HC Deb 10 May 1861 vol 162 cc1870-94
SIR JAMES FERGUSSON

rose to call the attention of the House to certain papers recently presented to Parliament relative to the affairs of Syria, and to move an Address for a copy of the final recommendations of the International Commission for the future government of the Lebanon, and to ask Her Majesty's Government whether it was their intention to urge the adoption of the plan of Her Majesty's Commissioner for the government of Syria upon the Sublime Porte? Although questions connected with the finances of the country naturally occupied the public attention at that moment, a little consideration would show that the affairs of Syria were not unworthy of deliberation, for those remote occurrences often exercised more influence even on the financial affairs of the country than would at first sight be believed. The China war in its beginning was insignificant enough, but it since attained a formidable magnitude in its bearing on our financial affairs, and probably we had not yet heard of it for the last time in our Estimates; and when we considered that a question relative to Syria led to the Crimean war, in which we lavished so much blood and treasure, and remarked the language held by more than one great Power in Europe—bearing so remarkable and significant a resemblance to the events that led to that fearful struggle, he thought the House would not do amiss if they considered the question which now presented itself with regard to Syria in all its bearings, and pressed on the Government the pursuit and the perseverance in a policy which being at once avowed and unswerving should steer clear of those dangers which had ever beset a vacillating policy. He did not think it necessary to go deeply into the history of the civil war which broke out in Syria last year. At first the sympathy of the British was naturally with those who were Christians, at least in name. He ventured at the time to express a belief that the quarrel would be found to be one, not of religious differences, but of hostile race; and he only referred to this now because it was a great satisfaction to him to find that the noble Lord who had so well represented this country in the internecine commotions of Syria had now come to be entirely of the same opinion. He would refer briefly to the account which Lord Duffer in, with his mature experience, gave of the outbreak amongst the tribes of the Lebanon and the outrages that were committed north of Damascus. In reading the blue book one could not fail to be struck with the firmness which Her Majesty's Government had shown in dealing with so difficult a ques- tion. From the first the Government saw the difficulties that were likely to arise from the occupation of Syria, and he did not doubt that they regretted the hasty consent they had given to the mission of the French troops to that country. He thought they had great reason to contratulate themselves on the universal meed of approbation which had been accorded to their representatives in Syria. Nor had there been wanting a manifestation of a spirit of benevolence by British officers, who, travelling in Syria for their own pleasure, had yet been instrumental in warding off many of the evils of civil war and of attaching the population to England, inasmuch as their conduct had well exhibited the unselfish policy of this country with regard to other nations. It would have been matter of further congratulation had we succeeded in doing more in procuring the administration of unswerving justice in Syria. It was to him matter of astonishment, after reading the opinion of Lord Duffer in on the history of the quarrel, to find that punishment had been meted out to only one party in that quarrel;. and that although it had been proved on the clearest evidence that not only the Druses but the Maronites were guilty of premeditated war. In one of the despatches in the blue book which he held in his hand, our Government were congratulated by Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer on the success of their endeavours to rescue from an unmerited death one of the great chiefs of the Druses. If they had succeeded in nothing else it was a great thing to rescue from undiscriminating punishment one who, so far from having been proved guilty, had been proved to be innocent. He was sorry to say that the congratulations were at least premature; for just before he entered the House that evening he received a letter which filled him with pain and regret. He had believed that when Her Majesty's Commissioner in Syria had expressed a decided opinion of the injustice of the proceeding by which the condemnation of Said Bey had been obtained his liberation would have been at once brought about. But he had received a letter from a gentleman now residing in Paris, who had often furnished him with valuable information, which letter he would hand over to the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office presently. The writer said, "I have just heard that poor Said Bey is dying in prison, with many suspicions of foul play. For God's sake interfere, so that a despatch or telegraph from the Government may desire his liberation." The letter went on to say that the continuous French occupation of Syria had greatly diminished our influence there. No doubt the noble Lord had received information on the same subject, and he trusted that if the Government gave the slightest credence to the rumour, they would not allow the man in whose innocence they believed to languish or die in prison. Lord Duffer in, in a despatch written on the 24th of February, said that when he first went to the country he was actuated by feelings of indignation against the Druses for their attack on the Maronites. But he soon found the affair was complicated; he saw there were two sides to the story; and that as the true state of the case unfolded itself, it became a certainty that, however criminal might have been the excesses of the Druses subsequently, the original provocation came from the other side. A despatch of Mr. Brandt, Her Majesty's representative at Damascus, expressed his opinion that the quarrel was one of long standing, and that it was an old wound re-opened. He attributed the outbreak there to the weakness of the Government in the provinces. The Pachas had no money to pay their troops; no means of repressing disorders; they had gone on careless of what took place; they were not troubled by the passions of the Mahommedans which always disturbed them, and at times broke out in a general massacre. This was different from the quarrel in the Lebanon. There it was a contest between hostile races. The disturbances in the towns were of a kindred nature to those in India. They were temporarily checked in 1858, when the first outbreak took place in Jeddah; and in his opinion they might have been checked in Syria, had the same vigorous action been continued. What, then, had been the conduct of the English and French Governments? When the outbreak took place, when the news of the massacres in the Lebanon reached this country, Her Majesty's Government took proper measures, which were consistent alike with the independence of Turkey and their duty to British subjects in Syria. They gave orders to despatch ships to the coast of Syria, and called on the Porte to repress the disorders. At first the French Government took the same course, as appeared by a dispatch of M. Thouvenel on the 16th July. He expressed himself satisfied with what had been done by the Porte, and declined to take any part with either of the two populations. But on the 17th M. Thou- venel wrote a second dispatch, in which he said he had been to St. Cloud and seen the Emperor, who considered it absolutely necessary that troops should be sent to sustain the authority of the Porte and to prevent the recurrence of fresh disorders. It was true that news had, meanwhile, arrived of the massacre at Damascus; but the information which the French Government had received years before must have convinced them that such an occurrence was to be expected; and it was remarkable that one day should have sufficed to make such changes in the views of the French Government. The Emperor concluded that the Porte had no authority left, and that it was impossible for it to send to Syria the necessary troops. Then the noble Lord took a step which he (Sir James Fergusson) thought he must have repented ever since. On the 18th of July he consented to the occupation of Syria by French troops. By the 21st he saw reason to change his opinion, and said