HC Deb 01 August 1881 vol 264 cc410-35
MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT

, who was precluded by the Forms of the House from moving the following Resolution:— That the annexation of the whole country of the Akhal Turcomans by Russia, in violation of her promises to this Country, has been encouraged by the unfortunate evacuation of Candahar, and is a menace to the security of British India; said: I regret, Mr. Speaker, that it should be necessary to discuss so important a question as that to which my Motion relates at a period very late in the Session, and at an advanced hour of the evening. Hon. Members are naturally exhausted with the heavy labours of a prolonged Session; but the opportunities open to private Members have been so very rare that I do not feel justified in postponing the discussion, on the remote chance of finding a more favourable day before the Vacation. My Notice was placed upon the Paper before recent events in Afghanistan had made the subject even more important. The grave crisis which now exists in that country makes the question peculiarly appropriate. Candahar, the great position which those who wished well to British supremacy in India were so anxious to retain, the scene of our defeat and triumphs, is now in the power of a bitter enemy of our rule. The Prince who inflicted the greatest reverse that British arms have experienced in Asia for more than a generation, is now supreme in Southern Afghanistan. Ayoub Khan, who defeated General Burrows, and was in turn overcome by Sir Frederick Roberts, has recovered from his reverse, has utterly vanquished the Army of our pensioner and protegé, Abdurrahman, Ameer of Kabul, and is now master of Candahar. The £400,000 of treasure, the rifles and the cannons which our Armies captured, and which were handed over with such foolish precipitation to an untried and incompetent candidate for the Afghan Throne, have now become the spoil of his rival and our enemy. By a striking coincidence, the defeat of Abdurrahman took place on the very day on which, 12 months ago, Ayoub inflicted the crushing disaster of Maiwand upon a British force. Such a triumph must have an injurious effect upon the prestige of England, not only throughout Afghanistan and Central Asia, but too probably in Hindostan as well. A state of civil war and anarchy, which is the fertile soil for Russian intrigue, has been created in Afghanistan. The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for India must now remember, with painful vividness, many of the arguments and prophecies which were addressed to the Government from Members of the Opposition, with regard to the abandonment of Candahar. I do not propose to reiterate those arguments now beyond the briefest recapitulation. On four principal grounds the retention of Candahar was urged upon Her Majesty's Government. It was pointed out that its strategic position, as a great military stronghold, was of immense value for the security of British India. That value has been testified to by the authority of every soldier of any eminence, with one single exception, both in India and Europe. Candahar is on the high road by which every great conqueror of the past has advanced to the subjugation of Hindostan. By a trifling expenditure of money, and with a garrison of some 10,000 or 12,000 men, it might have been made an impregnable bulwark of the Empire. As a great centre of commerce, Candahar is equally important. It has always been the chief mart of Afghanistan and Central Asia. Under our beneficent rule there, its trade had already doubled. If the railway, which Lord Beaconsfield, with such brilliant foresight, planned and begun, had been completed, Candahar might, in a few years, have become one of the greatest emporiums of the world. The manufactures of Lancashire and Yorkshire could have been carried, in four weeks, into the heart of Afghanistan. Vast regions now closed to British commerce, and about to fall under the influence of Russia, would have been opened to our stagnating manufactures, which would have been then diffused throughout Afghanistan, Northern Persia, the country of the Turcomans, and even remoter territories. The interest of the population itself of Candahar was a most forcible argument in favour of our retention of that city. None of the pretences under which it was abandoned are falser than the specious statements that the people wished us to go. The majority of the inhabitants of Candahar wished us to remain. They greatly flourished under the reign of impartial law and peace, which, for the first time for many years, they enjoyed under British ascendancy. Their trade doubled. They bitterly dislike the Afghan tyrrany under which they have suffered nothing but extortion, oppression, and suffering. Three-fourths of the people of Candahar are not Afghans at all. They are Persians and Hazerehs, who are by nature and habit industrious and peaceful, and who hate the rule of the licentious Afghan. It is equally incorrect to state, as the noble Marquess has done, that the Candaharis showed their hostility to British rule by falling upon the remnant of General Burrows' Army as it fled from the battle-field. Had any such general hostility been displayed, not a man could have escaped. In a few villages only, and these Alizai and Pathan, our soldiers were attacked. The best disproof of the statement consists in the fact that the inhabitants of Candahar remained perfectly quiet and loyal during the trying siege when our very scanty garrison was surrounded by Ayoub Khan's numerous host. It was not for the interest of the people of Candahar, but against their interest and to their grave injury, that we abandoned Candahar. To whom did the British Government give up that populous and flourishing city? The Governor, whom the Ameer, our protegé, had sent to succeed us, was described by the able correspondent of The Times, then with General Hume, "as a loutish-looking youth of 19, with manners worse than that of the average Afghan noble." It was to this "loutish-looking youth" and his tender mercies that the people of Candahar were given over by a Government that professed to consult their interest. Now, the same unfortunate people are exposed to the resentment of the new victor, and the House may easily picture the fate of those who are obnoxious to Ayoub, because they have been partizans either of England or of Abdurrahman. Well, Sir, there is a fourth ground, on which those who wish well to the power and repute of Great Britain, opposed the policy of surrender. I do not expect this reason to carry much weight with hon. Members opposite, who seem as indifferent to the honour as they are to the material interests of their country. The word of England—that word hitherto inviolate—had been pledged to the people of Candahar, that "they should not again fall under the rule of Cabul." These were the words in which Sir Donald Stewart, as Governor and as General, representing the British Government, addressed those people. That promise was in 12 months fulfilled by their transfer, their unwilling transfer, to the considerate autocracy of a "loutish youth of 19," the Agent of the Ameer of Cabul. Sir, when I speak of this humiliating transaction, I cannot help recalling a similar