CORRUPT PRACTICES AT ELECTIONS BILL— [BILL 8.]—COMMITTEE. (Hansard, 19 March 1863)

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, that on the last discussion of this Bill he had been strongly pressed to consent to an alteration in the indemnity, so as to make it absolute instead of dependent upon the pleasure of the Committee or Commission. He had since consulted with the Attorney and Solicitor General, and as they saw no objection he had agreed to make the alteration. It was only fair that the witness should answer every question addressed to him; and if he did, under the provision he now proposed the Committee or Commission would have no choice, but would be bound to give him a certificate. Of course, if the witness perjured himself, an indictment would lie against him. He therefore proposed, in line 40, to leave out from "and" to "examined" in page 4, line 4, inclusive, and insert— Provided always, That where any witness shall answer every question relating to the matters aforesaid, which he shall be required by such Committee or Commissioners (as the case may be) to answer, and the answer to which may criminate, or tend to criminate him, he shall be entitled to receive from the Committee, under the hand of their clerk, or from the Commissioners, under their hands (as the case may be), a certificate stating that such witness was, upon his examination, required by the said Committee or Commissioners to answer questions or a question relating to the matters aforesaid, the answers or answer to which criminated or tended to criminate him, and had answered all such questions or such question.

§ MR. BUTT
said, that the clause as proposed to be amended by the right hon. Gentleman made the protection depend entirely upon a person obtaining a certificate from the Commissioner, and upon his answering not merely a question tending to criminate himself, but upon answering all questions that might be put to him. He (Mr. Butt) thought, that when a question had been extorted from a man which tended to criminate himself, the indemnity should be complete and unconditional, and not made to depend upon anything he might do hereafter. He should therefore propose to insert in the clause a proviso to this effect— Provided always, That when any person shall be compelled under the provisions of this Act to 1630 give, and shall give, any answer criminating or tending to criminate himself, such person shall not at any time thereafter be liable to any indictment, prosecution, or penal action, for or in respect of any act or matter by him done or committed before his examination, in connection with any election forming the subject of such inquiry, for which he might have been prosecuted or proceeded against under such Acts.

SIR MINTO FARQUHAR
said, he had placed a verbal Amendment on the paper, much shorter in its terms than that of the hon. Member for Youghal (Mr. Butt), but intended to effect the same object.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, the effect of the Amendment proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Youghal would be that a man having answered one single question which criminated himself, he would be indemnified, not only against the consequences of that answer, but also against proceedings in respect of all corrupt practices in which he might have been concerned at the election. Now, he thought that would open the door to great fraud, and, in fact, defeat the object of the Bill. The purpose of the Bill would be frustrated unless the Commissioners were vested with a discretion as to granting their certificate to a witness who prevaricated, or made but a partial and incomplete disclosure of facts within his knowledge.

MR. LYGON
said, he had given notice of a Motion to strike out the clause, but the Amendment proposed by the right hon. Gentleman had entirely removed all his objections, and therefore he had very great pleasure in withdrawing his proposed Motion.

§ MR. COLLINS
hoped the hon. Member for Youghal (Mr. Butt) would not press his Amendment.

§ SIR FITZROY KELLY
said, that the right hon. Baronet had had the courtesy to give him an opportunity of considering the proposed Amendment, which seemed to him—although as to terms it might have been framed more accurately for the purpose it was intended to effect—substantially to meet the whole of the difficulties—and they were numerous—that had existed in regard to a clause providing, that when a witness compelled, contrary to the constitutional rule, to criminate himself by answering the questions put to him, it should be left in the discretion of the tribunal before which he appeared to determine whether he should be protected or not.

§ MR. BUTT
having intimated that under 1631 these circumstances he would not propose his Amendment—

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
then proposed a further Amendment, to insert, at page 4, line 6, after the word "Acts," the words "or for which he might have been prosecuted or proceeded against under such Acts."

