as he understood, the space available in the Dockyard was limited, and it required in consequence some consideration to arrange a satisfactory plan for the completion of the sheds. His right hon. Friend had raised a question with reference to the propriety of constructing an efficient graving dock at Malta. That subject had already engaged the attention of the Admiralty; and although he was not authorized to report any decision upon it, he could assure his right hon. Friend that they were fully sensible of the great and growing importance of the Dockyard at Malta, and of the economical and effective manner in which work was done there.

Vote agreed to.

(11.) Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £69,373, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Expense of Medicines, Medical Stores, &c, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1883.

MR. THOMASSON,

in moving to reduce the Vote by £7,900, said, a Select Committee had been sitting on the Contagious Diseases Acts, and there was no likelihood of its Report being presented this Session. Many of his constituents, and tens of thousands of people throughout the country, had been anxious that some protest should be made against the Contagious Diseases Acts this Session; and, therefore, he opposed this Vote. On the 15th of July last there had been presented to the House 12,805 Petitions, bearing 2,019,371 signatures, praying for the repeal of those Acts. Some of those Petitions had been signed on behalf of public bodies who condemned those Acts as utterly immoral; and although the Convocations of the Church of England had not protested against those Acts, yet large numbers of clergymen had done so by Petitions. Only the other week a Memorial from 200 Metropolitan clergymen had been presented to the Prime Minister against the Acts. He not only considered them immoral Acts, but entirely unconstitutional—even more unconstitutional than the Protection of Person and Property (Ireland) Act of 1881. By that Act the Lord Lieutenant, on reasonable suspicion, could commit persons to prison; by the Contagious Diseases Acts any woman could be treated as a common prostitute and summoned before a magistrate. The presumption of the law in other cases was that a person was innocent until proved guilty; but under these Acts a magistrate might assume that a woman was guilty unless she could prove the contrary. Unless a woman could prove a negative she might be detained in a hospital prison for nine months. This was entirely exceptional, and it was not right that the reputation of English women should be committed to the care of the police. No doubt, many hon. Members thought these Acts only applied to a degraded class of women; but he had never yet heard that any class of British subjects could be put outside the pale of the Constitution, and it was not the fact that only degraded women were brought up under these Acts, for hon. Members might be sure that the police would make mistakes—and they had made mistakes, as hon. Members would find from the evidence taken before the Select Committee. Not much more than two months ago a young woman had been brought before a magistrate at Dover, and the magistrate had said that there was no ground whatever for arresting her.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £61,475, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Expense of Medicines, Medical Stores, &c, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1883."—(Mr. Thomasson.)

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, there were two reasons on which he would appeal to his hon. Friend to consider whether it was desirable to take the opinion of the Committee upon the subject. First, with regard to the administration of this Vote. This was a statutory duty imposed upon the Government by certain Acts of Parliament; and the proper course for the hon. Member, who held a strong opinion against these Acts in common with many other persons, to take would be to repeal the Acts. But so long as they remained on the Statute Book it was the duty of the Government and the House to provide machinery for carrying them out. The second consideration was that a Committee had been sitting on this subject for four years, was on the eve of coming to a decision, and was now considering its Report; and the Leader of those who thought with the hon. Member had withdrawn a Motion he had on the Paper, because that Committee was sitting, and had not presented its Report. On these grounds he appealed to the hon. Member not to press his Amendment.

MR. R. N. FOWLER

said, he had come down to the House the other day to support the Motion of the right hon. Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld); but as that right hon. Gentleman had not thought proper to divide, he (Mr. R. N. Fowler) must agree with the Secretary to the Admiralty that, as the law enjoined the carrying out of the Contagious Diseases Acts, the Committee was bound to vote the money for the purpose; and, therefore, although he was opposed to those Acts, the Amendment should be rejected.

MR. THOMASSON

said, the right hon. Member (Mr. Stansfeld) had not thought proper to divide, because the Previous Question was carried against him.

Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 7; Noes 62: Majority 55.—(Div. List, No. 309.)

Original Question put, and agreed to.

(12.) £9,973, Martial Law, &c.

CAPTAIN PRICE

asked whether the Secretary to the Admiralty had had time to consider the question of Marine officers in connection with courts martial?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he had not had an opportunity of considering the question yet; but he had not forgotten it.

Vote agreed to.

(13.) Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £118,936, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Expense of various Miscellaneous Services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1883.

MR. MOORE

asked the Secretary to the Admiralty, what steps had been taken to meet the requirements of the Roman Catholic sailors in the Squadron at Alexandria? However successful that Squadron might be, it could hardly be expected that there would not be a considerable number of men on the sick-list owing to the hot climate of Egypt, and the necessity for a Roman Catholic chaplain might become very necessary.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, that, in accordance with a Minute issued sometime ago, he had telegraphed to Sir Beauchamp Seymour, asking whether there were any Roman Catholic clergymen at Alexandria and Port Said who would be available for the Fleet, and the reply was that there were. Therefore, he had not thought it necessary to make any special provision. There was every desire on the part of the Government to give every assistance of this kind; and he imagined that if any force of seamen or marines were landed, the services of the Roman Catholic clergy would be available.

MR. MOORE

said, what he wanted was to have a clear understanding upon this matter. What happened when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Westminster (Mr. W. H. Smith) was at the head of the Admiralty? The Squadron was in Besika Bay, and it was supposed there were some Roman Catholic clergymen on shore; but the seamen had to attend the churches on shore, for not a single one of the clergy could speak English, or any language in which they could communicate with the men, and then it turned out that the clergy did not belong to the Catholic Church at all, but to the Greek Church. He did not wish to impute bad faith to the officers in command; but he thought the Minute of 1878 ought to be carried out. He knew Alexandria and Port Said as well as any Member of that House, and he was not aware that the clergy at either of those places spoke English. He hoped the Secretary to the Admiralty would make some satisfactory statement.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he could only repeat the answer he gave a week ago. Sir Beauchamp Seymour had every reason to look after the interests of the men under his charge, and he was asked whether there were clergymen available. His answer was that there were. Subsequently he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) had been told by the hon. and gallant Member for Cork (Colonel Colthurst) that the clergy at Alexandria were considered to be fit persons in every way, and could speak English very well; but at Port Said there was no one with that qualification. As he had already promised, he would make inquiries into the matter.

MR. CALLAN

said, the matter was most unsatisfactory, and the explanation made it still more unsatisfactory. Were they to be told that in one of the largest Fleets which England had gathered together for the last 20 years no Roman Catholic chaplain was to be engaged? We were at war, although the Prime Minister said we were not at war. ["Question!"] He heard some Radicals call "Question!" That was always the Radical cry whenever a question of illiberality was raised. He stood there as a Catholic Member of Parliament to express his surprise at the explanation that had been attempted to be made in this matter by a Scotch Secretary to the Admiralty. ["Oh, oh!"] If he was interrupted any more by hon. Members below the Radical Gangway, he should move that the Chairman report Progress; indeed, he would make that Motion when he had said what he intended to say. He (Mr. Callan) noticed that an allowance of £3,300 was made in this Vote for chaplains; and what he was anxious to know was—whether any step whatever had been taken by the Admiralty to provide a Catholic chaplain at Alexandria? All they seemed to have done was to telegraph—"Are there Catholic chaplains available?" He understood there was only one English Catholic clergyman in or near Alexandria. Had that one been taken off to the Fleet? Had a salary been voted for him? Had he been placed on board any vessel, or given a steam-launch to go from ship to ship? No; the Admiralty had done absolutely nothing. In June, 1878, under a Conservative Government, the Lords of the Admiralty directed that— When a number of ships forming a squadron are sent on any service that would keep them for a considerable time away from ports where the services of Roman Catholic priests were available, arrangements are," not may, "to he made for a Roman Catholic priest to accompany the squadron. Had the Admiralty made any arrangement whatever by which a priest should accompany the Squadron commanded by Sir Beauchamp Seymour? If they had not, they were guilty of a deliberate violation of the Order that was made on the 7th of June, 1878. He would ask the Secretary to the Admiralty if he had made any effort to comply with this mandatory Order? When were they discussing this matter? At 2 o'clock in the morning, when not the slightest report of their proceedings would appear in the English Press. Where was the hon. Member for Berwick-on-Tweed (Mr. Jerningham)—that hybrid constituency somewhere on the Border? He understood he was at Buxton. It would have been far better if the hon. Gentleman had been here attending to the interests of those people through whose votes he occupied his seat in the House. It was the duty of the hon. Gentleman to have been here to have held up to public scorn the illiberal, bigoted, and intolerant action of the Government in this matter. ["Oh, oh!"] Well, the "grand old man" was not present. ["Question!"] He was impugning the action of the Government in deliberately violating the Order of the Lords of the Admiralty of the 7th of June, 1878. The Government had sent the Orontes to Alexandria without troops, and they sent the squadron without a Catholic priest. Both operations were on a par. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, he would move that Progress be reported.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. Callan.)

