HC Deb 08 June 1869 vol 196 cc1419-39
MR. CANDLISH

in rising to move the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the causes of the great excess of cost in prosecuting the War with Abyssinia over the Estimate submitted to Parliament, said, in a discussion which took place in this House on the 26th July, 1867, it appeared from the speech of the noble Lord the then Foreign Secretary (Lord Stanley) that the possibility of a war with Abyssinia had become somewhat dimly visible to the House and the country. The necessity for a warlike demonstration became more apparent to the minds of the then Government in the early part of the month of August in the same year, and so far had the probability of war advanced that in November the Government of the day thought it expedient to call the House together to communicate their policy to the country and to ask for the necessary Supplies for prosecuting a warlike demonstration against the King of Abyssinia. When the House met in November he believed he was correct in saying that there was a general concurrence of opinion in favour of the Expedition. He (Mr. Candlish) at least was one who concurred in the propriety of it; and the House at large, almost by a formal vote, more than tacitly, acquiesced in its policy, for it granted the necessary Supplies. It was easier to acquiesce in the policy of that Expedition than it was in the policy which made the Expedition necessary. It was casier to justify a warlike enterprise to release Consul Cameron and our countrymen who were detained prisoners in Abyssinia than it was to justify the; polity which Sent Consul Cameron there. He apprehended that if we had learnt nothing move from that Expedition, we had at least learnt this—that it was unwise for any civilized Government to attempt to establish consular or diplomatic relations with a semi-barbarous power. A nation at the head of civilization could in no degree deflect from the principles of truth, honour, and integrity; and could not with propriety, as he conceived, have any diplomatic intercourse with a nation which did not even understand the meaning of these terms. But the policy which sent Consul Cameron to Abyssinia, and the policy of the war which was un- dertaken by this country for his release, were not questions before the House tonight. The main question raised by the Motion which stood in his name on the Paper was the cost of that war in comparison with the estimate of expense which had been laid before the House. He should have very little to say on that question beyond quoting the language used in that House by the statesmen concerned in despatching the Expedition, for that language was shorter and clearer than any he could himself command. On the 26th of November, 1867, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire, then filling the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, after detailing the decision of the Government and the progress made in preparing the Expedition, asked for a Vote of £2,000,000 towards defraying its expenses, and used these words— It will now be my duty to explain the probable cost, as far as we can ascertain, of the war in which we may have to embark, and for which we have to a great degree prepared, and also to explain why I have fixed upon £2,000,000 as the amount which it is, on the whole, wisest and best to vote under the present circumstances. The Committee is entitled to the fullest confidence in this matter, and I do not know that I can proceed in a manner more satisfactory to the Committee, as well as to the Government, than if J place before them all the information that we have upon the subject, and state what we believe will be the complete cost of this war if it should commence and be pursued not only to its probable but to its possible termination. The Estimates before us, I need hardly remind the Committee, cannot be prepared with the precision with which Estimates are usually laid upon the table of the House, because they refer to expenditure taking place in a distant country, and they must therefore be described as "rough Estimates;" but I wish the Committee to understand that though I avail myself of an epithet in common use and call them rough Estimates, they are not careless Estimates. They have been submitted to as severe an investigation as was possible under the circumstances, to much criticism and to the judgment of most experienced men, and they have led to considerable inquiry, even in the distant places where the expenditure must to a great degree take place. We offer them, therefore, with as much confidence as we have a right to feel, and that confidence is by no means slight. Assuming, then, that the war commences, and is carried on until the end of the month of April, about which time it would be expedient that our troops should leave Abyssinia, we believe it will be necessary that we should incur an expenditure of £3,500,000. That amount will no doubt be increased if we are called upon to replace the forces