HC Deb 20 April 1858 vol 149 cc1364-76
MR. COX

rose, pursuant to notice, to move for leave to bring in a Bill to repeal the Septennial Act, and to limit the duration of Parliament to three years. He said this question had often been discussed in Parliament, but not for several years past. He had to solicit the indulgence of the House—to which no one who had an onerous duty to discharge had ever appealed in vain—while he endeavoured to bring its merits under their consideration. The question was one of great importance, and he appealed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and to hon. Gentlemen on the Ministerial side of the House to support the Motion he was about to make, because he intended to show the House that according to the ancient constitution of this country short Parliaments ought to exist. He would not, however, go into the history of this question further back than for the last five hundred years. It would be enough for him if he showed that up to 1715, when the Act which he sought to repeal passed, there were short Parliaments. The first Act which had reference to the duration of Parliaments was passed in the 4th Edward III, in the year 1330. By that statute it was accorded that a Parliament should be holden once in every year, and oftener if necessary. It appeared that that Act had been pretty well observed, but nevertheless breaches of its provisions occurred in the reign of the same king; and in order that there should he no mistake, by the 36 Edw. III. c. 10, it was enacted that a Parliament should be opened once in every year, as was ordained by the previous statute. Parliaments were accordingly held during the next ten years in exact conformity with the statute and the principle of the enactment with occasional lapses continued in operation till the reign of Henry VIII. Thus it appeared that during the fifty-seven years of the reign of Edward III, there wore thirty-seven Parliaments; in the reign of Richard II. there were twenty-six Parliaments held in twenty-two years; in that of Henry IV. there were ten in fourteen years; in that of Henry V. there were held eleven in nine years; and in the reign of Henry VI. there were held twenty-two Parliaments in thirty-nine years. Then came the reign of Henry VIII., who, as was well known, set all Acts of Parliament at defiance, and only held as many Parliaments as he chose. From that time to the reign of Charles I. Parliaments were held very irregularly, sometimes five or six years intervening between them, and sometimes two. He ought, however, to except the reign of Queen Mary, for it appeared that during the five years she was on the throne she called together five Parliaments. Hitherto the constitution had been that of annual Parliaments, however much infringed, but they now came to a different state of things and a new class of legislation. The 16th of Charles I. was passed, declaring that if after a period of three years the king did not call Parliament together, the people themselves were to have the power of doing so. The 16th of Charles II. repealed this statute, and declared that the power of calling Parliaments together at the end of three years should rest, not with the people, but with the Crown. But the 6th of William and Mary was really the Triennial Act. It was called "An Act for the frequent meeting and calling of Parliament," and it enacted that Parliament should be called once in three years, or rather that three years should not elapse without Parliament being brought together. For the first time they now found the words that no Parliament should last longer than three years. After the passing of the Act of William and Mary it was rigidly adhered to; a Parliament was called, which lasted three years and then dissolved. Passing over the reign of Queen Anne, be came to that of George I., when, unfortunately for the country, there was a change of Government—the Tories were turned out, and the King took into his councils the Whigs of that day. Changes of Government were not effected in those days quietly and without excitement, as was the case now, hut they were attended with rioting, violence, and bloodshed, and it was in the midst of such circumstances that the law was passed which he sought to repeal. In January, 1715, some remarkable words were put into the mouth of the king, who had just come to the throne; for, in a proclamation issued calling Parliament together, the people were directed to elect such persons as would redress their grievances and maintain the Protestant succession. The frightful and enormous expenditure which occurred at that election was made the reason for passing the Act which he now sought to repeal. When the new Parliament met, on the 14th March, 1715, the Whigs, who were in a majority, took care that all should be done which would prevent their opponents getting into power again. The year 1715 was signalized by rebellion in Scotland, and insurrection in the north, and disturbances in various parts of the country, The Earl of Oxford was impeached; the heads of the Earl of Derwentwater and other Peers rolled from the scaffold on Tower Hill. We condemned foreign countries for putting persons to death for their political opinions, but this was done in England in 1715. On the 24th of January, 1715, the king gave his assent to another Bill for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. The king stated to Parliament that the Pretender was in Scotland, which was not, however, true, and in this state of affairs the Septennial Act was introduced. Executions were taking place and the country was in a state of commotion. The Ministry of the day found that Parliament was about to expire, according to the provisions of the Act of William and Mary, at a juncture when the people were irritated by the harshness and cruelty of Government in suppressing the rebellion. That was a state of public feeling which they were unwilling to encounter, and therefore to secure their own immunity, they set about to see how they could best retain the power they had obtained by shedding so much blood, and what did they do? They did not bring a Bill into the House of Commons which was to extend the duration of Parliaments, but it was introduced into the House of Lords, which was then a sealed place, of the proceedings in which no one knew