HC Deb 17 June 1851 vol 117 cc915-49
MR. COBDEN

said: The Resolution I have now to move is a logical sequence to the discussion in which the House has just been engaged. It has been said, in the course of that discussion, that it is impossible for certain interests to support the present amount of taxation. One of the motives that has influenced me in bringing forward this Resolution is, that I thought it was so far suited to the present circumstances of the country that it would tend to produce a diminution of burdens and a relief from taxation. I wish the real scope and purport of my Motion to be understood at the outset, so that it may not be misrepresented in the debate. I do not propose, then, to discuss or entertain the amount of the armies maintained upon the Continent. When I speak of warlike preparations I allude to naval establishments and fortifications. Our Army is maintained without reference to the armies of the Continent, and the armies of the Continent are never framed or regulated with reference to the Army of England. In speaking of standing armies, which I regard as the standing curse of the present generation, the question is usually complicated by considerations of a purely domestic character. I am told that the armies of the Continent are not kept up by the Governments for the sake of meeting foreign enemies, but for the purpose of repressing their own subjects. This being the case, I am asked how I can persuade foreign Governments to reduce their armies, seeing that they are necessary for the maintenance of internal order, as it is called. But no such argument applies to my proposition, which is confined exclusively to the maritime armaments of England and France. I will, however, say, that I believe that if I can succeed in my Motion with France, the example of the two countries will be at once followed by other countries in the reduction of their navies, and that if a reduction in the naval forces and fortifications, of England and France takes place, other countries will afterwards follow with a redaction in their armies. I presume it will be admitted that the maintenance of a naval force beyond what is necessary, in the time of peace, for the protection of commerce against piracy, and in the intercourse with barbarous countries, is an evil, but I shall be told it is a necessary evil. If I ask why, it will be said, because other countries are armed as well as ourselves. Well, admitting that, and assuming that France and England maintain a certain amount of naval force, not for the purpose of protecting commerce, or acting as the police of the seas, but in order to hold themselves in a menacing attitude towards each other, that is a compound evil; it is not merely a pure waste of the amount of money which that portion of the navies of the two countries costs—there is also the sacrifice of the productive labour of the sailors, shipwrights, ? and I am prepared to contend that it would be better and more economical to vote that money and throw it into the sea, for we should then save the labour which is employed upon ships of war, and which might be then productively occupied. Nor will the old hackneyed argument, that "to preserve peace we must be prepared for war," apply in my case. What I seek is a mutual reduction of armaments which will leave the two countries in the same relative position as at present. These two countries will be equally well prepared for warfare with each other if they reduce their force to one, as if they both maintain their force at twenty, as their relative proportions will remain the same, and no advantage can be gained in the event of hostilities by keeping up this unnecessary force. I feel bound, in the outset of my argument, to prove the truth of my assumption that England does arm herself against France, and that France returns the compliment, and that this has been for many years the systematic policy of successive Governments in the two countries. I am prepared to show that it is the avowed policy of both countries to arm themselves, so that each may be prepared to meet the armament provided by the other country. In doing so I shall be obliged, contrary to my usual practice, to trouble the House with a few quotations. In the debate in the French Chamber of Deputies in 1846, when a Motion was made for a vote of 95,000,000f. for a great augmentation of the navy, M. Thiers said— There is nothing offensive to England in citing her example when our Navy is under considera- tion, any more than there would be in speaking of Prussia, Austria, or Russia, if we were deliberating upon the strength of our Army. We pay England the compliment of thinking only of her when determining our naval force; we never heed the ships which sally forth from Trieste or Venice—we care only for those which leave Portsmouth or Plymouth. I am told the noble Lord below (Lord Palmerston) was in the Chamber of Deputies when the speech was made. The noble Viscount (Viscount Palmerston), in the debate on the financial statement in 1848, only two years afterwards, said— So far from its affording any cause of offence to Prance that we should measure our Navy by such a standard, I am sure any one who follows the debates in the French Chambers, when their naval estimates come under discussion, must know that they follow the same course, adopting the natural and only measure in such cases, namely, the naval force which other nations may happen to have at the time."—3 Hansard, xcvi. 980. In the same debate on the financial statement in 1848, the noble Lord (Lord John Russell), after showing that the expenditure for the navy in France had increased since 1833 from 2,280,000l. to 3,902,000l., proceeds to observe— I am not alluding at all—it never has been the custom to allude, and I think we are quite right in that respect—to what may be the military force of foreign Powers. I do not, therefore, allude at all to the amount of the standing army that is kept up in France, or in Austria, or in Prussia, or in other foreign countries; but so great an increase in naval estimates, I think, does require the attention, and, at all events, should be within the knowledge of the House."—p. 912. I can give several other extracts from the speeches of leading statesmen, and from the newspaper press, of both countries, to the same effect; but I think it will not be necessary to trouble the House with many more, for it will hardly be denied that the two Governments have been, up to the present time, running a race of warlike preparations. I have two objections to that policy: first, it is an irritating policy, having a constant tendency to increase the evil, and to which I see no limits unless it is in some way met; and, secondly, it leads each country into the error of proceeding upon exaggerated reports of the preparations of the other. No explanations are ever offered or received, and both Governments are left to act upon their erroneous impressions. I found, when these reports were afterwards examined into, that they bore the traces of great exaggeration. I will mention an instance. Our naval force was greatly increased in 1845. The French were alarmed. A Committee of the Cham- ber of Peers was appointed to inquire into the state of the French navy. They made a report. In that report, drawn up by Baron Dupin, they said— We have now to announce the execution of a great scheme which the English Government is pursuing with its usual foresight, and which cannot fail to have a vast influence on the naval policy of other countries. The report then went on to say— That under the modest guise of steam guardships, the British Admiralty had determined on building eight additional line-of-battle ships, to be fitted out for continuing fifteen days at sea, and that the number was intended to he doubled in the next year. If we compare the powers of destruction possessed by the broadsides of these floating fortresses with those of the most formidable batteries ever employed by an army upon land for the destruction of fortified places, we shall then know what to think of an armament provided under the modest and defensive guise of steam guardships. It is, then, for France an absolute necessity to prepare an armament of a similar character and of equal force, so that we may have nothing to dread in future, in case of a possible misunderstanding with England. Now, in that report it was broadly stated that eight steam guard-ships were being prepared by the British Government against France; and there was some ground for it, inasmuch as eight large ships had been ordered by our Admiralty to be converted into screw-propellers; but when I sat on the Committee on the Navy, in 1848, I found, on examining the authorities of the Admiralty, that only four of these steam guard-ships were ever completed, and that, instead of being of the character stated in the report, they were only capable of going to sea for five days instead of fifteen, inasmuch as they were not prepared for carrying a large supply of coal. I will give another illustration of how the two countries played at seesaw in this respect. I have stated that in consequence of the increase of our Navy in 1845, France had voted a largo augmentation of her naval force in 1846. Mr. Ward, who was then Secretary of the Navy, came down to the House of Commons the following Session (of 1847), and made this a plea for a further increase of our Navy Estimates. After giving a detailed and glowing account of the augmentation of the French estimates, made in the previous year by the Chamber of Deputies, he added— Now, he found no fault with France for these things. France did what she thought right and necessary for the maintenance of her position. She set us, in many respects, a noble example. These facts, it appeared to him, ought to be a lesson to us. They imposed a very heavy respon- sibility on those who were in power in this country."—3 Hansard, xc. 570. But the British Government could not stop there. Our Navy was augmented until it reached upwards of 40,000 men. That produced its fruits in France. I have in my band an extract from a report of the National Assembly on the Navy in 1849. It says— Let us see whether foreign Powers really show us the example of a reduction of naval armaments. This very spring England has voted 40,000 men for the sea service. This vote will amount to 6,000,000l. sterling, without including the cost of artillery, &c., which is defrayed out of the Ordnance estimates. We content ourselves with twenty-four vessels of the line afloat, and sixteen in an advanced stage upon the stocks, for our peace establishment; the English have seventy afloat, besides those in course of building. With our peace establishment, such as it was fixed in 1846, we should be one-third inferior in strength to the English Navy. But this farce of "beggar my neighbour" will not be completely played out until I have given one more quotation from a speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty, being a direct response to the last menace from the other side of the Channel. In moving the Naval Estimates for the present year, the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty said—and it was this remark of the right, hon. Gentleman that induced me to give notice of this Motion— It was impossible to fix upon what was necessary in their own establishment without looking to the establishments of foreign countries. He might, however, observe that they had had sufficient proof in the course of the last year that a gallant, active, and intelligent people, not far from themselves, had not by any means neglected their naval establishments and naval power."