§ SIR DE LACY EVANSpursuant to notice, rose to draw the attention of the House to the military arrangements being made for meeting the contingency that has occurred in the Bengal Native Army. The hon. and gallant Member, who was indistinctly heard, was understood to say that, considering the House was to be prorogued during an emergency of momentous importance in reference to the military power of the country, it would not be thought unreasonable that he, as a professional man, should endeavour to direct attention to the subject—to elicit from the Government what steps they had taken or were about to take to meet the emergency; and, though he was aware that advice offered to the Government was not generally acceptable, to state his views of what ought to be done to render the military resources of the nation adequate to the occasion. He thought he was bound to offer some justification for giving his opinion, and this he found in his fear that until recently the Government had not appreciated, to the full extent, the importance of the contingency that had arisen. He formed that opinion first upon the fact that the whole proposed augmentation of our naval forces was only to the extent of 2,000 men. Surely, if the Estimate of the maritime force which had been presented at the commencement of the Session was adequate only to the wants of a peace establishment, the mere addition of 2,000 sailors was scarcely a sufficient increase to meet the requirements of actual war. Such a force was not more than adequate to carry on the war between Sir John Bowring and Commissioner Yeh. Then again, with respect to the militia, an estimate had been presented for £200,000 to meet the extra expenses that would be incurred between the present time and the 28th of March, a period of about eight months. That sum was a mere nothing to provide, when it was recollected that in 1393 a very short time there would be scarcely any regular troops of the line remaining in this country. The Government, of course, was better able than himself to judge of the actual relations of this country with the other Powers, and he sincerely hoped that there was no reason to apprehend any interruption of the present state of peace in Europe; but under any circumstances, and especially under circumstances such as the present, he thought it would be most unbecoming to us as a great Power to present ourselves before Europe comparatively disarmed. With regard to the embodiment of the militia, the noble Lord at the head of the War Department appeared to regard that as a mere contingency which might happen, and that the services of a portion of the militia might possibly be required. Now that circumstance alone, even were there no other reasons, would lead him to believe that the Government had not regarded the state of affairs in India quite so seriously as the occasion demanded. In looking round to see whence troops could be obtained in the present emergency, the garrisons of our various colonies would naturally be expected to supply a portion of their forces. There was a very large force at Malta—six or seven battalions; and he presumed that at least three of those battalions could be spared. During the Crimean war the Governor and the Commander of the Forces in Malta very properly sent away nearly the whole garrison of that island—a step which was regarded by the inhabitants as a proof of confidence in them; and the result proved that that confidence was well founded. He hoped, therefore, that a portion of the garrison of Malta would be made available for service in India; but instead of being brought home, as he heard was intended, he would suggest that those three battalions, together with the cavalry and artillery intended for Bombay and Kurrachee, should be sent through Egypt—a course by which many weeks might be saved. He had been told that the earnest desire of the Pacha of Egypt was to afford every facility for the transmission through his territory of the troops destined to meet the emergency in India. He might have been wrongly informed, but, if not, he hoped the Government would not hesitate to take advantage of the offer, and that if not the whole, at least the greater part, of the force would be sent by that route. The want of a coal depot at Suez had, he 1394 was aware, been put forward its an objection. But surely that might be provided in a very short time. There were other considerations with regard to the transport of troops to India at the present moment that were of great importance. On the 9th May last, a noble Earl in another place inquired what reinforcements were intended to be sent to India; and the answer of the Secretary for War was, that the Government did not consider that our territories in that part of the world were at all seriously menaced, but that 4,000 men would be sent by June, by means of transport ships, to reinforce the European troops in that country. But he had closely watched the accounts of the embarkation of troops, and he said that instead of 4,000 he understood that only 554 men were actually embarked in the month of June. He admitted that considerable exertions had been made to procure transports, and that since June the number of troops sent out had been considerably increased. Up to the 8th August he believed that about 16,600 men had actually embarked for India, and that 6,000 or 8,000 more were now under orders. There were 4,000 or 5,000 troops that had been intercepted on their way to China, by order of the Governor General, and sent on to India; and some additional forces had been likewise drawn from Mauritius and Ceylon. Taking all together, including those under orders for embarkation, the additional European force which the Indian Government would have at its command, when they all arrived, would not exceed, he supposed, 28,000 men. That was undoubtedly a considerable force, and with the artillery, about 100 guns, would be a most desirable accession to the British forces in India. Still he doubted whether all the arrangements had been made which the circumstances of the case demanded. One of the greatest difficulties to be overcome was the immense distance the troops had to be conveyed before they reached the scene of operations. He believed the whole of the troops hitherto embarked had gone out in sailing vessels, and he was told that was necessary in consequence of there being no depots for coaling steamers on the voyage That was an inconvenience, however, which it appeared to him might be easily remedied, and he hoped he should be told that measures had been taken for that purpose. At all events, he believed he was not incorrect in supposing that at Sierra Leone, the Cape, the Mauritius, and 1395 Ceylon coaling stations in every way suitable might be formed, each being about 3,000 or 3,500 miles distant from the other. Of this he was quite sure, that whatever expense might be necessary for so important an object as the shortening of the time distance by some 3,000 miles in conveying out troops to meet an emergency like the present, by establishing these coal depots, would be gladly borne by the country. Unless it could be shown that there was some practical difficulty in the way, he trusted he should be told by some Minister that ships had been sent out to form coal depots at the stations he had indicated. He hoped that the reply he should receive would give some distinct information upon this point, and if it should be in the affirmative, it would be a matter of great satisfaction to him. It had been complained that some of our old vessels of war, now in ordinary, had not been despatched to India, and he hoped to receive satisfactory information on this point also, for one or two vessels in the port or river of Calcutta would, under existing circumstances, be of great use. These were matters which had all been discussed by the public press; still he trusted there was no harm in his urging them upon the attention of the Government. He had seen recently in a newspaper that Captain Osborne's squadron of sixteen gunboats, intended for China, had left Rio on the 3rd of July. He trusted that that statement was correct, and that orders would be sent out to arrest the squadron at Galle, and send it on to Calcutta, for no force could be more effective in operating in the Indian rivers than a squadron of gunboats, and the need for them was much more urgent on the Ganges than in the Canton river. There were some other points which deserved consideration in speaking of the reinforcements sent out to meet the emergency of the mutiny of the Bengal army. Unquestionably 28,000 men was a very large addition to the European force in India. But it should be recollected that a large portion of that number was due in the shape of recruits for the Indian regiments, and therefore they could scarcely be accounted as an addition to our army there. Again, these troops would necessarily be diminished before October by casualties and deaths, and still more by the sick in hospital, and therefore we must be prepared to find them diminished by 5,000 or 6,000 men. Means should be in readiness to send out men atonce to supply that defi- 1396 ciency. With regard to the force which might be drawn from the Colonies there were four serviceable battalions in Canada. Canada might now almost be considered an independent ally of England. She was in no danger of attack from any Power, and her militia were quite adequate for any purpose of internal defence; therefore he saw no reason why three of those regiments should not be at once recalled for service in India. And not only that, but he would venture to renew a suggestion he made during the Crimean war, that advantage should be taken of the sympathy manifested by the Canadian people in the affairs of the mother country, and that the offer they then made to raise two Canadian regiments to be added to our regular army, but which, from some jealousy, he feared, existing at the Horse Guards, had been declined, should, if renewed, be now accepted. At this moment, if the Canadian people were informed that such a force would be valuable in India, he had no doubt they would be eager to renew the offer. Then as to the forces of the Cape. He had previously expressed his regret that so large a force should be kept up by the Government in that colony. There were at the Cape now, he believed, eleven regiments of infantry, a strong regiment of mounted riflemen, and 2,500 Germans. Yet at no time were the Kaffirs less able to make inroads into the British territory; and seeing that the Cape had the advantage of a free government, it was too much to call upon the Imperial Government to protect the whole of the extended frontier, or to do more than to afford them some assistance towards enabling them to guard it themselves. Four thousand British troops, acting in this way, would be sufficient to keep the Kaffirs within bounds for the next few years, when the protection of the country might safely, he hoped, be given up to the colonists. He was told that by maintaining this large army at the Cape we had been saved another Kaffir war. Even if it were so, which he questioned, he did not see any very great advantage in being saved from a war, if for that purpose we had to keep up a war establishment in time of peace; but of late years we had kept up a larger force at the Cape than at any period during the Kaffir wars, and as there could be no necessity for maintaining so large an army there, he trusted that he should hear from the Government that they had taken steps to render the troops at the Cape available for the emer- 1397 gency in India, where, as they were already half-way, if orders had been sent on in the first instance they would arrive long before any troops sent on from this country could do. It had been intended during the war with Russia to send one of the regiments at the Cape to the Crimea, but in consequence of some want of technicality in the order sent to the Commander of the Forces, that regiment was never despatched, and we did not derive the assistance of one man from the Cape during the Crimean war. He had observed as a rule that the Governors of distant colonies were very averse to parting with their soldiers; but the force at the Cape was altogether out of proportion to any demand that could arise for their services. He thought, under the circumstances, three or four battalions of infantry, and the 2,500 men of the German Legion, would be an ample force for the defence of the colony, and that seven battalions might be spared for India without danger. The order of the Government at home ought to be imperative; if however, the Government contented themselves with merely sending orders to the Governor of the colony to send all that he could spare, he should entertain great doubts of the result. He thought it was the duty of the Government at home to take the responsibility upon themselves, and to issue peremptory orders to send over so many battalions; for unless they did so he did not believe that any very great force would go from the Cape to India. He understood from the newspapers that the Governor of Bombay, immediately on hearing of the mutiny in the Bengal army, had very properly despatched two ships with reinforcements to Calcutta. He did not expect the same course would be taken by the Governor of the Cape without orders from the Government at home; but he trusted, if such orders had not already been sent out, that no further delay would take place in forwarding them, and that the result would be an addition of six or seven regiments of infantry to the available force at Calcutta. It was clear that not less than 100,000 of the Native troops in India had been either disbanded or were in arms against us; and even if they should have received that blow, which he trusted had ere this been struck at Delhi, it would still leave perhaps some years of serious work upon our hands before we could re-establish our military position in India, and place ourselves on our former footing 1398 of security both as regarded India and Europe. It was evident, when we took into consideration the vast extent of territory over which we had to act, that a very large force would be required to restore and maintain our position. As he had said, when the forces which had been sent out arrived in India, it would be found that considerable diminution of their numbers by sickness and other disabling causes would have occurred, and after their arrival still greater losses must be anticipated; it was necessary to provide for these, and the only means of doing so was by recruiting and the militia. At all events, he trusted he should hear no suggestion of having recourse to the enlistment of foreigners. Well, then, the only means of supplying the casualties and maintaining the effective strength of the army was by recruiting for the line and the militia, and as a means for supplying the ranks of the army he looked to the militia as of far greater importance than recruiting. If there was any branch of our military system that failed during the late war it was the recruiting. The late Lord Hardinge had given his decided testimony to that effect, and many hon. and gallant Officers then in the House knew how perfectly unsatisfactory and unavailable it was, both as to the number and to the quality of the recruits. Now he thought the time had arrived when they ought to consider what were the causes of this great difficulty which undoubtedly existed of recruiting the regular army. It certainly was not for want of enterprise or military spirit in the youth of the country; the chief reason, he believed, was that adequate inducements were not offered to young men to enlist. He believed £10 only was the maximum bounty in the late Russian war, whereas in the previous war double that amount was allowed. But it had been stated, he believed, by several authorities, and amongst them the late Commander-in-Chief, that a heavy bounty was objectionable because it encouraged desertion. That might be so; but, whether or not, he would suggest to the Government that it was a subject well worthy of their consideration what were the causes of the difficulty of recruiting the army, and what it was that occasioned the unwillingness on the part of the great body of the people to enter into the military service of their country; because, unless some adequate means were taken to facilitate recruiting we should get into a serious difficulty, 1399 notwithstanding our immense resources and the patriotic spirit of the country. Looking then to the militia as the chief source from which reinforcements to the regular troops could be drawn, he confessed he was disappointed when he found the Estimate to be proposed for the militia was only £200,000. He had heard it said that at some time between this and Christmas 30,000 of the militia might be called out, and had also heard reasons put forward why they should not be too precipitate in this matter—on the ground that it was not thought desirable to run the risk of interfering with the harvest, or with the recruiting for the regular army. He, however, thought these reasons wholly insufficient and would respectfully urge upon the Government the advisability of making arrangement for the immediate calling out a large militia force. At least 50,000 or 60,000 men ought to be embodied. He was almost afraid to mention the small number of troops we now had at home. When the Estimates were brought forward for the peace establishment, some months back, he stated that in his opinion it was not the duty of a non-official Member of that House to dictate to the Government the military force which ought to be maintained for the service of the country, but he added on that occasion that there were at that time only about thirty-one or thirty-two battalions of the line in the kingdom. That number had been now greatly diminished. Again, what were the means announced for supplying the deficiency? He understood it had been announced that all the battalions or regiments of the line at home were to be raised from 840 (the present complement) to 1,000 men each. But the number of battalions at home was so small that that would scarcely give them more than 3,000 or 4,000 additional men. Then they were to have ten second battalions of 1,000 each raised; which might give altogether an addition of 13,000 or 14,000 men. But even this augmentation, he contended, was wholly inadequate. Even in the present state of