of the Indian Government that are now assisting Her Majesty in this enterprise; but the increase will not, comparatively speaking, be considerable—I say comparatively speaking, because I have seen the most ab- surd Estimates on that head in the public papers. In case we have to replace the forces which the Indian Government now lend to Her Majesty, there will be an increase in the Estimate of £300,000, more or less. That is the whole amount which we believe would he required, and would give a total expenditure of £3,800,000; but the Government would contemplate the possibility of an expenditure, in round numbers, of £4,000,000, if we have to replace those troops. Now, of this £3,500,000, £2,000,000 alone will be payable by the Home Government during the present financial year—that is, the year ending on the 31st, of March—that is to say, £2,000,000 to meet the advances and make the allowances on account to the Indian Government, which would become due before that day, and to make good those advances which have been supplied by the services at home from the appropriated Votes. It certainly will not exceed the sum of £2,000,000 in the course of; the present financial year; and Her Majesty's Government are therefore of opinion that it is unnecessary to trouble the Committee of Supply for a greater amount than that. There is also another reason—though I think I have already given a sufficient one—why it is convenient not to contemplate at the present moment a greater expenditure than £2,000,000; for as far as we can calculate it will take exactly that sum to place our complete force upon the soil of Abyssinia. I think that General Napier may find himself with his army completely equipped and ready for action in Abyssinia, at a cost of £2,000,000. I do not wish to indulge in any sanguine expectations; but we ought not to be blind to this contingency, that after these great preparations, and after the invasion of Abyssinia by disciplined troops, it is possible that the future horrors of war may be spared."—[3 Hansard, cxc. 191–2.] This was spoken on the 20th November, and two days afterwards the statement was confirmed, if confirmation was needed, by the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Lord Stanley) in the most definite and precise terms, and the House received it with that implicit confidence which it was bound to exercise on an occasion of an official statement made under circumstances so grave and with such particularity and definiteness. The House re-assembled in February, and rumours being prevalent that an increase of expenditure would be necessary, the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Whalley) asked the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire if the Estimates for the war were likely to be increased. The reply was—"I have no reason to believe that the Estimates for the Abyssinian Expedition have been exceeded." This was on the 20th February, 1868, and when further pressed on the subject by Mr. Darby Griffith, then a Member of the House, the right hon. Gentleman said— I thought my previous answer was sufficiently explicit, and I can only say I have no reason what- ever to believe that the general Estimate I put before the House has been exceeded."—[3 Hansard, cxc. 989.] On the 16th March the hon. and gallant Member for Truro (Captain Vivian) asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer (then the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Northamptonshire, Mr. Hunt) a similar question. The right hon. Gentleman, in reply, said— I think it has been usual for this House to be content till the Budget has been brought forward in order to learn whether the Estimates have been exceeded or not. …. I do not decline to answer the question. The public mind has been made uneasy by exaggerated statements as to the expenditure going on in Abyssinia. …. My right hon. Friend the First Minister of the Crown (Mr. Disraeli) staled in November last that it was estimated that if the expedition lasted, as was anticipated, to the end of April, the expenditure would amount to £3, 500,000, and in certain eventualities it might extend to £4,000,000. From the last means of information at my disposal, I am able to state that I believe, up to the time I am speaking, the expenditure in Abyssinia will be covered by the lower of these two amounts."— [3 Hansard, cxc. 1684.] The present First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Childers) followed up this reply with these more pointed words:— "Did the right hon. Gentleman mean that the expense to the end of April had not been exceeded?" and the reply was that— If the Expedition lasted till the end of April the expense would amount to £3,500,000, and might extend to £4,000,000), but, that I believe that the whole of the expenditure up to the pre-sent time would be covered by the lower of the two amounts—namely, £3,500,000."