HC Deb 09 May 1870 vol 201 cc431-54
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

, in rising to move for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the Law relating to procedure at Parliamentary Elections, said: Mr. Speaker, I am afraid I shall have to occupy the attention of the House for a longer time than I should wish; but I assure the House that at this early hour of the morning, I will not trespass upon its time more than in my opinion is absolutely necessary in order to explain the motives of the Government and the provisions of the Bill which it is my duty to move for leave to bring in. The Bill is founded mainly, but not entirely, upon the recommendations of the Select Committee which sat during the present Session, and over which. I had the honour to preside. In one particular, I must begin by acknowledging the Bill is directly opposed to the recommendations of the Committee. I believe that this House has never considered itself to be absolutely bound by the decisions or recommendations of any Committee it has appointed, but has always reserved to itself complete liberty to reverse, alter, or modify any recommendations which such Committee may have made. But in this instance, I take it, the Committee on Parliamentary and Municipal Elections appointed last year was appointed rather for the purpose of collecting information, sifting opinions, and examining the subject generally than of establishing any fixed or definite conclusion, and therefore I, as Chairman of that Committee, do not feel so much hesitation as I otherwise might in proposing a measure which in one particular is decidedly opposed to the recommendation of the Committee. Now, the point on which the Bill and the Report of the Committee differ is, that of public nominations. I will at once proceed to state what was the recommendation of the Committee, and what is the proposal of the Government on this subject. The passage in the Report of the Committee which deals with this subject, is as follows:— At some places of election, both in counties and boroughs, the addresses which are delivered are rendered inaudible by noise, tumult, and wilful interruptions; and occasionally serious disturbances, begun on the nomination day, are continued throughout the election. That is by no means a too highly coloured statement of the case. In fact, I should be rather inclined to say, in the language used by some of the witnesses who were examined, that too often a public nomination is nothing but an expensive, a mischievous, and a useless farce, which tends to bring the Constitution of the country and representative institutions generally, into contempt, and which tends also to disgust the most peaceable and intelligent portion of the constituency with everything connected with elections. Sir, the Committee proceeded to give reasons which I shall ask the House to consider for the retention of the practice, but I will first state what is the plan which the Government propose. We propose that it should be the duty of the returning officer to announce publicly, as now, that on a certain day he will proceed at a specified place to the nomination or election, as the case may be, of the Member or Members to serve for the particular county or borough. He will name a period of two hours within a certain number of specified hours—that is to say, two hours between the hours of one and five—as the time during which he will receive nominations. Candidates will be nominated by the personal delivery, not the sending in, of nomination papers. These papers will have to be signed by the proposer and a seconder and eight other electors of the county or borough. The House will see by-and-by that there is an object in retaining a proposer and seconder as now, but in all cases the papers will have to be signed by 10 electors of the constituency. The delivery of these nomination papers will be made either by the candidate himself personally, or by the proposer or seconder of the candidate. The candidate will be permitted to withdraw his nomination paper, or in his absence the proposer and seconder may withdraw the candidate at any time within the two hours specified. If, at the conclusion of the two hours, no more candidates remain in nomination than there are vacancies to be filled, the returning officer will announce the result and publicly advertise it in the manner prescribed by the Bill. This operation will take place not altogether, but comparatively speaking in private. The persons who may be present at this nomination will be the candidate, ac- companied by one of his friends, who may be his legal adviser, the proposer and seconder, or any of the electors who may have signed the nomination papers, but no other person will have a right to be present, unless by the special permission of the returning officer. The advantages which will result from this plan, in contradistinction to others which have been adopted in places where public nomination is not in force are these—It will be necessary that the candidates, their proposers and friends, should meet face to face. They will know before the expiration of the specified period who are their opponents and who are in nomination, and they will have an opportunity of deciding there and then whether they will make up their minds to go to the poll, or whether they will withdraw in favour of some other candidate who has been nominated, and whether they may consider it worth while to incur the expense of a contest. Now, it is necessary, I think, that I should very briefly glance at the objections stated by the Committee to the doing away with public nominations, and see how far the system I have suggested will meet those objections. The objections stated by the Committee are five in number. In the first place they state that— On the other hand the abolition of the present system would, as it seems to us, tend to fetter the free choice of the electors, and would deprive a candidate of an opportunity of setting himself fright with a constituency, in the event of misstatements as to his opinions or his character; and it would make it extremely difficult to prevent the putting forward of persons as candidates for mere purposes of annoyance, or the fraudulent withdrawal of others who were in favour with the electors. Again, it must not be forgotten that, in the majority of cases, proceedings at nominations are conducted in an orderly manner, and without any attendant evils, and that in the case of an uncontested election the whole proceedings are concluded and the return is made on the day of nomination. Now, the first objection of the Committee, that it would tend to fetter the free choice of the electors, appears to me entirely opposed to one of their subsequent objections—namely, that it would make it extremely difficult to prevent the putting forward of persons as candidates for mere purposes of annoyance. I cannot myself see how the free choice of the electors would be fettered if, as I think is provided, ample opportunity be given to any 10 electors to bring forward a candidate of their choice, and if also ample opportunity be afforded them to demand a poll on behalf of that candidate. That it would deprive a candidate of an opportunity