§ MR. JENKINS,in calling attention to the Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the loss of Her Majesty's ship Atalanta, which was a matter of very great importance, and well worth the attention of this House, said, that all who had taken any interest in naval matters, and had followed the proceedings of that Committee, would agree with him that the noble Earl who now presided at the head of the Admiralty (the Earl of Northbrook) had done a great public service in establishing a very valuable precedent, inasmuch as this Naval Commission had been composed of other than naval officers, who had rendered valuable service and elicited 1836 very valuable evidence in the course of the investigation; and he could not help thinking, if the right hon. Gentleman who lately presided at the Admiralty (Mr. W. H. Smith) had taken the same course after the loss of Her Majesty's ship Eurydice, instead of bringing up one or two half-drowned seamen to be tried, they would never have heard of this miserable Juno or training ship Atalanta. Having followed the evidence of that Committee closely, he thought the Civil Members of the Committee had shown great skill and knowledge in dealing with the questions that came before them. He thought, however, it was a matter for regret that the inquiry was confined almost exclusively to the condition or unseaworthiness of this ship. He regretted that the inquiry had not extended to the fitness of a ship of this kind for a training ship. In the evidence before the Committee facts had been brought out which, in his judgment, proved conclusively that a grave blunder, a grave error in judgment, was made by the Admiralty advisers of the right hon. Gentleman; and he was very much surprised that his strong common sense and practical knowledge should have allowed him to sanction the fitting out of the Juno as a training ship. So far as he (Mr. Jenkins) could gather, the reason given for that was that she was the only sailing ship in Her Majesty's Service that was available for the purpose, and, to his mind, that was a very great objection to her employment. Now, a ship of 900 tons, according to the evidence, could have been built in a Naval Dockyard for £4,000 or £5,000 more than it cost to repair the Juno. The ship was 33 or 34 years old, and the original estimate of the cost for repairing her was £11,500. That was increased to £19,000, or thereabouts, and the total cost for repairs exceeded £27,000. After expending that enormous sum of money upon her, what did they find? That after her first cruise for nine months, she had to be repaired at a cost of £1,800 or £1,900, and a few months after that the repairs to her again amounted to over £800. The fact was that, the mistake having been made, the Admiralty had not the courage to condemn her, as she should have been, upon her first inspection at Portsmouth. As to the stability of the ship, it was proved at the 1837 outset that she was unsuited for the Service, because, before she left Plymouth, one of the best seamen in the Navy, Admiral Sir Thomas Symonds, condemned her and threw doubt upon her fitness for the Service. At the time the vessel left England she showed symptoms of straining, which made it plain that she was not so stable and sound as she should have been when first commissioned. The evidence of the master's mate was very important, as also was the carpenter's of the ship, his evidence showing that at the time she first left England she showed symptoms of straining, and throughout the voyage made a good deal of water even in ordinary weather. When they had an old ship, it was impossible to say whether the straining was such as to make it dangerous or not; and in this particular ship, he believed, the straining was of the character to make it dangerous. That it was so was seen from the fact that it created great anxiety in the mind of Captain Stirling and the officers of the unfortunate ship. Captain Stirling was never quite satisfied with this ship from the time she was first commissioned, for he was always suggesting alterations to the Admiralty. Although the Committee was appointed to inquire into her seaworthiness, they had not done so, but appeared to have evaded the question; and he should like to know if his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Trevelyan) could throw any light upon the matter, or if it had received the attention of the Admiralty? He had thought it his duty to bring the subject before the House, as he considered it a question of very great importance, and one which should not be passed over lightly. The evidence showed conclusively that the Admiralty were at fault; and though he did not blame the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. W. H. Smith), he blamed those who persuaded him to take this course. Ships of the kind were not fit for training ships. It was true they had a sailing vessel in the Mediterranean; but that was very different to crossing the Atlantic in the Winter months; and he would ask the right hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Sir John Hay) whether boys and young seamen could not be trained as well, or even better, in ships of steam power than in sailing ships pure and simple? 1838 In the future, he hoped the same mistake would not be made, and that these sailing ships would not be used as training ships. A great deal had been done by the Admiralty in fitting out a flying squadron; but they wanted more than that, they wanted a detatched squadron, and he hoped his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty would be in a position to tell them that steps with that end in view were being taken, so that our seamen and officers might be better trained than they could be under the present system.
MR. DUFFsaid, that, knowing how anxious the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Trevelyan) was to get into Committee upon the Naval Estimates, he would not enter into details in supporting the views of his hon. Friend. That was a subject on which he had more than once expressed an opinion in that House; and though he agreed with the Secretary to the Admiralty, who, in a speech the other day, said he believed the Navy, men and officers, were imbued with the spirit which distinguished the men in the days of Hawkins, Blake, and Raleigh, he was bound to say he was somewhat sceptical as to whether the men and officers now were as great naval sailors as the men of the 16th century. He doubted if they could go through the Straits of Magellan without a pilot. He was afraid that the men of the present day were not so efficiently trained as they should be; and he was very much struck at looking into some figures brought out before the United Service Institution by Admiral Wilson, that out of 18,500 seamen—and we had only about 19,000 seamen pure and simple—10,000 men were under five years' service, and they only averaged 18 months at sea, while 4,270 had served between five and 10 years, with four and a-half years' sea service, and 2,600 15 years, with 11½ years' sea service. Bearing in mind that point, he referred them to the Report of the Atalanta Committee, which stated that a large part of the men had never had the opportunity of handling a ship under sail in heavy weather, their knowledge being chiefly derived from books, and not from practical experience. The necessity of that was the more plain when they remembered that it was a practice amongst the large steam packet com- 1839 panies to insist that all their officers should have had their knowledge of seamanship from sailing ships. It was partly from want of this knowledge that so many disasters occurred. No officer would get up and say in that House that a man was fit for the duties of a seaman after about a year and a-half's sea service. How, then, was the difficulty they were now under to be avoided? The modern man-of-war did not employ many sailors, and that was all the more reason that they should seek for some special means of developing good seamanship. He therefore pressed on the Admiralty that they ought to have an increased number of cruisers. Those cruisers might be attached to the Channel and Mediterranean Squadrons; and, instead of their having so many vessels like those at present on foreign stations, they should have vessels of about 2,000 tons—vessels of auxiliary steam power, and not overloaded with guns. If the Service abroad were carried on with those vessels, they would be a very important school for training the officers and men. There would be a saving in the cost of coal, for he would not allow these vessels to steam excepting under certain circumstances. They might, with great advantage, be profitably employed in the Pacific, on the South-East Coast of America, and in the West Indies. Naval authorities he had spoken to on the subject had admitted that the only objection that could be raised was that of expense; but he did not think that they would be justified, if the Admiralty thought these vessels would conduce to the good of the Service, in refraining from having them on the ground of cost. In an interesting speech the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty had said that he believed that half the commerce of the world floated under the British flag. If that was true, it was an important reason why their commerce should be properly protected, and he was bound to say that he did not think matters were satisfactory in this respect at present. He hoped that in next year's Navy Estimates they would hear that the Admiralty were prepared to carry out some scheme for giving the men of the Navy greater experience as bonâ fide sailors; and if there was no objection, except the objection of expense, he hoped they would have the courage 1840 to come down and ask the House for the money necessary.
