COMMITTEE.

HC Deb 02 July 1858 vol 151 cc883-909

Committee report progress.

Resolved, That this House will immediately resolve itself into the said Committee.

House in Committee.

Clause 19 (Duties of the Council).

MR. VERNON SMITH

said, that the noble Lord had acted very wisely in putting into the hands of the Secretary of State everything to be done as regarded war and peace, and concluding treaties. The words, however, of this clause, providing for the carrying on of the secret correspondence, were not, in his opinion, very definite. He thought that the noble Lord ought to adopt the words of the existing Act defining what that correspondence should be.

LORD STANLEY

said, that the part of the Bill which dealt with the powers heretofore exercised by the Secret Committee was the 27th clause, where the business to be transacted through the Secret Committee was defined. This clause merely defined what were to be the relative powers of the Secretary of State and the Council with regard to correspondence. All that was meant by this clause was, that the Secretary of State was to be the person by whom all despatches were to be written, to whom they were all to be addressed.

COLONEL SYKES

explained the mode at present adopted by the Court of Directors with respect to despatches, and added that those Directors who were inclined to work had attended daily. He thought the noble Lord ought to expect a similar attendance from the majority of the new Council. He wished also to ask whether despatches going to India were to be signed by any of the Council.

LORD STANLEY

said, that they were to bear the signature of the Secretary of State only.

MR. WILLOUGHBY

observed, that he feared that this mode of proceeding would give rise to great inconvenience.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 20 (Secretary of State to divide the Council into Committees, and to regulate the transaction of business).

SIR ERSKINE PERRY

said, that this clause would give the Secretary of State great power over the conduct of the Indian business by the division of the Council into Committees. He hoped that the Secretary of State would draw up such regu- lations as would secure that the members of the Council elected by the Court of Directors should give up the whole of their time to the duties of their office.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

As much time as is required.

SIR ERSKINE PERRY

said, that many of the present Court of Directors were engaged in most complicated business transactions, and he thought there was no rule more clear than that persons engaged in administrative government, and paid a large salary, should cease to be engaged in trade, and give up the whole of their time to the duties of their offices.

LORD STANLEY

said, that this question had been discussed two or three times before. The Bill did not lay down an absolute rule, because the Government believed that it would be both impossible and inexpedient to lay down with precision any fixed rule. How could they say that no member of the Council should follow any other occupation? What was meant was, that he should give up as much time as was required for the duty he had to discharge, and as much time as the Minister should call upon him to give up. The clause before them did not mean more than to express the intention of the Legislature in passing this Bill, that the Minister should have the power of calling on the members of the Council for their services and time.

MR. VERNON SMITH

remarked, that the Government had never said distinctly what duties were to be performed and what time was to be given up to the public service by those gentlemen. He thought that they had a right to have a clear explanation as to what time really was to be given up to their duties by the Councillors. He wished to know what steps were to be taken to secure the adequate discharge of their duties. Was it proposed to insist upon their regular and daily attendance upon the Committees into which the Council was to be divided? If so, that would secure their attention to their duties. But if it was mainly intended that papers should be sent to them to look over at their leisure—in addition to the weekly meetings of the Council—he thought that that would afford no security for the devotion of a sufficient time to the public business, which was likely in future to fall into the same languid course which had in a great measure marked the transaction of business in Leadenhall Street, from the circumstance that many members of the direction were engaged in other business, and did not give sufficient time to the discharge of their public duties. Perhaps the noble Lord would lay upon the table a draft minute of the regulations under which the business of the department was to be conducted, and by which the object to which he had referred was to be attained. He understood that the noble Lord had on a former occasion stated that it was probable that the Council would be divided into six Committees. He thought it would be better that it should be divided into three, which was the present number of deparments into which the business of the Board of Control was divided, although he could not say that that division was made in the most convenient way. The clause gave the power of dividing the Council into Committees to the Secretary of State. He thought the power should be given to the Secretary and Council.

LORD STANLEY

said, that to take the last point first, he thought that the first formation of the Council was the very time when it was desirable to have some one authority to direct in what way the arrangements for the conduct of business should be made. Of course the Minister would consult the Council, and defer to the wishes of those by whom the business was to be transacted. He had sketched on a former occasion what he thought might be the probable division of business, but he admitted then, as he did now, that without some experience it would be impossible to regulate them beforehand. If he wanted further proof of the impossibility of doing this, it would he found in the admission of the late President of the Board of Control, who had had much more experience of the office than he (Lord Stanley), that the arrangements for the conduct of its business were not so perfect as he wished and could suggest. If a minute was laid on the table as a condition of the Act being passed, no doubt the Government would hold themselves bound in some degree to the arrangements there indicated. That would, it appeared to him, be undesirable. They could not, he thought, usefully now lay down regulations for the working of a body which did not exist, and which had not a precise parallel in any public office now in being. Undoubtedly, it was the purpose of the Government that correspondence should initiate in these Committees, and that all business, with but slight exceptions, should pass through them; and, if the business of India was anything like what they were told by those who at present conducted it he did not think the members of Council were likely to have cause to complain that they did not find work enough.

COLONEL SYKES

said, that he thought the Secretary of State would have a right to expect that the members of the Council should, as a rule, attend daily.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 21, (President and Vice President.

SIR EDWARD COLEBROOK

said, he thought it advisable that the Council should have the power of appointing their President in all cases in the absence of the Secretary of State. It might happen that the Council and the Government might come into collision, and in that case he thought the Council should have the power of selecting their own mouthpiece. He would therefore propose to omit all the words of the clause after the word "Council" in line 4, for the purpose of inserting —"and in the absence of the Secretary of State a member of the Council chosen by themselves."

