RESOLUTION.

HC Deb 21 April 1871 vol 205 cc1469-505

MR. CAVENDISH BENTINCK

, in rising to call attention to "the Declaration of Paris, 1856," and to move a Resolution, said, that nearly four years had elapsed since the Declaration of Paris and the matters connected with it had been discussed in that House, but he did not believe that this was to be attributed in any way to want of interest in it, so much as to the state of quiescence as to all foreign affairs which had prevailed during the last two Sessions, and down to the time when the great European War broke out some months ago; and this statement would be sufficiently established by reference to a Petition that he had presented, and which emanated from the most important commercial centres in the kingdom. The questions involved in the Declaration of Paris were, in his estimation, of such paramount importance that he had placed, on the Paper a somewhat similar Notice to the present, on the very first night of the Session, and it was only owing to accident, and no fault of his that he had not been able to bring it forward at an earlier period. He did his best to bring it on upon the 10th of March, when a stormy discussion, which ensued at an early hour, wrung from the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) the opinion that this was a matter which might well stand over for some time. He (Mr. Cavendish Bentinck) did not agree in that opinion; but, nevertheless, he was not sorry at the delay which had occurred, because he hoped to be able to point out to the Government the means by which some of the objections made to the Budget of the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be obviated, by showing how the defence of the country might be adequately provided for without the vast expenditure which he contemplated. First, the proposition which he made consisted of two points: he asked the House to express an opinion in favour of restoring the right of privateering; and, secondly, the Right of Search, both in their full effect. The Right of Search ought more properly to be called the right of seizure, for we defined it in this way—that it was the right to seize and confiscate enemies' goods at sea. This was a right which was inherent from the state of war itself, and had never been canvassed in operations on land. The Eight of Search and Seizure had been maintained by England at all times. The great statesmen of the last century—Pitt, Pox, and Grenville—maintained it in full force, and every other great man of that day did the same thing; and at the same time, he might mention many instances in which this right had availed this country in its contests, and he would mention two. The first was the celebrated case of the "Armed Neutrality" in 1870, when England was at war with France and Spain, as well as with her own Colonies. The combined forces against her maintained that enemies' goods were safe under a neutral flag; but England resisted the adoption of that principle, and by her continuing the right of seizure, that formidable combination crumbled to pieces. Again, in 1800, there was what was called "The Armed Confederacy," in which Russia, Sweden, Denmark, France, and Spain took part. England again resisted, the combination, and the British Minister at Copenhagen said that the right of visiting and examining on the open sea merchant vessels was 'regarded by the British Government as the unquestionable right of every nation at war, founded upon the law of nations, and generally admitted and acknowledged. On the 14th February, 1801, the British Government laid a general embargo on foreign vessels, letters of marque were issued, and in six months this second formidable combination disappeared. With reference to this, he had discovered a remarkable passage, written by Lord Nelson, in a despatch dated the 4th April, 1804, after the Battle of Copenhagen. The despatch was written to Mr. Addington, and the writer made use of this expression—he said that he had had a conversation with the Crown Prince of Denmark, and expressed himself to the Prince as followed:— Suppose that England, which she never will, should consent to this freedom and nonsense of navigation, the result would be ruinous to Denmark, and the Baltic would soon change its name to that of the Russian Sea. So matters remained till 1854, when, on the outbreak of the Russian War, "this freedom and nonsense of navigation," as Nelson called it, took possession of the British Government, and an Order in Council was issued, by which it was stated that Her Majesty would waive the right of seizing enemies' property laden on board neutral vessels, except contraband of war. He did not propose to discuss the reasons of that Order in Council; but he might observe that some attributed it to the influence of the Peace party, others to the fear of what course America might take, and others said that it was issued at the special request of France. Now, in passing, he might observe, that this Motion was in no respect one of a party character, and he should expect the support of some hon. Members sitting on the Liberal side of the House; and for his purpose, it was quite sufficient that the Order in Council operated to the disadvantage of this country, because the result was that the commerce of Russia went on and was in no way seriously diminished or injured. In order to support that proposition, which had been controverted, he should cite three Gentlemen of the highest authority who at present had seats in the House. On the 20th of February, 1855, the present Attorney General, then Mr. Collier, made a Motion in that House, which was virtually a condemnation of this very policy of Her Majesty's Government, and in a very able and persuasive speech said— It was said, truly, that we were not a great Military Power, and that the country had not a great standing Army, but that we had fleets which, if they could not destroy the forts and fleets of Russia, could at least blockade every port that power possessed. It was, therefore, anticipated, said his hon. and learned Friend, when urging his Motion, condemnatory of the policy which was afterwards embodied in the Declaration of Paris, from that blockade that the commerce and wealth of Russia would be so crippled that it would be impossible for the Emperor to continue the war for any lengthened period. … That our efforts had not met with the desired result was certain; but, indeed, the reverse. So far from our having blockaded the principal ports, the exports from that Empire had been greater than ever."—[3 Hansard, cxxxvi. 1660–61.] These remarks were seconded by his hon. Friend the Member for Bridport (Mr. Mitchell), who, in the same debate, said—"I believe there is no man acquainted with Russia, who would not be of opinion that the greatest means of coercion which could be used against Russia would be the closing of her ports and the stopping of her export trade; and that the best means of hostility against Russia at the beginning of the war would have been to take steps to stop the whole of the export trade of that country." But that was not all. There was another great Russian authority, the hon. Member for Wolverhampton (Mr. Weguelin), who, on his election, said that he had waited with a deputation of 30 or 40 merchants engaged in the shipping trade with Russia upon Lord Clarendon, who stated that he was satisfied with the correctness of the reasons which the deputation had furnished, but that the Government could not possibly take on themselves to quarrel with Russia—they could not afford to go to war with Russia. Well, then, after all, the result was we went to war with Russia as a military nation. We did not injure their ships at all, and we had to make a disgraceful peace. As soon as the French were exhausted, we were compelled to close the war, with Sebastopol only half taken, and we were obliged to accept Russian assistance in the re-embarkation of our troops. The next step in this case was, that which was done at the Congress of Paris in 1856. He did not wish to dilate on the sad, perhaps dismal, page of history in which the proceedings of that Congress were written, neither would he wish for one moment to cast a stain upon the reputation of the venerable Mr. Cobden, or the reputation of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright), whose absence from the House they all regretted. He regarded Mr. Cobden and the right hon. Member for Birmingham as honest men, only both of them were rather misguided; for instance, it was believed that after 1846, war was impossible, and Mr. Cobden again and again urged that policy on the Government of the day. On the subject of this Declaration of Paris, as it was called, he (Mr. C. Bentinck) would ask the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government and his Government to rescind it. He had to point out as one of the reasons for this being done that, in the opinion of the highest authorities, it had not been a legal proceeding; it was not a treaty, and it should not have been printed as a treaty; it was never ratified, and was never brought before Parliament at all. On 8th April, 1856, Count Walewski, in giving reasons for the adoption of the Declaration, proposed in the second Protocol, that the Congress should conclude its work by an arrangement which, he said, would constitute an advance on International Law, and then he enumerated four propositions, and wound up his proposal by saying that the adoption of his four pro- positions would be the attainment of a result to which none of them would be indifferent. Count Walewski, as a ground for adopting this Declaration, urged that the Congress of Vienna had sanctioned the abolition of the slave trade and the freedom of rivers; but the abolition of the slave trade was made under circumstances totally different, and the right hon. Gentleman at the head, of the Government would see that there was no analogy whatever to be drawn from the precedent. He would next state to the House the opinion of the late Lord Derby when this Declaration came to be known and discussed in "another place." Lord Derby expressed himself in the strongest terms of condemnation on the subject, and said it was admitted that the Declaration was not a treaty, and that it had not the same solemnity; that it was equally a surprise to the public and the Plenipotentiaries; and one that Government had asked, in surprise—"Is England at last so weak as to consent to this?" and concluded by exclaiming that we had been trying for the last 100 years to find a British Minister to surrender this point, and had found one at last. Lord Derby was supported by no less a person than Lord Russell, by Mr. Phillimore, by Mr. Henry Drummond, the present Chief Baron Kelly, and many others; by the late Sir Charles Napier, and, more than all, by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli), and by his right hon. Friend the Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. S. Walpole). All these concurred in condemning the action of the Congress and