things, although there was a strong feeling of public security, we ought to show to the world on all emergencies that we possessed a complete inherent power of military strength; and every means ought to be resorted to be restore our home establishment to its proper strength. With regard to the events that had recently happened in the East, the House had in the accounts in the public journals read many state- 1400 ments of heroic conduct on the part of the British officers in India, and he did hope that Government would lose no time in manifesting, in some conspicuous way, their sense of the services of those gallant officers. He might mention especially the two Lawrences and Lieut. Willoughby—one of whom in Oude, with an extremely small force, and the other in the Punjab, upheld the authority of the Governor and prevented disaster. Then there was Brigadier Wilson, who had evinced great skill and gallantry. [An hon. MEMBER: And Major Edwardes?] Yes, and Major Edwardes; he wished he had a higher rank than "major." That also was a distinguished instance of the resources, the energy, and the bravery of a British officer. Major Edwardes commenced at once to levy Sikh troops, and with great success. All those officers, as well as many others, he trusted, would receive from the Government the reward they so richly merited. He would not trespass further upon the attention of the House. There was one circumstance, however, which had struck every mind in this country, and almost every mind in Europe, in connection with this outbreak, and that was the extreme ferocity and inhumanity which had been displayed by the Indian Sepoys. It might have been supposed from such conduct that they had been long suffering under some grievous oppression; but the fact was just the reverse. No troops in the world were treated with more consideration or enjoyed greater advantages than the Sepoys of the Bengal army. The explanation of the atrocities of which we had read, on the part of the mutinous troops, remained, he admitted, to be explained. He trusted, however, that these mutinous assassins would be punished with condign severity, and that no mistaken lenity or false humanity would stand in the way of the well-deserved retribution which ought to fall upon them. Momentous as this state of things was, he must nevertheless call to mind that the people of this country had not been in any way intimidated by the serious position in which at one time we stood during the Crimean war, and that although during the sad interval referred to that gigantic struggle was calculated to embarrass the most powerful military Governments. The British public, instead of being therefore deterred from prosecuting the war, were earnestly desirous of prolonging it, with the utmost energy. The same feeling, he 1401 was confident, would animate the country on the present emergency, and the Government, backed by the popular feeling and by the concurrence of the House of Commons, would be enabled, without delay, to take such measures as would restore peace and security to India. Before sitting down he would suggest that as the local Government of India, with all its resources, might find a present difficulty in obtaining specie for the purposes of the military operations, he should be glad to hear, that the Home Government intended to include in the supplies about to be transmitted to India, the probably needed assistance, of this indispensable element of war.
§ VISCOUST PALMERSTONThe House, I am sure, will feel that the high military character of the gallant Officer who has just sat down must command the respect of all who listen to him, and that any opinions which he may express are worthy of the greatest deference even, from those who may not altogether agree with them, or who may not be disposed to carry them so far as he does. The gallant Officer therefore, will, I trust, give credit to the Government for having listened with the greatest respect and deference to the sentiments which he has just expressed, so honourable to him as an individual, and so worthy of the high character which he has always borne. However, I think that my hon. and gallant Friend in some measure overestimated the European difficulty which may be produced by the events in India, and the efforts which we may be compelled to make in order to meet their consequences. He seemed to think that foreign nations may, by the knowledge how large a force we have been compelled to detach to our Indian possessions, be led to imagine that we are weak and defenceless at home, and may therefore assume a higher tone, or adopt other measures with regard to us than would have been prudent under different circumstances. I think that the concluding observations of my hon. and gallant Friend afford an answer to any such apprehension. The nations of the world have seen with what unanimous spirit, and with what energy the British people have responded to any call for efforts and exertions which the Government has thought it right to make upon them in moments of national peril; and any Government or any nation which should think that the particular circumstances of the present moment render it safe for it to assume an unusual attitude towards this country would 1402 I am convinced, very soon find out its mistake, and would without loss of time resume its accustomed bearing towards England. It is true that we have had occasion to send to India, either from this country or from our colonies, a force which, in round numbers, amounts to about 30,000 men; but we have taken and are taking those steps which we think best calculated to fill up the gap thus occasioned in our home or defensive force. Measures have been taken such as those recommended by my hon. and gallant Friend. We are raising recruits as fast as they can be obtained, for the purpose of augmenting the establishments not only of the regiments at home, but of all regiments in every part of the world except India, those in that country being already at their full complement. We are forming ten second battalions, and are prepared to call out and embody a certain portion of the militia. Now, my hon. and gallant Friend seems to think that there is not on the part of the people of this country that disposition to enlist in the army which he would wish to see. I do not think that the example of the Crimean war affords any grounds for that apprehension. During that war we raised, speaking from recollection, fully 50,000 men in one twelvemonth; a number more than double that which was ever before raised in a similar time. The inducements to the people of this country to adopt the career of a soldier are the good treatment of the soldiers, the pension which is given under certain circumstances, and after certain periods of service, and the general respect which is felt for the military body. I do not think that there is any reason for saying that these inducements are not sufficient. Of course, lowering the standard and increasing the bounty would in some degree facilitate the process of recruiting; but at a period like this, when there is all over the country a great demand for labour for harvest operations, it is not likely that those who can get high wages for such work will, until it is over, be disposed to enlist in the army, however favourably they may regard it as a permanent career. I have not the slightest doubt that when the harvest is finished we shall get a greater number of recruits weekly than has hitherto been obtained; but even now the number who have enlisted during the short period that the recruiting has been going on is far from inconsiderable. We might say that we would raise twenty battalions; but what is the use of announcing that 1403 you will form a greater force than your recruiting will enable you to create within a given time? The best course seems to me to be to attempt the formation of as many regiments as you can raise within a short time, and when those are formed to raise others if they are needed. Again, my hon. and gallant Friend thinks that a larger force of militia ought to be embodied than we are understood to intend to call out. But there are two limits to this maintaining of troops; first, the means of recruiting; and, secondly, the amount of the public revenue out of which you can pay the recruits whom you may embody. The militia is paid like the line, and the expense of its maintenance is equal to that of the regular troops. I have no doubt that if we were able to tell this House and the country that we were upon the eve of some great European difficulties, that there were pending differences between this country and foreign States, which might end in events that would require great efforts for our self-defence—I have no doubt whatever that this House would respond to such an appeal, and that by the imposition of fresh taxes it would enable the Government to provide whatever increased amount of either military or naval force might be deemed necessary for the adequate defence and security of the country. But, fortunately, we are at present not in that position. I am not aware of anything which leads to the apprehension that we are likely to be engaged in serious differences with any foreign State; and, therefore, I think that it is more consistent with the duty of the Government to abstain from calling upon Parliament to give extraordinary means until the moment arrives when there is a prospect that they will be required. There are two errors into which men may fall. One is to overlook a really existing danger, and the other to imagine dangers which have no real and actual existence. It is, the duty of the Government to endeavour to avoid the latter as well as not to fall into the former. In the present state of things, I do not apprehend that any circumstances are likely to arise which would place us in difficulties at a period earlier than that at which the measures which we are now taking will restore our defensive force to the amount which, at the beginning of the year, was thought to be sufficient as our ordinary peace establishment. These events in India are very afflicting; they are very serious, and will require, 1404 fear, continuous efforts on our part to meet them; but as far as Europe is concerned, nothing has happened to disturb that state of peace in which we fortunately found ourselves at the commencement of the year. No doubt, Sir, my hon. and gallant Friend has called attention to several matters which are well deserving of consideration. Among other things he has suggested—what has also been suggested elsewhere—that measures might be taken to send through Egypt the reinforcements destined for India. In the first instance, no doubt, such a measure wears a favourble aspect; but there is this to be considered, that, even assuming, which my hon. and gallant Friend, I dare say, very justly assumes, that the Government of Turkey and the local Government of Egypt would make no objection to such a proceeding, the transport of any considerable number of men from Alexandria to Suez is a matter which would be attended with great inconvenience and considerable difficulty; so much so, that when, during the Crimean war regiments were brought from India by that route, our Consul-general in Egypt stated that the difficulties attending the arrangements were such, that he hoped and trusted we were not likely to have to adopt a similar proceeding again. That operation, however, was comparatively easy, because the arrangements were made long beforehand; the means of transport from India were prepared in that country, and we had, in the Mediterranean, vessels to take those troops to the Crimea. But suppose that to-morrow morning we determined to send 3,000 or 4,000 men to India, and wished to send them to Egypt, what operations must be performed. Not only must we obtain the consent of the local authorities, make an arrangement for the supplying of transport across the desert, (which for any large number of men with their baggage and stores it would not be easy to obtain), and make arrangements for supplying them with provisions during their march; but we must have in the Red Sea a sufficient number of transports, properly fitted, to carry them on to India. Therefore we must write to India, and the local Government of Bombay must obtain these transports, fit them for the reception of troops, and send them up the Red Sea to Suez. The Red Sea, as my hon. and gallant Friend knows, is at certain times of the year very difficult of navigation by sailing vessels for one-half its course, and it is not likely that steamers of sufficient 1405 number and magnitude could at once be engaged at Bombay. It is a matter worthy of consideration whether all these operations would not take so much time that troops starting hence to go across Egypt would probably not arrive in India so soon as those sent in ships properly equipped round by the Cape of Good Hope. Therefore it is very questionable whether that arrangement is one which would in practice attain the object of those who recommend it: not to mention the objections which exist to landing stores, men, and horses—if you sent them, which you probably would not—at Alexandria, transporting them by railway to Suez, and there re-embarking them. My hon. and gallant Friend knows that these operations of embarking and disembarking cannot be carried on without occasioning much damage to the stores so transferred. No doubt it is true, as he says, that the force at the Cape is larger than under the present circumstances may probably be needed, and is at a point very convenient for despatch to India. My right hon. Friend the Secretary for the Colonies has already written to the Governor of the Cape, directing him to send to India, in addition to the two regiments which had previously been ordered from the Cape, whatever portion of the garrison he may think can be spared consistently with the safety of the colony. We have therefore allowed Sir George Grey to use a full and free discretion as to sending to India any portion of the force now at the Cape, which he thinks may be spared from that station without danger to the security of the colony. We have done more than that. It having been represented to us that there may be a want of horses in India for the cavalry and artillery, we have therefore made arrangements to obtain, if possible, a supply of horses from the borders of the Persian Gulf, from the Cape of Good Hope, and from other places, to be conveyed to India. I will now touch lightly upon a topic which has been a subject of much difference of opinion both within and without these walls—I mean the China war; and I think that those Gentlemen who did not approve of hostilities having been commenced as they were commenced, must at least admit that out of evil good has come. The force, which has, I now trust, landed at Singapore, would not have arrived there so speedily but for the occurrences which took place at Canton, and that, I trust, will be a consolation to some hon. Gentlemen 1406 who disapproved the course which has been pursued in China. My hon. and gallant Friend has adverted to the proposal which was made during the late war with regard to raising battalions in the North American provinces. Now such a proposal at the present time is one which would deserve to be well and carefully considered, and upon which I do not wish at present to express any opinion; but I may mention to the House one circumstance which mainly guided the Government in their determination of not giving effect to those proposals during the war in the Crimea. We were at that time engaged in the discussion of questions of considerable difficulty and importance with the Government of the United States of America, and we did not think that it would be very desirable to withdraw at that time from Canada any large body of men, who might possibly, if the negotiations had taken an unfavourable turn, have been required for the defence of those provinces themselves. Well, Sir, my hon. and gallant Friend has adverted to the events which have lately taken place in India, and he has very properly dwelt upon the great energy and heroic courage which have been displayed by the British officers, whether civil, or military, in every part of that country. I, for my own part, must say that, while upon the one hand these events must be afflicting to the mind of every one, yet, on the other hand, every Englishman must feel proud of his country, when he sees how a few Englishmen, scattered over a vast country, in many cases acting singly and with the smallest possible support, have proved themselves equal to the emergency in which they have been placed, and have displayed equal skill and courage. I say that they have not shown mere bravery alone, but their skill and judgment have accomplished things of which any country might have been proud of performing under similar circumstances; and that is at all events, to a certain extent, a source of consolation which we may set against the darker portion of the picture. I can only assure my hon. and gallant Friend and the House that the Government are at present doing all that they think necessary to meet the difficulties with which we have to contend. We are not going beyond what we consider to be existing necessities; but if events should take a turn different from that which we hope they will take, if difficulties of other kinds, not at present foreseen, should come upon us, then we feel that we have 1407 at hand that resource which in this country every Government has—I mean the power of calling Parliament together, and of laying before them the circumstances of the case and of asking for those additional means which the necessities of the moment may require. I can only repeat that as, on the one hand, I believe that it would be blameable in us to shut our eyes to any difficulties which at present exist, and which may require additional exertion to meet them, so, on the other hand, I think that we should not be properly performing the duty which devolves upon us as a Government if we were to ask Parliament to impose burdens, and the country to submit to burdens, which we do not in our consciences believe that the interests of the country really demand. In conclusion, I can only assure my hon. and gallant Friend; that it is the anxious desire and aim of the Government to do everything which may be necessary to accomplish those objects which he has so properly pointed out to the House.
