HC Deb 05 August 1859 vol 155 cc1017-43

Order for Committee read.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

, in moving that the House go into Committee on this Bill, said that, as it had been by the courtesy of hon. Gentlemen allowed to be read a second time without discussion, he would take that opportunity of explaining the provisions of the measure. Many hon. Gentlemen might think that at a time when they read in the Moniteur that a general disarmament was about to take place in France, both with regard to sea and land forces, it was somewhat inopportune bring before the House of Commons a measure with the object of strengthening the British navy. In his opinion, however, as a naval man, this was the best opportunity that could be chosen for taking such a course. The object of this Bill was not to immediately increase our fleet, but to provide a militia force for the sea, as we already have on land and a reserve for recruiting our navy. The principle of a militia force was generally adopted in all countries, and it was to him a perfect marvel that a nation which depended so much upon the sea for its security as England scarcely possessed anything in the shape of a naval reserve. It was true that, of late years, the coastguard, which was, as far it went, an efficient reserve force, had been increased, but the number of men belonging to it and disposable as a reserve was less than £4,000. They had, besides, a force called the coast volunteers. Great doubts had been expressed by many persons, and by the Royal Commission which sat last year on the subject of manning the navy, as to the efficiency of that force in the event of an emergency. He was not one of those who entertained such doubts, for he believed that if the services of that force should ever be required, it would be found efficient for the purposes for which it was intended. There was, however, one radical defect connected with that force—namely, that the coast volunteers could not be required to go further than 300 miles from their own coast; and although, therefore, they might be very serviceable for the defence of the coast, they could not be regarded as of any great utility for the general purposes of the navy. The subject of a reserve for the navy had for many years past occupied the attention of eminent men. During the last great maritime war, the odious system of impressment was in full operation; but public opinion was so strougly expressed against that system that it gradually fell into disuse, and during the last three years of the war it was almost entirely ineffective. He had the other night made a somewhat curious statement to the House, which showed that the effect of impressment during the last three years of the war had produced a loss instead of a gain to the navy. There was no doubt that the system of impressment had been abandoned never to be revived; but no substitute had been provided for it, and the successive Boards of Admiralty had applied their attention to the adoption of some means by which, in case of emergency, sufficient reserves might be provided for the navy. Allusion had frequently been made to the admirable French system of the inscription maritime, under which a vast number of seamen could at any moment be rendered available for the navy. So long ago as the year 1824 the late Mr. Hume proposed in that House a Resolution to the effect that the House being well aware of the difficulty of manning the navy in a time of war, and of the evils of forcible impressment of seamen for that purpose, and considering that a time of profound peace will best admit the fullest and fairest examination of that most important subject, would early in the next Session take the subject into consideration, with the view to adopt such regulations as may obviate the existing evils consistently with the efficiency of the navy and the best interests of the country. This like many other proposals of that enlightened man was rejected. Since that time various propositions had been made with reference to this subject. The right hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir James Graham) introduced the Seamen's Enlistment and Registration Bill in 1835; and in 1847 the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark (Sir Charles Napier) submitted to the House a Motion for an enlistment of seamen with reference to reserves, which, however, was not adopted. In 1852 the right hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring) was so strongly impressed with the necessity of forming a naval reserve that he asked for a Vote for that purpose; but in consequence of a change in the Government that proposal did not receive the sanction of Parliament. In 1852 a Committee was appointed to consider this important question, and it recommended various means of manning the navy, including the adoption of the continuous-service system, the increase of the coastguard, and the enrolment of coast volunteers. In consequence of the recommendations of that Committee the system of continuous service was adopted by Sir James Graham, and although it had since sustained some violent shocks, he believed that if there was no sudden reduction of our naval force it would in time be productive of great advantages. The Royal Commission, on manning the navy, which was appointed last year, in consequence of a Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark had made numerous suggestions for improving the condition of seamen in the navy, and many of their proposals had been carried out by the late and by the present Governments. The recommendation of the Committee that the force of Royal Marines should be increased bad been partially adopted, and he hoped no long time would elapse before their suggestion that a body of seamen should always be kept at the homo ports would also be carried into effect and that their proposal of training ships would be tried. The principal recommendation of the Commissioners was, however, that from 20,000 to 30,000 men should be employed as a reserve force, under the title of Royal Naval Volunteers. The Commissioners proposed that these men should receive a retaining fee of £6 per annum, of which £1 should be deducted and set apart for a pension fund. The Commissioners recommended that at the age of fifty or fifty-five, these men should be entitled to a pension of 6d. a day, and that they should have the option of either receiving that pension or a smaller amount which should be continued to their widows and families. The Bill now before the House was framed upon that suggestion, although in some matters of detail it was not completely in accordance with the recommendations of the Commissioners. The Bill proposed that a number not exceeding 30,000 men should be invited to enrol themselves for a period of five years; that for that term each man should receive £5 per annum; that they should be called out for training for twenty-eight days in the year, and that during that time they should receive non-continuous service pay according to the rating they might hold. It was also proposed that at the expiration of the five years these men should have the option of retiring from the force, or of re-enrolling themselves for a further period of five years. If the country should remain at peace they would each during their five years' service have received a sum of £25, in addition to the month's pay, per annum during their training, and if they were re-enrolled for another period of five years at the expiration of ten years' service they would have received £50 besides the month's pay each year, and be entitled under certain conditions to pensions. Supposing, however, that this country should unhappily be involved in war, it was proposed that by Royal Proclamation these men, however long they had been enrolled, if still in the force, should be at once called upon to enter for active service in the fleet in any part of the world. There would then be a claim upon their services for three years certain; and if at the end of that period war did not cease, power was given by the Bill to require them to serve for two years more, they receiving 2d. a day additional for the last two years, whatever rating they might hold. In the event of war, therefore, the services of these men could be counted upon for a period of five years. There were some details with regard to this subject, especially respecting pensions, which it would be difficult to embody in a legislative measure. The Board of Admiralty had considered very carefully the proposals of the Royal Commission as to the deferred pensions at the age of 50 or 55, and it was thought that under some circumstances it would be a hardship upon seamen if the Government were restricted to the power of granting pensions at those ages. Cases might occur in which seamen had served faithfully during war, and had suffered in health, and, although not eligible for pensions in consequence of wounds, the grant of pensions might be perfectly justifiable. On the other hand, supposing the country to remain at peace, it became a question whether a man who had entered the force at the age of 20 years, and who had served for ten years, should be entitled to claim the same amount of pension as if he bad been engaged in active service before an enemy. It was thought, therefore, that it would be a matter of great difficulty to deal with the question of pensions by an Act of Parliament, and it was considered that the better course would be to leave these details to the regulation of the Admiralty, if the House gave its assent to this Bill. He was bound to tell the House that this was only an experiment. They had no experience to guide them on the subject, and therefore he could not tell the House that he felt confidence that the plan would be perfectly successful. He hoped, however, that it would be successful, and he was sure that was the feeling of the House of Commons and of the public. His opinion was that the best mode of attaining a successful result would be not to tie the hands of the Admiralty too much by Acts of Parliament; but he trusted that by communication with the Board of Trade, with the shipping masters, with the Registrar General of Seamen, and other persons connected with the merchant service, they might be enabled to frame regulations which would induce our merchant seamen to flock to the Royal Naval reserve. He believed that men-of-war's men did not thoroughly understand the merchant sailors. There had been a misunderstanding in the navy with regard to the merchant service; and he knew that merchant seamen had said they would be delighted to serve in the navy if they were satisfied they would be treated in the manner to which they thought themselves entitled. He could only say that the Board of Admiralty desired most ardently to effect a good understanding between the merchant service and the Royal Navy, and to establish between the two services feelings of mutual respect and affection. This Bill was the first endeavour to establish such a good understanding, and if the attempt proved successful they would induce a great number of merchant seamen, during their period of twenty-eight days' training, to see ships of war for themselves; they would find that the men were kindly treated, that they received good food and good pay, and the result would probably be that many of them would be induced to join Her Majesty's service. If this result could be attained, instead of endeavouring to retain men against their will in the Royal Navy, the greatest punishment that could be held out in terrorem would be dismissal from the service. If the House assented to this Bill he believed such regulations might be framed as would induce merchant seamen to come forward as volunteers under this system, and they would thus form an invaluable reserve for the Royal Navy. In the February number of the Revue des Deux Mondes there was a passage in an article attributed to a distinguished naval officer, the Prince de Joinville, to which he might call the attention of the House. The writer said,— On a vu quelquefois le genie d'un homme improviser une armee, jamais une marine. The statement was true. A navy could not be extemporized. It was necessary to have trained seamen; and the state of naval preparation maintained by the French nation enabled them to afford to disarm at once, because they knew perfectly well that within a week their fleet could be manned. He believed that the declared intention of the Emperor of the French to disarm was faithful and honest; but the French, after disarming by their maritime inscription could arm again in a week with the utmost facility. That, however, was not the case with this country, for we had no system of reserves. He thought that this great maritime country ought to be in a position to disarm; but if they allowed their seamen to leave the naval service, they had nothing to fall back upon. If, however, they had a valuable reserve of seamen, they could afford to imitate the example of other nations; and he hoped that if the House assented to this Bill they would before very long be placed in that position.