he thought the despatch of troops unnecessary. But in the meantime the Moniteur announced that the English Government concurred in the step of sending troops to Syria. Then it was that the French were able to establish what he might call their leadership in the intervention in Syria. The noble Lord having consented to the step, seemed to think that that would satisfy Fiance, and for some time afterwards he took no further steps in the negotiations. But the Porte protested against the sending of troops, and the British Consul at Damascus reported that the Turkish Government had succeeded in re-establishing order there. The despatch of the troops had therefore become unnecessary; but here was the point on which all the after negotiations turned. The noble Lord having consented to the despatch of French troops, did not insist on limiting their action to the occupation of the towns on the coast, where they would be able to give a moral support to the Turkish Government. It would be seen that most of the troubles of the French occupation were caused by the troops not being confined to these towns, where, if they had remained, they would not have roused the passions of the country in the manner that they had done. The Emperor agreed in the Conference to send his troops to act in concert with those of the Porte; but the language held to the troops themselves was hardly consistent with that idea, for in the "general order" issued to them on their leaving all the tra- ditions of the First Empire were invoked; they were told that they were charged with a great mission to the East—that they were going in the spirit of the first Crusaders. At the same time the other Powers were assured that the occupation was to be wholly a peaceful one, its object being to give moral support to the Turkish Government. On the 3rd of September the real policy of the French Government was made plain, when the French General, Beaufort, protested against the French troops being left inactive at Beyrout, and applied for permission to march up the country. Remonstrance was in vain, and the consent of the Turkish Government was unwillingly given to their advance upon the Mountain, where the General insisted on the occupation of the hostile territory of the Druses. About this time the noble Lord thought fit to interrogate the French Government, wanting to know how long the French troops were to say in the country; but he could obtain no satisfactory answer, and matters went on till, on the 7th November, he wrote a despatch stating that he saw insuperable objections to a prolonged occupation. Still the French made no sign of moving, though the Emperor continued to profess his anxiety to withdraw as soon as a settled government could be established in the country—but he refused to see that it was the continued occupation of the French troops that led to disorder. The negotiations became rather angry, the noble Lord again requesting that the troops might be withdrawn, and M. Thouvenel reiterating his opinion that the state of the country rendered that step impossible. On the 28th of January a despatch was written by M. Thouvenel which appeared to him to contain the key to the whole policy of the Syrian occupation. He stated that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as it was clear that the Maronites were not placed in a worse position than they were before, and that it could be made clear to the Catholic world that they had done all that could possibly be done for their protection; for if there should he a renewal of these atrocities after the evacuation the whole blame would fall on the French; and he (M. Thouvenel) would not deny that the French Government placed a certain value on the preservation of their influence over the Maronites. He thought the French Minister had been seized with an unwonted fit of candour when he wrote those words. He would not, then, inquire whether it was not that influence which for a great number of years had proved most detrimental to the good government of the country, by setting the Maronites against the Turkish Government, and leading them to expect aid from France. But by this despatch he thought it was clearly proved that the object of the French occupation of Syria was to encourage the Christian population to lean upon France for protection rather than on the Government of the country to which they belonged. It was originally agreed that the occupation should terminate in March, and some curious negotiations had taken place as to the prolongation, which, to speak fairly, were as unworthy of a great country as it would be of a private gentleman. After some difficulty it was agreed that the evacuation should be postponed to the 5th of June. M. Thouvenel then made objections to the evacuation being made effective on the 5th of June, and proposed that it should be enough if the transports were off the coast by that day. The English Government agreed to waive the term that the troops "shall" leave the country on the 5th, and substituted the word "ought," but insisted that there should be a "terme definitif." The French Government objected to the word "definitif" and that was struck out. Then the French Government applied that the evacuation should be postponed for ten days more; and then the noble Lord, in a despatch which must commend itself to the approbation of every gentleman who had read it, as the firmest that he believed was ever written by an English Minister, wrote that there must be an end to these discussions. Well, what had been the effect of this occupation? Had it tranquillized the country? His conviction was that the manner in which the French occupation had been carried on, so far from being conducive to the tranquillization of the province, and the re-establishment of the Sultan's authority, had had quite the contrary effect, and that every day it was prolonged it rendered more hopeless the restoration of a state of things in which commerce could be expected to flourish, and the peace of the Turkish Empire be preserved. This led him to the point which induced him to bring forward this question. It was a very serious matter for any one who advocated the early evacuation of Syria to consider what events might follow that evacuation. He had received letters during the last month from gentlemen holding different opinions on Syria; but all entertained the greatest dread of what might follow the evacuation of the country by the French. He received a letter yesterday from a gentle man at Beyrout, in whose statements he had reason to place every confidence, describing the state of uneasiness which existed at Beyrout as very serious, and mentioning that families which had been there for twenty-five years were now talking of leaving the country. There were several passages also in Lord Dufferin's despatches indicating his dissatisfaction at the state of affairs, and his anxiety as to what might follow the evacuation. He made these statements in all candour, as not wishing to keep back anything that ought to be known; not because this was an argument to prolong the occupation, but to show the necessity of early measures being taken to make a fresh outbreak impossible. If Englishmen were to shut their eyes to the dangers which undoubtedly existed, they would lay themselves open to the imputation—which the French would not be slow to cast upon them—that the jealousy of France rendered them insensible to the real interests of the country. To show that these imputations were already cast, he might refer to a clever article which appeared three months ago in the Revue des Deux Mondes; —and, by the way, he might observe that it was a most extraordinary thing that this article was written three months ago on a paper which had only just been presented to Parliament. That paper contained the reports of the British Consuls in various parts of Syria; they were confidential reports, and were printed only for the use of the Foreign Office. Until quite recently the noble Lord said it would not be for the public advantage that they should be presented to Parliament; yet this was the document on which a writer in the Revue des Deux Mondes commented three months ago. The commencement of that article was cercertainly the coolest he ever read. The writer said he would give a free translation— We have before our eyes certain reports which were sent by the British Consuls in Syria to Sir Henry Bulwer and to Lord John Russell. These reports were not intended for the public or for Parliament. We see that they were printed confidentially for the use of