QUESTION. (Hansard, 23 February 1863)

§ MR. BENTINCK

said, that if his hon. and gallant Friend (Lord Clarence Paget) gave good reasons for this reduction, he should join the hon. Member for Sunder -land (Mr. Lindsay) in rejoicing at it; but he must say, that as far as he knew the state of things which existed at present in foreign countries, he could see no reason for rejoicing in the proposed reduction. What had been the course of things in that House for years upon this subject, and which he was afraid was likely to continue for many years to come? It had been acknowledged, for many years, that the naval defences of this country were inadequate, and that the introduction of a new description of vessels must necessitate a great additional expenditure on the navy. The country had submitted to this additional outlay for the sake of the security of the country. And what now happened? It seemed of necessity that there should be alternations of hot and cold fits over the House in reference to the expenditure for the navy; the cold fit seemed now to be coming on, and there was to be a reduction in the Estimates. Now, what was the reason for these reduced Estimates? He did not attach much importance to what he heard out of doors, but still he would mention that he had heard two reasons suggested for the reduction. In the first place, it was said that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was not much disposed to encourage expenditure for objects of this kind, had insisted upon large reductions in the Army and Navy Estimates; and then, further, there was the rumour that the Government were apprehensive of a certain coalition, which, if it had ever been possible, could only have been entered into in disregard of the interests of the country. If this reason had had any influence in reducing the Estimates, he must 659 venture to think that the Government had been under a misapprehension of the risk likely to arise from such a source. He did not think that the House would have supported any such combination for attacking the Government upon the ground that they were laying out too much money for the defence of the country, and he believed that they would have followed a more prudent and popular course if they had maintained the naval expenditure at its present rate—always assuming that that rate was necessary to efficiency. If, however, good grounds could be shown for making the reduction, he should be glad to hear that it had been found possible to make it. Now, what would be the effect of this reduction? Why, the same thing that had happened over and over again before—that having laid out large sums of money to put our naval defences in a state of efficiency, all at once the cold fit comes upon the House, and suddenly, apparently without rhyme or reason, large reductions are made. And the result of this was, that upon the occurrence of any feeling of panic in the country, or upon some sudden emergency happening, the Government were compelled, in order to replace that which they had lost by reduction, to spend five times as much money as it would have cost to keep the navy in a state of efficiency. Work that had to be done in a hurry was always badly as well as expensively done. This was strikingly illustrated by what happened after the great reduction in the Navy Estimates in 1835. Every shilling of reduction on that occasion ultimately cost the country many pounds. Seeing the enormous expense of what was miscalled economy, he contended that they had a right to have clear and explicit reasons for reduction before they could say that it was justified by the circumstances. Another matter to which he wished to refer was this. He found that there were to be no further contracts for the construction of large iron-sheathed ships, though he did not mean to say that those which were now in course of construction were not to be completed. Now, a great deal of time was required for the construction of ships of this kind and if an emergency should arise; which rendered a large number of such ships necessary, the work would be done in a much more expensive and at the same time in a much worse manner than if done at leisure. 660 He had no doubt he should be told that there was no necessity for building iron-sheathed ships, because we had as many of that class as the French had; but that seemed to him to be a very unsound and dangerous argument, for this country was not in a proper position of defence when it was merely on an equality with France. In considering naval matters they of course always had in their minds the contingency of a war with France, for that was the next greatest naval Power; but it should be borne in mind that a war with France would have the effect of bringing this country into a state of war with other countries. In the event of a war with France the Northern States of America would, if they had a man or a dollar left, instantly go to war with us; and he therefore ventured to think that it was a dangerous argument to say that we did not want more iron-sheathed ships because we had as many as France had. He hoped he might be allowed to say a few words in reference to the French navy. He found that there was a great deal going on in the French dockyards which was never adverted to in that House. He wished to tell the House that there was a particular class of vessels building in the French dockyards in great numbers. They were building these vessels—he did not say with any present intention of going to war with this country, and, indeed, he believed that that was not the present intention of the French Emperor, whose object he thought was to keep at peace with us—but this impression was no ground why we should not look closely into their means of aggression in the event of war happening. He had taken the trouble to ascertain the facts from an authentic source, and he found that they were constructing in the French dockyards a large number of cavalry transports of very great tonnage and horse power, admirably fitted up for carrying between 300 and 400 horses each and a certain number of troops in addition. There would be, at the end of this year, forty-four of these vessels complete and ready for sea, and he had it upon the authority of the officials in the French dockyards, that they hoped in a very short time to have one of these vessels named after every Department in France. He should like to know for what possible purpose the French Government could deem it necessary to go to the enormous expense of building this particular class 661 of