the Declaration of Paris. From that time there was no discussion for some five or six years. Indeed, he might say between 1856 and the present period there had been but three debates on the subject when the matter had been fully discussed, those of 1862, 1866, and 1867. The first and last were originated by Mr. Horsfall, and the second by the hon. Member for Galway (Mr. W. H. Gregory), and their object was to extend the Declaration, and to abolish the seizure of private property at sea. The debate of 1862 lasted two nights, and was remarkable for this—that three propositions were found growing out of it, the first of which was that not a single independent Member on either side of the House supported the Declaration, but all were for either going forward, as it was termed, or else for receding. Secondly, Sir George Lewis first rose on behalf of the Government, and he laid down the doctrine that war put an end to treaties and to engagements in the nature of treaties—a statement which was much canvassed by subsequent speakers, but was supported by the Law Officers of the Crown. The last and most important proposition maintained that the Right of Search was absolutely necessary to the power of offence and defence. They all maintained that. From that debate he passed to 1866, when the debate on this subject was originated by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Galway; Lord Palmerston had at that time unhappily passed away from this world, and as Lord Russell, who was Premier, found it would be awkward for him, considering his previous experience, to speak on the question, the brunt of the debate fell on his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Richmond, at that time Attorney General, who on that occasion represented and defended the views of the Cabinet, although he was not a Member of it. The hon. and learned Gentleman, after urging that it would not be the policy of an enemy to fight a naval battle, asked, in that case, what remained for a maritime Power to do? He then said that the practice of capturing an enemy's vessels at sea was an operation against an enemy, and that the loss thereby caused fell much more upon the public and national resources than upon individuals; and he concluded his speech with this remarkable statement— If you drive an enemy's ships from the sea, you put on him a pressure of a very serious kind, and contribute greatly to the success of your belligerent operations. That being the view of the Government of that day, of the Government of 1862, and of the Government of his right hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, he did not think any Government could consent to such a change as was proposed by Mr. Horsfall and the Member for Galway. The question was simply this—"You have a right of search and seizure; you admit its principle; will you then go back to what it was prior to the Declaration of Paris, or will you allow the matter to remain in its present unsatisfactory state?" At the end of the Session of 1867, to the surprise of everybody, no less a person than Mr. John Stuart Mill appeared in that House, as the advocate of the Right of Search to its full extent, and asked for the revocation of the Declaration of Paris. Mr. Mill referred to our insular position, and stated that the Right of Search or Seizure was our only true weapon of offence against the enemy, and that, if we wished to get rid of the bloated armaments and absurd rivalries of the military Powers, our only course was to revoke the Declaration of Paris, which he considered a national blunder, and to revert to the old system. Mr. Mill was answered by Lord Stanley and the hon. and learned Member for Richmond. He (Mr. C. Bentinck) must say he observed in their speeches a very considerable departure from the position they had assumed in former debates, for Lord Stanley admitted it would be possible for us to withdraw from the Declaration on giving ample notice to the other parties to it; and the hon. and learned Member for Richmond also admitted there might be a time when it would be expedient for England to withdraw from the Declaration. The question which he (Mr. C. Bentinck) had now to put to the Government was—Had these circumstances occurred, or had they not? From that time the matter remained in abeyance till the war broke out, when this country was seized with a species of panic—as hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway called it, he would rather term it a lucid interval—and a desire was evinced to increase our armaments. That desire grew more intense in consequence of the German successes and the prostration of France, and likewise by the general seizure of property on land, wherever it could be found, by both belligerents. The French had doubtless suffered greatly from the Germans; but they had suffered still more from their own countrymen; and if one thing had been rendered more clear than another, it was that property on land was by no means safe from the belligerents. The Government had stated their reasons for reversing their policy, and had asked for a vast expenditure for military and naval purposes. The present situation had been so recently described by the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty, the only Member of the Cabinet who attended the Banquet at the Mansion House on Easter Monday, that it might be fairly assumed that everything he said was approved by the Prime Minister. The right hon. Gentleman said— The stupendous events that had lately happened in Europe had entirely absorbed the attention of the Government and the country. And what had we to do now? We had to buy back our Army, which belonged, at that moment, to the officers, and not to the nation. After referring to the isolation in foreign policy attributed to this country, the right hon. Gentleman proceeded thus— Recent events in Europe should teach us to rely not on treaties, for they were often scattered to the winds; not on alliances, for they were occasionally faithless in times of trouble; not on the words of statesmen, for Secret Treaties were produced which shook the confidence of every honest politician; but upon ourselves. This was the very point he would urge upon Her Majesty's Government. The House, he believed, as he did, would concur in thinking with the First Lord of the Admiralty, that it was our duty to take care of ourselves, and he trusted, therefore, they would adopt the Resolution he was about to move. What objections could be brought against it? It might be maintained that the Declaration of Paris was advantageous to England, because our commerce presented so large a surface for the enemy to attack; but it had been frequently shown that the right of seizure or search, while it might be injurious to the commerce of England, would be absolutely destructive to the commerce of any other country, on account of the number of our cruisers and privateers largely exceeding that any enemy could bring against us. It was in consequence of this that England was able to resist the formidable combinations made against her at the commencement of this century. The commerce of England would be comparatively safe, because our cruisers and privateers would be much more powerful than those of our adversaries, and we should have another immense advantage in consequence of our coal supply being greater than that of any other Power. If an enemy refused to fight in the open sea and retired to his harbours, the only course open to an opponent was to blockade his ports, and compel him either to come out or to submit to the destruction of his commerce. The second objection made to the course he suggested for adoption was, that it would be contrary to the principles of humanity, progress and civilization. This he ventured to dispute, and for several reasons. In the first place, the disposition and usual course of action of different countries presented widely divergent characteristics. If an Englishman knocked an antagonist down he, with great fairness, permitted him to rise and renew the combat; but a foreigner, on the other hand, having his enemy in his power, put an end to him at once. An instance of this had been afforded in the late war, where neither party yielded in any single point to the other, until absolutely compelled to do so. Again, privateering had been described as piracy, and all sorts of hard things had been spoken in reference to its use in warfare; but he considered that belligerent Powers had to the full as much right to employ privateers as Franc-Tireurs, torpedoes, or Gardes Mobiles; and, so far as the humanity argument was concerned, the right was stronger on their side, because privateers were used for the purposes of crippling the resources of a country and not to destroy the life of its citizens. The last objection to his Motion was, that it would be inconsistent with the national honour for England to withdraw from the Declaration; but, in answer to this view, he maintained that the Declaration of Paris was illegal in its inception; and if it was said that, though illegal at first, it had become legal through lengthened recognition, he replied that it was made for the advantage of the maritime Powers—namely, the United States, France, Russia, and England; and that neither of the first three Powers could insist at the present time upon this country abiding by the Declaration; for the United States had most consistently refused to be bound by the Declaration; France was prostrate, and there was no possible means of knowing the view that might be taken by the Government of that country when she had resumed her place among the nations; and Russia could surely raise no objection, after her own recent renunciation of obligations imposed by treaty. He would ask the Prime Minister to recall the words, to which he had referred as having been used by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and reflect upon the complete isolation of this country in regard to foreign affairs. At the present England had neither a faithful ally nor a sincere friend; France was hostile, because she imagined, most unfairly, that England had deserted her in her time of need; Germany was hostile, because she thought England had refused to abrogate her neutrality laws during the late war; and the United States was hostile, because they would still have several grievances against England, even after the Alabama and Fisheries questions had been settled. Therefore, he thought that if England availed herself of her present opportunity to withdraw from the Declaration of Paris, she would be taking an important step towards resuming the proud position she formerly held among European nations, and would at the same time prevent the necessity for making those vast military preparations which threatened to cost the country an immense sum of money in the course of a very short time. In conclusion, he begged leave to thank the House for the patience with which it had heard him upon a complicated and not very interesting question, and to move his Resolution.