§ SIR JOHN HAYsaid, that he desired to join with the hon. Members for Penryn (Mr. Jenkins) and Banffshire (Mr. Duff) in entreating the Admiralty to take some steps for training the officers and men in handling ships under sail. He did not, however, concur in the view of the hon. Member for Penryn in the condemnation that he had passed on the Admiralty for selecting the Ata-lanta for the purpose of a training ship. They must regret the loss of life that occurred in that vessel; but having served in the Vestal, a ship identical with the Atalanta, in very heavy weather and in a typhoon in the China Sea, he (Sir John Hay) knew that a vessel of that kind, well handled, was quite safe. Nor did he concur in the opinion of the hon. Member that there should be steam power in all the sailing vessels that might be used for purposes of training, for it would add enormously to the cost; and the opportunity that the officers would have for using the steam power at any time, when the energy and skill of those in command, and the skill of the men required to be developed, would tend to have an injurious effect. He thought that the figures which had been given should alarm the country. It was true that our Mercantile Marine had developed enormously, and that by its means we had a considerable number of men returned as seamen in training. A very small proportion of these men, however, could reef and steer—the old qualification for a naval seaman. He calculated that, as a matter of fact, when the number of servants, artificers, and foreigners were taken into account, they had only a Reserve of 15,000 men whom, in the event of necessity, they could hope to call upon from the Mercantile Marine in addition to the Royal Naval Reserve. This was all the more serious, since, of 19,000 men now quoted as seamen in the Navy, there were 10,000 who had only an average of a year and a-half's service at sea, and they all knew that a year and a-half's service at sea was utterly insufficient to make a sailor. He might, in connection with that fact, mention that although seamen might be improved in character and conduct, there was no doubt that, even amongst the more experienced of them, the sailoring qualifi- 1841 cations had much deteriorated. Before a Committee of the House last year Captain Shaw, of the Fire Brigade, an experienced and talented officer, mentioned that, until about 10 years ago, the men of the Fire Brigade were taken almost entirely from the Navy; but latterly he had given up taking men from the Navy, because he found that they had not got the activity and other qualifications that were necessary to make them efficient in the Fire Brigade. He now went to the Mercantile Marine to obtain the men that he required. It was thus impossible to suppose that we had such seamen as we could desire, and a change was absolutely necessary. They trained their boys for the Navy, and they had a force of 18,500 trained seamen; but there were only some 4,270 men who had had four and a-half years' service at sea, and 2,603 who had had seven and a-half years' service; whilst there were only 1,816 who had had 10 years' service. That was a small proportion to rely upon, and it was for that reason that he had given Notice to call attention to the desirability of having additional cruisers built or bought—for it did not much matter which—for the purpose of attaching to each squadron cruising ships, in which, when the iron-clads were in harbour for re-fittings, or when their service at sea was unnecessary and expensive, to put a proportion of the crews on board, and so gain for them that activity and that daring which was only obtained by constant exercise aloft. There was another question to which he would now call the attention of the House, and that was to the very few iron-clads that they now had for the defence of the country. In his opinion, an iron-clad was now what the line-of-battle ship was formerly. The naval power of a country was measured by its iron-clads. Although many of his hon. Friends would not agree with his views, he would call their attention to the idea on which iron-clads were first created. Some hon. Gentlemen were now of opinion that in creating an iron-clad they must create an impregnable movable castle. That was not his opinion. It was necessary that they should have large iron-clads to meet vessels like those Italy had produced, and such as the French possessed in the three largest ships of their Navy; but iron-clads were built originally because wooden ships were 1842 exposed to shell which set fire to them, and the vessels were liable to destruction before they could make a sufficient impression on the enemy. This directed attention to the building of iron-clads. At present it was quite true that the power of the guns was much increased; but if they built their ships of a material that could not be set on fire, they could continue an action, and it was not to be supposed that they would not lose some men and ships, but they could prolong the engagement and bring it to a successful issue. He, therefore, desired not to urge on the Admiralty the construction of great and costly ships—ships costing £1,000,000 each—but a sufficient number of ships to maintain the peace and perform the duty of the old line-of-battle ships. What was the proportion that this country seemed to desire in former days? In 1793 the British line-of-battle-ship Fleet numbered 115, whilst France had 76, and Spain 65. The combined Fleets of France and Spain were more in number than the British Fleet; but the proportion was thought sufficient. It, at any rate, preserved the peace in 1790, although, it did not do so in 1793. In 1790, when France and Spain were bent on war in the question regarding Nootka Sound, a large fleet was immediately commissioned, and an armament of 53 sail of the line brought France and Spain to terms without a declaration of war. In 1820 there was hardly a line-of-battle ship in the world that did not belong to England; our sail of the line surpassing in numbers the combined Fleets of all the other countries. In 1840 the relations of France and England were considerably strained after the successful attack on Acre; but the Fleet of England in the Mediterranean was increased by 17 sail of the line in a very short time, and the result was that France kept the peace. It was shown that a display of naval superiority might effect what a long and bloody war might fail to do. On the change from sailing line-of-battle ships to steam line-of-battle ships, France for a time took the lead; but in 1860, thanks especially