the Foreign Office; but we have thought that it would be good that these valuable and curious reports should be printed, in part, at least, for the guidance of public opinion, and for that reason we give an exact analysis of their contents. It was clear, therefore, that documents which had only just been submitted to the British Parliament, were in the possession of a French pamphleteer as early as February last. The writer then proceeded to make a careful analysis of these reports, and he hinted that the jealousy of England was such that she would rather see a recurrence of these outrages than the continued occupation of the country by the French. He concluded by stating— Unhappy country! there is on its horizon a cloud of blood, which, if it falls, will fill Europe with remorse and shame. Think of the effect which the cry will have in history when it is stated that 30,000 Christians were massacred in Syria in 1860, and 30,000 more in 1861, because England did not wish that they should be saved by France, as that would increase her influence in the East. Now he thought this justified him in urging on the Government that they should insist on the Turkish Government taking those steps at once which would alone be sufficient to prevent any evil consequences from the withdrawal of the French occupation. Lord Dufferin pointed out in his despatches that the Maronites were increasing in insolence, that they depended on France, and that so long as her shelter was thrown over them they neither knew nor cared for any other Government. What propositions had been made for the amelioration of Syria? Lord Dufferin had addressed himself to that question with great ability, and he had gradually brought round to his opinion the other members of the International Commission. It was to be regretted that the necessity of concluding these deliberations, so that there should be no excuse for the further occupation by the French, had obliged him to limit his deliberations to the settlement of the Lebanon, and prevented him from extending his plans to the future Government of Syria. He had, however, laid down important principles for that Government. He pointed out the viciousness of the present system, arising from the farming out of the taxes, and the rapacity of the Pachas, who knew they would not be continued in office long. Mr. Skene, the Consul at Aleppo, dwelt on the same grievances, and showed that the vices of the existing Government sprung from the weakness of the central authority and the mischievous practice of farming out the revenue. The peasantry were driven to despair, because if a man had more than an ordinary crop he knew he would be subjected to fresh exactions. The Pachas were never secure of their position for a year; and when, as sometimes happened, they were honestly inclined and wished to make roads or carry out other improvements, they found themselves surrounded by greedy followers who had friends at Constantinople, and whose rapacity they were compelled to satisfy for their own interest. Lord Dufferin represented that the future Governor of Syria must be a man who would be able to be independent of the hateful influences of Constantinople, who should be relieved from the necessity of paying black mail for his appointment, and who would he independent of the sinister influences of the different European Consuls, who were too often engaged in furthering other interests than those of the country. The noble Lord further stated that his scheme would fail unless a man was appointed who would command the respect of the European Powers; and that the people naturally looked on Fuad Pacha as the proper person—a view taken also by Sir Henry Bulwer. The noble Lord pointed to the absolute necessity for the de-centralization of Syria from Constantinople and the centralizing of power in Syria. Now it might be said that Fuad Pacha already possessed these powers. But he had not the power of appointing or removing his subordinates, he had no control over the commander of the army, who received his orders direct from Constantinople, or of distributing the revenues of the country, after a fixed tribute had been sent to Constantinople. Both Sir Henry Bulwer and Lord Dufferin stated that, unless in these respects the Governor had full and complete authority, it was useless to expect good government in the future. Lord Dufferin pointed out the absolute necessity of separating Syria for administrative purposes from Constantinople, and centralizing authority in that country. A plan for the Government of the Mountain had been prepared by the International Commission, according to which it was proposed that a Christian should be placed at the head of it, but that the Druses should be under a Druse, the Maronites under a Maronite, and the Greeks under a Greek. This plan was entirely in accordance with the suggestions contained in a remarkable Memorial which was presented to Lord Malmesbury in 1852, in which it was pointed out that the Lebanon could never be tranquil under the arrangement which divided the Mountain between two Kaimakans, leaving in some places Druses under the Government of a Maronite, and in others Maronites under that of a Druse. The Commissioners, with the exception of the French Commissioner, were unanimously of the opinion that the head of the Mountain ought not to be a native; but, unfortunately, the French Commissioner insisted that a Maronite should be appointed to that office. At that point the real information contained in the blue book ended, and the House was not informed whether the International Commission had come to any decision, or whether its appointment had been a failure. In the mean time, there appeared on the part of the French a disposition to throw on the English the responsibility of removing the troops, and of those torrents of blood which it was predicted would flow on their removal. The French had pointed out to the Maronites that their troubles were at an end, and that they would take care of them for the future, and in consequence of these assurances the Maronites had used language as against the Turkish authorities to which they had never before been subjected. It was probable, therefore, that, unless active measure were taken to induce the Porte to improve the Government of the country, and to give to one man power to repress disorder for the future, disturbances would again break out which would give France a colourable excuse for the despatch of a fresh expedition, without the consent of the Powers, for a new occupation of Syria, which might be indefinitely prolonged. In this state of things a good opportunity presented itself to England. Turkey regarded this country with a friendly eye, and although Turkey had protested against the establishment of an independent province in Syria, as fatal to the existence of her authority elsewhere, he thought that a middle course could be adopted, by the appointment of Fuad Pacha, not with a perpetual tenure of office, but with a power of continuance until he had had time to reform the Government. The Government of the Emperor of the French must, he thought, feel embarrassment on this question, and instances were not wanting in the despatches of M. Thouvenel which would lead to the belief that his Government would not be unwilling to recede from the position they had assumed. In this matter England could not be charged with pursuing any selfish policy, notwithstanding what had been stated by some French pamphleteers; and if we could prevent fresh disasters in Syria we should only be adding another to the many ser- vices we had bestowed on Turkey. We had already, through our Ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, done much to improve the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and the policy recommended by that noble Lord might, if fully carried out, become in the future, the foundation of the stability of the Turkish Empire. When the results of selfish ambition and aggression should have passed away, there would remain the fruits of the honourable policy which have ever characterized England, and which would bring eternal lustre upon the name of the Minister who should more successfully carry it out.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word 'That' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words 'an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, a Copy of the final Recommendations of the International Commission for the future Government of the Lebanon.'"—instead thereof.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

