HC Deb 20 July 1857 vol 147 cc49-67

Upon the Second Resolution, with regard to hostilities in China,

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

said—I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to obtain from Her Majesty's Government some further explanation, with respect to the position of this country in the unfortunate quarrel which has arisen with China. Sir, it is impossible to regard the present position of that quarrel without feelings of considerable anxiety, and I must say that, in my opinion, the explanations of the noble Lord as to the mode in which Her Majesty's Government hope to bring those unfortunate differences to a termination have been by no means satisfactory. It is impossible to conceal the momentous nature of the crisis in India, and I am fully convinced that hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House will say, as I do most heartily, that the noble Lord, in adequately addressing himself to that crisis, is entitled to all the support which the House of Commons can give him. But, on the other hand, I do think that either the Government should give the House the most candid and explicit explanations upon all points on which expla- nations are demanded, or state that it is, in their opinion, inconsistent with the interests of the public service to enter into explanations. In the latter case, I am sure the House would defer to such a representation. Now, I am obliged to say that I do not think that the explanations of the Government with regard to our position in China have been as candid and distinct as the House had a right to expect. The noble Lord said a great deal on a former evening about carrying on hostilities in China, but not being at war with China, which seems to be a favourite idea of the noble Lord, when we endeavoured to ascertain the mode of action by which the Government proposed to bring that unfortunate transaction to an end, the noble Lord was extremely reserved, and failed to give any satisfactory explanation. I confess I cannot even now understand the statements of the noble Lord and the present facts with regard to the diversion of the forces despatched for the settlement of the Chinese quarrel to India. Some ten days ago I gave notice of my intention to put questions to the noble Lord upon the subject. When the day arrived the noble Lord did not come down at the usual period of putting questions; but the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty stated that he was prepared to answer if I would address my questions to him. Accordingly I asked whether the Government had given authority for diverting the troops intended for China to India, and whether the Governor General had sent any instructions to Ceylon for the diversion of those troops? The right hon. Baronet said distinctly that no instructions had been sent from England, and that no authority had been sent by the Governor General to Ceylon. [Sir C. Wood made a gesture of dissent.] I beg the right hon. Baronet's pardon. He said distinctly that the Governor General had not sent to divert the troops, but had made a communication to Lord Elgin to know whether Lord Elgin would consent to divert them. I asked what authority Lord Elgin had to consent, and I recollect the First Lord of the Admiralty said that he must have acted on the principle of salus populi suprema lex. In answer to a question which I put to the noble Lord on Monday last with respect to the action fought before Delhi, the noble Lord referred to the diversion of troops from China to India, and expressed his perfect approbation of the application which Viscount Canning had made, seeming to imply an expectation that Lord Elgin would comply with that demand. In a third instance totally different language was held. In an answer which the noble Lord gave on Friday evening I understood him to leave it to be inferred that the Government of this country had authorized and sanctioned the diversion of those troops. I wish to say most emphatically, as the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord J. Russell) has said, that I can take no exception to that course if the affairs of India are of that peremptory nature that the interests of the country require that the troops destined for hostilities in China should be diverted to India. But I think, in that event, the noble Lord should have frankly and fairly stated that in the opinion of the Government the emergency described had arisen. I cannot, however, understood at this moment whether, in the opinion of the Government, that necessity has arisen. I cannot understand to what extent, if it has arisen, the Government have acted, cannot understand whether the Government have or have not distinctly authorized the diversion of those troops. Instead of a simple and candid statement upon this subject, it appears to me that the language of the noble Lord has been inconsistent with the language which he held in March last upon the Chinese quarrel, and inconsistent with the dispatches contained in the papers which came from the authorities of the Government in China. It is upon these grounds that, with the permission of the House, I am desirous to draw attention to the present state of affairs in China. I do not wish to go back to the question of the lorcha— whether she had the British flag flying or not. I do not wish to enter into the circumstances which attended the commencement of this miserable