of setting himself right with the constituency in the event of misstatements as to his opinions or his character, is a statement which I must admit; and that, I think, is the one solitary objection I know of to the abolition of public nominations. I do believe there is an advantage in certain cases in public nominations, in enabling candidates to meet face to face before the whole constituency, and to challenge his opponents in public to repeat the misstatements which may have been made, and thus to give him an opportunity of refuting them. That there is some advantage in that I do not deny; but hon. Members must be aware that in the great majority of cases where such public explanation is necessary and desirable, the opportunity for it practically does not exist at public nominations, and that where such misstatements and reckless and unfounded assertions have been bandied about, and where, probably, a state of great excitement prevails, the candidate might just as well talk to the winds as try to "set himself right" at a public nomination. Again, as to the objection that it would be difficult to prevent the putting forward of persons as candidates for mere purposes of annoyance, it might be so if the system we proposed was that of merely sending in nomination papers, without personal attendance, and if the poll followed as a matter of course upon the sending in of those nomination papers. But I think that when the candidates and their supporters are brought face to face, and have an opportunity of seeing whom they are going to meet, and also of considering how hopeless will be the contest in which they are are about to embark, that will very much tend to check the practice of bringing forward persons as candidates for the mere purposes of annoyance. This is also the proper place for me to state to the House that the Government do not intend to propose to make any alteration in the existing law as to the incidence of the necessary expenses of elections. The candidate, or, failing the candidate, his proposers and nominators, will, according to our proposal, be still held to be liable for the necessary ex- penses of the election; and this also, in my opinion, will, if it does nothing else, at any rate act as a considerable cheek on the putting forward of candidates merely for the purpose of annoyance. Another objection stated by the Committee is, that abolition of public nominations will render it extremely difficult to prevent the fraudulent withdrawal of candidates who are in favour with the electors. That I own I am unable to see. Of course, corrupt compromises may be made between candidates in future, as they are made now. But the corrupt compromise is not made now upon the hustings; it is made, and must be made, always behind the scenes; there are ample opportunities now, if candidates and their supporters are disposed to make them, for making such compromises; and I do not see how the system we propose will tend to encourage them. The last objection stated by the Committee is, that in the majority of cases the nominations are orderly, and that in the case of an uncontested election the whole of the proceedings are concluded and the return is made on the day of the nomination. Well, if I have made clear to the House the system which the Government propose, it is evident that those advantages will also attend our system, and if there are not more candidates than there are vacancies to be filled the return in that case will likewise be made on the day of the nomination. That, I think, is all that I need trouble the House with on the subject of nominations. Of course it is hardly necessary to say that if there are more candidates than there are vacancies to be filled, it will be the duty of the returning officer to announce that a poll will be taken, and to make the necessary preparations for the poll. I must now explain to the House what are the views of the Government as to the mode of conducting that poll. I have alluded already to the evils which too commonly attend the public nomination of candidates; but those evils are, I believe, small compared with those which are reserved for the polling day. On the nomination day there is riot, there is disturbance, but it is generally mere senseless, purposeless, objectless rioting. It is for the polling day that is reserved the violence with an object and intention. It is for the polling day, or the day immediately preceding it, that are reserved the of the briber, the violence of all kinds, whether of moral intimidation or of the intimidation carried on by an armed body of men. It is scarcely necessary—the facts are so well known and so patent—for me to accumulate proof; but I think the House will allow me to read one or two extracts from the Report of the Committee on these subjects. And let me say here, that although the Committee were considerably divided upon certain points in in their Report, and certain recommendations were only made by a bare majority, in regard to all that part of their Report which contains statements of existing facts the Committee, I think, were tolerably agreed; and although the draft Report was considerably altered, the Report as it stands was agreed to after consultation, and without any very great difference of opinion on the part of the Committee. The Committee state— The Returns in the Appendix to the Report of the Select Committee on Parliamentary and Municipal Elections in the last Session of Parliament show that both in former and in the last elections various corrupt practices, of which bribery and treating were the chief, have prevailed, and to such an extent as to invalidate many elections; and it cannot be supposed that either now or formerly have the whole of such practices been brought to light. With respect to the intimidation in boroughs, they say— It is certain, at least, that whether intimidation is extensively practised or not, the fear of it widely prevails among that class of voters who are liable to its influence. There exists during the the canvass in most boroughs a system of working upon voters through, private considerations, whether of interest, hope, or fear, for political purposes, and this system enables undue influence, in a modified form, to be constantly practised. Then, as to intimidation in counties, there is this passage— It is certain, however, that an influence, exceeding, in a greater or less degree, the legitimate influence which a popular and respected landlord must always exercise in his neighbourhood, is often brought to bear on tenant-farmers, and other voters in agricultural districts. The agent frequently holds language which the landlord would shrink from using, but which the latter does not think it necessary to disown. An instance was given where tenants who had signed the requisition to a candidate all voted with their landlord against that candidate; another, where no tenant on the estate would promise the same candidate a vote until they had received an assurance from their landlord that they might vote as they pleased, on receiving which they all both promised and voted for the candidate opposed to the landlord's politics. The inducement to vote with the landlord may frequently proceed rather from the hope of