MR. O'SHEA

said, he hoped his hon. Friend would not press the Motion he had just made. If the Admiralty were going to send any more ships, surely they would take good care that a Catholic chaplain was sent out there. In such a large Fleet as that at Alexandria it was not unreasonable to expect there should he a Catholic chaplain on board one or other of the ships, so that the Catholics in the Fleet might have a chance of receiving what spiritual comfort they might want.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, every step was being taken in the matter. According to the Minute he had quoted, certain steps were to be taken if no Catholic clergyman was available. The Admiralty had, first of all, to ascertain whether a Roman Catholic clergyman was available, and to whom ought they to apply but to the Admiral? The Admiral replied that there were Catholic clergymen available. Yesterday, he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) received the information that there was an English Catholic priest at Alexandria, but not at Port Said. He had already said they would inquire again; and if there was any part of the seamen of the Fleet who could not get the fullest religious comfort, the Admiralty would see that the services of a clergyman were provided. He did not think he could say more.

MR. MOORE

said, the Secretary to the Admiralty had been so courteous and considerate that he ought not to be pressed further. He should not have spoken so strongly in this matter were it not that Catholics had been the victims of a system of the grossest oppression and intolerance. A minister of the Protestant Church was granted a place in every one of the first class iron-clads; but Catholic priests had not even the commonest facilities given to them at our Dockyards at home, such as Portsmouth; they had no means of seeing or of giving instruction, or of administering any of the rites of the Church to the Catholics in the Navy. They were simply allowed to seek their way as best they could. In view of the promise of the Secretary to the Admiralty, that he would inquire into the matter fully, he was not inclined to press the subject further.

MR. CALLAN

said, he certainly placed more reliance upon the promises of the present Secretary to the Admiralty than he did upon those of officials generally, for whatever the hon. Gentleman had promised him (Mr. Callan) hitherto he had taken some pains to carry out. In this case, there was a direct and absolute Order made by a Conservative Government, which had been deliberately violated by a Liberal Government, or by the Whig Members of the present Liberal Government. The Admiralty had inquired from Sir Beauchamp Seymour whether the services of a Catholic priest were available at Alexandria; but the Admiral was the wrong man to apply to. Dr. Virtue, who had for the last 25 or 30 years acted as Army Chaplain at Malta, had just been elected to the new Episcopal See of Portsmouth. Dr. Virtue knew all about the disposition of Catholic priests in Egypt. Had the Admiralty applied to him in this matter? Dr. Virtue or Cardinal Manning were far more suitable persons to apply to in a matter of this kind than Sir Beauchamp Seymour. If the Secretary to the Admiralty would apply to Dr. Virtue in order that he might, to-morrow, give the Committee the information they desired, he would withdraw his Motion to report Progress.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he could hardly be expected to promise to-night that the Admiralty would apply to any individual for information. They had taken the best means at their disposal to ascertain the exact facts, and on Friday he would be quite prepared to answer any questions on the subject.