quarrel, further than to say that I, for one, have not in the slightest degree changed the opinions which I formerly expressed upon its injustice. I cannot forbear expressing one other opinion, that if Her Majesty's Ministers had received—as I confess I think they must have received—warnings of the danger which existed in India—if they had received warnings of the volcano upon which they were standing, the guilt of that unrighteous quarrel with China is rendered tenfold greater. I cannot conceive any imprudence or rashness greater than for the Government to sanction the circumstances under which that quarrel with China was commenced, if they had reason to believe, as I cannot resist the impression they had, that the danger existed in India which has since come forth in so striking and remarkable a manner. Let me remind the House of the peremptory and menacing dictation which marked the language of Sir J. Bowring, Admiral Seymour and Consul Parkes. Consul Parkes writing to Commissioner Yeh in October says, "I have made certain demands. I have demanded the men to be returned. I have demanded an apology to be made. If not complied with within twenty-four hours from this time you shall feel the force of the naval power of England, which will compel satisfaction of our demands." There were only two conditions which would have justified this language. One was that it should be held in a just cause, a point upon which I have already expressed my opinion; the other that the persons who used it should have the power of enforcing it. Now, I think I shall be able to show that this language was rashly used, and that the persons who used it had no power to enforce it. The truth is, that these menaces—these peremptory and offensive demands—have never, up to the present hour, been enforced. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords held language much to to the same effect. He said that it would be impossible to adjust our differences with the Chinese if we were to wait four or five months while a reference was made to England; that it was absolutely necessary to the authority and power of England that we should act immediately, and that no delay should be permitted to take place. But what I ask is, whether we have acted immediately? When did these transactions occur? Nine months ago. It is not only that we have lost four or five months, the period which Lord Clarendon thought so objectionable, but nine months have occurred since these differences began. Have we carried out one of our menaces? Do we now stand in a better position in China than we did nine months ago? We all know that this menacing language produced no effect upon the Chinese authorities. Yeh was not alarmed. He refused compliance, and what was the result? That bombardment took place which, if I heard aright, was denied the other night, and with respect to which the right hon. Gentleman the first Lord of the Admiralty was to read some private letters this evening. I think the right hon. Baronet will have considerable difficulty in proving that Canton was not bombarded, or that the Chinese were not justified in those touching complaints they made of the destruction of life and property which ensued. Such was the, conduct of our authorities in China. Did that conduct produce the results intended? By no means. The next event that occurred was that, in revenge for the bombardment of the Yamun, or residence of the Commissioner, the Chinese made an attack upon the British factories at Canton and burnt them to the ground. Every effort was made by the forces of Her Majesty to prevent that destruction of British property, but in vain. What was the next thing that occurred? Sir Michael Seymour wrote a dispatch intimating his intention, although the factories had been destroyed, to erect fortifications in the factory gardens, to remain at Canton, and to keep Her Majesty's ships in the river, for the purpose of prolonging hostilities. A very short time elapsed before Sir M. Seymour found that this plan of operations was impossible. He was not able to carry it out. He abandoned his intention of fortifying the factory gardens, or of remaining at Canton. At last he was even obliged to abandon his intention of keeping Her Majesty's ships in the river. He retreated to Hong Kong. A dispatch written in January and received at the end of February shows the view which Sir M. Seymour entertained at that time of the position of Her Majesty's servants and forces in China, and the line of action which he thought essential to the support of British interests in that country. Sir M. Seymour wrote:— The necessity of maintaining my communication with Hong Kong has decided me to modify my plan of operations, and to confine myself to keeping the river navigation open until the arrival of reinforcements. I shall therefore withdraw from the Dutch Folly and Factory Gardens, and occupy the Bird's Nest Fort, which, with the Macao Fort, will give me a most commanding position. By this measure I shall release the Niger and Encounter from a confined anchorage, where they are in continual danger of being burnt by fire rafts or from rockets from either shore, and secure their services for any emergency. He then goes on to say, and upon this passage I shall have to beg some explanations from the Government:— On a consideration of the circumstances herein set forth I trust their Lordships will concur in the propriety of my