MR. LINDSAY

said, the problem the Royal Commission on Manning the Navy were required to solve was, how to obtain a reserve sufficient for the emergencies of war at the smallest cost to the country, and with the least disturbance to its industrial resources during peace. He had the misfortune to differ with his colleagues on the Commission, and he thought they had not solved that problem. He thought his colleagues had failed because they had not fairly grappled with the question, what was the reason that the sailors of the merchant service were so unwilling to enter the Royal Navy. According to the estimate of the Commissioners, the cost of the plan they recommended would be £598,881; but he believed that, large as that amount was, it would not suffice to carry out their recommendations. The cost of a coastguard force of 2,000 men was £116,000 a year, while the estimate for 4,000 men as a reserve for the home force in their report was only£132,000; but he thought it would be nearer the mark if it were calculated at £200,000 In 1852 a Committee of naval officers inquired into the best mode of manning the navy, and they recommended increased pay in one shape or the other, which entailed upon the country an expenditure of £150,000 per annum; yet in 1854, two years afterwards, the hon. and gallant Member for Southwark (Sir G. Napier) found great difficulty in manning the Baltic fleet. It appeared, therefore, that this extra expenditure did not enable the country to obtain what it required. All this and even largely increased expenditure would be disbursed in vain unless reforms were made in discipline and drill in the navy. He found that the Admiralty were now paying about £100,000 a year to seamen for provisions which were not consumed because as they alleged the provisions were inferior; but why was not care taken that provisions of inferior quality were not supplied to the men? He believed that the extra drill enforced in some of Her Majesty's ships, and the provisions of the Articles of War, which imposed the penalty of death for nearly every offence enumerated in them, tended to deter merchant seamen from entering the Royal Navy. It was now proposed to form a reserve of seamen to be available in case of emergency; but at this moment they had in the Royal Navy a staff of effective officers barely sufficient for "peace establishment." He would recommend, therefore, that when they were inviting seamen of the merchant service to join their reserve force they should extend the same invitation to the officers of that service. Some slight distinguishing mark—some badge to show that they were officers of the reserve—which would give them a better position in society, especially abroad, would have a far greater effect than any pecuniary inducement in leading a number of the finest young seamen to be found in this country to enter the navy in that capacity. Independently of the services which these young men would be able to render as officers of the reserve he believed they would be found most valuable as recruiting officers for the navy among the body of seamen with whom they were connected. He would recommend, therefore, that this Bill should not be now pressed, but that the whole subject should be reconsidered by the Admiralty; and that before an attempt was made to form a reserve force of seamen the Articles of War should be altered, excessive and unnecessary drill should be abolished, flogging should either be altogether abandoned, or such a punishment should only be inflicted by sentence of court-martial, and along with the reserve of merchant seamen the officers of the merchant service should also be invited to enter that force.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER

had heard the speech of the noble Lord (Lord C. Paget) with great satisfaction, and his confession, tardy though it was, that the officers of the Navy did not understand the sailors of the merchant service. That was quite true, for only those who had well studied the character of merchant seamen could thoroughly understand the difference between them and seamen of the Royal Navy. He believed, however, that, notwithstanding the great difference which existed between these classes of men, they might be amalgamated in the manner suggested by the noble Lord. There could be no doubt, as the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) had said, that in some ships of the navy drill was carried to an excess; but he attributed that to the deficiency of officers, for if an Admiral was in command of a great many ships it was impossible that he could scrutinize minutely the discipline of his fleet. The punishment of death was imposed for nearly every offence mentioned in the Articles of War, at the judgment of a court-martial; but he entertained a strong opinion that the infliction of any punishment under these Articles, except by a court-martial, was illegal. Men were almost always punished without being tried by court-martial, and he remembered many years ago that a sailor, when tied up for punishment, said to his captain, "Why, Sir, I have not been tried;" and the captain's answer was, "A d—d rascal! Give him another dozen!" Such things occurred long ago; but the sailors now read the newspapers; they were better educated than they used to be, and they well understand whether they are properly treated or not. In the East India Company's service, where there are no Articles of War, a seaman who committed an offence was tried by the officers of the ship, who adjudged such punishment as they thought was deserved; and he believed that in only one or two cases had legal proceedings been taken against the captains of the Company's vessels, and that in no case had any damages been awarded by a jury. He concurred in the opinion that corporal punishment should not be entirely abolished, and he believed that if the question were put to any assembly of seamen nine out of ten would admit that without the operation of that punishment the discipline of the navy could not be maintained. In order, however, that it might have a greater appearance of legality in the minds of the seamen it should be inflicted only upon the sentence of a court-martial. It was said that the French were reducing their naval forces; but it had been stated by the right hon. Member for Halifax (Sir Charles Wood) only two years ago, that by conscription and inscription the French had the means of calling 90,000 seamen together. This country was suffering from the paying off of the fleet in 1857, and even with the aid of the bounty it could not now complete the fleet to the same extent as in 1857. There was one part of the plan of the noble Lord to which he had a decided objection, and it was that which proposed to give a pension to the men after ten years' enrolment in time of peace; and as the men would serve only twenty-eight days in each year, they would then be entitled to the same pension for ten months' service as the sailors would receive for ten years. That, he thought, would be certain to create dissatisfaction among the sailors.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

explained that he proposed to retain a discretion for the Government in respect of the matter of pensions.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER

was very glad to learn that such was the case. With the view of making the service more agreeable to seamen, he recommended that endeavours should be made to assimilate as much as possible the discipline of one ship to another, so that a number of little annoyances which the men suffered from a different usage in one ship from that they had been accustomed to in another should cease. He also suggested that it would give great satisfaction if the men were paid once a week, and that there should be better conveniences in certain respects for the men on board, by which their health and comfort would be promoted. If all these evils were remedied there would be no difficulty in manning the navy. The noble Lord spoke of the coast volunteers; but would the House believe that this great maritime country had no registration of the seafaring men existing in England? The 'longshore men in England and Ireland amounted probably to 200,000. There was no registry of them, but they might be registered and called on to serve as well as the volunteers. The sea-fencibles, established during the late war, furnished a large number of seamen, and these were points he recommended to the consideration of the Admiralty. Another question he wished to advert to was the system of "leave." He disapproved keeping the men too much on board ship. They would not learn their drill so quickly if they went on shore, but men were men and they wished to go ashore as well as the officers. He would suggest that the pay of the petty officers should be increased, and if more situations were opened for them this would be something for the seamen to look forward to. It looked as though the Admiralty was at length about to turn over a new leaf in the management of the navy, and he was glad to hear the candid statement which the noble Lord had made.