§ MR. HUNT
said, he thought this clause would bear hardly upon candidates and sitting Members, who did not stand in the same position as other witnesses. A sitting Member might be summoned by an adverse party to give evidence, and by his own testimony alone he might be made to forfeit his seat. That was a dilemma in which he ought not to be placed. He therefore moved the addition of the following words:— Provided also, That nothing in this section contained shall apply to the case of any sitting Member or defeated candidate called as a witness before any election committee.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, he regretted the hon. Member had not given notice of his Amendment. It involved an important principle, and at present he could not support it. The exemption of Members, he thought, would be most invidious.

§ MR. BUTT
said, with his present feeling he should be prepared to support the proviso. The object of the Bill was to protect from penal consequences those who gave evidence; but if the man against whom the petition was presented were unseated on his own evidence, they did not protect him against the penal consequences. He did not wish to expose a man to the terrible temptation of saying what was untrue, and as far as he could see at present he was inclined to support the Amendment. He suggested that the proviso should be withdrawn now, and proposed again on bringing up the Report.

§ SIR FITZROY KELLY
thought it would be very invidious and unjust to exempt Members from the extraordinary and unconstitutional liability which it was deemed expedient to impose on the rest of the community. He likewise believed that the proviso in itself would be almost nugatory, as it would be impossible for any Member to defend his seat if he refused to answer any proper question addressed to him, on the ground that it might criminate himself.

§ MR. COLLINS
said, the question in- 1632 volved was one of great magnitude, and should not be discussed without previous notice. He hoped his hon. Friend would consent to defer his proposal to a future stage.

§ MR. AYRTON
denied that an investigation before an Election Committee was a penal proceeding; it was a mere contention for a civil right, as a lawsuit for an estate would he, though the defeated party would necessarily be sensible of the loss. He hoped hon. Members would continue to be examined as they had been, for he must say the effect of personal examination had very often been to enable Members to keep their seats by clearing themselves of any personal knowledge of bribery, where without such testimony the evidence would have led the Committee directly to the conclusion that bribery had been committed.

MR. SERJEANT PIGOTT
said, he trusted the Amendment would be withdrawn. So far from protecting themselves from answering these questions, if any exception were made, it ought to be the other way, and they should rather incline to the side of severity than indulgence. A Member of Parliament owed more to the Constitution than any mere private voter.

MR. GUILDERS
said, that there was another reason for withdrawing the Amendment, and that, was that it placed the elected in a better position than the elector. The elector was compelled to answer, and if he were proved guilty of bribing, or being bribed, was liable to be struck off the register: a Member refusing to answer should be liable to lose his seat.

MR. LYGON
hoped the question, which was one of importance, would not be prejudiced by a hasty decision. He thought they should fix some time for its special consideration.

§ MR. DENMAN
said, he thought the hon. Member ought not only to withdraw the proviso, but never to introduce it again, either on the Report or at any other stage. If such a proviso were seriously attempted to be introduced into the Bill, the country would never believe they were in earnest, as he believed they were, in their endeavours to put down bribery.

§ MR. HUNT
said, that in moving the proviso he had no intention of giving Members any advantage over the rest of 1633 the community. He only desired to give them the same rights as any other witnesses examined before an Election Committee. But after such an expression of opinion as he had heard he would not press his Amendment.

MR. LYGON
put it to the Secretary of State whether it would not be well to leave out those words of the clause which referred to treating, on the ground that he believed it was impossible to conceive an election in which there would not be some cases of treating. Treating was very much a question of degree. By that clause the mere giving of a glass of beer to a voter would bring the candidate, if the act were traced to any of his agents, within the penal enactments of the measure. He moved to omit the first paragraph of the clause.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
supported the clause as it stood. No doubt treating was a matter of degree. There might be a small amount of treating, but there might be extensive treating. The Committee had unanimously recommended that the proof of agency with regard to treating should be placed on the same footing as the proof of agency with regard to bribery. In some cases that had been brought before the House, the treating was so extensive as to be merely another form of bribery.

