HC Deb 21 February 1865 vol 177 cc535-59
MR. ADDERLEY,

in moving for a Select Committee to consider the state of the British Establishments on the Western Coast of Africa, said, that it was a country notoriously unfit for occupation by the Anglo-Saxon race—a country which had been lately described by the highest authority as being, from one end of it to the other, a hotbed of disease, the occupation of which by us could only be justified by the highest and most disinterested motives—he would even say by the attainment of the objects in view compensating for the enormous sacrifice of life and treasure. And yet in this unhealthy spot, to say nothing of the large naval establishment, costing this country nearly £1,000,000 a year, we had no less than four settlements. The first was established long ago for the object of promoting the slave trade. Of late years it had been maintained for the opposite object of suppressing the slave trade, and for substituting legitimate commerce and civilizing the Natives of that coast. Two hundred years were spent by us in inflicting moral and physical injury on that country, and the last fifty years we had spent in attempting something like reparation. He wished for inquiry in order to see whether these settlements as settlements were well ordered and regulated, and whether they attained their object, or, on the contrary, did not rather obstruct it. On the first point he thought there was sufficient reason for inquiry, from the recent experience of one of those settlements. It was only last Session that the House was filled with alarm and anxiety, and some Members of it exposed to the bitterest suffering, owing to the Governor of the Gold Coast— one of these settlements—having nearly run us into a third war with the Ashantees, the most warlike of the African tribes. Governor Pine said, "The silence of the King of Ashantee must be broken by some steps taken on our part." Troops were reluctantly furnished to that Governor, and many gallant lives were lost, not in conflict with any enemy, but by contact with this pestilential climate, and through being brought into that contact without due preparations having been made. The troops were withdrawn only in time to save them from utter destruction, and in order to prove that the war, which was not precipitated by their withdrawal, could not have called for their presence at all. They were told by the same Governor that wars and commotions of this kind, when they occurred, involved a total suspension of the objects for which these settlements were made. He said that the seaboard of his extensive government lay exactly outside the cruising ground of the squadron, so that whenever war took place the squadron had to be withdrawn from the cruising ground in order to maintain the war. The Governor also stated that these wars must be expected in the neighbourhood of such tribes, from time to time, if Englishmen would settle there, and that whenever they did occur this country must be prepared to bear all the brunt of such wars, both in men and money. "For," said the Governor, "my government is not a colony but a protectorate, so that I cannot call upon the Natives or the inhabitants to supply either their labour or their money." The Governor added that he had neither hope nor heart to press the people for any tax, and he had recently run the settlement almost into a revolution by proposing even a licence duty on the sale of rum. Not only was it impossible to levy a tax upon the Natives, but also their services could not be made use of, inasmuch as the Gold Coast Artillery, the only Native force which had been raised, had become mutinous and insubordinate, and has since been disbanded. That was the local corps that was considered by Lord Grey as an essential part of the system which he established for the consolidation of our government. The Governor went on to describe his own position as anomalous and untenable, for whenever war threatened, as was almost continuously the case, his authority as civil Governor became suspended, the sole responsibility falling upon the military commander, with whom he had quarreled and held no communication whatever. The military commander had been removed from the colony since the period referred to, and the danger which then existed had ceased, but the Colonial Secretary told the House only last Friday that Colonel Conran, accompanied by troops, was at this moment making a military progress among the neighbouring warlike tribes for the purpose of opening a friendly intercourse with them, which was not unlikely to replace the Government in its usual confusion. He saw by the papers that the residents considered Colonel Conran understood their interests far better than the civil Governor, and the measures he had adopted were certainly more likely to promote the speculations of the settlers than the objects for which civil Governors were put there by this country. He might mention, lastly, that the Government of the Dutch settlement at Elvina, in the immediate neighbourhood, were now, and had always been, unfriendly to this country, and were always in intimate alliance with our constant enemies the Ashantees. Under such circumstances an inquiry into the state of the government of the Gold Coast could not be entered into a moment too soon by a Committee to be appointed for the purpose. Did the other three settlements present less ground for inquiry? What did they hear as to Sierra Leone, the most important of all our settlements on the West Coast of Africa, and which ought to be the very centre of improvement? What was the result of a century of philanthropic efforts here, begun by Clark and Wilber-force? A high authority had recently described Sierra Leone in these words— The people are the very pests of the neighbourhood. The Sierra Leone people are detested wherever they go, and always in bad odour with every one. The uneducated tribes on the coast are far more intelligent, and the Natives do more work where the white man has not settled. That was not a very satisfactory description certainly. He saw also from the Reports before the House that exports and imports, taking the matter in relation to the commercial value of the settlement, were steadily declining. The exports and imports at Gambia were also declining, and Governor D'Arcy stated that the whole of the neighbourhood was in a constant state of civil war. He went on to say— It is very difficult to avoid being mixed up with the troubles of our neighbours. The belligerent tribes seize cattle, ignorant, in all the excitement of war, of the property being British-Our traders make reprisals, or, in spite of my forbidding it under penalties, take service under the opposing chiefs. The merchants claim our protection up the river. Where is this to cease? As regarded Lagos, Governor Freeman said— From the lawlessness of the Egbas, the state of affairs is going from bad to worse. I have recalled from Abbeokuta all persons claiming British protection. The missionaries, however, refuse to pay me any attention. X only get opposition from the British merchants and residents in Abbeokuta. My influence is undermined. He tells the elders of Abbeokuta their anarchy cannot be allowed; "England is slow to anger, but will require satisfaction at last." At this moment, insisting on reparation to a Benin merchant, M. Henry, for a