HC Deb 31 May 1877 vol 234 cc1132-42

MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS.

MR. SANDFORD

rose to call attention to the omission from the Blue Book No. 2, on Turkey, of all mention of the conversation between Lord Salisbury and the Due Decazes at Paris, and between Lord Salisbury and Prince Bismarck at Berlin; and also to call attention to the proceedings of the Conference at Constantinople; and to move for the production of Copies of any Minute of the aforesaid conversations at Paris and Berlin. The hon. Gentleman observed that in the present state of the Eastern Question they could hardly overrate the importance of any information that they could obtain upon this subject. Everybody must feel that Prince Bismarck at Berlin held the key of the position. It might be of national interest or national importance that these conversations should be suppressed, and if it were so, all he could say was that it was most unfortunate. The suppression of these conversations had given rise to alarming rumours. It was generally believed that Prince Bismarck had confided to Lord Salisbury that Germany was about to attack France. He (Mr. Sandford) believed that no such communication was made. He did not believe it was the wish of Prince Bismarck to attack Franco, whatever might be the wish of the military party in Germany. And he was sure that Prince Bismarck was much too prudent a statesman to have stated to Lord Salisbury that he wished to attack France. The suppression of these conversations had given rise to all the more alarm, because conversations at Vienna and at Rome had been published. They had learned from Rome that they were unwilling to give any port on the Adriatic; and they had learned from Vienna that they objected to the Russian occupation of the Christian Provinces of Turkey; and the impression, therefore, left on the public mind was that the conversations with Prince Bismarck must have been of a most mysterious and alarming character. The special Envoy of England had been instructed by the Foreign Secretary to make the extraordinary proposition that Bulgaria should be occupied by a French Force. If the Foreign Secretary had only looked at the map he would have seen that north of the Danube there was a country called Roumania, and Roumania was ruled over by a Prince of the House of Hohenzollern; and he might have further ascertained that the one political feeling and instinct of the people of Roumania was in favour of France. It was not, therefore, surprising that a proposal to place a French Force on the south side of the Danube was scouted equally at Paris and Berlin. He had asked Her Majesty's Government on a previous occasion, whether any step had been taken for the neutralization of Roumania, and the answer was that there was no Treaty stipulation for the neutralization of Roumania. That was, no doubt, correct; but one of the Articles of the Treaty of Paris contained a provision that no armed intervention could take place without previous agreement between the Great Powers. The object of creating the State of Roumania was to place a neutral State between Russia and Turkey, and the first duty of diplomacy should have been to neutralize the territory of Roumania. They now heard that Roumania had declared her independence, and he should like to know what were the views of Her Majesty's Government and the other guaranteeing Powers with regard to this declaration of independence. We found that at the very moment when the Russian Ambassador was urging this country to sign a Protocol in the interests of peace, Russia was signing a Convention with Roumania with reference to the carrying on of war. He should like to know whether Turkey was to be regarded as an independent or as a dependent and protected Power? Not only among orators on the platform, but among Members of Her Majesty's Government, he found very conflicting views on that point. In all the earlier despatches of the Foreign Secretary up to the time when ho learnt what the feeling of his employers was, they found him urging that Turkey was an independent Power, and impressing on other Powers the necessity of maintaining its independence. But after lie had received certain deputations, Lord Derby took a different tone. On the 21st of September he wrote a despatch requiring Turkey, in the name of the Queen, to punish the perpetrators of the massacres in Bulgaria. If the victims of those massacres had been English subjects, Lord Derby might have had some right, in the name of the Queen, to demand the punishment of the offenders, for it was a well-known principle of International Law that one country had a right to demand from another an equal administration of its law as regarded the subjects of the complaining Power. But he had yet to learn if Turkey was to be considered as an independent country, on what grounds we could call on her to inflict punishment for acts committed by one portion of her subjects upon another. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, speaking in Lancashire, had said they were bound to treat Turkey as an independent State, such as Italy or Spain; but in a subsequent speech in that House, the right hon. Gentleman declared that we stood in a different position towards the Christian Provinces of Turkey from what we did to other countries, and that we ought to use our best endeavours to obtain good government for those Provinces. He should like to know from his right hon. Friend on what grounds he rested the right of this country to interfere. Was it on the Treaty of Paris? The 9th Article of that Treaty—the only Article referring to that point — stated that the Sultan gave his Christian subjects their privileges of his own free will, and it was expressly laid down that no foreign Power was to have a right of interference in the matter. The Secretary of State