episode, associated with others even more disgraceful, in the recent history of another portion of the British Empire. Sir Garnet Wolseley, also as Governor and General, assured the loyal Colonists and Natives of the Transvaal that—[Cries of "Question!"] I have no doubt those home truths are extremely unpalatable to hon. Members below the Gangway. I am entitled to illustrate my argument by a reference to a parallel case, and I do not intend to be disconcerted by the interruptions of the hon. Member for Scarborough (Mr. Caine). Sir Garnet Wolseley said that "the rivers should flow back in their courses, that the sun should rise in the West," before the Transvaal should be again given up to the Boers. Both these solemn assurances have been falsified by the action of the present Ministry. It is an evil practice which they are introducing; a practice which destroys all confidence among the nations in the honoured word of England. Sir, I trust that I have been able to show that the abandonment of Candahar was most unfortunate and ill-timed, and that it benefited no one. Neither the power, the influence and commerce of Great Britain, nor the interests of the people of Southern Afghanistan, nor the safety of Hindostan, were secured by our retreat. Within a few months of the day on which the last British soldier filed out from the ramparts of that splendid position, our enemy is within its walls; and Russia, has, in breach of her engagements, annexed a splendid people and a fertile territory, which brings her armies 400 miles nearer our Northern Indian Frontier, and close to the borders of Afghanistan. That country is the key of Hindostan. Nadir Shah, the great Persian conqueror, said that "the power which holds Candahar holds India." All the great authorities are agreed, whatever was their side in English politics, that all Russian influence must be excluded from Afghanistan. Even Lord Lawrence, the great standby of hon. Gentlemen on the Treasury Bench, had said that if Russia moved with regard to Afghanistan "we must wage war with her in every quarter of the globe." The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs strongly affirmed this principle in his recent speech during the Candahar debate. Afghanistan could not stand by itself. It must fall under either British or Russian influence. If we deliberately abnegate our interests and duties in that country, Russia will quickly and gladly occupy our position, and we can hardly blame her for doing so. Every event of recent Afghan history proves this. When Shere Ali had been satisfied that the Ministry of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) were, in 1873, too short-sighted or too timid to give him the alliance he offered and prayed for, Shere Ali at once threw himself into the arms of Russia. There is no unity or homogeneity about Afghanistan. It is not united, and hardly ever has been united. For a short time, under Dost Mahomet and Shere Ali, but only after bloody and exhausting civil wars, has Afghanistan been united. The inhabitants are made up of different races, with no bond of union, who are alien in religion and hostile in feeling to each other. The military strength of even an united Afghanistan is contemptible. We have never found any difficulty in conquering it; nor should we have had much trouble in holding it, provided we had possessed the courage to have a distinct and consistent policy, and to stand to it. A large party could soon be formed favourable to our rule, and the whole country would settle down as quietly as the Punjaub did in 1847. There are already 700,000 Afghans subject to British rule in that province. Russia can easily conquer and hold Afghanistan. What, then, are the dangers from a Russian advance? However much the apprehensions and warnings of those who have often been styled alarmists and Russo-phobists may have been ridiculed, no one who contemplates the patent facts of Russia's recent progress in Asia can any longer be indifferent to her advance. I will not weary the House with the details of Russian conquest in Asia. Suffice it to say that since 1862 she has moved forwards over 1,000 miles in the direction of British India. Her armies have traversed vast regions, great rivers, sterile deserts; have overcome savage and warlike races; have conquered great and populous cities, and acquired fresh bases for their operations within striking distance of Afghanistan, if not of India itself. In two directions her outposts are now barely 600 miles from our North-Western Frontier. The great Khanates of Central Asia have been conquered and annexed; and in the cities of Tashkend, Bokhara, and Samarcand, General Kauffman presides over an immense Vice-Royalty, bounded by the Oxus. On the more menacing side of the Caspian, General Skobeleff has recently made a prodigious advance, which has brought him close of Herat, and made Russia master of the richest portion of the Turcoman country, and of Northern Persia. It will be a terrible mistake, one fraught with the most disastrous consequences, if Parliament shows itself indifferent to this menacing proximity. Do hon. Members really ridicule the danger of a Russian invasion of India? Do they still assert that she has no intention nor wish to acquire that splendid Dependency for herself? On what grounds do they base their foolish confidence? What is there in the history of Russia to justify it? Has not her whole career been one of continuous aggression and conquest? Which of her neighbours have escaped her tenacious and devastating onslaught? Race after race, country after country has succumbed to the insatiable greed of the Russian power for fresh territory. What is there in the special case of India to justify such confidence? I ask hon. Members to consider the bare facts of the Russian advance in Asia, and ask themselves, dispassionately, for what object she can have incurred the vast sacrifices she has cheerfully undergone to extend her power, and always in the same direction—towards Hindostan? Why has she expended so much blood and treasure, so much labour and time in the conquest of wild countries and of brave and barbarous peoples? There can be but one reply. Her toil and expenditure have been devoted to one great object quite worthy of such efforts and offering an ample reward. The prize sought for is the fabled wealth of Hindostan. India, the Eldorado of all great conquerors, from Alexander I. down to our own time, is the reward that Russia has in view. It may be that experience has taught us that India is not so rich as we once imagined. Yet there is a vast amount of realized treasure in that country, of coin, of precious stones, of ornamental wealth, which are most attractive to an avaricious bureaucracy, civil and military, such as that which has control of the Russian Power. They are troubled with no scruples. It is not the good of the conquered people they seek. There are no sentimental humanitarians to press the claims, just or unfounded, of the subject population upon the conscience of the Russian public at home. The Russians desire to conquer countries in order to exploit them. The Natives of India would soon enough discover the contrast between our beneficent supremacy and the remorseless tyranny of St. Petersburg. Russian rule has been