very questionable wrong, he has imposed a fine, which being refused, Her Majesty's ships are again withdrawn from this cruising ground to blockade the trade of the Benin until the fine is paid. Such was the state of the four settlements in Western Africa, and having thus described their present condition, he would, with permission of the House, very briefly advert to their past history. The Gold Coast, first occupied by the Portuguese, and then by the Dutch, came into the possession of this country by the Treaty of Breda in 1672, when Parliament placed it under the control of the African Company, with a subsidy of from £13,000 to £20,000 per annum, for the purpose of carrying on the slave trade. It remained in their hands until 1821, when the Crown assumed the government, the slave trade having five years previously been abolished. Hardly had the Crown taken upon itself the management of the settlement before it was plunged in two Ashantee wars, the first of which was the most disastrous that this country had ever entered into with a savage tribe. The Crown was soon weary both of the expense of the wars and of the consequently declining commerce, and in 1827 they handed over the government of the settlement to a company of merchants who received a subsidy of £4,000 to carry on the government, they being informed that if they refused those terms the settlement would be abandoned. At that time a protectorate had been assumed over the neighbouring tribes which had led to many complications, and a magisterial jurisdiction had been set up over the natives, with a judicial assessor at its head, to discharge what Lord Grey described as the singular office of dispensing rude laws among uncivilized tribes. The company being found inadequate to conduct the Government, the Crown resumed the conduct of the settlement in 1843, and in 1864, by an Order in Council, it had been placed under the constitution of a Governor and a Legislative and Executive Council. In 1850 the Gold Coast was separated from the Government of Sierra Leone, and Lord Grey purchased the neighbouring Danish Forts, and established the Gold Coast Local Artillery, and otherwise extended and consolidated the Protectorate. Sierra Leone was ceded to this country in 1787 as a settlement for free negroes. Since that period a very large territory had been annexed to the colony, as was usually the case with our settlements there. It was now used as a convenient place for holding the Mixed Commission court for adjudicating prize slavers, and was the centre of the efforts made by missionaries in the cause of West African civilization. Lord Grey, in his work on Colonial Government, 1853, pronounces Sierra Leone to be a failure. Gambia, by a patent in Queen Elizabeth's reign, had its trade granted to British merchants, and a company was formed in the year 1618, for the purpose of carrying on the slave trade. In 1814 Gambia became exclusively British, the French taking Senegal and Goree. In 1816 the slave trade was by law abolished, and this settlement was used for the purpose of commerce and suppressing slave trade. It was separated from Sierra Leone by Letters Patent 1843. Lagos only assumed the position of a separate colony in 1862, after ten years previous occupation, and it was expressly occupied for three purposes—the suppression of the slave trade, the promotion of legitimate trade, and the benefit of the tribes. He might also mention that the free Republic of Liberia, originally established in 1816 by an American Colonization Society for the purpose of receiving free coloured people from America, though it had languished as a colony, had served as an effectual harrier to the carrying on of the slave trade in that country. He had referred to these matters to show how far this country was engaged in the occupation of West Africa and in obligations with the various chiefs in the neighbourhood of our settlements. The possession of any of the territory for the purpose of preventing slave exportation entailed a necessity, moreover, of constant extension, for suppression of export was nugatory unless our measures for suppression could be exercised along the whole coast. This was the consideration on which our settlements had perpetually increased, and under the present system must continue to increase. In 1850, when Lord Grey made purchase of Danish territory on the Gold Coast for the purpose of consolidating British strength, he contemplated the purchase of the Dutch territory also, that all might be under the protection of the Government of this country. On the extension of territory, he would quote the opinion of an officer of high authority— We have made a great mistake in acquiring territory round Lagos. I was the first that ever entered the river, and some twelve years ago took possession of the eastern point in the name of the Government, for trading purposes. I was ordered to give it up again, as the Government did not wish to enlarge their possessions. But what have we done since? Taken the whole island of Lagos, with territory many miles up the Lagoon, as well as on the sea coast, which has led us into serious broils with the Native Chiefs. All but the island should be given up at once, keeping the customs of the river with a consul and a steamer. We have no business to establish ourselves about powerful chiefs and tell them to do exactly what we bid, or we shall blockade or bombard their towns. We have not the means of carrying out such threats, and are only laughed at. I would likewise give up all Gambia but one fort and the Gold Coast protectorate. We do no good; it brings no return, but does much harm. He believed, as the Government of the day had told that officer twelve years ago that they did not intend to enlarge their possessions, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies would no doubt repeat the same statement which he made last year, that his policy was a similar one. And no doubt the right hon. Gentleman had broadly laid down that policy; but whatever might be his policy, whatever might be his intentions, he could not help extending the mode of settlement we now followed on the African coast. He would now state what had been done in the way of inquiry into this subject. On two occasions there had been Royal Commissions, but he did not think much had followed from them. An inquiry into the subject of the British settlements on the African coast was made in 1842 by a Committee over which Lord Stanley, now the Earl of Derby, presided. The ground of that inquiry was the fact already alluded to, that on the Gold Coast, which was then in the hands of a company, British merchants residing there were in the habit of supplying the slavers of Spain and other friendly Powers with equipments for carrying on that trade, for the suppression of which this country alone maintained those settlements. The Governors confessed their inability to suppress that practice, and such being the case, the Committee to which he had already referred came to the conclusion, and the House acted upon the Report, that the Crown should resume the government of the settlements, and of each under a separate Governor. But the question now was, whether, the Crown having resumed that government, the mischief which took place before had ceased; or whether it was not the case—as he believed it was—that a large body of merchants