for War lately told them that the Treaty of Paris was still in existence, and that they were bound by it. A Treaty in diplomacy, however, was not like an Act of Parliament in Westminster Hall. It was rather like a lady in society, who, when her character had been pretty generally impugned, was not held entitled to the same amount of respect as she otherwise would enjoy. The Foreign Secretary himself said that Treaties were not eternal, and could only be maintained as long as circumstances permitted. But although we had no special right to interfere on behalf of the Christian subjects of the Porte, we nevertheless had the common right to interfere in the government of Turkey which every nation had when its neighbours endangered the general peace and tranquillity of Europe. He believed that the Government of Turkey was intolerable alike for its Mahomedan and its Christian subjects, and the great mistake made in the Autumn agitation was that too exclusive stress was laid on the grievances of the Christians. He thought it would have been far better had the Great Powers commenced where they ended, and when first the insurrection broke out between Bosnia and Herzegovina to have told Turkey that her Government was intolerable, and that if she did not reform it within a certain space of time united Europe would be called on to take some steps to put an end to the misgovernment of the Provinces. That would have been far better than entering upon a Conference, the proceedings of which it was obvious could only end in a fiasco. Nothing could have been more absurd than for ten or a dozen Foreign Ambassadors to have gathered round a table to draw up a Reform Bill for a country whose language they could not speak and whose customs they did not understand? It would have been the interest and policy of England, if she were to interfere with the Government of Turkey, to urge on Austria to come forward as a great Slav Power. No doubt, there would be great difficulties in the way in reference to the Magyars; but the interests of 35,000,000 of people ought not to be sacrificed to Magyar jealousy. If Austria had known that she could have counted upon England, he believed she would have decided to take some important step. If we did not adopt that course, what other policy had we to pursue but a policy of waiting? We had no right to coerce Turkey without first warning her, and up to the present moment the only warning she had received from us was that she was not to be coerced. We could not coerce Turkey as the ally of Russia, but as a member of the European concert. If we joined Russia, the only effect would be to destroy that Turkish Fleet which was the only effectual obstacle to the advance of Russia on Constantinople. Heaven forbid, however, that England should commit the blunder of a second Navarino In 1855 he was one of the few Members of that House who looked unfavourably on the Crimean War, believing it was undertaken for French rather than for English interests, and he had then thought it of comparatively small importance whether Constantinople was occupied by Russians or by Turks. But things had now changed. In 1855 our communications with India were carried on by the Cape of Good Hope; now they were carried on through the Suez Canal, and England could not look with the same indifference as formerly on the occupation of Constantinople by Russia. Some wished this country to adopt a policy of action and to occupy Crete or Gallipoli. But were we to occupy them as neutrals, or as friends of the Turks? If as friends of the Turks, it would be a declaration of war against Russia. If as neutrals, the Turks might object, and it would be a declaration of war against the Porte. There were difficulties and dangers in the present policy of isolation. Within a very short space of time, he believed, the Turks would be conquered both in Europe and in Asia; and that they would then be too happy to come to terms with Russia alone; and if this country took no part in the struggle, she would have no right to take part in the arrangements which would follow on its conclusion. He believed the Czar had no intention of occupying Constantinople; but if the war went on, there might be considerable difficulty in restraining a victorious Army. He believed in the moderation of the Czar, but not in that of a victorious Russian Army. Russia would probably expect the restoration of the territory in Bessa-rabia taken from her by the Treaty of Paris; perhaps, also, some part of Asia Minor. She might likewise possibly demand the passage of her Fleet through the Dardanelles, and that the Bulgarians should be governed by independent Rulers. Herzegovina and Bosnia might be added to Austria, and some small addition of territory given to Montenegro. The Sultan would retain the residue of his dominions, but only as a satrap of Russia. He believed in a crisis like the present, the responsibility for action should rest on the Executive Government of the country; but he would venture to ask Her Majesty's Ministers for an explicit declaration of their policy, and whether there was any truth in what he had read in the newspapers — namely, that Russia had proposed to this country a localization of the war, and that that proposition had not been accepted? He would remind the Government that a policy of frankness always commanded the respect of of the majority of the English nation, and that a policy of concealment was altogether opposed to their sympathies and generous instincts.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words " an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, Copies of any Minutes of the conversation between Lord Salisbury and the Due Decazes at Paris, and between Lord Salisbury and Prince Bismarck at Berlin,"—(Mr. San ford,) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. BOURKE