MR. AYRTON

said, that nothing could be so mischievous as to deal with the Council in their collective capacity with their own chairman. The object of the Bill was to bing the Secretary of State in communication with the individual Councillors acting on their individual responsibilities. He wished to know what would be the position of the Under Secretary of State for India? He ought at least to stand on an equal footing with one of the Councillors.

Amendment negatived.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 22, (Meetings of the Council).

MR. LYALL

observed, that he thought a larger quorum than five should be fixed for meetings of the Council. He would suggest seven.

SIR GEORGE LEWIS

said, that five was the ordinary quorum of a Committee of that House consisting of fifteen Members, which was the number of the proposed Indian Council.

COLONEL SYKES

said, he approved of the hon. Member (Mr. Lyall's) suggestion, for in the Court of Directors they required a majority of the Members as a legal quorum.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 23, (Procedure at Meetings).

MR. MOFFATT

said, he would suggest the propriety of omitting that portion of the clause which authorized any one of the Council to record, not merely his dissent, but the reasons of it, from any decision of the Secretary of State and Council. If Mr. Princep were to be a member of Council, and to dissent from the Secretary for India, he had such a ready pen that he would himself fill several folio volumes with his protests. If a member of the Council had any reasons for dissenting, he should simply hand in those reasons to the Secretary of State.

LORD STANLEY

said, he thought that nothing could be more harmless than to allow a member of the Council the power of recording his protest. The protests were to be entered in a book kept for the purpose, and there was nothing in the Bill to compel either the Secretary of State or any one else to read the reasons adduced in support of them.

MR. WILLOUGHBY

said, that he did not see anything in the Bill to determine what part of the Indian business was to be transacted in Committee and what in full Council, or to point out who was to regulate this.

LORD STANLEY

said, that the 20th clause gave the Secretary of State power to direct in what manner the business should be transacted.

Clause agreed to; as were also Clauses 24 to 26 inclusive.

Clause 27.

SIR GEORGE LEWIS

said, that this clause renewed in a new shape the powers of the Secret Committee. If the House thought that such powers were useful, they would of course agree to the clause, but if not they would reject it. The powers of the Secret Committee were of considerable antiquity in the history of the East India Company. Before the Act of 1784, when the East India Company was completely independent, they were in the habit of appointing a Secret Committee of three persons, who communicated with the Government on all matters of peace and war and of a political nature. In Mr. Pitt's Act of 1784, there was a clause enacting that a Secret Committee should be appointed consisting of not more than three persons. In 1793, Mr. Dundas's Act organized the Secret Committee in substantially its present form, and empowered the President of the Board of Control to send through it to India any orders with respect to the making of peace or war, or to the negotiations with Native Princes, which he might deem desirable to keep secret. The powers of the Secret Committee were limited by a clause in the Act to questions of war, peace, and negotiations with Native Princes, so that legally the Secret Committee was not the proper channel through which Lord Ellenborough should have sent his despatch, as Oude was then an integral portion of the dominions of the East India Company. If the Council were smaller they might dispense with those secret powers. By the present Bill the Secretary of State would have power to send despatches to the Governor General on these three subjects without at all consulting his Council. If they were to be more upper clerks that arrangement might be satisfactory, but if they were to have a more potential authority they should not, he thought, be excluded from all interference in matters of such importance. The power of making war in India from this country was of a peculiar nature, and nothing in the Bill derogated from the power of the Crown to declare war regarding Indian or other Oriental Power; but, when the Crown directed an Indian war to be carried on, it was for an Indian object, and to be paid for out of Indian revenue; and, if there was any question upon which the advice of an Indian Council ought to be taken, it was a question such as this. He should be glad if these clauses could be omitted—and if the Council could be consulted upon questions of peace or war, or negotiations with Indian Princes. At all events, the powers of the Secret Committee ought not to be strained, as he feared they had been on some recent occasions, and he hoped, if the clauses were retained, the Government would never have recourse to the powers of the Secret Committee, except in extraordinary cases, on which it was impossible for the Council to be consulted.

MR. MANGLES

said that, unfortunately for the good government of India, the powers of the Secret Committee were, both legally and practically, much more than his right hon. Friend seemed to imagine. Under the Act of 1793, the Government of India had power to write home to the Secret Department upon any matter they pleased; and, unless the President of the Board of Control chose to communicate such despatches to the Court of Directors, they must be answered—as the Earl of Ellenborough answered the despatch of Viscount Canning—through the Secret Committee. By the Act of 1833, the sub- jects on which the Home Government might transmit despatches through that Committee were extended to negotiations with Princes or States out of India, or the policy to be observed with respect to such Princes or States. For many years after the conquest of Scinde the whole government of that province was conducted by the Secret Committee, and the Court of Directors knew nothing about it. He believed that much mischief had arisen from the Secret Committee undertaking to transact business with which it had no right to interfere. The real fact was, that nine-tenths of that which came before the Secret Committee, might with safety be communicated to the whole world. He desired, therefore, that there should be no Secret Committee in future. It was a more delusion and snare, for they might as well call the General Post Office a Secret Committee, as all the business the latter had to do was to sign despatches; and even if there were matters which it was thought desirable to keep secret, those matters often oozed out through the Board of Control. On the other hand, the Court of Directors had shown themselves to be as competent to keep a secret, when there was one, as the Cabinet of Her Majesty; and he had no reason to think otherwise of the proposed Indian Council if properly selected, while the Secretary of State would reap the same advantage from the advice of the Council in those matters as he would in all other matters.