there, whose interests were opposed to our public policy, had so much influence in the government of those settlements that they still interfered with the action of the Government in effectually carrying out the sole object with which that House bad established them there. The Committee of 1848–9, presided over by Mr. Hutt, and in 1850 the Lords' Committee, presided over by the Bishop of Oxford, both had in view the more general object of the best means for suppressing the slave trade. In 1853 the Committee presided over by Mr. Hume—and of which he himself was a Member—was appointed to consider how far the treaties for the suppression of that trade between this country and Spain and Portugal were carried out, and whether the large sums which had been voted to those countries for their consent in putting down the slave trade had been spent for the purpose for which they were voted. The subject of the settlements on the African coast only incidentally came under the notice of those Committees. But so far as they did they appeared to them of very questionable use in the suppression of the slave trade. The Committee of 1853 made it clear that the chief diminution of the slave trade arose from the stoppage of demand from Brazil. For his part he considered that the principle which was found to operate in ordinary commercial matters applied also to the slave trade—namely, that the supply was regulated by the demand. A blockading squadron might add to the difficulty and cost of carrying on the trade, but could not stop it. That was in fact beginning at the wrong end. The way to put down the trade effectually was to operate on the demand for slaves. As long as there was a demand for any commodity, whatever it might be, there would be a supply; and even if a wall were built round Africa there would not be a stop put to slave trade any more than there was to British commerce by Berlin decrees. He was happy to say that there had been a diminution in the slave trade; but it had been from a diminution in the demand. The demand for slaves was now confined to one spot—Cuba—and if pressure were put upon Spain, which winked at the trade, without ceasing on the coast of Africa to prevent the supply, we might hope for the speedy and complete suppression of the slave trade. That was the course which the King of Dahomey—who seemed to understand the principles of trade more clearly than Earl Russell—suggested when urged to assist in stopping the export. In the instructions given by Earl Russell to Captain Burton last year, when that officer was about to proceed on a mission to Dahomey, he said— Remind the King that he himself suggested to Commodore Wilmot that 'if we wished to put a stop to the slave trade we should prevent white men from coming to buy them.' You will state that Her Majesty's Government, having determined that the traffic shall cease, will take steps to prevent effectually the export of slaves. It appeared to him that the King of Dahomey took the more sensible view. What did Commodore Bruce say on the subject as the result of his experience?— If the slave trade could be suppressed for 100 years it would break out again in six months after the removal of the suppressing force. What was the opinion of Commodore Wilmot?— The climate is against all military operations, for which reason we should exert chiefly our moral power, holding little country for trading purposes. Our present success is not worth the blood and treasure yearly sacrificed for it. The squadron I have great faith in, but it must have more vessels, and some of peculiar speed and stowage. The monotony of the blockade is killing to officers and men. You can form no conception of what they have to undergo. I cannot speak too highly of their conduct under such trying circumstances—for months at anchor, rolling terribly; thermometer 86 degrees; no change of companions; no supplies of fresh stock, except at long intervals. We have not sufficient vessels to insure certain reliefs. I hope you will give my testimony to the merits of officers and men, for they richly deserve it. Depend upon it the step suggested by the King of Dahomey will be found the most effectual in achieving the extinction of the slave trade, and may speedily supersede those preventive measures adopted at great expense by this country. He (Mr. Adderley) believed that before many years the Governments of America, France, and England would combine to put a pressure upon Spain that she could not resist, and that their efforts, which had been long and ineffectually made for the suppression of an infamous traffic, would be followed by a course which in one hour would be crowned with success. He was glad to observe that the Spanish Minister at Madrid was reported to have said the other day to the Cortes that stringent measures were about to be adopted for the suppression of the slave trade. If that promise were carried out, the day was not distant—a day they would all rejoice to see—when the culminating hope of philanthropists would be attained, and the slave trade would for ever cease to exist. But suppose that that day had arrived, it was well to consider now with what other object the four settlements to which he referred should be maintained. Two other objects had been assigned. One was for the promotion of legitimate commerce, and the other for the civilization of the Native races. With regard to the first, he would appeal to the hon. Member for Manchester, and to the hon. Gentleman who had lately resumed his seat in this House for Salford (Mr. Cheetham), representing as they did the trade associations of Manchester, and the plans which Manchester had formed for opening a cotton field in Western Africa, whether they were of opinion that the Governments on that coast, conducted as they now are, were likely to promote or to obstruct the objects they had in view. The last quotation which he would make was with regard to the influence of our West African Governments upon commerce, and it was as follows:— There is probably more trade in palm oil in the Bights of Benin and Biaffra, and in ground nut on the coast between Sierra Leone and the Gambia, where no colony exists, than in all the British settlements put together. Indeed, there was pretty good proof that as the Governments were conducted now, they were obstructing rather than promoting commerce. Colonel Conran, trailing the British flag round the territories of warlike chiefs, gave bad encouragement to peaceful trade. Now, as to the second object, civilization, he doubted whether it was right to tax this country for civilization, even for the high object of civilizing barbarous tribes in Africa. If the efforts hitherto made had been successful, perhaps nobody in that House would be found to complain. But had we any encouragement to hope that the civilization of Africa would be effected through the agency of that House? The missionary work was noble, but it was not subsidized. Voluntary action had been to a great extent successful, but governments had done little to help it, and much to disturb it. It was the opinion of an eminent missionary who belonged to the most liberal and devoted mission upon the West Coast—namely, the Swiss mission of Basle, which subscribed larger funds than any of the English missionary associations—that the Governments maintained by Great Britain upon that coast, as now