MR. SERJEANT SIMON

said, he had much pleasure in seconding the Motion which had been proposed with so much ability by his hon. Friend. The question involved was one far removed from the domain of party, but no consideration of persons or of party ties ought to prevent an expression of his opinion. The Declaration of Paris, which, in 1867, in bringing the question before the House, Mr. John Stuart Mill—an authority, which he (Mr. Serjeant Simon) gave, in addition to those referred to by the hon. Gentleman (Mr. C. Bentinck) who introduced the Motion—had described as a grievous national blunder, was received with a thrill of amazement throughout the country; but no decisive steps were taken, and the only hypothesis on which he could explain the comparative apathy was that the people, having just emerged from the horrors of a dreadful war, were glad to adopt anything which could wipe out for the time the terrible recollection. This question of the Right of Search had never been properly laid before the country. In seeking to assuage the horrors of war, though the intention was benevolent, the country had gone too far, and though he would be the last to say a word against so eminent a public servant as the late Lord Clarendon, he could not help saying that if there was one circumstance to be regretted in the life of the deceased statesman it was that he had put his hand to the Declaration of Paris. England being an insular nation, the sea was her natural field of battle, for she must aim at being, if anything, a maritime Power. Suppose we had a dispute with North Germany, it would be impossible for us to contend on land with so powerful a military organization; and a blockade of two or three ports would be utterly ineffectual, while the commerce of the country could be carried on as usual only under neutral flags. He would ask those who contended that the Right of Search ought to be given up, whether they believed that civilization and humanity would be advanced by the acceptance of the principle that you might kill your enemy or blow him to atoms, only you must not be allowed to touch his property? It was very easy to talk about civilization; but one of your great means of crippling an adversary was by touching his property. There was a great deal said in these times about humanity, and much solicitude expressed for the working classes; yet you are prepared to recruit your Army from their ranks, to send them forth to bleed and to die in battle, whilst you refuse to adopt an effectual remedy of taking the property of your antagonist? For his own part, he could not admit a principle which implied that the taxation and the loss of life and limb were to fall upon one portion of the community alone, while our merchants and shipowners were to feel none of the ill effects of war, but were to prosecute their trade as usual and without any hindrance. The principle of the right of seizure of an enemy's property dated from the earliest times—from the time International Law first regulated the intercourse of nations. The first record of the right to seize an enemy's property at sea was found in the Consulato del Mare attributed variously to the 10th, 11th, and 13th centuries. It was distinctly there laid down that the Power at war was entitled to seize an enemy's property at sea, to take it to a port of safety, paying the freight of a vessel if found in a neutral vessel, and that the amount of the freight was to be determined by the aid of the ship's papers, and that in the absence of the papers the oath of the master was to be taken as proof. He would ask, where was the injustice of such a law? Could anything be more equitable? In time of war a neutral Power carrying on the trade of a belligerent ceased to be neutral, for what she in reality did was to promote the resources of the belligerent and so aid her in carrying on hostilities. A neutral Power that assisted a belligerent in carrying on its commerce during time of war was, in reality, contributing to the continuance of the struggle. He believed, therefore, that in acknowledging the principle of the immunity of property at sea, they were, in reality, acting contrary to the interests of civilization and humanity. The seizure of private property was a mitigation of the horrors of war; it was analogous to the civil as compared with the criminal process of law, and it was, he believed, the lesser of the two evils. No such thing was known in International Law as benevolent neutrality. In the name of humanity he said you were acting against the true principles of civilization and humanity. The tendency of the regulations of the Declarations of Paris was to prolong slaughter, and to increase devastation. But he felt, after all, that he was not bound to take the high ground of humanity and civilization. As an Englishman, he felt that it was our right and our duty to protect ourselves as far as we possibly could against the aggressions of other nations, and, where necessary, to vindicate our honour. We had no means of grappling on even terms with large military Powers, for the sea was our battlefield; and he could not help thinking that but for the abandonment of this right of capture we need not have been called upon for the excessive increase in our Army Estimates. During the Russian War we had temporarily abandoned the right, because we dreaded the consequences of some possible future collision with America; but America had refused to concur in the Declaration of Paris. He was ashamed to see England cower, for the first time, before a foreign Power. It was one thing to part with a right temporarily and another to part with it altogether. If we suffered false views of humanity to prevail, we should find ourselves crippled; for the source of our Power was our maritime strength, the greatness of which had been recognized by all nations, and which it was our duty to preserve at the proper standard. The exceptional cases in which treaties had been made by us were acknowledgments by other nations of the existence of the public law and of the justice of our claims. He protested against the abandonment of this element of our national strength, and urged that if the Government could by any means withdraw from the principle of this Declaration, it was their duty in the interest of the nation to take that step. It was said that this was a Declaration and not a treaty, yet it was just as binding, and in honour, if not by law, we must adhere to it. Had it been a treaty we should have gained some advantages corresponding to what we gave up; but there was nothing of the kind in this Declaration. We had simply given up one element of our national strength without obtaining anything in return. This Declaration was not a contract, because it had never been ratified, yet a Minister had put his signature to it as the principle by which this country should be guided. The difficulty was, in our admitting the principle that a neutral Power might carry an enemy's goods; and the more he looked into this matter the more formidable seemed to be the objections to that part of the Declaration. The subject could not remain in its present state; the country must go either backward or forward. To go backward would be to do what he thought would be proper; but to go forward would be to put an end to our maritime supremacy.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "the maintenance of British maritime rights being essential to the power, prosperity, and independence of the Empire, this House is of opinion that Her Majesty's Government should forthwith withdraw from the articles of 'The Declaration of Paris, 1856,' which are numbered respectively 1 and 2, and which are expressed in the terms following:—1. Privateering is and remains abolished; 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war,"—(Mr. Cavendish Bentinck,) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. BOURKE