a curse and not a blessing to every people that has fallen under its crushing power. But, Sir, do facts in any way show that Russia has no intention of invading India? I have good evidence to the contrary. Scores of Russian officers have in my presence avowed their hope of sharing some day in the attack upon that coveted Dependency. Russians are extremely frank in their admissions upon these subjects—I mean the ordinary Russian officer or civilian, not, of course, the professional diplomatist or politician. General Skobeleff himself, the ablest of Russian commanders, has repeatedly stated that he hoped himself to lead the Russian Army that should march to the conquest of India. The Grand Duke Nicholas the younger, in a book recently published, speaks of a pass in Central Asia which he was then exploring as on the route that he expected to traverse with an army of invasion. India, I affirm, is the goal, the ultimate end, not only of all Russian progress in Central Asia, but of the military aspirations of the great bulk of the Russian Army. Now, Sir, this being the case, I should like to ask hon. Members opposite if they have any idea what that Army is? Authorities of great weight say that in a few years it will number over 8,000,000 of fighting men. [Laughter.] Mr. Speaker, these are not my figures, they are the official estimates of the Russian War Office as to the results of its new scheme of Army Re-organization. They are confirmed by the evidence of a gentleman of intimate acquaintance with Russia, the only European who took part in General Skobeleff's recent Turcoman campaign. I should like to read what this gentleman, the Correspondent of The Republique Française, the leading journal of Prance, M. Gambetta's organ, says of the Russian Army— The Russian Army within seven years will number an effective of 8,000,000 of men. You cannot imagine the ardour which excites all these young men, soldiers to the tips of their fingernails, only demanding a campaign—content, satisfied, proud, when they gain the Cross of St. George, or when in the midst of flashing sabres they can die gloriously. You cannot compare these men with any other European Army. To them war is a game, a pleasure, a recompense. 'Hurrah! the Tekkes!' they cried, when they were on the march to Central Asia, ready to die rather than to retreat (he saw two whole companies slaughtered, not one having tried to fly). You must see them, you must hear them, you must live in their midst to understand them. War is a perpetual song; it is their ardent irresistible desire to hurl themselves into the melée. Now, Sir, it does not matter very much for my argument whether the Russian Forces are 8,000,000, or 4,000,000, or 2,000,000 strong; the smallest number would, I imagine, be a most awkward problem for our scanty Army to cope with. India has been often conquered by invaders who followed the very route by which the Russians are now so rapidly pressing. To take one instance only, Nadir Shah, in the middle of the last century, marched with 80,000 men from Teheran to Candahar, from Candahar to Delhi, the capital of Hindostan. He took and sacked the Imperial city, and then marched to Bokhara, North of the Oxus, by way of Herat and Balkh. Nadir Shah thus traversed the two great pathways by which the Russians are now converging upon India. How, then, does the Party which advocates indifference and neglect propose to meet an invasion when it comes? Do they think that Russian bayonets can be met by anything except armed men? Do they think that they can repel the onslaught of the men who took Plevna by laughing at them? Or do they propose to entrench themselves behind their moneybags—and even these are shrinking—and expect the Russians to retire overwhelmed from the contest? Is it by their superior "moral sense?" Is it by their self-satisfied consciousness of superior philanthropy? Is it by their pacific intentions that they hope to drive back the Cossack and the Circassian? I know, Sir, it has been the fashion to allay alarms by assuming that Russia has not the money, nor the resources wherewith to invade India. Let not hon. Members lay that flattering unction to their souls. There cannot be a greater mistake. No country that has the men, and the spirit, the courage, enterprize, and desire to undertake a great war is ever kept back for want of money. Lord Derby, in this respect, made a prediction as mistaken as most of his political conclusions. He publicly stated, early in 1877, that Russia could not possibly attack Turkey because her finances were in such a bad condition. Well, Sir, Russia did attack Turkey within a few weeks of that prophecy. She waged a tremendous and. exhausting war with her valiant enemy and was victorious. I doubt if the credit of Russia stands much, if any, lower now than it did before that struggle of 1877. Russia has an unlimited supply of good fighting men; nor will she want for money. Iron has always conquered gold. It always will conquer gold unless the gold is defended by strong arms and courageous hearts. You can only repel a Russian invasion by being prepared and resolute. It is the strong man armed that keeps his house in safety, and not those who wait until the danger is upon them in an overwhelming torrent, before they begin to take necessary precautions. It would be a fatal blunder to meet the Russian attack on the Indus—that is, on the plains of Hindostan. For if Russian Armies were in possession of Afghanistan, the key of India, if behind "that veil of mountains" Russia could mature her plans of invasion at leisure and in secrecy, it would be open to her to select her own time for pouring her armies by different outlets upon your immense and ill-defended Frontier. A single battle there would settle, as it has often settled before, the fate of India. It is an axiom of good generalship to keep your enemy as far as possible away from your central resources—from the heart and strength of your power. Once let him penetrate within your inner lines, and immediate collapse may follow from a vital blow. This was the case with France in 1870. So soon as the Germans penetrated her Frontier line of fortresses around Metz, all resistance was ineffectual. War should be, if possible, conducted in your enemy's country rather than in your own. It spares your own people great ravages and suffering. If you had such a splendid position as Candahar, you would paralyze any attempt to attack you by any other route. You could then await your enemy with confidence in a fortress of great strength, abounding in every kind of natural resource. With the railway to Candahar, British troops could be placed within its ramparts within four weeks of their leaving your shores. Not a man or gun need be moved from Hindostan itself. All the garrisons of that country could be retained to meet the emergency of internal trouble. It is by no means improbable that if you waited to meet the Russians on the Indus, the most serious difficulty you would have to deal with would not be their bayonets in your front, but an alarmed and discontented population in your rear. Well and honourably as India is governed, it would be folly to shut our eyes to the fact that there are large sections of the population jealous of our rule. There are fanatical