conducted, were no assistance to the efforts of the missionaries for the civilization of the country. If that was the case what was to be done? He thought it quite clear that we must either go on or go back, that we must do a great deal more or a great deal less than at present. We must either render every Government secure by larger forces, open up the country, make roads, and extend our power in order to make it efficient for good, or else stand out of the way of the Native chiefs, who, if we were not there, would have a much greater control over their own subjects. Our commerce will find its way there without any civil or military establishments to protect it, and will indirectly civilize the country. The Committee of 1842 had led to a separation of the settlements, and, by making four little Governments instead of one great Government of Sierra Leone, they had deprived the country of the services of competent men, for now no salary was given which could induce an able man to remain there long. The consequence was that we were pretty certain to get Governors of an inferior stamp, and who would be jealous of each other, who would be acting one against another, each having a policy of his own, and each counteracting the policy of his neighbour. Another consequence of our present West African policy was territorial encroachments and territorial entanglements. Now, the question for the Committee would be, whether the experience we had had since 1842 and the new circumstances which had since arisen would not lead us, at all events, to concentrate our power there, to contract our engagements and the responsibilities which we had entered into; and whether the new means we had at our disposal and the steam power we could now command might not, by wise combinations, enable us to economize our strength, and to make a smaller force far more efficient. Certainly the aspect of the times and the state of the world do not invite us needlessly to scatter our forces on Quixotic errands. He had stated the grounds upon which he asked for an inquiry. Upon the grounds upon which these establishments were founded and are maintained—in the cause, namely, of the suppression of the slave trade, of the promotion of legitimate commerce, and of the civilization of Africa—he demanded inquiry, whether upon all these great objects our present system of government on the Western Coast of Africa was working satisfactorily.

MR. CAVE,

in seconding the Resolution, said, he did not wish to be understood as concurring in all the observations of the right hon. Gentleman. If, however, he had urged no other reason in support of his Motion than the length of time that had elapsed since inquiry had taken place, he thought he was entitled to carry it. The investigation which took place in 1842 was held with a different object from that now on view, when the idea was all but universally entertained that no amount of money was too great to expend for the civilization of the African. A feeling, however, now prevailed that this attempt was somewhat Quixotic, and that to tax this country heavily for such a purpose was rather going beyond the proper duty of the House. He quite agreed with the right hon. Gentleman that the question of the slave trade was one of supply and demand. At the same time an important element which had not been alluded to entered into the question, namely, that of price. The present price of slaves was the only obstacle to the demand for them, being ten times as great as formerly. He believed that if the blockading squadron were removed, if the settlements were suddenly taken away, the price of slaves would fall to such an extent that the demand from Cuba would enormously increase, and the supply follow; and that the Government of Spain, which he hoped was contemplating a different policy, would find the temptation to allow a continuance of the trade too strong for them to resist. There could be no doubt that the settlements were in an unsatisfactory state, and he believed they had been conducted upon false principles from the beginning. Under the influence of the Anti-slavery Society, crowds of recaptured Africans were maintained in idleness at the public expense, at a time when labourers in this country were only able to obtain precarious, and in many cases insufficient, means of livelihood. The Committee of 1842 recommended, indeed, that they should be induced to emigrate to the West Indies, but they seemed half afraid of making such a reasonable recommendation, so strong was the feeling in this country against even the appearance of forced labour. He agreed with his right hon. Friend that the suppression of the slave trade wa3 to be accomplished rather by concentration of means than by spreading them over a large surface. There was no reason to believe that the slave trade was not going on along the West Coast of Africa, but there were no captures because the fastest vessels on the coast were the slavers. The greatest speed of Her Majesty's cruisers was eight knots, while the slavers could make perhaps sixteen knots. He could not go so far as to say that these settlements should be done away with; it might have been wrong to place them there in the first instance, and they might have been badly administered, and many of the evils alluded to were caused by faults in administration, not by any necessary or inherent defect; but it would be impossible suddenly to suppress them. If they were suppressed the loss of prestige would be very great; other nations would probably take them up, and it would not be wise, he thought, to give to France, for instance, a greater share of power on the West Coast of Africa; for France was not to be trusted in the matter of slave trading. All these settlements had a considerable revenue, and he did not see why with better administration they might not be self-supporting. Sierra Leone had a revenue of £30,000 a year, but the expenditure was very great, the salaries "alone having risen from £17,000 in 1860 to £20,000 in 1862. There was a mixed commission there, it was true, but it was a bad place for a mixed commission; vessels had to beat up to it, and few cases, therefore, had been taken there for adjudication. One of the subjects which the Committee would have to investigate was the reason that, while the imports and exports from the whole of the coast had increased from £3,000,000 to £4,000,000 the commerce of the British settlements had decreased. It had been asked what would be the use of the occupation of these stations if the slave trade was at an end. He would answer that they were useful for the prevention of piracy and for the protection of British vessels, even on other parts of the coast. He wished to make one suggestion, that was that care should be taken to obtain competent practical witnesses. The Committee of 1842, which was founded upon a Commission, examined among a great many witnesses—Dr. Madden, who was the principal Commissioner who had officially visited these settlements for the express purpose of collecting evidence, and a number of naval and military officers who had been out on the coast in question; and it would be a great pity if this inquiry should be conducted without sufficient witnesses of the best kind, and should fail in consequence of obtaining only speculative evidence. He gladly seconded the Motion for the Committee.

