HC Deb 15 March 1866 vol 182 cc315-22
SIR JOHN WALSH

said, he rose to call the attention of the House to the importance of continuing the construction of the Iron-clad Men-of-War, and to move for Returns of the total cost of the building and equipment of the Warrior and the Agincourt respectively. In bringing under the consideration of the House this very important subject, they must bear in mind that the iron-clad vessels hitherto completed were for the purpose of supplying the place of the great wooden three-decker fleet which formerly existed, and that vessels of a new class were needed of smaller tonnage and less draught of water than had hitherto been launched. He had observed with great satisfaction that the Admiralty had turned their attention to this subject. Every one knew that frigates, corvettes, brigs, and sloops of war, were a most important part of our navy, and it would be a great blow to our naval efficiency unless means of supplying the wants of that important branch of the service could be contrived by the ingenuity of modern naval constructors. In the late Parliament he drew attention to the subject of the naval power of England. Some remarks he had then made attracted a degree of attention which he had scarcely anticipated, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in an important speech he delivered to his constituents at Liverpool, made reference to those remarks. He begged to thank his right hon. Friend for the courteous and friendly terms in which he had made reference to him, but he thought his right hon. Friend's observations were calculated to give an erroneous or exaggerated impression of what was said. His right hon. Friend had characterized him as the friend of profuse general expenditure, and had intimated that his suggestions, if adopted, would place an obstacle in the way of economical reform. But it would be impossible to replace our wooden fleet by an iron-clad fleet without considerable outlay, and his remarks were directed to that point. He did not arraign the general peace establishment as it existed in 1864. At that time Parliament voted 70,000 men for the navy, just one-half of the total number they had during the last great war, when they met all the navies of the world, and were supreme upon the seas. He did not question that that was a sufficient peace establishment; at the same time, he had always been the strongest advocate of an efficient Channel fleet. He considered that this country should never be left at the mercy of an unforeseen contingency which might plunge us into war, and even prevent us from defending our own shores. In 1864 and 1865 there existed, and he trusted there would continue to exist, a very efficient Channel fleet, and he dare say that many Members of that House had witnessed with gratification the friendly meeting of the French and English fleets in the course of the last year. It was not the question of the peace establishment to which he wished to draw the attention of the House, but he did not think that either the House or the country had ever realized to themselves sufficiently the immense consequences to England which had resulted from the great revolution in the mode of naval construction and naval warfare. At the close of the last war England was undisputed mistress of the seas; not all the nations in the world combined could for one moment stand against the number, the power, and the efficiency of the English fleet. But what was the position of England up to the time that iron-clads had practically superseded wooden ships? During a large portion of the time her peace establishment was inadequate, much more so than under the present Admiralty. But in those days they did not depend upon the peace establishment as constituting the naval supremacy of England. Behind the peace establishment existed two great arms of strength which England alone possessed, and that was the point to which he wished to direct the attention of the House. The immense number of ships in ordinary constituted the great naval strength of England during forty years. At any time if she had been called upon to put forth her strength and energies upon a sudden demand, these ships in ordinary at Portsmouth, in the Hamoaze, at Sheerness, in the Medway, and at Pembroke, might have been equipped, manned, and put to sea. But no other Power had anything like that naval force laid up in ordinary. There was another immense reserve which they possessed in a peculiar degree, and which happily still remained. It was a most difficult thing to convert a landsman suddenly into a sailor. The sailors of England's merchant marine approached nearly the number of 300,000, and nothing was easier than to convert a merchant seaman into a very good man-of-war's-man Taking the average, the merchant seaman was a better practical seaman than the man-of-war's-man; he worked on smaller craft, and had to turn his attention to everything, whereas the man-of-war's-man probably confined his attention to one or two things. The main thing was to teach the merchant seaman the use of the guns, and this was not very difficult, as he would be under the direction of a practised artilleryman to each gun. England, therefore, stilt possessed the means of rapidly equipping a fleet such as no other nation possessed. Therefore, during the whole of those forty years this country had a means of equipping a fleet, and again of manning it, which no other nation in the world possessed, and which would have placed us in a short time in the position in which we stood in 1815, at the close of a gigantic struggle. But be wished to call attention specially to this fact—that the whole of that wooden fleet which had been our strength had become as useless, as incomplete, and as valueless for all purposes of war as if their timbers had become rotten, or as if they had been sunk to the bottom of the sea Our wooden ships were now as practically obsolete as the old Roman triremes, the appliances of modern warfare completely superseding them. Iron-clad vessels were comparatively speaking invulnerable, but if he might coin a word to express his meaning, he would say that the incombustibility of the iron-clad was more important even than its invulnerability. By the recent improvements in naval gunnery the shell was projected with the greatest ease and precision at point-blank range into the vessel's hull; whereas, under the old system, it required great knowledge of conic sections, and deep acquaintance wish mathematics, to cast effectually a shell upon a wooden ship, especially in a state of motion. Such were some of the altered conditions of modern warfare. Mr. Cobden, whose accuracy in details was so remarkable that one might almost venture blindly to follow him, in a speech which he made three years ago on going into Supply on the Navy Estimates, stated that we had at that time 66 ships of the line, 40 large frigates (of a more powerful class, he believed, than the old 74), making together 106 of what might be called first-class ships, besides upwards of 150 vessels of smaller construction, which were of immense use in representing our flag in all parts of the globe. Now the unfortunate result of the particular direction that progress had taken had been entirely to confiscate the whole of this great naval force. This involved not only an immense loss of capital, but, what was more important, of power. England had lost immensely in power from that great change, and stood no longer the first great naval Power. He feared that the public mind had not been properly awakened to this fact, though it was still the constant habit to speak of England as the mistress of the seas, and as holding the trident of the ocean. That was all very fine, but, unfortunately, it was not true. The trident of the ocean had slipped from her grasp, and if war were now suddenly to break out it would be found that there did not exist the means of defending our own shores from insult and from plunder, our commerce from interruption and from privateers, and of ensuring those supplies of food which were now necessary to the existence of the nation. Perhaps we should scarcely be safe from invasion itself. England, though she had to some extent replaced her power, had not one tenth of the force in iron-clads that she formerly possessed in wooden ships. The Secretary to the Admiralty told them that at the end of the year the country would have 30 iron-clads afloat, but what was that compared with 106 sail of the line, and large frigates almost equal to ships of the line, besides 150 ships of smaller calibre, which carried the power of England all over the world, and made her flag known in every sea? How could a fleet of iron-clads, drawing 28 and 36 feet of water and even more, compare in utility with that wooden fleet, for entering rivers and harbours in every part of the world? These were facts, mortifying and distressing facts; but it was not well wilfully to shut their eyes to them. It would be far wiser to look them steadfastly in the face, and prepare in time for any emergencies that might arise. It was the part of true wisdom and national foresight to examine calmly into what stops could be taken for placing the country in the proud position of naval superiority which it occupied before these vast changes. Sound economy and judicious retrenchment ought by all means to be strictly observed; but in doing that they must not forget to measure what they were likely to save immediately in money and what they sacrificed in permanent safety and power. The Chancellor of the Exchequer would allow that, in case of necessity and with an adequate motive for putting forth her strength, England was not too poor to provide the means of vindicating her position among the nations. He did not come forward with any specific proposal that we should build so many iron-clads in a certain time, or that we should replace our old wooden force at once by a corresponding number of iron ships. That must be a matter of time. But what he would impress on the House was this, that there was a work before us which we must not lose sight of; that we must not suppose, because the noble Lord with his happy power of exposition gave us a flattering account of our naval strength, we had therefore got all we required. There was a vacuum to be filled before England could become what England had been, and she had not only all the pecuniary means, but all the constructive resources that were needed to fill it. England, with her inexhaustible stores of coal and iron, with her great mechanical and manufacturing skill, was the very centre of construction of those ships for the whole world. If the Emperor of Russia wanted an iron-clad, he would send to Limehouse; if the Sultan wanted one, he would go to Liverpool; if the Brazilians or the Peruvians wanted iron ships, they would come to us. There were few nations which could construct those vessels at all, and none which could do so in so quick and effective a manner. The Government had, therefore, only to take time by the forelock and to keep in view the position in which we stood, and the urgent need of supplying the want, in order to become a greater naval Power than we were even under the old heart-of-oak system.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