having, in conjunction with Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary, applied to his Excellency the Governor General of India for the assistance of 5,000 troops. As, however, the warm weather will be approaching before any force can be assembled, and the Chinese are active in their preparations for the defence of their city, it would be expedient to have such an army as will, by their numerical strength, render a successful result the more certain. I wish to ask the Government what was the result of this application for 5,000 troops from Sir M. Seymour to the Governor General of India? The noble Lord at the head of the Government told us the other night that the force at Hong Kong is now sufficient for any purpose to which it is likely to be applied. I do not understand on that hypothesis why an additional force was sent from this country. But I am disposed to believe that the force at Hong Kong is very far from being sufficient for the end required, and therefore I want to know whether this application was made by Sir M. Seymour to the Governor General of India; what the answer was; whether any troops have been sent from India to reinforce Sir M. Seymour in China; and if no such reinforcements have been sent, how the noble Lord opposite reconciles with that fact his statement that the British force now at Hong Kong is sufficient for any demand that may be made upon it? How can we hope to make such inconsistencies tally one with the other? The noble Lord has also told us that Lord Elgin is going to carry on a negotiation in China. How is that statement to be reconciled with the language held by the Earl of Clarendon in another place, that the only argument which the Chinese understood was the argument of force? The noble Lord was told the other night by the hon. Member for Plymouth (Mr. James White), who has himself resided in China, that it was perfectly useless to send Lord Elgin to negotiate with the Emperor. He was informed that the Emperor would refer our Ambassador to Commissioner Yeh at Canton; and what the result of that reference will be, the House may easily conjecture, when it recollects how Yeh received our demands eight or nine months ago. If Yeh did not then comply with the demands of the British Government, menacing as they were, and supported by a certain show of naval power, is he likely to comply now, when our naval power has been tried and has failed, and when, instead of threatening the Chinese with fire and sword, we are ourselves reduced to a defensive position at Hong Kong? I cannot but regard these circumstances as being of the most serious character. It appears to me that they are of a nature to endanger the power, the reputation, and the authority of England in the East. I for one utterly condemned the policy of this Chinese war ab initio, nor have I since modified that opinion. But Her Majesty's Government: having embarked in it, I hold they are bound by every consideration which can influence British statesmen, to see that at least our honour shall, if possible, remain unsullied, and that we shall not be exposed to insult and disgrace in consequence of these unfortunate transactions in China. I have already admitted, to use the language of Shakspeare, that good reasons must give place to better," and that there may he paramount considerations why these troops should he diverted from China to India. But let the Government be more frank and explicit than they have been. Let them tell us what the necessity is. Even then I must ask them how they propose to carry out this Chinese quarrel. Divert troops to India if you please, but you must adopt some substitute. We are embarked in a war. Hostilities have been going on for some time, and no one can deny that to a certain extent we have failed. I hold it, therefore, to be of the very first importance that the noble Lord should give this House and the country some fuller and more intelligible explanation than he has yet given as to what his intentions and prospects are with respect to the prosecution of this unhappy Chinese war. Where is General Ashburnhara? Is he to go with these diverted troops to India, or is he to go to Hong Kong, there to be a general without an army? Where is Lord Elgin? At what place is he to negotiate? At Pekin or at Canton? Above all, is he to negotiate with or without that strong and indispensable support which a military force could give in China? If he negotiates with that support, I am afraid he cannot be successful. Let me ask the noble Lord another question. To what extent is the diversion of troops to be carried? He has told us that the portion of the Chinese expeditionary force which has been sent to Singapore may be diverted to India; but he has never told us what portion has been sent to Singapore, and what portion goes straight to Hong Kong. Therefore upon that point we have no information, and for the sake of the public interest, I entreat the noble Lord to give us some intimation of what, in the event of a diversion to India of the troops sent out, will be the military force in China. I thought it indispensable to make these inquiries, not in any hostile spirit towards the Government, to whom in this emergency every support should be given, but because this is a matter upon which I feel great anxiety, and also, I must say, some apprehension. I do trust that this unhappy quarrel, begun in injustice, may not terminate in disgrace.