anything, and it was there passed and brought down to the Commons on the 19th of April, 1716. One would have supposed that a Bill of such a character would have received considerable discussion, and a long time would have elapsed before it was passed through its several stages; but having been brought in on the 19th of April, and read a first time on the same night, on the following 26th it was passed and sent back to the House of Lords without any Amendment. That showed the state of the country and the fear and trepidation of the Parliament. Members jumped at the idea of securing their seats for another four years, and they were glad to pass a Bill for that purpose in one week. Although the Bill was only in the House of Commons one week the people got an inkling of it, and sent up petitions against it. One of those petitions came from Abingdon, and it set forth that the most valuable privilege which they enjoyed was their being represented in Parliament, and that though they had a Member who was faithful to his duty, yet if he forgot that duty by the extension of the duration of Parliament to more than three years, they would be unable to make such change in their representation as they thought desirable for a considerable lapse of time, and therefore they objected to any alteration of the duration of Parliament beyond three years. Another petition was from Horsham, and it stated that the Petitioners looked on the Bill as an overturning of the constitution and an infringement of their liberties. A Motion was made to reject this petition, and on a division 157 voted for its rejection and 90 in its favour. The House of Commons therefore would not receive the petitions of the people. The Septennial Act was entitled an Act for enlarging the Continuance of Parliament as arranged by the Act of William and Mary, passed for providing for the frequent calling together of Parlia- ment; and the preamble of the Act alleged three reasons for the change:— that triennial Parliaments entailed grievous expense; that more violent and lasting heats and animosities than had ever been known before had arisen since the Act 6th William and Mary was passed, by which triennial Parliaments were established; and that it was desirable Parliament should continue longer than three years because of the existence of Popish factions, which were dangerous to the Government; that Act was recited in the preamble, which went on to say that it had been proved that the said Act was burdensome by reason of the expenses it caused in the election of Members of Parliament, and by reason of the heat and animosity it created, which were greater than they had been before it passed, and that if the said provisions were continued then, when a restless faction were endeavouring to renew rebellion and promote invasion, the results would be most disadvantageous to the country. None of these allegations would, however, now hold good as reasons why that Act should not be repealed, and we should not go back to the old system of our constitution. It might be said that the expenses of elections were so great that no man ought to go back to his constituents so often as once in three years. But he believed that if an hon. Member was true to his pledges and attentive to his duty to his constituents, he would be elected as long as he chose to seek their suffrages, and that the shorter Parliaments were the less likelihood there would be of men lavishing money to obtain seats for their own personal advantage. If hon. Members had to go back to their constituents every three years there would be less chance of their forgetting the pledges which they gave upon the hustings, and less necessity for reminding their constituents of the manner in which they had discharged their duties. He had been for years a member of a body, the members of which were elected annually, and he found that, presenting himself year after year to his constituents, they knew what he had done almost as well as he could tell them. But Parliamentary constituencies, under the present system, were almost as prone to forget as the Members were themselves, and he doubted very much whether he should remember what he had promised on his election if he were not a metropolitan member, and in daily communication with his constituents. It was the grossest absurdity to allege that the heats and animosities which were occasioned by the change of Government from Tory to Whig were attributable to the Triennial Act, and with regard to the third allegation in the preamble of the Septennial Act—namely, that when a rebellion or invasion threatened, it was imprudent to dissolve Parliament, — that reason did not hold good now. We were not threatened with invasion, though we might have been if the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton had continued in office. There was no rebellion in Scotland, and there were no dangerous Popish factions. The succession to the Throne was as secure as it could possibly be; and, although some men might prefer a republican to a monarchical form of Government, he believed that the few of that opinion who were in England were ready to postpone their republicanism out of the love and veneration which they bore towards Her Majesty the Queen of this realm. It might be said that, taking the average since the Septennial Act, Parliaments had really been triennial; but he contended that the average ought not to he taken, and that, omitting the exceptional instances of Parliament being dissolved a very short time after election, in consequence of a change of Ministry or any other cause, ordinary Parliaments had lasted more than five, and in many of them nearly the full seven years. It was said that the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton and the noble Lord the Member for London were just now bidding for the leadership of the Liberal party. If it were true, there was a chance for them. He should be very glad—before the discussion was over—to hear each of the noble Lords bidding "Triennial Parliaments," and he was sure that by such a bid they would advance themselves greatly in the favour of the people. The hon. gentleman concluded by moving for leave to bring in a Bill to repeal the Act of George I, cap. 38, commonly called the "Septennial Act," and to limit the duration of Parliaments to three years.