SIR FRANCIS BARING

Before I make any observation on the very important subject under debate, I cannot but express my great regret that the gallant Admiral should have stated that the punishments in the navy are illegal. [Sir CHARLES NAPIER: Illegal in the eyes of the men.] I am glad to hear the gallant Admiral's explanation; from what he said I understood that he concurred in that opinion. I fear others may make the same mistake; and though the gallant Admiral's legal opinion may not have the same value as his naval, yet such a statement, backed by so high an authority, is likely to exercise serious influence on the minds of the sailors. There are also circumstances to which I need not further allude, which would specially counsel prudence at the present moment. I agree with the gallant Admiral and the speakers who have gone before me, that many points in the naval service are capable of improvement; if I do not follow the various suggestions thrown out, it is not because I underrate them. The condition of the seaman has been greatly improved by successive Boards of Admiralty since the peace, but that does not preclude the consideration of further improvement. I feel satisfied that the House will not refuse to vote any sum for the improvement of the condition of our gallant defenders, that the Government may, on proper consideration, feel it right to ask. But improve that condition as you will, the great difficulty will still remain—the manning the navy on the breaking out of a war. You then have to go into a limited market for a large and sudden supply. The number of sailors in peace will be regulated by the wants of the navy and the merchant service. If you suddenly call for a large addition to your naval force, let the navy be as popular as you can make it, you will still find the greatest difficulty in supplying the men. The old remedy was impressment. I am glad to find impressment has of late become less popular among naval officers than it was when it was my duty to consider this question. When I conversed with old officers on the subject I generally found that in their hearts there was a lurking feeling that in a war recourse must be had to impressment. To impressment I entertain strong objection. It is not merely the difficulty which the Commissioners state so strongly in their Reports, I mean the difficulty of enforcing impressment in the present state of public feeling; the system itself has always appeared to me to be remarkably ill-contrived to obtain a constant supply of men for the navy. In an emergency it might answer for the moment. There may be extraordinary cases in which the laws of political economy, as of justice, must be overrode by the necessity of self-preservation. At such a moment it might answer to lay hands on all sailors, as in a besieged town it may be expedient to seize on all provisions or other such articles. But to ensure a permanent supply, impressment is a contrivance rather to drive away than to procure the men you want. The supply of sailors must, after all, he considered in relation to the rules that regulate the supply of other articles. Now, what sane man would adopt such a system if he wished to obtain a steady supply of corn, of horses, of cattle, or any other article. To take it against the will of the owner—to pay for it what you please—to keep it as long as you like—to carry it where it suits you. This would not procure what you want, it would drive it away, as impressment drove your sailors into the American service during the last war. If then impressment must be abandoned, it is the part of prudent men to adopt measures in time of peace to secure a naval reserve. Anaval reserve, Sir, is a measure eminently defensive and peaceful. I am not prepared to adopt, in its extended sense, the adage so commonly quoted now, that being prepared for war is a security for peace. But a naval reserve gives a power of defence without exciting rivalry or irritation. In many cases it would have the most beneficial effect. For instance, when subjects of difference exist which may lead to war. In such circumstances those who are at the head of the Admiralty have a most painful risk to run. On the one hand they feel the expediency of raising men to be prepared for the future; on the other, they feel that these very preparations increase the irritation, and may produce the very evil of war which they are anxious to avoid. Between these counterbalancing dangers the choice is full of anxiety. But with an efficient naval reserve the Government may avoid all unnecessary demonstration, confident that if the necessity arises the men would not he wanting to man the ships that would be required. My gallant Friend, the Secretary of the Admiralty, has mentioned that in the year 1852 I brought forward a proposal for the purpose of creating a naval reserve. It is quite true that in that year I laid upon the table an estimate, accompanied by papers, explaining the scheme. It was in principle similar to the plan now before the House, but of a much less extensive character. Our policy was to go step by step, and to see how far our first attempt succeeded before we went further. The plan was in accordance with the proposal of an excellent officer, Captain Brown. It was to give a retaining fee to 5,000 men, who had already served in the navy, and who should be bound to serve again when called upon. My proposal, Sir, was not fated to succeed. I was removed from office, and my successor the Duke of Northumberland referred the whole subject of manning the navy to a Commission of naval officers, and my plan was sent to them. I may add, to show the insecurity which attends these subjects, that the Commission, composed of officers of high character and standing, reported my plan to be impracticable and set it aside. They recommended the coast volunteers. The late Commission, on the other hand, report that the coast volunteers can not be relied upon as an effective naval reserve, and recommend a reserve formed upon the principle of the plan rejected by their predecessors. Upon the best consideration I have been able to give the subject, I believe that a proposal, such as the one now before the House, is the best adapted to meet the difficulty. No doubt it is an experiment, first, in respect to the number of men that might be procured; and, secondly, whether they would join when called upon. This can only be decided by the experiment being actually tried. Still, looking to the evidence before the Commission, I feel considerable confidence that the experiment would be successful. I am glad it is not incumbered with the system of naval schools recommended by the Commissioners, for I have much doubt how far such a system would answer, and I would suggest to the Admiralty that if on consideration they should be decided to adopt the recommendation, the plan should be at first tried on a small scale. In carrying out this new proposal of a reserve, much must be left to the discretion of the Admiralty, and I trust the House will not bind down the authorities too strictly, but leave them ample room to meet the difficulties which must present themselves in launching a new system. I will now say a few words upon two points recommended in the Report of the Commission. They have proposed to increase the number of the coastguard and of the marines, and they have suggested that the marines should be employed instead of military to garrison the naval ports. I have a very good opinion of the coastguard; even when I was at the Admiralty it was a naval reserve of great value, and since that time, it has been much improved by being placed under the Admiralty, and by being well organized. If a greater force of coastguard is required for revenue purposes, I should not for a moment grudge it. But if not really wanted for the revenue, I doubt the wisdom of increasing the coastguard; keep for the revenue what it requires, liable to be called out in time of need. If additional men are wanted for the defence of the country, either add to your reserve, or to the permanent naval force. So with regard to the marines; no corps is more valuable; but if more marines are required, let them he dedicated to naval and not to military purposes. They will be wanted and he most valuable at the breaking out of a war. If they are employed permanently to garrison your naval ports, you throw an obstacle to their going afloat when they are most required. And now, Sir, you must permit, me to call the attention of the House to a subject connected with our system of manning the navy, on which I am desirous of making some observations, I mean the system of continuous service. This system, Gentlemen know, was recommended by the Commission appointed in 1852. I had the misfortune when the arrangements were made for carrying it into effect, to entertain much doubt of the result. I placed my doubts before my right hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle, then First Lord of the Admiralty; but diffident of my own judgment when opposed to the report of naval officers of high character and experience, and anxious not to throw difficulties in the carrying out of a plan recommended by them as so beneficial to the navy, I did not press my objections in Parliament. Connected with a naval port I have since heard reports which lead me to fear that the system is not working satisfactorily. When the Commission was appointed I was in hopes to find in their Report a full investigation into the results of the continuous-service system and evidence that would satisfy me that my doubts and fears