said, he thought the House would be of opinion that this question was one of great interest and importance, because no one could deny that the position in which the question of belligerent rights at sea had been left by the Declaration of Paris might one day cause serious inconvenience to us, might cramp and cripple our naval power, might be productive of much loss and injury to our mercantile marine; and, in our anxiety to avoid that result, might involve us in serious disputes with nations which either were parties to the Declaration of Paris, or had since declared their adhesion to its principles. The Declaration of Paris consisted of four Articles. The third Article in that Declaration gave immunity to neutral goods in an enemy's ship, and that had been the principle on which England had always acted. The fourth Article abolished paper blockades, and that course we had followed for at least 100 years, for Lord Stowell had laid it down that in order to show the violation of a blockade it was necessary first to prove that a blockade actually existed. With regard, therefore, to two of its Articles, the Declaration of Paris made no alteration in the policy of this country. By the first Article privateering was abolished; and here he could not agree with the hon. Member for Whitehaven (Mr. C. Bentinck), as he thought it was a species of warfare that led to the worst excesses, to serious crimes, and had a demoralizing influence on all who were concerned in it. In recent years neutral Powers had done their best to put an end to privateering, and it might be said that Mexico was now the only nation which showed any disposition to resort to it. The House, however, should remember that America had declined to abandon the practice, except on one condition—namely, that all private property at sea should be exempt from capture. This was somewhat remarkable, as she was the first Power, immediately after the Declaration of Independence, to submit this question to European Powers, with a view to obtain the general assent to the abandonment of the practice. America took that step, and until 1830 that principle seemed to be a cardinal point of her policy, as would be found from the Correspondence which passed between that country and England. About that time there was a sudden change, and ever since then America had declined to abolish privateering, except under the condition he had before stated. The policy of the first Article in the Declaration was a wise one, and he should be sorry to see it abrogated. The great change which had been made in our maritime policy was that effected by the second Article, by which we abandoned our right to capture enemy's goods in neutral vessels—a right that had always been looked upon as our right arm in war, and in giving up which he believed we had dealt a heavy blow at our naval strength. We had defended that right upon principle, upon authority, and from motives of policy and expediency; because while we recognized the right of a neutral to carry on his legitimate trade during a time of war, without interference from a belligerent, yet we had always maintained that a neutral must not carry on his trade in such a way as to derogate from the right of a belligerent. The point was put very tersely by Vattel, who said— The belligerent does not oppose their rights, but simply asserts his own; and if the two rights are incompatible, it is the effect alone of inevitable necessity. Again, Kent, in his Commentaries, used the following words on the subject:— I should apprehend this belligerent right to be no longer an open question, and that the authority and usage on which the right rests in Europe, and the long, explicit, and authoritative admission of it by this country, have concluded us from making it a subject of controversy. And that we are bound in truth and justice to submit to its regular exercise in any case, and with any belligerent Power who does not freely renounce It. In fact, this was an epitome of the opinions of all authoritative writers upon International Law. We had defended the right of capturing enemy's goods in neutral vessels on the ground of policy and expediency, because while we were weak on land, we were strong at sea, where it would be bad policy to deprive ourselves of the power of injuring our opponents as much as possible. For that reason other nations, knowing that we should exercise that right, were less anxious to go to war with us than would otherwise be the case, seeing that their commerce would be destroyed if we were to act upon it. Mr. Canning, he might add, refused in 1827 to ratify a Treaty which Sir Charles Stuart had concluded with Brazil, and which contained a clause giving up the right of capturing enemy's goods in neutral vessels. It was curious that the treaties which had been made surrendering this right had never survived the exigencies of war. Those treaties, however, were totally different from the Declaration of Paris now under discussion, and which had arisen out of the circumstances connected with the Crimean War. They were engagements between one nation and another, and therefore, when war broke out between the parties, there was an end to the treaties. A few years, for instance, after the declaration of the Armed Neutrality in 1781, Sweden and Russia went to war, and notwithstanding that both countries were parties to that neutrality, the moment hostilities broke out the Treaty was thrown to the wind. The same thing was also done by Denmark. But the Declaration of Paris was made in favour of neutral nations, and he did not think any person would contend that the signataries to it could release themselves from the obligations attached to it. In that case, what, he would ask, would be the practical result of the waiver of her right by this country? So long as she remained a neutral Power, that waiver would, no doubt, be beneficial, because she would be able to carry on her commerce in common with other nations under a neutral flag. But matters would assume a very different aspect if we were engaged in hostilities with a nation which was powerful at sea. We should not then be able to capture our enemy's goods, and he would obtain his supplies under a neutral flag. The result, he might add, of a war with France would be, under the Declaration of Paris, that our carrying trade would pass into the hands of neutral Powers until we had destroyed our enemy's fleet; while, in the case of America, which was no party to the Declaration of Paris, and which retained the right of privateering, the result might be still more disastrous. The Declaration of Paris was made in favour of neutral nations, and supposing we were at war with America, and were to inform neutrals that, as America was not a party to the Declaration, we should not consider ourselves bound by it; they would say that made no difference; the Declaration had been made in favour of neutrals, and therefore they had a right to call upon us to give them the benefit of the Declaration. He could not, however, concur altogether in the view taken by his hon. Friend, because it would not be desirable to close by a one-sided action our arrangements on the subject with foreign Powers. That would be following the bad example set by the Emperor of Russia and Prince Gortchakoff. At the same time, it was well worthy of consideration by the Government whether they should not take some favourable opportunity of laying before the Powers who were parties to it the serious consequences which adherence to the Declaration might entail, with the view of obtaining their consent to a modification of its terms.