MR. LYGON
observed, that a bribe was a bribe, and when once given and taken there was no doubt of the character of it; but it was a question whether giving a glass of beer was treating. He thought they ought not to take evidence of treating until they had established the connection between the sitting Member and the acts complained of.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said the hon. Gentleman seemed to think that the clause made it incumbent on Election Committees to receive evidence of treating before proof of agency was offered. But he did not read the clause in that way. It would, he thought, be in the discretion of the Committee, according to the circumstances of the case, to receive evidence of acts of treating independently of any proof of agency. The clause merely said it should not be necessary to prove agency in the first instance, before giving in evi- 1634 dence the facts whereby the charge of treating was to be sustained.

§ MR. GATHORNE HARDY
suggested the insertion of the words "unless the Committee shall otherwise decide."

§ MR. CHILDERS
proposed to extend the operation of the clause to cases of undue influence.

§ MR. COLLINS
moved an Amendment, to leave out "House of Commons resolves," and insert "the Houses of Parliament separately resolve." The suspension of the writ by a Vote of the House of Commons alone was an infringement of the prerogative of the Crown and the privilege of the House of Lords.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
pointed out, that as the powers would be exercised under an Act of Parliament which had received the sanction of the House of Lords and the assent of the Crown, there would be no infringement either of the privileges of the House of Lords or of the prerogative of the Sovereign. If the concurrence of the two Houses was required, the House of Commons might, if the assent of the Lords was refused, be tempted to suspend the writ during the continuance of the Parliament. This power, he thought, was open to abuse, and he should be glad to see it abolished.

MR. LYGON
said, he had always voted against the suspension of writs; for he could never understand why innocent voters should be deprived of their rights because a number of other electors had been guilty of malpractices. It seemed to him that the clause unduly restricted the prerogative of the Crown, and he should therefore propose the omission of the clause altogether.

MR. SERJEANT PIGOTT
observed, that if the concurrence of the other House were required to the suspension of a writ, the consent of the Crown would also be necessary. If an Act of Parliament gave the House of Commons the power, he did not see why they should hesitate to accept it. There would be little fear of their misusing it.

§ SIR FITZROY KELLY
said, he could 1635 not support the Amendment, as he did not think the House of Lords should be permitted to interfere directly or indirectly with elections of Members to serve in the House of Commons. Looking, however, at the clause as a whole, giving power to suspend writs for a period of five years, which might extend beyond the duration of the Parliament, he thought there was matter worthy of further consideration.

§ MR. CLAY
wished to know whether the clause would supersede the ordinary Parliamentary right of suspending a writ; and whether, if a writ were once suspended for five years, that term could be afterwards shortened if the circumstances should seem to justify it?

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, the Bill contained an express provision that it should not affect the right of Parliament to alter or suspend the right of voting of all or any of the electors in any place for which the writ was suspended. It gave power to suspend a writ for five years absolutely, even though the House should not continue in being so long; and when once a writ had been suspended under this clause for five years, there was no power to shorten the period.

§ MR. BENTINCK
protested against the unconstitutional suspension of writs proposed by the clause. It was well known that when a Motion for suspending a writ was brought forward it was turned into a party question, and that the issue or non-issue of the writ depended entirely upon whether the constituency whose bribery was in question would return Members in favour of the majority in the House.

