[BILL 297.] THIRD READING. (Hansard, 2 September 1880)

§ MR. NEWDEGATE

Among the Acts which are to be renewed by this Expiring Laws Continuance Bill is the Ballot Act, which is to be renewed only for a year, 1099 and I am anxious to take this opportunity, however late in the Session, to draw the attention of the House to some of the circumstances connected with the operation of the system of secret voting; because I feel more and more convinced that, when the House meets after the Recess it will be found that under the system of voting, the majority of the will become so completely pledged as to have lost much of its deliberative character. This, I am sorry to say, as one of the effects of secret voting, is perfectly understood in the United States. It seems to be there understood that the Members elected under the system of secret voting, and the abuses which are inseparable from it, cease to be Representatives, and become mere delegates. The evidence of these defects in the system of secret voting is too strong already in this House. I wish, therefore, to take this opportunity of calling the attention of the Government and the House to some of the facts connected with this system of voting which is as yet novel in this country, but which, at the same time, after only a short experience, has began to manifest some of those evil characteristics that are so well understood in the United States. I speak of the United States, because I have a somewhat peculiar knowledge of the electoral system in the United States, and can speak as a witness of the operation of the Ballot in that country; and I do not suppose that there is any other Member of the House who was present at the election of the President at the General Election of 1841—in the United States. I went there for the purpose of seeing the merits or the demerits of this system. I had peculiar advantages. I had letters of introduction to eminent Americans, amongst others to the late Mr. Webster, with whom I had two conversations on this subject. I happened to travel to the United States with a gentleman who had, perhaps, better opportunities of letting me behind the scenes than any stranger living could have had. I went out in the steamer with the late eminent comedian Mr. Buckstone, and through him I became acquainted with the late Mr. Power, the great Irish comedian. Those gentlemen fully entered into my object, and, both being extremely popular with all classes in the United States, they afforded me opportunities for informa- 1100 tion such as I think very few Englishmen could have obtained. They assisted in getting me behind the scenes. In this country the system of secret voting is at present new. In the United States it has manifested characteristics which have alienated many of the intellectual and educated classes from it; and I can adduce no better proof that its disadvantages are known and felt in America than the fact that the Dominion of Canada, lying contiguous to the United States, has, with the exception of the Province of New Brunswick, rejected, and continues to reject, the system of secret voting. Our fellow-subjects in Canada, who are in a position to witness what I have seen, are determined not to follow in this respect the example either of the United States or of the Mother Country, but to continue the system of open voting as being necessary, in their belief, to the maintenance of free institutions, and for the continuance of their connection with this country, to which they are much attached. I have no personal reasons for disliking the system of secret voting. In the constituency which I have so long had the honour to represent in Parliament, changes were proposed, but none were made, in consequence of the last Reform Act—that of 1867. The extension of the borough of Birmingham, so that it might include its great suburb of Aston, was recommended by the Boundary Commissioners in 1868; but their recommendation was rejected; and I was told that, under the system of secret voting, owing to the exclusion of a great suburb of Birmingham from the borough and its remaining in North Warwickshire, I was certain to be unseated as soon as the Ballot came into operation. I said in this House that I did not believe anything of the kind, and I was returned at the next General Election—that of 1874—by the largest majority I ever had, and at the recent General Election my seat was not contested. I have, therefore, no personal feeling on the subject; but I entertain, as strongly as I have ever done, since I have witnessed the wholesale corruption and intimidation in New York and other parts of the United States, a rooted distrust of the Ballot. I entertain the same aversion to secret voting—the same convictions, which the late Lord Palmerston entertained. I hold that it is not only false in principle, an evil in itself; 1101 but in the United States the evils it generates have increased until the House of Assembly has completely lost its former representative character. I am so convinced of this that I venture now, before hon. Gentlemen on either side of the House, especially Supporters of the Government, are pledged to any particular measure with respect to this secret voting, to call the attention of the House to circumstance which are within my knowledge. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright) has been one of the great advocates of the Ballot. But there is this peculiar circumstance with respect to that right hon. Gentleman. He has often cited the operation of the Ballot in the United States with approval; but he has never been there to see its operation. I have been there, and have formed my opinion on the spot, after conversation with some of the most eminent American statesmen of that day. I may be told that mine is an old experience; but the late Mr. Graves, formerly Member for Liverpool, was in the United States just before the debates in this House on the introduction of the Bill for establishing secret voting. His evidence, given from recent experience, gained more than 30 years after the evidence which I desire to tender to the House as obtained by myself, so corroborates all that I saw, is so confirmed by all that I have since heard, that, with the permission of the House, I will quote what Mr. Graves said, the more particularly as he referred to documents which he had procurred in the United States. Among these was the Report of a Committee that inquired into this very system. He lent it to me and I returned it to him; but I am very sorry to say that his premature death precluded his procuring a copy for me. Speaking on the 29th of June, 1871, Mr. Graves said— If the Government had called for the views of the Canadians on the question, they would have been informed that no later than last Session a Bill had been introduced into the Legislative Assembly for the purpose of changing the mode of voting from vivâ voce to the Ballot, and that it had been rejected by a large majority. He would now turn to the United States. America always used to be put forward as their great guide on this question; but now it suited the advocates of this change to ignore altogether the operation of the Ballot in the United States, and to say that Australia should be their guide in bringing about this great change. Now, he held in his hand the Report of the Committee 1102 which inquired into the New York election frauds in 1869. The Committee declared that these frauds were so varied in character that they comprehended every known crime against the elective franchise; that they corrupted the administration of justice, degraded the judiciary, defeated the execution of the laws, subverted for the time being in Now York State the essential principles of popular government, robbed the people of that great State of their rightful advantages in the election of President, Vice President, Governor, and other officers, disgraced the most popular State in the Union, and encouraged the enemies of Republican Government to decry its institutions as a failure. More recently still the Governor of New York, in his message to His House of Assembly, said that all laws and measures to aid in establishing purity of election would fail if they did not reach this great evil; that no power would guard the Ballot-box, if the voters were influenced by the corruption of money. It was money, not measures, that secured the result of an election. This influence pervaded all society, and it was practised with impunity because the offenders could not be convicted and punished. From the impression that he derived from a personal visit to that country very recently, however, he was bound to say that in this country, individual corruption was more frequently practised than in America; hut in America it was the corruption of party platforms, and through the operation of the Ballot the independence of the voter was lost, because it passed into the hands of committees and party wire-pullers. These influences managed elections and they corrupted the constituencies. He noticed with regret that there was not in America the same ambition among the leading men to enter public life that existed hero. On the contrary, there they rather shunned taking part in Parliamentary representation, and he hardly met an enlightened citizen who did not join in the regret caused by this circumstance. He feared that in our own country the Ballot would cause a worse state of things than existed at present. He was bound to say, however, that when he went into the West, and got among the farmer class, he found an entirely different state of things to what he had seen elsewhere; and it was, in his opinion, of great value to that country that it had so steadying an influence in the farmer class. He passed some time in Kentucky, where he was astonished to find that the institution of free voting was practised as in this country, and the feeling there was that there was less corruption, quite as much freedom, and quite as much quietness in the elections as in those States were there was secret voting. The people said they should be sorry to change their system of open voting for secret voting, and his impression was that in Virginia the same system prevailed."—[3 Hansard, ccvii. 