Sir, the hon. and gallant Gentleman has called attention to the condition of Syria, the policy of the European Powers who have intervened in its affairs, and the course of Her Majesty's Government with respect to that policy. After the able speech of my hon. and gallant Friend, I think it right that I should state, as far as I can, the present position of these affairs, and the views of her Majesty's Government with respect to them. The hon. and gallant Gentleman says truly, the papers that have been produced contain various recommendations with regard to the Lebanon that have been offered from time to time. One of those recommendations is that there should be a Governor General of Syria having extensive powers, and under him a Christian Governor of the Lebanon. I own it appeared to me that this arrangement would have been to the advantage of Lebanon, would have conduced to the welfare of the inhabitants, and been on the whole the best arrangement that could have been made. The Porte, however, felt great objections to the proposal to appoint a Governor General of Syria, apprehending he might assume an independent position, and imitate in Syria what has taken place in Egypt. As there were no means of deciding this point in opposition to the wishes of the Porte, the Commissioners thought that there might be a three-fold division of authority—that a Kaimakan might be appointed for the Maronites, another for the Druses, and a third for the natives belonging to the Greek Church. It was also proposed that a system of "disaggregation" should be adopted. The word is used to describe the process by which certain villages inhabited by Maronites should be taken from under the authority of the Druse Kaimakan, and transferred to the Kaimakan of the Maronites; and vice versa other villages inhabited by Druses taken from the Maronite authorities, and transferred to that of the Druses. But this arrangement could not be easily accomplished; it was much opposed by the French Commissioners, who were supported in their view by their Government in Paris; and it became impracticable. It then appeared to me that the best plan was to go back to the original proposition, leaving out those points to which the Sultan objected; the best solution of the difficulty seemed to be the appointment of a Christian Governor; and it had the merit of having received in its former shape the concurrence of all the Commissioners. Their only differences of opinion were on the point—certainly one of great importance—whether the Christian Governor should be a native or not. Four out of the five Commissioners thought he ought not to be a native; and it struck me as obvious that there would be a danger, if the Governor were a native of the Lebanon, that he would retain in his own breast, and cherish in the breasts of his family and tribe, those resentments and hatreds which have caused so much desolation and bloodshed already. My own opinion is that the arrangement to which I have just referred should take effect; but the French Government are still of opinion that a Maronite chief would afford the best kind of Government for the Lebanon. The last Report of the Commissioners I have not yet seen, but I believe it is nearly in accordance with what I have stated; it has been sent to Constantinople in order to be considered there. The hon. Baronet will see that I cannot produce the further papers he asks for. We are just at that point of the negotiations at which it is the general rule and practice not to produce to the House such documents, and some of them, indeed, have not yet reached my hands. I hope, with the Iron. Baronet, that we may be able to find some means for the future good Government of Syria. I quite concur with what the hon. Gentleman has said of the merits of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's exertions in Turkey. But there is this diffi- culty that has since arisen, and still continues; the Russian Government has always considered itself bound to take under its special protection the subjects of the Sultan who belong to the Greek Church. The French Government, on the other hand, considers it a matter involving the pride and glory of France that it should extend its protection to the Roman Catholic Christians. Our course has been, and we have invariably pursued it, to induce the Sultan to endeavour to give to all his subjects the protection and good Government they are entitled to, whether they are of the Greek Church, Roman Catholics, Maronites, or Druses. We think they are all equally entitled to good Government. We see with great pleasure the improvements that have been made from time to time; they constitute, on the whole, vast changes from the condition of the Christians in Turkey twenty or twenty-five years ago. Other questions remain, in some parts of the Sultan's dominions, with regard to those changes. I cannot now enter into the particulars, but the negotiations now cannot last very long, as the points under discussion have been reduced to very few—almost to one. With regard to the evacuation of Syria by the French troops, we have every reason to rely on the good faith of the Emperor of the French in carrying out the engagements into which he has entered.