were unfounded. I have been disappointed in both these expectations. The Commissioners, it is true, express a favourable opinion of the system, but I miss a full and searching inquiry. On the other hand, the opinions and facts which turn up in the evidence confirm the impressions I entertained. It may sound an odd question, but it is one which lies at the root of the inquiry. Do you want your navy for peace or for war? If for peace, I admit the continuous-service system may have some advantages; but it is for war you want your navy, and to obtain trained men at the breaking out of a war is your great difficulty. But even in peace I cannot find that the system has fulfilled the expectations held out. The Commissioners indeed say, that with the excellent system of continuous service there will be no difficulty in manning the navy in time of peace. There never has been any such difficulty without that system. The difficulty was to keep within the number of men voted, not to obtain them. For years be-fore 1848 the number of men borne exceeded the Vote, and when I succeeded to office I found it required a firm hand to keep the number within the proper limits. It is true that there were difficulties at particular moments, and in manning ships when first commissioned, and delay and expense were incurred. This evil the continuous-service system was to cure. I have no means of obtaining official information. I have none other than what is derived from the ordinary channels, and I may he in error. But I read and hear of the Marlborough and other ships waiting for a crew, and there would seem to be as many complaints as formerly. But I have an official fact of great weight in accordance with my view. I allude to the late bounty—since the war such a step was never taken. I am not here now to question the judgment of the Admiralty, but it does not speak well for the efficacy of the system when under it recourse is had to this unusual and extreme measure. I must appeal also to the Report of the Commissioners themselves. They recommend that a certain number of men should be kept in the home ports for the purpose of manning ships when first commissioned, and avoiding delay and expense. It is quite clear, then, that the evil exists still—if the continuous service had cured it, as was expected, the Commissioners would never have made this recommendation. There were other advantages expected to follow from the adoption of the continuous service; among the most important were, that the Queen's service would become more popular and that batter men would enter. I wish to inquire, with such information as the Report affords me, how far these expectations have been fulfilled. A great many witnesses were examined before the Commission, and I readily admit that the officers of a higher rank, with two exceptions, were in favour of the system. The first of these exceptions is the gallant Admiral opposite, the Member for Southwark. He grounded his objection on a reason of great weight. He was anxious to bring the Royal and Mercantile Navy into more friendly and closer contact, and he thought that the continuous service tended in the opposite direction and made the division wider. The other exception was Captain Sullivan, an officer of much merit, and whose opinion deserves the more consideration because he was connected with the Marine Department of the Board of Trade, and had more general information than could be obtained on the quarter-deck. Captain Sullivan evidently did not entertain so favourable an opinion of the system as his brother officers. But, Sir, if you wish to get at the feeling of the sailor, there are others to be consulted besides admirals and captains, however distinguished and well informed they may be. Now, before the Commission several warrant officers were called. Mr. Howell, one of them, was the spokesman; he was examined at considerable length and answered with great intelligence. In the course of that examination his opinion of the continuous system was given; it was unfavourable, both as unpopular, and as not obtaining the best men. From this opinion none of the others recorded their dissent. They were not individually examined at length, but expressed generally their agreement with Mr. Howell. But there is some means of testing Mr. Howell's opinion. There is a return attached to the Report of the Commission, showing the number of continuous-service men among the able and ordinary seamen. I find that the number of these men among the able seamen is smaller in proportion than among the ordinary seamen; showing both that the system is less popular among the able than the ordinary seamen, and that it secures a larger proportion of the latter than the former. But this is not all. Sir R. Bromley in his evidence speaks of the large number of desertions, especially, he says, among the continuous-service men. This remarkable observation is not followed up in the Report, not a single question is asked on it by the Commissioners. Left as it is without explanation, it hardly leads us to infer that the system is either popular or obtains the best men, when those who enter under it are especially given to desert. But let me allow, for the sake of argument, that the system has advantages in time of peace. Your difficulty and your aim is to man your navy in time of war; for this object it would be good policy to sacrifice any peace advantages which might interfere with obtaining men when you really want them. Let us, then, consider the old system and the continuous-service scheme in their effects on the breaking out of a war. Under the old system a sailor entered the navy practically for his three or four years. At the expiration of the time the ship was paid off—he was free—he might re-enter the navy if he chose, or he might take a spell in the merchant service. The result was that there was always in the merchant service a floating number of men who had served in the Queen's service, and would at once be fit for a man-of-wars-man. The principle of the continuous service is to retain the same men, and the effect must be that the number of men in the merchant service who had served on board Her Majesty's ships would diminish. To show the effect more clearly, I will put an extreme case, of course an impossible supposition. Supposing the old system to be carried to an extreme and you never reentered a sailor who had once served his three years in a Queen's ship, the ultimate result would be that every sailor in the merchant service would have served in a man-of-war, be trained to the guns, and in case of an emergency be fit for service. Now, act upon the continuous principle to the same extreme—educate your sailor when a boy, keep him in the service when a man, retain him until he is no longer fit for work—you will probably make admirable sailors by your system, but when war breaks out and you require an additional number you will not find in the mercantile marine a man who has served or been trained on board the Queen's ships. This point appears to me of great importance. In case of emergency recourse must be had to the merchant service for manning the navy. But it is not sufficient to get mere sailors. Trained seamen are required; and adverting to the improvement in gunnery, the importance of this is greater than it was formerly, and is daily increasing. Naval officers and gentlemen often talk of the French system, and praise it. It is a compulsory system, and so far not adapted to English feelings. But we, perhaps, may take a lesson from it; in France every seafaring man is liable to serve in the navy seven years. But do the French keep them continuously for the whole seven years, according to our new system? When I was at the Admiralty it was quite the contrary—a man was taken, he served for three years, he was then discharged, and a fresh one taken who was kept in the same way for three years only. I have heard that this practice was complained of as inconvenient, but the result was that when the French Government called out their men there was always among them a considerable number who had served and been trained in a man-of-war. As France did with her navy, Prussia, I believe, does with her army. Every man is liable to serve; he is trained for three years, he is then discharged and a fresh man called out. No doubt such a practice is open to objection. You may be told that it disorganizes the regiments—that you discharge the soldier just as he is at his best—that you have thrown away all the expense of training him: all the arguments so familiar to us as employed in the naval system may be used. There is some truth in many of them. The army itself, in time of peace, may be less perfect, but what is the result? When war breaks out, Prussia has not a mere army, she has a nation of soldiers. I wish I could see some such system in the navy of England—some system by which the Royal and mercantile services should be so interlaced that in case of emergency men might be found in the one capable and trained to perform the duties of the other. I am not here to advise or wish that we should adopt the foreign practices which are inconsistent with our habits and institutions; but at any rate we should not follow a course which is contrary to sound policy, and make the distinction wider between the two services. I fear we are doing so by the continuous-service system. I am aware that I differ from a large number of the higher officers of the navy, but entertaining these opinions, I have felt it my duty to state them to the House for their consideration and judgment.