—3 Hansard, cxiv. 1187. And the right hon. Gentleman went on to give a description of the naval evolutions at Cherbourg, and that great fortified place was held up to this country with a formidable account of its preparation. Now, will it be credited by the House that at almost the moment when these words were being uttered by our First Lord of the Admiralty, the French Government were quoting our example to justify an increased outlay for the improvement of this naval arsenal. I hold in my hand a report of a commission of the National Assembly recommending the outlay of 6,800,000f. to continue the defensive works at Cherbourg; and it bears date the 11th of April, 1851. It says— If we would be fully alive to the necessity of no longer leaving in a defenceless state a point most important and certainly the most menaced upon the whole coast of the Channel, we have only to listen to the opinion entertained of Cherbourg by the English, and especially by one of their most renowned sailors, Admiral Napier, in his recent letter to the Times. We have only in fact, to cast our eye upon the map, and to observe the vast works which the British Admiralty are now executing at Jersey and Alderney for the purpose of creating a rival establishment to our own. This is the more necessary, inasmuch as the railroads and steamboats in England are every day increasing, and their powerful means of transportation give to those who possess them the facility of concentrating upon any given point a sudden expedition. We must be on our guard against so powerful an enemy, situate at so short a distance from our shores, and who by the aid of steam will be henceforth independent of wind, tides, and currents, which formerly impeded the operations of sailing vessels. One of the best things this House has done for a long time was to suspend, the other night, the works for the fortification of Alderney. These works are a menace and an affront to France, and are meant as a rival to Cherbourg. Now, Cherbourg, as every one knows who has sailed along that coast, besides being a naval arsenal, is a most useful, valuable, and indispensable port of refuge for merchant ships; in fact, a breakwater at Cherbourg might be made by subscription from all the maritime States of Europe, so important is it to all who sail along that coast. But Alderney can mean nothing but a fortified place, within a few miles of France, to menace that country. It can never be useful as a harbour of refuge, for no merchant vessels will venture near it. These fortifications were projected during a panic in England, caused by the cry of a French invasion; and if any one could get at the professional springs set in motion to create that panic, it would be a most instructive history. In 1845 the country was led to suppose that we were to be invaded by some maritime Power. A number of engineers had a roving commission to go along the coast and point out places where money could be spent in raising fortifications, and when they had exhausted the coast of England they went over to Jersey and Alderney. I have heard the evidence of some of these gallant gentlemen before the Committee on the Navy Estimates. One of them said he went down to Plymouth—he found the people there expecting their throats would be cut the next day; and, said he, "strange as it may appear, I shared their alarm." It was whilst under the influence of that panic that we projected our harbours of refuge, as they were called, upon which it was suggested between 4,000,000l. and 5,000,000l. should be expended. It was under the same panic that the works at Keyham, upon which 1,200,000l. is to be wasted, and the works at Alderney, which are to cost four times as much as the fee-simple of the whole island, were projected. I do not mean to bring these facts in accusation against any particular Government or party in this country, nor do I intend to charge England with being worse than her neighbour beyond the Channel; both are equally to blame, and it is very difficult to say on which side the greater culpability is to be found. I may, in justification of these remarks, appeal to the authority of one of the most accomplished and amiable men in France, almost the only man who, in 1847 and 1848, had the moral courage to attempt to stem the torrent of prejudice and passion which was hurrying us into these warlike preparations. Monsieur Michel Chevalier, in a pamphlet which was noticed with merited commendation by the noble Lord at the head of the Government (Lord John Russell), in his Budget speech of 1848, stated, that whilst we were projecting our fortifications on the British coast, France, at the same time, was projecting works to the extent of between 10,000,000l. and 11,000,000l. sterling, without including the fortifications of Paris, and he gave a comparative estimate of the increased expenditure both of France and England, from 1838 to 1847, showing that in that period England and France had respectively augmented their naval expenditure to the extent of between 13,000,000l. and 14,000,000l. sterling, and that, both going on in that neck-and-neck race of folly, the two countries had, in fact, spent nearly the same amount. Now, the practical question which I have to ask is, can any means be devised for putting an end to this foolish international rivalry? Is there a remedy for what everybody will admit to be a great evil? Is it possible to bring human reason to bear upon the mass of folly, waste, and extravagance, which I have been describing? Is diplomacy unable to bring the two nations to a better understanding of their true interests? I know that I shall be asked to quote a precedent for what I am recommending, and I think there is some force in the precedent I am about to adduce. I will not refer to the more remote examples of the last century, such as the agreement for the demolition of Dunkirk, or the treaty for mutual reduction of armaments entered into between France and England in 1787, or the convention called the Armed Neutrality; nor will I allude to the treaties for suppressing the slave trade, which defined the amount of force to be maintained by the contracting parties; but I will cite a modern example, bearing, as I believe, upon the case under consideration. The case to which I shall refer is that of America and England, for limiting the force to be kept up on the lakes of America. I will give the text of the treaty:— Arrangements between the United States and Great Britain, between Richard Rush, Esq., acting as Secretary of the Department of State, and Charles Bagot, his Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary, &c., April 1817:—The naval force to be maintained upon the American lakes by His Majesty and the Government of the United States shall henceforth be confined to the following vessels on each side, that is—On Lake Ontario, to one vessel not exceeding 100 tons burden, and armed with one 18-pound cannon; on the upper lakes to two vessels, not exceeding like burden each, and armed with like force; on the waters of Lake Champlain, to one vessel, not exceeding like burden, and armed with like force. All other armed vessels on these lakes shall be forthwith dismantled, and no other vessels of war shall be there built or armed. If either party should hereafter be desirous of annulling this stipulation, and should give notice to that effect to the other party, it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of six months from the date of such notice. The naval force so to be limited shall be restricted to such services as will in no respect interfere with the proper duties of the armed vessels of the other party. Now it will be remembered that, during our war to the United States in 1814, the greatest efforts were made on both sides to secure a naval supremacy upon the lakes, which was considered by the highest military authorities to be indispensable to the success of the land operations of the armies. Upon this subject the Duke of Wellington, who was then at Paris, thus expressed himself in a letter addressed to Sir George Murray:— I have told the Ministers repeatedly that a naval superiority on the lakes is a sine quâ non of success in war on the frontier of Canada, even if our object should be solely defensive; and I hope that when you are there they will take care to secure it for you. So that in case of any rupture between England and America the occupation of the lakes was considered by that great authority as necessary to success; and yet, notwithstanding that, immediately after the war, the two countries had the good sense to limit the amount of force upon the lakes. And what has been the result of that friendly convention? Not only has it had the effect of reducing the force, but of abolishing it altogether. When I sat on the Committee, I did not find that any vessel was left on the lakes as an armed force. From the moment that it was known that there was to be no rivalry in the armaments of the two countries, neither party cared to maintain even the moderate force which they were entitled to keep up. And this is, in my mind, the natural result of such a friendly understanding; and I believe it will be found that, in the event of England and France entering into a negotiation for a reduction of their naval forces, the effect will be that, from the moment they are satisfied of each other's sincerity, all desire for maintaining an armed force will cease on both sides. I admit that the case of England and France, and that of England and America, to which I am referring, are somewhat different; but yet I ask whether it is not possible to devise some plan, if not by actual convention, as in the case of America, yet by some communication with France, in which we may say, "We are mutually building so many vessels each year; our relative force is as three to two, and if we increase it tenfold still the relations will be the same. Will it not be possible by a friendly understanding to agree that we shall not go on in this rivalry, but that we shall put an equal check upon this mutual injury?" I may be told that to undertake a reduction of forces in every part of the aqueous globe, is a very different thing to the regulation of the naval establishments upon the lakes of Canada. But I will remind the House that our