MR. LAYARD

thought the present question involved precedents of very great importance, not alone as far as Syria was concerned, but as applicable hereafter to other parts of the Turkish empire. The House was indebted to the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite for the able manner in which he had, on more than one occasion, dealt with this matter. They could not doubt that the hon. Gentleman was well informed, as the facts he had stated had always turned out to be true. He was himself not prepared to go to the extent the hon. Gentleman did in the policy he advocated; but the Motion would tend to strengthen the hands of the Government. The papers laid upon the table of the House proved three things: first, that there was great difficulty in governing Syria; next, that mischief under foreign occupation had already occurred; and, thirdly, that in the past outrages the Christians were the aggressors. It would appear that the Maronites were instigated to the aggression by their priests, or by foreign agents; that the Druses, convinced at last they should be attacked, endeavoured to anticipate the Christians; that sanguinary battles ensued in which, as in all barbarous warfare, there was much unnecessary slaughter. The papers proved also that some of the Turkish population of the towns, generally of the lowest order, joined the Druses and took advantage of the outbreak for the purpose of plundering. On the other hand, it was proved that a large number of the higher class of Mahommedans gave protection to the Christians. Before the French occupied Syria it had already been shown that the Porte could repress these disturbances; some of the guilty it had already punished, but it allowed others to escape who ought to have been punished—for which it deserved reprobation. It was evident that since the French occupation an unsatisfactory state of things had prevailed in Syria, arising out of the misconduct and irritating attitude assumed by the Maronites, who had, murdered a large number of men, women, and children in cold blood. The French occupation had only led to mischief, as it had encouraged ideas of vengeance on one side and retaliation on the other. He believed the French would leave Syria in June, according to the Convention; but what was to be done with Syria when they did leave? The difficulty of governing Syria was increased by the fact that it was inhabited by ten races divided into seventeen fanatical sects. Lord Dufferin was a high-minded, liberal gentleman, possessed of good sense and judgment, but before he had been in Syria two months he proposed a plan for the government of that country—a problem which had for years puzzled those best acquainted with the East. That plan was sent home, accepted by the Foreign Office, and Sir Henry Bulwer was instructed to press it on the attention of the Porte. The Porte, however, very naturally protested against this scheme on the ground that it would place Syria in the same position of virtual independence as Egypt. It was first suggested that the mountains should be divided into two parts with a Christian and Mahommedan governor. Then Lord Dufferin and the Commissioners agreed that there should be one Christian governor for the Lebanon, but the French said he must be a Maronite. Lastly, it was suggested that there should be three governors—a Greek, a Druse, and a Maronite; but all these plans appeared to him equally unworkable. He thought they ought not to suggest to the Porte any plan whatever. It was unjust to force on the Porte a plan for the government of Syria, and then to make it responsible if that plan did not succeed. Either the Great Powers should take the government upon themselves, or they should leave it to be administered by Turkey, holding Turkey responsible in case of failure. It was admitted that the Porte was fully alive to its responsibility towards the civilized world, that it would do its utmost for the good government of Syria. But the greatest difficulties the Porte had to contend with arose from the Christians themselves. When Fuad Pasha left a Christian governer at Damascus he was actually obliged to turn him out on the complaint of the Commissioners, because of his oppression towards both Christians and Mahommedans, and because he committed outrages upon unhappy women who went to him for redress; and Lord Dufferin stated that the worst and most bloody feuds on the mountains had been between the Christians themselves. Any general principle or precedent which might now be laid down for the Government of Syria required the utmost consideration, because they might hereafter become applicable to other parts of Turkey. If the principle now attempted to be established with regard to Syria were accepted, Russia had an equal right to claim the application of the same principle to the rest of Turkey. Allusion had been made to an article in the Revue des Deux Mondes, as containing misrepresentations. Unfortunately it was the custom of French writers to endeavour to give a false notion of our policy in the East. If he should not be out of order he wished to refer to an instance which involved a matter personal to himself. An article had appeared in the Débate grossly misrepresenting him.