SIR GEORGE LEWIS

said, the question for consideration was the power of the Government to send out orders to India.

MR. AYRTON

remarked, that it was very desirable that the House should reconsider the question of a Secret Committee; and at the same time that the powers of the Secretary of State with respect to sending out orders on questions of peace or war should be clearly defined in the Bill. He regretted that the recent despatch of the Earl of Ellenborough, which many thought a very admirable document, should have been used as an illustration of an abuse of power on the part of the Secret Committee. His own opinion was that there was no case, except that of a declaration of war with some European Power which had possessions beyond the Cape of Good Hope, where the Secretary of State should be allowed to send a despatch to India without communicating it to the Secret Committee within the period prescribed in a previous clause. He sub- mitted, therefore, that instead of passing this clause in general language, giving an undefined power to the Secretary of State, the noble Lord ought to bring up a new clause more strictly defining under what circumstances he might transmit despatches without giving the notice to the Council referred to in the previous clause.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

said, he was very anxious, on principle, that this clause should pass as it stood. What was the officer they were dealing with? A Secretary of State and a Privy Councillor, bound by his oath to secrecy, and yet it was proposed to oblige him by an Act of Parliament to communicate everything he did or heard in his capacity of a Privy Councillor to a Council who were not Privy Councillors, and therefore not within the category defined by his oath. That was a matter which the Committee must leave to the discretion of the Secretary of State, as this clause now left it. While it was said, there were very few things which could not be communicated, there were yet a few things which ought not to be made public. Orders might be sent out to India, or received from, bearing immediately on European transactions, and not on Indian interests, and it would be both inconvenient and injurious that such information should be given. He quite agreed with the hon. Member for Guildford that the Court of Directors kept secret the recall of the Earl of Ellenborough. and well they might, until it was all complete, in order to avoid trouble and inconvenience. Their prudence was quite as much in that matter as their secrecy. As for saying that a man who could not keep a secret ought not to be made a Councillor, it was too late after he had been made a Councillor for life, and only removable upon address from both Houses to the Crown.

MR. ROEBUCK

said, this clause was the keystone of the very trumpery arch which this Bill was intended to erect. Although there was a pretence of limiting the power of the Secretary of State, the real object was to enable him to do as he liked; and the Bill as it stood, and especially by this clause, created a double Government. If this clause was struck out, the Secretary of State would have always to act with the knowledge of his Council. They knew that India could not be governed in that way. He had proposed that the whole government should be given to the Secretary of State; but they had created a Council, and, like Frankenstein, they were afraid of their own creation—they feared lest their own Council should turn and rend them. If they did away with this clause, the Bill would be unworkable, and prove nothing better than waste paper.

COLONEL SYKES

said, that he had put an Amendment on the paper to leave out this clause, and he was disposed to take the sense of the House upon it. He agreed that only in rare instances the matters which came before the Secret Committee were other than such as might not be laid before the public at Charing Cross. These rare instances could be met by the Secretary making his Council secret for the time being. It often happened that the Court of Directors were made a secret body. When matters of finance or exchange came before them the Chairman merely said the Court was made secret, and gentlemen were immediately on their honour and did not divulge anything that occurred. There might be a similar arrangement in the Council. He did not think it safe to lodge such a power in the hands of a single man as that possessed by the President of the Board of Control by means of the Secret Committee. The Affghan war was originated through the Secret Committee, and it ended in leaving the bones of 15,000 of our countrymen bleaching in the sun, and costing fifteen millions of money. The first Burmese war was the work of the Secret Committee, which cost nine millions and half the army. The second Burmese war and the war in Scinde were originated without the legal knowledge of the Court of Directors. All those disasters arose from the powers vested in the President of the Board of Control which the noble Lord wished to perpetuate.

MR. VERNON SMITH

said, two important questions had been raised with reference to this clause—first, whether the power of the Secretary of State with reference to treaties and questions of peace and war were sufficiently defined; and secondly, whether such a power should exist at all. He thought it was advisable to define rather more clearly the powers of the Secretary of State with reference to the Secret Committee. He thought that the letter of the Earl of Ellenborough on the subject of Oude was within the rule, as it was written in answer to secret despatches. His previous despatch as to the treatment of the mutineers might, perhaps, have been different, The hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Mangles) and the hon. Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes) said that they hardly remembered anything of consequence that passed through the Secret Committee. Those gentlemen were the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Secret Committee when he (Mr. Vernon Smith) was President of the Board of Control, and he was glad to hear them say that he did not make much use of that Committee. [Mr. MANGLES: What you did, did not matter a straw.] He was glad to hear the hon. Member say that nothing occurred which signified a straw, as that did away with the notion that he was opposed to the Persian war. He hoped, however, that the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) would not abandon the principle, that the Secretary of State ought to deal with treaties and questions relating to peace and war without the interference of the Council. That was a material point in the Bill, and its maintenance would give the Secretary of State real power; for if he were to submit to his Council every question relating to negotiations, to treaties with foreign States, and to peace or war, he would be placed completely in the power of the Council, and the government of India would be vested not in the Secretary of State but in the Council for India alone. Suppose the most of the wars in India had some European as well as Asiatic elements in them. Therefore, if the Secretary of State should have reason to believe that some aggression was contemplated by Russia upon our Indian territories, and he were required to consult the Council, they might say, "How are we to decide upon the necessity of this war? You say it is not merely an Asiatic but an European war, and we call upon you to communicate to us the secret information which you possess." There would be this absurdity, moreover, that after he had obtained the consent of the Cabinet, the major authority, he would have to obtain the consent of the Council, the minor authority. On these grounds, then, he entirely agreed with the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield that it was absolutely necessary to retain this clause in its integrity, and he should accordingly support it.