Moved, That a Select Committee be appointed "to consider the state of the British Establishments on the Western Coast of Africa."—(Mr. Adderley.)

LORD ALFRED CHURCHILL

said, that after the very able and elaborate statement of his right hon. Friend, it would ill become him to occupy the time of the House to any great extent by enlarging upon what had been already stated. He must, however, express his satisfaction that his right hon. Friend had redeemed the pledge that he gave at the end of last Session in moving for this Committee at so early a period of the present year, because he believed that there were ample materials to occupy the attention of the Committee for a very considerable part of the Session. The unfortunate Ashantee war, which last year was the cause of so much pain in the House, was of itself sufficient ground for a Committee, but there were other reasons why an inquiry should be now undertaken. The state of affairs on the West Coast of Africa was now, and had been for a considerable period, most unsatisfactory. Without any intention to prejudice the present occupiers of the Colonial Office, he must say that that matter had been the bête noir of the Department. The unhealthiness of the climate and various other causes of that nature had militated in a great measure against the full development of the resources of the country immediately bordering upon the British settlements. Cape Coast Castle was one of the oldest, if not the oldest, British settlement. It was instituted about 150 years ago, when England was a slaveholding Power, for the purpose of enabling us to procure slaves to send to our settlements in America. It had been computed that before the slave trade was abolished we had exported 960,000 slaves from the African coast to America, and we had thus incurred an enormous responsibility; and, as a Christian country, we were bound to make good in some way to the unfortunate people of Africa our depredations there. Therefore the idea of giving up any of the settlements on the coast would not, he thought, find favour in England, and he did not understand the Mover of the Committee to make any such suggestion. All he understood the right hon. Gentleman to say was that the present method of government required inquiry, and that we must either increase our responsibilities by occupying and forming a colony of the protected territory, or we must reduce our responsibilities by limiting the area over which we now professed to exercise protection. The climate, the right hon. Gentleman had stated, was notoriously unfit for the Anglo-Saxon race, and that was the reason why more had not been done there. It had been difficult to get men of a superior class to undertake the charge of government on that coast, but he believed it would be quite possible to locate the Government officers on the higher grounds of the hills. The same objection was made to Jamaica and our West Indian colonies till it was found out by going to the top of the hills the amount of sickness was very much reduced, and on the West Coast of Africa there were very high hills indeed, where a climate might be found in which the health of Englishmen would not suffer at all. We had been at a charge of £1,000,000 to support the slave trade squadron, but he concurred with the right hon. Gentleman that where there was a demand there would always be found a supply. He thought one question for the Committee would be whether it was possible that England might be induced to make the protected territory into a colony which would be self-supporting, seeing that at present we exercised little or no control over the Native chiefs, and had done nothing by education beyond the voluntary efforts of missionaries, or by making roads which by opening out fresh country, would give facilities for their cultivation. He did not mean to say that he was prepared to adopt that view at once, but inquiry might be made in that direction. There were others who thought it much better that we should give up the whole of the protected territories, and simply retain the forts as places where there might be stationed small executive Governments and a few soldiers, but he did not think if we simply did that we should be exercising the same control over the slave trade that we did now; whereas, if we made a colony of the protected territory, he believed the free-grown cotton, coffee, and other things, which would be brought into competition with the slave-grown produce of other countries, would tend to reduce the value of slave labour. So fully alive were the natives of Cape Coast Castle to the inquiry about to be instituted, that they had subscribed large sums for the purpose of sending over here witnesses of their own to place their case clearly before the Committee, At the present moment, too, there was in this country the able representative of the Basle Missionary Society, which adopted the plan, while instructing the Natives in the Christian faith, of teaching them the occupations of civilized life—such as carpentry, blacksmith's work, and other useful employments—and by these means they led the Natives much more easily than did the simple missionary, who confined his operations exclusively to religious teaching. It was unfortunate that in Gambia trade had been falling off. While the number of English vessels had considerably diminished, there had been a corresponding increase among the French. He thought it was a fit subject of inquiry as to whether our system of government had or had not in any way suppressed the energy of our merchants in trading to that country. There was no doubt we had on the coast of Africa enormous resources, capable of supplying this country with raw material for our manufactures. He believed that last year we imported to England from Cape Coast Castle fifty tons of cotton of a superior kind to most of the Asiatic cotton. Therefore, by giving fair and proper encouragement to the trade, we should no doubt enable them to increase the produce of this superior article, and thus to compete with slave-grown cotton. He could only further express a hope that the inquiry would lead to great results for the material and moral improvement of that part of Africa.