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

said, he was glad to see that a measure had been at last introduced for this purpose, and if it was not in its present shape all that could be desired it could easily be made so. The plan was only an experiment; but if it did not succeed they would come to the matter again with the advantage of greater experience. He did not think that the continuous-service system had had a fair trial. No man should be admitted as a continuous-service man who was not an able seaman; whereas they had admitted good men and bad alike. With regard to impressment he thought that the greatest benefit the Commission on Manning the Navy had conferred on the country was in putting an end to that system, which hung as a terror over the minds of seamen. No Government could ever revive that system after the Report of the Commission. India had been brought under the government of this country, and why was it then that no less than 500 men of the naval brigade of Calcutta had been discharged some time ago, and in two or three months after offered a bounty of £5 a man to induce them to reassemble, which object it was impossible to accomplish? He believed that if the Government carried out the recommendations of the Commission most of the grievances of which seamen at present complained would be removed. He would urge on the Government to do away with the hulking system, which led to desertions while the ships were fitting out. He thought that the casks of salt beef ought to be branded so that the date of curing could always be ascertained. Under the old system it was impossible to calculate the degree of senility at which a piece of beef had arrived. The men refused to eat the beef in a particular cask; that cask was handed from ship to ship and descended from father to son, until all trace of the birth and parentage of the beef was entirely lost. Now any one who had ever read even an elementary work on chemistry knew that such stuff was not fit for use; yet so long as it did not get a bad smell it found its way from ship to ship till at such a Resolution as that proposed by the noble Lord was not actually and in terms a Vote of want of confidence, it was so near an approach to such a vote, that hardly any man could consent to support the noble Lord's Motion who would not also assent to a vote of want of confidence. It would not be consistent with his own position and that of more than 300 Gentlemen on that side of the House to adopt what on the hypothesis he was considering was clearly a party vote. But if in its principle and spirit it was a party vote, he might ask, looking at the state of the opposite benches, where was the party that was to support it? Regarding it as a party vote, it was a proposal that ought hardly to be brought forward unless it was to be made the ground of a trial of party strength. Taking the Motion, however, on its merits, it would be inconceivably rash to attempt to lay down the policy which should or should not be followed—not at that moment, but some weeks, perhaps some months, hence, and so to define that policy in total ignorance of the circumstances which might then be existing. The proposal pointed to the future—not to the present; and it was impossible for any man not endowed with the gift of prophecy to say what might be the state of things at the time when it really came into operation. If, indeed, the noble Lord had called on them to act or not to act upon his advice at the present moment, they might say they had such great confidence in his judgment as to determine at once to do what he told them. But when he pointed to the future they could not but feel that when the future came the noble Lord himself might change his views. It was easy to suppose that three weeks hence something might arise to induce the noble Lord himself to consent to go into a Congress; and yet, if he succeeded in carrying that Resolution, he would find himself debarred from doing so by the success of his own Motion. For himself, he was inclined to follow the old-fashioned custom of holding Her Majesty's Ministers answerable for the conduct of public affairs, and therefore he could not refuse to concede to them that power and that latitude of action which were the natural concomitant and the indispensable condition of all true responsibility. But while he could not vote in the affirmative of the Motion, he should also regret if he were obliged to meet it with a direct negative. He went a great way with the noble Lord in deprecating a Congress, ex- cept under circumstances which would make one far more desirable than he now believed it to be. He should therefore be most unwilling to join in any vote which this country or Europe might construe as indicating an inclination to enter a Congress. The objections to such a measure were very strong. The noble Lord said, the state of Italy was calculated to give us great anxiety, and on that account he proposed to do nothing. Now, that very circumstance would be a reason, not perhaps for accepting a Congress, but why one should naturally be proposed by many as a solution of the difficulty in which that part of Europe was placed. In another of the noble Lord's objections, however, he cordially concurred. If England were to join in a Congress under present circumstances, she would be likely to enter it without authority. A Congress of nations was, no doubt, an apt conclusion at the close of a great war. The great Powers which had been engaged in the strife agreed to sheathe the sword and to come to those territorial and other arrangements which were to result from the fortune of war. But England had not been a belligerent, and therefore could not appropriately negotiate the arrangements that were in any sense to be regarded as the termination of a contest in which she never took part. She could not make peace, because she had not been engaged in war; still less could she take part in bestowing the spoils of that war, having had no share in winning them. Those spoils were, by the way, very small, because, after all, the Emperor of the French had gained less territory than King Charles Albert won and lost by the sword in 1848. Another objection to our going into a Congress was this:—English statesmen, as far as he had observed, had not distinguished themselves in the Congresses of Europe. Those Congresses seemed to have been fatal to the reputations of our public men. After the Congress of Vienna all Europe was merry with the singular blunders made by the Marquess of Londonderry. In the Congresses of Laybach and Verona, happily, we took no part. He did not look back with pride or satisfaction to the Congress of Paris in 1856. We never knew what it was that an English statesman would be saying and doing in a Congress. He there spoke and acted sometimes in a most fatal way, and committed the country to a line of policy without having ever taken the opinion of Parliament or the country on the subject. Before the Con- gress of Paris, no man's reputation