thought the House must be surprised, as certainly he was himself, at the speech which had just been delivered by his hon. Friend. His hon. Friend had invited a discussion upon certain points connected with foreign politics which were of a difficult and delicate character; and he believed the House would agree with him in thinking that it would be inexpedient for him to follow the hon. Member through the various topics which he had raised. So far as the neutrality of Roumania was concerned, he (Mr. Bourke) had already described to the House the position in which this country stood, and therefore it was unnecessary for him to dwell upon that topic. There could be no doubt that the neutrality of Roumania and the provisions of the Treaty of Paris had been infringed by Russia. With regard to interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, that was a subject which had been fully discussed in the House; but there was one point in connection with it which his hon. Friend appeared to have misunderstood. His hon. Friend had said that the Treaty of Paris absolutely precluded this, as well as any other country, from interfering with the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. That, however, was an opinion which lie did not think any person fully conversant with the facts could hold to be sound. Under the Treaty of Paris, which had been called that evening the " common law right of interference " remained exactly where it was before, and one great proof of that was, that in 1859 the Earl of Malmesbury addressed to the Porte one of the strongest despatches ever written, calling attention to the condition of the Christian races under Ottoman rule, and stating unequivocally that this country would " insist "—that was the word used—upon the promises of the Sultan being carried out. Therefore, the right of interference not only existed theoretically since the Treaty of Paris, but had been acted upon by this country and acknowledged by the Porte. His hon. Friend who had raised this question at the present time had also said that the Conference at Constantinople was objectionable, because it would have been better to have told Turkey that she must reform herself, and that if she did not do so in a short time the European Powers would interfere; but it appeared to him that, for reasons which had been frequently urged in the discussion of this subject, it would have been extremely unwise for Her Majesty's Government to have adopted that course. His hon. Friend had likewise said that the difficulties of a policy of inaction were almost equal to those of a policy of action, and no doubt that observation was perfectly true; but that was precisely one of the reasons for refraining from saying what would be the policy of the Government in the future. That policy, as everybody must be aware, considering the present grave aspect of affairs, must be guided entirely by circumstances. Her Majesty's Government had no reason to suppose that either Russia or any other Power imagined, at this moment, that when the terms of peace came to be discussed they could be any other than Europe generally could accept. In other words, when those terms came to be considered, they would constitute a question for the Powers in general. The conversations between Lord Salisbury and Prince Bismarck at Berlin, and Lord Salisbury and the Due Decazes at Paris, to which his hon. Friend had referred, were strictly confidential, and Her Majesty's Government, which was guided in the matter solely by a regard for the public good, exercised its discretion in not publishing them. Had those conversations been, so to speak, of a public character, Prince Bismarck and the Duc Decazes probably would not have communicated their views to our Ambassador so freely as they had done. With regard to the publication of despatches generally, he thought Her Majesty's Government had certainly not erred on the side of withholding information. The present case, however, was exceptional, inasmuch as the communications made by Prince Bismarck and the Due Decazes to Lord Salisbury were intended for the British Government alone, and not for any other. In those circumstances, he hoped the House would not think him disrespectful, if he declined to give any further information on the subject. His hon. Friend had asked whether Russia had made a communication to Her Majesty's Government as to the localization of the war? In reply to that question, all he could say was that he did not know of any communication from the Russian Government of the nature which had been described.