MR. HADFIELD

seconded the Motion.

Motion made and Question proposed,— That leave be given to bring in a Bill to repeal the Act of the first year of George the First, cap. 38, commonly called the ' Septennial Act,' and to limit the duration of Parliaments to three years.

MR. WALPOLE

Sir, the hon. Gentleman, in making an appeal to the two noble Lords and to this bench with respect to this question, has gone back in his recollections of the history of this country to a very early period, in order to show that, according to all constitutional doctrine, we ought to shorten the duration of Parliament. I think, however, that if the hon. Gentleman had studied our history a little more accurately he would have found that there is nothing in our constitutional practice to sanction that doctrine. He would have found that the first statute to which he referred was one which was not applicable in the least degree to the frequency of elections, but to the frequency of the Session of Parliament. He would have found that the statute of Edward III., providing that Parliaments were to be holden once annually, and oftener, if need be, related entirely to the Session, and not to the choice of Members. The hon. Gentleman went through the history of England during the reigns of Henry IV., Henry V., and Henry VI., in order to show that Parliaments were then frequently held. If he turns again to those reigns he will find no doubt that there was much uncertainty on the subject; that Parliament sat but for short periods, and that they were prorogued, adjourned, and dissolved, according to pleasure. Still, I believe that in many instances though frequently hold they were not frequently chosen. And if, continuing his researches, he passes on to the reign of Henry VIII., a reign which lasted for about thirty-eight years, he will find one Parliament sitting for six years at the least—the Parliament, I mean, which was summoned in 1529, which was prorogued no less than seven times, and which caused the dissolution of the greater monasteries. The instances to which he refers in Queen Mary's reign were not all of them new summonses of Parliament, but one or two were renewed sittings of the same Parliament. If he will refer to the reign of Edward VI., which he passes over, he will find that one Parliament sat for five years, that is to say, it was not dissolved until the end of that period; and on referring to the reign of Queen Elizabeth, he will find a Parliament summoned in 1572 which was not dissolved until 1583, but which, during those eleven years, sat twenty-five times. I might go through the reign of James I., anil even that of Charles I., to show, in answer to the appeal which the hon. Gentleman has made to these benches, that from the first statute he quotes down to the Act passed by the Long Parliament in the reign of Charles I., there is not a single law or instance of usage in the history of this country which will establish the principle that upon constitutional grounds, Parliament ought to be annually elected. The first attempt at limiting the duration of Parliament, in the reign of Charles I., was that made by the Long Parliament, which passed an Act whereby it was provided that Parliament should not exist for a greater length of time than three years. But that Parliament was the very first to break through its own law, and declared itself indissoluble except by its own act. That statute was therefore repealed in the reign of Charles II., and the celebrated Parliament of the Merry Monarch was one of the longest Parliaments that over sat. The second time that an attempt was made to limit the duration of Parliament was on the occasion of the passing of the Triennial Act of 1691, agreed to by both Houses, but which was one of the few instances in which a Bill passed by the two Estates of the realm was not assented to by the Crown. The violation of the constitution, if there has been a violation—or rather, to speak more correctly, the alteration made in the constitution which imposed upon the Crown the necessity of calling together Parliament in the first instance once in three years, and in the second instance once in seven years—was effected, first in the reign of William III., and afterwards in the reign of George I. That, Sir, is the correct historical account of the constitution of the country with reference to the question of the duration of Parliament, and when the hon. Gentleman points to the Septennial Act as a violation of the constitution, because it enabled the Parliament then elected to exist for seven years instead of for three, he forgets that if that Parliament had simply repealed the Triennial Act there was nothing whatever either in the constitution of the country, the common law, or the statutable law of the land, to prevent that Parliament from existing during the whole reign of the King. Constitutionally, therefore, the hon. Gentleman will see that the appeal he has made to us is not an appeal to support a Motion for Annual or Triennial Parliaments; but if he wishes us to be guided by precedents to be found