SIR ROUNDELL PALMER

said, that though not present in the early part of the debate, he had collected that the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. C. Bentinck) appeared to be under the impression that in former debates upon this subject he (Sir Roundell Palmer) had expressed some opinion in harmony with the object of the Motion; but he took the liberty of informing him that he was in error in considering so. On two occasions—in 1862 and 1866—it was his duty to express the opinion of the then Government against the Motion of the hon. Members for Liverpool (Mr. Horsfall) and Galway (Mr. W. H. Gregory) for exempting from capture private property at sea during war. The arguments in favour of that Motion were no doubt connected with certain observations, made on consequences, which were expected to follow from the Declaration of Paris; but on the first of those occasions he emphatically stated, speaking on behalf of the Government with which he was connected, that he did not contemplate the possibility of such a thing as that England should recede from the Declaration, whatever might be its consequences, for after that Declaration was once made, assuredly it was not his opinion that it would be right in any respect for this country to depart from it. Unless it was done by the common consent of all parties to the Declaration, it would be simply repudiation on our part—it would be merely following the example set in the autumn of last year, of which we had expressed so unfavourable an opinion. And here he parted company with his hon. and learned Friend opposite (Mr. Bourke), for he could not conceive anything less becoming the dignity of the country than to make a weak complaint to the other countries to which we were bound, that England repented of the Declaration, because possibly in certain contingent circumstances it might do us harm, and that therefore we should be obliged if they would release us from it. If we entertained that opinion, and we had reason to believe it was shared in by the other parties to the Declaration, then the sensible thing would be, if they concurred in it, to ask them for their concurrence; but unless we had some ground for believing that all were likely to concur in our views, he could conceive, as he had already said, no more undignified, and therefore no more impolitic act than for us to seem afraid of the consequences of our engagement. He hoped, therefore, unless circumstances very much altered, that no such policy would be entertained by Her Majesty's Government. Now, with respect to the Declaration of Paris itself, he never was any party to it, nor had his right hon. Friend at the head of the Government any responsibility with regard to it, and therefore he was at liberty to speak freely of its effects. He never had participated in those extreme alarms which were entertained as to the effect of that Declaration, and while he thought it was a point very fairly open to doubt and controversy, whether, on the whole, it was politic at the time or not to enter into it, yet having once entered into it, he could not see what possible good there could be in making these lamentations over it. The simple fact was, that, on a balance of inconveniences, it bound us to endure one rather than the other. There could be no doubt that the right to take enemy's property out of neutral ships, although it was as well established by International Law as any other right could be, was always attended with great irritation and inconvenience to the neutrals in its exercise, and it had a tendency to draw neutrals into alliance with the enemy. Those were circumstances, so far as they went, which were strongly in favour of relinquishing such a right. On the other hand, it was true that by such waiver we should also relinquish some means of weakening the enemy during war; and what was perhaps of more consequence, we might in some degree increase the tendency of war to throw our carrying trade into the hands of neutrals. That was a question of degree; but with respect to its diminishing our means of annoying our enemies, he attributed but very little importance to it. The enemy, though he might be enabled to carry on his trade more securely than he could formerly have done, could only do so by giving up the use of his own ships, and employing means incapable of being turned to any purpose of hostility; nor had we, by relinquishing this right, conferred on neutrals the right to carry contraband of war for the enemy or to break blockades. It came to this, that to a limited extent we waived the right of taking private property at sea. He always had been, and was still, against waiving that right generally; but it was a different thing to waive this small fraction of it which was separated from anything like actual or possible connection with belligerent operations. By this Declaration it was never intended to waive the whole right, nor was any such consequence involved in what we did. As to the loss of the carrying trade, that was easily exaggerated also; for the mere fact of our being at war had always had the tendency of throwing into the hands of neutrals a considerable part of our carrying trade, and a considerable part of our merchant shipping in time of war had always found its way into the hands of neutrals. The right to take enemy's goods in neutral bottoms was subject to many difficulties and impediments in practice, on account of the contrivances and simulations which the system necessarily involved: so that even when the right was most fully established, it was still a fact that the belligerent Powers did to an immense extent send their trade by neutrals and their ships under neutral flags; and although they were sometimes taken, yet in the great majority of cases they doubtless escaped. The Declaration of Paris might, to a certain extent, and until freights rose to a certain height, exaggerate that which had always happened. There was and would be a limit now, as formerly, to those operations, depending very much on the rate of freight, insurance, and the power of convoy, and circumstances of that kind; and he hoped that, in the event of war—though he trusted that war might not happen—our merchant vessels would arm themselves to a moderate extent—a thing which seemed to be perfectly in their power to do, and which in his judgment was by far the best precaution that could be taken against any new dangers arising from this or other alterations of our maritime laws. If they did that, he did not believe that the Declaration of Paris, or anything else that happened, would place our carrying trade or our maritime power in a materially worse position. He did not participate in the alarm which appeared to prevail in some quarters. The thing had been done and done irrevocably, in his opinion, unless they were invited by a concurrence of opinion on the part of other nations to re-consider its provisions. That being so, the proper tone for this country to adopt would be to say—"We adhere in good faith to the engagement; we will not fruitlessly review its policy or complain of its possible defects; but will go on, and with good heart use all the powers that are left us for our security, if, on a future occasion, we shall unhappily have occasion for their exercise."

MR. STEPHEN CAVE

said, that the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down had proved the extreme inadvisability of our having entered into the Declaration of Paris; for he had told the House that it was so far worse than a treaty that it could not be rescinded. Treaties were usually subject to reversal, on proper notice being given by one of the parties to the others; but this Declaration, hastily made they were told, there were no means of escaping from. The hon. and learned Gentleman said they were not to indulge in lamentations over things that were past and could not be undone; but, surely, there was something more than lamentation when the country was told by the highest authorities in it that to have accepted this Declaration was a suicidal action, and one which must necessarily cripple the country in any future war. The hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Bourke) made rather an unfortunate allusion when he referred to the repudiation of the Treaty of Paris by Prince Gortchakoff. He said it would be undignified, and not following a proper course if we imitated that example, and said—"We repent of what we have done, and intend to give notice of our withdrawal from it." But what course was taken when the repudiation of that Treaty was notified to us? Was it not that we ac- cepted the repudiation? ["No, no!" "Hear, hear!"] The Government practically did so. No doubt, Earl Granville, in his despatch, said he could not accept the repudiation; but, on Russia persisting, we had to yield, and we went into the Conference without any foregone conclusion—that is to say, we accepted the repudiation of the Treaty. The hon. and learned Gentleman stated that by the Declaration we got rid of the irritation which neutrals experienced on account of the Right of Search being exercised. He quite admitted that that was a great object to secure; but he denied that it had been secured, for this reason, that contraband of war was excepted from the Declaration. Contraband of war might mean anything, and how could contraband of war be found without search? and it was the Right of Search that was objected to. The Americans objected to the Right of Search to such a degree that they would not even allow us to search vessels carrying their flag, for slaves, under the Slave Trade Treaty. They allowed us to go on board to verify the nationality; but they objected to its being carried further. The hon. and learned Gentleman had said that it was a very small fraction of the Right we had waived; but that was worse than the surrender of the whole Right, because if the right of taking merchant vessels at sea at all be given up, then he quite admitted—speaking commercially—that we should not be injured. He would not then enter into that wider question; but what, he asked, had already been the effect of the waiver of that fraction of the Right? Why this—that on the mere rumour of war we were in danger of losing the whole carrying trade of the country; and very naturally; because the first thing that happened was that insurance rose to war-risk rate, and everybody knew that the rate of insurance was one of the elements which governed freight, and therefore the carrying trade was naturally diverted into another channel. The experience of the past proved this. The fact that a second-class American vessel had obtained a cargo at Calcutta on a former occasion, when a first-rate English ship could not obtain one, even at a lower rate, had already been mentioned. Since then, during the American Civil War, the specie from California had been sent to Europe in English in- stead of in American vessels. America had lost nearly all her carrying trade, owing to the depredations of the Florida and Alabama, which she had not recovered to this day. The hon. and learned Gentleman proposed that we should arm our commercial vessels, and in that way be able to beat off the cruisers of the enemy. But everyone knew that in these days of heavy artillery the scantling of our merchant vessels was not able to carry guns of sufficient calibre to resist a ship of war. Neither would it be advisable that large passenger steamers—carrying, perhaps, numbers of women and children—should commit themselves on unequal terms to the attacks of the cruisers of the enemy. After one or two such disasters the feeling of the country would, he believed, be so roused that we should throw to the winds this or any other Declaration which led to such results. His own opinion was, that nothing could be worse than to bind ourselves by Declarations of that kind. They had originally put themselves into a wrong position by the Foreign Enlistment Act; and by the amended Act of last Session he was afraid they should find themselves in a still worse position. To bind themselves by an abstract Declaration was like binding the House by an abstract Resolution. It might appear a small matter at the time; but when a practical issue arose they might find themselves brought face to face with a policy which would prove most disastrous to the country.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