future advantages to be conferred than from the fear of injury to be inflicted; but, of whichever character the inducement may be, we think that the influence so exercised comes under the description of undue influence, and, as such, ought, if possible, to be checked. One more extract. After referring to the evidence as to elections in Ireland, and stating at some length the opposite views of different parties the Committee state— We cannot doubt that there is some truth in the assertions made by both parties; and we are convinced that, under the present system of conducting elections, there exists in many boroughs and counties of Ireland no real freedom of election. We consider that some change is urgently required. These are the statements agreed upon, I think I may say almost unanimously, by the Committee, and I think, without going further, I may confidently say the statements of the Committee are a sufficient proof that there is something in the present mode of conducting elections which imperatively demands a remedy. What are the remedies proposed? There are three remedies, and I believe only three proposed—namely, the use of voting papers, an increase in the number of polling-places, and vote by Ballot. Now, the use of voting papers, I think, I may dismiss as shortly as the Committee do in their Report— A few witnesses have recommended the system of voting papers. Their chief recommendation is that the risk of riot on the polling day would be diminished. In our opinion, they would tend to aggravate some of the evils of the present system, by the facilities which they would give for bribery, for fraud, and for certain forms of intimidation. I quite agree with this view; I think that such a remedy would be no remedy at all. Well, Sir, as to an increase in the number of polling-places, probably that may be a very desirable thing; but I do not think that any hon. Members will say it would be anything like an adequate remedy for the evils I have enumerated; besides which, I believe, there are at present ample powers in the hands of the magistrates to increase the number of polling-places, if they think that necessary. Then comes the third remedy proposed—that the votes be taken by Ballot. Sir, this is not the time nor the occasion for me to consider the abstract arguments for and against the Ballot; and if I should weary the House by stating the objections urged against secret voting, it is not for the purpose of entering into an argument, but to show the House that those objections have not been overlooked, and to consider how far they can be provided against by this or any other measure. The Committee have very fully and effectively stated the arguments against the Ballot. I think I am justified in saying that they were framed by a hand no means friendly to secret voting— The principal objections which have been advanced against the ballot as applied to our own elections are—that the act of voting is a public duty, and should involve a public responsibility; that it would lend to hypocrisy and deception; that it would do little to restrain the practice of treating; that it would increase bribery, by making it more difficult to detect; that it would be wholly inoperative in the case of spiritual intimidation such as that which is alleged to exist so extensively in Ireland; that it would afford facilities for personation. Now, as to the first objection—that the act of voting is a public duty. Of course, that is not only the first, but the main objection to the Ballot; and I confess it is one which I have always felt so forcibly that it has hitherto induced me to vote against the Ballot, and renders me reluctant to come to a different conclusion. I admit there can be no more worthy spectacle in a free and constitutional country than that of the constituencies returning Members of Parliament by an open, a pure, a tranquil, and, above all things, a free election. But I may say, Sir, that not one of those qualifications, unless it be accompanied by the others, will make an election satisfactory. An open election will not be sufficient unless that election is pure, tranquil, and, above all things, free. Freedom of election I take to be an essential characteristic of a satisfactory election. The other qualifications would be most desirable. The election ought to be open. It is very desirable it should be open, and very desirable that it should be pure—and purity I hope may be obtained. Certainly, it is desirable that the election should be tranquil; but I say again it is essential it should be free. This is, I believe, not a matter of opinion, but is laid down in the law of the country. I was very much struck with a passage in a judgment delivered by Mr. Baron Martin at the hearing of the Beverley Petition. He laid it down that when Parliament gave a man a vote it imposed upon him the duty of using it honestly and without undue influence. He described a variety of conditions which would amount to undue influence, and stated that if it were proved before the Judge that a considerable number of votes had been given under undue influence, the election would be a bad one by the operation of the common law alone. According to the learned Judge such an election would be void without the operation of statute law. That, therefore, well bears me out in saying that, above all things, it is necessary that elections should be free. Can it be said that the system of open voting has hitherto given us either pure, or tranquil, or free elections? An overwhelming amount of evidence, familiar to every Member of the House, gives a full contradiction to that supposition. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us that we should not hesitate to adopt some system of voting which will render our elections pure, tranquil, and free. Neither am I without hope that these advantages may be secured while yet the openness may not be altogether lost. It is well known that in our own Colonies, where the Ballot has been in operation for some time, when the necessity for secresy has disappeared the secresy itself also disappears; and that, when no one is disposed to take advantage of the knowledge, every voter votes just as openly and publicly with the Ballot as without it. Therefore, I am in hopes that under a system of Ballot the day may come when not only our desires in respect of purity, tranquillity, and freedom of election may be realized, but openness of voting may be also regained. Then I have one or two words to say as to the hypocrisy and deception said to be encouraged by the Ballot. I really feel scarcely qualified to decide the nice moral point that appears to be involved in this argument, whether it is more wrong to act a lie or to tell a lie. Those who argue that the Ballot will encourage hypocrisy and deception assume, of course, that the voter has some object in telling some one that he is going to vote one way when he is really going to vote the other. If he has the desire under the present system of open voting to vote one way, and yet in order to fulfil some obligation to another person he votes the other way, that, in my opinion, is acting a lie, whereas in the case of secret voting he will tell one. As I have just said, I do not pretend to