SIR CHARLES WOOD

I hope the House will allow me to repeat some of the statements which I made the other night, which it is necessary I should do in order to reconcile those inconsistencies and wonderful contradictions which the right hon. Gentleman has conjured up. I must say I do not understand the object of a considerable portion of the right hon. Gentleman's observations. He said he was unwilling to revive the discussion of which we had had so much in the preceding Parliament, but, nevertheless, he contrived to indulge in a few strong epithets of the injustice of our cause and the cruelty of our conduct. Another observation, too, I think he would have done well to withhold until he had read the papers which my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Control has just laid upon the table. The right hon. Baronet attributed great blame to the Government for undertaking the war in China, having been warned of the volcano upon which we were standing in India. If he had waited for the papers he would have found that his supposition was wrong, for they will distinctly show that no such warning was ever given. However, to take the right hon. Gentleman's complaints in chronological order. He first complains that threats were used by Mr. Consul Parkes which were never enforced. It is quite true that Sir J. Bowring and persons more experienced in China than he, were mistaken in their estimate of the effect which our operations would have upon the Chinese I authorities. They believed that each successive step would produce the effect of enforcing compliance with our demands, and such was the universal opinion of the authorities of Hong Kong, which was to some extent justified by a preceding case, when Captain M'Dougal, with a much less force than was at the command of Sir M. Seymour, obtained all that was required. If I am called upon to say to what I attribute the non-compliance of the Chinese with our demands on the present occasion, I should I attribute it to the mild course we have pursued, and the anxious care we have displayed to spare life and property, which have led the Chinese, like most barbarous nations, to attribute our forbearance to a sense of weakness. I will now say a few words in reply to the tirade we have heard about the bombardment of Canton, The hon. Member for Plymouth (Mr. James White) the other night gave a very correct account of what was done there or rather what was not done. The public buildings were shelled, as were also buildings in which troops were seen, and magazines were exploded, but none of the habitations of the peaceful portion of the people—the inhabitants who took no part in the warlike proceedings. It was not an indiscriminate bombardment, by which the dwellings of the peaceful inhabitants of Canton were destroyed. I deny that such was the case. The only passage in the Canton papers upon which such a statement could be based is at page 139, where Sir M. Seymour says, "I am now shelling the city from the Dutch Folly. "The question is, what is the meaning of these words? Do they mean that the Admiral was shelling what the hon. Member for Plymouth called truly the peaceable portion of the city of Canton—that part wherein were situated the dwellings of the people who took no part in offensive operations against us; or do they mean what is expressed in another page of the papers, wherein Sir M. Seymour says, "A few shells were thrown into the city yesterday from the Dutch Folly, in the direction of the Government buildings?" [Lord C. HAMILTON: That was on the 14th of December.] The question is, whether the words of Sir M. Seymour which have been so criticised mean that or more. Do they mean that he wantonly bombarded the city? He was quite ready to admit that they might bear the larger construction which had been given them, but whether justly or not was another question. It has been my duty most carefully to read all the dispatches of Sir M. Seymour, and referring to the course which he pursued on former occasions as evidence to guide us in reading these dispatches, I thought at the time that it was utterly impossible that he could have done that which is attributed to him, which is totally contrary to the spirit in which he conducted other operations. He says in a dispatch, which will be found at page 97— I resumed operations on the following day (October 28) from the Dutch Folly…I had previously given the fullest warning to the inhabitants in the vicinity to remove their persons and property (Captain Hall having lauded twice for that purpose), in which occupation they were engaged during the whole of the night. Before the landing took place I assembled the officers and urgently impressed upon them (as I had previously done by written order) the necessity of restraining the men from molesting the persons and property of the inhabitants, confining warlike operations against the troops only; and I have pleasure in bearing testimony to the forbearance and good conduct of the seamen and marines. No straggling took place, and when the orders were given to re-embark, the men returned to their boats with regularity and despatch. Thus, when the course of military operations rendered it necessary for him to attack those buildings, he sent his flag—captain twice on shore to induce the inhabitants to quit with their property, and delayed his attack to give them time to do so. With this view of the character of his proceedings it is perfectly impossible to believe that on a subsequent occasion he should have done that which is so