LORD STANLEY

The noble Lord has improved the occasion for the purpose of advertizing his missionary society. I do not object to that, for if the accounts we have are correct, it stands in considerable need of some such support. But that is not my reason for rising. I think my right hon. Friend (Mr. Adderley) has done good service in bringing this subject before the House; and I do not at all regret that that other and larger question, the African squadron, is not at least in form made part of the inquiry. I do not believe it is possible altogether to leave that out of the question. I do not believe it is possible to go into one part of the subject, of our relations with the West Coast of Africa, without dealing also with the rest. But it is quite large enough for a separate investigation; and as we have borne with that remarkable English enterprise for so many years, we may, I think, very well endure it for some time longer. For my own part, I do not wish to conceal my opinion that if the people of this country knew what has been and what is the waste, I do not say of money merely but of what is much more important, valuable lives on that coast, that African squadron would very shortly be numbered with the things of the past. I do not believe there is a year or even a month that passes in which the service on that coast does not put an end to some life among our officers, which, measured by any rational standard of comparison, is worth more than the merely animal existence of a whole African tribe. But that matter may very well stand over. What I wish to urge on the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Caldwell) is not simply that he should sanction this inquiry, which I believe he is prepared to do, but to allow the order of reference to be made wide enough to cover that which is the real question at issue. If we are merely to go into the question of civil and military expenditure to see whether it be possible to keep up these establishments at somewhat less cost than we incur at present, that is altogether an insignificant matter. The real question is whether there are not some at least among these settlements which involve us in great outlay and risk, and the maintenance of which serves no useful purpose. When I say they serve no useful purpose, I mean that they do not answer the end of promoting our trade; because I suppose nobody imagines that we increase our political influence or our military power by retaining them. No enemy is likely to attack our settlements on the African coast; and if he did he would soon find that the attempt brought its own punishment, he would be likely to lose his army from disease and to take nothing from his conquest. And as to that other point raised by the noble Lord who preceded me—that which I may call the philanthropic part of the question—I think we are in that respect acting in some degree under a delusion. Whenever that matter is discussed, either in the press, in this House, or at public meetings, it is constantly assumed that in some way or other we are responsible for the fortunes and destiny of the African race. Now I confess I do not see that that is in any manner the case. I can quite understand how an impression of that kind should have existed. The feelings of this country thirty years ago may well be excused. Every great movement gives rise to strong feelings; and it is quite natural that the men who put an end to the slave trade, and had just succeeded in abolishing slavery, and who had the evils of those two systems strongly impressed upon their minds, should have felt that some reparation, some compensation, was due to those whom we had injured. But, after all, we must look at the case as it really is. The slave trade was not created by England or by any European country. You may carry back its existence in Africa, I believe, to a period anterior to any recorded history. We do not know of any time when it did not exist in the interior of Africa. Englishmen found it there and used it; and I do not deny that they aggravated its evils. But they did not originate it, they only took it up as it stood. And now, thirty years after the extinction of slavery, and sixty years after the legal extinction of the slave trade, I think we may fairly hold that whatever debt we owed to the people of Africa has by this time been paid off. If we talk of civilizing the Africans I am afraid we had better first look at home. We have not to go five miles from the place in which we are sitting to find plenty of persons who stand as much in need of civilizing and who have as little done for them as the negro. Therefore, I say, we ought to view this simply as a matter of trade; and then the question is very much narrowed. We have only, or at least mainly, to consider whether the trade that is carried on at these various points which we occupy is increasing or diminishing, and whether there is any reason to think that at any point it would be greater or less if our occupation were to cease. I have looked at the statistical returns, and although the returns of the revenue and those of imports and exports do not precisely agree as to the inference which they suggest, and although there may be an increase of trade at Sierra Leone and the Gambia River, yet in one place at least—at the Gold Coast—there is a very considerable falling off. We have to ascertain whether that falling off is likely to be temporary or permanent; we shall also do well to compare the amount of trade at the' ports occupied by the British Government with the immensely increased trade which has taken place along the coast generally; and upon that comparison it will be for the Committee to express its opinion as to whether the English occupation has really created or fostered commerce. As to morality, I apprehend that there is no evidence to show that, at Sierra Leone at least, the oldest, the longest occupied, and the most important of these settlements, we have attained any great success in that particular. On the contrary, it might be found that we had produced a race the most worthless of any in the world. One word only upon the question of the expense of these settlements. I have no doubt we shall hear whatever is to be said in their defence; and it may be stated that, as far as civil government goes, they cost very little, and that even their military expenses are not very considerable. As to civil government, I would point out that, with the exception of the Imperial forces, which stand in a different class, these are the only colonies which entail on us any charge whatever for their civil government, excepting, perhaps, one or two of the smaller West India Islands. With respect to military expenditure, in the first place the defence of these establishments is mainly naval, and it is difficult to estimate what is the particular amount of naval force you are maintaining on the coast for that special object. In the next place, their military cost is not to be measured by the extent of the force you keep up there. The real burden is the responsibility you have undertaken, and the limit of which you do not know and nobody knows. Recollect how the matter stands. You cannot afford to send out as governors or persons in authority in these colonies, in any sense, your best men. No man will go out to Africa who can find employment elsewhere. I do not speak with reference to the present occupants of these offices—I do not know who they are; but you must take, not the men whom you would choose for such situations, but the men whom you can get. Communication, although improved, is not very frequent, the distance is considerable, and in the hands of these men, placed there with no influence brought to bear upon them such as a large British population can always bring to bear on those who govern—in the hands of men chosen as I have mentioned, surrounded by negroes, having everything their own way about them, you are compelled, to a great extent, to leave the power of peace and war, and an authority the exercise of which may at any moment involve the sacrifice of thousands of lives and many millions of money. I do not wish it to be inferred, from what I have said, that I am ready to commit myself at once to the absolute abandonment of these posts. But I think there is a primâ facie case made out for inquiry as to whether they are worth retaining. And holding that opinion to some extent with regard to them all, I think it does more particularly apply to that one of which we know the least, and with which the business we do appears to be decreasing, the Gold Coast, where, in a country extending over some 300 miles, you are surrounded on all sides by utterly savage and warlike tribes, and have constituted yourselves, so to speak, the head of a confederacy over which you have very little material power. That settlement is in so peculiar and so anomalous a position that I think it might deserve to be made a special subject of inquiry.