COLONEL NORTHsaid, he entirely agreed with the noble Lord as to the confidence which was to be placed in the zeal, courage, and loyalty of our officers and men in India; but, at the same time, he thought that it would be a fatal error to trust entirely to the personal courage of any body of men. At the present moment this country was sending out a large number of seasoned soldiers, together with some hundreds of recruits. Now, the House must remember that it was very easy to add some 200 or 300 recruits to a regiment of 800 or 1,000 seasoned men, and yet retain the regiment in a good state of efficiency; but the case was very different when a regiment was formed entirely of young recruits, young non-commissioned officers, and young commissioned officers; for no one could suppose that any very great reliance could be placed upon such a regiment for the defence of the country, notwithstanding the loyalty and personal courage of the men composing the regiment. A regiment of soldiers; upon whom reliance could be placed was not to be formed simply by dressing men in red coats and teaching them how to manæuvre: the real soldier was a man who had been properly trained to his calling. He thought, therefore, that it was a great error to send all the seasoned troops out of the country, and to rely upon the militia alone for the defence of the country,—who, although they were thoroughly 1408 brave and worthy of the character of Englishmen in every respect, nevertheless could not be supposed to possess the qualifications which were necessary to form a proper soldier. The effect which a small well-disciplined force had in controlling a mob proved the value of that feeling of reliance, not only upon himself, but upon every member of his corps, by which the seasoned soldier was actuated, and that feeling could not be expected in a regiment of raw recruits. With regard to the question of expense, it simply came to this—was the safety of the country worth being insured or not? If not, then no trouble need be taken about the matter; but if it were, then surely, whatever the expense might be, she ought to be placed in a position of safety against any attack which might be made upon her; and he could not help thinking that the Government were paying but little attention to the great advantages of seasoned soldiers and young soldiers as regarded the defence of the country.
§ MR. BENTINCKsaid, he could not help thinking that the remarks just made by the noble Lord would have been much more satisfactory, both to the House and the public, if the noble Lord had gone into more details in regard to the defence of the country. He had no doubt that the noble Viscount spoke with great confidence when he said, that if any foreign country should suppose that, on account of the position in which England was placed by recent events, she might with impunity adopt another attitude with regard to us, she would speedily find out her mistake. Now, that was no doubt very agreeable for them to hear; but, after all, it amounted simply to nothing but an expression of opinion by the noble Lord that we should be ready at all times to resent an insult and to vindicate our own honour. But the noble Lord went on to say that he saw no reason to apprehend any contingency arising in Europe which would require a larger amount of defences than we were prepared to supply. The authority of the noble Lord was no doubt very great; but, after all, it was but the expression of an individual opinion as to whether such a contingency might or might not arise—the contingency of a greater force than we had already prepared being required. The noble Lord should recollect that, if such an emergency did occur, it would be too late for precautions. If the emergency should occur—that of a sudden outbreak 1409 in Europe requiring an immediate increase of the defences of the country—it would then be too late to assemble the House of Commons, and to take those measures which should be of a most decisive character. Therefore, as the noble Lord admitted the possibility of the occurrence of such an emergency, the remedy he suggested of calling together the House of Commons was not the one adequate for the occasion. He did not think that this was a position in which the House should be placed. If the noble Lord had condescended to give them some more detailed account as to the amount of the force in the country actually available for our defence, it would be somewhat more satisfactory than the vague statement which he had offered on the subject.
§ SIR HARRY VERNEYsaid, that it was all very well for persons who were in a comparative state of safety to talk coolly over what had occurred in India, and what measures were necessary to suppress the mutiny; but what must be the feelings of those who were in that country, when they thought that all these calamities had arisen from the want of foresight in those who governed India? The crisis was one which required to be dealt with by something more than mere patriotic phrases. It appeared to him that some six or eight of the ships of the line under Lord Lyons in the Mediterranean might easily be prepared to carry a regiment a piece to India. There were, some time ago, between 9,000 and 10,000 troops at Malta, and six or seven regiments might therefore, with the utmost facility, have been despatched thence to Madras and Bombay by means of vessels belonging to the large squadron which Lord Lyons had under his command in the Mediterranean. Why, he would ask, had not that course been adopted? There might, no doubt, be European objects to be attained which would render it expedient that we should maintain a considerable force in the Mediterranean; but that end could be accomplished by sending out from this country troops to supply the place of those which he contended ought to have been despatched to the East. There was also another point which, in his opinion, was well worthy of the consideration of the Government—he alluded to the sending out gunboats which could go up the Indian rivers to protect the cities which were situated upon their banks. Gunboats might, for instance, be sent up as far as Allahabad, and other 1410 towns throughout India, with that view; and that no step of that kind had been taken was, he thought, an act of omission which was open to grave censure. In fact, these matters had been passed over as if these precautions were of no importance, and there existed no crisis in our Indian empire. He did not, however, feel disposed to find fault with the Government for the course they had pursued in reference to the matters to which he had adverted, so much as with that House, which had pressed upon the Government, at the close of the Crimean war, a resort to measures of economy which had, in point of fact, turned out to be productive, instead of a saving, of ruinous expense. The House of Commons ought, he contended, to have protested against the adoption of such measures; and, among them, against the disbandment of those 3,000 artillerymen, whom it would now be found extremely difficult, if not impossible, to replace. Hon. Members must bear in mind that to their keeping the interests of the country had been committed by their constituents, and that they would not be properly discharging the duty which had been confided to them unless they were determined to force the Government to take such steps as were necessary for the due protection of Her Majesty's dominions both at home and abroad.
§ MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, he wished to press two considerations upon the House. It appeared to him that one subject especially had been overlooked by the House, and it was this:—Whatever may be the prospects of our immediately quelling this mutiny in India—whatever may be the prospect of the force now going out as to its adequacy to restore security in our possessions, many of our fellow-countrymen must necessarily be exposed to the greatest perils, and he was afraid that too many had been put to death of whose fate we were not yet made aware. However we might have provided for the immediate emergency, we should consider that India must, for some years to come, be permanently garrisoned. The soldiers we were about to send out to India must remain in India; and, therefore, we must not expect that our military establishment at home would be recruited by the return to England, from time to time, of the several regiments of which those troops consisted. Under such circumstances, we ought to make such preparations as would enable us to maintain, not only a peace establish- 1411 ment, but such an establishment as would enable us to reinforce the ranks of our array in India, should a contingency similar to the present again arise. On the point of calling out the militia, there would be a great inconvenience in having the militia converted into a standing army. The intention of the embodiment of the militia was, that it should be called out for the protection of this country against a sudden emergency. It would be, therefore, departing from the whole nature of the force to embody it as a standing army. The militia might be the best school for recruiting an army; but being a force only intended to be called out on an emergency, on that emergency ceasing the men should be allowed to return to their previous occupations. He hoped that the House would excuse him for pointing out those two considerations, which he thought were extremely important. The one was this—we must not look to the return of the soldiers from India perhaps for years; and the other was, that it would be extremely unwise to rely upon the militia, when we believed that we required the services of a larger force than we had at present in order to maintain the safety of the country.
MR. W. WILLIAMSsaid, that the desire evinced by some hon. Members for the maintenance of an enormous standing army in time of peace was one which, from his previous experience of that House, caused him very little surprise; nor was he astonished to find that the hon. Baronet the Member for Buckingham (Sir Harry Verney) had found fault with the Government for dismissing 3,000 artillerymen at the close of the late war. He should wish, however, to know what, in the opinion of the hon. Baronet and of those Gentlemen to whom he adverted, was the use of a Government, if reliance were not to be placed upon their estimate of the force which it was necessary to keep up for the protection of the country? Now, the House of Commons had never refused any force which the Government considered necessary. If the mutiny in India had come immediately after the war with Russia, the Government would, of course, have maintained the army at its then strength. The feeling of the community at large was, no doubt, in favour of upholding our dominion in India; but to the Executive Government they must look to take the steps to which it was expedient to have recourse in order to secure that end, and not to gentlemen bearing military 1412 titles but possessing little or no military knowledge. The noble Lord at the head of the Government had stated that he was prepared to adopt every measure which the protection of the country might demand, but that he was bound to consider the question of the taxation of the people,—which did not seem to enter into the consideration of some hon. Gentlemen. He for one, after the confidence in the administration of the noble Lord which had lately been so unequivocally manifested the people of England, was quite contented to be guided by his opinion.