SIR EDWARD COLEBROOK

said, that the power in question had been hitherto limited and defined, and yet Presidents of the Board of Control had often gone beyond it. He thought such a power was in some respects objectionable; but was the Committee prepared to say that there was no case in which a Secretary of State might issue orders for peace or war in India? He shrank from joining those who wished to put such a limitation on the power of the Crown, though he would admit the evils which existed in connection with the Secret Committee. The evils which had hitherto existed had arisen mainly from the negligence of Parliament in not demanding a strict account from the Ministers who were responsible for the conduct of Indian affairs, and it would be most dangerous to transfer such responsibility to the Council. He would support the clause, although it might be possible to define more clearly the power of the Secretary of State.

MR. CHICHESTER FORTESCUE

said, he was of opinion that it would be absurd to surround the Minister for India with an able Council if, in dealing with matters affecting foreign States, and with questions of peace and war, he was empowered to act entirely without their advice or knowledge. On the other hand the House had determined on establishing a Council far too large to be entrusted with the duties performed by a Secret Committee. It would be impossible that there should be that entire confidence between the Minister and the individual members of a large Council, which would warrant his disclosing to them all the secrets of Indian policy. He had given notice of a clause providing for the appointment of a Secret Committee, consisting of the Vice President of the Council for India and of two other Members of the Council, to be selected by the Secretary of State in Council. He proposed that the Minister should not be able to send out a secret order without first laying before the Secret Committee a certificate, signed by two at least of his colleagues, that the public interest required secrecy to be observed in that particular case; and further, that with regard to such a communication, the Secret Committee should have the power of advising and of placing its opinions on record, and if the Minister differed from the rest of the Committee, then he should be required to place his reasons on the minutes. Such a secret committee as that would increase rather than diminish the responsibility of the Minister, making him more careful and cautious in entering upon a war in consequence of the warning he would receive as to the ultimate results of such a course of policy.

LORD STANLEY

said, he would refer, in the first instance, to the proposition of the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, and he confessed that he did not think it would attain the object the hon. Gentleman intended. No effectual check would be placed upon a Minister by requiring him formally to communicate his intentions to men who had not the power to prevent him from carrying out those intentions. As to the authorization of his two colleagues, that also would be a mere matter of form, and would act rather as a screen from responsibility than as an actual check on the actions of the Minister. On the general question he had not much to add to what had been already said, and especially by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton. He could understand the feeling which existed against investing the Minister with a power of this kind. In fact the Secret Committee was a necessary evil, and he thought that when you had a Council of fifteen members—elected for life, and not politically united with the Minister—that the arrangement now proposed was the best. For every purpose it would be easier to consult the Secret Committee than the whole body of the Council. If in every case you were to say that the whole Council was to be consulted it would diminish the authority and responsibility of the Minister to a point below what it had been at any time. As to defining the powers of the Secret Committee in the Act under which it was at present constituted, its powers were very accurately defined, as extending to questions relating to peace and war, treaties and negotiations. The powers of the Secret Committee might have been exceeded and abused, but excess or abuse ought not to militate against its utility. He could not consent to give up a power which for seventy years had been exercised by the Minister for India.

MR. MANGLES

said, he wished to make a practical suggestion. The noble Lord had referred to the speech of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton as conclusive, but the only argument he had heard, from the noble Lord, and he admitted its force, was that there might be cases in which European politics were mixed up with Indian questions, and that such matters could not be properly laid before a purely Indian body. Why then should not the Council of India be fully informed of all Indian matters and be restricted in their information in relation to all matters which involved European politics either di- rectly or indirectly. The noble Lord did not say a word against the Council being informed on Indian matters. The Government had always allowed their secrets to leak out, but the Court of Directors on the contrary had always managed to keep theirs, so that he thought there was no fear of any being divulged by the Council.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