806–8.] In the United States, under the secret-voting system, the so-called representatives cease to be in the service of their constituents, and become mere delegates of the various caucuses, who combine for their return. It is, therefore, in the capacity of delegates merely that they go into the House of Assembly. The 1103 caucuses are the absolute masters of these delegates, because they have the opportunity of making the individuals, whom they return as Members, their victims, answerable at any time for the abuses which the caucus practices. Now, this is what I heard myself; and it is confirmed by the Report cited by my hon. Friend the late Mr. Graves. If Her Majesty's Government mean realty to inform themselves of the evils to be guarded against in secret voting, let them send for this Report which I have read—the Report on the New York Elections, published in 1869. I feel sure they will be convinced that I am speaking, not of an imaginary state of things, but of facts which I have tested by personal observation of the system as it works in America. Let me remind the House that secret voting is no safeguard against civil war. In the United States, we all remember a terrible Civil War; whereas if you look back through the annals of our own country for more than 100 years, you will find that England has been peaceful under the system of open voting, while only a few years have elapsed since the great nation on the other side of the Atlantic was torn by Civil War. My Friend Mr. Graves mentioned that he passed some time in Kentucky, where he was astonished to find that the institution of free and open voting was practised as in this country. Therefore, in the United States, the system of secret voting is not universal. The feeling which prevailed there was that far less corruption, and almost, if not as much, quietness existed as in those States where the voting was open as where there was secret voting. The people of Kentucky said they should be sorry to change their system of open voting for secrecy. The same system, said Mr. Graves, prevailed in Virginia. I heard Mr. Graves make these statements to the House. Other hon. Members had not the same opportunity of verifying the truth of his observations that I had, when he placed in my hands the document which recited the very corruption that I myself saw in 1841, and proved its increase up to 1869. I hope that the House will excuse me for taking this opportunity, while we are calm, for urging these considerations on their attention, of showing that a partial remedy will not suffice to secure us against the evils that prevail under the 1104 operation of secret voting in the United States. I well remember that the late Mr. Webster, during the election of President Harrison, told me—and I see no reason why I should not now repeat his remarks—that he did not think the system of secret voting was adapted for England. He said—"America is comparatively a young country. Our electoral divisions are more equal; they are more proportioned to population than those of your country. The condition of our people is more equal altogether than yours; so the system of secret voting is better adapted to this country than it can be to yours." We have not in this country yet reached manhood suffrage as it exists in the United States. We have not yet reached equal electoral districts; and I believe that the inequality which prevails in our electoral system is one of the principal guarantees for the full representation of public opinion, for the due representation of advanced education, and of refined intellect—an advantage that has not of late years prevailed in the electoral system of the United States. The proof of this is, they have been obliged to supply the failure of the House of Assembly, in that respect, by increasing the power of the Senate, and by arming the Supreme Court with such powers as have not been committed to any Court in this country. ["Question!"] The hon. Member who cries "Question!" thinks I am proceeding a little too far in my remarks; but I am speaking as one who witnessed what he has not seen. It is one thing to act on the report of others, and another to see the evils of secret voting with one's eyes, and to hear on the spot the opinions of eminent men with respect to the difficulties of avoiding or curing these evils, opinions which many of these eminent persons would not publish. There is evidence enough of the growth of these evils in this country. This House has sent an Address to Her Majesty praying Her to authorize eight Commissions, because, not satisfied with having punished for corrupt practices the Members who were returned to this House, we have already found it necessary to extend our inquiries to the organizations that returned these Members, with a view to extend to them also the punishment due to corruption. Let me ask the House and the 1105 country to weigh that fact. I have heard some who are inclined to impugn the conduct of the Judges appointed under the Act of 1868, because they have warned this House of the danger and of its magnitude. I remember the passing of the Statute for the appointment of those Judges; and it was expressly stated in debate, that they were appointed to sit at the sites of alleged abuse, and from those sites to furnish Parliament with information. These Reports have been made strictly in accordance with the duty assigned to the Judges; and though they may be disagreeable to the advocates of secret voting, they are none the less valuable to the country. I wish to point to one other circumstance. During the last four or five Sessions this House has witnessed a disposition to disorder such as I never, in my long experience, saw before. The system of Obstruction organized for the purpose of coercing the action of the Legislature is novel to this House. We have been obliged to adopt a Standing Order for the prevention of that evil, and for the protection of the independence of the House against such coercion. I will, with the permission of the House, read the opinion of one who is now a Judge in Ireland as to the probable effect of secret voting there: and then