§ MR. WHITESIDEsaid, the gravity of the present crisis in India was one which it was impossible to overrate, and one which was associated with many painful considerations. Since he had list addressed the House upon the subject of India, he had heard from his hon. Friend the Member for the city of Dublin, of the murder of his relative by the mutineers, a fine young man, with whom he had the pleasure of being acquainted; while he had heard from his hon. Friend the Member for the county of Armagh, of another instance in which a relative of his had been a victim. Now, he would ask, was there to be no redress afforded for the misconduct of those by whose neglect such unhappy events had been brought about? Had the Government formed to themselves no idea of what the policy was to be, which, in ruling India was, for the future, to be pursued? Was the House of Commons disposed to assent to that which he might be permitted to call the somewhat servile doctrine recommended by the hon. Member for Lambeth—of taking it for granted that everything which was said and done by her Majesty's Ministers must be supposed to have been said and done rightly and well? Against such a doctrine as that, he, for one, protested. There was nothing which the Government might deem, to be necessary for the defence of India, which hon. Members upon his side of the House would not be found ready to grant; and, indeed, they had been not a little surprised at the circumstance that they had not had the question of the embodiment of the militia brought somewhat sooner under their consideration. He must, however, be excused if he did not place implicit reliance in the wisdom and foresight of her Majesty's Ministers; and he could not help feeling strongly that upon the policy which they proposed to carry out, in reference to India, would, in a great measure, depend the amount of the military force which it 1413 would be necessary to maintain in that country. Now, while upon that point, he should call the attention of the House to an extract from a letter bearing the signature, "An Anglo-Indian." which had, a few days before, appeared in that journal which had the largest circulation of any newspaper in the world, and by means of which the sentiments contained in the letter to which he referred would, no doubt, be conveyed to the inhabitants of India. The extract to which he alluded was as follows:—
I am happy to hear that evidence is being obtained both as to the Emperor of Delhi and the King of Oude. It will be pleasant to save £250,000 or £300,000 a year in their forfeited pensions.I have some hope that the Nawab of Moorshedabad may be implicated too. That would save £120,000 a year more.Once again, do allow me to plead earnestly that, instead of now yielding to caste, and pottering about the 'prejudices' of the natives, our future policy should be an unbending, stern, and avowed discouragement of everything opposed to civilization, social morals, and British supremacy. If we now issue a proclamation declaring that, whereas caste has been used as a plea for sedition, and whereas it is based on falsehood, and the British Government regards all men as born equal, therefore, henceforth, it shall not be recognised in any form, the whole Hindoo population will bow, admit the justice of our indignation, and this monstrous anti-social absurdity will soon perish.I am not for letting the State turn missionary; but, if our soldiers knock down every filthy idol they see, and lay every musjid level with the ground; and if they pollute every shrine, and plunder every one which is worth plundering, I shall not be sorry. For, as to these 'religions,' what are they, in fact, but lust, lies, treachery, murder, and social degradation? I should like to see our Government cause it to be known, that its past forbearance has been abused, and that now Mahomedans and Hindoos must look to it for no sort of countenance,He wanted to know, from some member of the Government, whether this was the policy to be acted upon in India? [Lord PALMERSTON made a sign of dissent.] It was recommended in The Times by a correspondent signing himself "An Anglo-Indian," who was probably a military man, and who said that 56,000 additional troops would not suffice for what he, very properly, called the reconquest of India. He would not deny that this was an intelligible policy—a clear, decided, ruthless, policy of extirpation. It recommended the Government to make war on caste. He did not speak particularly of the present Minister for India, but the Government had previously done this. A petition, to which he had before referred, emanating from the wealthy Hindoos of Calcutta, and which 1414 had been reprinted, warned the Government that the laws they were passing for India were calculated to subvert the social institutions of the people of that country. In an appendix to the papers that had been laid on the table, General Hearsey explained that a feeling of apprehension pervaded the minds of the people that the English Government meant to make war on caste. General Hearsey said,—Perhaps, those Hindoos who are opposed to the marriage of widows, in Calcutta, are using underhand means to thwart Government in abolishing the restraints lately removed by law for the marriage of widows, and conceive if they can make a party of the ignorant classes in the ranks of the army believe their religion, or religious prejudices, are eventually to be abolished by force, and, by force, they are all to be made Christians, and thus, by shaking their faith in Government, lose the confidence of their officers by inducing Sepoys to commit offences (such as incendiarism) so difficult to put a stop to or prove, they will gain their object.That was exactly what those who best understood India had already said. The Government had changed the laws of inheritance and marriage. Why should the Government insist that Hindoo widows should marry again? The Hindoos considered that the law of marriage had been desecrated. If, in a court of law, parties could establish a second marriage, they could claim the inheritance which, by the ancient law they had lost. Why should men, carrying out a red-tape policy at their desks, issue an edict subverting the ancient laws of India? Suttee was rightly abolished. This was admitted in the native petition, which was signed by many natives who, themselves or their relatives, had embraced Christianity. The right hon. Baronet (Sir C. Wood) avowed that he had passed one of these minutes on education. He, therefore, had to answer, in part, for what had happened, for he had been a party concerned in the introduction of this new policy in the Government of India. He had received a letter from Calcutta, the writer of which, a civilian, said that the East India Government had annexed twelve or thirteen new provinces, and yet they had made no addition to the civil servants, while they had taken away the military to place them in situations of civil trust. The annexation policy was not the act of the Directors, for it was forced upon them. How could the Government expect that custom which "o'ermastered nature." and bent nature to itself, should be got rid of by their little edicts? It was the most ridiculous policy that a 1415 Government possessed of a distant empire had ever pursued. The natives believed that the manufacture of the cartridges was only the consummation of a policy that had long been pursued. He did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Vernon Smith) could translate Hindostanee, but he remembered he said, that no one, from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas, could have anticipated the recent outbreak. Now, he understood that the native papers had been writing sedition for months past, and warning the Government that something would happen. If the Government wanted to know what was passing in the minds of the Natives they must look at those newspapers, which were the expositors of their opinions. A friend of his, acquainted with the matter, said that the circulation of these papers was not large, but that it would be a great mistake to infer, in consequence, that the Natives did not know of these publications. His friend said that a Moonshee would sometimes read one of these articles to a whole regiment, the men squatting around him to listen. It was clear that, from Christmas last, the Government had plain notice of what was going on. That the Government had notice in January was clear from the papers laid before Parliament, and on the 20th of February, a native newspaper, published in Meerut, stated that all the Mahomedans and Hindoos were agitated in mind, that the natives would not obey the Government, and that the fire of mischief and the flame of disaffection would be kindled in the Western Provinces. He did not complain that the Government had put down these native papers, although he understood they had, with great impartiality, also put down the English papers that were engaged in writing up the Indian Government. But, if they found the Native newspapers preaching sedition, was it not time to inquire and to act? He had also received a letter, written on the 13th of March, by a gentleman in Calcutta, who had been walking about with a revolver, expecting to have his throat cut. This gentleman had given a narrative, which he had compared with the papers laid before Parliament, and which was similar to the statement of the Sepoy, as to the intention of the mutineers at Barrackpore. This statement, made to Lieutenant Allen by a Sepoy, on the 7th of February, was to the effect that a conspiracy existed among the four Native regiments at Barrackpore. They determined 1416 to rise against their officers, and to plunder Barrackpore. They next proposed to proceed to Calcutta and seize Fort William, or, failing that, to take possession of the Treasury. What was the strength of the European regiments at Calcutta to resist this threatened outbreak? His correspondent said that, on the 13th of March, the Governor General, whom it was part of the conspiracy to seize, had 200 black gentlemen as a guard. The number of white men to defend Calcutta on that day was 250. The Sepoys were the sentinels of the outer fort, and, in the inner fort, a Sepoy and a European soldier were sentinels together. The design was that the Sepoy in the inner fort should shoot the English sentinel, and that the mutineers should then seize the fort and treasure. On the 13th of March there was not a ship of war at Calcutta, nor was there any protection for the shipping. The English population were armed by the Government, and formed themselves into a volunteer corps. The King of Sardinia had a ship of war there, which was placed at the service of the Government. Thus the Governor General had evidence, in January, February, March, and April, warning him of the mutinies among the troops, on the subject of religion, and that they said they were determined to die for their religion. The idea had been disseminated ever since 1851 that the Government were making war upon caste, upon the laws of inheritance, and the fundamental customs of the Hindoos, and the natives believed that the Government meant to overthrow their religion. Yet, on the 7th of February, in the midst of all these warnings, Lord Canning wrote to say that three regiments might be withdrawn from India for the China war. Indian troops were also wanted for the war with Persia—a war undertaken with no other plain reason that he had ever heard, except that the Sha had not modelled his epistolary correspondence on the example of the Polite Letter Writer. Lord Canning rightly said that he could not spare more than three regiments, and now reports that he daily received communications telling him of fresh mutinies, and that he had issued repeated proclamations assuring the people that the last thing the Government intended to do was to meddle with their caste or their religion. But, unfortunately, the people would not now believe these protestations. This was the effect of the radical blunder that had been committed. If they chose to embark in such a 1417 policy as he had described, they ought first, to have collected an adequate armed force around them. He had it from high authority, that, if they really meant to overthrow and root out the institution of caste, according to the recommendation of the writer in The Times, they must have, not 56,000, but 300,000 men for the purpose. It was clear, therefore, that the nature of their policy was as important an element in this question as the number of their troops. When the hon. Member for Lambeth told them they ought to be governed by the opinions of eminent military men, he seemed to forget that when such men gave their opinions they were never acted upon. They had had warnings, as to the rotten condition of the Bengal army, from Sir C. Napier, from Lord Melville, from Brigadier Jacob, and a dozen other high authorities; but those warnings had remained unheeded. Even General Hearsey told them, quoting the language of Lord Metcalfe, "I fear we shall wake up some fine morning, and find that her Majesty has lost India." This was the apprehension entertained from the general disaffection among the Native troops. What advice had the highest military authority, Sir C. Napier, given them years ago, in regard to Delhi, where so many of our countrymen and countrywomen had been cruelly murdered? Why, that for the defence of that great Mahomedan city and its magazines, 12,000 men were required; that they ought to have there the means of escort for their convoys, and a force adequate to resist any sudden danger; that Delhi was the grand depôt whence supplies had to be drawn for all the stations between the Upper Ganges and the Upper Sutlej, and that the supplies must be sent from this central point to the Punjab and to Jullinder, until a more convenient route, viâKurrachee, had been completed. They had been told, then, that Delhi ought to be made the magazine for their army, their artillery, and their treasure; and yet, strange to say, when the recent outbreak occurred they had not a single European soldier at that most important position. The opinion laid down in a paper written by the eminent authority to whom he had referred was, that wherever it was necessary to have their magazines, one-sixth of their military force should be composed of Europeans. It was but just to Lord Canning to say that he had reported the deficiency of European strength and European control in the Native army. But it appeared that the state of the Indian 1418 finances would not permit of the required improvement. The Directors could not afford to bear the charge of two additional captains and two additional lieutenants to each regiment. Who, then, was responsible for all this? As long as the House of Commons, when it was about to prorogue, allowed a Ministry to go to war, as in the case of Persia, without the previous sanction of Parliament, we had no security that we might not soon be involved in an European war, while England was denuded of regular troops. It was stated that Lord Hardinge was afraid to bring the Bengal army together, on account of the danger of a mutiny. The force on which they had been relying appeared, then, to have been an army of conspirators! The fearful results that had lately been witnessed were the inevitable consequences of causes which had been patent to all men, and either the Board of Control, the Directors, the local Government of India, or all of them together, were answerable I for disasters which were fairly ascribable to their mischievous policy. They talked of reconquering India. That was easier said than done. But did they mean to hold that peninsula, inhabited by superstitious and, it might be, fanatical races, by proclaiming that henceforth caste was a thing not to be endured, that established custom must entirely be subverted and ancient laws superseded by an English Minister who chose at any moment to issue from his desk a code that did violence to the long-cherished feelings and usages of the people. The Sepoy was formerly respectful, docile, and obedient. Now he was insubordinate and mutinous. It was the business of the House to scrutinize the causes that had led to this change. The officer who had the command of a wing of the 53rd Regiment at Calcutta, suspecting an outbreak of disaffection, did not wait for the directions of his superior, but promptly, and of his own accord, ordered that one company should be kept constantly supplied with ten rounds of ammunition, and that the guards should be doubled. This officer's name was Major Clarke; and he wrote a letter to his comrade, who commanded another wing at Dumdum, informing him of what might be expected at Calcutta, and advising him also to have one company supplied with ten rounds and to double his guards. Yet this gentleman was called to account for having adopted these precautions. The same steps were directed 1419 to be taken in regard to the small residue of European troops which remained in Fort William. This occurred on the 3rd of February, and yet four days afterwards the Governor General was called upon to send away three regiments. On examining the papers before them, hon. Members would see how one event influenced another. The hon. and gallant General opposite (Sir W. Williams), who had been starved at Kars, was seen by Persian agents while a prisoner in the camp of the Russian General Mouravieff. War subsequently broke out with the Shah. Then came "the hostilities," as they were termed, but he called them "the war," with the populous empire of China; and to add to their difficulties they also saw the flames of civil war now raging from one end of the Bengal Presidency to the other. By the two first of these wars, in the waging of which the Government had taken so much pride, the available military force in India had been seriously weakened; and yet, forsooth, they criticised the conduct of their officers, and wondered that General Barnard had not done that which they did not give him the indispensable means to achieve. They talked of voting men and money, of calling out the militia, and then of proroguing Parliament while they were engaged in war against half the human race. When hon. Members returned to their several homes they would have to spend their time as many thousands of their fellow-countrymen were now doing, namely, in waiting with aching hearts for the next mail, which might bring with it tidings afflicting to the heart of many an English family, He maintained, then, that the Government had shown neither watchfulnes, foresight, nor judgment; otherwise they would long since have discovered the real state of things in India. If they were determined to adopt the new policy, which was at least intelligible, they ought to have the 56,000 men who the writer he had previously quoted said were necessary to reconquer India. Although the House had been told by the Government that they had nothing to do but to vote men and money, he trusted that the day was not far distant when the principles and policy by which India was to be governed would be settled and fixed by the House. Whether the principle on which India was to be governed should be something more intelligible, more consistent and more rational than the principle of the existing system, or not, he trusted that the House of Commons, as an integral 1420 part of the constitution of this country, would exert its authority, and that its voice would be heard; and he was sure that if that voice was heard it would be for the good government of India and the consolidation of the power of the empire.