—[Ibid.] Up to this time the House will perceive that no hint was given that the Estimates had been exceeded. Nothing further was communicated to the House till the 23rd April, when the Budget speech was delivered; and in that speech it was stated that the supplies to be obtained from the country were much less than had been anticipated, and that in consequence supplies had to be obtained from a distance, and that the Estimates would be increased on that account to about £600.000 a month. Sir Robert Napier anticipated that he would be on his way home on the 20tlv of April, and that if there were any further charge it would be small in amount, and would probably be defrayed by the Indian Government. The expenses up to the end of May would thus be about £5,000,000. This was a statement made to the House when the late Government must have been in possession of full information on the subject. It was made ten clays after the fall of Magdala, and the welcome news of its fall was within two days of these shores. The calculation as to the time when this event would take place and the prisoners be liberated was fid-filled to the letter. It was in the month of April. Magdala was reached on the 10th; on the 13th it fell; the Abyssinian army was scattered to the winds; and on the 18th the British army was on its homeward march. "Within 100 days Sir Robert consummated his mission—released the prisoners and destroyed the fortifications of Magdala. So that in point of fact there was nothing to increase the Estimates. On the 4th of March the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote) said— What the House has a right jealously to look at is the information that was supplied to it when it was called upon to vote money."—[3 Hansard, cxciv. 636.] When the £2,000,000 was asked for by the Government the estimate was £3,500,000. On the 23rd of April another £3,000,000 was asked for by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the estimate was thus increased to £5,000,000. So, according to his own test, the right hon. Gentleman would see that it was fair to quote the remarks at the time to which he had referred. [Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: Hear, hear!] Now, what had been the cost of this war? On the 4th May last the right hon. Gentleman the present Chancellor of the Exchequer said the expenditure was £6,800,000 in India. £461,000 by the War Office at home, £4,262,000 by the Admiralty, £250,000 by the India Office; making a total of £8,773,000. In other words, the actual expenditure was shown to be £5,300,000 in excess of the original Estimate, and £3,800,000 in excess of the second and corrected Estimate which was submitted to the House at the time the Vote was given. These facts, he submitted, amply justified the proposition which he had placed upon the Paper, and the right hon. Gentleman opposite, he believed, far from objecting, in point of fact, invited this inquiry. [Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: Hear, hear!] While inquiry was pending, it was not for him to make charges against any person; but obviously there must have been grave and serious mistakes somewhere. He would assume that the representations made to the House were honestly made, accord- ing to the information which at the moment had reached the authorities. Mr. Turner, who supervised the expenditure on the part of the Government, wrote to say— These totals, making altogether £5,000,000, will doubtless prove to be considerably under the actuals when brought to account rather than otherwise. And Major General Jameson said— Provided the Expedition terminated on the 31st of May, it would not be safe to ask for less than £3,000,000 in addition to the £3,000,000. In the opinion of the gallant officer £3,000,000 would be a safe amount for which to ask, and if the Expedition lasted beyond the 31st of May a further charge of £600,000 would be requisite for every month beyond that day. Sir Robert Napier reached the coast with his forces in June; at that date, therefore the Expedition might fairly be taken to be at an end, but it might, perhaps, be necessary to allow another month for the removal of materials. In seeking an investigation into the expenditure of all this money the House was engaged in a strictly constitutional work. Public money was voted freely for any object of which the House approved; and it would always maintain the honour of the country by making good an outlay, whether wisely or unwisely incurred, reserving to itself at a later period the right of full inquiry. In answer to the objection which might be possibly urged, that this Motion came too late, and that the Committee, if appointed, could not report during the present Session, the hon. Gentleman said that there had been no early opportunity of raising the question with effect, as, even yet, the official information was hardly complete; and the Committee, though unable to report, would at least be able to lay upon the table the evidence which they had taken, and ask to be re-appointed next Session.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