contrary to the spirit of his instructions, so contrary to the feelings of an Englishman, and so contrary to the character of an officer who is designated even by those who differ from Government as one of the best and most humane of men. I said in one of the discussions which took place upon the subject, that hon. Gentlemen were not justified in placing the construction which they did upon these words of Admiral Seymour. I said I was convinced that what he did mean was, that he simply bombarded the public buildings and places where troops were assembled. Since which I have written to Sir M. Seymour to ask him whether the construction which I placed upon the words was the correct one. I can truly say that there was not the slightest personal feeling in my mind with reference to the contradiction which I had received as to the right interpretation of the passage to which I have referred, but when I alluded to the matter the other night I certainly thought that those who had denounced a gallant officer for his inhumanity would have received with pride and satisfaction the contradiction that wiped away such an imputation from the character not only of that gallant officer, but of the nation to which he belonged. I was astonished at the attempt to throw discredit on the statement then made, seeing that it was calculated to remove an imputation cast on the nation as well as on the character of one of our most gallant officers. As I have already said, I wrote to Sir M. Seymour, with reference to the bombardment of Canton, and from him I received an answer, in which occurs the following passage:— I must not omit to thank you for the caution you are kind enough to give me in the instance (p. 139) where I inform Sir J. B. that 'I am now shelling the town,' which, it is scarcely necessary for me to say Incorrectly conveyed more than the reality. The world at home will by-and-by learn that there has been no indiscriminate destruction of Chinese persons or property at any period of our operations, and how studiously I have avoided such a repugnant course, notwithstanding the most urgent advice for a very different proceeding from classes ' many and various.' Since I came down to the House I have had put into my hands confirmation of this statement from an independent quarter—namely, from the Belgian Consul at Shanghai, and published in the "Moniteur Beige." In a letter written by that gentleman, and dated "Hong Kong, May 9, 1857," he says:— Admiral Seymour has conducted all his operations in the most humane and mildest manner. I can, as an eye-witness, guarantee that the so-called bombardment of Canton was so conducted as to inflict as little injury as possible on the inhabitants, while punishing the authorities. I hope, after these statements from the gallant Admiral himself, and from an eyewitness in the person of the Belgian Consul, that the imputation cast on us as a nation and on that gallant officer will not be repeated in this House, and that in future a more generous view will be taken of the conduct of officers discharging responsible duties in distant parts of the world. So much for the alleged bombardment of Canton. It is true, as the right hon. Baronet states, that the measures then taken had not the effect of inducing Commissioner Yeh and the authorities at Canton to come to terms with us upon the question in dispute. After the attack on Canton and the destruction of the public buildings, the vessels were withdrawn and moored at intervals on the river from Bird's-nest Fort to Hong Kong, as it was thought necessary to have a check on the war junks and keep open the communication. There was no object to be gained by holding the river suburb of Canton after the destruction of the factories. It is true, also, that the Governor General of India was requested to send a body of troops to assist in making an attack on Commissioner Yeh, and that he declined to send them; but it appear; that afterwards part of two regiments were sent from Madras to take up their position in Hong Kong. Such was the state of matters when last we received intelligence from China. My noble Friend, when this question was first before the House, announced—and the announcement was received with the greatest satisfaction by the House—that Lord Elgin had been sent to open direct negotiations with the Imperial Government of China, to endeavour to get the present dispute brought to a settlement, and to place the relations between the two countries on a sounder foundation for the future. My noble Friend (Lord plamerston) repeated that announcement two or three nights ago; and therefore I hardly understood what the right hon. Gentleman meant when he asked what were the views with which Lord Elgin was going to China. Surely the right hon. Gentleman could not have misunderstood the statement made by my noble Friend so short a time ago, and yet he has asked for what purpose Lord Elgin has gone out to China. It was further stated that the Government had sent out 5,000 men to China, that it was not thought desirable they should arrive before autumn as the climate of China was such as to render it impossible for European troops to act during the hot weather. It was expected they would arrive at the time when Lord Elgin returned to the south, after completing his negotiations at Pekin, when, if his efforts had been successful, and all questions were satisfactorily settled, they would; be again sent home. If, on the other hand, his negotiations failed, then the troops would have arrived there at a time when I