vessels, except for the purpose of being able to act efficiently in the event of circumstances compelling them to go to war with this country. Could anybody suggest any other country into which France could ever want to send a large force of cavalry by means of such vessels. Not certainly to Mexico; nor could they want them to convey cavalry into Italy or across the Rhine; and he should like to know what the impression of the Government was as to what could be the intention of the French Government? It seemed they could only be utilized in an invasion of England. There was another point which he should wish to call attention to. He had had an opportunity, during last summer, of inquiring as to the number of workmen and artificers employed in the French dockyards; and he might mention that they made no secret of the matter—everything was perfectly straightforward and open, and every one was quite ready to tell you all you wished to know. He found that the artificers and labourers in the whole of our dockyards were 10,700 odd, and altogether, perhaps, there might be 12,000 or 13,000 persons employed; whilst in the two dockyards of Brest and Roche-fort alone there were 11,000—there were Cherbourg, L'Orient, and Toulon besides. No doubt it would be said that the French were not exceeding us in their expenditure in their dockyards, because their navy did not cost as much as ours; but when this was said, hon. Gentlemen never adverted to the fact that the cost of labour in this country was somewhat more than double what it was in France, the exact proportion being this — that in France the cost was 2–5ths of what it was in this country. They had, therefore, in two out of five or six dockyards in France, nearly as many workmen as there were in the whole of our dockyards; and he was bound to say that there was more actual work done in France, with the same number of men, than in England. Another thing which must be borne in mind was that the French required but few vessels, compared with what we required for colonial purposes. He wished to avert to one other point. The hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) had told them that Committees of that House were useless; and the most glaring example of their inutility was the Committee appointed to inquire into the system pur- 662 sued by the Board of Admiralty. He contended, that so long as the present constitution of the Board of Admiralty continued, it was impossible—even whilst giving the Board credit for its best intentions—that a wise, judicious, and economical expenditure could ever be established. Well, then, what do they do? They usually went contrary to the practice adopted in every other Department of business, which was to select for the head of the Department a person most likely to know something about it. After having elected some gentleman to preside at the head of the Admiralty, without reference to the knowledge and ability necessary for the efficient discharge of the duties, they then appointed a certain number of naval Lords who had virtually the direction of the Board without its responsibility. The responsibility really rested with the First Lord, who might be a person utterly unacquainted with the details of the Department. That distinguished functionary was compelled, for the first year or two of his official existence, to lean for support and advice upon the professional men who were in his confidence. What happened next? Just as this high official was becoming somewhat acquainted with the details of his Department a change took place in the arrangements of the Government, and he was turned out of office, to be replaced by another distinguished politician, equally ignorant of the duties of his vocation, and compelled to place himself under the direction and advice of others in order to learn his business. Now, so long as the Board of Admiralty was made a political job office it would be impossible to have any one continuous or consistent system of expenditure or any continuous system of control over it. Even under the present system, with the First Lord fully acquainted with all the details of his office, thoroughly competent to discharge its duties with the greatest efficiency, and assisted by Lords possessed of the necessary knowledge and ability, the Board was liable to the contingency of being changed in a short time. Under such circumstances, the principle invariably acted upon by the succeeding Board was to upset the system of its predecessor, and to adopt a different system altogether. The dockyard authorities, whose extravagance demanded some supervision, were always too glad to encourage 663 this change of officers, in order to save themselves from that supervision which they so much dreaded. So long as such a system lasted, it was impossible to establish any efficient or effective investigation into those sources of extravagance which were constantly at work in all our dockyards. A Committee sat upon this subject some few years ago. He dissented from the Motion for the appointment of such Committee, believing that it would prove utterly useless. The result proved the truth of his prediction. The Committee was composed almost exclusively of officials and ex-officials; so that, in fact, it became a body of men who were sitting in judgment upon their own conduct. It was impossible that such a Committee could arrive at any useful conclusion. He had ventured to say that it would prove a broad farce, and would do nothing. Well, that Committee sat throughout the Session and did nothing. When the House met in the following year, the gallant Officer who had moved for the Committee was so convinced of the utter absurdity of such a Committee that he declined to move for its re-appointment. He (Mr. Bentinck) sincerely hoped that no hon. Member would ever move for its re-appointment. He should, however, like to see a Committee of men appointed who would be competent to deal with the subject—not men who would be compelled by circumstances to prejudge the question. He contended that no officials or ex-officials were competent to sit as members of such a Committee. Until the House was willing and determined to appoint a Committee fairly constituted, and resolved to investigate the subject thoroughly, it was utterly useless to propose any modifications of the system under which the Board of Admiralty acted; and whilst the present system continued, the annual discussions that took place in that House on the subject of economy in the public expenditure would be entirely and utterly fruitless.