MR. VERNON SMITHAlthough Her Majesty's Government, and, I believe, the House as well as Her Majesty's government, are very anxious to go into Committee of Supply, which is the appointed business for this evening, I cannot let this debate, short and interesting is it has been, pass without entering my decided protest and my distinct denial of the truth of the assertion made by my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham (Sir H. Verney) and repeated by the hon. and learned Member for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside), that Her Majesty's Government are not conscious of the gravity of the present state of things in India. They are perfectly conscious of it, and I believe this House is also conscious of it. I think we may take the moderate and wise speech of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Westminster (Sir De L. Evans) as an instance that this House is perfectly conscious of the gravity of the occasion. But I should like to know whether the hon. and learned Member for Enniskillen is conscious of the gravity of the occasion, and whether he really thinks it is worthy of the importance of the occasion, to come down here this evening with scraps out of newspapers which he has carefully collected for the purpose of charging them upon the Government as being manifestoes of the Administration. Why, Sir, I thought on hearing the hon. and learned Gentleman read a letter from The Times newspaper, that the signature would at least have been "Palmerston," or that my own name would have been affixed to it, as he appeared to quote it by way of casting a reproach upon the Government; but it turned out that the signature to that letter was "Anglo Indian." He says that the "Anglo-Indian" wishes to put down caste, and throughout the whole of his speech he laboured to show that there was somebody in this country who was disposed to put down caste. He did me the honour to allude to me. He said that I supposed I could sit at my desk and write a little law which would govern India. Where does the hon. and learned Gentleman find proof that I ever had such a notion? He did not adduce the slightest evidence to prove that I ever had any such 1421 immodesty or presumption as to suppose that I could sit at my desk and write a little law which could govern India. I have, on the contrary, on all occasions expressed a very different opinion in the House of Commons with reference to the government of India. I have always been as anxious as any man could be to express my opinion that India could not be governed by any such means. I therefore repudiate altogether the assertion of the hon. and learned Gentleman that there is any such scheme on the part of the Government as that of putting down caste and counteracting and destroying all the principles by which we have hitherto governed the people of India. The hon. and learned Gentleman says, and very truly, that this is a sad subject. It is one respecting which he has heard dismal accounts even since he spoke last; and I roust say that he has this evening repeated almost word for word what he said on the last occasion when this subject was before the House. There is not a syllable in the speech which he has just delivered which might not be found in the speech which he made on the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire, and which, in my opinion, was a much abler speech than that of this evening. But he has heard sad stories—that is to say, he has heard one or two such stories; but I believe that I have myself heard a hundred such stories for every one that he has heard. And therefore, if inclined to take that tone, I should be just as able as the hon. and learned Gentleman to give sad accounts of the present state of India; but Her Majesty's Government, while they feel sincerely and deeply upon that subject, believe that it would not become them to come down to this House to speak in a tone of melancholy despondency, and excite additional alarm in the minds of all British subjects, with regard to our posessions in India and the misfortunes that are occurring there. I do not think that that would at all become the Government of this country. The hon. and learned Gentleman did nothing throughout the whole of his speech but elaborate all those questions which we have already discussed. I can only repeat what I said on the last occasion, that for all that has occurred in India the whole country is just as responsible as any Government, whether the present, or any of its predecessors. I do not wish to throw any responsibility attaching to a person who holds my position upon 1422 any other human being. But if the hon. and learned Gentleman wishes to treat this subject in a philosophic and states manlike manner, he should consider what has been passing in this country for the last ten years. The whole of this country has during that period been bent upon what is called the improvement of the condition of India and its inhabitants. We may have been wrong; but every one that ever thought of India has urged upon us the moral and even the religious improvement of India. If we went rather slowly then, we were charged with being impeded by antiquated notions; and if to avoid the reproach of going too slowly we have gone faster, surely it is hard that you should turn round upon us and say—"You have gone a great deal too fast—why did you meddle with these things?" Not only the present, but every preceding Government that has existed since India came into our possession has been constantly charged throughout the whole of England with governing India on too slow and antiquated a system. I think the hon. and learned Gentleman has idly wasted his powers in throwing out general abuse against all persons who have been members of the Government for the last ten or twenty years. When I asked him whether he charged me with being responsible for the present state of India, he said that he did not. He declines to make an attack upon any particular member of the Government, and his declamation has nothing to do with the present Government. But he says for all these things we have no redress and no inquiry. I say, have as much inquiry as you will; but what you have to do at present is to put out the fire which is now raging over India. After you have quenched it, then have inquiry till you sicken of it. I should be most happy to assist the hon. and learned Gentleman in a future Session of Parliament, if he wishes to have an inquiry upon the state of India—if he wishes to have a Committee, if he wishes to bring in a Bill, if be wishes to take any measure by which Parliament can improve the state of India. The hon. and learned Gentleman complains that Her Majesty's Government only come forward to ask for men and money. Why, that is all that can be of any avail at present; and I believe that the hon. Gentlemen who sit on that as well as on this side of the House are perfectly willing to give us men and money for the occasion. On that subject I believe there is but 1423 one voice. I really mean no disrespect to the hon. and learned Gentleman, because I have the greatest admiration for the lively eloquence with which he entertains this House; but I cannot help thinking that his object in making a speech on this occasion, just as we are breaking up, is move to afford himself the consolation of thinking that he may be the more pleasantly remembered by us during the recess than to make suggestions for the improvement of the state of things in India. As far as regards the things which he has mentioned he has not shown that great assiduity in obtaining information which I think generally characterises all that he says. For instance, he says that we have committed a great fault with respect to Hindoo marriages, and that our course in that regard has been offensive to the people of India. Is he aware that the Act with respect to that subject arose from a petition very numerously signed by Hindoos? That petition stated, and very fairly and reasonably, that as we had put an end to the burning of widows upon the death of their husbands, it was only right that they should be permitted to marry again—that if we gave them existence by one law, they should not by another law have the manner of that existence interfered with. That change in the law with regard to widows has by no means had the effect attributed to it by the hon. and learned Gentleman. It may be one of those subjects upon which the Legislature has rather invaded the privileges of the Hindoos, but it is not the only one. On the contrary, it merely indicates what has been the tendency of modern legislation. But all of a sudden we have, it appears, found out that we have been going too fast. The hon. and learned Gentleman says that with regard to this outbreak no foresight, no precaution, no activity has been shown on the part of the Indian Government; but I think he is entirely mistaken. The hon. and learned Gentleman says we knew of this outbreak on the 6th of February. [Mr. WHITESIDE: I said the Government in India were aware of it in February.] Well, as soon as they were aware of it the Government of India took the most effective steps to put an end to it. The Government of India disbanded the troops at Calcutta. When we heard of the refusal of the cartridges by the Native army we also heard that punishment had been inflicted for that refusal. There was therefore no reason why the Government in this 1424 country should suppose that any outbreak was likely to occur in India. The hon. and learned Gentleman has quoted authorities, most of them anonymous, to prove that the Government ought to have anticipated this mutiny; but I think I may quote as authorities the Governor General of India and the Commander in Chief of India to prove that those vessels which the hon. and learned Gentleman says were so necessary at Calcutta were not at all required by them, and that they did not require the army which he speaks of. The quotation which he has repeated this evening from Lord Canning's despatch to the Government tells for us rather than against us. I do not think it necessary to go through all those other charges which he has renewed against the Government this evening. He brought forward the opinion of Sir Charles Napier—a most excellent authority, no doubt, upon military matters; but I was rather surprised that he quoted his opinions with regard to Delhi, because Sir Charles Napier recommended that there should be a large garrison and arsenal at Delhi. Now, that is one of the greatest misfortunes that we have had to encounter during this outbreak, for Delhi has thereby been made the focus for all the mutineers to resort to. They have there obtained possession of powder and ammunition, which have been the great cause of their being able to sustain themselves against us. But Sir Charles Napier recommended that there should be twelve Native regiments stationed at Delhi; but if we had done so the matter might have been still worse, for these regiments would probably have joined the mutineers. But as regards Delhi there is nothing now in the policy of the Government. It has always been the established policy of the Indian Government not to keep European forces at Delhi on account of the extreme unwholesomeness of the place and its neighbourhood, and still more from fear of a collision between the King of Delhi and the persons around him and the European troops stationed there. I do not think that the hon. and learned Gentleman has in any way sustained his accusations against the Indian Government. I defy any man to point out in any of the documents relating to India any passage showing that my Lord Canning has been in fault on this occasion. I believe that throughout these transactions he has shown the greatest possible judgment. All persons with whom I speak, who are well acquainted 1425 with India, say that he has exhibited the greatest vigour and personal courage that could be expected from any man in his position. That I believe to be the undenied and undeniable fact as regards Lord Canning. There may be some expressions of distrust with regard to India in the letters addressed by Sir Charles Napier to Lord Hardinge, but I believe that any man would have been denounced as a madman or a visionary who had hinted that such an outbreak as that which has occurred would occur in India. I believe that that outbreak can by no means be attributed to any want of foresight on the part of the Governor General, I did not expect to be called upon to answer the observations of the hon. and learned Gentleman to-night; but I believe I have now answered most of the points which have been mentioned. I may remind the House that we have already had a long debate upon this subject; and I think any hon. Gentleman who could introduce any new facts or arguments into the discussion must be gifted with great liveliness of imagination. With reference to the observations of the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster (Sir De L. Evans), I must say the Government are most thankful for any suggestions offered to them by one who possesses his military experience, and I only wish that he had gone further and had favoured us with his opinions as to the reorganization of the Indian army—a subject upon which he would be an excellent authority. I am, however, desirous of correcting one error into which the hon. and gallant Member has fallen with regard to the manner in which the troops were sent out. They were not all sent out in sailing ships, and it was not from motives of economy that any of them were sent in sailing ships. A question arose whether screw steamers or sailing ships were best adapted for the conveyance of the troops, and it was thought on the whole most advisable to send many of them in sailing ships, or clippers, and the remainder in auxiliary screw steamers. Twelve auxiliary screw steamers have been sent out, and all the ships are under a penalty to make the voyage in a certain number of days. They will arrive at a period when the climate will be best suited to Europeans; and I hope that, arriving by degrees, and pouring up the country, the disaffected will be astonished at the apparently perpetual invasion of fresh European troops. 1426 I believe that the arrival of those forces in India will produce a great effect upon the minds of the Native population. My noble Friend has assigned reasons against conveying troops to India across the Isthmus of Suez, and I may add that I believe the passage of the Red Sea at this season of the year would be attended with the most injurious consequences to the health of Europeans. Considering the impossibility of any previous arrangements, and the difficulty of conveying troops across the Isthmus without such arrangements, it was deemed advisable to send them by the usual route. I can assure the House that the Government are acquitted, in their own consciences, of any neglect to avail themselves of the best means of pouring troops into India. I may observe that, in addition to the European troops, our forces will be increased by a large number of the Punjab levies, consisting of different classes and races, to the amount of some 40,000 men, who will be ready to act against the mutineers, and upon whose loyalty, according to Brigadier Chamberlain and the officers by whom they have been organized, full reliance may be placed. I was glad to hear from the hon. and gallant Member (Sir De L. Evans) a tribute to the merits of the two Lawrences and other distinguished officers in India. They are men in an exalted position, but I could also detail to the House acts of heroism not only on the part of officers of every rank—brigadiers, captains, and young lieutenants, but also on the part of civil servants,—magistrates and others—as would gladden the hearts of Englishmen, and render them still more proud of having such men for their countrymen.
