HC Deb 30 March 1855 vol 137 cc1406-9
SIR DE LACY EVANS

wished, as Parliament was about to adjourn for some time, to make some observations with regard to the momentous events which were occurring, or were likely to occur, at the seat of war. There was one point to which he wished to direct their particular attention, namely, to the reinforcement of the army in the East. The accounts which had lately been received from the army with regard to its health and the return of invalids from the different hospitals to its ranks were very satisfactory, and must be very gratifying to the country. The condition of the army with regard to clothing and provisions had also materially improved. But still there remained much to be done. It appeared that the enemy were by no means wanting in exertions to reinforce their army, and that fresh troops were continually pouring in—perhaps, in a greater proportion than those which this country were sending to the seat of war. He knew nothing as to what reinforcements might have been sent out, except what he had seen in the public papers—but during the last month he did not perceive that any considerable amount had been embarked. He had, however, been much pleased at hearing it stated by the noble Lord at the head of the Government that recruiting was going on favourably, and he hoped that the Government would omit no effort to carry it on. He believed that it was of more importance for the Government to direct their attention to recruiting a class of men physically competent for the work of the army, than to make any extreme efforts with regard to the militia, which, in the present war, was to his mind of secondary importance, inasmuch as the prospects of invasion were most remote:—in the former war the case was very different. He therefore hoped that the increase of the regular army was the great object to which the Government was directing its attention. He did not believe that the bounty now offered was adequate for the purpose, and in a momentous contest like the present—when by liberal efforts he believed that the contest might be terminated in a limited period—it would be false economy on the part of the Government to hesitate to increase the bounty if men did not recruit in sufficient numbers. There was another point to which he also wished to direct the attention of the House. They saw that a powerful armament was about to proceed to the Baltic; and as this fact had been stated in the public papers, as a non-official person, he might, without risk, refer to preparations which it was said were being made for a Baltic campaign. They all knew that a large fleet had been sent to the Baltic last year, where, from unavoidable circumstances, it had not done much. It was generally considered that the ships of which that fleet was composed were too large for utility; but those of the fleet which it was alleged was to go there during the present year were as large. Steamships were much wanted in the Baltic Sea, and indeed, from its narrow navigation, sailing ships were even dangerous, and the number of steamers there should be as large as the naval resources of the country could command. It was also alleged in the public prints that powerful batteries, of a light draught of water, were being constructed to accompany that fleet, and he could only suppose that they were intended for the capture of some fortress in that sea. In his opinion, however, if a fortress were attacked by these batteries, captured, and then abandoned, that proceeding would not materially affect the main objects of the war; whereas those batteries would be of great use in the Euxine, where the main struggle between the European Powers and Russia was going on. He did not pretend to ask for an explanation on the subject, because the Government would probably not think it consistent with their duty to give any information, but he must say that, according to his opinion, the concentration of attack upon one particular portion of the enemy's territory and upon one particular fortress was the principle which should be constantly adopted in war. In the last European war it was, unfortunately, not so adopted, and this was probably the reason why that war had been so prolonged. At that time we carried on operations in the Colonies and in the Mediterranean, and we sent a very powerful armament to Walcheren; while, if these forces had been poured in on one point, and placed at the disposal of the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula, the Duke would have long before found his way over the Pyrenees. He hoped, therefore, that this system of making attacks upon various points, instead of concentrating our whole power, naval as well as military, upon those parts of the enemy's territory where the struggle was most vital, would not be persisted in. It was his earnest hope that every man and every horse and gun at the disposal of the Government would be sent to the seat of war with as little delay as possible. He was told there were several batteries now at Woolwich. He was not sure of this, and, indeed, should be surprised if the statement were true, because it would show, on the part of the Government, a laxity of management which he thought was highly reprehensible. These batteries, if really at Woolwich, ought to be sent out to the commander of our forces in the Crimea, where the enemy was very powerful in artillery, and possessed, probably, a greater armament than any army ever had to contend with in a siege. The authorities were very apt everywhere to keep a body of reserve in their own hands at home. He did not pretend to say that that was the case in this instance. But he remembered that at Constantinople, when the Turkish army was engaged in important operations on the Danube, he was informed by a Turkish general officer, that sixty pieces of artillery, with the horses to serve them, were retained at the capital as a kind of reserve; but as we were now engaged with an enemy who had a most powerful artillery, it should be considered whether these guns should not be sent to the army. There was, he repeated, a tendency everywhere to retain a reserve at home, which reserve would be much better employed in active service than left at some central depôt. The hon. Member for Berwick (Mr. Scott) last evening, in his observations upon the naval operations in the Black Sea, alluded to the impropriety of our not having destroyed or occupied Odessa, and appeared to think that if that place had been occupied matters would have been in a very different position. Now, the hon. Gentleman was perhaps not aware that to make effectually the diversion he spoke of would have required a small force amounting to 100,000 men. That force was not at the disposal of the Allies, and therefore this little complaint against Admiral Dundas had no foundation whatever. He (Sir De Lacy Evans) had probably seen as much of these maritime operations as any man in that House, and he could say, as an eye-witness of those in the Black Sea, that he had never in his life seen any better conducted, and he really thought they redounded to the honour and credit of the naval commanders.