I will ask the House to compare his anticipations, with the fact that a section of the Irish Members had, during the debates of the last two or three years, proved rebellious against the authority of the Speaker—in fact, against the authority of the House itself—to a degree that never existed before. The extract I am about to read is from a book, which deals with other subjects, by Gerald Fitzgibbon, esquire, then a Master of Chancery, and now one of Her Majesty's Judges. Writing on the disturbed state of Ireland, he says— Three objects now float in the agitated surface of the Irish political sea—Denominational Schools, Home Rule, and Vote by Ballot. The priests are navigating the school question, unaided by the laity; the laity conduct Home Rule, unaided by the priests; and vote by ballot is allowed by both these parties to drift on to its destined port upon the current of Ministerial influence and power. In vain, the priests are goading their congregations to help them in their agitation for the schools, while they, themselves, turn a deaf ear to the solicitations and reproaches of the Fenians and agitators for Home Rule. The policy of the priests is easily explained; they have the Ministry half 1106 pledged to comply with their demand of the schools, and they see, with characteristic sagacity, that Home Rule is embarrassing to their friends in power, and is not yet ripe. They say of it what the First Napoleon said of the Empire, when he was urged to assume it prematurely—namely, 'That pear is not ripe yet.' They, therefore, discountenance the pressure of that most embarrassing question on the Ministry; while they are engaged in overcoming the obstacles which must be encountered on the school question. The leader of the priests is not a desperado, but a cool, far-seeing, and hitherto successful, ecclesiastic of the mediaeval type. This allusion is to the late Cardinal Cullen. His policy is to bide his time; to concentrate his own forces on valuable points, and to crush his opponents in detail." While he and his subordinates have cautiously abstained from giving help or countenance to the Home Rule sedition, they have equally refrained from every expression, which may hereafter bring upon them the reproach of inconsistency, when—the school question being happily settled—the Home Rule pear will be ripe. In the meantime, they look upon the Ballot as an accomplished fact; and although they regard it as a powerful arm for the battles yet to come, some of them, whether ignorantly or craftily, express apprehension of the effects of that measure on the influence which they have, and which they prize, over the minds of the voters. There is no foundation for their fears, if any such fears exist. The Ballot will enable every voter to support whatever candidate he pleases; and adopting that most successful principle' of keeping his secret from brother and from son, so clearly explained by the Reverend J. Ryan, he may amuse his landlord, or his creditor, or his friend with promises before the election, and with significant assurances after it, and thus escape the resentment of all except the priest. The priest he cannot escape; if he commits the mortal sin of voting against the right man, he knows that at confession that sin 'will be dragged out of him,' as the sin was dragged out of the bad child when on trial for heaven or for hell, and will not be forgiven. This allusion to "the bad child" has reference to the school system of the Christian Brothers, so-called, which the author has elsewhere in his pamphlet described. The Ballot, therefore, is a desideratum for the priests. If, with the proper use of the Ballot, after the schools shall have been conceded, the Irish contingent in the field of Party strife can be substantially augmented, then will be the time to aid the agitators of that question, and get home the Parliament to the Island of Saints. The expulsion of obstinate Protestants from Ireland are triumphs which no Jesuit would hope for, or attempt to accomplish in a year, or even in a generation. Such results must be attained in due time, and by slow, insidious, and ostensibly constitutional means. The Irish House of Commons, when they obtain it, must 1107 be first well packed with subservient Members, who will easily become an overwhelming majority when free from the vices and the votes of 500 English and Scotch Members. The United Parliament has, by the Church Act and the Land Act, made two clear precedents for the breach of national compacts and the invasion of private property. The case will be much clearer, and the arguments much more cogent, for restoring Ireland to the Irish, than they were for confiscating the Church property, and charging, by an ex post facto law, the property of Irish landlords with encumbrances for the benefit of tenants, which have been variously estimated at a value of from £15,000,000 upwards. To come at the property of Irish Protestants in this legal, peaceable, and constitutional method will require time and patience—two things which the everlasting Church and the far-seeing Jesuits are always ready to bestow. It was through priestly power that the electoral evils grew up to the extent described by Mr. Graves as prevailing in New York. That was proved in New York. No influence can be superior—none equal—under the Ballot to that of the priest. This was one prime aggravating cause of the evils which grew up. I trust that the House will excuse mo for