MR. J. J. POWELL (Gloucester)
moved the omission of the clause, with the view of substituting for it a clause of which he had given notice. He did this because he believed the clause to be unjust and unnecessary, and because he believed that, with all its unnecessary injustice, it would be found inoperative to produce the good result expected from it. Unless the clause was absolutely necessary, its injustice was so palpable that he did not propose to detain the Committee at any length by exposing it. What the Committee was asked to do was in effect this:—That whenever a Commission of Inquiry should report that in a constituency, say of 2,000 voters, they had discovered, after diligent scrutiny, some 200 or 300 of those voters were habitually corrupt, the House should 1636 disfranchise the whole 2,000, for the sake of punishing or purifying the 200 corrupt persons. Such a proposition wais so monstrous that it must strike everybody with conviction that nothing but the sternest necessity could justify it; and he therefore passed on to consider whether it was necessary. Now, it could easily be demonstrated that it was not necessary. What was the object of their legislation on this subject? He presumed it was to purify, and not to disfranchise, the constituencies. And how could they best purify without disfranchising them? Why clearly by excising from them the corrupt members. But how were they to find them out? Why, they would be already found out and reported to them by name by the very Commissioners and the very Report on which the House was asked, because of those corrupt persons, to disfranchise also the best and worthiest members of their community. But then, it might be said, how could they rely on the Report of those Commissioners? how could they know that they had fully inquired and faithfully reported? The answer was first of all, whether they knew it or not, the Bill proposed to rely on their Report to disfranchise not a part only but the whole of the community; and secondly, that all experience of these Commissions and Commissioners authorized them to place implicit confidence in them. They were gentlemen of great experience, they were armed with all the powers necessary for inquiry, and he had never heard a doubt suggested as to their perfect impartiality. Several witnesses examined before the Committee, in 1860, gave their testimony on this subject. One of them, who had been secretary to several Commissions said, "I think they always get at the truth," and strongly recommended, that instead of the present system of trying petitions by Committees, they should be tried by Commissioners on the spot, which it was shown would be a much more effective and a much less expensive method of procedure than by Committee. When a Commission of this kind visited any place, the whole constituency was put upon its trial. If any one had anything to allege against the purity of the place generally, or of any electors in particular, he was at liberty to state it. The persons accused were sent for, heard in their own defence and by their witnesses, and might in their turn accuse others, who would have to go through the same process. The Commissioners then reported that certain persons 1637 named had been guilty of corrupt practices; and in their schedule they included every person against whom the evidence of guilt was deemed sufficient. It was material to observe that they arrived at this result, in a great measure, through the assistance rendered to them by the honest portion of the community. Gentlemen who were disgusted at the corrupt practices which had prevailed at and disgraced the place they resided in, rendered the Commissioners all the information and assistance in their power, and thus enabled them to get at the truth. The inquiries of the Commissioners were thus made very searching, and the result was that the House knew who the corrupt persons were, and knew also that substantially all the rest of the community were not corrupt. The necessity, therefore, which could alone justify disfranchising a whole constituency did not exist. Moreover, this provision, like other things of its kind, would nullify itself by reason of its injustice. At present they had in their favour all the honest men in the community—such men were equally interested with the House in getting rid of the corrupt, and did all they could to assist in doing so. But how would this clause operate? Why, it would give every honest man the same interest as the rogue in concealing corrupt practices. How could they expect a man to expose the offences of others, when he was himself to be punished for them? He wondered what result the right hon. Gentleman would expect from an enactment to the effect, that it being necessary to put down bribery and corruption, every person reported as guilty of those offences should receive a certain number of lashes, and then going on to enact, that it being extremely desirable that such persons should be brought to justice, every honest man who would give such information as should lead to the conviction of offenders should receive precisely the same punishment. [A laugh.] They laughed at that as absurd, but in principle it was precisely what the right hon. Gentleman proposed to do. It might be said, that a great evil existed, and something must be done. To this he replied, adopt the natural and just course of disfranchising those, and those only, who deserved disfranchisement. If difficulties were objected, let them examine them. It might be said, that as these Commissions were not part of the ordinary tribunals of the country, it would be unsafe to deprive a man of his franchise simply upon their 1638 Report. It might also be said that to do so would be a breach of the certificate of indemnity given to those who made a full disclosure before the Commissioners. A short examination would show the fallacy of those objections. First of all, if they were objections, they were as much so to the Government clause as to that which, he would substitute for it; for as they were going to disfranchise all upon the Report of a Commission, it could not be more objectionable to disfranchise a portion only on the same Report. As to the exceptional character of the Commission, that might be easily provided against by giving a power of appeal under proper restrictions; and as to the certificates of indemnity, the Government proposed to disfranchise those who had them as much as he did, and in fact, if they did not, the only persons who could be disfranchised would be those innocent persons who had not got, because they had never needed, certificates of indemnity. Surely the guilty would not be the less disfranchised because the innocent were disfranchised with them; and surely the legislature, when it passed the indemnity clause, never contemplated that it should be not only a shield from the consequences of past offences, but a licence to commit the like offences for the future? He was aware the right hon. Gentleman contended that he was not introducing a new principle, and that the law of making a community responsible for the misconduct of individuals was of very ancient origin, and was still in existence. But surely there was no analogy between making a hundred responsible for the damage done by rioters, and making the inhabitants responsible criminally and subjecting them to the same punishment as the rioters whom they had vainly tried to resist. And if the right hon. Gentleman wished to revert to the rude or simple legislation of our Saxon ancestors, which made every tithing man responsible for the good conduct of every other man in the tithing, let him at least accompany it with the wise and just proviso which characterized the Saxon law—namely, that if a man could purge himself of the offence by proving that he was no party to it, he should not be amerced for it. The hon. and learned Gentleman concluded by moving the omission of the clause; and said if it were carried, he would propose a clause for disfranchising such persons as a Commission should report to have been guilty of corrupt practices.