said, that he could imagine cases where, under the apprehension of European wars, the Secretary of State for India might act without consulting the Council. But that rather belonged to his power as Secretary of State than to any function as his of Indian Minister. But the question here was totally different. The question was this. They had been now for months endeavouring to supplant the double Government of India by something more simple and direct, and they had established a Council competent to advise the Minister for India. Then came this 27th clause of the Bill, which enacted that, with regard to all the most important affairs of India, the Council was to know nothing, but everything was to be conducted by the Secretary of State. The noble Lord, at the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carlisle and others, proposed a clause that the Secretary of State should not be able to dispose of the revenues of India without the consent of the majority of the Council. The hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeen had said that the Burmese war cost £9,000,000, and that the expense had been incurred in consequence of an order of the Minister for India alone, and yet it was said that £10,000 was not to be spent without the consent of the Council. The clause, it seemed to him, would of necessity do away with all the efficacy of the Bill. It had been said that such power had been sometimes abused; that might have been the case, but questions of war and peace, of treaty or negotiation, and of the policy to be pursued towards the Native Princes, were questions of such importance that they ought to be deliberated on in Council, and if not he agreed with the suggestion that the whole power should be vested in a Secretary of State, and that there should be no Council. What, however, he wanted to see was a real and effective Council. It was urged that fifteen was too large a number for that purpose. Who made them that number but the noble Lord himself, though at first he was satisfied with twelve. But he (Lord J. Russell) did not think that the number was so large that it could not be trusted with a secret. For many years the Cabinet of the Sovereign consisted of fifteen, and therefore it was not number alone on which secrecy depended. Those composing the Council would be experienced men, not rash. He thought that if in 1853 such a Council existed, and the Secretary of State went to them and said, "Government have under their consideration insults and injuries and the violation of treaties which have been made by Persia, we wish to consider it as a question of policy whether an expedition should not be immediately sent out and hostilities commenced," he believed very great good would have resulted from the advice of such a Council, and that their proceedings might have been very well kept secret. In fact, if financial questions were to be submitted to this Council, he did not see, inasmuch as questions of war always involved those of finance, how discussion in the Council could be avoided. Such questions affected the welfare of many millions of the people of India, and he could not believe that they ought to be taken from the cognizance of the Council. Even if every man in the Council were opposed to the policy of the Government, the Secretary of State ought, after all, to say it was their policy, and as such he adhered to it; that the reputation and honour of the country could not be maintained without it. He could easily imagine cases in which long afterwards it would be desirable to know the opinions of the Council with respect to the origin of wars which had taken place. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford was so impressed with the importance of the question of peace and war, that he had given notice of an Amendment that the forces of Her Majesty should not, without special causes, be employed beyond the frontiers of the British possessions in India without the consent of Parliament. An effective check, he thought, was necessary, and where could there be a better one on the Secretary of State than through this Council, to whom he should submit his reasons for going to war? After such wars had been entered into Parliament had no remedy; they must pursue them and the nation was saddled with the cost. He should, on these grounds, vote most cordially with the hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeen against the clause. The fact, as it appeared to him, was, that in all routine business the Council were to be consulted, but on all great questions which con- cerned the welfare and happiness of the people of India and the permanence of the empire they were to be ignored.

Motion made, and Question put, "That Clause 27, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

The Committee divided: Ayes 119; Noes 95: Majority 24.

Clause agreed to, as was also Clause 28.

Clause 29 (Appointments to be made by or with the approbation of Her Majesty.

SIR ERSKINE PERRY

said, he rose to move the insertion, after the word "India," line 5, of the following:— And the appointments of Lieutenant Governor of provinces or territories, and the appointments of Members of the Council of the Governor General of India and of the several Presidencies. The question he wished to raise was whether, now that they were introducing a new form of government with new emoluments, it would not be better to remove the great blot upon the existing system—namely, the remuneration of the governing body by means of patronage. Let them take care not to split upon the same rock as that on which they had made shipwreck for the last sixty years. The remuneration of the members of the governing body ought entirely to consist of salary, and of the high powers with which they were entrusted for the improvement of the condition of India. Forty-five years ago Lord Granville, in a statesmanlike speech, recommended the very course he was now proposing, and suggested that the choice of the young men destined for the civil service should be made by competition, and by examination in the great schools and Universities of the country; while the nominations to cadetships should be given to the sons of Indian officers. Why should the Government not throw a portion of the appointments to regiments of the line, as well as to the scientific branches of the army, open to public competition? And why should not the various public schools have each a certain number of nominations. But whatever mode of disposing of this patronage might be adopted, it ought, at all events, to be placed in the hands of the responsible Minister of the Crown, and not in the hands of a majority of the Council.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

LORD STANLEY

said, he did not think that the Amendment of the hon. and learned Gentleman had much to do with his speech. The question of first appointments in the Indian services did not arise upon this clause. When they came to that subject he should be quite prepared to discuss it.

MR. VERNON SMITH

said, he regretted that the noble Lord, in the Amendment he was about to propose in this clause, had abandoned the plan contained in the Bill of his noble Friend the Member for Tiverton, and in the first Bill of the present Government, that the nomination of the Councils of the Presidencies should rest with the Governor General and the respective Governors, as they would be much better able to choose the best men than the Council here. No doubt it was intended that the Secretary of State should take the advice of the Council with regard to the appointment, but it was to be regretted that he had departed from the design of the original Bill.

LORD STANLEY

said, he must admit there was a good deal to be said in favour of the proposition. At the same time he believed that no proposition could be more unpalatable to the whole service in India than such an arrangement, inasmuch as it would destroy in a great measure the independence of the civil service by putting it absolutely under the control of the Governor General. It was supposed that such a measure would have the effect of making the officers of that service mere tools in his hands.

SIR ERSKINE PERRY

said, he wished to remind the noble Lord that the appointment of Lieutenant Governors of provinces and Members of Council was dealt with in this clause. He would also observe, that that there ought to be no distinction in the mode of appointing Governors and Lieutenant Governors. One office was almost as important as the other, and the appointments, in both cases, ought to be made by the Secretary of State absolutely.

LORD STANLEY

said, he thought that these officers could most satisfactorily be appointed by the Council.

MR. WILLOUGHBY

remarked, that of all the Amendments which the noble Lord proposed to introduce into the Bill that which took the appointment of the Councillors from the Governor General and the Governors of the Presidencies was the most deserving of support.

MR. WILSON

said, that in reference to the noble Lord's observation, that it would be more agreeable to the Civil Service to have the appointments made here rather than in India, the intelligence conveyed even by the last mail from India proved that the very reverse was the fact. From that it appeared that the wish among the Civil Service in India was that the appointments should be made by the Governor General, so as to increase and consolidate his responsibility; and although the Governor General might not, on his first arrival in India, be able personally to judge of the merits of particular individuals, he would at once have the advice of those upon whom he could rely, and would afterwards be able to decide upon his own experience.