MR. SEXTON

said, the matter was one of considerable urgency, and in order to avoid misapprehension and disappointment it was well the Committee should thoroughly understand the pledge given to the hon. Member for Clonmel (Mr. Moore). The Secretary to the Admiralty had promised to look into the matter; but that was quite inadequate. He (Mr. Sexton) supposed there were 15,000 men now on board ship in the East, and at any moment their services might be called into requisition. It was a matter of extreme importance that none of those men should be deprived of the ministrations of their Church. If the Committee were to understand that in a day or two, if the Government ascertained from Sir Beauchamp, Seymour that there was no proper spiritual comfort obtainable by the Catholic seamen, it would be provided from England or elsewhere, they would be satisfied.

MR. CAMPBELL BANNERMAN

said, that was what he was endeavouring to indicate. A special appointment, or arrangement, was only to be made when no resident clergyman was available. The Admiralty had not yet been able to ascertain whether a suitable clergyman was available. They were told there was a Catholic clergyman available in Alexandria, and he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) had already promised to make further inquiries as to the truth of the statement. If it was found there was no Catholic clergyman available on the spot, it would be the duty of the Admiralty to carry out the Minute of June 1878 at once.

MR. CALLAN

said, he had no objection to withdraw his Motion; but he would raise the subject again on Report. If the Admiralty were really honest, they would apply at once to the very best authority on the subject. What did Sir Beauchamp Seymour know about the matter? He knew a great deal more about bombardments than about the administering of the last Sacrament to a Christian. If the Secretary to the Admiralty applied to the right person, lie could know within an hour what Catholic clergymen were available at Alexandria, or, if there were no Catholic clergyman speaking English at that place, he would be told the nearest port where they could be procured. This information could be procured at once from a rev. gentleman who had been for 25 years a chaplain in Her Majesty's Service—namely, Dr. Virtue, now of Portsmouth. He presumed the hon. Gentleman, instead of sending a special messenger to Dr. Virtue, would rather order it to be asked from the mainmast of Sir Beauchamp Seymour's ship—"Is there a Roman Catholic clergyman who speaks English in the ruined city of Alexandria?" In this matter the Admiralty must condescend to recognize the Catholic Episcopacy. The Catholics of England were a large body, and they insisted upon their rights; and they required, demanded, and compelled the authorities to provide Catholic chaplains in the Fleet.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

said, that the expression which fell from the hon. Member for Clonmel (Mr. Moore) with regard to the conduct of the Admiralty officials savoured of a certain amount of unfairness, and he knew the facts were not altogether as his hon. Friend appeared to think. A relative of his, who was a chaplain at Portsmouth, had told him that nothing could exceed the affability and goodwill shown to Catholic chaplains by Naval officers. They never had the least difficulty in inducing the officers to do anything that was at all reasonable in the way of getting men to Divine Service, or having facilities afforded them for Confession. It was only fair this should be publicly stated. As to the question immediately before the Committee, he believed the real difficulty was to be found in providing quarters for chaplains. Although a Catholic chaplain might have comparatively few men in each ship to look after, it was a mere matter of decency and humanity that the Catholic sailors should be allowed the comforts of religion which a priest could administer. No Catholic priest would hesitate to be put to any amount of inconvenience and suffering in regard to quarters, or anything else, if his duty told him he ought to attend the Catholics serving in the Mediterranean. Formerly Dr. Grant was recognized as an intermediary official between the Government and the Catholic Hierarchy in the matter of chaplains; and he (Mr. Arthur O'Connor) was sure that if any representation were made to any of the Catholic Bishops in England that there was a need of Catholic priests, there would be no difficulty in obtaining the services, not only of one, but of half-a-dozen priests.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Original Question put, and agreed to.