MR. CARDWELL

I have very great pleasure in acceding to the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman opposite. It is quite right that there should be an inquiry into this subject, and I am perfectly prepared to answer the appeal made by the noble Lord as to the order of reference, and to say that I shall not seek to limit the form of it. It appears a perfectly fair subject of inquiry how far these settlements have attained the ends for which this country instituted and maintained them. But I trust, I may say, without offence to the noble Lord, that I did hear with some regret the expressions which fell from the noble Lord with regard both to missionaries and the efforts Which this country has made for the suppression of the slave trade. I hold in the highest esteem the labours of those men who, denying themselves the comforts and happiness of home, leave their own country and devote themselves to spread the Gospel, in which they sincerely believe, among the most benighted and miserable inhabitants of any portion of the Globe. [Lord STANLEY: I said nothing against them.] I certainly most willingly retract what I have said if the noble Lord thinks it unjust, because I should sincerely welcome his acccession to the sentiments I myself entertain. [Lord STANLEY: I expressed no opinion on the subject.] The noble Lord certainly said the noble Lord behind me (Lord Alfred Churchill) had advertized his missionary society, and it stood greatly in need of such an advertizement. It was that expression that led me to make the remark I did. Now, with regard to the efforts we have made for the suppression of the slave trade, I own I do not know a nobler or a brighter page in the history of our country, following, I am sorry to say, upon a darker or more discreditable page than that which begins with the abolition of the African slave trade, which was consummated by Lord Derby and the Government of 1833 in the total extinction of slavery throughout the British dominions, and which is continued in the efforts we are making to inculcate on other countries, and enforce, by our efforts on the Coast of Africa the removal of that great, that worst of all the curses, that have ever afflicted humanity. I do not agree with the noble Lord that the slave trade can be traced back anterior to the time of history, and that it did not originate with the European race. I believe that the slave trade, of which we all speak in the terms of horror which it deserves, was instituted originally between the Spanish colonies in America and the Coast of Africa, and in it unfortunately Great Britain for many years bore a large and disgraceful part. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Adderley) in quoting the language of the King of Dahomey, that if the white man had not been there to buy the slave the African slave trade would not have been carried on to the extent it has been. But, thus fully agreeing in the propriety of this inquiry, and not at all disposed to limit its scope and object, I must say I regretted to hear one portion of the right hon. Gentleman's speech. Knowing as he did that we were perfectly prepared to grant the Committee, it was not necessary for any purpose he had in view to refer in terms of reproach to those holding the Government offices on that coast. When about to enter on an inquiry which we are willing should be full, free, and searching, we had better, I think, go into that inquiry in a dispassionate spirit, not having previously condemned those who are to be brought before it, but prepared to hear all that may be said on both sides, and reserve our ultimate judgment till we know what evidence will be brought before us. Now, with regard to Governor Pine of the Golden Coast, I much regret the remarks that have been made with reference to him, and must say when the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir John Hay) brought forward his Motion last year it was not as a personal attack on the Governor. On the contrary, such an attack was pointedly and repeatedly disclaimed. I am not now going to enter into what the right hon. Gentleman called a second Ashantee war with him. I will not enter into the charges brought against Mr. Fine. He has expressed his desire to appear in this country. I am giving him permission to do so. He will have the opportunity of appearing before the Committee. The right hon. Gentleman will have the opportunity of asking him what questions he likes, and Mr. Pine will have the opportunity of making what answers he thinks fit. But what I do wish is the opportunity of making on his part a simple explanation with regard to a matter which gave him great pain last year, and which I was not then in a position to explain. There was an impression last year that he left the Colony in the Rattlesnake for the benefit of his health, without having made with Colonel Conran the arrangements necessary for the welfare of his troops. That statement caused him great pain. But I have since been informed that he had made with Colonel Conran the arrangements necessary for the welfare of the troops before he left the coast in the Rattlesnake for the benefit of his health, and I must say, whatever judgment we may form of his conduct when we have heard his evidence before the Committee, I feel quite certain that he is a person who in difficulties would not be disposed to spare himself or throw the burden on others. Having said that with regard to the inquiry and Governor Pine, I will just say what I think has been the object of these settlements. I am glad to find that the right hon. Gentleman seems in the main to agree with me. Certainly, the object is not colonization. In that climate, under those circumstances, no man living would wish to see the Anglo-Saxon race emigrate and settle there. Colonization, in the proper meaning of the name, is wholly and entirely foreign to the purposes of those settlements. For what, then, were they intended? The main objects were first that they should be ancillary to our other efforts for the extinction of the slave trade and its attendant cruelties, next that they would tend to the prevention of those horrors which the Committee of 1842 and former inquiries, partly now forgotten, brought to light—I mean human sacrifices and various other abominations which prevailed on the coast of Africa; and, lastly, the introduction of legitimate trade. These were the objects which the country bad in view in establishing these settlements. Now it is for the Committee to inquire, and I will not express my opinion till I have heard the evidence, how far these four settlements are ancillary to, and