MR. MANGLES

said, he fully agreed with the opinion expressed by his hon. Friend the Member for Leominster (Mr. Willoughby), in favour of the alteration of the clause proposed by the noble Lord. He could not conceive whence the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Wilson) could have derived his information that the feeling in India was against it. He could assure the House that the opinion of all those who had recently come from India, as well as of the Court of Directors, was that the alteration proposed by the clause would be a very great improvement.

MR. VERNON SMITH

said, that mention was made in the clause of the legislative member of the Council. Had the noble Lord ever considered whether that office might not be abolished, now that by the Act of 1853 the Chief Justice was admitted to the Council? A saving of £10,000 a year would be realised to the public by the abolition of this office.

LORD STANLEY

said, he would consider the point.

Amendment by leave withdrawn.

LORD STANLEY

said, he would propose an Amendment to the effect that appointments to the Presidential Councils, instead of being with the Governor-General and the Governors of Presidencies, should rest with the Indian Minister and his Council.

MR. CHICHESTER FORTESCUE

said, he thought it better that the appointments of Lieutenant Governor of Provinces should be made on the sole responsibility of the Governor General.

LORD STANLEY

said, that the Governor General would have the power of appointment. The Council would only have a power of veto, which would, no doubt, only be exercised in cases of decidedly objectionable appointments.

Clause as amended agreed to, as was also Clause 30.

Clause 31 (Appointments to the Civil Service).

SIR ERSKINE PERRY

said, this clause related to the Civil Service, and it appeared by it that the Government meant to continue the present system of competition, for which he offered them his thanks. But the clause referred to the Act of 1853, and that Act contemplated the course at Haileybury, which was now abolished, and therefore he suggested that as this clause was really impracticable, the noble Lord should take into consideration the clauses which he had brought up on this subject.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

read the section of the Act of 1853, and showed that the clause before the Committee was only meant to bind the Secretary of State to the same extent as the Court of Directors new were with regard to this particular subject, and stated that he saw no reason for not adopting the clause as it stood.

VISCOUNT GODERICH

said, that the Earl of Ellenborough, when President of the Board of Control, had made a most excellent change on this point, by abolishing the former regulations, and putting himself in communication with the Civil Service Commissioners. Did the Government mean to continue that course under this Bill?

LORD STANLEY

said, he did not mean to pledge the Government on the subject, but their object of course would be to offer the widest opportunity to those who wished to compete in the examinations.

Clause 32 (Other Appointments and Admissions to Office).

MR. CAMPBELL

said, he was clearly of opinion that this patronage should be placed in the hands of the Secretary of State, instead of the Council.

SIR DE LACY EVANS

said, that he was glad that the admission to the scientific branches of the Indian army were to be thrown open to competitive examination. He should be glad, however, if the Government would go a step further, and deal in a similar manner with nominations to commissions in the other branches of the Indian army. He should at the same time prefer, if the system of patronage was to be preserved with respect to these branches of the service, that patronage should be vested in the Minister, rather than shared with the Council.

MR. T. BARING

said, he could not but think that the House and the country would view with great jealousy the transfer of the whole patronage of the Indian army to the Secretary of State. No charge of the misuse of the patronage of cadetship had been substantiated against the Directors of the East India Company before the Committee of 1853, and he would ask whether the services of any part of Her Majesty's forces had surpassed the Indian army. Would they, then, pronounce a condemnation upon the system which had produced such men as had fought and fallen in our service in India? It had been said that the distribution of this patronage had occupied too much of the time of the Board of Directors, and would occupy too much of the time of the Council. But it would occupy as much of the time of the Minister. The Directors of the East India Company had never used the patronage for political purposes. Was it likely that the same thing could continue to be said if this patronage was transferred to a Minister of the Crown? They should maintain the patronage in hands that would not be likely to be affected by such influences; and they should look to the working of the system that now prevailed. No doubt the Directors of the East India Company had given cadetships to their friends. But had the system worked ill? He believed that no deserving civil or military servant of the Company had ever been refused a cadetship for his son. And, while by the present Bill it was proposed to reserve one-tenth of the cadetships for the children of such persons, it was in evidence that under the old system they received one-fourth of the applicants. He believed that competition was not the best test with regard to the service of the country. They ought to have more experience of the competitive system in the civil service before applying it to the military service, and they ought to guard against promotion in India being placed in the hands of any Ministers for political objects.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

said, that the question raised by the hon. Member for Huntingdon would be better discussed on other clauses.

Clause agreed to, as was also Clause 33.

Clause 34 negatived. Clause 35 was agreed to.

Clause 36 (Real and Personal property of the Company to vest in Her Majesty, for the purposes of the Government of India).

SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBY

wished to know what the position of the Indian creditor would be under this clause?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, that he apprehended that the Bill would not effect any change whatever in the position of Indian creditors. There would be merely a change of trustees. The Directors of the East India Company had never been personally liable for the Indian debt; the members of the Council would not be personally liable for such debt; but the general liability of the property of which they were trustees would remain precisely as it was at present.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 37,

MR. JOHN WILLOUGHBY

said, he would move after "India" in page 12, line 5, to insert, "subject to the debts and liabilities mentioned or referred to in the last preceding clause of this Act." His object was to secure to existing creditors a lien over the assets of the Company.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

said, he did not think the words proposed would secure the object of the hon. Member, and suggested that the Amendment should be postponed.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 38 (Dividend of the Company, and existing and future debts and liabilities and expenses charged on the Revenues of India).