decide in which case the greater moral guilt is incurred; but I do contend that the encouragement to hypocrisy and deception afforded by the Ballot will not be of very long duration, because when once the voting is proved to be perfectly secret no one will take the trouble to ask the voter which way he has given his vote. The argument that vote by Ballot will not do away with treating goes for nothing, unless it can be proved that it will tend to encourage treating. It is further objected that the Ballot will increase bribery and will afford facilities for personation. This objection, I admit, is one that requires careful consideration, inasmuch as it involves an examination into the different systems of secret voting. For my own part, however, I do not see that it necessarily encourages either bribery or personation. Under any system of either open or of secret voting, in order to establish either bribery or personation proof must be given that there has been a corrupt payment on the part of one person to another, or that some person has voted on behalf of another. These are facts that, under the existing system, must be established before some tribunal before any person can be punished for such an offence, and the proof of those facts does not appear to me to be necessarily more difficult in the case of secret voting than under the present system. I quite admit that under a system of absolutely secret voting, where it is impossible for any Court of Justice to ascertain how the vote has been given, some additional inducement might be held out to bribery and to personation, because, although the persons committing such offences might be discovered and punished, yet it would be impossible to strike off the vote in favour of the person bribing, because it would be impossible to identify the vote, and, therefore, the briber would obtain all the advantages he contemplated when he offered the bribe to the voter. Those making use of this argument do not, however, appear to be aware that there are systems of secret voting whereby it is quite possible, as has been clearly shown by the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr. Leatham), to identify the vote when necessary. I am prepared to say that, under such a system, the detection of bribery and of personation is quite as easy as it is under the open system of voting. It seems to me that under the system of secret voting the inducement to bribery is somewhat less than under the present system, because the person bribing will not have the same certainty that he has now that he will get the vote he purchased with his money. There are, however, objections to a system of possible identification of votes, the chief one being that if the Court can identify the vote other people may succeed in doing so, and that thus, in an anxiety to prevent bribery, the secresy which it was proposed to give the voter will have been taken away from him. Now, in my opinion, the test of a good system of secret voting is that it affords easy identification of the vote by the Court or Judge, while it renders it impossible or so difficult as to amount to practical impossibility that it can be identified by any other person. I will now state to the House what is the plan which the Government proposes, and how far it meets the objections to which I have alluded. Under the plan proposed by the Government it will be the duty of the returning officer to provide a sufficient number of polling stations—which word is intended to include all separate places where votes are taken, whether within the same building or not—to appoint deputy returning officers, who are to preside over each polling-station, and also to provide a sufficient number of polling papers for each station. He will not personally preside at any of the polling stations. They will be presided over by deputies. An agent, or some official like the present personation agent, may be appointed by each candidate—in writing—to represent him, to detect personation, and to watch over the candidate's interests. The polling papers will somewhat resemble cheques in a banker's cheque-book; they will have a counterfoil, on the face of which they will be numbered, either consecutively or in different series; but the counterfoil will bear on; its face the same number the paper will have on its back. On each voter establishing a claim to vote, the presiding; officer will give him a polling paper, at the same time entering the number of the voter upon the register on the counterfoil. The voter will then retire into a private compartment for the purpose of marking the ballot paper, and having done so he will fold it up in such a way that the names of the candidates on its face will not be visible, though the number on the back will, and he will place it in the ballot box in the presence of the returning officer. At the close of the poll the presiding officer—always in the presence of the agents of the candidates—will open the ballot box and take out the ballot papers, which he will unfold, placing them on their faces in such a way that neither he nor those who assist him will see the names of the candidates, but only the numbers on the back of the ballot papers. He will make them up into packets, which he will seal in the presence of the agents, who also will affix their seals, and the packets will be transmitted to the returning officer, who on receiving all the packets of voting paper from the various polling places will, also in the presence of the candidates' agents, proceed to open them, placing them in the reverse way to that in which they were placed by the presiding officers—that is, the faces of the papers upwards, so that the names of the candidates only are visible, the numbers on the back not being seen. He will then, in the presence of the agents, count the votes which have been given for each candidate, and at the conclusion will announce the result, and advertise it publicly in the manner provided by the Bill. There are other provisions relating to manner of voting by those who are blind, or cannot read, or are in any other way physically incapacitated, but we do not propose to enter into those refinements which have been suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield (Mr. Leatham), of printing the names of the candidates in different colours, or of using invisible ink, or anything of that kind, as we think it very desirable that the whole system should be as simple as possible. I may have failed to make this matter clear to hon. Members; but when they see the provisions as described in the Bill I think they will find this to be a very simple and easy way of taking the votes. We have only provided that the names of the candidates should be printed, and if the voter is blind or cannot read he must get the returning officer to mark the ballot paper for him. I should have stated that at the close of the poll the presiding officer will at once seal up and send to the Clerk of the Crown the counterfoils of the papers that have been used; and it will be the duty of the returning officer, after he has counted the votes which have been given for each candidate, to re-seal the packets and to send them also to the Clerk of the Crown to be preserved. The