feelings towards the alien race, and ambitious Princes jealous of our ascendancy. There are proud races discontented at having their right of tyranny over their less warlike neighbours taken from them by the equity of British rule. There are Princes whose right to make war, to plunder and annex, has been curtailed since they were compelled to bow before the flag of England. How artfully, and with what success Russia would work upon the jealousy, ambition, and smouldering discontent of the Natives of India, those who know her history will be at no loss to realize. Russia would choose her own time for her great and final blow. It might well be such a one as the present, when our scanty Army has its hands full with a revolt in a distant Colony and with revolution and anarchy at home. Meet her onslaught at Candahar, and even if the most improbable contingency of your being driven out of that fortress occurred, there are dozens of positions among the defiles between Candahar and India which a few men can make good against an army. Sir, there are two facts in connection with the Russian system of con-quest which deserve special notice. They constitute the great difference between her conquests and those of England. Every race, every district which Russia acquires is immediately subjected to a rigid conscription. Her fighting material is thus constantly increased. Each fresh acquisition is thus made a stepping-stone for a further conquest. In the late Russo-Turkish War, it was her auxiliary and subject races that bore the brunt, at least of the earlier stages of the contest. It was after the Poles, the Finns, and the Cossacks had been decimated that the Imperial Guard was brought up to finish the war. In Asia Minor it was the Grenadiers of the Caucasus that stormed Kars, and Georgian and Circassian regiments that did most of the fighting. In a few years the most determined of Russia's opponents will learn to fight under her banners. Those same Daghestani mountaineers, who, under Schamyl, waged a struggle to the death for 12 years before they succumbed, are now her choicest troops. It is with them that Skobeleff has just annihilated the Turcomans of Akhal. Therefore, it is of serious moment to us whenever Russia adds fresh strength to her already enormous forces. She is conquering the finest races' of Asia. With our scanty Army and declining military spirit this cannot be a matter of indifference to us. It has been said that these conquests weaken the Russian power. It may be true that her internal condition, honeycombed as it is with revolution and discontent, is very bad; but her military strength is not less—it is considerably greater than it has ever been before. The second point is the system of colonization that Russia adopts with regard to every new and unsettled country. Colonies of Native Russians or Cossacks are planted among the conquered population. These live side by side with them, and hold their land on tenure of military service, like the old Roman Border Colonists, from whose tenure originated the feudal system. They are thus able and ready to suppress the first beginning of revolt. In the Caucasus these Military Colonies are frequent. Some of the Circassian mountaineers have actually been transported 1,000 miles from their homes to make room for their oppressors. So now the recently subjugated country of the Turcomans is being effectually colonized with Cossack settlements. Now, Sir, I come to the latest advance of Russia towards India, and the most serious of all. In my humble judgment, the fall of Geok Tepé was the gravest event for British interests that has taken place in Asia since the Indian Mutiny. Russia has at one stroke advanced her outposts nearly 400 miles nearer to our Empire in Hindostan; she has subdued a gallant people, and acquired a very rich and valuable territory. Before considering the annexation of the Turcoman country further, I wish to bring under the notice of the House the horrible, the atrocious cruelty with which this last conquest, like so many others, has been effected. The conduct of General Skobeleff closely resembles that of his predecessor, General Lomakin, in the expedition of 1879. Within the badly-constructed clay walls of the great aoul or village of Geok Tepé were collected most of the families, as well as the fighting-men, of the Akhal Turcomans. Upon this vast assemblage of some 50,000 souls, men, women, and children, the Russian General rained continuously for three weeks, heavy shot, mitraille, and bullets. He surrounded the encampment with his Cavalry and Artillery (70 cannon), and prevented any attempt at escape on the part of these wretched beings. When Geok Tepé was taken by assault, aided by dynamite mines, General Skobeleff, in his official Report, states that 4,000 unburied bodies were found within the walls. The number of Turcomans who perished in their most gallant defence is estimated, at the very least, at 12,000 persons. So much for the humanity of a Russian General who bombards an inhabited encampment even of Turcomans, and refuses to allow the women and children to escape. But what followed? I will describe it in the words of General Skobeleff himself. When the survivors, abandoning the struggle, fled from this scene of death, he let loose upon them his Cavalry and Horse Artillery. For 17 versts our soldiers pursued and slaughtered the fugitives; 8,000 of both sexes were hacked to pieces by our pursuing troops. Was a more fearful, more heartrending scene ever pictured by the imagination? These wretched people, encumbered with their families, fled across the level plain without protection or shelter. Grape shot and rifle bullets were poured through their dense masses, while the sabres and lances of the Cavalry did their work upon the defenceless fugitives, and the bayonets of the Infantry despatched the wounded and exhausted who could no longer fly. Let me briefly quote the account of what General Lomakin did in 1879. General Lomakin wrote as follows in his official Report to the Russian Government:— During six hours our 12 cannon kept up a continued fire on the fortified village settlement, where were collected nearly all the population of Akhal, including women and children, more than 20,000 persons. The effect of our artillery was terrible. The Turcoman prisoners say that several thousands of their people were killed. The Correspondent of The Golos, the principal Russian newspaper, thus describes the scene— At 4 o'clock the women and children streamed out of the aoul by two roads with pack-camels, in the hope of passing through and escaping. Picturesque was the sight. The long line of pack-camels, surrounded by women clad in variegated garments, and half-naked children with cries and noise and tears, winding in the direction of the mountains. To the feet of our troopers the beautiful, swarthy Tekke women on their knees, threw themselves, holding forth in their hands sucking babes, and imploring in an unknown tongue to have mercy on them. All of them by command of the Chief of the Staff were turned back to the aoul. Affecting were these scenes; but war will always remain war. [Mr. CAINE: Hear, hear!] The hon. Member for Scarborough (Mr. Caine) cheers the last sentence. Such barbarity is not war. It may be the warfare