HC Deb 19 April 1848 vol 98 cc509-26

On the Motion that the House at its rising adjourn to Saturday,

MR. DISRAELI:* Sir, in rising pursuant to the notice I gave yesterday, I assure those hon. Gentlemen who are interested in the Orders of the Day, that I shall stand for but a short time between them and the progress of business. I share that objection, so generally entertained in this House, against unnecessarily calling its attention to the transactions of foreign States in which this country may be eventually mixed up. I am always willing to leave such transactions to the superintendence of the Minister under whose supervision they naturally fall. But there are cases, I think, in which it becomes this House not to permit transactions of that character to pass without some notice; and I cannot help being of opinion that what has recently occurred in a country in the prosperity a which England is much interested—I mean what has recently occurred in Denmark—does form an exception to that general rule to which I have adverted, and which I should wish to observe. I am well aware, that, if at all times it may be inconvenient for the House of Commons to interfere in diplomatic transactions, the present juncture of affairs would appear it the first glance to increase such an inconvenience. But that inconvenience depends upon the circumstances of the particular case; and, as regards the case to which I wish to call the attention of the House—and I shall do so very briefly—I feel persuaded that a right understanding of those circumstances by * From Corrected Report. the House will have a tendency to maintain the peace which England now enjoys, and to promote the promulgation of those principles throughout Europe which may tend to avert that too imminent danger of hostilities which it cannot be denied now exists.

It is unnecessary for me to remind the House of the general character of the country to which I am referring. The House bears, no doubt, in mind, that it is a State which, if the amount of population be regarded, does not rank among the first Powers of Europe. But the importance of a State does not merely depend upon the amount of its population, but upon the character of that population, and the geographical position of the country. Denmark is an ancient kingdom, inhabited by a brave and independent race of people, dwelling in a land which from its physical configuration must necessarily exercise a considerable influence upon some of the principal nations of Europe, especially in case of war. The present Sovereign of Denmark acceded to his throne at the commencement of this year, under circumstances at the same time both remarkable and interesting. He succeeded to absolute power over his subjects, but nevertheless the first act of that monarch, when he inherited his ancient throne—when he succeeded to that position of absolute sway— was immediately, of his own proper impulse, mero motu, to announce to his subjects that he was determined to accord to them free institutions; and that on a large and liberal scale.

I wish the House for a moment to contrast the position of the King of Denmark at the commencement of this year with that of the other Sovereigns who have subsequently been extremely liberal in offers and lavish in promises to their subjects; and I beg them not to mix up the case of the King of Denmark with the case of other potentates who at the present moment appear in the gracious character of conceders of liberal institutions to subjects to whom they had been long denied. This great boon was granted by the King of Denmark to his people at the commencement of the present year, in a time of profound peace, at a moment when the most sanguine votaries of the European movement felt that there was but a poor chance of any material alteration in the institutions of Europe during the lives of many of those powerful Sovereigns and still more powerful Ministers, who were then in the full enjoyment of the power they had so long wielded.

The position of Denmark—a country often and again dismembered at the Peace —was settled by the Treaty of Vienna in this manner:—It was to consist, in the first place, of those celebrated islands upon one of which, Zealand, Copenhagen is built, and of its ancient continental province of Jutland, together forming Denmark Proper, with a population exceeding perhaps a million and a quarter; and, in the second place, of adjoining possessions it had also long enjoyed—the Scandinavian Duchy of Schleswig, and the German Duchy of Holstein, by virtue of which last territory the King of Denmark had always been a German prince. The King of Denmark, then, with more than 1,250,000 subjects in Denmark Proper, and much less than 1,000,000 subjects in the two Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, announced to his people that an equal number of representatives should be sent to his Diet from those two Duchies, with a population so inferior, with those sent by Denmark Proper. I mention this trait to show how cordial and genuine was the spirit in which the King of Denmark was prepared to act, and how equally he wished to incorporate in these new privileges every part of his dominions.