advantages which we think belong to this system are these—everything is done either in the presence of the candidate himself or in the presence of his agent, and therefore any attempt on the part of the returning or presiding officers to defeat the object of the Act in any way will be immediately detected by an agent in the interest of one or other of the candidates. We further think that the identification of the vote, if necessary, in a Court of Justice, will be easy, for we propose to adopt one of the provisions of my hon. Friend's Bill—namely, that a vote shall not be identified unless it has been proved to be a bad one before a competent Court; but when a vote has been proved to be bad it will be easy, by a comparison of the counterfoil, inscribed with the number of the vote on the register, with the voting paper containing the same number as the counterfoil, to prove for whom that bad vote has been given. We think it will be impossible, or so difficult as to be practically impossible, for any other person than the Court to identify a vote which has been given. The counterfoil will immediately be separated from the ballot paper, and by the system which I have endeavoured to explain it will be impossible for any person, without an evidently fraudulent proceeding—which would be detected immediately by an agent—to see both the names of the candidates on the face of the paper and the number on the back, which would give a clue to the identification of the voter. The Bill contains some other and very important provisions, two of which are referred to in the Report of the Committee, and are rather in the nature of Amendments to the Corrupt Practices Act than alterations in the mode of proceeding at elections. There will be a clause providing that no room shall be hired in any public-house, either as a committee-room or for any other purpose than that of holding a public meeting, at which a candidate shall be present. Some Members of the Committee were of opinion that the use of public-houses should be absolutely prohibited; but it was thought by a majority of the Com- mittee that there were many places where no room could be obtained except in a public-house, and, therefore, it was thought not right to prohibit the use of a room in a public-house for holding a public meeting, although the Committee were unanimously agreed, that rooms in public-houses should not be used for the purpose of committee-rooms. There is another provision inserted in the Bill in pursuance of the recommendation of the Committee; and I shall best explain it by reading the paragraph from the Report of the Committee relating to it. The Committee state— We have received evidence to show that the present provision of the law, which requires a return of the expenses of candidates is insufficient for its purpose, and fails in many cases to secure a full statement of such expenses: and we think that any payment made by a candidate, or his agent, on account of the election, and not included in the return of his election expenses, should be declared to be a corrupt payment within the meaing of the Corrupt Practices Act. A clause to that effect is embodied in the Bill. It is, no doubt, a stringent clause, and would operate quite irrespectively of the nature of the payment, which might be one of the most innocent nature. Nevertheless, if it were not included in the return prescribed by law, the fact of making it would be sufficient to invalidate the election. Though the clause is stringent, and may lead to some cases to hardship and injustice, yet I believe that on the whole it would prove most useful and efficient. It would tend to reduce the expenses of the elections and operate as a great protection to candidates themselves. We know that frequently cases of the most painful description occur, when a candidate is drawn, contrary to his own wishes and determination, into corrupt expenditure. He knows nothing of such corrupt practices during the progress of the election, They have been committed by some injudicious friends, and he will not turn round on them; and often it is a most difficult point for a candidate to decide whether he should repudiate such corrupt expenditure. Under these circumstances I believe that the clause in question will greatly strengthen the hands of candidates, and cause them to announce that they will positively refuse to make any payment which is not included in the prescribed return of expenses. With regard to a Question put to me a short time ago with respect to the subject of the expenses of returning officers and the possibility of placing some check on them, I have been in communication with several persons who I thought might assist me in reference to the matter, and I find that there is more difficulty connected with it than I imagined, and though I do not despair of having a clause to meet the case, I should be unwilling at this moment to pledge myself on this point. There is only another matter to which I will refer, and that is the case of municipal elections. The Select Committee was appointed, as the House is aware, to inquire into the procedure at Parliamentary and Municipal Elections, and in the course of our inquiries we found that the proceedings at municipal elections needed amendment as much or more than the proceedings at Parliamentary elections. In this Bill we have not attempted to deal with the question of municipal elections, because our inquiry showed us that a great deal more was necessary to be done in their case than in that of Parliamentary elections. The whole system of municipal elections requires a Corrupt Practices Act to be specially framed for itself, and we have not had time this Session to prepare such an Act so carefully as is thought desirable. Therefore, we do not deal with them by this Bill, but postpone the subject for another year. I believe I have now stated all that is necessary as; to what the Bill contains and does not contain. We are aware that these proposals are imperfect, and we invite the assistance of the House for the purpose of amending them and rendering them efficient. We know that no Bill which we can propose or the House can pass will be of any avail to check the monstrous evils which have grown up, unless it is supported and aided by the exertions and good-will of the people of this country. From what I have heard on the Committee, and from what I have seen in the country, I believe that there does exist among the most intelligent electors a sincere and earnest desire to put an end to these abuses; but, nevertheless, there exist a strange apathy and irresolution on the subject, and there appears to be an indisposition on the part of those who see and acknowledge the evils to exert themselves and grapple with the difficulty. I trust that this Bill, amended by the assistance of Parliament, will give to that large and, I hope, increasing class the means, which they have hitherto lacked, of offering a firm resistance to the corrupt practices which they detest, and will enable them to make a stand for the freedom, the purity, and the tranquillity of elections.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Law relating to procedure at Parliamentary Elections."—(Marquess of Hartington.)