stood higher than that of the Earl of Clarendon. What did the Earl of Clarendon do in the Congress of Paris? The protocols showed that one day, apropos apparently of nothing, that noble Lord stood up and denounced almost the only free press on the Continent of Europe—namely, that of Belgium, and he also went on to express the honor and indignation with which he regarded a society with a pleasant name—the Marianne Society—which had never before been heard of in England, but which he inveighed against as one of the worst evils then existing in Europe. That kind of language was extremely derogatory to this country, because every man who heard it or read it when it appeared in the protocols, knew that it was put into the mouth of our negotiator by a foreign Power. There were strong objections, then, to our entering into a Congress, though he did not say that they were of such a character that they might not perhaps be out-weighed. The state of Italy must cause great anxiety to all who felt an interest in her happiness. The conduct of the Italians throughout the war had certainly been in all respects most admirable. Their bravery in the field and their moderation and love of order during recent transactions had been beyond all praise; and if there was one man who had gained more glory than another in the late short but bloody war, it was General Garibaldi. It was time for Austria and for Europe to part with the idea that States could be held or partitioned upon a mere possessory title, without reference to the will of the people. The States of Italy had expressed their will with perfect order, yet with calm resolution. Tuscany, Modena, Parma, and the Legations had all evinced a strong determination no longer to be governed by the rulers under whom they previously lived. Were those rulers, he wanted to know, to be forced back on these independent States? If we could be satisfied that the determination of the de facto Governments of Italy would be respected, and that foreign troops would he withdrawn from Italy, and if those terms were adopted as the basis on which a Congress might meet, then, much as he disliked the idea of a Congress, he would not resist the temptation that would in that case be offered, because the main objection to our joining in one—namely, the want of authority on the part of England, would be removed. If it could plainly be seen what the Congress was to do, he would not disapprove of our entering a Congress to settle the details of an arrangement arising out of the basis he had described, and also to arrive at a European solution. The repugnance he had not hesitated to express in regard to a Congress was not founded on any conviction that England ought to stand isolated among the nations of Europe. There was an idea abroad that England was separating herself from the affairs of Europe, and that her power was no longer to be relied upon as an element in the maintenance of the peace of Europe. He could not but think that that impression was owing in great measure to the prominence which had been obtained in this country by what we called the "Peace party," and to the connection of the existence of that sect with the neutrality of England in the late war. He believed that nothing could be more erroneous than to argue upon such a conclusion that England was to become null in the affairs of Europe. The importance of that sect arose from the great ability of the hon. Gentleman who was its chief, and not from the opinions of which he was the advocate or the numbers of those who held them. It was one of the qualities of that gifted man's eloquence that although he compelled many to follow him, he compelled still more to go very strongly against him. In fact, the interest in warlike affairs which now prevailed in the great cities of England had to a great extent been created by that very agitation in favour of peace of which the hon. Gentleman was the distinguished chief. It was a symptom—and by no means an unwholesome one—of English pugnacity. The Emperor Napoleon, he rejoiced to say, was disarming. That was a very happy omen for this country, and he trusted that we should imitate—though, with our humble means, we must follow it at a very respectful distance—the admirable system which the Emperor of the French had perfected, by which a peace establishment could very rapidly be made one of preparation for any emergency. Early in the month of March there was nothing but a peace establishment in France, yet in the month of June the Emperor was able to meet the Austrians at Solferino with one of the greatest and most efficient armies which had ever been seen. There was a cloud hanging over our relations with France, and, strange to say, that cloud had gathered, not in consequence of any act done by the Emperor of the French or by the French Government, but in con- sequence of words that fell from three of the most prominent of our English statesmen. The Emperor Napoleon was not a mere titular sovereign; he was a great commander of men. If they lived 100 years hence instead of to-day, they would be looking back upon the history of 1859 with the deepest interest. They cannot but think and talk of the Emperor of the French. Nay, more, he would go the length of saying that there were very few indeed of our public affairs which they could settle without some reference to the designs of the Emperor Napoleon. They had to take them into consideration in their military arrangements, in their naval arrangements—even in their financial plans they still must bear in view the Emperor Napoleon. He (Mr. Kinglake) was, however, not one of those who would indulge in hostile criticism upon the Emperor of the French. He would not forget that he was our faithful ally in the Crimean war, and that during the Indian mutiny his fidelity to us was never for one moment shaken. Those were circumstances which he never would forget. But the House had been told by the hon. Member for Birmingham, and that language was quoted and endorsed by the two noble Lords below him, that they ought not to indulge in any hostile criticism upon the Emperor of the French; and the hon. Member for Birmingham went so far as to say that if we did so even for a few months more, England would be embroiled in a war with France. Good heavens! what an alternative to propose to a free and spirited nation—enforced silence or war with France. A war with France would be dreadful, but so would be the enforced silence advocated by the hon. Member. If England submitted to such a silence, then, he would say, had commenced the subjugation of England. We would not endure considerations of foreign policy to interfere with the freedom of speech and freedom of action amongst Englishmen at home. That was the principle upon which the late Parliament acted when they overthrew a very popular Minister for pressing the late Conspiracy Bill, and he had no doubt that the existing Parliament would pursue a similar course if the Ministry betrayed any semblance of subserviency to a foreign Power.