§ MR. KNIGHTLEY
said, he should vote for the omission of the clause, because he thought the penalty under it was not sufficient. There were certain places, that were very well known, that ought to be disfranchised altogether.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, there was nothing in this clause which would prevent Parliament disfranchising any place where corruption was almost universal. It was intended to meet those cases in which, although corruption was extensive, there might be a majority who were not corrupt. The principle was this:—To enable the House, if it thought bribery had been so extensive as to call for a temporary suspension of the writ, to act upon the whole community of electors, and therefore create an interest in preventing corruption altogether. It was true that in some cases, where Commissions had reported extensive bribery, acts of corruption had not been proved against one third of the individual electors. But it was impossible to read the Reports without seeing that countenance had been given to bribery by persons not engaged in it. It was clearly impossible to prevent corrupt practices being carried on if this clause were altered so as not to affect the whole community. It did not follow that in every case the House would support the Resolution. If a large proportion of the electors appeared to have taken steps to prevent bribery, it would be competent to the House to abstain from doing so. They would simply have the power, wherever there was proof of the corruption of a number of electors, and connivance or indifference on the part of the rest. His hon. and learned Friend proposed to deal only with individual electors; that individual electors guilty of bribery should be struck off the poll, and that where the proof before the Commission was not conclusive an appeal should be had to the Court of Queen's Bench. Upon what ground was it persons were reported guilty of bribery? Upon their own evidence, subject to the indemnity to which they were entitled; and the Bill declared that such evidence should not be used in any court of law. If therefore persons came before a Commission and declared their own corruption, and were reported to be guilty of bribery, they would have nothing to do but appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench; and if an issue were tried, the evidence upon which the Commission reported would be excluded, and they would be, by an easy process, restored to the fran- 1640 chise. He hoped the House would retain the clause in its integrity, which he believed would have a very beneficial effect.

§ MR. GATHORNE HARDY
said, that if the hon. and learned Gentleman had been returned for Gloucester free from any taint of corrupt practices, it was a clear proof of the beneficial influence of suspending a writ. If any appeal were given, it must be to the County Courts, for the expense of the Queen's Bench would deter those electors who wished to adopt that very certain mode of being restored to the register. He thought that where corruption existed to a considerable extent without affecting the character of a borough, there should be some minor punishment short of total disfranchisement, and that some time for suspension should be fixed. He thought that in fixing five years the Committee had not gone too far.

MR. HENLEY
wished to know whether the Resolution of one Parliament was to bind another, and whether the House of Commons was to have the power to make a hard and fast bargain which might extend over two or three Parliaments? It would be a very strong proceeding. He could quite understand resolving that during their own life-time they would suspend the issue of any writ; but he was not aware of any precedent for giving to a Resolution of that House the power of law, and he thought that if they wanted to go beyond the Parliament in existence when the Resolution was passed, they should have the sanction of the other House, and of the Queen. Without reference to the merits of this case, it was a serious thing to make a precedent for giving to a simple Resolution of one House in one Parliament the power of effecting certain things after the Parliament itself had come to an end, either by efflux of time or dissolution by the Crown.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, that the House now had power to suspend a writ during the existence of the Parliament in which the Resolution was passed, and this Bill would give legislative sanction to suspension beyond a dissolution, so long as it did not exceed five years.