LORD ELCHO

said, he had no wish to enter upon a general discussion of the Eastern Question; but he thought his hon. Friend (Mr. Sandford) had done good service in eliciting the statement from the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs that, in the event of peace being made, that peace must be a matter for European arrangement.

MR. BOURKE

said, that what he had desired to convey was this—that when the question of peace came to be discussed, it no doubt would be one which would concern Europe; and the European Powers would consider that they had a right to share in the deliberations respecting the future.

LORD ELCHO

said, there was, however, a question of more vital importance than that to which his hon. Friend the Member for Maldon had drawn attention. It would be in the recollection of the House that in the very able speech which they had heard from the Home Secretary before the Recess, there were certain limits laid down within which, it was said, English interests would be deemed to be at stake. The arguments of the right hon. Gentleman seemed to meet with general approval in the House on both sides, for the noble Lord the Member for the Radnor Boroughs, who had the distinguished honour of being Leader of the Opposition, when he spoke subsequently in the debate, said merely that he would not bind himself to the limit which had been laid down by the Home Secretary. Now, it was an important question whether we were in a position at the present moment to defend those interests. He did not believe that the most extreme humanitarian among us—he did not believe that ten men even of those who were at that moment assembled in Bingley Hall, where a right hon. Gentleman who had formerly retired from public life was now addressing 30,000 people, and inaugurating, he would not say the music and harmony, but probably the discord of the Liberal future—would deny that circumstances might arise in which it would be absolutely necessary for England, as far as she had the power, to step in and defend her interests in the East of Europe. The question was—Were we in a position to do that, and were the Government taking the steps necessary to defend English interests, should they in any way be assailed in the course of the present unhappy war? Efficiency and promptness were one and the same, and any interference on our part, in order to be efficient, must be prompt. Now, efficiency meant men and horses; it meant matériel, it meant transport, it meant organization. He would assume that we had the men; but our organization was a paper organization. When the Mobilization Scheme was laid on the Table of the House last year, it was of value mainly as showing not that we had our corps d'armée ready, but how they should be disposed of when ready, and as showing, in fact, the poverty of the land in that respect. It was a skeleton scheme, which required to be filled up. Now, to fill up such a skeleton scheme, not only were the elements he had mentioned required, but the important element of money was also necessary. Without asking for extra money, were the Government prepared to fill up the skeleton with flesh and blood? Now, what was the present state of our supplies? He held in his hand a War Office Circular which gave all the requirements of a corps d'armée numbering 35,000 men; and he believed it would be found that the state of our supplies was very far from what was there shown to be necessary. He believed that the stores we had were principally in one great arsenal, so that it would take a long time to get them out—that we were deficient in transport carts of all kinds, and especially in ambulance waggons of the latest pattern—that ammunition carts were wanting for both Infantry and Artillery—and he would ask whether it was true that Artillery battery waggons had been taken from the batteries and used for the supply of ammunition? Then, 11,000 horses were required for a corps d' armée of 35,000, but he believed that nothing at all approaching the number required was available at the present time. As regarded small arm ammunition, he was told we had not enough even for home consumption in time of peace. As regarded powder, we made something like 500 barrels a-year less than was annually expended, and although we had a supply of 300,000 barrels, yet it was scattered all over the world, and, therefore, to a large extent would not be available.

THE O'DONOGHUE,

rising to Order, asked the Speaker whether the matters which the noble Lord was discussing were within the scope of the Motion?

MR. SPEAKER

said, the Main Question before the House was as to going into Committee of Supply, to which. an Amendment had been moved for Papers. That being the state of the case, undoubtedly the observations of the noble Lord were not relevant to the Amendment before the House.

LORD ELCHO

asked, whether any remarks on the general question as to the state of preparation we should be in if called upon to defend English interests would be out of place at that moment, or whether he ought to wait till the Question for going into Committee of Supply was again put?

MR. SPEAKER

observed that the more convenient course was for the House to deal, in the first instance, with the Amendment actually before it.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.