said, that the House as well as himself always listened with the greatest respect to whatever fell from the hon. Baronet on this subject, because they were sensible that he could have no other object in view than the safety and honour of the country. Our annual Estimates, however, were very large, and he had failed to discover any reason from the hon. Baronet's speech for proposing to make them larger. The hon. Baronet had on this, as on former occasions, compared the number of iron-clads which we now possessed with the line-of-battle ships of former days. It was quite true that if we took numbers alone into account our fleet might be said to be inferior to what it was at the close of the great European war. In those days we had more than 100 line-of-battle ships; but the number of the large and costly ships required for the present day was much less than it was then, and the real question was, what was our naval strength as compared with that of other nations. He would not go into comparisons or refer to what was done in other countries, for that it would be well, if possible, to avoid; but he could say that he confidently believed that the armour-plated ships which we had constructed during the last few years had placed this country in a very safe position. He would not say that we were now in the same relative position as we were at the close of the great war. In these days it was not to be expected that we should at once be able to sweep the seas, as in those. What we did expect, however, was this, that if we were obliged to go to war, we should be able to maintain our rights, and that our fleet would be found to be worthy of the dignity of the country and quite sufficient for her safety. It would, undoubtedly, be necessary that the Government should come annually to that House for a large sum for the construction of more of those armour-plated ships. But even now he would like to ask the hon. Baronet whether he would not rather go to sea with our thirty armour-plated ships than with the 100 line-of-battle ships, of which he talked with so much pride. It was certainly desirable that we should go on constructing those iron-clads, and constructing them regularly, and the Government were responsible for this—not to allow other nations to build more powerful armour-plated ships, or ships of any other description to an extent which, compared with our own force, might endanger the liberty, the honour, or the dignity of this country. He was surprised to hear the hon. Baronet say that England was in an unprepared state as regarded her seamen. He understood the hon. Baronet to say that in former days we could call forth any number of seamen we pleased, and that thus we were in a state of full preparation for war. Now, there precisely lay the distinction between these days and those, but the distinction was quite in the opposite sense from that intended by the hon. Baronet. It was quite true that there was at the close of the war a vast number of seamen available for any purpose that might be required; but we entirely neglected that which of late years was considered so important—namely, the question of naval reserves. It was also true that the number of men we voted for the navy was not so very large, but he would say, without the least, fear of contradiction, that of late years we were in such a position that we could in crease our naval force, if required, to such an extent as to be quite able to meet any fleet that might suddenly be brought against us.