to the patriotic protest of the late Prince Consort, an effort was made, and our superiority was reestablished. Then came the era of ironclads, which had replaced the old line-of-battle ship. At first our great private establishments seemed to leave us with- 1843 out fears of any rival; but France emulated our activity, and in 1870, while Great Britain had 40 iron-clads, France had 31. At that time other Powers had hardly any iron-clads; but it must be borne in mind that now there were 266 iron-clads or more owned by Powers other than Great Britain. He would, however, use France otherwise than as the standard of comparison, and would remind the House that the present Secretary of State for War (Mr. Childers), in 1870, as recorded in Hansard, when he stated the numbers of the Fleets as 40 and 31 respectively, also said that, in order to maintain the relative supremacy of England, it would be necessary to build each year 12,000 tons of iron-clads—8,000 in the Royal Dockyards and 4,000 in private yards—that was, to produce three new iron-clads in each year, in order to keep pace with the shipbuilding then going on in France. The result of the last 10 years had been very different from that contemplated. France, after her great misfortune, was supposed to be devoting herself solely to the improvement of her Army, which was increased to 1,700,000 men, and it was thought she would not pay the same attention to her Navy. It was not, however, as they expected. They had now built or building in the English iron-clad Navy 58 or 59 ships, of which six were building. The French iron-clad Navy was 62 or 63, including 11 that were building. Thus, in numbers, it would be superior to our own, when those building were completed, and that was not a result that we could regard as satisfactory. If the proportion that they desired in 1870 was as three to four, it could not be advantageous to this country that that proportion should now be apparently equal. Subtracting the vessels that the French were building, they had 52 iron-clads, all but one in European waters, whilst, subtracting those that we were building, we had 53, not all in European waters, but in all parts of the world. It was, therefore, evident that in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and generally on the European coast, the French were in numbers greatly superior to us. But of the ships he had named belonging to the British Navy, one was at Melbourne, two at Bombay, one at Hong Kong, two at Bermuda, and four in China, the Pacific, and Australia. Those 10, then, must be deducted, from 1844 the force available for the Atlantic and Mediterranean, leaving 48 or 49 in Europe, of which six were building, to compare with 63 French, of which 11 were building. It might be said that a majority of the French ships were wooden ships iron-armoured, and that we preferred iron and steel. It was asked—Were the French ships of a character and quality that were dangerous to England? And, in looking at that question, he would remind the House of what had recently occurred in the Tunis affair. Perhaps the country generally were unaware of the fact that by a stroke of the pen, as it were, 10 sail of iron-clads appeared off the harbour of Sfax on a recent occasion, whereas we had only six iron-clads in the Mediterranean; and, however powerful and effectual these might be for the services they might be called on to perform, the House would remember that ships of that kind or any other kind could not be in two places at once. An hon. Friend of his who had visited Brest Harbour had informed him that he had seen there 31 iron-clads fitted with the newest artillery and mitrailleuses. He did not deny that steel and iron ships were preferable to some of these vessels, which, it might be said, were of wood and iron, and such as this country would not be satisfied to rely upon. But it must be remembered that we had in our Navy wood and iron ships which were returned as perfectly good and efficient vessels—the Lord Warden and the Repulse, for instance, which were built before, at least, 20 of the ships in Brest Harbour. The French had increased their Navy very much more rapidly than England during the last 10 years. Instead of having built 120,000 tons in the course of 10 years, as was stated to be necessary in 1870, England had only built 96,000 tons. Therefore, although it was evident that France had increased her Navy rapidly in the course of the last 12 years, this country had built ships in nothing like the proportion suggested as being necessary by the Secretary of State for War in 1870. He (Sir John Hay) suggested that instead of building six ships at the present time we should be building 18, in order to keep pace with the rate of building in France, which had, during the time he had referred to, more than doubled. Moreover, all the other Euro- 1845 pean Powers had added to their maritime strength, and there were, in addition to the iron-clads possessed by England, a total of 266 iron-clads belonging to the various Powers of the world; and he contended that these must, of necessity, be taken into consideration in deciding the number of iron-clad vessels which this country ought to possess for the maintenance of her naval superiority. He was not of opinion that shipbuilding should be confined to our Dockyards, which ought to be particularly utilized for the purpose of repairs; but that it should be distributed amongst the mercantile shipbuilding yards of the Clyde, the Tyne, the Humber, the Mersey, and the Thames, the resources of which were sufficient to turn out from two to three iron-clads each within the time necessary for their construction. Now, it was admitted that it was impossible to maintain the Navy in a state of completeness without spending £12,500,000 upon it annually; but, notwithstanding this acknowledged fact, we had now cut that amount down to £10,000,000. On the whole, therefore, during the last 10 years we had spent£15,000,000 too little on the Navy, except in that year when the late First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. W. H. Smith) bought the ready-made iron-clads, which alone saved the country from occupying a naval position inferior to that of Prance. He trusted the House would forgive him for having endeavoured to make clear the absolute necessity which existed for maintaining the superiority of the British Navy; and he appealed, to the First Lord of the Admiralty to make an effort in that direction, which, if the facts were as he had stated, he felt sure the country would willingly respond to.