MR. LYGON
thought it a most dangerous precedent to delegate to this House the power to do by Resolution that which a separate Act of Parliament only could effect. Parties might be so balanced that one vote might determine the fate of a Government; and in case of an appeal to the constituencies it was very undesirable 1641 to deprive any constituency of the privilege of expressing an opinion upon the question on which the Crown resorted to the country for advice.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, that if the five years expired while Parliament was sitting, the writ would issue by Resolution of the House; and if the five years expired between a dissolution and the assembling of the new Parliament, by the authority of the Crown.

§ SIR FITZROY KELLY
said, he must object to the clause. the ground on which he must resist the clause was, that although it was expedient that a Parliament should have the power of suspending a writ during its continuance, he did not understand why, for the offences of a small portion of a constituency, the House of Commons should have the power of encroaching on the prerogative of the Crown, and disfranchising, perhaps, a very meritorious portion of the constituency for a longer period than its own existence. He thought it highly inexpedient to give the House of Commons such a power to hind the whole Legislature for years to come.

§ MR. HUNT
pointed out, that if the clause passed as it stood, the House of Commons might go on suspending the writ of a particular place, and then just at the end of the Parliament pass this Resolution; so that in effect the writ might be suspended for two Parliaments.

§ MR. BENTINCK
said, that the right hon. Gentleman had not answered the question whether the effect of the clause would not be to enable one Session of Parliament to suspend a writ during part of a subsequent Session.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, that clearly the effect of the clause would be that the suspension might extend over a future Parliament. The writ would be suspended, not by the action of the House of Commons, but by virtue of an Act of Parliament; and the House of Commons would be bound, by the Act, just in the same manner as all the other parties were.

§ MR. WALPOLE
said, he was in favour of the clause, and thought it would be an improvement in the law, that instead of disfranchising a borough, which was the only punishment it was at present in the power of the House to inflict, they should have the power of suspending the writ. He thought that the five years might well run over a dissolution, for the constituency would be thereby warned, that if their evil 1642 practices were continued, they would be disfranchised altogether. Still he was of opinion that the clause required guarding, as he thought the Secretary of State would see from attention to two considerations. First, this suspension might be effected simply by a Resolution of the House, and there was no guard against the Resolution being taken at a distant sitting of Parliament; and he thought that in all cases the Resolution ought to be moved within one month after the date of the Report of the Committee. Secondly, the Resolution ought to be passed in a Committee of the Whole House, and for this reason, that the House might not be taken by surprise. The Report of the Committee would then be laid on the table, and the House would have an opportunity of confirming or of rescinding it.

§ SIR EDWARD COLEBROOKE
also thought the clause too general; for, as at present framed, the House of Commons, if it thought fit, might act on a Report several years old, even though a general election had intervened.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
allowed that there ought to be some limit in point of time, and said he would introduce words on the Report. As to the other point raised by the right hon. Gentleman, he scarcely thought that the practice of the House should be regulated by an Act of Parliament. It was rather a matter for the Standing Orders.

MR. HENLEY
said, the many difficulties which had been raised about this clause only made it clearer that there was considerable danger in passing it. His right hon. Friend, who was in favour of it, could not harden his heart to the Resolution being passed at once, but wanted the House to have a second opportunity of considering it. It was suggested that the Resolution should be passed within a month of the presentation of the Report; but considering what thick blue-books these Reports generally made, it was hardly likely that many Members would be ready in that time to give their verdict. He saw great harm in enabling the House to do by Resolution that which had hither to been done by the Legislature. It was a bad precedent, and might hereafter be used for drawing the whole power of Parliament into the House of Commons.