MR. SPEAKER

said, the hon. Member might refer to anything which he construed into an attack on his personal character, but it was not in order to quote documents referring to debates in this House.

MR. LAYARD

was aware of this, but the statement to which he was alluding did affect his personal character. It represented him as having said that the English Government should ask the Sultan to send two Albanian regiments, whose pay was in arrears, to the Ionian Islands, and that then the Ionian Islands would know how to appreciate the English rule. No English gentleman would have expressed such an opinion, and to impute it to him was a reflection on his character as a Member of this House. With regard to the state of Christians in Turkey, the consular reports recently laid upon the table, showed that, after all, their condition had very much improved, and if it had not it was due to themselves rather than to the Turks. They would not help themselves. The papers would show that many of the so-called Christians were a shame to the name of Christianity. He thought these papers creditable to Turkey, but at the same time complained that it was a hard thing that they should be published. Fancy sending to Ireland a Consul from every nation in Europe, and inviting them to make a report upon the differences between Catholics and Protestants in that country. It would be impossible to govern Ireland a week after the publication of such a report. It might appear a paradox, but it was literally true that the present position of Turkey was entirely owing to her toleration of religious creeds. It was a mistake to suppose that when the Turks conquered the provinces now forming that empire they found a highly civilized people. Any student of history would know that the Byzantine Empire was at that time so low that it was falling to pieces of its own accord. A Christian body would have exterminated the conquered race as the Spaniards had exterminated the Moors, or as Russia was now ruthlessly exterminating the Tartar races in the Crimea; yet Russia had the audacity to complain of the conduct of Turkey! There was, no doubt, a great deal of misgovernment in Turkey, but any one who read those papers would see that there was a steady desire on the part of the Sultan, and on the part of the higher dignitaries, at least, to introduce improvements; and in a few years' time the country might be expected to be in a far better position than at present. It appeared from the report of Mr. Consul Skeen that in Northern Syria there was an absence of crime of any kind, which could not be recorded by any civilized country in Europe. He asked them to leave the Porte to govern Syria, and to make the Porte responsible. To do this they must stop consuls and priests from being political agents. He could tell them the present position of a Governor of a Turkish province. When a new Pasha was appointed he was waited upon by the English Consul, who recommended the imposition of such and such taxes, and the remission of others. The French and Russian, and Russian and Greek Consuls called and made their recommendations in the same way; of course, the unhappy man could not adopt them all, and then those consuls whose suggestions were not adopted wrote to Constantinople that the Pasha was corrupt and unfit to govern a province, and in a short time the unhappy Porte was compelled to withdraw him; and so it went on, Pasha after Pasha, till government was utterly impossible. Of all the curses to a country the greatest was the political agitator in the garb of the soutane, and Turkey suffered more than any other country from this source. All sects were alike in this respect. As a general rule there was no systematic oppression of the Christiana in Turkey. He desired to see them flourishing and happy, but a great deal depended on themselves; and he hoped, therefore, that the noble Lord at the head of the Government would support the Turks in this matter, and would not force upon them an impracticable plan, which could only end in failure.

MR. C. CLIFFORD

said, he felt greatly indebted to the hon. and gallant Gentleman for having brought forward this subject, and begged to remind the House that he had been the first to warn it to suspend its judgment when the conflict broke out last year. He (Mr. C. Clifford) spoke from his own personal experience of the miserable condition of the Lebanon, in consequence of the political intrigues of the Christian priests. In 1844, when he was over there, a war broke out, which was begun by the Maronites, and had it not been for the interposition of a gallant officer an equally dreadful massacre would have been perpetrated to that which had horrified them last year. The country was deeply indebted to Lord Dufferin for the manner in which he had made a stand against the wholesale massacre of the Druses which was at first demanded by the Maronite bishops, and also against the heavy fines it was proposed to levy on them. Those priests handed in at first a list of 4,600 persons whose death they demanded, and that list was subsequently reduced to 1,200; but that sanguinary suggestion, thanks to Lord Dufferin, was not carried out; and next to impose a fine of 1,000 piastres, or about £8, upon each male Druse above fifteen years of age, which would have produced heartrending misery. The plan developed by Lord Dufferin in his despatch of the 3rd of November was very well calculated to remove the difficulties which beset the government of the Lebanon, though he despaired of seeing the time when the hostile tribes would be brought into true reconcilement with each other. He could not, however, agree with that part of the plan which proposed a loan, to be guaranteed by the different Governments of Europe. The manner in which the great offices at Constantinople were disposed of was most scandalous. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the foremost defender of Turkey, admitted the corruption which was practised, and all he could say was "corruption was not long ago also rife in England, and even now the words of Mr. Burke are ringing in our ears." But, if corruption did at one time prevail in England, we had never appointed as governors of provinces persons who would become the accomplices of murder and treason. When he (Mr. C. Clifford) was in Beyrout information arrived there that a Christian garrison had been shut up in a fortress, and that they had surrendered to the Druses. It appeared that those Christians were subsequently led captive into a certain ravine, with the intention of being massacred. A gallant officer, however, went to their rescue, and by his influence over the Druse chiefs saved them from the fate which threatened them. The Christians, numbering 160, and composed of men, women, and children, were brought in safety back to Beyrout. The gallant officer to whom he alluded was the same who had marched from victory to victory in India, and had retrieved our fortunes there when they looked gloomy in the extreme. His name was Sir Hugh Rose, whom he (Mr. C. Clifford) was proud to call his friend.