§ SIR. THOMAS BRASSEYsaid, he had been asked to reply on behalf of the Admiralty to the observations which had been addressed to the House by the hon. Member for Penryn (Mr. Jenkins); and he trusted that it would not be thought that the important statement which had been made was treated with any disrespect in consequence. With reference to the speech which had fallen from his right hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay), he should leave that to be dealt with, when the general Shipbuilding Vote was reached, by his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty. He would, however, say a word or two with 1846 reference to the personnel of the Navy. His right hon. and gallant Friend had not expressed all the confidence which he had hoped he entertained in the Naval Service of the present day, and seemed, to some extent, to question the seamanship of the men, quoting in support of that view an opinion expressed by Captain Shaw, the Superintendent of the London Fire Brigade, to which he (Sir Thomas Brassey) offered the opinion of another gallant officer who had come fresh from his command, and who spoke in the highest terms of the seamen of the Fleet. With reference to the Royal Naval Reserve, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite seemed to question its efficiency; but, from reliable information in the possession of the Admiralty, he (Sir Thomas Brassey) was in a position to state that the Royal Naval Reserve was never in a more efficient condition than at the present time. He believed there had never been so little difficulty in keeping up the number of the Force. So far from there being any difficulty in this respect, they had recently had applications for the enrolment of men in excess of the number provided for in the Votes, and they heard there were men applying for admission whom it was a great disappointment to the recruiting officers to reject, on account of the exceptional qualifications which they possessed. He might also state the Liverpool Committee of Shipowners and Masters, who for many years had been watching attentively the position of merchant seamen, had recently dissolved, because they were sensible of the great improvement which had taken place in that respect. He would also remind the House that the facilities for training seamen were now brought to a degree of development and efficiency which had never been reached in former years. They had heard, on a recent occasion, of the great prosperity which, at the present time, was attendant upon the shipping enterprize of the country; and those who were anxious for the maintenance of seamanship in the Merchant Service must learn with satisfaction that the owners of ships were now finding the investment of their money more remunerative in sailing ships than in steam vessels. In turning to the speech of the hon. Member for Penryn (Mr. Jenkins), it was not necessary to trouble the House with any lengthy observa- 1847 tions on that subject, nor was it for him (Sir Thomas Brassey) to vindicate the conduct of the late Board of Admiralty in selecting the Atalanta as a training ship. The House was aware that naval opinions were strongly in favour of training our seamen in sailing ships, and the officers of the Navy were, in this matter, not singular in their views; because, in the Mercantile Marine, experience in sailing ships was held to be indispensable to the production of a seaman. That principle having been accepted, the next question was this—Was the Atalanta a suitable ship for the Service? On that point it was sufficient to observe that, when formerly in commission, she held the character of being a buoyant and stable vessel in bad weather. In accordance with the duty which devolved on the present Board of Admiralty, a Committee was appointed to inquire into the matter, and it was determined that its investigations should be of the most searching and impartial character. The Committee was fairly constituted, and combined both naval and other elements. The inquiry was most exhaustive, and the Report was signed by every Member of the Committee. It was to the effect that the Atalanta was a sound and stable ship, well-manned and well-equipped. With such a Report as that before them, the Board of Admiralty had not felt themselves called upon either to punish or to censure any officers, whether professional or executive, who were responsible for the selection and the equipment of the vessel. The heavy expenditure on repairs to the vessel had been sharply criticized, and it must be admitted that if such an outlay could have been anticipated, it would have been preferable to have built a new ship. There was a great discrepancy between the original estimate and the final statement of the cost of repairs, which amounted altogether to £28,000, the original revised estimate having been £16,000. But, on the other hand, it was stated on the part of the shipbuilding department that a vessel of the same type could not have been built at a less cost than £36,000. This would apply to the argument of the hon. Member for Penryn, that a new ship might, perhaps, have been constructed at a less cost than the amount of repairs. The liability to great and unforeseen expenses was doubtless an objection to fitting out any old wooden ship for re- 1848 newed service at sea. In the case of the Atalanta the expenditure was distributed over a lengthened period. It was divided between three Dockyards, and no single individual was responsible for what had occurred. He would not hazard a conjecture as to the cause of the loss of the Atalanta. It was certain that the vessel had encountered a hurricane of extraordinary severity; and seamen well knew how fearfully the ordinary phenomena of bad weather were intensified in those great tempests which were encountered only at intervals of years. He need not pursue further the painful subject of the loss of the Atalanta. Before passing to other topics, he would take the opportunity of expressing on behalf of the Admiralty and the nation their sincere and heartfelt sympathy with the widows and the orphans who had been left desolate by the disaster. He now turned to the general subject of the training of seamen; and as regarded that no hon. Member was more entitled than his hon. Friend to address the House on the subject. He spoke with the experience of a successful shipowner and a former commander of merchant ships. The Navy would value the opinion of a seaman who had received his training in what he might call the Sister Service. His hon. Friend had said that he shared the general opinion that the art of handling a ship under canvas was a valuable, if not an essential, part of a naval education. At the same time, he recognized the importance of steam in combination with canvas as an additional guarantee for safety. Such being the views of his hon. Friend, he claimed his general approval for the ships, in which the majority of their seamen were now serving. They had at present in commission one large frigate, the Inconstant, and 19 corvettes, some of which far exceeded in size and power the frigates of former days. They had 13 sloops, and one sailing sloop, the Cruiser, which was doing excellent work in the Mediterranean. He was giving expression to his personal opinion when he said that he hoped that another vessel like the Cruiser might hereafter be added to the Mediterranean Squadron. We had also five brigs, which were most useful for training purposes, attached to the home ports. On the last occasion when the Board visited the Dockyards, they saw the squadron of brigs weigh anchor 1849 in Plymouth Sound, and execute in admirable style a series of intricate evolutions under sail. The present Board were determined to keep up the seamanship of the British Navy in a manner worthy of its ancient reputation. They had fitted out a Flying Squadron, and transferred large numbers of seamen from the barracks at Sheerness and the receiving ships at the home ports to seagoing ships. They would take care to supply the Navy with ships which would be efficient under steam and sail. They would spare no pains to improve not only the ships but the system of training. They knew that they were watched by competent critics, and he thanked his hon. Friends the Members for Banff and Penryn for their interesting and suggestive speeches.
ADMIRAL EGERTONsaid, he was of opinion that no particular individual was responsible for the selection of the Ata-lanta, the whole Board being really responsible; and he had no doubt that the reasons which were put forward in favour of her selection were satisfactory to the Board in general. Remarks had been made with reference to the age of the vessel. As they all knew, there were old ships and old ships. One old one might be seaworthy, while a younger one might be utterly unseaworthy. He might illustrate that by recalling to mind the loss, some 20 years ago or so, of the ship that took Wolfe to Quebec. It was lost on the sands, and it was found, on examining her, that she was as sound as she possibly could be, although she must have been something like 104 years old. Everyone formed his own theory as to the cause of the loss of the Atalanta, and there certainly was nothing in the evidence to show that her age had anything to do with her loss. He was surprised to hear it said that Admiral Symonds objected to her; for he believed that any objections which he could have entertained against her were with regard to her equipment for such a purpose as that for which she was used. Sir Thomas Symonds was the son of her constructor; and, so far as his (Admiral Egerton's) recollection served, he did not think there was any vessel of which he was prouder. She sailed and was commanded in an admirable manner. That was the conclusion at which he had arrived after a careful study of the Blue Book on the subject. There was little 1850 or no profit to be found, however, in further discussion of this painful subject, and he regretted that the memory of it had been revived. He wished to endorse the remarks of the right hon. and gallant Admiral opposite (Sir John Hay) with regard to the very great importance of increasing the number of their war ships. He had not investigated the question so fully as his right hon. and gallant Friend of the number of ships in course of building by foreign Powers; but while he would not like to say a single word which would cause a feeling of antagonism between this country and France, he felt bound to say that it was impossible to observe without some anxiety the large number of iron-clads which their neighbours across the Channel were constructing. As to the best type of ship to build, he would very much prefer that they should build a large number of smaller ironclads, rather than that they should expend vast sums in building one or two very large ships. It might be necessary to have one or two great vessels; but he thought they should spend the money of the country to much greater advantage by building a large number of smaller ones with the proper amount of speed, rather than in building a few great ships. He was very anxious that the Admiralty should turn its attention more to the consideration of the armament of the Navy, for competent observers had put it on record that they were not in a satisfactory position in regard to the guns on our ships. A distinguished officer had said that the English guns were not equal to the guns on the vessels of some foreign Powers, and that that was the opinion of the foreign officers themselves. As to training ships, he agreed that they ought to use both steam and sailing vessels for the purpose, and there certainly ought to be some sailing ships on foreign stations. Such ships ought to have one or more tenders attached to them for the use of officers and men. With regard to expenditure, the new ships that were necessary to the efficiency of the Navy could not be built without considerable outlay; but he felt convinced that if it were only clearly shown that we were absolutely behind other nations as regarded the equipment of our Navy, no difficulty would be found in providing the money requisite to place it in its proper posi- 1851 tion in relation to the Navies of the world.