of an Attila or Zenghis Khan. It is not the warfare of modern times or of civilized nations. If the hon. Member for Scarborough thinks that it is, let me recommend him to re-read his history. Such atrocious deeds are a disgrace, an ineffaceable disgrace, not only to the cruel generals and soldiers who perpetrate them, but to the Government and Monarch under whose rule they are permitted and encouraged; aye, and to civilization itself. For it is under the pretence of civilization that such foul barbarity has too often of late been committed. I trust, Sir, we shall hear no more of the civilizing mission of Russia, even from the right hon. Gentleman himself, who has been so often her apologist. [Mr. GLADSTONE: No, no!] Well, Sir, I will not now detain the House by trying to disprove the disclaimer of the Prime Minister. I regret to say that I cannot accept that disclaimer, recollecting, as I do, expressions with regard to "the knightly crusade," "the sisterly mission," "the civilizing labour" of Russia; recollecting, above all, how actively the right hon. Gentleman worked on her behalf when he was in Opposition. These are no exceptional acts of cruelty on the part of Russian commanders. This is the usual way in which Russian warfare is conducted. General Kaufmann treated the Yomud Turcomans with equal cruelty in 1875. I could even parallel these massacres from a hundred similar and worse cases in Bulgaria and Roumelia during the late devastating war. At Hermanli this same Skobeleff, able general and agreeable companion that he is, drove with his Cossacks and Artillery 80,000 helpless refugees, most of them women and children, through a deep river and a narrow gorge, and finally into the bleak hills of the Rhodope, where most of them perished amid the frost and snow of a severe winter. What, Sir, is this Turcoman region which Russia has just annexed in spite of her promises? It will be remembered what an effect the assurances of the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had upon the House during the Candahar debate. He told the House in the most formal manner that the new Czar had recalled Skobeleff, and that Russia would withdraw from her recent conquests. Sir, I cannot suppose that the hon. Gentleman, a responsible Minister of the Crown, would have made such a statement had he not possessed what he believed to be ample grounds for making it. I cannot believe that he would make a statement which was intended to influence, and which did influence, a critical debate on a great subject without having received some direct assurance, in the sense he quoted, from the accredited Agents of Russia. What has happened? General Skobeleff was not recalled. Within a very few weeks of the Under Secretary's solemn statement there appeared an Imperial Ukase incorporating the whole country of the Akhal Turcomans, and much beyond it, in the Russian Empire. Even that was not enough. Within the past month we learn that the whole of the Attrek Valley and a region extending close up to Meshed, and including some of the most fertile portions of Khorassan, are also annexed. Time was when the hon. Baronet (Sir Charles W. Dilke) was not the humble and ever ready apologist and defender of Russian aggression that he always now appears to be. Time was when he took a manly and statesmanlike line upon these questions, and when he was no inconsiderable thorn in the side of the Prime Minister's "masterly inactivity." In 1871, during the debates on the Czar's arbitrary abrogation of the Black Sea Clause, the hon. Baronet denounced in no measured terms the weakness and incapacity of the Government of the right hon. Gentleman. What legerdemain has worked the painful change that we see? Is it the thraldom of Office? Is it some other reason? or is it the spell of national humiliation which the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) seems to cast over all those with whom he is brought into contact. The hon. Gentleman made a statement in 1871 which I should like to repeat to the House, so sound and admirable as it is itself, and so unlike the uncertain and unsatisfactory utterances which we have been getting accustomed to expect of late from the Under Secretary. It related to the shuffling and pusillanimity shown by Ministers over the Black Sea Clause. It is none of the fault of England; but comes of the timidity of her statesmen, and the weakness of her rulers. It is said that the policy of the Government has been a peace policy. I do not think that it has been either a peace policy or a safe policy. It may be a policy for a time cheap—although your Estimates do not show it; but it is not a truly pacific policy, if it is neither calculated to maintain the present dignity of this country, nor the security of any in the future."—[3 Hansard, ccv. 915–16.] Admirable words! The policy of Her Majesty's Government is, indeed, not a peace policy; it is not a safe policy. It is not cheap. It is a peace-at-any-price policy, a policy of humiliation and surrender—a policy which suggests aggression and invites attack. It is a policy which leads you to spend millions of money and thousands of lives in the near future that you may save some trifling expenditure and some little effort at present. It is a policy which allows threatening evils to accumulate until it is impossible to cope with them without the most desperate sacrifices. It is the policy which drifted England into that unnecessary and costly struggle of the Crimea, which by a little firmness and statesmanship could have been so easily avoided. This is known by nobody better than by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Would that the hon. Baronet (Sir Charles W. Dilke) retained a little of the patriotic watchfulness and forethought which he displayed 10 years ago. The moment that we abandoned Candahar and that the present Government showed that they really meant to go backwards and close their eyes to evident perils, then the Russian Government took heart of grace, and decided that it might venture to annex whatever it fancied. This Turcoman region is a splendid acquisition. The country is rich and prosperous, especially that portion which lies South of the Kopet Dagh range, the water-shed of Khorassan, and the proper boundary of Persia. Every traveller who has visited this country has borne evidence to the fertility of the soil and the physique and courage of the people. I will only quote one extract from a good authority, at least one which hon. Members opposite will not dispute. General Petroosevitch, the Russian explorer, writes that besides cultivating juwarree or maize, they grow barley, rear enormous crops of melons, and manufacture embroidered carpets and cloths having no equal in Asia. In one of his rides along the Akhal Frontier in 1878, he caught a glimpse from the crest of the Kopet Dagh of the Tekke country near Askabad. He says— Before me stretched a broad zone of gardens inclosing settlements and containing, according to those who had been there, any quantity of peach-trees, nut-trees, and grape-vines. Walnut trees and vines I myself saw in the neighbouring valleys. Consequently, if the Akhal Tekke settlements, exposed to the North wind, enjoy such a propitious climate, how much more so must the valleys further to