After the speech to which we have just listened I can hardly be doing wrong in seconding the Motion, which I am quite as anxious to see adopted as the hon. Gentleman. I desire this—first, upon general grounds, for I think that the ground which the hon. Member has taken is a perfectly sound and legitimate one, and that if the course which he proposes on the present occasion was more frequently adopted in cases where a large expenditure for a particular object has been sanctioned and then exceeded, it would conduce very much to economy, and would have a beneficial effect upon the Executive Government in keeping them up to their duty in these matters. We know very well that, excuse or disguise it as we may, war will always be a very wasteful business; and everybody knows that on occasion of a war there is generally a great deal of public enthusiasm excited, which enables the Government to obtain the sanction of Parliament for entering into it; and that while a war is going on the Government have it entirely in their own hands, and have only to come down to the House and deprecate discussion on the subject, and the patriotism and feeling of the country would always prevent their being hampered. Then, after the war is over, there is too often a tendency to make the best of a bad business—to say—"The money is gone, and now there is nothing to do but to pay the bill." And so one great expenditure after another gets hushed up and slurred over, in a way not for the public interest. I think the hon. Gentleman—if I may say so— has acted very discreetly and entirely in conformity with that which ought to animate the Members of this House in bringing forward this Motion at the time and in the manner in which he has done. He has avoided saying anything which could give any offence whatever: and I thank him, on the part of my late Colleagues and myself, for the language in which he has couched the remarks which he has just addressed to us. I can assure him that we warmly reciprocate his desire to have this matter entirely cleared up. That is one reason why I support the Motion. Another is, that I am confident, when this Question is examined into before a Select Committee, and comes to be really probed by the examination of documents and of witnesses, it will be found that, although if may, perhaps, be said we were to a certain extent to blame for using language which may have given the House and the country an impression of greater certainty on our parts than we ought to have felt; yet it will, I believe, appear that throughout we acted perfectly bonâ fide, and that the information which we laid before the House, and the grounds upon which we ourselves acted were grounds such as would have justified any Ministers in our position in taking the course which we actually adopted. I hope, moreover, and I believe it will appear, that the excess which was unfortunately incurred was an excess for which we were not responsible, and for which the circumstances of the war will fully account. I admit that when the hon. Member says we mentioned £3,500,000 or 4,000,000 as the probable cost of the Expedition, supposing it would last till April, and when at a later period we named £5,000,000 as the probable amount, and that when some eight or ten months afterwards it turns out that the estimate has been exceeded by the amount stated by the hon. Member, that is a matter which, primâ facie, requires explanation and defence. But I would ask him to bear in mind that the House and the country were perfectly aware that these Estimates were necessarily of a very rough and uncertain character. It was part of the case urged against us by some hon. Gentlemen that we should not have entered into this war at all, because we were undertaking an expedition at short notice into a wholly unknown country, where it was impossible to say beforehand what means and appliances we should meet with—whether we should find the ordinary supplies of provisions, whether we should find any means of transport, whether we should even find a proper supply of water. We knew that we should also be pressed for time, and that if the Expedition did not come to a conclusion by the end of April or the beginning of May we should lose a whole season. We knew that the health of the troops would suffer, that great misfortunes might be apprehended if they were compelled to remain in the country for another season, and that during the whole time they were there the difficulty in supplying our troops with provisions in that unknown country would be very great. Under these circumstances, not having time to communicate as rapidly as we could have wished to do with the base of our operations at Bombay and the country of Abyssinia in which the operations were to carried on, and knowing how long it would take to send out supplies from this country, it was necessary to give a considerable latitude to those upon whose judgment we relied and to whom we entrusted the safety of the Expedition. The principal directions we gave to General Sir Robert Napier and also to the Government of Bombay, who were charged with the organization of the Expedition, were— "Take care, whatever you do, that you do not incur any disaster. Take care that you do not compromise the safety of the British troops or the honour of the British name. Ask for what you require. Do the matter as economically as you can; but do not let it fail for want of proper provisions and supplies." In that way, we in England necessarily put; ourselves to a great extent in the hands of those who had to organize the Expedition—the Government of Bombay and Sir Robert Napier. We endeavoured, as well as we could, to form an estimate of what the expenditure would be. We knew the force of men that was required, and with the aid of the Admiralty and the War Office we endeavoured to calculate the cost of the supplies that it would be necessary to send from this country, and the cost of the transport. By the aid of officers who had had experience in the Persian and other campaigns we formed as good an estimate as possible of the probable cost of the force while it was under arms. But we had no estimate supplied to us from the seat of war or from Bombay that we could lay upon the table of the House, or to which we could refer as representing the expenditure for which we held the Government of Bombay responsible. I may say that I mentioned this to the House at the time that the second Vote was asked for. I laid upon the table a Return, from which I quoted some passages in March last; and in regard to which I said that the information it contained was not so full or so accurate as we could wish, but that we hoped and believed that the sum we were asking for would be sufficient. It now turns out that we were considerably under the mark, because we under-estimated the expenditure that had already occurred, and because we had not foreseen certain events that occurred after the period at which we reckoned on the termination of all expenditure. When I say that we put ourselves in the hands of the Government of Bombay and of General Sir Robert Napier in regard to the expenditure, I desire to say most explicitly that I am not attempting or desiring to throw any blame upon the Government of Bombay or the Commander-in-Chief on account of the extra- ordinary cost of the Expedition. I should call it very discreditable on the part of the Home Government if we attempted to shift on