MR. JOHN WILLOUGHBY

said, he would propose, after the words "chargeable on the revenues of India," in line 26, to leave out "alone." The insertion in the clause, of the word "alone" raised the important question whether the Consolidated Fund would be liable, in case of a deficit in the revenue of India. The answer given to that question in the discussion on the East India Loan Bill was unsatisfactory. Indeed, the point was left in doubt, but it was very desirable that it should be cleared up. In his opinion, when the Crown took the Government of India it should also take upon itself the liabilities of the East India Company, and it was desirable that the position of the public creditor should not be altered. There was no analogy between an Indian loan and a Canadian or an Australian loan, for in the case of these colonies representative bodies could secure those loans upon the colonial revenues; but in India the Executive did it. The present liabilities of the East India Company were as follows: — First, the capital of the Company, £6,000,000 stock, redeemable at 100 per cent; or £12,000,000, partly secured by the guarantee fund; called partly secured, because when they came to pay off the stock they would have a deficit of £745,000. The next item was the old bonded debt of £3,894,000, bearing 4 per cent, and quoted at from 18s. to 20s. per cent premium, and payable upon twelve months' notice from either party. The next item was a sum of £1,970,000 borrowed from the Bank of England. Then there was the last East India loan of £4,421,000 and the public or territorial debt of £56,518,000, which bore 4 per cent interest, a proof of how high the credit of the Company stood in India. The latter was the debt to which this clause more particularly referred, and he wished to direct the attention of the Committee to the nature of the promissory note issued by the Company to the creditor on account of their loans. It made no mention of the revenues of India alone being answerable. The Company borrowed in its corporate capacity, and not only the revenues of India but every farthing of the property possessed by the Company was liable for the discharge of the money borrowed. The next class of obligations was the railway stock and debentures to an amount of £34,000,000, which might be demanded at any time within six months' notice, and which, of course, must then become a charge upon the revenue. By what means were the East India Company to be released from these heavy responsibilities? The straightforward course of the Government would be to declare the Imperial revenue answerable for the Indian deficit. The territorial debt was secured, not only on the Indian revenue, but upon the general revenue. The question of India bonds would become a very serious one after the transfer of the Government took place; and the only way out of it would be to give the public creditor Government security. The question was one which affected the public credit in the highest degree, and it ought to be remembered that three-fifths of the territorial obligation had been lent upon the guarantee of a settled trade, and a great part of the remaining portion had been advanced to carry on wars for Imperial purposes. Thus the war in Affghanistan alone added £15,000,000 to the territorial debt, the Persian and other wars being also charged on the revenue. The fact was, that the whole of the real and personal property of the Company was liable for the liquidation of the debt, and it would be incumbent, when they abolished the Company, upon the Government to provide some other adequate security, It might be said—indeed it had been said—that the security of public creditors would not be damaged, but he could not admit any such principle. The value of the security held by creditors depended upon the good administration of India, and if the present change were an improvement, there would be no risk in Her Majesty's Government undertaking the obligations of the Company. Sir Robert Peel was clearly of opinion that if the credit of India was shaken through disturbances, the credit of England must be brought to its aid. On these grounds he thought this Amendment ought to be agreed to.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, that, divested of technicalities, this was a simple point, and had been amply provided for in the Bill. He could quite understand the desire of creditors of the East India Company to have better securities than they already possessed. He would not enter into any controversy whether such could be found; but when the hon. Member asked what was the remedy, he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) would reply by demanding what the Indian creditor would have done supposing that this great change had not been proposed, and that the Indian revenue became deficient? He could only repeat what he had said on a former occasion with reference to this subject, though his statement did not seem to carry conviction to the mind of the hon. Gentleman—that the security of the Indian creditor remained identical with what it was before, the only difference being, to express it in the popular way, that the trust was changed, and that whereas before the Indian creditor looked to the Directors, he would now look to the Council. The hon. Gentleman had entered into a catalogue raisonée of all the Indian securities, and, reading a railway bond, said, "See the engagements under which the Directors are to the holders of these bonds, which they are bound to liquidate within a certain notice; and when you destroy the Direction, to whom is the creditor to look?" Let the hon. Gentleman look to Clause 16, which, in the first place, provided that the Council was to stand in the place of the Company in relation to all suits; and then, turning to Clause 61, he would find that it was provided that engagements as against the East India Company might be enforced against the Council in like manner as against the said Company; while Clause 62, which completed that group of clauses, provided that the Council, like the Directors, should not be personally liable. The hon. Gentleman, therefore, would find that the point he had raised as to where they should find a remedy was amply provided for in the Bill, and that every contract into which the Company had entered the Council should in like manner be liable for. Whether, therefore, they looked to the security or the remedy, the case was equally provided for. He trusted that the Committee would support the clause before them, and not put the East Indian creditor in a different position to that in which they were now placed.

MR. WILSON

said, he wished to point out what he considered an ambiguity in the clause. The principal of the debts incurred by the East India Company was charged on the Indian revenue alone, but nothing was said as to the interest.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

said, it was a legal maxim that if they secured the debt, they also secured the interest that might be due on such debt.

SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBY

said, he could not regard the answer of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as satisfactory. The creditor had now the collateral security of the hereditaments, chattels, stores, and personal property of the Company in this country. The question was, did not this Bill restrict the security for the bond debt to the Indian revenues alone?

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

said, the hon. Member would find words in the clause to make all moneys, arising from any property transferred to Her Majesty under the Bill, applicable in aid of the revenues of India.

SIR H. RAWLINSON

said, the bonds rested on the original stock of the Company.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

said, he rather thought that the bonds were receiving a better security under this Act than they rested on before; for, by the Act of 1833, he believed they were thrown entirely on the revenues of India; but here they were cast also on the real and personal property transferred to Her Majesty.