the Souti, sheltered by mountain ridges? The valleys the Russian traveller refers to are the valleys of North Khorassan, where sheep lamb twice a year, and the people never know what it is to have a bad harvest. These valleys have already been annexed by Russia. Khorassan, up to and including Herat, was for several centuries the granary of Central Asia. This is really the first valuable country the Russians have yet conquered in Asia. It brings them South of the Desert, which is their natural boundary in Asia, and which should be the barrier between England and Russia. It gives them a fresh base close at our gates, from which they can prosecute their further advance with every advantage of position and resources. They will no longer have long and difficult marches to make, or dangerous opposition to overcome on the road to India. Their railway will soon be able to convey any number of troops from the Caspian to Herat. The Russian Army of the Caucasus is over 100,000 men. It can readily be trebled, and. one half despatched to annoy, if not to invade, one of our Indian Possessions. The Russian head-quarters are now barely 100 miles from Meshed, the capital of Khorassan, and second town in Persia. They are less than 300 miles from Herat, "the outer gate of India." From the Caspian to their new outposts, a distance of over 400 miles, has thus been bridged by one campaign. The integrity of Persia is violated, and the Shah seems to have become a mere instrument in his great neighbour's hand. The most serious fact connected with this advance is the railway which the Russians, with real statesmanship, are bringing forward from the Caspian to Herat. Already, half of the distance to Meshed is laid down; soon one-half of the remainder will be completed. The same Correspondent, whom I have already quoted, gives a most interesting description of its progress and value, written in April last— The railroad no longer encounters the least obstacle. It is an immense green billiard-cloth of turf, upon which the sleepers and rails can be placed without need of spade or pick. By next June (1881) the railway will certainly be completed to Bami—i.e., 264 versts (180 to 190 miles).…This line, which, such as it is, has so efficaciously served General Skobeleff, will, after June, have a fresh destination. It will then serve, not only to throw into Central Asia as many troops as the Russian Government may desire, but it will serve equally for the transport of merchandise coming from Herat, from Meshed, from Bokhara, and from Samarcand. General Annenkoff is busy in appointing special agents to most of these places, who will direct all their caravans to concentrate at Bami. Let people in England be under no illusion that this line, so excellently constructed, and upon which I have already travelled 35 versts an hour, can arrest itself at Bami. Once at Bami, a Ukase will direct its prolongation to Askabad, if not immediately to Herat. They may move gently (doucement) at St. Petersburg, and dole out their orders by doses of 20 or 60 versts; but it will not be surprising if they make 500. According to this well-informed gentleman, there is not the slightest obstacle between the Russian troops and Herat. The ground is level and well watered. "They have but to march some 300 miles, and say 'J'y suis.'" The efforts, and successful ones, which Russia is making to secure the trade of all these regions are not the least suggestive to us. Will it be believed that a British Ministry deliberately threw away such a rare opportunity of extending British trade and political influence as was offered by the railway to Candahar? It seems incredible; yet this was done only four months ago, and we are now reaping the evil fruits. There now remain only the Tekkes of Merv and a few minor tribes independent. These cannot long retain their liberty. Gallant they are; but no untrained and ill-armed race, be it as brave as Hercules, can long stand against breech-loaders. General Kaufmann, from the Oxus, and Skobeleff or his successor, from the Tejend, will join hands at Merv, and the whole of this magnificent people of the Turcomans will become Russian subjects. You will then find, too late, what you have lost in allowing such a valuable barrier between your possessions and the Armies of Russia to be beaten down, and not only beaten down, but to be added to the strength of your enemies. The physique of these Turcoman horsemen is unequalled. Their courage is proved by Geok Tepé, when they lost over half their numbers in defence of their liberty. They will make a far finer cavalry than the Cossacks, say Sir Henry Rawlinson, General Baker, Colonel McGregor, and Professor Vambéry. Their breed of horses is matchless, both for speed and endurance. A Turcoman rider will go, for five or six days, 100 miles a-day, on the same horse. It is no wonder that the Russian generals are anxious to conquer, and turn this splendid race into auxiliaries of the Czar. They might, by a very little management and support, be turned into our allies, and fight our battles for us for many years. Instead of this, we shall only too probably have to meet them as enemies upon the Indus. For her advance upon Herat, and thence upon India, there are now three roads open to the Russian Armies. One along the Tejend by Sarakhs, the second through Kuchan and Meshed, and the third West and South of Meshed, avoiding Herat, and striking the main road to Candahar at Farah. That there is no difficulty in marching from Herat to Candahar, Ayoub Khan's advance over the very ground twice within 12 months shows its facility. We have, Sir, a great dominion and a great charge at stake. On the highest ground, we have to guard the safety and interests of 250,000,000 of an alien population in India. However short our rule there may fall of the standard of absolute perfection, no one can deny that England has done much for that wonderful Dependency. It is no empty boast to say that the people of India have never, in their long history, enjoyed such benefits of government as England has conferred upon them. These growing myriads, alien to us and to each other in origin, in creed, in feeling, and in interests, enjoy to an extent, for them unequalled, the blessings of order, of law, of peace, and education, and all that makes a people prosperous and happy. It is our duty to preserve this vast population from the blighting domination of Russia. Nor are the benefits to England herself inconsiderable. The trade with India is worth £100,000,000 every year to this country. The number of your surplus population to whom India gives beneficial occupation, is close upon 250,000,000. She buys your manufactures, and sends you in return her products. More than this, upon the possession of India depends all the carrying trade with the East, with China, Japan, the Islands of the Archipelago, with Arabia and the Persian Gulf. No Englishman can wish to see this mine of wealth for England handed over to the most backward of European Governments, a Government that shuts British products out by protective tariffs. I have ventured to remind the House of these reciprocal advantages to India and to England from our connection with that country. They may be of service to those who would cry "Perish India!" or who