the Government of Bombay any of the responsibility that properly belonged to ourselves. I wish further and besides to bear my testimony in the most emphatic manner—and the more so because I think that hitherto very scant justice has been done to the Government of Bombay—to the excellent manner in which they performed the very difficult service that was pressed upon them. Perhaps I may be allowed, as an evidence of the difficulties with which the Government of Bombay had to contend, to read a few passages from a letter which Sir Seymour Fitzgerald has addressed to me in reference to the debate that took place in this House in March last— The charges appear to be that the Government of Bombay has committed the country to an expenditure 'monstrously' differing from their estimate; that they have failed since the close of the Expedition to send a proper account of the actual cost; and that the expenditure has been reckless and extravagant. As regards the first point, I wish to say that at no time have I ventured to give any estimate of the probable cost. The preparations bad not been commenced a month before it was obvious to everyone here that it was impossible to form even an approximate estimate; and if I had been required to give one I should have declined. We were called on to make provision for 40,000 men and 30,000 animals, and it was necessary that this should be done at once and without the least delay, to insure the early departure of the Expedition. A sudden call of this magnitude deranged the prices in a. way to defy calculation, so that we were driven to have recourse to the most distant markets. Further, from the complete ignorance that existed as to the country whither the force was sent, everything bad to be provided, not only food for the troops and followers, but hay for the animals, and even firewood for the men. Even at home, where there is nothing that cannot be procured from manufacturers accustomed to supply the ordinary demands of the market, our task would not have been an easy one. But here articles had to be provided the manufacture of which was unusual and almost unknown. For instance, when the preparations for the Expedition were commenced, there were but thirteen spare water tanks in the dockyard. We had to provide, and did provide, in an incredible short space of time a sufficient number to carry more than 4,000,000 gallons of water, though I was told at first by the contractors that so unusual was the manufacture that no contract could be taken for the supply of more than forty, or at the utmost, fifty per week. From our ignorance of the country no one could say whether the Expedition would last two months or two years, and under such circumstances no one in the House or out of it could at that time have understood that any 'estimate,' properly speaking could pretend to be, or was put forward as a calculation upon sufficient and reliable data. As regards the delay in rendering an account, even if there had been delay, the circumstances I have referred to would have been, I think, a sufficient explanation. The expenditure had been made, it may almost be said, at every port east of Suez— Bombay, Kurrachee, Calcutta, Madras, Aden, Bushire, Muscat, and a dozen places in the Red Sea, and made, too, under different authorities acting independently. The number of vouchers already examined exceeds 25,000, and the net charges actually audited and reported to the Imperial Government amounted to,£6,618,000. These have been regularly sent home month by month as fast as the audit was completed. These figures, T think, not only disprove any charge of delay: but I believe I may challenge the production of any instance of a similar expenditure being so quickly and completely rendered. I mention these facts in order to show the pressure put upon the Government of Bombay, and to explain why we could not receive the information as rapidly as was necessary to enable us to lay trustworthy Estimates before the House. It was impossible to receive these accounts so as to enable us in March to know what the real amount of the expenditure would be. It may be said that this was a very bad and unbusiness-like transaction; but all I can say is, that if you examine the circumstances of any other war you will find that precisely the same tiling has occurred on all former occasions. And if we consider, in the case of the Abyssinian Expedition, the great hurry in which the thing was done, and the wide area from which the supplies wore, drawn, I think it is very much to the credit of the Indian and Bombay Governments, that they have been able to present so complete an account within so short a time as ten months after the conclusion of hostilities. I believe I am right in stating that this has been done, and that the total amount falls within the Estimate given in March last. All these matters, however, will be well sifted before a Committee, and upon their Report Parliament will be enabled to pronounce a judgment. I do not complain of the time in which the hon. Member has brought forward his Motion, or of the deductions which he and others have drawn from the facts as they are now before us. All I ask is, that the final decision of Parliament should be suspended until the matter has been completely inquired into. And although the Committee will be unable to finish its labours this Session, much useful work may be done in ascertaining what information is required, and the quarters from which it may be best obtained, and in framing questions to be sent out to India and answered before another Session. There will also be an opportunity, no doubt, of personally examining officers who may be able to throw light on the subject. I believe that Mr. Turner is now in this country, and others connected with the various War departments may either be in this country or may be invited to come over to give evidence. I am aware it may be said that my Colleagues and myself might have begun to make our arrangements at an earlier date. All that I can say is that we hoped against hope up to the last moment, and until political events happened in Abyssinia of such a character as to leave us no alternative but to commence operations. No doubt by beginning so late, the accidents of the season, and the absence of particular officers, made the preparations more hurried than we could have wished, and hurry in such a case means increased expenditure. It was found that time was running very close; and, although it was calculated that the campaign would be finished by the end of April or the beginning of May. it was impossible to tell what, would occur, and whether the force might not have to remain there during the whole year. It was, therefore, necessary to order largo supplies to be sent out. Supplies, which would have been necessary if the campaign had been prolonged, were to a great extent wasted or had to be brought back at a time when the monsoon was adverse to navigation, and thus in various ways unlooked-for expenditure was incurred at the close of the Expedition. The late Government court inquiry; they are prepared to take any blame that may be fairly found to attach to them. At the same time they enter upon the inquiry with considerable confidence that the verdict will be one upon the whole very decidedly in their favour, and creditable to the Government of India, and particularly that of Bombay, as far as they had the management of those operations.