§ MR. MACLIVERsaid, he desired to press upon the Government the necessity of considering the claims of that deserving and important class, the naval engineers. On a former occasion, when the subject was before the House, the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Trevelyan) stated that the position of the naval engineers had been improved; but that was said under an evident misapprehension. So far from that being the case, they were no better off now than they were 20 years ago. In moving the Navy Estimates, the Secretary to the Admiralty stated that in future less blue-jackets and more artificers would be employed in the Dockyards; and that being so, he trusted that the position of the artificers, which, so far from being better, was really worse than it was formerly, would also be taken into favourable consideration. He wished also to call attention to the manner in which the grievances of naval officers were attended to at the Admiralty. It had been said that the Admiralty was always ready to meet the claims of those who felt aggrieved. On this point he had recently received a letter from an officer of long standing and great experience in the Navy, in which he said that if officers brought forward complaints, however well founded they might be, they would become marked men, not by the Civil Lords, but certainly by the Sea Lords of the Admiralty; and the writer went on to suggest that, as a remedy for such a state of things as now existed, the First Lord should appoint a certain time and place at which he would be prepared to receive officers and listen to their grievances.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFprotested, in the strongest possible manner, against the way in which the Navy Estimates had been treated that year. They were brought on that day without a single Minister being present who was responsible for the Estimates. He had nothing to say adverse to the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Trevelyan), who, either as Secretary to the Admiralty, as a speaker, a writer, or a politician, was a credit to the House and to the country; but the hon. Gentleman was not a responsible Minister. His complaint was that the First Lord of the Admiralty 1852 was a Member of the Upper House, and that he had never opened his mouth about the Navy since he had held his present Office. In 1871, the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government stated that the two Ministers responsible for the two great spending Departments ought to be in that House; and in 1872, he said that the two principal Ministers who were responsible for those Departments ought to sit in the House of Commons. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) pointed out, however, that when sitting in the Lords, the First Lord of the Admiralty could not be responsible for the Estimates, and it was plain that the right hon. Gentleman did contemplate that the First Lord ought to be in that House. It was trifling with the House and with the country that these Estimates should be discussed before a Gentleman who, however able, was not responsible, and that the Ministers who were responsible were not there. The result of having the First Lord in the other House was that a host of petty tyrannies towards the Navy and the Dockyards might be brought forward, to which they could get no satisfactory reply. One act of tyranny to the Dockyards perpetrated by this invisible Board was in their stopping a quarter of an hour of the dinner time of the labourers. That put the men to a great deal of inconvenience, because, whereas before they were able to walk home and get their dinners, they were now no longer able to do so. The old navigating officers of the Fleet also complained of the way they had been treated. The warrant officers also complained that they were put on a lower rate of pay when working in the harbours than what they enjoyed when at sea; and many other grievances of artificers, Dockyard riggers, and others might be mentioned. With regard to the complaint that the First Lord would not see a deputation from that House because it was an interference with discipline, he maintained that it was no such thing, and that the engineers and Dockyard labourers had just as much right to have their views represented as any other class of electors in the country. He trusted that the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty would bring this matter before the particular Lord of the Admiralty, who would put it before the next Lord, who would 1853 place it before the First Lord, and that the grievances of the engineers would be remedied. He wished his hon. Friend would go into the complaints that came from the Dockyards. He would find that none of them were extravagant; but he would also find that a great many were reasonable, and that all of them were plausible, if the hon. Member had the opportunity of going into these matters as he (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) had when he visited his constituents. An hon. Member behind him reminded him that the crisis might soon come; but he was always happy to meet his constituents, and feared nothing as far as that was concerned. If the hon. Member (Mr. Trevelyan) only went into these matters, he (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) was sure he would find a great deal to redress. He trusted that in future years the Navy Estimates would be moved at an earlier period of the year, and that the day was at hand when the First Lord of the Admiralty would again be a Member of that House.