(14.) £873,688, Half Pay, &c. to Officers of Navy and Marines.

(15.) £866,127, Military Pensions and Allowances.

SIR JOHN HAY

wished to ask a question which he believed his hon. Friend the Civil Lord would be able to answer. The Committee would remember that the case of Captain Brownrigg, who was killed in action, was brought before the House early in the year. At that time, although the Admiralty did all that was right and liberal to the widow and children, the ordinary practice by which a grant from the Royal Bounty Fund was made to the widow and children of an officer who was killed in action could not then be carried out. He thought it would be satisfactory to the Committee to know, on authority, what had been done in the matter?

SIR THOMAS BRASSEY

said, that, in addition to £2,402, £700 had been given to the widow, and one-third of that amount to each of the seven children.

Vote agreed to.

(16.) £330,535, Civil Pensions and Allowances.

(17.) £123,700, Extra Estimate for Services not Naval, Freight, &c. on account of the Army Department.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, he did not wish to detain the Committee at that hour of the night; but, as an old officer, and as one who had charge of the Transport Department at the Admiralty some years ago, he was bound to acknowledge the admirable manner in which the Transport Service had been conducted in regard to the Army now embarking for the East. He had taken some considerable pains to ascertain the fact from military officials and others; and he believed that, both in respect to economical arrangement and to the perfect comfort of the troops, the distinguished officer—Admiral Sir William Mends—at the head of the Transport Department deserved the thanks of the Committee and of the House.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, that, in case the observations of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman did not reach the gallant officer in question through any other source, he (Mr. Camp-bell-Bannerman) would take care they were conveyed to him.

Vote agreed to.

(18.) £155,457, Greenwich Hospital and School.

SIR MASSEY LOPES

said, that some time ago the rumour was current that some alterations were to be made in regard to the Greenwich Hospital and School. He would like to ask whether there was any truth in the rumour?

SIR THOMAS BRASSEY

said, that since the Estimates were introduced, a Committee, consisting of gentlemen specially conversant with the question relating to the training of boys for the sea, had reported on the general condition of the School. The Committee was originally appointed in consequence of difficulties which had been experienced in sending a full proportion of boys into the Navy, and providing proper outfits for those who were not up to the standard required for the Navy, and who, consequently, were sent into the Mercantile Marine. It was also felt that the standard of physical development insisted upon in all cases tended to exclude the most necessitous boys from the benefits of the school. The Committee had instituted an exhaustive inquiry. The main results were satisfactory; but suggestions were made for improvements in numerous details. An organic change of importance was proposed. It consisted in the subdivision of the School into two parts, the boys being selected in the one case with reference to the physical standard insisted upon in the Navy, while in the other division they were selected with reference to the circumstances of their parents and their claims on the bounty of the country. The final adoption of this suggestion had been reserved for mature consideration. On several important matters of detail the suggestions of the Committee had been already adopted. A more liberal and varied scale of dietary had been approved. It would involve an additional sum of £3,500 a-year for the 1,000 boys under instruction in the School. Some addition had been made to the winter clothing. The instruction in trades, and the employment in domestic duties of a nature deemed to be unfavourable to the physical development of the boys had been curtailed. It was proposed to substitute a larger amount of instruction in seamanship, and additional instructors had already been appointed. Additional accommodation had been provided for the sick by the erection of a new wing to the Infirmary, capable of holding 25 beds. As a measure of precaution, a subway had been formed connecting the east and west sides of the establishment. The present Board were fully resolved to maintain the efficiency of this valuable School, and to support the officers and teachers of the School in the important task of training the boys committed to their care.

MR. W. H. SMITH

said, they were to understand, therefore, that no radical change in regard to the Hospital and School would be made—no change in the number of boys—without the House having an opportunity of expressing an opinion on the point.

SIR THOMAS BRASSEY

said, that was so.

Vote agreed to.

Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.

Committee to sit again To-morrow.