§ MR. DISRAELISir, I wish to make a few observations upon the question brought under our notice by the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster, and to recall the attention of the House to the real subject under discussion. At the same time I must say I am rather surprised at the tone assumed by the President of the Board of Control in reply to my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Whiteside). It is not, I think, at all surprising that, in the present emergency, my hon. and learned Friend, or any other Member of this House, should seize upon an opportunity of dilating on the causes of the state of affairs in our Indian empire, and denouncing the system of misgovernment which has there existed. But what is the 1427 rejoinder of the right hon. Gentleman? He says:—" I object to such comments, because you are not making this a party question. Your criticisms apply not only to the present but to preceding Governments. They don't touch me any more than other people, if so much. Do not waste your time in adducing arguments to show that a most important dependency of the empire has been misgoverned, but make a party attack." Why, we are always told we are making party attacks; it has been said that the House of Commons is converted into a scene of party warfare; but when an hon. Gentleman, speaking with knowledge and feeling upon the subject of India, tries to discriminate the causes and reasons which have brought about the present portentous state of affairs, he is complained of because he is not making a party attack. I think the House is much indebted to the gallant veteran. (Sir De L. Evans) who has called attention to this subject. It is one that ought to occupy our attention, whatever may be the pressure of public business. Indeed no public business can be more pressing. I cannot say that the answer of the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) was so satisfactory as I could have desired. I must observe of the noble Lord's reply that he underrated our danger in India, and overrated the disposition of Europe; and these are very dangerous sentiments on the part of a Prime Minister of this country. I agree with the hon. Baronet the Member for Buckingham, (Sir H. Verney) that the state of affairs is most grave; and I think it is much to be regretted that from the first, on the part both of the Government and the country—the country, of course taking its tone from the Government—there has not been a due sense of the vast and imminent danger to our empire and to our national power, which, in my conscience I believe to exist, and which, though it ought not to appal us, is one for which we should be thoroughly prepared. I think there is no mistake so grave on the part of a Minister as to undervalue public peril. Certainly there is no graver mistake an English Minister can make. The English nation is never so great as in adversity. In prosperity, it may be accused, and perhaps justly, of being somewhat ostentatious, and, it may be, even insolent; in its middle fortunes it may often prove itself unreasonable; but there never has been a time when a great sense of responsibility has been thrown upon the people of this 1428 country when they have not answered to the occasion, and shown that matchless energy which has made, and will maintain, their position as the leading nation of the world. The opinion of the noble Lord, however, seems to be either that the emergency is not so great as I believe it to be, or that if it is so we should veil its hideous proportions from the people of this country. In either case I think the noble Lord's opinion is erroneous. The noble Lord says to-night:—" This is an affair of pounds, shillings, and pence. We are going to do something; but more we cannot do, because we must look to the resources at our disposal." Now, that is not a proper tone to take. If the noble Lord really believes the empire is in danger, it is not becoming in him to say that the resources at his disposal are limited, and that the measures that he adopts in such a great emergency must of course be of a proportionate character. I don't want at all to re-open the controversy which I raised about a fortnight ago when I introduced the subject of India. The views which I then expressed were not lightly assumed, nor can they be answered by the incidents of the hour. Time and thought must be the test of their soundness and authenticity. But as the question has been re-opened both by my hon. and learned Friend and by the right hon. Gentleman, I may be permitted to make one or two observations. I think I have a right to say that nothing that has occurred since that debate—none of the information which has reached us from India—has at all refuted the views I then, with great humility, placed before the House. Upon that occasion the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Vernon Smith) took me to task because I had endeavoured to point out the causes which had led to an understanding between the Hindoo and Mahomedan Princes, and because I had intimated that they were dissatisfied with the Government of India. The right hon. Gentleman then said that no proof whatever was in the possession of the Government that any such feeling existed on the part of the Native Princes, and that I had deprived the Government of one source of solace—their confidence in the disposition of the Indian Princes. Well, what was the news brought by the next mail? We learnt that those very Indian Princes, whose contingents, we were told, had been placed at our disposition, had joined the rebels against us; and in one of the papers recently placed upon 1429 the table, I find a letter from General Hearsey, stating that emissaries of the Indian Princes were in the ranks of the army. I ventured to say, on the occasion, to whieh I refer, that I believed we were making a great mistake in treating this merely as a military mutiny. I will not enter into that question, but among the papers laid on the table yesterday I find a despatch from the Lieutenant Governor of the North West Provinces—a man of the highest reputation, whose policy, though it may in some respects have been blameable, has upon the whole, I believe, been wise—containing a telegraphic message, in which nothing but the most necessary and urgent information is communicated; and he speaks of disaffection in the great mass of the population, stating that it has reached even to the intelligent classes. I ventured, when this subject was formerly under discussion, to call the attention of the House to a subject to which my hon. and learned Friend has referred—namely, the "tampering," as I expressed it, of the Legislative Council of India with the religious prejudices and opinions of the people; and I said there could be no doubt that, from an aggregate of circumstances, great prejudice had been excited in the minds of the population of India. In the Minute of the last Governor General of India—the celebrated Minute of 280 paragraphs—there is in page twelve and paragraph four a very brief announcement much in this fashion:—It is announced as a certain fact of very great significance that the young Prince Maharajah Dhuleep Sing had entered into the Christian community; and it is announced also as a matter of great significance that the daughter of the Rajah of Coorg had been baptized, and that our gracious Sovereign was her godmother. This was translated into the Indian papers, and circulated in every bazaar; and, with such evidence, combined with many other circumstances to which I will not now advert, but which are familiar to the House, who will say that the Government of India is exempt from that grave charge I have mentioned—grave, not for its intrinsic character, but for the awful consequences it has entailed on this country and on India? But I doubt very much whether the noble Lord, having underrated our position in India, is adopting measures of adequate importance to meet the present state of affairs. He has mentioned the troop: which may he expected soon to assemble in India and the resources on which he 1430 counts. He says, if more should be wanted, he can call Parliament together, and can appeal to the House of Commons and the country; and no doubt he will then obtain sufficient support to undertake any other measure that may be required. But what I want to impress on the House is this—the present year is gone. This is the first campaign, and, of course, from the nature of the circumstances—from the surprise of the whole affair—a most disastrous campaign. The gallant General has indulge in the hope that Delhi is taken. I do not indulge in that belief, and I think it unwise that a person of the gallant General's authority, unless he has strong reason for the conviction, should give weight to such a rumour, because I conceive that you will never get the people of this country to brace up their energies to the necessary point if they suppose that the next mail will bring intelligence of some event which will induce them to rank this affair with a Chinese or Persian war.
§ SIR DE LACY EVANSI did not express any confidence in the event alluded to.
§ MR. DISRAELIIt is not my wish to misrepresent the gallant General, but I think it is much better to leave the impression that Delhi is not fallen, or will not fall easily, in order that we may be ready to meet that probable result, by a preparation of our resources accordingly. We will assume, for it is probable, that in the present year we shall do nothing. The commencement of the next campaign will be in November. Now, what I wish to impress on the House and the country is, that everything depends on the next campaign. All Europe and all Asia will watch your efforts; and, if your efforts and energies are adequate, commencing in November, the opportunity will be at your command, and you may save your empire and establish it with renewed force and vigour. But if in the next campaign you have varying fortunes, and nothing determined and decisive—if it is to be an affair of, campaigns, and you enter into a third campaign, you will then find other characters on the stage, with whom you will have to contend, besides the Princes of India. The noble Lord says the business of a Minister is not to underrate the danger, but, at the same time, he ought not to take an exaggerated view of it. That is one of those platitudes which really convey no meaning; but I maintain that it is the duty of a Minister to make himself tho- 1431 roughly master of the circumstances with which he has to deal, and to form a sound and prescient opinion on what may occur. We have had before great trials—we have been despoiled of rich territories and seen our empire shaken; but surely in the past we might see some vision of the future, if the present is to be governed by negligence and indifference, and by a Minister who systematically depreciates the danger he has to encounter. The other night you passed a Resolution that you will rally round and support the Crown in the present danger. What good does a Resolution of that kind? A Resolution formed after due deliberation—formed upon ample knowledge of the subject—a Resolution of such a nature doubtless gives moral support to the Minister, and lends strength to the Crown; but a Resolution, the creature of perplexity and ignorance, does no good to the Minister, and adds no strength to the Crown. It really does harm, because it conveys throughout the country the notion that the House of Commons is doing something when in fact it is doing nothing. At the commencement of our American troubles, there never occurred a disaster or a danger but a Member of Parliament was at hand to propose a Resolution of confidence in the Minister, or for the support of the Throne; and what did it all end in? The course of events will always baffle mere words; and a Resolution of the House of Commons, unless it embody a policy, and be the expression of an assembly which knows what it is about, gives no strength to the Minister, and only misleads the nation. That is the position in which we are placed at the present moment. There is not in the House, or in the country, a due sense of the gravity of the emergency. Viwed by itself, it would require our utmost energies to meet; but he who views the present state of affairs in an isolated manner is unworthy of being the Minister of this country. I heard with great pleasure from the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Vernon Smith) that a large body of irregular troops was coming from the Punjab to assist us in our campaigns. I am disposed to be generally sanguine, and I have little doubt that, under the guidance of the energetic and able men that our military force still possesses, we may expect very beneficial results from that movement. But if we could combine with that movement an expedition up the Indus, then success, I think, would be certain instead 1432 of problematical; and you may rely on it that, unless your operations in the next campaign, on which all depends, are on a great scale—unless you throw the lion's paw of England over the whole of the Peninsula, by advancing from the Punjab on one side, and by ascending the Ganges on the other—unless you act with that decision and on that great scale, it is doubtful whether you will effect your object. I do not say that the resources you indicate will allow of operations of that kind; but I do not think that anything should be left to chance, and your expeditions should, therefore, be on a great scale. The noble Lord says that it is difficult to induce men to enlist. The ordinary motives for enlistment are supplied by bounty and pension; but depend upon it that one means by which, more than by any other, you may induce men to enlist in the service of their Sovereign, is by impressing on them that their country is in danger. The moment you raise in the country a high feeling, you will find that you have a motive power which will effect your purpose as forcibly as bounties or pensions. The people of this country, however, do not understand the danger in which they are placed. The scene is remote from them; they listen to persons in high places, from whom they naturally take their tone, and they infer that the country is not in danger. How was this awful business related to us? The President of the Board of Control got up and told us that the Governor General of India wrote in high spirits; and the right hon. Gentleman is now irritated because the conduct of Lord Canning is criticised. Men in his position naturally find their conduct criticised. I am not disposed to speak of Lord Canning with any severity. He has had little experience in India, and is little responsible for the present state of that country. I am willing to believe that he has displayed some energy in the present state of affairs. It is some consolation to see that there is anybody who displays energy; and therefore do not let us grudge to him the credit which that noble virtue should command. But no one can deny that Lord Canning was caught napping, and that his first measures showed irresolution and vacillation—from no moral defect, perhaps, but rather from the position in which he was placed. I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that Lord Canning is very little responsible for the state of affairs in India; but he is surrounded by men who have created 1433 that state of affairs which has resulted in such disaster; they are the very men who have been the prime councillors during the last ten years, and they are the very men whose conceit and arrogance have endangered the Indian empire. We must not repose, then, with confidence on Lord Canning, when the Council of India is composed of individuals who are the chief criminals, and who ought to be called to account for the present state of affairs. We must remember that the Governor General of India is not an isolated individual, and that when we criticise his policy we criticise the policy and conduct of those who, as it were, have been bred and born in that very system which has broken up with—I will not say such fatal—but with such humiliating and disastrous consequences. With these general views I am of opinion that the noble Lord has altogether, from the first, underrated the state of affairs in India; and I cannot agree with the noble Lord—although I should not have introduced the subject—in his views of the disposition of the European Powers. I should have treated the subject abstractedly; I should have said that I could only suppose that the great Powers of Europe would behave, probably, at a moment of danger and emergency to England, as the great Powers of Europe have behaved before. What is the state of affairs? What has happened within the last few days? What was it that induced me to make the inquiry of the noble Lord to-night about the strange proceedings that have happened at Constantinople? Why, if it had not been for the absorbing interest which the state of India commands, you would have had a much more agitated Parliament about what has taken place in Constantinople than about what has occurred in India; while out of doors, no doubt, you might have excited much more public passion and feeling than at present. All this, however, is now hushed over; and though I was told to-night, and have heard with great satisfaction, that those circumstances will lead to no estrangement between England and France, I only understand that that is so because the noble Lord has renounced the whole of his policy, and has, in a manner which I think must astonish every one, absolutely agreed that all that arrangement by which he has been agitating that part of the country in so unsatisfactory a manner for a very considerable time, must at once be cancelled and blotted out from the record 1434 of his political deeds. We are in a position of perfect and complete alliance with France because, under the pressure of circumstances, we have entirely changed our policy. Yet the noble Lord says that there is nothing in the disposition of any European Power which ought to occasion us the least annoyance. Sir, I would not trust the disposition of Powers more than the disposition of individuals. When men are in great estate, possessed of all the accidents of fortune, and living in the sunshine of perfect prosperity, they have a great many friends who have confidence in them, who admire them, who compliment their courage, their "pluck," and their power; but when the hour of disaster comes—when we lose our fortune and out-high estate—when we are supposed to be in great perils and difficulties, it is astonishing how those individuals will walk on the other side of the way and pass us unnoticed, or, if we appeal to them for character and support, how they will either refuse to know us or will say something, probably, that will be to our disadvantage. Sir, I have more confidence in the spirit of this country, so high as it is at present, and in its resources—so ample as they now are, if wisely administered—than I have at this moment in any European alliances, or in any policy which would depreciate the real dangers that we have to encounter in our own dependencies. We must meet those dangers with stern, unbending courage. Our resources must be upon a greater scale than they have yet been stated in the expanding project of the Government. Each week, indeed, they seem to take a more serious view of the situation; but the original vice of the mean and small conception with which the intelligence of these disasters was first received still is impressed upon all their plans. They are not large enough, or deep enough, or comprehensive enough. If we get into a third campaign—which will be the inevitable consequence of our not availing ourselves of the resources of the country in a proper manner—depend upon it we shall be on the eve of a great disaster for England. At present it is my solemn conviction, that, if we make up our minds thoroughly to combat the difficulties which we have to encounter, we must bring an irresistible force into India before eight months are over, and we must accompany that irresistible force with some announcement of a policy which 150,000,000 of people may rally round with confidence 1435 and hope. So acting, it is my conviction that we may emerge from this struggle, not with shorn powers, not with diminished lustre, but with that increased character which always accrues to those who show that they have confidence in themselves, and that they possess energies which they know how to use with effect. Then, Sir, we may still hold India, we may still maintain our empire, and we may continue to enjoy those amiable dispositions of foreign Powers in which the noble Lord has so much confidence.