MR. MUNDELLA

said, he was sure the House would be as content as he was that the right hon. Baronet (Sir Stafford Northcote) anticipated him in rising to second the Motion; but he would have been better satisfied—and he was sure the House would have been better satisfied—if the right hon. Baronet had not, in the latter part of his speech, elaborately defended and excused the lavish expenditure to which we have been subjected. It appeared to him that much of the defence the right hon. Gentleman had put forward was not exactly founded upon fact, for the circumstances which were supposed to have caused the extraordinary expenditure were all known and calculated upon beforehand, and it was anticipated that the campaign would finish when it did. It was said that the original estimates were of a rough and uncertain character, and that we had no estimates from Bombay or from the seat of war; but the right hon. Gentleman who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Disraeli) in submitting them, said— They have been submitted to as severe an investigation as was possible under the circumstances, to much criticism, and to the judgment of most experienced men, and they have led to considerable inquiry, even in the distant places where the expenditure must to a great degree take place. We offer them, therefore, with as much confidence as we have a right, to feel, and that confidence is by no means slight."—[3 Hansard, cxc. 191.] Moreover, the statement that these were rough Estimates could not apply to the 23rd of April, when the war was actually finished. In military and commercial circles the Abyssinian War was regarded as a great scandal, and the expenditure as having exceeded, almost all precedent. He did not wish to cast reflections upon the late Government, nor upon the gallant officer in command of the army; but there was fault somewhere, and it was but right that a Committee should immediately investigate the matter, not only that, the country might have the satisfaction of knowing what had become of the extra £5,000,000, but that it might also prevent such extravagance in the future. If we were to be again involved in war, it would probably not be a little war with some barbarous prince, but it might be a great war with some civilized nation; and the question was whether in such a case we were again to waste all our resources at the very outset, and so involve the country in immense expenditure and risk. It was well known there was the grossest mismanagement in Abyssinia; that the army sent there was out of all proportion to the work to be done; and that the freights surpassed anything ever known in this country. He had it on the authority of contractors that such things as these occurred—a ship was chartered to take out compressed hay at so much the voyage and at so much per day demurrage; when the captain arrived out with his cargo he was kept waiting for months, charging demurrage, the mules on shore dying meanwhile; he was then ordered away to an Indian port, where he was kept waiting for months; he was then ordered out to sea to throw the cargo overboard; that order being countermanded, he was told— "We don't want the hay; take it away, and do what yon please with it;" and he, knowing where he could find a good market, went and sold it and brought home the proceeds to his owners. Numbers of vessels had been kept lying for months under demurrage in Annesley Bay and off Bombay, and the captains had then been ordered to throw their precious freights overboard. At the close of the war 6,000 mules and horses, which had been collected at Suez at an enormous cost, were given away for an old song; and, as another instance of the wasteful and extravagant expenditure, he might mention that 500 women Mere taken from India to grind corn for the Sepoys in Abyssinia, but that it was afterwards found they had never ground corn in their lives. Men who had seen something of the wars of the last quarter of a century in India, America, and Italy, and who had been with the Austrian army and with the Danish army, said they never witnessed such extravagance as they saw in Abyssinia. It was a war of gold, and altogether a disgrace to us, reflecting the greatest discredit upon those who had the organization and management of it. Under these circumstances it was only right that an inquiry should take place into the matter, and until that inquiry should have terminated he hoped that the House would suspend its judgment, and would not come to the conclusion for which the right hon. Gentleman had contended— that everything was done that could be done, that all things ought to be made pleasant, and that the waste of money could not be prevented. In justice to the British tax-payer he urged investigation.

MR. EASTWICK

said, he had hoped that the debate would have terminated with the speech of the right hon. Baronet (Sir Stafford Northcote), who made such a satisfactory statement. As it had been continued, and the hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Mundella) had preferred such strong charges, he would say he felt certain of this that, should the matter be referred to a Select Committee, the zeal and energy displayed by the Bombay Government would receive a more full acknowledgment than it had yet received. He believed that only those who had been concerned in such a task could fully appreciate the labour of organizing an Expedition which comprised 15,000 fighting men. Of course, the markets of Bombay were not able to supply the required stores, and there- fore it was necessary to send to other parts of the world to get thorn, and we were simultaneously buying mules in the Dardanelles, Spain, and Africa, and horses in St. Petersburg. When so many demands were being met, was it possible to form any just estimate of the expenditure? It was utterly impossible, and tin-Government would have been justified in declining to publish any estimate. The Bombay Government and Sir Seymour Fitzgerald devoted all their time and energy to keeping' down the expenses: but many things occurred which it was quite impossible to foresee. The Government had no doubt acted wisely in selecting for the command the best officer they could find, and then leaving to him the conduct of the operations. The force had originally been fixed at 12,000 men; but Sir Robert Napier had asked for 2,000 more, and it was impossible to comply with that demand without a large additional expenditure. Again, the original estimate had been for six months' stores, and it was thought afterwards better to increase that amount to twelve months' stores. When the campaign terminated earlier than had been anticipated a vast amount of stores remained on hand, and it would have been better and cheaper to have left them at Annesley Bay than to have removed them, because it was not possible to sail transports without steamers; indeed, after some vessels had remained for several weeks, it was found to be the cheapest course to throw their cargoes into the sea. When all these things come to be considered, it would certainly be found that there was no reason to impute blame to the authorities: on the contrary, they would receive much greater credit than had been given to them by the country.