MR. LEATHAM

said, he rejoiced, in common with the great majority of Members on his own side of the House, that at last the Ballot had become a Cabinet question; but there his satisfaction ceased. First he regretted that other matters, however important, but more or less irrelevant, were dealt with in the Bill, for the Ballot was surely a matter great and distinct enough to have a measure to itself. Nor was the Bill a simple embodiment of the recommendations of the Committee which sat upstairs; and, indeed, as the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) said, one of the main provisions of the Bill ran directly counter to one of the most emphatic recommendations of the Committee—he referred to the discontinuance of public nominations. Again, the Ballot was not proposed in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee, for they especially and emphatically recommended that the vote should be absolutely inviolable, except in cases of bribery, or in case the vote had been adjudged invalid. These were the proposals of his Bill, but not those of the Bill of the Government. He proposed to limit the scrutiny in the way recommended by the Committee; but the noble Marquess did not propose to limit the scrutiny in any way. The noble Marquess simply proposed what was well known as the Victorian Ballot; and in Victoria intimidation by landlords, customers, and employers, was all but unknown. He could easily understand that an imperfect system of Ballot like that proposed might work well in Victoria; but it was quite another question whether, in a country in which intimidation was so rife as it was in England, so imperfect a system would operate as it had operated there. He must also express his extreme regret that the noble Marquess had not attempted to deal with municipal elections, for on every side we heard that since the municipal franchise tad been, so widely extended without the Ballot, and the municipal and Parliamentary constituencies had thus been made identical, municipal corruption offered so many facilities to Parliamentary corruption that enormous impetus was given to the corruption of constituencies; and, in another year, some of them might be beyond the reach of the Ballot, or any other remedy. For these reasons he felt great regret that the Bill of the Government had not been made more perfect. He had hoped it would have been his pleasing duty to announce that, in consequence of its completeness, any further action on his part would be unnecessary; but, as it was, the only alternative open to him was to postpone the second reading of his own Bill to the day named for the second reading of the Bill of the noble Marquess.

MR. NEWDEGATE

, after complimenting the noble Lord upon the distinctness and ability of his statement, said, it was not the manner but the matter which had fallen heavily upon the House. The Government proposals did not commend themselves to him. First, the House was asked to adopt secret voting, to apply to England and to Scotland a remedy which might be necessary for the miseries of Ireland, but which was not necessary for elections either in England or Scotland, and he must remind the House that physic, where not needed, was poison. He did not look forward with pleasure to the dose prepared for them. He had had some experience of noisy nominations, but what was the inconvenience of a little noise on such occasions compared with the advantage of informing a whole constituency at once, without priority of information, of those, who were candidates for their suffrages? Simultaneity of information was one great element in the fairness, and therefore in the freedom of election. The noble Lord seemed to consider every electoral contest was a species of open warfare. Military men spoke of some engagements as affairs of cavalry and artillery, and the Committee or rather the noble Lord seemed to intend to treat contested elections much in that sense; the nomination was to be an "affair of cavalry"—of newspapers, and the polling was to be an affair of artillery, an affair of agency; from the beginning to the end of an election, the Bill proposed that that which formerly and still insured fairness and freedom, face-to-face publicity, was to be avoided. Electors were to learn through the newspapers who were the candidates; and the election was to be entrusted to agents who might be honourable men; but, at the same time, he was convinced that the people in England and Scotland would rather manage their own affairs than trust to agents, however honourable. Having always voted against the principle of the Ballot, having always followed Lord Palmerston into the Lobby against that innovation, he must withhold his assent from the Bill.