§ MR. PULESTON, in reference to the claims of the naval engineers, said, he considered them to be urgent and well-founded; and that any scheme for the improvement of their condition should also include those who were below them—namely, the engine-room artificers. With respect to what had been said as to the refusal of the First Lord of the Admiralty to receive a deputation of Members of the House in reference to the complaints of the naval engineers, the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Trevelyan) had spoken of the discipline of the Navy, and disapprovingly of the fact that officers had asked Members of Parliament to bring forward their grievances. But they were driven to do so, as they found, practically, that their complaints were otherwise unheeded. While he (Mr. Puleston) said that, he joined very cordially in what had been said by his hon. Friend (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) as to the courtesy and efficiency of the hon. Gentleman who held the Office of Secretary to the Admiralty and represented that Department in the House. It had been promised that the new scheme relating to the Royal Marines should be promulgated by the 1st of July; and, as it was not issued yet, there was some anxiety to know what it was to be. He bad endeavoured, on more than one oc- 1854 casion, to urge the desirability of getting rid of some of the glaring inequalities that existed in the Dockyards, and he had submitted plans by which that object might be attained. The distinctions, for example, between shipwrights, wheel-rights, and carpenters were so unnecessarily wide as to call for serious attention; and the labourers' question was a large one, particularly that raised by the hired men. The most important requirement was that more men should be put on the Establishment. Something was done by the late Government in that direction, and, to some extent, the factory hands were established. It was necessary to offer inducements to good men to remain in the Service. When they joined it they wanted to look forward to the future as being measurably provided for. In the absence of such provision, the law of supply and demand produced serious variations in the population of the Dockyard towns, which, in a large measure, were built up on the faith of Government. Then, with regard to pensions and to provisions for the widows and orphans of seamen, Admiral Gambier had shown that there were various funds in connection with the Admiralty, derived from fines and other sources, which, even without any help from the Treasury, and without any contributions by the men themselves, would constitute suitable provision for this purpose. The fact mentioned on a former occasion by the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Trevelyan), that only 3 per cent of the seamen who had been asked for their opinion upon a fund to which they should contribute had replied in the affirmative, was due mainly to the circumstance that no matured scheme was placed before them; and he (Mr. Puleston) believed that if a substantial and intelligent scheme were presented to them, showing that if they either contributed so much themselves, or authorized so much to be deducted from their pay, a fund would be made sufficient to provide adequate provision for their wives and children, the affirmative answers would be nearer 100 per cent than 3 per cent. He desired also to call attention to the arbitrary way in which officers were sometimes dismissed from the Service; and he would give as an instance the case of two officers in one of the Departments, the Medical Department, who, after serving, one in Stonehouse and the other in Plymouth, 1855 for a year on trial, were confirmed in their appointments and then suddenly and summarily dismissed without any charge being made against them. They had, on the faith of their appointment by the Admiralty, gone to considerable expense in furnishing their houses, and establishing their families in what they regarded as a permanent position; and the only explanation they could get from the Admiralty was that the interests of the Service required their dismissal. Men dismissed under such circumstances, of course, lost their character, and would not be able to obtain other occupation, because they could give no reason for their dismissal, although their accounts had been declared by the Admiralty officials to be in perfect order. Such a system was injurious not only to the men, but to the country; and he hoped the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Trevelyan) would consider their case. At the least, compensation ought to be given them, and their characters vindicated, so that they might have a chance of obtaining other employment. Another matter of importance was the action of courts martial; and he would remind the hon. Gentleman of the case of Lieutenant Deacon, who, after 18 years of good service, was some time ago court-martialled on a charge of drunkenness at the mess, and convicted on the evidence of four officers, although four others declared that he was not drunk. One of the witnesses upon whose evidence mainly the officer was convicted, it was reported, had since been the subject of charges which showed, at least, that, if these statements were true, his evidence was of less value than it was assumed to be. He did not dispute the finding of the courts martial, nor question their ability and sincerity of purpose; but the sentence in this case had been unanimously declared by the papers throughout the country, including the Army and Navy papers, to be of unprecedented severity; and he again appealed to the hon. Member to allow the sentence to be reconsidered—not with a view to Lieutenant Deacon re-entering the Service, but in order in some way to lessen this unmerited disgrace. In conclusion, he would express his regret that when the Navy Estimates were about to be considered the House should be so empty as it was on this occasion, and that more interest was not taken in a 1856 Service to which, more than to any other, the greatness of this country must be attributed.
§ MR. BROADHURSTsaid, he sincerely trusted that next Session the Navy Estimates would be brought on at a time when it would be possible to discuss the important matter raised by the speech of the hon. Member for Plymouth (Mr. Macliver). The engineers of the Royal Navy were still looked upon to a considerable extent as intruders; and the fact was not realized so much as it would have to be, that engineers would be the chief mainstay in the future of our fighting vessels. He hoped that any scheme which might be prepared would be a thorough one, dealing with the grievances in no niggardly manner, and placing the engineers in the position demanded by their importance in the Service.
§ MR. H. ALLEN, as Member for Pembroke, also desired to enforce the arguments of the hon. Member for Plymouth (Mr. Macliver), and observed that the position and claims of the engineers were more and more forcing themselves on the attention of the public. With regard to the number of men on the Establishment, he believed that before metal was substituted for wood in the construction of ships, all the Dockyard employés were on the Establishment, and were entitled to superannuation allowance on retirement. But the system of hiring men was then introduced, and now in the Pembroke Dockyard only about one-third of the men employed were on the Establishment. Another grievance was that men of inferior grade were set to do superior work; and when they had passed their probation were not put into the superior grade, but were kept in their old position, and received the pay and pension belonging to the inferior grade. He hoped the hon. Gentleman would endeavour to remedy that grievance.
§ MR. BIGGAR, who had a Motion on the Paper to move for a Select Committee to inquire into the claims of Mr. John Clare, patentee of iron shipbuilding, said, he was unable to move the Resolution; but he desired to call the attention of the House to the matter. The claims of Mr. Clare had been frequently placed before the House, and the reply had always been that this case was settled a very long time ago, and 1857 that the Minister of the day was not disposed to re-open it. He (Mr. Biggar) did not think that was a sufficient answer; and he did not intend, if he could in any way avoid it, to accept a reply of that sort. He wished the Minister of the day, or some succeeding day, to meet the case on its merits, and to give a sufficient explanation, or such a decision, as would settle the question once for all. Though the case had been pending for a long time, his friend, Mr. Clare, had never allowed his claim entirely to collapse. Up to the time at which the claim arose, the principle on which iron vessels were built was with vertical columns from the keel, and then by what were called stringers from stem to stern of the vessel. After sustaining any strain, ships built in this way were liable to double up like a sheet of paper, and go down in deep water. Mr. Clare invented a new principle, somewhat resembling lattice girders. Whether Mr. Clare was the original patentee of this improved form of shipbuilding or not, there was no doubt that his plans were submitted to the Admiralty, and that the Admiralty was impressed by the desirability of the plans, and afterwards built vessels upon plans similar to his. So far all seemed very fair. Mr. Clare, however, made an application for compensation; and, in his (Mr. Biggar's) personal opinion, one reason why the claim was unsuccessful was this—that he expected to be paid at a very high rate. He expected to get a commission upon all vessels which had been built upon his plans, and on all vessels that might be built on these plans during the term of his patent. The result was that a controversy arose between the Admiralty and Mr. Clare. They set him at defiance, and gave him an opportunity of trying his case in a Court of Law. The result was unfavourable to Mr. Clare, for the reason that Mr. Scott Russell and Mr. Charles Fox gave evidence that his plans were not a novelty, but that vessels on the same plans had been previously built. Mr. Clare was convinced that that evidence was erroneous, and thought he could prove it. What he (Mr. Biggar) claimed was that a Select Committee should be appointed to inquire into Mr. Clare's case. He did not ask the Government to commit themselves to give any compensation; but he asked that they should not oppose the 1858 appointment of a Committee next Session to investigate the claims, and, if they found they were not just, then there was an end of the whole matter. If the Committee recommended in Mr. Clare's favour, the Government would only be bound to take into consideration the nature of his claims.