SIR CHARLES WINGFIELD

observed that it had been left to Sir Robert Napier to determine the strength and composition of the force, and he believed no one was prepared to say that he took too large a force. He did not know what resistance or physical difficulties he would have to encounter, and if he had failed, having had full discretion left him, it would not have been enough for him to say that he had miscalculated the campaign. Was the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Stafford Northcote), then, in error to leave it entirely to Lord Napier to determine the strength of the forces? He thought not. It was impossible for him to calculate the difficulties that lay in the way of the enterprise, and the only thing he could do was to trust the commander, and give him freedom to select what force the nature of the enterprise might require. Sir Robert Napier merely said to the Government of Bombay—"I want so many thousand men; put them down in Abyssinia and give me the means of moving them there." It rested with the Government of Bombay to provide transport and carriage in Abyssinia. Whether they had provided it at a reasonable rate, or whether they had incurred needless expenditure, was a point which required minute inquiry; £4,230,000—nearly half the entire cost —was spent in sea transport; including coals, the cost of the transport was nearly £5,000.000. That did appear to him an excessive sum, and he could not but think that inquiry would show it was a lavish and needless expenditure. On this point inquiry was urgently needed. Pending that inquiry, he received with some reservation the assurance of the right hon. Baronet that the Government of Bombay deserved the thanks of the country for the manner in which it had conducted the necessary preparations for the Expedition.

COLONEL SYKES

said, the Expedition had from the first occasioned surprise on both sides of the House. It originated with three Members on the liberal side, who advocated it on the ground of the insulted dignity of Great Britain, Her Majesty's representative having been imprisoned by a barbarian. Two of those Members were no longer in the House; the third was still a Member. The other side, then in power, took it up as a capital card, thinking that a great deal of credit might be got out of it by redeeming the honour of the country, They certainly deserved great credit for placing their confidence in the ability and judgment of Lord Napier. But unhappily, the Expedition had occasioned very considerable expense indeed—far beyond what had been anticipated by the Government themselves. At an early period of the year, when discussing the subject, he stated that he had a list of the transports employed in his hand, and the cost per month would amount to 40 lacs, or £400,000. If the expedition lasted six months there would therefore be £2,400,000 for transports, alone, and if twelve months, £4,800,000. That was independent of coals. The Government had the same? sources of information which he possessed—namely, information from Bombay, and they should have known this fact as he know it. Neither in policy nor justice should the tax-payers of the country have been called on to bear such an amount of taxation — approaching to a sum of £10,000,000—for what? A phantom— the redemption of the national honour, and the maintenance of the prestige of England in India. He denied that the honour of England was compromised because Mr. Cameron, who had no business in Abyssinia at all, had been taken prisoner by the King. The whole affair might have been managed by native agency for £30,000 or £40,000, or even much less. As for prestige—he had some knowledge of India, having seen a good deal of it, and of its different nations, and he might say there was not one in a million there that ever heard of Abyssinia, So far as the military operations were concerned, nothing could be more satisfactory or effective. The manner in which General Napier had depots provided along his line of march till he got to Magdala did him infinite credit, lint how had all this money been spent, the expenditure having terminated before the time anticipated by the Government? In July, 1868, a gentleman, who had resided for six months at Zoulla, came to him and said he had seen transports from Suez loaded with hay collected in Syria, and others from Bombay. What became of it? These transports lay in Annesley Bay, and some never delivered their cargoes at all. Then the quantity of coal supplied at an increased price was very large indeed. He had asked the late Government for a Return of the number of ships which brought hay to Annesley Bay; of the price paid for the hay; of the quantity left in Abyssinia, and of the quantity never unshipped. The Under Secretary for India had informed him that the order for the Return was sent to Bombay on the 20th of August last, but the required statement had not yet been received. The order had been repeated, and when produced he had no doubt it would, to a great extent, explain the increase of the estimate, without at all, m his opinion, affecting the character of the Bombay Government, and certainly not of Lord Napier. Another cause of waste had been the purchase of mules in Syria, where they cost £40, and in Spain, where they cost £80 per head; while in Abyssinia they might have been had for £4 or £5. What became of those mules? Many thousands of them had been left on the coast of Abyssinia when we came away. With, regard to all beyond the mere military expense of the Expedition, he thought it was quite necessary that an inquiry should be instituted, and the country would thank the Government and the late Minister for India for having consented to it so readily.

CAPTAIN F. E. B. BEAUMONT

said, that the case was that a number of their fellow-countrymen were unfortunately detained at a long distance from this country, and in order to rescue them the country had spent £10,000,000, though a much smaller sum would have sufficed for the purpose. Under these circumstances it behaved the House to inquire into the causes of that unnecessary expenditure.