MR. BERESFORD HOPE

said, that he for one felt the greatest possible satisfaction at the prospect of the abolition of public nominations. He hoped, however, that there would be no interference with Parliamentary elections in any of the Universities, for he did not think that the evils which existed elsewhere existed there. A clause should, therefore, be inserted in the Bill exempting the Universities from the operation of the Bill.

MR. FAWCETT

said, he thought many Members would be surprised and disappointed at one part of the noble Marquess's (the Marquess of Hartington's) speech. After all that had occurred, and especially after the statement made by the Prime Minister within the last month, the opinion was general that effect would be given to the views expressed heretofore by a majority of the House, and that the necessary expenses of conducting elections would be borne, not by the candidates, but by the constituencies. When the hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. P. A. Taylor) lately proposed the payment of Members, the Prime Minister fully admitted the justice and necessity of making the constituencies pay the necessary election expenses, and he supported the proposal when first made—a proposal which, in the Select Committee, was only lost by the casting vote of the noble Marquess. The argument used by the noble Marquess this evening was very extraordinary. It was in effect this—"We propose to abolish nominations; and it is, therefore, necessary that election expenses should be borne by candidates in order to prevent fraud." Now, one of the most plausible arguments against this plan was that it would encourage a large number of Candida- tures by men who wished to indulge their vanity by appearing upon the hustings at nominations. But, in abolishing nominations this argument could no longer be used. It had always been proposed to hedge round the plan with securities, and the imposition of a fine of £100, £200, or £300 upon fictitious candidatures would give all the security that could be desired against such fraud. After the Prime Minister's declaration there would be great disappointment on this subject. Many a man upon the Treasury Bench had consistently and persistently voted against the Ballot. The arguments for the Ballot were just as strong five years since, when the Treasury Bench treated this question with contumely. How was it they had altered their opinion? He was afraid it was through party exigencies. It was hard that a scheme advocated by the Prime Minister should be thrown aside because there was not the same party exigency on the subject. If the Prime Minister did not support the plan now, it would show once more that this was an age of political inconsistency. In candour he was bound to add that he differed from the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr. Leatham), and did not think that the Bill should be merely a Ballot Bill. All the proposals of the Government, except that to which he had alluded, seemed to be in the right direction. The country would welcome the abolition of nominations and the forbidding of committee meetings in public-houses. He believed the country would also have liked the extension of the prohibition to all political meetings, and some further restriction on the employment of paid, canvassers and agents. The House would never have done all they could do for the reform of the electoral system unless they dealt courageously with that growing scandal, the increasing expense of elections, and they could not do this unless they put some check upon the unlimited use of paid agents and canvassers.

MR. WHITBREAD

said, he desired to tender his grateful thanks to the Government for having taken so early an opportunity of carrying out, as he thought most honestly, the recommendations of the Committee. It was, of course, very difficult for them to please all their supporters, as was sufficiently proved by the two speeches to which the House had just listened. The hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr. Leatham) was angry with them for going beyond his propositions, and the hon. Member for Brighton (Mr. Fawcett) was equally angry with them for not carrying out his hobby. He, for one, regarded as of great importance the clause making every payment not included in the return of election expenses a corrupt payment, and the vote upon it would test the sincerity of the House as to whether they were or were not in earnest in endeavouring to put down corruption. The revelations after the last Election showed how many honourable men there were who had been led away by the fatal reasoning that because a devoted supporter of theirs happened to have spent a certain sum of money in seeking to promote their return, they were bound six months afterwards to recoup him for the outlay. Now, if such payment, whether within one month or a year, were made a corrupt payment the candidate would have a ground on which to stand in refusing to make it. His hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, he might add, complained of the exclusion of municipal elections from the operation of the Bill; but he must be well aware that the Ballot alone would not cure the evils by which those elections were attended. As to the machinery proposed by the Government, he had not made up his mind whether it or that suggested by his hon. Friend was the best, but that was a matter of detail which could be settled in Committee. He trusted that when the Bill came to a second reading his hon. Friend would be in a better frame of mind.