naval force is allotted to certain "stations," which are defined according to well-known geographical limits. For instance, there is the East India station, the Pacific station, the Mediterranean station. Now the force we maintain on those stations has always borne a certain relation to the force of other countries. I remember, for instance, that the late First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Auckland, in his evidence before the Navy Committee, stated, that our force in the Pacific was framed with reference to the amount of force kept there by France and America. Now, I ask, is it impossible to come to a friendly arrangement respecting these stations similar to that which has been so completely successful on the Canadian lakes? Why, it seems to me that the convention fixing the number of slave cruisers to be kept up by the great naval Powers on the coast of Africa is very nearly a case in point, in which what I contend for is completely accomplished. But I may be told, I am dealing merely with France, and forgetting that there are other maritime States; but I contend that there are only two countries besides ourselves of any importance as first-rate naval Powers, namely, France and the United States. America has very wisely set us the example of a reduction of her navy—in fact, she has not a line-of-battle ship now in commission. The only one she had last year at sea, the Ohio, has been brought home from the Pacific and laid up in ordinary; and the works in her dockyards, so far as relate to ships of the line on the stocks, have been suspended. When California was discovered, America might have placed two or three line-of-battle ships oft" that coast; but she withdrew the only one she bad there, and turned her artisans and shipwrights to construct some of the most magnificent steam vessels that were ever seen; and her commerce is extending as fast as our own. The hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Urquhart) may, perhaps, refer me to Russia; but all history proves, that no country that has not a mercantile marine can be a great naval country. You may build up a large navy as Mehemet Ali did, and put his fellahs on board; but if you have not a mercantile marine, you never can become a great naval Power. Russia has, no doubt, a great number of ships at Cronstadt—I have seen them all—but if Russia has power she keeps it at home, and there may be very good reasons why she does so, for I have heard remarks from American sailors lying at Cronstadt to the effect that her vessels are not much to be admired. She has about 30,000 sailors, but they are men taken from the interior, unaccustomed to sea duty, and are, of course, a complete laughing-stock to British seamen. I do not consider that any country like America or England, carrying on an enormous commerce, and possessing hundreds of thousands of experienced sailors, can ever be endangered by a country having no mercantile marine. With reference to our distant stations, at all events, America offers no objection, but rather invites us to this course by her example. France is the only country that presents herself with any force upon foreign stations; and, I ask, is it impossible to carry out the same rule in regard to France that has been agreed to with the United States; or are we to go on ad infinitum wasting our resources and imposing unnecessary taxes, in order to keep up that waste? I may be told, probably, that this is not the proper moment for such resolutions as this. I think that it is the proper moment. I believe that nations are disposed for peace, and I am glad to be able to cite the opinion of the noble Lord at the head of the Government, and of the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that there is a great disposition on the part of the people towards maintaining national peace. I hold in my hand, also, an extract from the most powerful vehicle of public opinion—a paper which certainly everybody will admit has the best possible opportunity of knowing what is the tendency of public opinion throughout the world—I mean the Times newspaper. That journal, in a recent leading article, said— Wars of nation against nation are not the evil of the day, but the contests between classes in the same country. Europe is already so much governed by the representatives of taxpayers, that an European war is an affair of improbable occurrence. Even in countries where constitutional government is not understood, the ruling power would be very slow, for its own sake, to impose taxes for purposes of war. Europe has remained at peace, although European society has gone through convulsions in the course of the last five years, of which history presents no example since the breaking up of the Roman empire. If there is not a disposition on the part of the people of the Continent to go to war, where is the use of, or the necessity for, the enormous naval force which France keeps up? Surely there must be as great a disposition on the part of that country as of this to reduce the burdens of taxation, by diminishing expenditure. I have conversed with French statesmen on this subject, and when I have put it to them, as I have to English statesmen, they have admitted that the plan which I propose would be most desirable for them. They said that they kept up their navy because England kept up hers, but that it would be the greatest possible relief to them to be able to reduce it. I believe that if our Government were to make a friendly proposal to France, it would be met in an amicable spirit. France does not pretend that she is so strong as England by sea, and she does not aim at being thought so, for it is invariably admitted in the discussions in the French Chamber that she has no pretensions to rival England in the amount of her naval force. England may, therefore, take the initiative in recom- mending a reduction of armaments, without the danger of compromising her dignity, or of having her motives misrepresented; and if a friendly proposal of this sort he made to France, I fully believe it will be accepted. This leads me to another view of the subject, which illustrates the utter absurdity of the course pursued by the two countries. If England is the more powerful by sea, France is invulnerable by land, so that while the spirit of rivalry is maintained by two countries so equal in point of resources, taking the army and navy together, it is impossible one can ever gain a permanent advantage over the other. If one were exceedingly weak, and the other strong, and the strong could have some extraordinary motive to possess the weaker, I might despair to convince by argument; but the case of England and France is very different. Whenever England increases her armaments and fortifications, France does the same, and vice versâ. We are pursuing a course, therefore, which holds out to neither country a prospect of any permanent gain. We are not actuated by motives of ambition or aggression, but are simply acting for self-defence, and no rational mind in either country supposes anything else than that a war between the two countries must he injurious to both. Both nations, therefore, have an interest in putting an end to this mutual rivalry and hostility by the course which I recommend. I shall be anxious to hear the opinions of the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Department (Lord Palmerston) upon this subject. I do not ask him to carry out the terms of this Motion in any particular form. My Resolution merely says that a communication should be entered into in a spirit of amity with France. I do not stipulate for a diplomatic note in this form or that. I shall be perfectly satisfied if I see the attempt made, for the objection that I have to our present policy is, that there never has been an attempt made to stay the progress of that rivalry in warlike preparations of which I complain—there never has been anything done that could by possibility tend to bring the two countries to an understanding. All I stipulate for is, that diplomacy shall put itself a little more into harmony with the spirit of the age, and occupy itself in promoting the welfare of the taxpayers, and forwarding the interests of humanity at large, instead of busying itself in petty intrigues and technical formalities, which have ceased to exercise the slightest influence over the fate of nations. I shall be told that the object I have in view, however good in itself, cannot be promoted by Governments; that it must be the result of the slow progress of public opinion, and of the gradual operations of individual enterprise. Why, public opinion and individual enterprise are doing much to bring England and France together? Compare the present state of things with that which existed twenty-five years ago. I remember that at that time there were but two posts a week between London and Paris for the conveyance of letters. Down to 1848, thirty-four hours were allowed for transmitting a post to Paris; we now go in eleven hours. Where there used to be thousands passing and repassing, there are now tens of thousands. Formerly no man could be heard in our smaller towns and villages speaking a foreign language, let it be what language it might, but the rude and vulgar passer-by would call him a Frenchman, and very likely insult him. We have seen a great change in all that. With the increase of intercourse, old prejudices have abated; a better knowledge of each other has produced an increase of respect and confidence; until at length, in this the first year of the second half of the nineteenth century, we have seen a most important change. We are witnessing now what a few years ago no one could have predicted as possible. We see men meeting together from all the countries in the world, more like the gatherings of nations in former times, when they came up for a great religious festival—we find men speaking different languages, and bred in different habits, associating in one common temple erected for their gratification and reception. I ask, then, that the Government of the country shall put itself in harmony with the spirit of the age, and shall endeavour at all events to follow in the wake of what private enterprise and public opinion are achieving. I have the fullest conviction that one step taken in that direction would be attended with important consequences, and would redound to the honour and credit of any Foreign Minister who, casting aside the old and musty maxims of diplomacy, should step out and take in hand the task which I have humbly submitted to the noble Lord. I beg to move— An Address to Her Majesty, praying that She will direct the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to enter into communication with the Government of France and endeavour to prevent in future that rivalry of warlike preparations in time of Peace, which has, hitherto been the policy of the two Governments, and to promote, if possible, a mutual reduction of armaments.