§ MR. EDWARD CLARKEsaid, he had intended to say something with regard to the claims of the engineer officers; but it appeared that they were satisfied with the prospects held out by the Government, and they, no doubt, had good reason for believing that their case would be attended to. With regard to the warrant officers, the same observation would also apply. But two cases had occurred lately, one at Plymouth and the other at Devonport, where persons in the service of the Admiralty had been dismissed without being afforded any opportunity of making their complaints known or having them investigated. He should like to know why, in these two cases, no opportunity had been given to persons who, after many years' service in the Navy, had been deprived of their employment, of having an investigation into the circumstances of their dismissal. The particular case upon which he wished to say a few words was that of Lieutenant Deacon, who was dismissed from Her Majesty's Service in consequence of the finding of a court martial which sat upon an accusation of intoxication made against him. Now, he (Mr. Clarke) was very sensible of the difficulty of reviewing a decision of a court martial; and, of course, his own experience in Courts of Law had taught him to be very careful indeed in forming a judgment upon reading the proceedings of a trial as to what really took place. But he was bound to say deliberately, after reading the report of the evidence given at Lieutenant Deacon's court martial, that anything more unsatisfactory than the evidence which was given there he never remembered. Mr. Deacon was charged with intoxication, and the witnesses against him were persons who did not volunteer their accusations, but who had been spoken to before they were called to give evidence. In almost every case it was only under pressure that they expressed the opinion that Mr. Deacon was intoxicated. The particulars of the charge were certainly of a very remarkable cha- 1859 racter, because the intoxication was alleged to have taken place at a time when Mr. Deacon was at dinner—he was, in fact, presiding at the dinner—he had given a toast, and had then ordered coffee, and had left the dinner; and, so far as one could see, there was no evidence of his having behaved in such a way as to lead anyone to believe that he was in a state of intoxication. So far as the evidence went, he (Mr. Clarke) was quite unable to find anything except an expression of opinion on the part of some persons that this gentleman was intoxicated, and it was upon evidence of that description that he was dismissed Her Majesty's Service. It was a matter of terrible importance to a man who, though not old, had spent several years in the Service; and he hoped the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty and the First Lord would give the case their re-consideration. If ever there was a case in which the finding of a court martial needed reviewing, he thought it must be that of Lieutenant Deacon.
§ MR. W. H. SMITHsaid, he should reserve any observations he might have to make upon the question of iron-clad ships until he had had an opportunity of hearing the statement of his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Trevelyan). The hon. Member for Penryn (Mr. Jenkins) had drawn attention to the case of the Atalanta; and although he (Mr. W. H. Smith) had not intended to address the House after the able statement made by the Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Sir Thomas Brassey), yet he thought it would be, on the whole, more fitting that he should now notice some of the statements made by the hon. Member. He had very generously acquitted himself (Mr. W. H. Smith) of any personal responsibility in the loss of that unfortunate ship; and he might take the opportunity of saying that no circumstance, except the loss of the Eurydice, occasioned him more deep sorrow during his administration of the Admiralty than did the loss of the Atalanta. It was a most deplorable occurrence, and entitled the relatives of the gallant men who sacrificed their lives to the sympathy and regard of the country. The hon. Member had referred to the Naval Lords being responsible for the selection of the ship. He (Mr. W. H. Smith), however, wished 1860 to express his entire concurrence with the observations of the hon. and gallant Admiral the Member for East Derbyshire (Admiral Egerton), and to say that the Board as a Board were responsible for the selection of the Atalanta. Of necessity, in the distribution of business, the discharge of certain duties fell to one or another member of the Board; but the Board, as a whole, were responsible for everything that was done by them. The vessel was selected, not by himself or by his Board, but by the previous Board; and he believed they selected her with full knowledge of all the circumstances of the case, and that they were fully justified in their selection. She was a ship of good character and good reputation. She had been almost completely rebuilt at Pembroke, and so thoroughly and substantially refitted that, to the best of the belief of those competent to judge, she was in a perfectly sound condition when she left British shores. No doubts were expressed as to seaworthiness, and the gallant Admiral then commanding at Devonport in no way hinted that she was in the slightest degree an unsafe vessel. She was, in his opinion, too small to accommodate the seamen; but that was a mere expression of opinion with regard to size. The misfortune was deeply to be deplored; but he (Mr. W. H. Smith) was not on that account prepared to say that the endeavour to train seamen in sailing vessels must be a mistake. If it was, it was a mistake which was shared by the most experienced owners of steamships in the country. He believed that in some of the largest lines of steamships the owners made it a condition that their junior officers should have had a practical training on board purely sailing vessels. There was another fact which had been lost sight of. He believed that the Merchant Service was as well manned and the ships were as well found as at any period of its history. There was a great advance in the seaworthiness of their ships and the character of the sailors. Yet it was notorious that on the occasion which resulted in the loss of the Atalanta more than 20 ships foundered at sea, or, at any rate, had not been heard of, having been engulfed in the storms that prevailed then. He thought that circumstance alone pointed to a condition of things which might well account for the 1861 loss of the Atalanta. With regard to the captain, he wished to say that that officer was selected on account of his reputation as a sailor. He believed that the captain never uttered a single suggestion as to any deficiency in the ship herself. He had complete confidence in the ship, and he (Mr. W. H. Smith) could only say for himself and his Colleagues that they had complete confidence in the captain and his officers. He hoped, however, that even that calamity would not induce the Admiralty to refrain from training their seamen in sailing ships. There were circumstances in which the use of steam was very desirable, and there were vessels which possessed steam power and also sailing qualities. The Comus was a vessel of that class; and they had, to a considerable extent, taken the place of the gun-boats on the Chinese coast. But he hoped that their sailors would continue to be trained in purely sailing ships.
§ MR. JENKINSrose to reply to some of the observations of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for "Westminster, when—
§ MR. SPEAKERsaid, that the hon. Gentleman was not entitled to make a second speech.