drawing their intention to the magnitude of the evils which arise under secret voting. Under this system it is not so much against individual as against wholesale corruption you have to guard. The Government have intimated that, during the Recess, they are about to seek a remedy for these evils, which promise to be wholesale, and an Address to Her Majesty has been voted for the appointment of several Commissions of Inquiry. With the permission of the House I will cite the deliberate opinion of the late Leader of the Liberal Party, Lord Palmerston, whom for years I supported in his opposition to the establishment of secret voting. I communicated to him all the information which I had gathered from the United States, and he told me himself, that it was confirmed by the wide information he derived, having been so long Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with respect to the operation of secret voting in various parts of the world. Speaking on the Motion of Mr. Henry Berkeley, in 1864, Lord Palmerston said:— I object to the Motion because it is founded on an erroneous assumption. The hon. Member deals with the right of voting as if it were a personal right, which an individual was entitled to exercise free from any responsibility, whereas I contend that the vote is a trust to he exercised on behalf of the community at large. 1108 Even if the franchise were ever so extended—even if we had a manhood franchise, if every man arrived at the age of discretion were entitled to vote, it would be only a trust, because there would still be a large portion of the community, women and minors, affected by the laws, by taxation, and so on, whose interests would be committed to those who had votes. Indeed, our legislation is based on the understanding that a vote is a trust, and not a right. If a vote were a purely personal right, would not a voter be entitled to ask on what principle of justice you should punish him for exercising it in the manner which he thinks most for his own individual advantage? But you attach a penalty to the man who employs that right of voting in a way at variance, as you deem, with the public interest, for bribery, or any other such consideration. I say, then, that a vote is a trust, and I maintain that every political trust ought to be exercised subject to the responsibility of public opinion. The whole political framework of civilized nations rests on the principle of trust. The interests of the important, committed to a selected few who are community are in various degrees, more or less charged with duties, in regard to particular things, on behalf of the people at large; and their action in fulfilling that trust ought to be subject to responsibility towards those on whose account they exercise it. But I contend that the Ballot as proposed is intended to withdraw the voter from that responsibility which the public exercise of the trust confided to him would impose, and in that respect I think it would be a political evil. We have been told about the system in other countries—in America, for instance. But in America, as everybody knows, ballot voting is not secret. It is ticket voting. A man votes for a great number of officers at a time, and he sticks his ticket in his hat, and is proud of the party and the cause he espouses; he does not think of concealing the members, judges, governor, or other officers appointed by public election in the United States for whom he gives his voice. The Ballot, then, I hold, is founded on a mistake in principle, and is at variance with the fundamental assumption on which all our political institutions are based."—[3 Hansard, clxxvi. 44–5.] What have we in Birmingham? We have there a fictitious tribunal, erected for the purpose of dominating the return of the Members of that borough. If we are to have the Caucus, and if the system of secret voting is to be continued, I trust that, those who seek its amendment will not overlook the Italian system, in which the Caucus is regulated and incorporated by law for the improvement of the representation. In Italy they have the system of electoral colleges. I myself believe, that, if we are to have manhood suffrage, which seems to me an inevitable consequence and adjunct of the Ballot—I see not how we can ultimately escape from it under the Ballot—if we are, I say, to have manhood 1109 suffrage, and equal electoral districts, as remedies for the evils which secret voting is already generating in our electoral system, then I trust, that the Government, or whoever may be charged with the duty of curing, or rather of mitigatgating, the evils which I consider are inseparable from secret voting, will give their careful attention to the system of electoral colleges, the system by which, in Italy, one great object is attained—that the less educated—that is to say, the masses—are combined by law, in the exercise of the franchise, with the more educated classes. The Italians thus obtain much of the power of the Caucus, and, at the same time, escape from some of the evils of the Ballot. If you covet this power, which is so liable to abuse, and would avoid some of the evils, and amongst the rest the wholesale system of corruption, the Italian system is worth your attention. I myself believe that the evils of secret voting are incurable. I hold this proved by the example of the United States. I think the tendency to corruption and intimidation evils inseparable from the system of secret voting.