MR. URQUHART

said, it was his intention to move, as an Amendment— That it is inexpedient, by Resolutions of this House, to move the Crown to originate negotiations on abstract questions. He thought that, instead of casting aside musty diplomacy, they should cast out the newfangled diplomacy of the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office. The commencement of those large armaments, and their continuance and increase since, were to be traced to the policy of the noble Lord; and if the House were not prepared to sanction that policy, or to continue the present ruinous expenditure, they would but stultify themselves if they said to that noble Lord, "We beg you to take charge of this our mission; we place our power in your hands, and we beg you to negotiate towards the accomplishment of an end which is directly at variance with all your former conduct." The hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) said that there was no cause for rivalry between France and England—that there was a great intercourse and interchange between the two countries—that they had material interests in common—and that war could not fail to be injurious to both. Wherever, then, there was an English subject—or, reciprocally, a French subject—injured by an act of the foreign Power, there was furnished a casus belli. In all such cases, thanks be to God, their adjustment had not been left to the management of the noble Lord at the head of Foreign Affairs, but to the judicial decision of a court of law. The truth was, that much mischief had arisen from the meddling interference of this country with the affairs of other countries. Before the last war, there was a common understanding between the States of Europe, and their connection was carried on by treaties. But since then an alteration had taken place in their diplomacy, and mutual rivalry was the result of it. The repulsion of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary to the Government of M. Thiers was the cause of the mutual rivalry of the two nations, and had originated their increased naval armaments; and the late Sir Robert Peel attributed the misunderstanding, in a great measure, to the policy of the noble Lord opposite (Lord Palmerston) with respect to Syria. Did not the dispute of 1844 arise out of an interference with a Syrian pachalie?—and that of 1846 from one respecting a missionary in Tahiti? Was not each of those a miserable interference, with which this country had no concern? What was it but an assumption of a most inordinate power, which the noble Lord and the other members of the Government did not possess over a parish or a county in England? This was the cause that had led to those late diplomatic interferences which were terrible because secret; and to that exercise of the moral influence of England abroad, which was dangerous because the House possessed over it no control. This was the cause of those asperities between us and foreign States, which had destroyed the value of peace even while it existed, and had rendered its continuance problematical. The House, however, was in great measure responsible, because it had not exercised greater vigilance over the Foreign Office, and so was the hon. Member (Mr. Cobden) himself, who had threatened to take every possible means of diminishing the supplies in order to abridge the noble Lord's (Lord Palmerston's) powers of interference. With respect to the Motion before them, he accepted the hon. Member's substantive proposition; but he appealed to him whether he would confide to the noble Lord the task of negotiations so much at variance with his character, and so much in opposition to all his past antecedents?

MR. MACKINNON

Sir, I have listened with great attention to the speech of the hon. Gentleman who has brought this Motion forward—a measure that does him great honour, one which, coupled with his exertions for universal peace, will entitle him to the thanks of the present and future generations. The question before us is one to which I have paid some attention, and in which I take considerable interest. I think the hon. Gentleman deserves praise for the pains he has taken and the talent he has displayed on the subject. On looking back to the history of mankind from the first ages to the present time, it is a melancholy retrospect to find that in all ages, in all countries, man has been occupied in the destruction of his species. The early wars of mankind appear to have been wars in some measure of necessity. In barbarous tribes it appears that the locality they occupy is calculated barely to support them, that is, to keep them alive; if another tribe endeavours to occupy the same spot, both would perish together: hence arises a war of extermination; one must destroy the other, much in the same predicament as two men in a shipwreck, on one plank which can support but one: these wars, though not justifiable, may be styled wars of necessity. As men emerged from their barbarous state, we find them waging wars of ambition and interest: look at the wars of the Greeks, the Romans; of the middle ages, when they conquered from ambition, seized the wealth of the conquered, and made them slaves: in these wars both ambition and interest were combined. This system of warfare was of course palatable to the parties who gained so much by carrying it on. Of late years it seems that wars of ambition have continued so far down as the days of Napoleon. In the present day, however, wars are not likely to be so pleasant an amusement and agreeable a pastime as in the days of Louis XIV. The art of war is so much improved, that vast expense is incurred—probably more is lost by a nation by going to war, than can by any possibility be gained; the natural result must be, that all civilised communities who now have a share in the national counsels will pause before they load themselves with taxes for the purpose of worrying their neighbours. Burke remarks, that man, taking this globe, destroys more of his fellow-men in one year, than all the lions, tigers, wolves, and other animals of a ferocious nature, have destroyed of their own species since the creation of the world. He (Burke) calculates the destruction of human life from wars and the concomitants of wars, pestilence, famine, &c, at thirty-six millions in a century. In the present day, from the causes I have mentioned, it appears that if wars are undertaken, they will probably be wars of interest; in saying this, I allude to European wars, such as took place so frequently in the last century—not to the contests between civilised nations in their colonies, and in the extension of civilisation over barbarism. Now, in reference to the hon. Gentleman's Motion, it appears to me, that considerable difficulty may arise in carrying it out. Our colonies are essential to the prosperity of our empire; the time will come, and is not far distant, when the European States are likely to produce their own manufactured goods: look at the Crystal Palace, and see the great improvements in machinery made. Where are we to look out for a market for our immense productions but in our colonies?—if we lose them, what are we to do? Can we in our present situation secure the welfare of our colonies and their commerce, without an armed force? If, as the hon. Gentleman proposes, we were to disarm in the exact proportion of France, and of other nations who have no colonies, and entertain no fear of invasion, we might reduce our Navy to one vessel of war. Would this be a satisfactory state of affairs to the people or to this House? The hon. Gentleman the Member for Stafford, who has just sat down, accuses the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of intermeddling with other nations, and often incurring the danger of leading us into a war. It is a singular fact, however, that the noble Lord, so long as he has held the Foreign seals, a longer period than any other Foreign Secretary within the last sixty years, has always kept us at peace, and has contrived to preserve us in amity and good feeling with every civilised State in this and the other hemisphere. Now, if by reducing our forces, we lost our colonies, how should we be placed? Can we at this time allow them to be without any military or naval force? yet, if an understanding was entered into with foreign Powers, to disarm in the same proportion as they did, should we not be obliged to act in such a manner? Let us look at the state of our foreign possessions. Could we spare many British troops from India? I should think not. Have we too many at Jamaica, in the Windward or Leeward Islands—in Ceylon, or at the Cape? It does not appear that any could be spared from Ireland; and considering the increasing population in Great Britain, and times of discontent or scarcity that might arise, we have not many to spare in England or Scotland. I quite agree with the hon. Gentleman, that economy and retrenchment are not only desirable but called for by public opinion, and I think every succeeding House of Commons will be more in its favour; but I do not exactly see where, in the armed force of this country, such a reduction can he made with safety. At the same time, I must say that I cordially approve of the hon. Gentleman's intentions and motives; they are founded on the purest philanthropy, and will, I am certain, gain the esteem of all men, to which he is so justly entitled. I think this Motion may do good; at any rate it can do no harm; it must create in the public mind a distaste for useless and expensive wars. But I hope the hon. Member for the West Riding will be satisfied to place his Motion on record, and to leave to Her Majesty's Secre- tary for Foreign Affairs the hest mode of carrying it into effect, without having him hampered by a Resolution which it seems his inclination and duty to follow. This course I recommend to the hon. Member's adoption as the best he can take.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