Under these circumstances, the deputies having assembled to construct this free Government, no portion of the kingdom objecting in any degree to the general proposition of the Sovereign, that proposition being so full and extensive, that it had anticipated all that his subjects desired—a thorough and complete representation of the people, the absolute enjoyment of a free press, and the recognition of all the provincial privileges and institutions of the inhabitants — Holstein, the German Duchy, declined to be incorporated with the other States, because they regarded the new constitution to be one which, in its tendency and effect, would absorb them in a Scandinavian population, and terminate the connexion which they always wished to cherish with their German brethren. What was the conduct of the King in this position? No sooner was that representation made to him by the deputies from Holstein, than he immediately acceded to their wishes, and agreed that the constitution he was about to grant should be limited to Denmark Proper and to the Scandinavian Duchy of Schleswig; and that Holstein should remain unincor porated with them; but at the same time he offered to the latter duchy the same free privileges he was about to confer on the other parts of his dominions, anticipating that the time would, perhaps, come, when all Germany would enjoy them. I state this in order that the House may not think my purpose is to vindicate the course of any Sovereign who is behind the spirit of the age, and refuses the enjoyment of free institutions to his subjects; and also to show the House that I am not advocating the interests of a monarch who has been suddenly inspired by the recent course of events to appear in the character of a Royal professor of liberal opinions; but that on the contrary, the King of Denmark, in the prime of life, in the full possession of absolute power, acting upon his own convictions—convictions he had long cherished while Crown Prince—did seize the first occasion, upon his accession to his throne, and in a time of profound peace, spontaneously to come forward and grant free institutions to his subjects, and that on a scale so considerable, that throughout all the unfortunate discussions and misunderstandings which have since occurred, no party has risen into notice which has pointed out a freer constitution than that which the King himself devised, and voluntarily proffered to the acceptance of his people.

The troubles of the monarch began thus. A month elapsed—for it is not, of course, possible to arrange the affairs of a whole people in a day—but there being no suspicion on the side of the people, no backwardness on the part of the Sovereign, when the French revolution occurred; and the consequence of that event upon some of the dominions of the King of Denmark was remarkable. The German party, which of course predominated in Holstein —in which, in fact, there was no Danish population—were extremely anxious to exercise an equal influence in the neighbouring Duchy of Schleswig, in which from its contiguity to Holstein there had gradually grown up a certain amount of German population. The consequence was, that the ready-made machinery which exists throughout Europe, which at a signal from Paris, or which, as in this case, by a sympathetic rather than a preconcerted action, can always be put in motion, operated in Schleswig. A Provisional Government was formed in that capital, where no preparation had been made to receive it, because no discontent could possibly have been anticipated by the Sovereign to exist. However, a Provisional Government was formed there, and they published an announcement that they would not be incorporated with the kingdom of Denmark, but that they chose to become a German State, in common with the Duchy of Holstein.

In this state of affairs, a remarkable event occurred. There had been a quasi revolution at Berlin. There, too, was a monarch who had granted liberal institutions to his subjects, though not exactly under the same circumstances as those under which the King of Denmark had acted. Animated, however, by the gratitude of his subjects for his concessions, and not content with merely effecting the happiness of the people of Prussia, the King of that country, hearing of what had occurred in Schleswig, received a deputation from the Provisional Government set up there—promised that the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein should, under his patronage and protection, be acknowledged as German States, and then ordered some of his troops, who had not perhaps been so successful in Berlin as he had intended, to recover their laurels in an invasion of the States of a friendly Power.

Sir, there is probably no event in modern history more unjustifiable than the conduct of Prussia under these circumstances. Since these occurrences, it has been pretended that Holstein being a German State, and Schleswig, though not a German State, having chosen to be united to Holstein, and the King of Denmark, as Duke of Holstein, being a German Prince and a member of the German Diet, the King of Prussia, as a member of the same body, had not only a right, but felt it also a duty, to march his troops into the territory of another member of that Diet, in consequence of the disturbances there existing. But, in the first place, the King of Prussia ordered his troops to march, and his troops entered Holstein, and occupied Holstein, without the German Diet having given any order whatsoever. In the second place, if any application had been made to the Diet for interference, it ought to have been made, not by the member of the Diet, who was King of Prussia, but by him who was King of Denmark. And, in the third place, even if the Diet had authorised Prussia to occupy Holstein, it would have been impossible for the King of Prussia to show that he had any right whatever to invade Schleswig and occupy a considerable portion of that duchy.

But even if there had been no disturbances at Berlin, and even if the forms of the Diet had been complied with, it is difficult to find, in point of policy, an excuse for this step. Was it to pacify the Duchies? The King of Denmark was perfectly able to pacify those Duchies. Was it because the King of Denmark, in his character of Duke of these portions of his dominions, and a German Prince, was acting tyranically towards his subjects in the Duchies, and that they consequently required the protective interposition of the German Diet? In that case it was an affair for negotiation; they ought to have alleged their grievances, and preferred their complaints—they ought to have asked the King for his defence, given him the opportunity of making that defence, and, if guilty, of making reparation. But throughout the whole of this transaction no offence is stated; the Diet was not applied to at all; the invasion took place without the authority of the Diet; it was an invasion without authority and without cause.