MR. GLADSTONE

I think, Sir, the House will expect a few words from me after the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton (Mr. Fawcett). But first, I wish to discharge the more agreeable duty of expressing my best thanks to the Committee, and to my hon. Colleagues, who have bestowed so much labour upon this subject, first of all, for the great exertions they have made in bringing towards its final solution the question of secret voting, and secondly, for the other important and very valuable suggestions they have made, and several of which are included in the present Bill. Further, I wish to state, in reply to the hon. Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Beresford Hope) that there is a clause in the Bill which I believe he will find will entirely exclude the Universities from the operation of the Act. With regard to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, I may say we are both fortunate and unfortunate. We are fortunate, inasmuch as there is nothing so dangerous to individuals or to a Government as too much adulation. It is fortunate, considering the imperfections of human nature and the many faults into which we may fall, that we have always got a friend at hand to remind us of our fallibility, and we are certainly indebted to my hon. Friend for not seeking to make our faults less than they are, either in number or intensity. We are unfortunate, however, in this, that while, as is perfectly natural, my hon. Friend finds fault with us on the points wherein he differs from us, he must also find fault with us on the matters wherein we agree with him; and when we come forward with a measure for secret voting can, in the largeness of his charity, find no better motive to ascribe it to than, sordid motives of our own political interests. However, it is always a great advantage to feel that we have touched the ground; and, on this occasion, I am glad to think that our opponents who sit opposite can say nothing more bitter of us, with regard to the considerations which have governed our conduct in relation to this Bill, than what has already been said, eagerly and without loss of time, by my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton. With respect to the absence from the Bill of the provision for relieving the candidates of the expenses of elections, and transferring them to the constituencies who have a deep interest in the matter, and are naturally the parties on whom they ought to fall, I may state that the reasons which induced the Cabinet to refrain from making any such proposal are of the simplest character. I will not refer to some matters which might cause delay, because of the considerable difficulties which lie in the way of framing plans to give effect to what seems to be a sound and healthy principle. I will content myself with stating that we were most anxious to proceed with the important measure which my noble Friend near me (the Marquess of Hartington) has just asked for leave to introduce, but we felt that, in order to give it a chance of success, we must not overload the vessel by bringing into it matters which, al- though they might tend to theoretical perfection, would, on the other hand, greatly diminish the prospects of passing the Bill this Session. My hon. Friend, in his sanguine view of the question, ought not to forget that his own proposal; when submitted to the House last year, did not survive a second reading, but was actually rejected at that early stage, though, I admit, only by a small majority. That circumstance indicated the marked division, of opinion among hon. Members on the subject, and the difficulties in the way of carrying such a proposal, and I would appeal to the House—I would almost leave it to my hon. Friend himself—to say, whether, as practical men, we did not arrive at a wise conclusion when we determined to postpone the consideration of a subject such as that, in order to obtain the very best chance we could secure for carrying into effect the important purposes aimed at by the present measure.

MR. JAMES

said, he was sure hon. Members did not desire to have a long discussion on the details of a Bill which was not yet in print; but he trusted he might be allowed to express his extreme regret that the Ballot proposed by the Government was to be deficient in its principal element, and, as many thought, its chief recommendation—namely, perfect and inviolable secresy. Many hon. Members believed that the Ballot contained but little abstract good, but regarded it simply as a necessary remedy for certain evils. It was the secresy of the Ballot that recommended it to many of its supporters, but under the present Bill, secresy would depend on the side upon which a paper was placed and a variety of accidental circumstances. This was not merely a question as to the amount of publicity which would, in point of fact, be so obtained; but, one as to the effect which the possibility of publicity would have on the minds of the voters. From the noble Marquess's (the Marquess of Hartington's) statement, it appeared that the element of secresy was to be sacrificed for the sole purpose of obtaining a scrutiny. He would not enter upon that subject now; but he hoped to have an opportunity on some future occasion of showing how the necessity for a scrutiny could be reduced to a minimum. He did not wish to place himself in opposition to the Bill; and if the principle of secresy could be discussed in Committee it would, no doubt, be considered at that stage. If, however, it should be found that the principle was so blended with the Scrutiny Clauses that it could not be properly discussed in Committee, he should propose, on the Motion for the second reading, an Amendment to the effect that it was in expedient to sanction any form of Ballot which was not complete and inviolable in its secresy.

LORD CLAUD HAMILTON

said, that the differences of opinion existing among those who called themselves supporters of the Ballot showed the inexpediency of introducing a new Reform Bill after midnight. He hoped the Government would not force the House to give even a preliminary sanction to a Bill to which he, for one, entertained the most serious objections, irrespective of those already stated by the supporters of the principle of secret voting. Most sincerely did he trust that there would be no attempt to hurry the House into a preliminary assent to the principle of secret voting, by asking them to pass the Bill through its first stage at so late an hour, contrary to all the usages of the House. Silence was very often supposed to imply consent, and as he was strongly opposed to the principle of the Bill, he would move the adjournment of the debate.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned."—(Lord Claud Hamilton.)

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

said, he hoped the noble Lord (Lord Claud Hamilton) would not divide the House. He (Mr. Cross) was perfectly willing that the Bill should be introduced, though he objected to the measure in toto. In his opinion voting was a public duty, and ought to be public in order to secure its being performed honestly. He should therefore vote against the second reading of the Bill.

MR. R. N. FOWLER

said, he wished to ask the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) whether he intended to abolish the declaration of the poll as well as the nomination.

LORD CLAUD HAMILTON

said, he would withdraw his Motion for the adjournment of the debate.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by the Marquess of HARTINGTON, Mr. Secretary BRUCE, and Mr. JOHN BRIGHT.

Bill presented, and read the first time. [Bill 120.]