Sir, in anything I may say in opposition to the Motion of the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden), I will beg the House not to suppose that I wish to express, or that I am actuated by, any feelings or principles at variance with the fundamental principle upon which his proposition is founded. However I may differ from my hon. Friend, if I may so call him, with regard to many of the opinions which he from time to time expresses in this House, and however little I may think the methods by which he endeavours to give practical effect to his general principles are those best calculated to attain his end, yet in regard to those international principles and feelings which influence his political views as the advocate of peace, I am ready to do him the most ample justice, and to subscribe implicitly to the general tendency of the views which he from time to time expresses. I trust the part it has been my lot to take in administering one department of the affairs of this country has shown that there has been nothing in my conduct in any degree inconsistent with the opinions I am now professing; for, however it maybe the fashion with some persons, in that easy colloquial jaunty style in which they discuss public matters, to declaim against modern diplomacy and international intermeddling, yet at least I can appeal to facts. I can appeal to the fact that during the considerable period for which I have been responsible for the conduct of the foreign relations of this country, though events have happened in Europe of the most remarkable kind, and attended with great commotions of public feeling, and great agitation in the social and political system of the Continent—although during that period events have happened which have brought the interests of England, I will not say into conflict, but into opposition to the interests of other great and powerful nations, yet, at least, the fact is that we have been at peace, and that not only has peace been preserved between this country and other nations, but that there has been no international war of magnitude between any of the other great Powers of Europe. If then, on the one hand, we are taunted with perpetual interfering and intermeddling, in the relations of other countries, at least we ought to have the credit given to us that that interference and intermeddling has been accompanied by the continuance of peace between those countries with which we have interfered. It is too bad that we should be accused, on the one hand, of interfering constantly in the transactions of other countries, and at the same time that we should be denied the credit of those results which accompanied that course of policy. I think, Sir, that in looking at any great object we should not fix our eyes entirely upon the object itself, but that due attention ought to be paid to the mode by which that object may best be accomplished, and to the fact that persons may sometimes defeat their own intentions by not choosing the most judicious means of carrying them into effect. Now, if all nations were composed of men guided by the most philosophic and philanthropic dispositions, exempt from the influence of human passions, with minds enlarged by the most extensive views of human affairs, you might perhaps think, and justly, that the best way of obtaining peace would be to state that you were perfectly unarmed and unable to defend yourselves, throwing yourselves upon the good feeling of other countries, and assuring them that you entertained nothing but the most friendly disposition towards them. But man is not of such a nature. The world has not yet arrived at that pitch of civilisation at which one country can rest for its safety upon the forbearance of its neighbours. The world has not yet arrived at such a pitch of civilisation that a country possessing a multitude of riches which its neighbours may desire to acquire—a country whose commerce has excited the jealousy of rival nations, and possessing colonics which are the objects of covetousness to other maritime States, can rest its security simply upon its good intentions and its perfect incapacity for defence. The objection I take to the means by which my hon. Friend from time endeavours to force upon this country and upon the world his most laudably pacific views is, that he aims too much at divesting this country of the means of defence, without waiting until other States have placed themselves in a similar position of want of means of offence. The hon. Gentleman began his speech by asserting that he put the comparison of military means wholly out of the question, and that he confined the object of his Motion simply to a question of comparative naval resources. In accepting to a certain degree the standard of comparison which he proposed, namely, the relative powers of England and of France, I must at the same time observe that it is impossible, in taking that comparison as a standard, to throw out of the question, as my hon. Friend would do, the military force of France; because it is obvious that, in comparing the means of offence and defence of two countries so near to each other, and brought so much nearer in practice by the modern improvements of navigation, one country which possesses an army of 350,000 men, and a National Guard, of about 1,000,000, as compared with a country whose standing military force within the realm is, I think, something about 40,000 men, without any militia or National Guard at all, you cannot confine yourselves simply to the number of line-of-battle ships each may possess, but that you must also take into consideration the military means each country may have with the view of attack or defence. I think the zeal of my hon. Friend, who is in the habit of wishing to undervalue the necessity of defensive precautions, has carried him somewhat too far when he talks of Cherbourg as simply a port of refuge, and of the works at Alderney as an insult and a menace towards France. Why, as to Alderney, the whole island would hold about 1,000 people, and the harbour, if completed, would afford accommodation for a few steamers. When you talk of the works at Alderney as aggressive against France, you might as well talk of the aggression of a sentry-box against a fortified town. But what is there at Cherbourg? A harbour, it is said. Why, Cherbourg is a great naval arsenal; and in the very report from which my hon. Friend read an extract—a report presented last April to the French Assembly, explaining the grounds upon which certain sums were proposed to be voted for works therein mentioned—it is stated, I think, speaking from memory, that the works have been in progress now for nearly fifty years, that the whole amount of expense will be something between 7,000,000l. and 8,000,000l. sterling; and the ground upon which the works are represented as of value to France is an advanced post within some sixty miles of the English coast, incapable of being blockaded, and which would therefore afford in every war a most important point of aggression towards England in case of a war. I do not wish to exaggerate the relative means of France for attack as compared with England, and still less do I wish to imply that the continuance of these or any other works of the same kind on the part of the French Government and people is to he considered by this country as an indication of any existing hostile feeling on the part of France. I entirely disclaim any such belief on my own part. I am convinced that the greater intercourse which has taken place of late years between the people of the two countries has dispelled many prejudices, and has removed many foolish hostile feelings which have long survived the causes that gave them rise. It is one of the most gratifying circumstances of the times in which we live to see two great nations, situated close to each other, each gifted by nature with various qualities entitling them to the esteem, to the friendship, and I will say to the admiration, of each other, capable of rendering each other the most important services, capable also, if actuated by fatal passions, of inflicting upon each other the greatest calamities—it is most gratifying to see that every day, every month, and every year, brings these two nations into more general and friendly contact, and that feelings of mutual friendship and esteem are rapidly succeeding those antiquated notions of national antipathy of which I trust there will very soon remain no trace except the records which former histories may contain. But if a great and rich country like England wishes to maintain peace and friendship with a powerful State, it must take care that it shall be able to defend itself. I do not ask the country to arm itself with the means of aggression. I should wish that there might not be anything in our arrangements in time of peace which would indicate any intention of aggression, or which any Frenchman could see fairly pointed to as affording the means of aggression against France. We have no feelings that could lead us to take such a course; and I am the last man who would wish that anything we did should be capable of such an interpretation. But, on the other hand, I say it is a duty we owe to ourselves—a duty we owe to those functions which I think Providence has destined this country to perform—a duty we owe to those who will succeed us—that we should place this country in a position, and keep it in a position, to be able to repel attack, if, in any unfortunate and unforeseen circum- stances, such a necessity should unhappily arise. The hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Urquhart) with that reckless feeling of condemnation which it is my misfortune to be always pursued by him, has launched out into a very eloquent condemnation of that mischievous and detestable intermeddling with the affairs of other countries which I displayed in the affairs of Tahiti, and again in 1844. If the hon. Gentleman's memory had been only equal to his eloquence, he would have recollected that those two transactions, which he laid thus heavily to my charge, took place at a time when the Government of this country was administered by that great statesman whose loss we all deplore—Sir Robert Peel—and not during the time when I was in office. The hon. Gentleman must, therefore, either retract the condemnation he has passed upon the present Government, or he must modify in some degree his panegyric on the conduct of our predecessors. My hon. Friend (Mr. Cobden) saw, however, that his proposal that arrangements should be made between England and France for a reduction of their naval forces, was open to the objection that England and France are not the only naval Powers in the world, and that either England or France might naturally reply, to the other—by whichever the proposal was made—that there were other considerations besides the armaments of the other party by which their respective arrangements must be guided. It is proper to remind the House, when the hon. Member for the West Riding says that for a longtime past there has been nothing but a struggle between the two countries which should outdo the other in its naval arrangements, that the fact is not as the hon. Member supposes; for though, in 1840 and 1841, the events connected with the expulsion of the Egyptians from Syria led to an augmentation of naval force, both on the part of England and France, the Administration which succeeded that of the late Sir Robert Peel had reduced the naval force to the lowest amount at which it had been, I