§ COLONEL SYKESsaid, he had abstained hitherto from any expression of opinion upon the lamentable events which had taken place in India, because he thought that the time had not yet arrived when the discussion of them in that House could have any profitable result, although undoubtedly the time would come when it would be necessary to discuss the origin of all the circumstances which had occurred. And he would not now have trespassed on the House, but that he had received a letter which afforded gleams of hope from a gentleman who had risen to the highest distinction, both as a soldier and as a politician, by the force of his character—he meant Colonel Edwardes, the hero of Mooltan. The letter was dated Peshawur, June 12, and he would read a few passages to the House. In the first place, Colonel Edwardes said—
The consoling feature of this terrific mutiny is, that the soldiery have met with very little sympathy from the people of any part of the country. Here and there an apparent unanimity of mutiny and end of all Government has raised the loose characters to plunder and license; but as a rule the country has not stirred. This is a glorious reply to those who would fain make out that our rule is not a good one in India, and here at Peshawar, where fanatic and predatory races surround us, and where hundreds of priests are secretly plotting our ruin, the people have stood aloof from it all.Again, he said:—Religious fears and religious hatred have caused this frightful rebellion, and political causes will be sought in vain.He went on to state that the Hindoo Sepoys, Brahmins, and Rajpoots were beginning to believe, owing to the Mahomedans at Delhi having shown their ancient feeling of hatred and oppression towards the Hindoo races, that they had been made tools of by the Mahomedans. That was one of the brightest features in the whole matter, since it at once separated those two elements, which, united, were most formidable, but which, disunited, afforded well-grounded hopes for 1436 the future. Colonel Edwardes mentioned, also, a very curious incident with regard to the mutiny at Jullundur. He said:—At last the troops here have gone openly into mutiny, but in a strange, disunited kind of way. The guards brought the treasure and delivered it up to the authorities, while the rest of the corps broke out.''The letter was too long to read in extenso, I although there was scarcely a word in it which was not of very high importance as proceeding from an individual whose acquaintance with India was so thorough, whose judgment was so sound, and whose energy of character had been so remarkable, both upon former occasions and in the present emergency. Colonel Edwardes was now, by his own authority, organizing bodies of troops from among the hill tribes and others who were showing themselves ready and willing to perform loyal service to the British Government. Accompanying Colonel Edwardes's letter was an extract from another letter, dated 13th of June, from Huzara, a formerly disturbed part of the country, in which the writer said:—The people here are most loyal; all flocking in and offering to stand by our sides, or go any-where to help.It had been stated that the authorities in India and the Government at home ought to have been thoroughly prepared for and to have anticipated the frightful outbreak which had taken place; but upon that subject he had heard a letter read the other day from one of the highest and ablest officials in the Government of India, in which, quoting from memory, occurred these words:—"The people of England will say that we ought to have been prepared for this outbreak. Our reply to the people of England is, that they might just as well have expected us to have been prepared for an outbreak of cholera, or an earthquake, so sudden, so unexpected was it." He (Colonel Sykes) entirely concurred in that opinion. Since the battle of Plassey, 100 years ago, the very same thing might at any time have occurred in an army of Brahmins and Rajpoots had the same religious chord been imprudently touched; but it had been carefully avoided. The mutinies which had taken place had been on account of the pay of the men, or on their being ordered on foreign service contrary to their terms of enlistment; or questions similar. There had been no outbreak against the Government during that period, and never had they lifted their 1437 hands against their officers in combination before. On the contrary, those men had fought in a hundred battles and gained us a hundred victories, always showing the utmost readiness to support the honour of the British arms. They had reduced to our sway a great portion of British India; but if there had happened to break out among them at any time during those 100 years any frantic delusion like the present, which had spread from station to station, the same disasters would have occurred as those we now deplore. The Sepoys believed that an attack was being made on their religion—a belief entirely unreasonable; but in cases of fanaticism it was utterly impossible to apply the rules of reason. The proof that there plot among the existed no concerted plot among the against the British Government was to be found in the simple fact that the mutiny crept so slowly from station to station. Thus, so far back as the 26th of February, the 19th Regiment at Berhampore refused to use the cartridges, and was disbanded at Barrackpore on the 31st of March. The men, too, did not rise against their officers. They said, "We will go to any part of the world against an enemy, but we are prepared to die rather than lose our caste." Hon. Gentlemen acquainted with the history of the Middle Ages would know what was the meaning of excommunication. When the Pope, in the plenitude of his power, excommunicated an Emperor, he could not find one of his subjects even to do a menial office for him. Now, what excommunication was in the Middle Ages, that loss of caste was to the Brahmin and Rajpoot in the present day. Every Sepoy who put one of the greased cartridges into his mouth became a degraded being in the eyes of his fellows; his own mother could not touch him, nor his father or brother cat with him. Was it to be wondered, then, if the Sepoys would far rather brave death than submit to such degradation? He did not come forward as the apologist of these men; he was merely showing how their conduct was to be accounted for. Would the Sepoys have lifted their hands against their officers at Meerut had common for bearance been exhibited towards them, or if a thorough knowledge of the Native character and prejudices had been possessed by the controlling authorities? The facts were these:—The skirmishers of the 3rd Cavalry, one of the finest regiments in the Bengal army, ninety in 1438 number, or fifteen from each troop, were ordered to parade and use cartridges, which they were assured were ungreased. This was on the 23rd of April, twenty-three days after the 19th Regiment had been disbanded at Barrackpore. The men did not believe that the cartridges were harmless, and they begged their Native officers to go to their European superiors and ask that the matter should not be forced to a crisis; for they said that "if we use the cartridges, we shall be looked upon as criminal by our co-religionists, and shall lose our caste." Their wishes were favourably viewed in the first instance; but the better feeling of the officer in command was overruled by another officer of the regiment, who said, "If you give way, the men will say you are afraid of them." The parade was then ordered. With five exceptions the Sepoys refused to use the cartridges, and for this disobedience of orders and mutiny (for mutiny, of course, it was), they were sent to their lines, but not placed in confinement. There they remained for three weeks, when an order came down from General Anson at Simla that they should be tried by court martial. This was accordingly done, and these eighty-five men were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in irons with hard labour. The next day they were paraded before the assembled troops of the station, irons were placed on their legs, and they were sent to the common gaol among 1,400 felons. This was on the Saturday. The remainder of the Native troops, of course, thought that their fate would be the same, as they also must necessarily refuse to bite those disastrous cartridges; and on the Sunday the disturbances took place. The men turned out in the first instance with sticks, went to the gaol, and released the eighty-five prisoners, but unhappily, at the same time, released 1,400 felons. Now, he (Colonel Sykcs) had commanded a regiment of the same class of Sepoys in the battles of Rirkee and Poona—at several sieges, and during a march in the monsoon, under trying circumstances, and he knew something of their temperament and feelings, and he could not help hoping and believing that the atrocities committed during the outbreaks had been committed by the escaped felons. At Allahabad 3,000 of these jail birds had been released, and he firmly believed that it was by them that the horrors had been perpetrated which had filled this country with indignation and disgust 1439 Under all the circumstances of the case, he did not fear for the result. He repeated that he did not in any way offer an apology for the conduct of the Sepoys. They had mutinied, and they must take the fearful consequences. All he said was, that the mutiny had been occasioned by one of those frightful delusions that might have occurred at any time. It was like one of those tropical storms which burst so suddenly and which were so disastrous in their effects, but which were of short duration; and, in like manner, it might be hoped that after this unhappy mutiny was trampled out, as it must be, the horizon would be cleared and there would be a bright future. He was glad to be able to express his opinion that the number of European troops which it was proposed to send out would be sufficient for the purpose of quelling the revolt, but he trusted no Gentleman in that House or in the country would be mad enough to suppose that India could be ruled by European troops alone sent out from this country. It was idle to suppose that our little islands, with their 28,000,000 of inhabitants, could give a perennial supply of troops sufficient to keep in subjection 181,000,000 of people. Such a notion was utterly irrational, and any attempt to put it into practice would ruin India, and prove 'permanently disastrous to England.