MR. OTWAY

observed, that unquestionably there had been a great excess of expenditure over the estimate, and that circumstance formed a proper subject for inquiry. Therefore it did not seem desirable to enter now into a discussion of every matter which had been referred to that evening; and if the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote) had concluded his remarks with the expression of his desire that the House should suspend its judgment until the Committee made its Report the debate might then have ended. However, after stating that there were three departments connected with the expenditure of the Expedition—the Home Government, the Government of Bombay, and the department of the Expe- dition under Lord Napier—the right hon. Gentleman went on to declare his satisfaction -with the economical proceedings of each, and to express his conviction that the result of the inquiry would prove entirely creditable to the late Government. Now, prophecies with regard to Abyssinia had not been very fortunate on the part of the right hon. Gentleman; but he trusted that the proposed inquiry might verify to some extent his hopes. The statements made in the House that evening showed that a strong impression existed in the country that there had been a lavish and unnecessary expenditure in connection with the; Abyssinian Expedition. That was a necessary subject for inquiry, and the Motion of the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Candlish) had the entire concurrence of the Government.

MR. F. WALPOLE

said, he would have been glad if the hon. Gentleman who made the Motion (Mr. Candlish) had also proposed to inquire into the causes of the Abyssinian War. Charges had been made of great hurry and great expenditure in connection with that Expedition; but- his knowledge of war led him to believe that on the occasion in question hurry meant economy. He would be very glad to sec the result of that inquiry, and he was sure that when the result was known. Gentlemen on the other (the Ministerial) side of the House would regret the acerbity with which they had pressed that Motion.

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

said, he was sorry to notice the tone in which his hon. Friend the Member for Chatham (Mr. Otway) had granted the Committee. he was glad that it was to be granted: but he did not think from the tenour of the observations of the hon. Gentleman that the Government would approach the inquiry in any spirit of fairness. He wished, however, that the whole Abyssinian question should be referred to that Committee. Let them go to the heart of the business and see how the Abyssinian War began. he thought Mr. Cameron, who had suffered greatly, had been foully attacked in the course of the discussion, and in justice to him they ought to investigate the whole of the matters that had led to the Abyssinian War. In reference to the observation of the hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes), who said that Abyssinia was full of mules, he must observe that though there were mules enough there for a shooting party or a small number of persons, yet lie believed that for the supply of a single regiment with the necessary mules the resources of Abyssinia would be absorbed in a single day. With regard to expenditure, he had always noticed that as soon as shipowners and manufacturers had grown rich on warlike expeditions they immediately began to grumble when the bill came to be paid. The Abyssinian Expedition had shown that the arm of this country could reach any part of the globe, and by adding to the prestige of the nation, would tend in future to save British tax-payers from expenditure for similar expeditions. He moved that the whole Abyssinian question be referred to a Select Committee.

MR. AYRTON

suggested that, as there was much important business before the House, the discussion might now be allowed to close. It was not the desire of the Government to say one word to prejudge the inquiry. The duty they had to undertake with regard to this Expedition was very simple, though very onerous —it had only been to pay the demands made on them during the last three months for the expenses incurred under the arrangements made by the late Government; and the few questions they had had to consider had been, simply with reference to the allocation of the charges between the British Exchequer and the Government of India. The Government had not imbibed any feeling of prejudice in the question; they only desired that the Committee should approach the subject with an impartial mind, and a full determination to do justice to the motives and conduct of the late Government. He hoped the House would not be drawn into an interminable debate on the origin and progress of the Abyssinian War.

MR. ALDERMAN LUSK

said, that though the House had been told a great deal about enormous charges for freight, the charges made were not extraordinary at- all. They amounted, as a rule, for sailing ships, to about £1 per register ton per month, and that at a time when there were but few ships in the market. If the required number of ships had not been obtained in consequence of not giving a fair price for them, and any disaster had occurred as at the Crimea, the Government would then have been accused of bungling and mismanagement.

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

said, he would not press the Amendment of which, he had spoken.

MR. CANDLISH

in reply, disclaimed the imputations of the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphinstone), and said he was not aware that there had been any asperity in the debate or any attack on Consul Cameron. He thanked the Government for their acquiescence in the Motion.

Motion agreed to.

Select Committee appointed, "to inquire into the causes of the great excess of cost in prosecuting the War with Abyssinia over the estimate submitted to Parliament."—(Mr. Candlish.)

And, on June 21, Committee nominated as follows:—Mr. BAXTER, Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE, Mr. GRANT DUFF, Sir John HAY, Mr. SEELY, Mr. EASTWICK, Major ANSON, Mr. CHRISTOPHER DENISON, Mr. WHITE, Mr. HOWES, Sir PATRICK O'BRIEN, Lord ELCHO, Captain BEAU-MONT, Mr. CHARLES TURNER, Mr. MUNDELLA, Sir JAMES ELPHINSTONE, Mr. HOLMS, Colonel BARTTELOT, and Mr. CANDLISH:—Power to send for persons, papers, and records; Five to be the quorum.