believe, since the peace in 1815. Therefore that struggle had then ceased; and it is well known that when the affair of Tahiti took place, one ship of the line was our whole force at Spithead, and that ship of the line—the Collingwood, I believe, was detained there on her way to one of the American stations. Surely, then, it could not have been any naval armament on the part of England at that time which led to the exertions made by the French. It has been stated that in 1846 there was a debate in the French Chamber upon a great naval augmentation, founded upon an augmentation which was alleged to have taken place in the naval force of England. The great naval force which England had at that time, and which, according to my hon. Friend, was the foundation of the French armaments, consisted of one sail of the line in the Mediterranean, and one sail of the line caught and detained at Spithead, instead of proceeding to the coast of America. There was, therefore, at that time no great amount of naval force on the part of England which could lay the foundation for any great exertion on the part of France. But, the debate in the French Chamber—which it was my fortune to hear—turned, as far as I recollect, upon this point- that the Government proposed an armament of forty sail of the line, not all in commission, but that that amount of force launched or unlaunched should be permanently maintained; and M. Thiers and those who opposed the Government wanted to have forty-two sail. The difference of opinion was only about a ship or two. The hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Urquhart), who sees further into millstones than most people, sees in the events of that period evidence of a most treacherous and Machiavelian scheme on my part. He says— It is a remarkable fact that at this moment there was a reconciliation between the noble Lord and M. Thiers; at that very moment M. Thiers was recommending a great augmentation of the French navy; and, rely upon it, whenever the French augment their navy, it is because they intend to attack England. The noble Lord, therefore, chose for his reconciliation with M. Thiers the very moment when it was manifest to the world that M. Thier's entertained hostile views with regard to this country. Now, I can assure the hon. Gentleman that this reconciliation, or rather renewal of acquaintance between M. Thiers and myself, took place upon very different grounds from those which he supposes. M. Thiers was then kind enough to show me evidence that the French think that works are necessary to enable them to defend themselves, and that, even with their immense army and armed population, they did not disdain to expend very large sums in order to secure themselves against attacks from other Powers. The works to which I refer are purely defensive, for no man can say that fortifications can ever be made to march to attack a foreign Power. M. Thiers took me round the fortifications of Paris—works which cost, I believe, something like 12,000,000l. sterling; and I must say, though there are many different opinions as to the value and merit of those works, and although I am quite aware that the opinion of an unmilitary man is worth very little on such a point, that I think the balance of opinion is decidedly in favour of the value of those works, and that they do add greatly to the defensive strength of France, and by that means to the security of peace between France and neighbouring Powers. Now, the hon. Member (Mr. Cobden) has stated, as an illustration of the plan he would wish to have carried out, that a convention was concluded between this country and the United States of America for regulating the amount of naval force which each nation was to maintain upon the inland lakes of North America. That certainly was a very wise and good arrangement. I agree that it has worked very advantageously for both parties; but, at the same time, I am sure the House will see that there is a great and manifest distinction between inland lakes and the seas of the world. That distinction was marked by these two Powers; because, having made the arrangement with regard to the inland lakes, they did not make any similar arrangement with respect to the seas of the world. For the reasons I have stated, it is manifestly impossible that England and France could entertain any hope or expectation of coming to an effective arrangement as to the extent of their naval forces, the amount of which depends upon a great variety of circumstances. The hon. Member for Stafford objects to my being charged with the conduct of these negotiations; but, perhaps, if the hon. Member for the West Riding would propose the hon. Member for Stafford to conduct them—I declining to serve—he would gain one vote in favour of his Motion evidently—though what might be the success I am not able to say. If the Motion of the hon. Member for the West Riding should be agreed to, I should certainly feel, in entering upon the negotiations which he proposes, that there could not be any possible prospect of coming to a practical result. I shall be ready to adopt the Motion and speech of the hon. Gentleman as the expression of an influential Member of this House, responded to, I hope, by the unanimous feeling of the whole House of Commons—that not only do we hope that the relations between England and France will be, but that we almost think—if common sense actuates those who, on both sides, have the management of affairs—they must be, as far as human foresight can go, friendly towards each other; that those mutual suspicions and reciprocal jealousies which may from time to time have misled the calculations of those who, in each country, have had the management of affairs, will disappear; and that mutual confidence will take the place of reciprocal distrust. But at the same time my hon. Friend a little exaggerates, I think, the want of information of either party with regard to the arrangements of the other. It is not necessary that either party should send out the spies of whom the hon. Gentleman has spoken, because nothing more is necessary than to read the debates in this House, and to look at the Estimates, to know exactly what is the state of our naval arrangements; and there is no greater secrecy with regard to the naval arrangements of France. I again say, I accept with pleasure the speech and the proposal of the hon. Member—provided it is not imposed upon the Government in a way which I think would very much defeat the intentions he has in view—I accept it with pleasure as the right hand of friendship tendered by this country to our neighbours. I agree with him in thinking that there could not, perhaps, have been a more appropriate time than the present for a demonstration of this nature, because we have now converted this country, I may say, into the Temple of Peace of the whole world. We have invited the natives of every civilised and on the face of the earth to come here, not to the rivalship of physical strength or of brute force, or the arts of human destruction, but to come here to compare the progress which each nation has made in those arts which constitute the happiness 'and ornament of the human race. It is certainly a proud year for this country; and it is no less a source of satisfaction to us to see the confidence which is reposed in this nation by those who come themselves and who bring their goods to this great and mighty Exhibition. It is also a source of honest pride to us to know that nothing has more struck the foreigners who have done us the honour of visiting us on this occasion than that spirit of order which they have observed pervading every rank of society in this country. They have expressed their wonder at the respect for the laws which is the spontaneous feeling of all, from the highest to the lowest in the land, and which arises, perhaps, from the excellence of those laws—I do not mean to say they are perfect, any more than any other human institutions can be, but the comparative excellence of those laws—which secure to every man, from the highest to the lowest, the full enjoyment of the honest fruits of his industry, and which protect him against oppression from above, and against insult from below. I am glad the hon. Member for the West Riding has taken advantage of this meeting of the world to declare in his place in Parliament those principles of universal peace which do honour to him and the country in which they are proclaimed; and, if I object to being sent bound and fettered into a negotiation through which I confess I cannot see my practical way, it is not because I object to the end the hon. Member desires and proposes to accomplish, but because I think that end is more likely to be accelerated by the language of the hon. Member, and the sentiments he and the House have expressed, than it would be by the particular and specific Motion he has this evening brought before us. Upon these grounds I trust that my hon. Friend will be satisfied with the expressions of approbation with which the sentiments he has expressed have been received by the House, and with the expression of the determination of Her Majesty's Government, who feel as ardently on the subject as any man in this country or in the world can do—that as far as their influence, and power, and persuasion may extend, they will, so long as it may be their lot to have anything to do with the affairs of the country, use every effort in their power to avert the misery and calamities of war. I trust the hon. Gentleman will be content with this, and that he will not press his Motion to a division, which may be liable to misconstruction, and in which it may be thought that those who oppose the Motion differ with him as to the end he seeks to accomplish, instead of merely objecting to the method by which he endeavours to effect it. When I assure the House that our endeavours to carry out the views expressed by the hon. Gentleman will be continued, I may say that the experience of recent times is highly encouraging to those who wish for the maintenance of peace. The diffusion of constitutional government throughout Europe must tend greatly to the maintenance of general peace. It not only ren- ders it necessary for Governments to persuade Parliament that there is just cause for imposing burdens on the people, but it thereby places Governments on their trial, and prevents them from carrying matters in dispute to such a point that they cannot recede with honour, even if they become convinced that they are not wholly in the right. There is a growing disposition in Europe to settle quarrels among the nations by amicable intervention and negotiation; and we could not have a more striking example of this than what took place last year, when we saw those two mighty military Governments of Austria and Prussia, after calling out their hundreds of thousands of men, and apparently on the point of battle, yet, from the influence of good sense and reason on both sides, entering into preliminary negotiations, and devising means to terminate their differences without shedding a single drop of blood. The progress of civilisation in Europe is most gratifying to the friends of peace; and I can assure the hon. Member for the West Riding that Her Majesty's Government are as anxious as he possibly can be, not only, to preserve this country from the calamities of war, but to exercise that influence which so powerful a people as that of England naturally possesses to save on every possible occasion other countries from those calamities.

