COLONEL DICKSONsaid, he rose to call the attention of the Secretary of State for War to the hardship and inconvenience experienced by Militia officers, called out for training in Ireland in places where 245 there is no barrack accommodation, in not receiving lodging money where the troops were billeted. Militia officers in Ireland suffered under great disadvantages, and were charged most exorbitantly by the innkeepers upon whom they were quartered. He believed that very little good was derived from the mode in which the traing of those regiments was conducted. The men were billeted apart from the officers, whose control over them was thereby greatly impaired. Great sums were spent on the Militia, and the force had been entirely remodelled during the last seven years, but he ventured to say that they were in no better condition now than when they were first remodelled, because although certain regiments had been brought into discipline, as they were disembodied many men were lost and never returned. By a Return dated March 6 last, he found that the actual strength of the Militia was 23,735, while the number to which they ought to have amounted was 32,523; therefore, if required for immediate service, a deficiency of one-third would be found. When last taken the number of the disembodied force present was actually 44,340, there being absent 30,507, or very nearly the same number absent as those present. The whole system at present adopted for keeping up the Militia was wrong, and required remodelling, for it was a force that could never be depended upon. He was himself enlisting men every day who it was well known would be never seen again after they had received the bounty. Commanding officers were compelled to enlist such men because they were told they must keep regiments up to a certain strength. If they did not obey these orders letters were written demanding an explanation of the cause; but at the same time that they were enlisting the men they knew that the money paid was thrown away, it being in many cases used to enable the recipients to pay their expenses to America. What was the use of keeping a regiment 1,000 strong in a time of peace? When a Line regiment marched out it was hardly ever more than 500 strong, and why might not Militia regiments be kept at that standard until they were called out for service, when as many men as were wanted might be procured? This plan would save the bounties now paid to men who never came near when they were wanted. Then, again, calling out the Militia for twenty-one days' training was a perfect farce. It was true that 246 at the end of twenty-one days they were able to march past and to go through a drawing room field-day with tolerable credit. But they were not converted into soldiers. There would be time, in the event of war, to make just as great an advance in drill and discipline before the services of the Militia were likely to be required. If, however, it was thought necessary to call them out, every regiment ought to have its fair turn. For the present state of our army the Secretary for War, as well as right hon. and gallant predecessor, deserved great credit. According to a Return just presented to Parliament, we had now under arms 226,304 men of all ranks, of whom there were in this country 94,454 regular troops and 19,333 Militia, who had been embodied for two years, and might be considered equal to any average regiment of the Line. Thus we had in England, including depots of Indian regiments, no fewer than 113,787 effective soldiers fit for immediate service. That was a most creditable army to keep up for home service; but what an army would it not be if we had in the Militia a properly organized reserve which might be immediately called out if necessary! He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would take an early opportunity of devising some new scheme for placing the Militia on a proper footing, and meanwhile the junior officers ought to be recompensed for the delay and inconvenience to which they were exposed when called out.