said, he wished to recall the House to the real question under consideration. The question was not whether the Right of Search should be abolished, nor whether we should abstain from the capture of private property belonging to an enemy; but whether we should repudiate the convention or agreement which we had entered into at Paris with all the other Powers of Europe. He believed all civilized nations agreed that the ordinary Right of Search for contraband of war should be maintained. The right hon. Gentleman who spoke last (Mr. S. Cave) was entirely in error in supposing that the Americans ever objected to that Right of Search. The question before the House was not whether we should abstain from capturing private goods from an enemy. He confessed that he was against such a step, and was pre- pared to oppose the Motion of the hon. Member for Galway (Mr. W. H. Gregory), if he brought it forward, because that undoubtedly was a belligerent's right, which he should not advise this country to part with. As reference had been made to a speech which he made in 1855 upon the Russian trade, he begged to say that the object he had in view in that speech was to show that the blockade we had instituted against Russia was not effectual—that we had blockaded the mouth of the Danube, and thereby deprived this country of a large supply of grain which it might otherwise have obtained from the Danubian Principalities, and that we had not blockaded ports which ought to have been blockaded. He thought the House would see that that had nothing to do with the present question. What the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. C. Bentinck) asked the House to do was, in fact, to repudiate, he would not call it a treaty, because technically it was not a treaty, but the agreement which we entered into in Paris with all the principal Powers of Europe. He did not deny that there was strong authority for the proposition that a belligerent had a right to seize neutral goods in any ship. The origin of that rule was, he believed, as early as the Roman Empire. Rome recognized only two classes of people—her subjects and her enemies. She recognized no neutrals, and forbade all treaties between her subjects and her enemies. But with the progress of civilization the rights of neutrals had been more and more considered; and although the ancient rule of International Law was adopted by many writers, still he thought it ought to be borne in mind that it had been questioned by many modern writers of no small authority; amongst whom were De Mertens and Hautefeuille, by whom it was regarded as a relic of barbarism, which ought to be expunged from the International Law of civilized nations. This rule was announced, he believed, for the first time in a treatise, written in the 13th century, entitled Consulato del Mare. Grotius, he believed, did no more than quote it, without expressing any opinion about it. Although that rule was exercised by American tribunals, a very considerable European sentiment had long prevailed against it, and that sentiment was best illustrated by the number of treaties which had been en- tered into in which that rule was expressly abolished. From the beginning of the 17th to the end of the 18th century England had abrogated the rule by treaties with almost all the maritime Powers in Europe. There was a treaty with Portugal in the time of Cromwell establishing the rule of free ships making free goods. That treaty remained in force till 1810, or for a period of 150 years. Cromwell entered into a treaty with Louis XIV. to the same effect; and it remained in force, with the exception of a few years, until 1793. Again, between 1665 and 1796—a period of 131 years—the rule that free ships made free goods was in force by virtue of a treaty between us and Spain; and the same might be said with respect to our relations with Holland and, he believed, some other countries. Not only were such treaties concluded between us and those Powers, but also between those Powers and one another—for example, between France and Spain, between France and Holland, and so on. Therefore, it might fairly be said that the right of capturing an enemy's goods in neutral ships was opposed to the sentiment of Europe, and that the rule that free ships made free goods was recognized by many treaties—in round numbers, by more than 100—entered into between us and the principal maritime Powers of Europe, and also concluded by those Powers among themselves. That being the state of the case, they would be prepared for the statement of Lord Clarendon as to the public opinion of Europe on that point at the commencement of the Crimean War; and he thought the House would agree that Lord Clarendon was as well qualified as any man to form a judgment upon what was the state of opinion in Europe on that subject. In 1856, speaking in the House of Lords, Lord Clarendon said— Every other maritime Power in the world has protested against our practice, and at the commencement of the war England was the only Power which upheld the right of seizure. If your Lordships could be aware, as I was, of the strong feeling—of the intense anxiety—of the neutral Powers, at the commencement of the war, to know whether we meant to adhere to the rule which we had hitherto maintained, you would then fully comprehend the great importance of the question. Almost daily inquiries were addressed to me by the representatives of the neutral Powers, and though I certainly cannot say that the maintenance of our former rule would have led to another 'Armed Neutrality,' it was quite plain that we should have stood alone in the world—we should have had every other maritime Power against us, and most properly so—because we should have been maintaining a law which was contrary to the public opinion of the world, which was hostile to commerce, and as unfavourable as possible to a mitigation of the evils of war. We should not only have stood alone in the world—but it was quite clear that we should have been at war not only with Russia, but with every other maritime Power in the world."—[3 Hansard, cxlii. 495.] That was the view stated in 1856 by Lord Clarendon, and he was not at all sure that it expressed too strongly the general opinion of Europe on the matter, or went at all beyond the truth in saying that as far as Europe was concerned we stood alone. America was the only other country that maintained the doctrine. That concession was made to all the Powers of Europe. Referring to the Treaty cited by the hon. and learned Member for Whitehaven (Mr. C. Bentinck), he found that that Treaty was made by Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Italy, and Turkey; there was an unanimous agreement among those Powers that free ships should make free goods. We stood alone in asserting the opposite doctrine; and he could not but think that as a matter of prudence it was a fair concession to the public opinion of Europe that England made in 1856. But be that as it might, what had been said by the hon. and learned Member for Richmond (Sir Roundell Palmer) was quite conclusive on the subject. That Treaty or that agreement—and the distinction was a somewhat fine one between a treaty and an agreement—having been entered into, we could not now repudiate it without the consent of the other signataries to it. That was the short answer to the proposal of the hon. and learned Member opposite (Mr. C. Bentinck). They were discussing, not a mere Declaration but an agreement, as its language would show. The hon. and learned Gentleman read the Preamble of the Instrument, as follows:— Considering: That maritime law, in time of war, has long been the subject of deplorable disputes; That the uncertainty of the law and of the duties in such a matter gives rise to differences of opinion between neutrals and belligerents which may occasion serious difficulties and even conflicts; That it is, consequently, advantageous to establish a uniform doctrine on so important a point; That the Plenipotentiaries assembled in Congress at Paris cannot better respond to the intentions by which their Governments are animated than by seeking to introduce into international relations fixed principles in this respect; The above mentioned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorised, resolved to concert among themselves as to the means of attaining this object; and having come to an agreement, have adopted the following solemn Declaration:

1. "1. Privateering is and remains, abolished;
2. "2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war;
3. "3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag;
4. "4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy."

On the part of the Government, therefore, he should not like to take a distinction between an "agreement" and a treaty, as he could not admit that it made any difference whether what was done was called an agreement or a treaty; and he was not sure that they would recognize any such distinction if taken by any other Power. Having come to an agreement, had they any right to repudiate it without the consent of their cosignataries? He thought the House and the country would hesitate to sanction such a proceeding, merely because it might happen to suit our convenience to do so. It was not quite correct, as stated by the hon. and learned Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Serjeant Simon), that we got no quid pro quo. One of the provisions of the Declaration was that neutral goods under an enemy's flag, contraband of war excepted, should not be liable to capture. Now, France had before a different principle from that, and therefore we had obtained a concession in that respect from France. Having, as against France, got, to a certain extent, a quid pro quo for what we conceded, we were estopped from repudiating our agreement with her. It would be a breach of faith on our part to do so. He did not know whether the hon. and learned Gentleman would suggest that they should seek the consent of their co-signataries to set aside the arrangement. If they did seek it would they probably not obtain it? A solemn agreement had, however, been entered into and a Declaration signed by all the great Powers for our benefit as well as for the benefit of other neutral nations; but whether it was for our advantage or not, it appeared to him that we were now bound in honour to adhere to it. Enough, he thought, had been said in the course of the debate to induce the House not to adopt the Resolution.