MR. ROEBUCK

said, nobody could have heard the speech of the noble Lord without being pleased with its pacific tendency; and he was sure that the general effect of his speech would be, that every man of a peaceable disposition would have increased cause of admiration for the conduct of the noble Lord. But he must observe, that the way in which the noble Lord had represented the argument of the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden), would be calculated to mislead everybody as to the end which his hon. Friend had in view. The noble Lord said, he coincided in the end, but what he quarrelled with was the means. Now, the end which his hon. Friend at present proposed, was very different from what he had formerly brought before that House. Waving for the present all reference to other countries, he had corns forward with a clear and definite proposal for an agreement between the two great nations of France and England, and he asked why, in a time of profound peace, there should should be these heavy armaments. They were founded upon mutual distrust, which again were created by mutual misunderstandings; and what his hon. Friend proposed was, that they should get rid of these misunderstandings, and, by coming to a full explanation as to their mutual objects and aims, that they should both agree to reduce their means of aggression and of defence. The noble Lord had used a characteristic expression in this respect—he said, that France and England had shaken hands. Yes, but they had shaken hands with the mailed glove, and what his hon. Friend (Mr. Cobden) proposed was, that they should take off this glove—that they should be ready, of course, if offence were given, to resent it, but that they should not always sleep in mail. The hon. Member for the West Riding said, he would not enter into the question of military armaments, because the Government of France might say that their armies were maintained not for the purpose of aggression, but for what they called the maintenance of order—an answer which only showed, by the way, how little every Government in France, since 1793, had understood of the maintenance of order. The noble Lord objected to this non-reference to military armaments. But what did the noble Lord himself say? He referred to the fortifications of Paris, which the French people had raised at an expense of several millions sterling, and he said that these fortifications could not be intended for the purposes of aggression. That was precisely what the hon. Member for the West Riding said with respect to the military-force: both were maintained to keep down internal discord, and both, he might add, were unsuccessful in doing so. The hon. Member (Mr. Cobden) had adduced one remarkable instance of successful mutual disarmament which the noble Lord had not fairly grappled with—the agreement with the United States as to the naval forces that were to be kept up on the great inland lakes. The noble Lord said there was a difference between these lakes and the seas of the world; but he (Mr. Roebuck) wanted to know what was the difference between Lake Ontario and the Mediterranean. The common sense of the two countries had put an end to naval armaments on the lakes, and peace, and security, and happiness were the result. Well, if the noble Lord would address the Government of France upon the same principle, he had no doubt that the same beneficial effect would follow. He cheer- fully acknowledged that the noble Lord had had the glory—["Hear, hear!"] Yes, he would use that word—the glory of maintaining peace during the most turbulent period of European history. With the single exception of 1793, he knew no period in European history more fraught with danger, turbulence, and war, than the year 1848. The noble Lord had taken England and her destinies through that fearful period unscathed, without war; and he gave the noble Lord all praise for doing so. But was there any reason why he should not improve those circumstances which the present age now afforded? They were now in very different circumstances from those with which their ancestors had to deal. Ever since 1830 the rule had been non-interference with foreign States, and the noble Lord had fully carried out that rule. [Ironical cheers from Mr. Urquhart.] The noble Lord had already dealt, he thought, with the hon. Member for Stafford, and he had no wish to strike a blow after the noble Lord. He left the hon. Gentleman and his wanderings to the estimation of the House; and he repeated that it was the peculiar characteristic of the noble Lord that he had carried out the principle of non-interference established in 1830; and he now asked the noble Lord why he did not carry the principle one step further, and adopt the proposition of the hon. Member for the West Riding? If his hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding of Yorkshire had introduced into his Motion the general question of peace and war, he (Mr. Roebuck) would have been opposed to him, because he did not think that they could put down war between nations. But he did not agree with the noble Lord, that when they were enjoying peace, they should be armed just as if they were at war. The Resolution of his hon. Friend (Mr. Cobden) was not founded on fear; it simply desired peace. And why should not the House of Commons commission its Minister to represent to France that we desired peace with all its advantages, and to reduce our warlike establishments? Why should not this be done, careless of all petty jealousies and little feelings of diplomacy? The House might solemnly declare, in all the majesty of its greatness, and in all the pride of its perfect peace and unapproachable security, that we wished to divest ourselves of the powers of offence; and then we should exhibit to mankind a spectacle and set an example even greater than that we had already done in this celebrated year. That would be a course beneficial in its effects, and becoming the character of this great nation. He would not follow the noble Lord through the various topics of his speech; he only wished to state to the House and the world the real nature of the proposition now before them; there was nothing abstract in it; it only signified that we wanted peace and all its advantages; and if the noble Lord would accept the proposition that was now made, instead of considering himself "cribbed, cabined, and confined" by it, then he would find himself armed with a power which no great nation had ever put into the hands of an individual, not with the means of injuring others, but of extending the dominion of peace, and all the benefits which civilisation and peace can confer.

MR. URQUHART

explained, that he had not intended to charge the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) with the responsibility of what had occurred either in Syria or in Tahiti.