their services were most desirable. A considerable naval force has also been sent out, but as far as we have any information up; to the present time one vessel only has arrived, which had not been sent to China wholly independent of these transactions. I thought it desirable, in sending out vessels, to relieve those which had served their time on that station, to include seven or eight gunboats, to be employed in co—operation with the Chinese authorities in protecting the trade against the pirates that infest the Chinese waters. By the last; accounts we were informed that seven of these gunboats had arrived, and I have no doubt that ere long we shall have a good account of their operations against the war junks, a service for which they are peculiarly adapted, inasmuch as they can follow them into the shallow water where vessels of larger draught are unable to go. At the present moment Sir M. Seymour holds the Bird's Nest Fort, which is one-and-a-half mile from Canton, as his advanced post, and from thence to Hong Kong, the whole way down the river is occupied by our vessels moored at intervals and keep- ing up an uninterrupted communication. Canton is effectually blockaded, and it appears is reduced to a state of great distress—there is a great scarcity of provisions—money being raised at 7 to 8 percent, per month, and, strangely enough, an application has recently been made to the Admiral to allow grain to pass through our fleet to the relief of the inhabitants of Canton. At all other places in China with which we have communication the greatest harmony prevails between us and the Chinese authorities, and piracy has to a great extent been put down. But the right hon. Baronet asks why we do not take efficient means for prosecuting hostilities with China; though he has been informed time after time that it is impossible our troops can act in China till the autumn, and they would be there when Lord Elgin returned from Pekin. I have also said, that 5,000 troops have been sent out, which will be ready to act should Lord Elgin fail in bringing the matter to a satisfactory conclusion by negotiation. In the former Chinese war, when Lord Gough landed, he had only 2,700 men, which be found sufficient to boat the Chinese. Then the right hon. Gentleman, with a grave face, asked what were the circumstances that induced the Governor General to divert the troops on their way to China. I was certainly astonished to hear that question, as I thought it was obvious enough what those circumstances were, and that they were a perfect justification of the course which the Governor General had taken. And if those circumstances are a sufficient justification in the opinion of the right hon. Baronet as they were in the minds of everybody else, what does he mean by saying that the Government have not prosecuted the war in China with sufficient vigour to obtain our demands? The Government have taken active measures to send troops to China, but a greater necessity arose, and they have diverted those troops from their original destination to meet that necessity. Then the right hon. Gentleman said that the different accounts were contradictory, but if the right hon. Gentleman would take into consideration the difference of date, he would find everything consistent. The right hon. Gentleman asked me last Friday week whether any orders had been given to Lord Elgin by the Government to forward any portion of the troops then on their way to China to India. I replied that no such orders had been given. He then asked if Lord Canning had sent any orders to divert the troops from Ceylon, and I stated that, so far as I was aware, no such orders had been sent. He then asked whether Lord Elgin had authority, in case of receiving an application from Lord Canning, to divert the troops. My answer was, that when Lord Elgin left this country we had no idea that such a need would arise in India, and therefore no authority had been given him on the subject. That was then the exact state of the case; but on Saturday morning a different state of things arose. A telegraphic message was then received from India, and the first measure which we took upon its receipt was to stop the India mail which left here on Friday night, and to send out orders to Singapore to stop all the troops which had not passed that place, and to divert them at once to India. At the same time we received intelligence that Lord Canning's letter which had not reached Lord Elgin at Ceylon, had overtaken him at Singapore, and that Lord Elgin, acting upon a most proper estimate of the emergency of the case, had taken upon himself to divert all the troops originally destined for China to the graver need which had arisen in India. That was the step which Lord Elgin took, acting upon the principle salus populi suprema lex, and the measure has met with the perfect approval of the Government. I believe that the whole of the 5,000 troops sent from this country and intended for China will touch at Singapore, and that, in accordance with the direction of Lord Elgin, and the orders subsequently sent from home, they will all there be diverted to meet the greater need in India. When Lord Elgin wrote, the first regiment which had been sent on from the Mauritius had not reached Singapore, consequently there is reason to believe that the whole of the force will go to India. The hon. Gentleman then asked what is our present position in China? Up to the latest accounts, Lord Elgin was at Singapore, waiting for the frigate which is to convey him on to Hong Kong, from