SIR HARRY VERNEY

addressed the House and was proceeding to point to the corruption and mal-administration that pervaded the Turkish Empire; when—

Notice taken, That Forty Members were not present; House counted, and Forty Members being present,

SIR HARRY VERNEY

proceeded to say that this corruption and mal-administration were at the root of all the disturbances in Syria and other parts of the Turkish Empire; and that it was to the remedying of those evils that attention must be turned if we hoped to avert the danger arising to Europe from the present condition of the Turkish Empire. The hon. and gallant Member was very imperfectly heard.

MR. MONSELL

thought that the House had diverged from the important question brought before it by the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite. The object of the hon. and gallant Member was, he believed, to impress upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity of devising some reliable security that the disgraceful scenes which took place last year in the Lebanon should not be repeated. The hon. Member for Southwark (Mr. Layard) was for leaving matters entirely in the hands of the Turks; but he (Mr. Monsell) would venture to suggest a difficulty in the way of adopting that proposition, and that was that this country had entered into solemn engagements with reference to the Government of the Lebanon. In the year 1842 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated in a despatch that he had communicated to the Christians of Mount Lebanon the pledge that their ancient rights should he respected, and one of those ancient rights was that they should be governed by rulers selected from among themselves. The suggestion, therefore, of the hon. Member for Southwark was entirely inconsistent with the honour and good faith of this country. It was one of the first statements made by Lord Dufferin—and he repeated it over and over again—that if a tolerable Government existed, and no sinister influences were allowed to engender discord between them, the Druse and Christian populations would be inclined to live in perfect harmony; and that view was supported by the fact that there had been no massacre without the presence of Turkish troops. He utterly denied the statement of the noble Lord, that the bloody encounters of hostile tribes had been for ages the scourge of Syria; and everybody who had looked but cursorily into the history of that country must know that religious wars never took place there until 1838. Since the influence of the Turkish Pachas was introduced in 1841 the tribes had been set one upon the other, and the Turks were at the bottom of every single disturbance that had since broken out in the country. If the Turks were allowed to arrange the affairs of the Lebanon the result would be most disastrous. A remarkable petition, signed by 438 merchants and traders in that part, belonging to all the different nations of Europe, had been presented to the Commissioners, and the persons signing the petition expressed their belief that nothing but ruin and misery would befall the Christians in the Lebanon, if European occupation were withdrawn before some proper system of government was established. It would be an outrage against humanity if this country were to permit such a result. He thought that, when all the sufferings of the Maronites were considered, they ought to be spoken of in more tolerant language than was used when they were described as being Christians only in name, and some allowance should be made for the feelings of persons who had had such horrible atrocities perpetrated upon them. There had been 288 murders of Maronites by Druses since Fuad Pacha arrived in the Lebanon; so that, if the Christians had committed outrages, the Druses had committed outrages likewise. He concurred in thinking that neither of these tribes ought to be hardly dealt with. Each was necessary to the other, and the true policy was to endeavour to bring them together in the same state as they were in about twenty-five years ago, and to place them in a position to be able to resist any attempt on the part of the Turks to intrude on the Government of the Lebanon. Unless that were done, any scheme that might be proposed would entirely fail, because the Turks would endeavour to change their suzeraineté into a sovereignty. The influence which this country possessed with Turkey imposed on it in the eyes of Europe the solemn responsibility of compelling the adoption of a fair and just system of government in the Lebanon, and he entreated the Government not to allow European occupation to cease until some security against the repetition of these terrible massacres was obtained.