§ MR. PEACOCKE
pointed out, that if this Resolution, which was to have force for five years, were passed at the beginning of a Parliament, and that Parliament lasted 1643 seven years, the writ would not be suspended for a whole Parliament.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, that it was not intended necessarily to carry the suspension over a whole Parliament; but there would be a period of five years during which the place would be unrepresented.

§ SIR JOHN SHELLEY
asked by whom the writ would be issued if the five years happened to expire when the House was not sitting.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, the writ would issue in the usual manner, under the authority of the Act of Parliament.

MR. PEACOCKS
said, he scarcely thought it was the intention of the right hon. Baronet to suspend the disfranchisement of a borough over a dissolution, and during part of a future Session.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, that that was the intention, if it should be necessary. The object was that a constituency found guilty of malpractices should remain unrepresented during the full period of five years.

§ MR. KNIGHTLEY
asked how the culpable electors were to be punished. A man received £10 for his vote; the writ was then suspended for five years, and before that Parliament was dissolved the writ would be issued and the same elector would have another opportunity of receiving another bribe.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
replied, that if the House saw fit, it might suspend the issue of the writ over the five years, or until the summoning of a new Parliamennt.

MR. J. J. POWELL
said, he had heard no reason why the whole body of the electors in any borough should be disfranchised because a few were guilty of bribery, and he should therefore divide the Committee on the clause.

MR. PACKE
, with a view to prevent disorder at elections, proposed a new clause—(Treating), providing that every candidate who should directly or indirectly pay for any meat, drink, entertainment, or provisions for any person other than an elector, with a view to influence the election, on the nomination or the polling days, should be deemed guilty of treating and should forfeit £50; and that any per- 1644 son furnishing such meat, drink, or entertainment, should pay 40s., and, if an elector, be incapable of voting at such election.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
said, that the law as it stood afforded sufficient security against treating, and certainly thought the proposal of the hon. Member would be no improvement, but rather a change for the worse. A great portion of the proposed clause was unnecessary, as it merely re-enacted that which was provided by the present law. In fact, while the existing law was of a general character, prohibiting treating before the polling-day, on the polling-day, or after, the clause would limit the prohibition.

MR. PAGET
moved a clause—(Persons who are under a Recognizance, or have been served with a Subpoena, not appearing, to be guilty of Contempt of Court).

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
saw no reason in this particular case for departing from the ordinary practice or for making the offence in question a contempt of court.

§ MR. GATHORNE HARDY
pointed out that the hon. Gentleman who moved the clause seemed to be of opinion that bribery was worse than murder, for the witness was to be subjected to a greater punishment for non-appearance.

MR. PAGET
moved a new clause—(Judge of a Superior Court may order Trials to be held in the Central Criminal Court, or in a neighbouring County).

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
opposed the clause, on the ground that no necessity for the proposed change in the practice of the law had been shown.

§ MR. PULLER
moved a new clause to follow Clause 10— Any person who shall be convicted of bribery or undue influence at an Election, or against whom judgment shall have been obtained for any penal sum by the Corrupt Practices Prevention Acts made recoverable in repect of the offences of bribery, treating, and undue influence, or either of them, shall, in addition to any other punishment or forfeiture, be incapable of being elected or sitting in Parliament during the five years next after such conviction or judgment.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
I am not disposed to object to this clause, which provides a temporary disqualification only on a conviction by a court of law.