whence he was to proceed to Pekin to open negotiations with the imperial Government of China; but what he might do under the circumstances he might have to meet when he arrived there, it is impossible to say. He has ample naval force at his command to meet any emergency that might arise, and he must act upon his own responsibility and according to his own view of what the necessities of the case demand. It is impossible to judge here of what circum- stances he may have to meet, or to give specific instructions in reference to negotiations carried on at the other end of the world. Lord Elgin is a man of discretion and sound judgment, and by that discretion and judgment he must be guided. Probably before his arrival the war junks in the river will have been destroyed, but no further operations will be undertaken until the result of his negotiations are known. Hon. Gentlemen are aware that a large additional force of gunboats has been sent out. These will reach China probably in the autumn after the arrival of Lord Elgin, and will be available for any operations that it may then be thought necessary to carry out. A considerable force of marines is also to be sent out, which will furnish garrisons for the forts and allow a greater force to be brought against Canton. The force now under the command of Admiral Seymour will enable him to hold his own until they see what effect Lord Elgin's representations to the Imperial Government have, and by that time there will be an ample naval force in China to enable Lord Elgin to carry on whatever operations the circumstances of the case may render necessary. My own belief is, that there will be no interruption of peaceful relations in any other part of China, for at no time since the last Chinese war have the authorities and the inhabitants of the other ports exhibited more friendly or more amicable feelings towards the people of this country. Whatever hostilities take place will, I believe, be confined to Canton. It is the wish of Her Majesty's Government, that they should be confined to that place; and that seems also to be the wish of the Chinese Government and people. At present the efforts of Admiral Seymour will be directed to the maintenance of his present position, no further hostile operations being intended until the result of Lord Elgin's mission is known.

LORD CLAUD HAMILTON

said, he felt deeply that England was compromising her honour and her high character in entering upon these hostilities with China, and he must protest against the attempt of the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down to cast upon those who differed from the Government as to the policy and conduct of the hostilities against Canton, the invidious imputation that they were, therefore, desirous of running down the gallant Admiral whose misfortune it was to be obliged to be engaged in these discreditable proceedings. As Sir M. Seymour was a gallant Admiral, he must from his inmost soul detest the task which was intrusted to him, and must feel degradation and humiliation in pouring shot and shell and fireballs into a city full of a peaceful commercial population. Because he (Lord C. Hamilton) was obliged to condemn the conduct of the Government then, let it not be supposed that he blamed the gallant Admiral. The right hon. Gentleman who began his speech by asking the House to look into the blue-book which contained a narrative of these events, fell into a strange error in quoting them, by disregarding the dates of the different dispatches, and treating them as if they were arranged in the book according to their dates. In this manner the right hon. Gentleman was in error as to the period at which the Admiral wrote that he was shelling the city from the Dutch Folly, and he appeared to be in error also as to the period at which the inhabitants were said to have been warned previously to the shelling of the city from the Dutch Folly. The right hon. Gentleman had endeavoured to meet a public statement by a private letter, but his vindication entirely rested on a confusion of dates, for the dispatches clearly showed that while on the 14th of December the fire was turned on the public buildings and the wall, on the 15th of December the city itself was shelled. It was said that the object of the Admiral in the Chinese seas was to prevent the destruction of private property. He had no doubt of the Admiral's desire, but it was impossible, if the Admiral acted in conformity with his instructions, but that there must have been an enormous destruction of private property. The noble Lord had said we were not at war with China, but he would ask what possible effect could have been produced by all these cruelties, occasioned, as stated in the Friend of China, by a "terrific and continued cannonade for five hours," and by a "tremendous conflagration," as mentioned in another account? In the Morning Post there appeared a private letter of the date of the 15th of December, in which it was stated that they had created a great hubbub among the Chinese (Laughter). He would take that laugh as an index of the humanity of those carrying on the war against China. The sufferings of the inhabitants of Canton could not force Commissioner Yeh, who was acting under orders from the Emperor, into compliance, and therefore the infliction of those sufferings was wanton and cruel. But when the House heard so much about moderation, it was right that the House should know that the Admiral rather discountenanced moderation, for it would be seen in the bluebook