MR. DISRAELI

Sir, I think the House has hardly done justice to the motives which actuated my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Whitehaven (Mr. C. Bentinck), who introduced this Motion, in the view it has taken of his remarks. The House, I think, should recollect that it was on the very first day of the Session that my hon. Friend gave Notice of this Motion, and at that time the House was in a very different position from that in which it now finds itself with respect to this subject. We had then been informed that Russia had repudiated a most important provision in the Treaty of Paris—a provision, indeed, which many thought to be the essence of that arrangement. Now, at the period when the Declaration of Paris was entered into there was no small disapprobation of that policy expressed by many public men, and entertained by considerable parties in both House of Parliament; and I have no doubt that my hon. and learned Friend, hearing it announced that a Conference was to be held in London to consider, with no foregone conclusion, the claim of Russia to free herself from the solemn engagement she had entered into by the Treaty of Paris with this country and others, thought it a proper opportunity for the Conference also to consider the principle of policy which had been disapproved by persons of authority at the time, and of which he himself did not approve, and which he felt that the Conference offered a fit and appropriate occasion to modify, and, if necessary, even to abrogate. The course of Business has prevented my hon. and learned Friend bringing forward that proposal in time, for the House, had it sanctioned the policy which he recommended, would have influenced the decisions of the Conference. But, having given Notice of it, he has still deemed it his duty to bring the subject under the consideration of the House. Sir, I agree with my hon. and learned Friend that, if Her Majesty's Government had thought proper, that was a legitimate occasion on which they might have brought the Declaration of Paris before the representatives of the Great Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, for them to consider the expediency of modifying or even abrogating that declaration. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Richmond says that neither he nor the Prime Minister was responsible for the Declaration of Paris, and can therefore consider it impartially. I also, Sir, have no share of responsibility in respect to the Declaration of Paris. But I must express the opinion, which I gave at the time, that I believe it to have been a most impolitic step, calculated to cripple the powers of this country, and the evil effects of which hereafter are at present incalculable, and may be of a nature which all of us will deplore. I never could bring myself to attach importance to the representation of Lord Clarendon referred to by the learned Attorney General a few minutes ago, because it amounted to nothing more than that the exercise of this power was vexatious to the neutral Powers on whom it was exercised. There is no doubt about that. I am afraid that the exercise of power at all times is not agreeable to those who experience its force and influence. As for supposing that under the then circumstances, there was any probability of the maritime Powers of the world entering into an alliance of armed neutrality against England, I think that a moment's reflection must dissipate the idea as an idle supposition. Even if a possibility, I could not admit it as a sufficient answer to those who objected to give up an ancient policy of our country, and one which Lord Clarendon himself admitted to be our right—our long-enjoyed and possessed right. Who were the maritime Powers whose alliance we could fear, and whose armed neutrality was to curb and control our power? Why, the great maritime Powers were Russia, France, and the United States. Well, with Russia we were at war; France was our ally; and the United States were so opposed to the policy, that when it was embodied in the Declaration of Paris, they declined to accede to it. Therefore nothing could be more flimsy than the view which Lord Clarendon took with respect to the possibility of an armed neutrality opposed to England. But although no one objected more than I did at the time to the policy of the Declaration of Paris, and although subsequent events have to no extent induced me to modify my opinion, I never at any time treated that declaration as an idle document, from the engagements of which we could disembarrass ourselves with levity, and as a matter of course. It is a solemn thing when a Power such as England enters into an engagement, especially under the circumstances of the Conference of Paris; and even though that engagement may not take the form of a treaty, and may not be ratified by the Sovereign, still an engagement signed by the English Minister at such a Conference, which has not been challenged or rejected by Parliament, is a document which ought to have, upon this country at least, the moral effect of a treaty; and we cannot divest ourselves of such an engagement except in the most formal and satisfactory manner not merely with respect to ourselves, but to all concerned. I maintain that opportunity was given us by the Conference held lately in London; but although I entirely approve the policy of my hon. and learned Friend, who was quite justified in bringing this question before the House, and has dealt with it in a speech of great clearness and ability, I cannot agree that we should forthwith withdraw from the Articles of the Declaration of Paris, because we have not the power of doing so without first taking some preliminary steps not contemplated by my hon. and learned Friend. I by no means regret—indeed, I am glad—that my hon. and learned Friend has brought the question before the House, as it was brought three or four years ago by a distinguished man no longer a Member of this House, because I am quite certain that, sooner or later, it is impossible that this Declaration of Paris can be upheld; but the mode of releasing ourselves from its engagements suggested by my hon. and learned Friend is too abrupt; we must emancipate ourselves from its fatal trammels in a regular manner, and in a manner which will be approved by the public law and morality of Europe. I regret very much that the opportunity—the golden opportunity offered by the recent Conference on the Treaty of Paris of 1856—has been lost, and that it was not taken advantage of by the Government to achieve the object my hon. and learned Friend had in view. I regret that Conference was held. I have expressed my opinion that it is to be lamented we ever agreed to calling it; but having agreed to its assembling, we should have at least obtained some advantage from a circumstance in itself so calamitous. In the course of its proceedings we have registered the disgrace and recorded the humiliation of this country; but if we could, by its means, have released ourselves from the fatal engagements of the Declaration of Paris, it would have thrown one gleam of light upon what I shall ever consider a dark page in the history of England.