do subserve these objects. But this I do say, that whereas that range of coast from Gambia on the north to Lagos on the south was the great nest and focus of the slave trade, it is now almost entirely free from the slave trade, and the squadron is enabled to confine its operations to a few points where the slave trade is still unfortunately carried on. As an instance of this we have heard that for some time past there has been a slaver waiting at Whydah to take off a cargo, but so close, vigilant, and effective has been the guard of the squadron that she has not been able to leave. This being the case, I think it a very fair subject of inquiry; and I shall be very glad that it is inquired into how far these settlements do and how far they do not promote the objects for which they were established. The remarks I have to add will be few; but I am bound to say when I go on to consider the question in detail the same difficulties which struck the right hon. Gentleman present themselves strongly to my mind. It appears to me worthy of all serious consideration whether if you had one object or policy in view it was wise to have four separate establishments. Entirely dissociated from one another in Government and a total absence of communication between them, might they not lead to four separate policies where there ought only to have been one? Instead of the expense of four Governments, might they not be united under one administration, where greater economy would have been introduced? Would not four military forces, separate from each other, naturally tend to make each governor desirous to carry his own military force to the maximum, to be prepared for all emergencies, and thus producing a constant tendency to increase the force on the coast? Would not having four governors be likely to encourage the recurrence of four difficulties at the same time, whereas under one governor he would temporize and dispose of one before he got into another. I think these are fair and legitimate objects of inquiry. I find, in point of fact, there has been a considerable increase of late in the number of troops kept on the coast, and, instead of that increase of force having satisfied the demand for force, the demand for force was still increasing. It appeared that if the force, which consisted of two regiments, were retained, it would be necessary to trouble Parliament with a demand for money to erect buildings for their reception, the present buildings being insufficient for the purpose. That was a point upon which I could not delay coming to a conclusion, for either the buildings must be provided, or at the approach of the next rainy season the troops must be removed. The conclusion to which my noble Friend the Secretary for War and myself came was, therefore, not to ask the House pending the inquiry we knew would take place for an increased Vote for buildings, but to diminish the force. As to the general question, it seemed to me, after the notice that was given by the right hon. Gentleman and the weighty opinion expressed by the noble Lord opposite and others, that it would be more satisfactory to the House and the country, that there should be an inquiry than that the subject should be dealt with by anticipation, without inquiry. But I have another strong reason for desiring the assistance of a Select Committee. This is not a new question. The establishment of these separate settlements in their present form—I do not speak of Lagos, which was a recent affair, but of the Gold Coast and Gambia—dates from an inquiry by a Committee of this House, of unusual authority—a Committee on which sat Lord Derby, then Colonial Secretary; Lord Russell, ex-Colonial Secretary; you, Sir, and other Members of influence. It was on their express recommendation that separate governments were established. I think, therefore, it is right we should now have the authority of a fresh Committee and further evidence in order to decide what should be done. As the right hon. Gentleman had given notice of his Motion for a Committee I deemed it my duty to prepare for it during the recess. I therefore requested General Ord, Governor of Bermuda, who was at home on leave, but was willing to undertake the duty, and having twice before fulfilled missions to the Coast of Africa was peculiarly fitted for it, to visit the settlements in question. He has done so, and has returned. When the Committee meets the instructions under which he went out and the report he has made will be the first documents laid before it. I cannot state the contents of that report, as I have not yet received it. But from conversation with General Ord, I understand he will inform the Committee that the settlements are important ancillaries for the purposes for which they are intended, but that many suggestions may be made for increasing their efficiency and diminishing their expense. It is entirely in accordance with his opinion that my noble Friend the Secretary for War and myself have taken, or, rather, are about to take, the step of reducing the force now employed on the Gold Coast. I have thus shown the views the Government entertain. In conclusion, I can only say that I shall enter upon this inquiry with the greatest willingness and pleasure, and I sincerely trust that the result will he not only increased efficiency and economy in such settlements as you may think it expedient to maintain on the Coast of Africa, but I also earnestly trust that you will go into this Committee in the spirit in which I understood my hon. Friend has moved for it—not a spirit of desire to withdraw from the noble efforts to suppress the slave trade, but a desire that those efforts should be real and efficient. I know no enterprise more noble in which this country has ever engaged, and, looking around at what is passing in other nations, I cannot help thinking that this is not the moment to flinch from the task. There are signs of promise in the sky, and there is an earnest desire to abolish this infamous traffic amongst civilized and humane countries such as has never been seen since the day when England herself abolished slavery.

Motion agreed to.

Select Committee appointed, "To consider the state of the British Establishments on the Western Coast of Africa."

And on March 3, Select Committee nominated as follows:—

Mr. CARDWELL, Mr. CHICHESTER FORTESCUE, Sir FRANCIS BARING, Lord STANLEY, Mr. SEYMOUR FITZGERALD, Sir JOHN HAY, Mr. BUXTON, Lord ALFRED CHURCHILL, Mr. ARTHUR MILLS, Mr. BAXTER, Mr. WILLIAM EDWARD FORSTER, Mr. GREGORY, Mr. CHEETHAM, Mr. CAVE, and Mr. ADDERLEY:—Power to send for persons, papers, and records; Five to be the quorum.