that he said, "compulsion is the only argument to convince the Chinese," and "moderation is considered but another name for want of means to enforce compliance." However, the Admiral was not to blame for acting on his instructions; but the right hon. Gentleman had completely failed in his attempt to prove by a private letter that the impressions borne out by these public despatches was not correct. The noble Lord the other night said, that the public had approved the proceedings at China, but if that were the case, why did not the noble Lord propose to wipe from the journals of the House the Resolution adopted in the last Parliament? If the noble Lord made such a proposition he would find that the House would come to a similar decision, for not a single person representing a large constituency had declared that he would concur in an approval of the proceedings at Canton. The noble Lord knew very well that other circumstances besides approval of what had occurred in China affected the decision at the hustings, and, indeed, some of the noble Lord's colleagues had been obliged, in order to please their constituent, to state in their addresses that they did not like the whole of the proceedings there, but that they should have been wanting in liberality if they had not supported a distant public servant.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER

said, he did not know what the noble Lord meant when he said, that the Admiral in the China seas had received instructions to commit horrible cruelties. The Admiral only received orders from the Admiralty, and if he had received orders to commit horrible cruelties he would not have obeyed the orders. He had himself received a communication from Admiral Seymour, in which that Admiral said, that they did not call it war in China, but only the punishment of some people for insulting the British flag; and that they threw a shell into the town occasionally. He believed that was quite right, for it was the only way to bring the war to an end. Under present circumstances at Canton weapons must be used at a distance, and nothing else was to be done but to throw a shell in now and then in moderation. To hear the noble Lord one might suppose that Admiral Seymour was massacring the whole of the Chinese at Canton, but he understood from that gallant Admiral that he thought it hard that he should be abused by persons who were thousands of miles from the scene of action and who knew nothing of what occurred.

GENERAL THOMPSON

said, he believed that the transactions in China all arose out of what was technically called a "trade falsehood," which, it seemed, was not regarded everywhere with all the dislike which other falsehoods created. There was evidence of a foregone conclusion to quarrel with the Chinese, and a wretched and dishonourable subterfuge was got up about a miserable boat and some men who were taken from it. It was said that the British flag was insulted. They had all heard of the British flag and the British lion at the elections; there had been no end of the cries, "The British flag! The British flag! The British lion and the British flag!" and evidence had now come out, that there had been no British flag at all. The plea had been, that there was a kind of fetishe stuck up, which the Chinese were bound to have recognised and venerated; but now the evidence came that there was not even the fetishe. The floods of falsehood which followed were only equal to the first. Was there a man who believed in the poisoning at Hong Kong? Call the whole College of Physicians, and ask whether they could poison 300 men with arsenic without any of them dying, the arsenic not being weighed out by grains and scruples, but put into bread of which they ate according to their appetites, some more, some less. That was falsehood the second. Then there was falsehood the third, which came down to Huddersfield, where a most able and respected servant of the public, formerly a Member of that House, was excluded from a scat. The news came down there, that all was over; that the Emperor of China had conceded everything that was demanded; that the British lion was triumphant; and that there was nothing more to do but turn out of Parliament the gentleman to whom he had alluded. He would suggest to the House the consideration of a counter case. Suppose a fleet—Russian it might be—appeared in the Humber to enforce the landing of alcoholic drinks in defiance of the Excise. Suppose the director of that armament declared that he was not at war with Queen Victoria, but with the Mayor of Hull, and then the fire of the fleet was directed upon the Mayor's cucumber-frames, —would any one maintain that this was conduct worthy of a, great nation, or, indeed, of any nation, and that it did not sink the nation guilty of such an net below the ordinary level of civilization and humanity? Would not such a nation be degraded to the rank of Filibusters and pirates? What would everybody say of a Government that adopted such falsehoods, that patronized such actions, and that gave every public officer in its service reason to believe that he might commit any wanton or foolish thing he pleased, and would receive their support? Believe none of us, —never trust a philosopher or a Benthamite again,—for there was no knowing to what lengths he would go when he once got his head turned by communications with men who regarded opium-smuggling as the grand virtue, and its enforcement by violence as the merit of merits.

Resolution agreed to, as were the remaining Resolutions.