MR. GLADSTONE

After the speech of my hon. and learned Friend behind me the Member for Richmond, and of the Attorney General, it is not at all necessary to enter upon any portion of the general argument. The question has been considerably narrowed, and by admissions which entirely exclude the possibility of the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. C. Bentinck) being adopted. On the one hand there is no denial, either by the hon. and learned Member for Richmond, or the Attorney General, that upon the merits of the case, as well as upon the ancient law of Europe, there was very much to be said; but, upon the other hand, as regards the binding force of the instrument, whereby we have committed ourselves to a certain course with regard to this matter, there is an almost equally general admission, beginning with the hon. and learned Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Serjeant Simon), who seconded the Motion, on this side of the House, and ending with the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, to the effect that the Declaration into which we entered in the year 1856, and in which, perhaps, scarcely any leading Member of this House at the present time was originally concerned, has, under all those circumstances, in its actual form, full binding force at the present moment, and that we cannot entertain the question as practically submitted to us. The right hon. Gentleman opposite the Member for Buckinghamshire—very loyally to his political Friend—has vindicated the conduct of the hon. and learned Member for Whitehaven as regards the time chosen for submitting this Motion, and his vindication is this—That there was a very good opportunity for proposing this Motion at the time the Conference was sitting, and that, on that account, the hon. and learned Member cannot be open to adverse criticism for proposing it now that the Conference has ceased to sit. I must say that, although the hon. and learned Gentleman could not be reproached for raising a question of so much general interest on any occasion, there is not much force in the special plea by which the right hon. Gentleman seeks to justify his having introduced it to-night. The right hon. Gentleman, however, has performed another duty appertaining very much to his place; he has shown, or endeavoured to show, that the Government was wrong in omitting to take advantage of the occasion offered in his opinion by the recent Conference for undoing this Declaration, or raising the question as to its existence. He has censured in very strong terms the original proceeding, and he has gone a good deal out of his way to give an opinion, quite conformable to what, on a proper occasion, I should have been prepared to expect from him, upon the result of the recent Conference. Now, in the first place, he and I are in the same predicament; we are both entirely free from the responsibility of having adopted this Declaration; but, at the same time, while never having had any occasion to form a positive opinion upon the subject, I must say that to describe as "flimsy" the consideration offered by Lord Clarendon, and by the Government of Lord Palmerston, for arriving at that Declaration is hardly a line of observation that meets the justice of the case. The right hon. Gentleman says there was no prospect of an armed neutrality, if we had persevered in the course we had adopted for a considerable number of years; and his reason is, that the only three maritime Powers in the world worth taking into account were, from the special circumstances of the case, quite outside the calculation. But the right hon. Gentleman must have entirely forgotten the nature of the policy of the declaration of the United States upon the subject. It is true the United States refused to agree to the proceeding, but why? Because, in their opinion, it was insufficient and did not go far enough; because the United States were in favour of the surrender of a principle the British Government were not prepared to abandon—namely, the right of capture of private property at sea. The fact is, therefore, unfortunately, the reverse of what has been stated by the right hon. Gentleman, and, therefore, the American Government were perfectly ready to lead the opposition to our policy even at that very moment, had they thought fit, and if this country had persevered in maintaining the right of capture of enemies' goods in neutral vessels. I may remind the House that these armed neutralities do not depend for their efficacy upon the action of the first-rate maritime Powers. There are various other Powers without maritime force, such as Holland, Italy, Austria, Spain, Denmark, and North Germany, which have begun to aspire in that direction, and the combination of these Powers may be very formidable, even though no one of them alone is capable of exercising a material influence upon the fortunes of war. But it is also right to recollect that those who met upon the occasion of the Conference of Paris of 1856, and those who advised the proceeding, the temporary proceeding of 1854 for which I, for one, was responsible, had in view not merely the circumstances of the moment, but were likewise bound to consider that which was likely hereafter to happen. The state of the case was this—England was totally isolated from the actual living sentiment of the civilized world upon this subject. I do not enter into the argument whether that was a sufficient reason for the concession. But I, who took part in the temporary concession, am in no condition to censure severely those who made the permanent concession; and I hold that to describe as flimsy—as a thing entirely irrational and without the fair range of discussion—the policy adopted by the Government of Lord Palmerston in 1856 is going very much beyond what any candid consideration of the case will permit. But, says the right hon. Gentleman—in perfect consistency with the acknowledgment he had made as to the binding character of the Declaration of Paris—however binding that Declaration may be, it was perfectly open to the Government of Her Majesty, if they had thought fit, to use the recent Conference on the neutralization of the Black Sea as an occasion for re-opening this question. Naturally, from his point of view, therefore, he censures the Government for having failed to avail themselves of the opportunity. Now, I wish to say a word in defence of the Government upon that subject. When the Conference met upon the neutralization of the Black Sea, I very greatly doubt—indeed, I do more than doubt, I firmly deny—that it would have been a wise policy on the part of the British Government to extend the issue then raised. The question raised grew out of a claim by Russia to be released from certain stipulations. If Russia was to be released from certain stipulations, the question also naturally arose, what other concessions, having direct reference to the subject of these stipulations, ought to be made, if any. But it was never contended, and never conceived by those who were parties to the Conference, that the whole question of the Treaty of 1856 should be thrown open for discussion. Would it have been wise, would the right hon. Gentleman say it would have been wise, in us to have invited or encouraged, or, I may say, even forced Europe to re-open the whole of the Treaty, deal with it as undone, and commence de novo the construction of a system of international obligations with reference to the East? Such a course would have been most unwise; and I do not believe that, as a positive proposition, however practicable it may be to propound a doctrine of that sort in the course of a conversation like the present, it would have been possible seriously to maintain such a policy in this House. But the proposal involves a great deal more than that. It would have been necessary not only to undo all that was done in 1856 with reference to the Eastern Question—for I admit that, at any rate, it would have been more or less germane to the matter in hand—namely, the neutralization of the Black Sea; but the right hon. Gentleman goes a great deal further, and says, that because a question has been raised as to the neutralization of the Black Sea, you should therefore have both undone the Treaty of 1856, by subjecting the whole of it to re-consideration, and likewise have proceeded to do that which had no connection whatever with the neutralization of the Black Sea and the Eastern Question—namely, invite Europe to reopen another chapter, a chapter of matters dealt with by the Conference of 1856, because that represented Europe sitting in solemn assembly, and having, in that character, nothing to do with the subject of peace or war there settled. Now, the right hon. Gentleman has entirely forgotten that the Conference of Paris of 1856 did not meet for one purpose alone; but having met for the purpose of making the arrangements immediately connected with the peace and the settlement of the Eastern Question, it then went on, upon the invitation of Count Walewski, the President of the Conference sitting in Paris, to discuss other matters bearing on International Law, which, it was thought, would contribute to the prospect of good relations among the civilized countries of Europe. I wish to prove this, and I think I can show that we should have had no title whatever, no locus standi, no presumption on our part, if we had attempted to drag into the Conference of three months ago the subject of maritime International Law. When Count Walewski proposed to the Conference of 1856, that it should proceed without delay to consider certain questions of International Law, he found the Conference positively unable so to do, for it was not, by their instructions, within the powers which many members of the Conference had received. Count Buol for one, on the part of Austria, said that as regarded the principles of Maritime Law, he appreciated their spirit and bearing; but that, not being authorized by his instructions to express an opinion upon a matter of such importance, he must confine himself to the statement that he was prepared to await the orders of his Sovereign. Baron Manteuffel said he had no instructions on the subject of these questions of International Law. They were, therefore, matters entirely separate from the subject of the Conference. They had no connection whatever with the Eastern Question; and if we had, on the occasion of the present Conference—supposing we shared the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman, as to the policy of the Declaration of Paris—attempted to re-open the whole of these subjects, it is hardly too much to say that not only would our proposal have been rejected, but we should have been subjected to the serious reproach of the right hon. Gentleman, that our arguments for dragging it in, head and shoulders, before such an assembly were "flimsy" arguments, and we should have placed ourselves in a position little short of ridiculous. I must say one word more. The right hon. Gentleman has expressed, in very strong language, his opinion that the work of the Conference of London has subjected this country to "disgrace and humiliation." I think those were the words comprised in the brief but emphatic declaration of the right hon. Gentleman upon the effect of the Conference; and his late Colleague (Mr. S. Cave), who sits near him, said that Prince Gortchakoff had repudiated the Treaty of 1856, and England had accepted that repudiation. Now, the best reply to such a criticism is to read the words which Prince Gortchakoff, by the hand of Count Brunnow, has accepted. At the end of October, Prince Gortchakoff did, on the part of the Emperor of Russia, declare himself to be liberated from certain engagements of a treaty signed by him; and on the 17th of January, by the hand of Count Brunnow, Prince Gortchakoff signed a document declaring that— He recognized it as an essential principle of the law of nations, that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting Powers, by means of an amicable arrangement. I will not ask what language is adequate to describe such a transaction; but I do say that a Government which obtained the signature of such a declaration, in complete contradiction and utter annihilation of the whole doctrine contained in the Circular of Prince Gortchakoff, is not liable to the charge of being parties to the disgrace and humiliation of this country. Of course, I am perfectly aware that this is entirely different matter from the question of the neutralization of the Black Sea. The value of that engagement, and the possibility of maintaining it, are points upon which I will not touch, for they are wholly irrelevant to the question raised by the hon. and learned Member (Mr. C. Bentinck). Without censuring the hon. and learned Member for raising the question, I cannot help thinking there was immense force in what fell from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Richmond (Sir Roundell Palmer), upon the impolicy of complaining of these concessions under circumstances in which it is admitted on almost all hands that we have no power to do—what this Motion asks us to do—that is to recede from them. Many think they were proper and just concessions; and at least they have the advantage of placing us in sympathy with the rest of the civilized world. But there is great force in the argument of my hon. and learned Friend that, if we have not the power to alter the position we voluntarily assumed, we are pursuing a course not likely to attract either sympathy or respect from other nations. I trust that the hon. and learned Gentleman, after the discussion which has taken place upon the question, will not trouble the House to divide.

MR. CAVENDISH BENTINCK

said, his object was satisfied by the discussion which had arisen, and would withdraw the Motion.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.