in the earlier period of our history, it would be an appeal that Parliament should last even longer than seven years. A large por- tion of the hon. Gentleman's speech was directed to the constitutional and historical portion of the question, and therefore I thought it right to correct some of the statements he made in order that we may proceed upon sound premises. The real question, however, which the hon. Gentleman wishes to submit to the House is this, whether the extension of the duration of Parliament from three years to seven in the reign of George I., thus limiting its existence, which otherwise, according to the constitution, would have been unlimited, was, or was not the best measure of time which can be fixed upon for the duration of Parliament. That is really the only question before the House, and no doubt it is open to argument as to whether seven years is or is not the best period at which its duration should be fixed. I think we shall all agree that annual Parliaments, notwithstanding the constitutional reasons which may be alleged in their favour, would be too short, and probably we should equally agree that if Parliament was allowed to remain in existence during the life of the reigning Sovereign, undoubtedly that would be too long. In the former case, you would be driven to such frequency of election that you would have nothing steady or certain about your legislation; and, in the latter case, such an impunity would be given to Members, who would never be held in awe by the necessity of having to meet their constituents for a renewal of their trust, that the most inconvenient consequences might result. The real question, therefore, is, whether that law, which has now been the law of the country for nearly 150 years, is not a wise provision for the limitation of the duration of Parliament. I think, for several reasons, it is a wise provision, and that the period fixed is, on the whole, the best which has yet been devised. The first reason why I uphold it is, that if you have a duration of Parliament for a smaller number of years, great inconvenience would be felt in consequence of the inexperience of the Members, and there would also be a certain want of confidence in the Members themselves, arising from the frequency of their return to their constituencies. The daily business of Parliament, too, is far better transacted when the return of Members is made for a longer period than it would be if this Bill were carried. As the hon. Gentleman has referred to the time when the Triennial Act was in operation, perhaps he will allow me to point out, as it is a question of experience, what was the experience of our ancestors with respect to the limitation of Parliament to three years. I hold in my hand the History of Europe, by the noble Lord the Member for London (Lord John Russell), from the peace of Utrecht, and in that history he quotes a passage from a speech of Sir Richard Steele, giving an account of the operation of the limitation of the existence of Parliament to three years— It made a triennial King, a triennial Minis try, a triennial alliance. We feel this in all occurrences of State; and they who look upon us from abroad, behold with anxiety and doubt the struggle in which we are necessarily engaged from time to time, under this law. Ever since it has been enacted the nation has been in a series of contentions. The first year of a triennial Parliament has been spent in vindictive decisions and animosities concerning the late elections; the second Session has entered into business, but rather with a spirit of contradiction to what the prevailing set of men in former Parliaments had brought to pass, than of a disinterested zeal for the common good. The third Session languished in the pursuit of what little was intended to be done in the second; and the approach of an ensuing election terrified the Members into a servile management according as their respective principals were disposed towards the question before them in the House. Sir, I believe that to be a just and true description of what took place under the system of triennial Parliaments. You would have again the same inconveniences if you had recourse to the same measure. The first year you would have hon. Members learning their business; in the second you would have them endeavouring to legislate; and in the third you would have them seeking to gain popularity, in order to be in a position to meet their constituents at the end of the year, and ensure their election. Such a state of things must be inimical to cautious, continuous, and well-considered legislation. This House, instead of being the representative of the deliberate judgment and conviction of the sensible and thinking portion of the community, would be the mere reflex of their hasty conclusions, and more probably represent the prejudices and passions of the nation than its reason and its judgment. These are the considerations, stated shortly, which induce me to withhold my concurrence with a plan which would introduce the system of triennial Parliaments. The experiment