Whereupon Previous Question proposed, "That that Question be now put."

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

Sir, the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down, in the begin- ning of his speech, gave, I think, very conclusive reasons against the adoption of the Motion, which has been made by my noble Friend, and he has met that Motion by proposing what is termed the previous question. So far as I am concerned, and I believed so far as my colleagues are concerned, we should have been perfectly willing to deal with the Motion by meeting it with a direct negative; but if it be the pleasure the House to treat it as a Motion which it would be unwise and imprudent under existing circumstances to entertain at all, of course Her Majesty's Government can have no objection to concur in that vote and support the proposition which has been made by the hon. and learned Member, made of his own choice and without concert with Her Majesty's Government. But there have been matters of great interest raised in this discussion, both by the hon. and learned Gentleman and by my noble Friend, who opened the debate, and I am sure my noble Friend will not be supprised that a Motion upon a subject of such immense importance upon the affairs of Europe, challenging the attention of Europe at a period so critical, and aiming, as he himself will be the first to admit, in a peculiar manner at imposing limits upon the free and responsible action of Her Majesty's Ministers, should itself be subjected to some scrutiny. Now, if I read the terms of this Motion of my noble Friend, the first remark, I think, that occurs is, that it is scarcely applicable to the position in which we stand, because that which it condemns, or rather prohibits, is the taking part in any Conference for the purpose of settling the details of a peace the preliminaries of which have been arranged between the Emperor of Austria and the Emperor of the French. But I am not aware of any proposal, of any suggestion, of any idea, or even dream of taking part in a Conference for the purpose of settling details the preliminaries of which have been arranged by the Emperor of Austria and the Emperor of the French. The details of peace, as we all know perfectly well from the public journals, if not otherwise, will be settled by the belligerents themselves; and what will remain to be settled are not merely details for the purpose of giving effect to the resolutions of the belligerents, but other great questions of European policy, vitally affecting the interests and happiness of Italy, stretching beyond the limits of Italy itself, and as well entitled to be termed matters of high and prime Euro- son who has not the means to carry on resistance to a Petition before a Committee of this House. If there is any fault it is in the rules of this House, wherein it is so costly that no man of small means is ever able to sit in this House, provided any person chooses to bring a Petition against him whether rightly or wrongly. Now my means are sufficient to maintain me as a gentleman, but if I have got to spend two or three or four or five thousand pounds to defend my seat by bringing witnesses nearly three hundred miles from their homes, I cannot do it. It is a very expensive thing to take people so far from their homes. If I did as I have been advised by some of my friends to do—resist the Petition by saying that there is not the least charge against me through them (and I know there is not through myself), I should place myself in inextricable difficulties, perhaps, during the rest of my life. If, however, instead of having hundreds a year I had thousands, I would oppose the Petition, and if this House will bear me out in the expense I will proceed with it; but I am not going to ruin all my friends, and those who are dependent upon me. I appreciate the honour of a seat in this House, but not to the ruin of myself, and those with whom I am connected, and it was upon that account, and upon that ground alone, that I acted. First of all I thought they were in joke, because all Petitions are alike; they charge you with bribery, and with everything they can charge you with, like the old lawyers charging everything to be sure of catching something. Now, these Petitions are all so general in their wording that I really thought there was nothing at all in it, till I found that they were persevering with this Petition, and that they were going to persevere with it—this one in particular. I thought nothing at all about it; I thought the Petition would have been withdrawn, but I found it was not to be. In consequence I told Mr. Wyld that I did not intend, and never had intended (and this House must have seen that I never did intend), to defend my seat, for I have never been in any division in this House since that Petition was presented. I did not intend to have anything more to do with it. I fully intended to resign my seat at some future time, if I saw that they were determined to follow up the Petition. Now, I most firmly assert that there was no sort of compromise—corrupt compromise—the only compromise was this (and there was this compromise), that my object was that the petitioners, whoever they were, should come forward and withdraw the Petition, and by withdrawing the Petition withdraw all the charges against me. Now, if I had gone into the case I must have allowed all those charges to remain against me, and must have submitted at all future time to be told that I had not defended my seat because I was afraid to do so. I said I thought the better plan, not knowing that I was offending against the rules of the House, the better plan would be that the petitioners should exonerate me, should withdraw their Petition, and by withdrawing their Petition they would have exonerated me from all charges, and my friends from all charges which were made in that Petition. Under that idea, I said I did not wish any longer to sit in the House, and I should be at any time ready, with the sanction of the House, to do anything that was right and proper. Now, these are all the principles upon which I have acted, and under such circumstances I leave my case in the hands of the House, and I have no doubt that they will feel as I feel that it would not be right for any man to go into a ruinous expense to himself and those about him, although he liked a seat in this House ever so much, in order to retain his seat. I have seen many men, whose names I could mention, who have rued the day when they defended their seats in this House. I do not intend to do it, but if there are any persons who will back me out, whoever they may be, and pay the expense, I will defend my seat.

And then he withdrew.

Question put— That, in the opinion of this House, any Minister would be guilty of a breach of the privileges of this House, who should advise the Crown to confer the Office of Steward of the Chiltern Hundreds, or of the Manor of East Hendred, or of the Manor of Northstead, or of the Manor of Hempholme, or of Escheator of Munster, upon any person charged with corrupt practices at an Election, and who for the purpose of evading the jurisdiction of this House, has entered into an agreement to vacate his Seat, upon the withdrawal of the Petition charging him with such corrupt practices.

MR. ROEBUCK

called for a division.

MR. SPEAKER

Tellers for the Ayes, Mr. Roebuck, and any other Gentleman who will undertake the office.

MR. DARBY GRIFFITH

I will, Sir.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 30; Noes 214: Majority 184.