§ SIR FRANCIS GOLDSMID
moved a clause (Votes for Candidates Guilty of Bribery thrown away). The object of the clause was, that where a candidate petitioned and claimed the seat and proved bribery against the sitting Member, such candidate should be declared the sitting Member, if no recriminating case of bribery could be proved against him. At present, unless such candidate could strike off so many of the voters of his opponent as would place him in a majority, he would not be entitled to the seat. All he could do was to stand again; but he would present himself under the disadvantage of having proved bribery amongst the constituency, and would stand a small chance of being returned. The effect of the clause proposed would be to make bribery defeat its own end, and as a consequence to diminish it throughout the country. The only objection he saw to his proposal was that it would give the seat to the person who represented the minority. But he thought that was a mere verbal objection, for the real majority consisted of those who honestly exercised the franchise.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, that this was not the first time his hon. Friend had brought forward this proposition, nor the first time that he (Sir George Grey) had stated his objections to it. These objections remained unchanged. Votes could only properly be held to be thrown away where the disqualification of the candidate was patent and known to the electors. His hon. Friend's proposal struck directly at election by majority. Thus, if in a constituency of 3,000, the candidate elected had 2,000 votes, and the other candidate 1,000, and if the person elected was unseated for bribery through a single act committed by an agent, the candidate with the 1,000 votes would become the representative of the constituency. In such cases he thought that the electors, not having any knowledge that acts of bribery had been committed, should have an opportunity of again exercising their choice, and giving their votes for another candidate.

§ MR. HUNT
moved the addition of a clause (Recovery of Cost by Member declared duly elected by unanimous Resolution of Committee), such Member to be entitled to recover from the petitioners against him his costs and expenses.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, the Com- 1646 mittee had at present a discretionary power to declare a petition frivolous and vexatious, and the petitioners then had to pay costs. He believed that arrangement was sufficient. It would be rather hard to inflict costs where a petition had been presented in good faith. The effect of the clause would probably be to discourage petitions, and would so far foster bribery, He thought it would be better to leave the law in that respect as it stood.

§ MR. BRADY
held that costs ought to fall on whichever party lost the case.

§ MR. CLAY
believed the effect of the proposed provision would be to deter parties from presenting petitions, even in the most justifiable cases.

§ MR. E. P. BOUVERIE
said, the objection to the clause was its want of mutuality. To make it complete, there ought to be also a provision that the sitting Member, if unseated, should be liable for costs. Even where there were strong grounds of suspision, a petition might fail for want of technical evidence, and in such a case the petitioners ought not to be mulcted in the expenses of both sides.

§ MR. SCLATER-BOOTH
thought some provision of this sort was desirable.

THE CHAIRMAN
pointed out that the clause was out of order at that stage.

§ MR. HUNT
then moved the addition of a clause (Provision for Payment of Costs of Commission of Inquiry), providing that where any Commission issued to inquire into the extensive prevalence of bribery, or treating, or other corrupt practices, in any county or borough, shall report that such practices have extensively prevailed in such county or borough, the Commission of the Treasury shall certify to the Treasurer of such county or borough the total amount of the cost of the Commission; and the Treasurer shall within two years pay the same, the amount to be levied by a borough or county rate.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, he would assent to the clause.

§ MR. DARBY GRIFFITH
moved the insertion of a clause (Unlawful Payment of Travelling Expenses to be deemed Bribery).

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, that in the framing of the Bill, interference with the subject of travelling expenses was studiously avoided. The law as it at present 1647 stood worked satisfactorily. The effect of the clause would be to declare that to be bribery which was not bribery.

§ MR. CHILDERS
rose to propose a clause (Provisions for Elections for Places for which Members have been unseated). The clause contained sections A to L constituting a code of provisions applicable to such cases. The hon. Member, in support of his clauses, said that in the great majority of intances bribery at elections was committed late in the afternoon on the day of polling. That arose from the circumstance that in the afternoon the votes of the several candidates were nearly equal, and electors held back their votes in order that they might become more valuable. He proposed a very simple remedy. He did not propose it with respect to all boroughs, but only such as had been affected by bribery. He proposed that in a constituency amongst which bribery had been committed, the state of the poll at all future elections should not be made known during the day. And he proposed to effect that in this manner:—Instead of a vote being given publicly, an elector, after he had satisfied the returning officer that he was entitled to vote, would receive a paper with the names of the candidates, to which would be attached the number of the elector on the register—that paper, which would indicate for whom the elector voted, would be put into a box, which at four o'clock would be opened, and immediately after four the returning officer would publish the votes in the most formal manner.

§ SIR GEORGE GREY
said, that the clauses proposed by his hon. Friend were long and important enough to form a separate measure. He would not consent to their incorporation into the present Bill.