could hear that cry unmoved. I have to thank the House for the kind and patient hearing it has granted me. I regret that I could not have dealt with a subject so extensive and important in a shorter compass. The interests and honour of the most noble fabric of Empire that human genius and enterprize have ever erected are at stake. I am very sensible of the inadequacy of my statements. I would only urge upon the Government to be forewarned and forearmed in time to meet the danger while it is still a small cloud upon the horizon, and, before it has swollen and covered the whole sky, to take that "stitch in time which saves nine" in political as well as in domestic relations. Let them retrace their mistakes. Let Candahar be held as an impregnable bulwark of our power, and let the Russians be courteously but firmly informed that they will not be allowed to annex the Turcoman people. England cannot afford to lose the high repute she has hitherto held in the East. I never thought, Sir, that I should hear, as I did in this House a few days ago, the reputation of England spoken of as "that miserable thing called prestige." Sir, what else is prestige but the character, the moral status, the reputation of a people among the nations? It behaves no State to guard its prestige so vigilantly and resolutely as England. Her "thin red line" can do a great deal, but it must have the prestige of old at its back. It is not by your bayonets, your rifles, or your cannon; it is not by your handful of soldiers among myriads of an alien population that the supremacy of England is secured. No, Sir; it is by the belief, hitherto unimpaired among your subjects in India, that the courage of Englishmen is invincible, that the word of England once pledged is never broken; that the foes of your power never gaze upon the backs of your soldiers in permanent retreat; that although you might be beaten once, or twice, or thrice, yet you would return to the struggle with quenchless resolution. These were the great qualities by which Englishmen of the past built up and consolidated the Empire you enjoy. It is by maintaining your reputation for courage, for statesmanship, for unflinching tenacity of purpose that you can alone maintain it.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

said, he did not hear any proof from the hon. Member that the annexation of the country of the Akhal Turcomans was a violation of any promises made to us. He considered that the hon. Member had been alarming himself unnecessarily. By many persons the importance of Merv had been ridiculously over-estimated; but they had forgotten that Merv was not on the road to India. Candahar was on the road to India, he admitted; but he did not see why there should be so much outcry about it. The late Lord Beaconsfield; while a Member of that House, described in the darkest colours the atrocious character of these Turcomans. They were a set of robbers who had damaged Russia, and had always been a terrible scourge to Persia. It was not for us to complain when Russia, in her own interests, had been forced to make an advance against those enemies of the human race. This advance of Russia was having a civilizing influence in Central Asia; and, even were we so misguided as to seek to stop her advance, we had not the power. He hoped, therefore, the Government, by fair diplomacy, would come to a fair understanding with Russia.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

Sir, I find it difficult to deal with the somewhat extensive speech of the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett). The hon. Member has evidently given his attention to this question, and has collected a great deal of information on it. I should be sorry if he or the House supposed that I mean to treat him with disrespect in saying that I will not attempt to follow him through the whole of that speech. But I should find considerable difficulty in doing so, because I am utterly unable to ascertain what was the exact point to which he wished to direct the attention of the House. As the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) said, there was not a word in the speech of the hon. Member to prove the proposition that Russia's annexation of the Akhal Tekke territory was a violation of her promise to this country. Neither has he said a word as to the second proposition in the Motion he had intended to make, that the annexation of the Akhal Tekke territory has been encouraged by the unfortunate evacuation of Candahar. I think the hon. Member was well advised in avoiding that subject, for he would have found it difficult to prove that operations which had been going on for a year before our evacuation of Candahar were encouraged by that evacuation. There is no connection whatever between our occupation of, or advance from, Afghanistan, and the Russian occupation of the Akhal Tekke territory. Does the hon. Member mean to say that if we had resolved to remain in Candahar Russia would have been prepared to abandon the results of her campaigns, and to have retired from the Akhal Tekke territory? [Mr. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT was understood to observe that the Under Secretary of State said so.] The Under Secretary of State said nothing of the kind. I do not think it ever entered the head of any reasonable person that such a result would follow. As far as I could gather from the hon. Member's speech, his sole object was to discuss again a subject which was fully discussed months ago—namely, our evacuation of Candahar, which evacuation was approved by a large majority of this House. I do not think it necessary that I should follow the hon. Member into another discussion of that subject. The only matter which I think it may be necessary for me to advert to for one moment is his endeavour to prove that our retirement from Candahar has led to the victory of Ayoob Khan, and that that victory is a condemnation of the policy of Her Majesty's Government. The Government and the House also, I think, were perfectly aware that the success of Ayoob Khan against Abdurrahman Khan was perfectly possible, and even probable. We have never pledged ourselves or our policy to the success or to the ability of Abdurrahman Khan to overcome his rival. On the contrary, I remember perfectly well that in the observations that I made to the House in the debate, I stated distinctly that the question of his supremacy in Afghanistan could never be decided until there had been an appeal to arms, and that it was impossible to foretell what the result of that appeal would be. No doubt, we have given some support to Abdurrahman Khan; but, if so, we have done nothing more than to discharge what we considered to be a debt to the people of Afghanistan, rather than an act in our own interests We have, undoubtedly, inflicted a very great injury and mischief on Afghanistan. We have destroyed whatever existed there in the form of government, and we have replaced it in the state of anarchy in which it was before Shere Ali succeeded to the Throne. That may have been necessary or it may not; but, no doubt, great injury was thereby done to the people of Afghanistan. We decided that it was not necessary in the interest of England that we should permanently occupy and undertake the