MR. STUART WORTLEY

said, he thought the language of the Bill ought to be made clearer on this point. As he read it, the security was limited to the revenues of India alone.

MR. CARDWELL

said, he rose to congratulate the Committee upon the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had completely negatived the position of the hon. Member for Leominster, that the debt of India was a charge upon the taxpayers of this country, and that no hon. Member who had supported the Amendment had maintained that position. He had no doubt that the difference as to verbal construction between the hon. Gentleman the Member for Bute (Mr. Stuart Wortley) and the Solicitor General might be arranged before the Bill was reported.

Amendment withdrawn.

Clause agreed to; as were likewise Clauses 39 to 42 inclusive.

Clause 43 (Power to grant Letter of Attorney for Sale of Stock and Receipt of Dividends).

MR. MOFFATT

said, he rose to move the following proviso:— Provided that no such general letter of attorney or order shall be executed or signed, except the same has been first authorized by a resolution passed in Council, his object being to take precaution against the commission of fraud.

LORD STANLEY

said, he thought that ample security would be provided in a clause to be brought up on the Report.

Amendment by leave withdrawn.

Clause agreed to; as were also Clauses 44 to 46 inclusive.

Clause 47 (Present System of Issuing Warrants for Payments Continued).

MR. WILLOUGHBY

suggested, that it would be inconvenient to require every warrant to be signed by three members of the Council. At present warrants were only signed by two Directors.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 48 (Audit of Accounts in Great Britain).

MR. MANGLES

said, he did not know on what ground the noble Lord intended to appoint a separate auditor for the accounts of the Company. The audit of the East India Company had met the full approbation of the noble Lord the late President of the India Board. He did not see, therefore, why they should be put to the expense of another auditor.

COLONEL SYKES

would move to leave out the clause.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, he thought it introduced a great improvement. It would introduce a better system of audit than now prevailed. It would not necessarily lead to any increase of expense.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 49 (Accounts to be Annually laid before Parliament).

MR. GREGSON

proposed the insertion of words providing that no pension or gratuity beyond a certain amount should be granted by the Secretary of State, out of the revenues of India, without the sanction of that House.

LORD STANLEY

said, he thought that the check which a majority of the Council would possess over all appropriations of money would be a much more effective control than a mere appeal to the House of Commons.

Amendment negatived. Clause agreed to.

Clause 50 struck out.

Clauses 51 and 52 agreed to.

Clause 53 (Servants of the Company to be deemed Servants of Her Majesty).

MR. WILLOUGHBY

proposed to add to it these words:— And the transfer of any person to the service of Her Majesty shall be deemed to be a continuance of his previous service, and shall not prejudice any claims to pension, or any claims on the various annuity funds of the several Presidencies in India which he might have had if this Act had not been passed.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

said, that these words were the same that were inserted at the end of the clause in regard to the servants on the establishment. There could, therefore, be no objection to their insertion here.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause, as amended, agreed to; as were also Clauses 54 to 59 inclusive.

Clause 60 (Council to come in place of the Company with regard to pending suits, &c.)

SIR ERSKINE PERRY

said, he understood that this clause was intended to give the same power of suing the Secretary of State and Council that now existed with reference to the East India Company. He thought, however, that that intention was not adequately expressed or carried out by the clause. He would propose to add these words:— And all actions, suits, and proceedings which, but for the passing of this Act, might have been brought against the said Company, may from henceforth be brought against the Secretary of State in Council; and the property vested in the Crown as aforesaid shall be subject and liable to the same judgments and executions, in the same manner and form respectively as if this Act had not passed.

MR. WHITESIDE

said, this clause only related to pending suits. The addition of his hon. and learned Friend would more properly be proposed at the end of the 61st clause.

Clause agreed to, as were the remaining clauses.

On the bringing up of the new clauses relating to Military Patronage,

SIR ERSKINE PERRY

said, he intended to move the omission of one of the new clauses on this point.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, he proposed to insert the new clauses pro forma to-night, and to have the Bill reprinted, so that the Report might be brought up on Monday, when it would be competent to any hon. Member to move the omission of any of the clauses.

SIR ERSKINE PERRY

said, the subject of the clause could not well be considered, except in Committee. He moved the Chairman report progress.

Motion made and Question, "That the Chairman report progress," put, and negatived.

On the Question that the clause be read a second time.

MR. LOWE

said, he could not consent to the clause. It was impossible to go on at that late hour with the discussion of one of the most important questions involved in the Bill.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

merely wished the House to agree to the clauses pro forma, and to take the discussion of them on the Report on Monday.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

wished to get through the Bill with as much speed as was consistent with decency, but there was no occasion for hurrying it through the House. There was a material difference between discussing the details of a Bill in Committee and on the Report. In Committee an hon. Member might speak more than once, whereas on the Report he did not possess such a privilege. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would allow the Chairman to report progress, with the view of going on with the Bill in Committee on Monday.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, that on the Report every hon. Member would have an opportunity of dis- cussing the clauses, and of making at least three speeches on each of them. Ample opportunity for discussion would, therefore, be afforded by the course he proposed.

SIR ERSKINE PERRY

said, it was clear that the right hon. Gentleman in the early part of the evening contemplated going on with the Bill in Committee on Monday. There was a most important clause to come, which could only be properly discussed in Committee.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, that if it were the wish of the Committee he would not press the matter.

Clause read 2^o.

House resumed.

Committee report progress; to sit again on Monday next.