§ SIR EDWARD WATKINasked Mr. Attorney General, Whether his attention has been called to the proceedings at Boston (in the matter of the Petition against the return of the then sitting Members) and to the questions submitted to the Court of Common Pleas by Mr. Justice Grove, and to the decision thereon; whether it is the fact that 877 Voters were reported as having received gifts of coal without any legal proof to that effect as respects the alleged recipients, and that 353 Voters were struck off, so as to seat the Petitioner, John Wingfield Malcolm, esquire, without hearing such Voters, or ascertaining for whom such 353 persons actually voted; and whether, thereby it becomes probable that the Petitioner has been seated by the process of striking off votes given for himself?
THE ATTORNEY GENERALIn answer, Sir, to the first Question of the hon. Member, I have to state that my attention has been called to the proceedings at Boston, in the matter of the Petition against the return of the then sitting Members, and to the questions submitted to the Court of Common Pleas by Mr. Justice Grove, and to the decision thereon. The second Question of the hon. Member, in the terms in which it is expressed, involves a very grave charge against the learned Judge—namely, that of having arrived at a decision in the absence of any legal evidence to support it. If it is the intention of the hon. Member to suggest such a charge, which from what he has just said I conclude it is not, I should have ventured to submit for the consideration of the House whether it is a convenient practice for the Attorney General to be called upon to express an opinion upon the propriety of a Judge's decision, in reply to a Question put by an hon. Member, and at a time when the usage of the House would 122 not permit of the Attorney General entering into any sufficient explanation of the conclusions at which he had arrived; nor of any other hon. Members, whose opinions are of at least equal value with those of the Attorney General, and who may differ from his conclusions, entering into any discussion upon the subject. The inconvenience of such a practice would be, perhaps, more particularly apparent in a case like the present, in which, by law, the decision of the learned Judge is final, whatever doubts the Law Officers may entertain as to its correctness. I by no means suggest that such questions should not, under any circumstances, be raised; but that, if raised, it should be at a time and in a manner which would admit of their being fairly considered. I am disposed, however, to think, from the terms in which the hon. Member's third Question is expressed, that he is under a misapprehension as to the actual state of the law as it affects the votes given in favour of any candidate who has been proved guilty, by himself or his agents, of bribery, treating, or undue influence. By the 25th section of the Ballot Act it is provided that in such a case there shall be struck off, from the number of votes appearing to have been given to such candidate, one vote for every person who voted at such election and is proved to have been so bribed, treated, or unduly influenced. At the inquiry before Mr. Justice Grove it was established to his satisfaction that upwards of 850 voters had been bribed by the agents of Mr. Parry, and, that being so, all that remained to be done was to ascertain that a number exceeding the majority of Mr. Parry over the Petitioner had voted at the election; it was quite immaterial for whom they had voted. The provision to which I have referred was inserted in the Ballot Act for the express purpose of obviating the necessity of ascertaining how the bribed voters had voted.