which has been tried has not been successful, and therefore I think it would be unwise to try it again. Well, then, I ask, has the experiment of septennial Parliaments failed? [An Hon. MEMBER: Yes.] The hon. Gentleman who is bold enough to respond to that question will, perhaps, permit me to recall to his recollection, and contrast what I have just read as the result of the Triennial Act with what has happened in Parliament since the repeal of that enactment. We are speaking of the House of Commons historically; and, I ask, who were the great governors of this country before the passing of the Septennial Act? They sat principally in the House of Lords. I venture to say, that if you go over list after list of great Ministers, you will find that the influence of this House at the time that Act was in operation was as nothing when contrasted with that of the House of Lords. All your great Ministers, your Burleighs, your Buckinghams, your Shaftesburys, your Sunderlands, your Nottinghams, your Godolphins, your Halifaxes, were Members of the House of Lords, and the two most eminent men in our history of that time—Henry St. John and Robert Harley—both found it necessary, when they were honoured with the favour of their Sovereign, to get transferred to the Upper House, because they could carry on the Government of the country better by being in that House than they could do in this. But what has been the state of the House of Commons since the passing of the Septennial Act? From that time down to the present many of the most important statesmen who have presided over the destinies of the country have been Members of this House. I need not refer to the author of that Bill himself—one of the best Ministers of this country that ever lived, whoso love of peace was only equalled by his love of constitutional freedom as established by the Revolution—I mean Sir Robert Walpole. If you trace your history from that period, what are the nest names you find? Those of Mr. Pelham, of Mr. Grenville, of Lord North, and—greater than all, and greater than that of almost any Minister that ever elevated the honour and dignity of this country—you find the name of the first Mr. Pitt. You may then take the short administration of the Marquess of Rockingham and the Earl of Shelburne, and you find them succeeded in the next period of your history by Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox. When those two men were carried away in the same year—when they were gathered into the sacred vaults of the neighbouring Abbey— Where—taming thought to human pride— The mighty chiefs sleep side by side, They were followed by that good man for whom, perhaps, I may be briefly allowed to offer a passing tribute of little less than filial affection, the commoner, Mr. Percival; and, after him, with the exception of the Duke of Wellington, Earl Grey, Lord Melbourne, and the present Prime Minister —some of whom were raised to distinction by their early struggles in the House, and the last of whom is admitted to be an ex-exception to every rule — I ask whether the names to which the historian and posterity will hereafter refer, as the greatest of this age, will not be the commoner Mr. Canning, the commoner Shit. Peel, and perhaps I might add—if it were not like offering flattery to statesmen happily still among us—the commoner Lord John Russell and the commoner Lord Palmerston? But it is not only that the influence of this House has been raised by the Septennial Act. I contend that nobody can trace our history without perceiving that every branch of legislation has gone on improving from that time to this. I do not attribute all that improvement to the Septennial Act alone; but I do attribute a great deal of the dignity, the power, the ability, and the authority which this House has exercised since that period to the measure which the hon. Gentleman advises us now to repeal. I will not detain the House longer; but, since you have found that the legislation of your country has improved under the Septennial Act; since that Act has maintained this House in harmony with the House of Lords, which it is doubtful whether a Triennial Act would be able to accomplish; since it has added to the ability, the authority, and the dignity of the Executive Government, while it has upheld the freedom and independence of the House of Commons, I trust that you will pause long and anxiously before you revert to a measure which has failed, as a substitute for a system which all experience tells us has admirably fulfilled the objects for which it was intended.

MR. HADFIELD

(who was almost inaudible) said, that he was surprised the right hon. Gentleman had referred to one of the most corrupt Ministers who had ever ruled in this country, Sir R. Walpole, and to the apostate Pitt; and that he had made no reference whatever to one of the greatest measures in history, the Reform Bill, He contended that many of the advantages which had been enumerated by the right hon. Gentleman had been owing to that measure.

Question put—

The House divided:—Ayes 57; Noes 254: Majority 197.