HC Deb 24 February 1848 vol 96 cc1297-301
MR. EWART

rose to move for leave to bring in a Bill to establish a power of appeal in criminal cases. Experience had shown the necessity for granting such appeal. Within the last two months, even, criminal cases to the number of ten, at least, had occurred, which, in the circumstances attending them, proved the necessity for the introduction of the power of appeal. The Bill which he desired to introduce would give a power to grant appeals generally as regarded points of law and matters of fact. One species of crime was necessarily excluded from the operation of the measure—that of treason and misprision of treason. Those crimes were already provided for by the Statutes of Anne, William, and Mary, George III., and Queen Victoria. With that exception, the Bill was intended to apply to all criminal cases. The Bill would confer upon a criminal court the power of granting appeal in three ways: first, by a new trial; secondly, by arrest of judgment; and, thirdly, by entering a verdict for the prisoner. The judge before whom the appeal should come to be heard, would have power to assign counsel and attorney to the prisoner; and the judge on the original trial would be empowered to order that the prisoner should be fur- nished with a copy of the indictment. One clause of the Bill fixed the time within which appeals could be claimed; another enforced the attendance of the witnesses and prosecutor at the appeal; and a third provided for their payment upon the same scale as at the original trial. It might be urged as an objection to his measure, that it gave the power of appeal to the prisoner, and not to the prosecutor. In reply, he must say that he sought only to remedy an acknowledged evil. Many difficulties were connected with a double right of appeal; and, therefore, his Bill was restricted to cases in which the prisoner might want to appeal. At the same time, if the House should think proper to extend the right of appeal to prosecutors, he would not object to such a provision being engrafted upon the Bill. The introduction of the power of appeal would be attended with difficulties, owing to the want of a functionary established in other countries and in a division of Great Britain, Scotland, namely, a public prosecutor. The time would come when a demand for a public prosecutor would arise in this country. Another impediment in the way of the introduction of the system of appeal was to be found in the want of a record of the evidence given on the trial, and of the decision pronounced by the judge. At present the only admitted record was the judge's notes, which were usually insufficient, and it might therefore frequently be difficult to obtain the materials whereon to base an appeal for a new trial. In conclusion, the hon. Member moved for leave to bring in a Bill to establish the power of appeal in criminal cases.

SIR G. GREY

said, that it was not his intention to offer any opposition to the introduction of the Bill; but he wished it to be distinctly understood that he did not pledge himself to approve of all the provisions which might be embodied in the measure. It was far from his intention to intimate that the subject was not of great importance, and deserving of the serious consideration of Parliament; but when the Bill should be printed he would be better able to discuss its provisions, which, at present, he was not certain that he distinctly understood from the hon. Member's statement. Great difficulty would be experienced in carrying into effect the details of any measure on the subject; and it was apparent, from the hon. Member's remarks, that he was aware of some of the difficulties which he would have to encounter. He begged the hon. Member would not appoint a very early day for the second reading of the Bill. He thought that any attempt to assimilate criminal proceedings to the proceedings in civil cases must altogether fail. In criminal cases the prisoner always had the benefit of any doubt that might exist; but there was no parallel circumstance in a trial of a cause between two litigant parties.

Leave given.