§ LORD JOHN RUSSELLSir, I feel bound to notice some of the arguments of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli). I regretted the able speech which he made on a former night, and I certainly regret, too, some of the assertions he has just made. The right hon. Gentleman says that a Resolution of this House to support the Crown in the efforts it may have to make and the measures it may have hereafter to take for the pacification of India will have no moral force. Sir, my opinion is entirely different from that. I agree with the sentiment which has been lately enunciated by a gentleman (no lover of war) who, I am happy to say, is again a Member of this House—I mean the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright)—who says that the first thing to be done at present is to prevent anarchy, and suppress revolt, and that then, having done this, we should turn our whole attention to remedy any evils which may exist. That seems to me to be the right course to pursue. The hon. and gallant Member who has just sat down says that there has been 1440 a sudden belief among the troops of high caste in India that the Government is attempting to induce them to do that which is contrary to their religion and which would make them lose caste. I cannot, however, think that when we come to examine this subject we shall find the movement so sudden as he supposes. I should rather collect from the steps which Lord Canning has taken that his impression is, that one of the Native Princes at least is concerned in this matter; that it is likely there was a general conspiracy for the purpose of subverting British power in India, and that, as one of the means (this being not at all the origin and cause of the mutiny), they have endeavoured to inspire the troops with the belief that their religion was in danger, and that they were to be deprived of their caste through the cartridges they were required to use. The right hon. Gentleman, in speaking of this question, compares it with the American war. I believe there is no similarity between the two cases. We had in North America to deal with a people of British origin, and we insisted upon payments from them which they conceived were inconsistent with their rights as colonists and with the charters granted to them. We were completely wrong in that quarrel, and those who in this House supported the Minister supported him in a course of injustice, which led finally to the separation of America from this country. The right I hon. Gentleman takes it for granted that those who have conducted the Government in India for the last ten years, and those who have counselled Lord Dalhousic, are I criminal. I will take for granted the truth of no such assertion. I admit that the whole course of our Government in India does deserve the most patient consideration and the most deliberate inquiry. It may be that errors have been committed; but for my part, I am inclined to believe that in spite of those errors a great amount of good has been imparted to the people of India by our Government, and believe, at all events, that the intentions, whether of the East India Company and its Directors, the Board of Control, or the Cabinet of this country, have been as benevolent as those of any Government that ever existed. It may be that the hon. and learned Member for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside) is right with respect to particular laws. It may be that we shall have to retrace our steps. But I own I cannot for myself take it for granted that the Government 1441 of India has been an oppressive Government. I cannot agree that the case which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) evidently endeavours to make out—namely, that this is a just and righteous revolt, inspired and animated by a desire to get rid of a tyrannical Government, will bee made out. That, I believe, will not be borne out by an exanimation of facts. But again I say, that the first thing to consider is the manner in which this revolt can be suppressed, I believe, as Mr. Bright believes, that anarchy would take place in India, if we were not successful. Therefore it is for the Members of this House to consider—more especially for the Members of Her Majesty's Government to consider—what are the means by which it may be suppressed, and what are our prospects of suppressing it. In reckoning upon the prospects of success (the mutiny, whether wisely or unwisely, not having been foreseen), I should say it was natural that the first success should be with the mutineers, Where regiments of several hundred men are drawn out, and there are but three or four European officers, the murdering of those European officers is a task of little difficulty. With 200 or 300 Europeans; against some thousands of mutineers the mutineers would naturally have the first; advantage, and would be able to march off; with their arms and to use these greased cartridges, which one of the officers says they have no scruple in using against the Europeans. But when that first success has been gained, when the horrible scenes of which we have read the details, to our infinite disgust, have taken place, when the mutineers are collected together, we may then fairly consider what are their further prospects of success. Let us recollect that we have on one side an organized Government, the representative of an ancient monarchy, the representative of a monarchy which has all the advantage of a free people to support it, and all the organization of which a civilized community can boast. On the other hand, it is not at all probable that this puppet King of Delhi should have any organized plan of action. It is not likely that the military would be immediately obedient to the civil power, or that the civil power would be able to restrain the excesses of the military. Many must be disgusted by the plunder which will take place. Those who are engaged in trade and commerce at Delhi and other towns will find that the rule of a licentious 1442 soldiery is oppressive and injurious to their lives and peaceful possessions. The Mahomedans and Hindoos will hardly long agree in the same object. The Hindoos are afraid of religious persecution, and they believe that with a Mahomedan rule restored they would not have religious freedom. With these apprehensions we may fairly calculate upon dissensions and discord among those who have the first success and the first triumph. Troops will be arriving weekly in India, and I trust that the gallant General sent out there—Sir Colin Campbell—who has won laurels on former occasions, and is worthy to be associated with those who have been mentioned with honour to-night, will be able to collect together a force which will suppress at least the mutiny, wherever its head-quarters may be. As to pacifying the whole country, that must be a task of time, a task of great cost, and a task requiring the utmost vigilance of the Governor General and the military commander. But, with the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Sykes) telling us, upon the authority of Major Edwardes, that the people generally do not side with the Sepoy soldiers, I cannot but think that the means of restoring tranquillity will speedily be found. If that is the case, it seems to me that our first duty, in the short remainder of the Session, is to assure the Executive Government that support will not be wanting to their efforts; and I cannot agree that it is a matter of indifference, or that it lacks moral force, if Gentlemen on the opposite and Gentlemen on these benches declare their readiness to give that support to the Government. I believe, on the contrary, that in Europe and in India such a declaration will have a great effect. Measures have already been taken by Her Majesty's Government, and although it is impossible for me to pretend to criticise with any justice, yet I must say it caused some disappointment to me to find that we had no other means of sending reinforcements to India than the means which might have been very proper a great many years ago, of sending troops in sailing ships. We all know that of late years mechanical improvements have enabled those who have the command of troops and those who have the command of the sea, and enabled ourselves on a very recent occasion, to perform wonders of which our ancestors were entirely ignorant. We know that in Egypt there are means of conveyance by railroad. We 1443 know that large screw steam men-of-war have lately been employed at sea, and that they can carry men with greater certainty and in loss time than sailing ships. The Government, no doubt, have considered these things; but I must say it is a disappointment to me to find that these mechanical inventions, the overland route, and steam line-of-battle ships, do not appear to have added at all to our means of reaching the scene of revolt. My noble Friend at the head of the Government said it would have been necessary that ships should be sent to Suez. What I wonder at—ignorantly perhaps—is, that when they first heard of the mutiny the Government did not write to India and say that if ships were sent to Suez by a certain time a certain number of troops should arrive at that time. If they had done so, the ships would have arrived already at Suez, and troops from Gibraltar or Malta could have arrived at Suez at the same time. I am convinced, so far as the moral impression is concerned, that 5,000 troops arriving suddenly, very soon after the revolt had become known, would have produced a very great effect. Still, I can have no doubt that the Government are taking steps adequate to the occasion, and that they will find the 30,000 troops of which they speak a sufficient force for the campaign in November. I quite agree with the right hon. Gentleman opposite that this country is sometimes too little forbearing to neighbours in prosperity; that she always shows to great advantage in adversity, and that when an effort is to be made, nothing can be more admirable than the spirit, the courage, and the readiness of the people, and their contempt of all other considerations but the immediate object of crushing the influence to which they are opposed. I further agree with the right hon. Gentleman that instead of the course which we remember was taken with respect to China, exaggerating in every way the insult done and the necessity of prompt and vigorous measures, the Government in this case have rather sought to diminish the danger and to represent it as not so serious as was imagined. If that were done as a policy I can only say it is a very mistaken policy, because the more the people of this country are convinced of the danger the more ready will they be to rally round the Throne, and to bear any sacrifice which they may be called upon to endure. There is one subject which has been mentioned 1444 this evening, upon which I have not heard any explanation. The hon. and gallant General, who deserves our thanks for having brought this question forward, touched upon the financial efforts which will be necessary. From all accounts received from India, it appears that not only at Delhi, but at many places where treasure was collected, that treasure has been seized. So much for the taxes already collected. With regard to the taxes to be collected it is feared there will be the greatest irregularity, not to say total suspension, of payment in a great part of the country. The East India Company have these troops sent to them, and it is a sort of consolation which we give ourselves from time to time, that the troops gone to India are now at the charge of the East India Company. That the Consolidated Fund will be relieved might, in ordinary times, be a source of consolation; but I own that at present I think it would be more patriotic if we were to look at this subject as pertaining to the empire as a whole, and if the Government were to profess their readiness—perhaps they have professed their readiness—to come to the aid of the East India Company, in any financial effort which may be necessary. Unless they do so, I cannot see how the ordinary payments are to go on in India, much less how advances are to be made in this country. I think it is desirable that the machine of government should not be interrupted. In no part of a great empire like ours ought it to be said with truth that our troops are unpaid, that our civil servants are unable to find stores, and that all the vast and costly preparations which are necessary for the carrying on of hostilities are in danger of failing in any degree from the want of pecuniary means. The East India Directors are fully aware of their own situation. It is for them to say what probable wants they may have; but I trust that, if they do make any representation of that kind—even although it might he necessary to bring in some new Bill during the present Session—the Government will not hesitate to give them all the assistance they may require. It will be a matter for the future consideration of Parliament what part is to be borne by this country and what part by the East India Company; but at present there is a serious danger which we ought to meet by every means in our power. Whether it be troops, whether it be ships, whether it be money, there ought to be no part of this 1445 danger overlooked by those to whom the destiny of England is entrusted. One word with respect to the position of affairs in Europe, and I have done. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire has accurately represented the statement made by my noble Friend at the head of the Government at the commencement of this discussion. I did not understand my noble Friend to say that he entirely relied upon the tranquillity of Europe or the amicable disposition of all Powers towards us. I understood him to say—and I thought the observation a just one—that even if any Power in Europe were hostilely disposed towards us, it would probably reflect that, in the event of its offending us, although the retort might not be immediate, yet this country has strength sufficient to revenge any insult to which it may be exposed, and that such a Power might find itself a sufferer from the incautious manner in which it had provoked our resentment. That I understood to be the sense of the observation made by my noble Friend, and I thought it was well calculated to protect us from insult. But, in the midst of all these great affairs, I do hope that we shall not allow, and that the Government will not allow, diplomatic squabbles to interfere with the important interests of the empire. It was agreed at Paris last year—whether the resolution was a wise one or not is a question which cannot now be discussed—that divans should be assembled in Moldavia and Wallachia, in order to express the wishes of those Principalities as to the future form of government; and Lord Clarendon stated more than once in the Conferences, that it was desirable to ascertain precisely, by an exact representation of the people, what those wishes were. Let them, therefore, be fairly ascertained. If there is any doubt about the regularity of the elections, let that doubt be satisfied. Let us not put ourselves forward as the defenders of imperfect or fraudulent elections, but let us agree with the other Powers of Europe in saying that the Moldavian and Wallachian elections ought to be fairly and freely conducted. I am afraid that the rivalry of professional diplomatists has in the present instance, as in many others, boon the source of a good deal of mischief; and I am glad that the Emperor of the French, who on this occasion, as frequently before, has shown both the fidelity of his alliance with this country and his wisdom in meet- 1446 ing the emergencies to which he is exposed, has made the matter plain, and that we have surrendered the point in dispute. I trust that we shall hear no more of this unfortunate transaction; and if we let it be known that we are not disposed, in order merely to gratify the pride or vanity of some of our agents abroad, to engage in a quarrel, with which neither we nor our Government have really anything to do, and in which none of our interests are involved, then with the strength and the name of England I certainly am not apprehensive of any European quarrel arising out of these matters. I am sure that the question of India is one of sufficient magnitude to occupy the whole attention of our Government. As far as I can sec, this House has shown its readiness to support Ministers in suppressing the revolt of the Sepoys, and I believe it will be equally ready, when the proper time comes, to investigate and redress any grievance or any evil of which the people of India may have reason to complain. Those 180,000,000, to whom an hon. Gentleman has referred, have called upon us to give them a good and just Government, and we have no right to attempt to govern them unless we do so with justice and for their benefit. I believe that such is the wish of this House. I believe that, as soon as this unhappy revolt shall have been suppressed, we shall see every disposition to investigate the evils which are alleged to exist in India; and I do trust that, whenever we discover any wellfounded grievance, we shall be unanimous in seeking to supply a remedy.
§ Mr. DISRAELII wish to make an explanation. The noble Lord has imputed to me certain words which I never used. He has represented me as saying that the revolt in India is a just and righteous revolt, or as endeavouring to make the House adopt that opinion. I never used those words, and I never attempted to induce the House to adopt that opinion. My opinion is that this is a foul rebellion—not a just revolt; but I do not think that even a foul rebellion can occur without a cause, and I have endeavoured to trace and to characterize with accuracy the causes which have led to the disasters we all deplore.
§ LORD JOHN RUSSELLI alluded to the word "criminal," and some other expressions of the same nature which the right hon. Gentleman used in speaking of persons concerned in the Government of 1447 India. I am glad, however, to have drawn from the right hon. Gentleman an avowal of his opinion that this is a foul rebellion.
§ MR.DISRAELIThe noble Lord has confounded two speeches made at the interval of a Fortnight. In one of them I certainly used the word "criminal" with reference to counsels which I believed to be of a criminal character in so far as they have brought about such dangerous consequences as those which we now behold. What the use of that expression has to do with my opinion of the rebellion in India, or with the statements imputed to me by the noble Lord, I cannot understand.