MR. FREELAND

said, Sir, I am sorry that I did not hear the commencement of the speech of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ayrshire. I understand that he paid a high tribute to Lord Dufferin, and I should not do justice to my own feelings if I did not express my deep conviction that the Government of this country have been exceedingly fortunate in their choice of a Commissioner for Syria. Lord Dufferin, in circumstances of peculiar difficulty, has shown an amount of energy, sagacity and firmness, and, in dealing with the cases of particular prisoners, a judicial impartiality most honourable to him and creditable to the country of which he is the representative. There are many points connected with the question now before us, which, although discussed at length in the papers which we have received, we cannot, I think, discuss with advantage in this House. Such, for instance, are the different degrees of criminality attaching to the Turkish and Druse prisoners at Beyrout and the Druses imprisoned at Mokhtarah. I allude to this point only for the purpose of stating that to M. Thouvenel we are indebted for the merciful suggestion that one or two only out of twenty-two Druse prisoners set apart for execution at Mokhtarah should be executed. This suggestion must be regarded as highly honourable to M. Thouvenel when we consider the peculiar and delicate position in which France stands relatively to the Maronites. It was, moreover, at variance with the opinion of the French Commissioner in Syria, who had thought that a much larger number should be executed. I am glad to find also from, the papers before us that M. Thouvenel has expressed his satisfaction at the conciliatory spirit shown by Her Majesty's Government as regards the proposals for prolonging the occupation. I trust sincerely that a spirit of conciliation may animate all the great Powers of Europe in arriving at a solution of this question, and that they will not act as the patrons of the Greek Church, or the Maronite Church, or of the Druses, but as the apostles of humanity. With regard to the term of the French occupation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has taken up a very decided position, and I think that this matter may very safely he left in his hands. In his presence, I hardly like to say how much I admire his foreign policy, not in Syria only, but in Italy. I think, however, that my hon. and gallant Friend opposite, in commenting on the proceedings of M. Thouvenel, has hardly made sufficient allowance for French sympathies and for the extent to which, in connection with Syria, ecclesiastical influences have been brought to hear on the French Government. The question as to the origin of the disturbances in Syria is, no doubt, a question of great interest. I will not now refer to it except to state my opinion that as between the Druses and the Maronites, the latter, instigated, as I believe, by the intrigues of their priesthood, were the aggressors. Sir Henry Bulwer, Lord Dufferin, and M. Novikow are of this opinion. M. Thouvenel speaks fairly enough on this point, and hardly disguises his opinion, as regards the Maronites. He states, moreover, that he has no wish that the truth should be concealed. But after all there can be no doubt that the chief blame lies with the local authorities and the Ottoman Government. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs attributed in one of his despatches the whole misfortunes to the connivance of Khoorshid Pasha at Deir el Kamar and the cowardice of Achmet Pasha at Damascus. Sir Henry Bulwer writing to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 27th of June, 1860, says— I must add with deep regret that the Ottoman Government is the more to blame for what has occurred in Syria, since assuredly a week has not passed during the last year that I have not been constantly bringing the state of that province under the attention of Fuad Pasha, and the three grand Viziers who have succeeded each other. That is what Sir Henry Bulwer says; but what did the Turkish Government do in the teeth of all these warnings? What says Consul Brant, writing from Damascus to Sir Henry Bulwer in May of the same year? After speaking of the disordered state of the Lebanon, he adds— Unfortunately, there are very few troops here, the greater portion having been recalled to Constantinople; our Pasha is, therefore, almost powerless. In the teeth of all these warnings the Turkish Government withdrew its troops to Constantinople. I am, therefore, Sir, unable to concur with my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark in the extent to which he goes in his eulogiums on the Turkish Government, though I honour the spirit in which his speech was made. As to the future, we cannot here discuss in detail any plans for the Government of Syria. But it seems to me that, in any settlement of this question, there are two main points which ought to be attended to. The first is, that the Government of the whole of Syria, as well as that of the Lebanon should be provided for in the settlement. The other, that Syria should be governed in the interest of the Native races and not in the interest of this or that particular Power. I do hope that some plan may be adopted to prevent a recurrence of those terrible calamities which have been so feelingly referred to by my right hon. Friend behind me, the Member for Limerick. No doubt it may be difficult to devise a plan. But the greatest difficulty appears to me to be to obtain a guarantee for the faithful carrying out of the plan, whatever it may be, and of any reforms promised for Syria by the Ottoman Government. It may be said, there is the good faith, there are the promises of the Ottoman Government. Well, but that good faith is pledged already. The Hatti Sherif of Gulhane in 1839, the Tanzimat of 1844, the Hatti Humayoun of 1856, promised reforms large enough to regenerate, not Turkey only, but every empire in Europe. Have those reforms been yet accomplished? The Hatti Humayoun promised reforms in the provincial and metropolitan police. But, has the police system been yet reformed? Murders and pillage are the reply. The system of farming the taxes, too, was condemned, but is not yet abolished. Reforms were promised in the provincial councils, but the Medjlis is still the centre of misgovernment and corruption. Canals and roads were promised. How many have been made? How do matters stand as regards agricultural produce, and the mode of collecting the Government tithe? Major Cox speaks of crops having been cut and then left three weeks on the ground; and one of our consuls speaks of a case in which they remained on the ground two months before the tithe collector could be found to assess their value. No doubt, in 1860, the tour of the Grand Vizier Mehemet Kibrisli Pasha was attended with beneficial results; and I have great hopes of reforms, looking to his past history, from the proposed mission of Omar Pasha to Bosnia. But these are partial reforms only. Large and general reforms are needed. I am told that the most necessary reform is that which is required in the Seraglio. The extent of that establishment, with its countless women and troops of enuchs is something beyond belief, and the cost of it bears a proportion by no means inconsiderable to the entire expenses of the Turkish army, the payment of which is often left in arrear. If Her Majesty's Government are desirous of saving Turkey they must speak plainly to the Turkish Government. They must urge it to adopt at once some comprehensive plan of Reform, and obtain if possible some guarantee for its being carried into execution. By this course they may confer enduring benefits on the population of the Turkish dominions—Mahommedan as well as Christian. By this course they may fulfil the expectations of Europe, and give stability to what is now a tottering empire.

MR. DARBY GRIFFITH

said, that we had endeavoured to support the Turkish Empire, but had not found the means necessary for the accomplishment of that object. Serious evils had arisen from French influence in Egypt, and from the Turkish law of succession to the Sovereignty. The principle which we ought to adopt was, to prevent foreign conquest of Turkey; but while encouraging liberty in other parts of the world it was impossible for us to stay the march of progress in its effects on the Turkish Empire.

Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put and agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."