administration of Afghanistan. Having decided to retire from that country, we considered that it was our duty to its people to give them, at all events, a chance of re-establishing for themselves settled government. Whether we selected the best candidate or not, what was done was done not so much in our own interests as in discharge of a debt to the people of Afghanistan, and to give them the opportunity of restoring, if they thought fit, a settled Government, such as existed before we destroyed it. The hon. Member has informed us that Russia can have no object in conquering these vast and sterile regions, unless it is with the view of invading India. At other times he informed us that she had acquired by those conquests fertile districts and the control of useful, warlike, and also industrial populations. He told us that he had had the privilege of conversing with General Skobeleff and hundreds of Russian officers, who, with wonderful unanimity, had avowed their intention of invading and conquering India, and that Indian Sepoys are quite unable to cope with the Russian soldiers. I wish when he made that assertion that somebody on the Bench opposite had explained how, under those circumstances, it entered into the mind of the late Government to bring Indian Sepoys from India for the purpose of defeating Russian soldiers in Europe. The hon. Member told us that the danger which now threatened India from the advance of Russia is only to be compared to a small cloud; but that soon we shall see Russia commanding the services of 8,000,000 men. He did not inform us by what process the Russian Army of 500,000 men is to be increased to the extent of 8,000,000. He indulged in an eloquent denunciation of the cruelties practised by Russia in the conquest of the Turcomans. It is no business of mine to defend Russia, and, no doubt, those campaigns may have been accompanied by some cruelties. But when the hon. Gentleman denounced Russia in such warm terms he ought to have adduced stronger proofs than he did of the facts that those cruelties were committed. All that he brought forward was the report that a Russian General had bombarded a fortified place, which not only contained soldiers, but the families of soldiers. I do not conceive that it is possible, if women and children and property are placed within a fortified inclosure, to avoid the bombardment of such a fortified position consistently with the necessities of war. The hon. Member only quoted the Correspondent of a newspaper, and gave no official authority for the allegation he made in that respect. He had spoken of the annexation of the Akhal Tekke country as a menace and a danger to India. Differing altogether as I do from the views of the hon. Member and those who agree with him as to the security of our position in India, I cannot admit his contention in this respect. But if it is any satisfaction to him, I have not the smallest hesitation in saying with perfect plainness that I do not think the annexation by Russia of the Akhal Tekke country is a matter of indifference to us. I will not enter into the discussion of the question whether that annexation was consistent or inconsistent with the pledges given by Russia to this country. I think that a good deal may be said on both sides of that question; but it has not been entered upon by the hon. Member, and I do not wish to enter upon it now. We are not concerned in the independence of the Akhal Tribes. But the recent advances and conquests of Russia have, no doubt, had consequences which do affect us in two points very nearly. The extension of Russian territory along the Northern Border of Persia raises a question of the integrity of Persia which cannot be indifferent to us, and the near approach of Russia to the borders of Afghanistan is not a matter of indifference to us. The present Government have admitted as plainly as any other that the integrity and independence of Afghanistan is a matter to them of vital importance, and that they do not intend to permit interference by any foreign Power with the internal or external affairs of Afghanistan. If Afghanistan were under a settled form of government it might be indifferent to us whether Russia or any other country extended to the very borders of Afghanistan. But that is not the case of Afghanistan. It has not, and perhaps it never may have, what we recognize as a settled form of government. There could be no doubt that, if Russia advanced towards the borders of Afghanistan, a state of things might ensue which would not be of advantage to the good relations between this country and Russia. Such an advance, therefore, could not be a subject of indifference to Her Majesty's Government, and I have no objection to state that what has taken place in Central Asia is receiving the consideration of the Government. But what does the hon. Member ask us to do? I have listened to his speech, and I confess I failed to ascertain the conclusion at which he arrived. The hon. Member, indeed, said there was some connection between our leaving Candahar and the advance of Russia; but, so far from that being so, it is my opinion, and it is the opinion of many persons—military men and others of high authority in India—that our continued retention of Candahar would have been in itself a sufficient reason for the advance of Russia.

MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT

said, he wished to explain that what he had said was that it was the general policy of retreat which had been adopted which encouraged the advance of Russia. He had not said that none of the Sepoys were a match for the Russian troops. What he did say was that most of them were not.

MR. ONSLOW

expressed his thanks to the noble Lord for the re-assuring speech he had made. For his part, he did not look at the question from a political point of view. The noble Lord said that the Government had always shown Russia that the independence of Afghanistan could not be a matter of indifference to them. The present position of that country was most serious, for if it fell under the rule of Ayoob Khan it would be governed by an enemy of ours and a friend to Russia. Her Majesty's Government could not, therefore, too plainly give Russia to understand that there should be no interference on her part with Afghanistan.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, that the noble Marquess had stated the broad outlines of the policy of the Government, and it was satisfactory to have to deal with a Member of the Government who did not take shelter under evasions. For his part, he would not regret seeing Ayoob Khan Ruler of Afghanistan. It was true he hated England, and not without cause; but if he kept England out of Afghanistan on one side he might be relied on to keep Russia out on the other. He thought the real danger of the matter was that Russia was advancing near enough to India to be within striking or, at any rate, agitating distance; and in the latter case her action would be sufficient to compel this country to send to India a force which would have a tendency to cripple her power in Europe.

LORD FREDERICK CAVENDISH

asked leave to withdraw the Motion for going into Committee of Supply.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Committee deferred till To-morrow.