SIR JOHN WALSH

said, the noble Lord had misunderstood him. He had stated that we still retained the men, but had lost the ships.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

said, he was glad the hon. Baronet appreciated the efforts which the Government had made to maintain the reserves. He did not wish to be always parading our force, but if he were to enumerate all the available reserves over and above the actual number of men at sea, the hon. Baronet would be far from dissatisfied on that head. With regard to ships, their numbers, though very much less than in former times, were, in comparison with those of other nations, very considerable. With regard to both ships and men, be believed that this country had not, since the great war, been in so satisfactory a state as it was at the present time.

MR. H. BAILLIE

said, that the noble Lord was correct when he stated that the question of naval armaments had resolved itself into a question of comparison. All nations were re-constructing their navies, and each was trying to build the most powerful armour-clad ship. He, however, doubted the correctness of the noble Lord's assertion, that the position of England in this respect was satisfactory, and asked whether our navy was predominant or oven adequate for the defence of our interests in any part of the world. He pointed to the Mediterranean, and asked if there was a sufficient naval force there to protect British possessions in that sea, even against any aggression on the part of Italy. He believed there was not, for the Italian Government had more iron-clad vessels in that sea than England had. Were there any iron-clads belonging to England in the Pacific? America had some there. [LORD CLARENCE PAGET: We are going to send two to the Pacific Ocean.] The naval expenditure was very large, and he doubted whether the money was wisely disposed of. He thought that it would be much better to construct smaller vessels instead of those huge iron-clads which it was impossible to use at distant foreign stations, because there was no port where they could be repaired except in Great Britain. If the Government desired to defend the interests of England in every part of the world, and to meet, when necessary, the iron-clads of other countries, it was imperative that; smaller iron-clad vessels should be constructed.

MR. WHALLEY

said, he wished to suggest the inauguration of a volunteer naval force. Such a force might be of great service to the country, and it would be nothing more extraordinary than the Volunteer corps established during the last few years, which bad given so much satisfaction. He thought that the money, and the energy, and intelligence now do-voted to yachting might be made available for the defence of the country. He believed that Lords Yarborough and Alfred Paget favoured the project.