§ MR. TREVELYANsaid, that, as his right hon. Friend (Mr. W. H. Smith) reserved his remarks upon their ironclads for the purpose of saving time, he would ask his hon. Friends to pardon him if he also reserved any answer he had to make to their observations until the House was in Committee. There were one or two matters, however, upon which he would wish now to say a few words. A remark had been made by the hon. and gallant Admiral the Member for East Derbyshire (Admiral Egerton) as to the British Navy being behind other Navies in large ordnance. Such was not the case, though the real fact was that we were at this moment at the actual point of a revolution in the larger ordnance. The guns of the future were not yet afloat, being, with scarcely an exception, still in the course of construction. With regard to the state of the Navy at present, he would give one or two figures; but not by way of comparison of the relative strength in this respect of the British Navy and of the Navies of other countries. Austria had 10 ships carrying 110 heavy guns; Italy, 12 ships carrying 91 heavy guns; Ger- 1862 many, 18 ships carrying 118 heavy guns; Russia, 29 ships carrying 179 heavy guns; France, 59 ships carrying 356 heavy guns; and Great Britain, 98 ships carrying 572 heavy guns. He was not speaking of iron-clads. It might be said that all those guns, with scarcely an exception, were of the old type. There were guns of a new type in the Chilian and Japanese Navies; but almost all other nations were in an attitude of expectation concerning them. Last year the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. W. H. Smith) took money for 14 6-ineh guns of the new type; this year they had taken money for 115. It was only yesterday he (Mr. Trevelyan) had to issue a Minute under which the first battery of guns of the new type was to be mounted on an English cruiser now carrying six Armstrong guns. His noble Friend (Lord Northbrook) did not let a day pass without holding some consultation, or asking some question as to the state of progress of one or other of those guns, and the Admiralty would not rest until what the right hon. Gentleman so eagerly desired was accomplished, and Great Britain had an equipment of guns far superior in number, and not inferior in power, to the guns of any of the great Powers of the world. When he (Mr. Trevelyan) spoke of Lord Northbrook he was not inclined to defend him a second time; but this he might say—that Lord Northbrook possessed in a high degree the power of inspiring those who acted with him with a feeling of loyalty and attachment to himself, and with energy and public spirit in carrying on the business of the country. He did not see anything beyond what he had said the other day that needed defence in the personal conduct of Lord Northbrook, nor anything to complain of in the Parliamentary situation. He did not see any inconvenience in the management of the Department which arose from the present arrangement, though his share of the responsibility was as great as any reasonable man could desire to have. Where there was £11,000,000 of public money to be spent, there was plenty of work, not only for one man, but for two men, and for many more to help and supplement their efforts. With regard to the matter which his hon. Friend (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) brought before the House, that was a question which required very 1863 minute inquiry at the various ports of the country. He could only say, with regard to the shortening of the dinner hour in the Dockyards, that in the Dockyards, as elsewhere, the Factory Acts had to be observed; and that, it being necessary to make up in the course of the week five quarters of an hour taken from the working time of the boys subject to those Acts, various plans were considered, and it was ultimately decided to curtail the dinner hour in the manner of which the hon. Gentleman complained. At the same time, the Admiralty would be glad to adopt any better arrangements that could be suggested. With respect to the Royal Naval Engineers, they were the only branch of the Service that had not been dealt with in a comprehensive manner, and he would make a statement with regard to them in moving the Navy Estimates for next year. As for the delay in the promulgation of the scheme for the Royal Marines, he had to say that it was due only to the desire of the Admiralty to judge of the practical working of the corresponding scheme that had been prepared by the Secretary of State for War. It only remained for him to say a word on the case of Mr. Clare, which had been brought forward with great moderation, considering the long time it had been before the public. In June, 1855, Mr. Clare wrote to the Admiralty, stating that if buoyancy, strength, and resistance were the points required, he could produce a mode of construction which would produce greater efficiency than any yet adopted. For some time after that he laid his plans before the Admiralty, where they were carefully considered; and, after consultation with the professional officers, a reply was given. In September, 1853, Mr. Clare filed a patent for certain methods of fastening iron plates of iron-clads; and on the 13th July, 1855, the then Secretary to the Admiralty answered him that the Board was not prepared to entertain his suggestion, and in November of the same year wrote—"I have to acquaint you that we have no occasion for your services." This was done on the responsibility of the professional officers of the Admiralty. Mr. Clare was not willing to accept this answer, and in September, 1864, he sent in a bill for £6,571,740, the details of which he (Mr. Trevelyan) had 1864 by him. He would only read the last three items—
To loss by Admiralty for withholding payment from me since 1856,£2,000,000; to loss by Duke of Somerset nominating gentlemen to oppress, persecute, and swindle me of my property by perjury, £2,000,000; to the interference on behalf of the Duke of Somerset paying Captain Coles for 14 years for my inventions, £2,000,000.This was followed by a printed paper entitled—"Clare versus The Queen; or, a Petition of Eight versus a Petition of Wrong," which concluded by saying—If your Majesty will be pleased to say that a sum of money shall be paid on account, and a new trial take place, my case shall not only be proved quickly, hut shall put every one of the Admiralty conspirators and perjured witnesses into gaol.Up to this time he had relied upon the opinion of the professional officers, who positively declared that they gained no benefit whatever from Mr. Clare's services. But he did not put a great deal of store on what had up to then occurred. Mr. Clare took his case into the Queen's Bench, and filed a petition claiming £500,000 for the infringement of his patent. The Admiralty contested his claim, which was tried in February, 1863, at very great length; and the evidence of the Admiralty professional officers was supported by some of the ablest naval engineers of the day. Mr. Scott Russell stated that he had built many ships, and he produced the drawings of one built in 1850 identical in principle with the idea of Mr. Clare. "If you believe the Crown witnesses," said the Lord Chief Justice, "then there was no novelty in the invention, or there has been no infringement of it." Mr. Samuda, another witness, declared that for many years he had built ships on this principle. The opinion of the Lord Chief Justice was very strong. He characterized the claims to be the wildest and most extravagant he had ever known. Since that time Mr. Clare had never left the Admiralty alone, and his letters convinced him (Mr. Trevelyan) that he belonged to that class of men whom the Admiralty could not possibly have accepted as one of their professional officers. His claim before the Court of Queen's Bench was that he ought to have been engaged as constructor and shipbuilder for the Admiralty. He still wrote and signed himself—"Inventor, Patentee, Upholder, 1865 and Marine Ship Constructor of the State Navy since 1853," but sometimes only used the initials. The late First Lord of the Admiralty left it on record that it was clearly impossible to re-open the case. The verdict of a Court, presided over by one of the ablest Judges that ever sat in the Queen's Bench, had been taken; and he thought successive Boards of Admiralty were quite right in declining to re-open the question. It very often happened that a gentleman came to the Admiralty and made a sort of general proposition; and in subsequent years, when another gentleman did really make such a thing as was vaguely suggested, the first gentleman sent in a claim. The Admiralty was not ungenerous; but if inventors of real service to the country were to be rewarded, it was all the more necessary to refuse the claims of those whom the Admiralty professional officers pronounced to be of no service whatever.