MR. MILNER GIBSON

cordially agreed with the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield in paying a tribute of approbation to the speech of the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) had no reason to consider that speech a hostile one. On the contrary, he was entitled to feel that its tone, and the admissions it contained, were very much in the direction of his Resolution. But if there was anything to complain of in the speech of the noble Lord, it was rather that of omitting to give any approval of the precise object which the hon. Member for the West Riding had in view, that precise object being a reduction of armaments and then a reduction of taxation—areduction of armaments brought about by means which would not affect the position of this country, which would leave her in as good a position to repel attack as she was before, and would not leave her to the necessity of depending upon what the noble Lord deprecated—namely, upon the forbearance of foreign countries, seeing that she offered great temptations either to the ambition or avarice of other nations. The proposition did not invite the House to depend on the forbearance of any country. It did not ask them to place the country in a position in which she would be unable to repel attack, but it merely asked the noble Lord to act now in reference to the reduction of the force precisely upon the same principle on which he him- self had acted with reference to its increase, and when France, having increased her force, he called upon the House to increase ours, and supported an Address to the Crown for that purpose. The mode adopted by the noble Lord for increasing the force, was precisely the one now adopted by the hon. Member for the West Riding for decreasing it; and therefore it could not be called an improper one. He (Mr. M. Gibson) would give no advice to his hon. Friend as to whether he should or should not divide the House upon the Motion; but if he divided, he should have his cordial support. He thought the House ought to have rather more of a clear understanding that the noble Lord would practically undertake to do the things which they were anxious should be accomplished. It was not enough to make a speech showing the general advantages of peace, and the dangers that might arise from the possibility of war. The great difficulties of making reductions in our military armaments were well known. Every naval officer, naturally fond of his profession, of necessity opposed any considerable reduction of naval armaments. This rendered it necessary that the utmost powers of Parliament should be brought to bear upon the Executive Government, in order that they might have the means of replying to such officers as might want to increase the force. He remembered the present First Lord of the Admiralty putting a very pointed question to a gallant Admiral in the Committee on the Naval Establishments; he asked him if he ever know a time when gentlemen in the profession were satisfied that the amount of force was sufficient. He (Mr. M. Gibson) did not throw this out as a matter of blame. People were naturally proud of their profession, and therefore they did not want considerable reductions. All of us were rather apt to think that the naval force of the country ought to be admired in itself, that it was something to keep, to be looked at, and admired. There was a fondness for it; and he did not think it quite came home to us, that the slightest degree of naval force beyond what the country required was an unmitigated evil. But we should bear in mind that officers in the Navy were but the servants of the public; that the profession ought not to be kept up beyond what the circumstances of the country required; and that it should not be retained for the sake of ornament. He hoped that as the noble Lord had said he agreed in the end now proposed, he would undertake to enter on communications with France with a view to a mutual reduction of armaments. He wished the noble Lord could have told them that he had ever entered into communications with France for such a purpose. A more absurd statement could not have been made than that about the breakwater at Cherbourg, for that so-called breakwater was a mere dyke.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

said, that his allusion was to the basins there.

MR. MILNER GIBSON

had never heard any one offer a word in defence of our works at Alderney, where a sum of 600,000l. had been thrown into the sea. They were called defensive works. Defensive of what? Was the pier defensive of the cows? They had made these works for the reception of war steamers, in order that they might the more easily make an aggression on France, and France viewed them in that light. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty would give them a more definite assurance than had been expressed by the noble Lord, that communications would be commenced with France for the purpose of procuring a mutual reduction of armaments.

SIR HARRY VERNEY

said, that during this discussion hon. Gentlemen had altogether lost sight of one class of their fellow-subjects, namely, those British merchants who were residing in far distant countries. Their merchants residing at Valparaiso and Buenos Ayres felt now a security which they would not feel if they did not know that the fleet of England was prepared and able to protect them whenever circumstances should demand their interference. He hoped that their feelings and interests would never be lost sight of.

MR. BROTHERTON

was desirous of expressing his gratification at the sentiments expressed by the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; but he hoped that some Member of the Government would give a more positive assurance than had been given by the noble Lord, that the negotiations for the mutual reduction of armaments proposed by his hon. Friend (Mr. Cobden) would be carried into effect. He did not subscribe to the maxim, that in order to preserve peace they must be prepared for war. The best mode of preserving peace, in his opinion, was to act on just principles. He understood from the noble Lord that he accepted the speech and the resolution of his hon. Friend, and, under these circumstances he would recommend his hon. Friend not to press the House to a division, as he thought the discussion would produce greater effect in Europe if there were no appearance of division on the question.

MR. HUME

said, it was very desirable that the House should be unanimous on the present occasion. He understood from the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary that he approved of the Motion of his hon. Friend (Mr. Cobden), and, if so, he thought that the noble Lord should accept the Motion. His hon. Friend showed that the increase of the armaments in France was owing to the increase of the armaments of this country, whilst in this country the increase of the armaments of France was put forward as the ground of increasing the military and naval establishments of England. What his hon. Friend wanted was to put an end to the expensive policy on both sides. The noble Lord was praised for preserving peace. But he (Mr. Hume) would ask, what country came to attack them? It was to him quite sickening to hear all this talk about preserving the peace of the world. They had now been nearly forty years at peace, and during that period they had spent 10,000,000l. or 11,000,000l. on their warlike establishments yearly. When the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary quarrelled with France and America, their armaments had been greatly increased. He contended that whilst they were at peace they should have the benefit of peace. It was in that view that his hon. Friend proposed the Motion. He saw nothing whatever to prevent two nations like France and England coming to a mutual agreement to reduce their armaments. The good understanding which existed between this country and France, from 1830 to 1840, had enabled them to reduce their armaments to a very large extent; and it was the Syrian war which was an intermeddling in affairs not concerning them, that obliged them to increase their war establishment. If the question were withdrawn, it would lead to the inference that it met with no support in that House. He should, therefore, vote for the Motion of his hon. Friend, if it was pressed to a division.

SIR ROBERT H. INGLIS

If unanimity could be secured he should not object to the Motion, but as the Government objected, the hon. Member for the West Riding would, he thought, act most wisely in accepting the assurances which had been given. He thought the hon. Member would risk all the advantage that he had gained by pressing the question to a division. If carried at all, it would be by a fractional majority; although in the present aspect of the House he could expect nothing but a defeat. It was therefore the duty of the hon. Gentleman to accept the next best thing to that which he desired, which could only be obtained by trusting to the declaration of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary.

MR. GEACH

would also request his hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) to withdraw his Motion, believing that his object would be much better gained by the discussion which had taken place than by even a successful division.

MR. COBDEN

felt unfeigned satisfaction at the tone which the debate had taken. He was satisfied with the declaration of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, and he should not, after what had been stated as to the confidence reposed by his friends in the noble Lord, persevere in the Motion, which he withdrew for the present Session. He considered, however, that the only fault of the hon. Member for Salford (Mr. Brotherton) was being a little too sanguine in favour of the Ministerial benches.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

said, nothing could be so unpleasant to a Minister of the Crown as to risk the being taxed in future with the breach of an engagement. He must request the House, therefore, to observe what it was that he had said. He entirely concurred with the principle and object of the hon. Member's Motion, which he conceived to be not only the maintenance of peace with France, but the inspiring between the two Powers and the two Governments those principles of mutual confidence which would put an end to jealousies. He objected to the Motion, because he believed it was not the best means of arriving at the result. He begged not to be understood as undertaking that the Government would enter into negotiation. They would consider themselves perfectly free to use their own discretion according to circumstances; but the object at which they would aim would be that which he had stated to be their guiding principle.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.