Since then, indeed—since Holstein has been occupied by the forces of Prussia— since a considerable fortress in Schleswig, delivered up by treachery, has been retained—since Schleswig itself has been invaded—a curious body, a body itself in a state of reconstruction and revolution, calling itself the Germanic Diet, and assembling at Frankfort, passed an ex post facto resolution, authorising the King of Prussia to do that which he had already done, and also to do that which is even more unjustifiable, and which until that authority was given him be himself seemed to hesitate about accomplishing.

The moment that this Provisional Government was formed in Schleswig, the moment that rebellion in the most unblushing and flagrant manner had been announced, the King of Denmark appealed to his people.

And here it may be shown how wise and politic is that monarch who grants, not from restraint, but from conviction, free institutions to his subjects. There was no country in which party feeling had run higher than in Denmark. There was the aristocratic party and the democratic party, who had not agreed for centuries; there was the German party and the national party, between whom violent passions had been excited. But in consequence of the conduct of the King, all party feeling had ceased in Denmark, Nothing was known but the Danish nation, and pride in a monarch who had trusted to the loyalty of his subjects, and to the spirit of freedom. Never was appeal from a monarch so answered—never king so supported by his people. From the first nobleman to the humblest shopkeeper in his dominions, one and all rallied around him. And, Sir, in this case we must not rank the power of the King of Denmark according to the extent of his realm, or to the sum of its population. You may think that, after all, there is only a million and a half of people devoted to him; but I wish to know what Sovereign in Europe, except our own gracious Queen, has a million and a half of devoted subjects? The King of Denmark, supported by the unanimous population of his kingdom, eminent as they are, both morally and physically, for great virtues, is a more powerful Sovereign, perhaps, than some of those who violate the rights of nations, and who seek some compensation for their blundering tyranny by making a diversion for their troops, which had been foiled in a service little honourable at home, by a foreign invasion scarcely more distinguished. The King of Denmark, at the head of his forces, and supported by that naval power which could not have been put afloat had he not raised in his people that spirit of patriotism which on rare occasions only can be counted upon, marched into Schleswig, defeated the rebels, and in three days would have pacified the whole population, had it not been for the occupation of Holstein by Prussia, and the invasion of Schleswig by the same Power. Up to this moment not a single rational cause has been alleged for the erratic conduct of the Court of Berlin—no case of justification has been put forward; and the only means by which a vindication has been sought to be established has been in a weak adaptation of some of the dreamy effusions of German professors, which for years have been agitating their country, and which in this disordered and distempered age are, it seems, to be reduced into practice in the dominions of a neighbouring ally.

But all things have always a pretext as well as a cause; and the pretext in this case, for all the reasons that have been adduced resolve themselves into this—the pretext for this extraordinary proceeding, is German nationality. It is actually laid down as a principle by men now occupying seats in the Cabinets of Europe, that wheresoever the German language is spoken, there the German flag ought to wave. That is really and truly the pretext upon which the invasion of Schleswig and Holstein has taken place. All this may be very fine, very national, and very courageous; but it would be well for the House, when turning their attention to this subject, to consider whether it would not become the German people, if this be their opinion, to act with a little more consistency? If, wheresoever the German language is spoken, the German flag should wave, why do not the Prussians invade Alsace? Why do they not invade those provinces towards the west, where the German language is spoken, and meet at once the high spirit of France? Or, turning towards their eastern frontier, why do they not occupy Livonia, where the German language is spoken, and thus encounter the colossal power of Russia? That would be, indeed, consistent and national; but the principle only holds good towards the north. And why? Because it is in the north, when surrendered, that the pretext vanishes, and the cause appears.

Germany is the centre of Europe, and has no reason, one would think, to complain of the territorial advantages which have been allotted to it. Its broad and rich lands are watered by the three most considerable rivers of Europe—the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Danube. But Germany, which possesses almost every other advantage, is not a great naval Power, and Germany wants a coast. That is the real reason why Denmark, supposed to be weak, is to be invaded in this age of liberty on the plea of nationality. It is to gain the harbours of the Baltic, and to secure the mouths of the Elbe, that the plea of German nationality is put forth. Hitherto in the Baltic, Russia and the Scandinavian Peninsula have prevented this project of Germany; while Holland and Great Britain have intercepted in the North Sea its maritime development. But now, under shelter of the plea of nationality, taking advantage of the fact, that the King of Denmark possesses in Schleswig perhaps 150,000 subjects of German race, his dominions are to be invaded, and may be conquered, notwithstanding the valour of his few but determined subjects, in order that Prussia may suddenly appear as a great maritime Power.

I do not wish to argue this case with respect to the interests of England. I do not wish to say anything about whether it is or is not for the interest of England that a new naval Power should spring up among the nations of the Baltic or the Northern Seas. But this I wish to lay down as a principle, that it is for the interest of England, and not of England alone, but of all Europe, that peace should be maintained. And peace cannot, I think, be maintained if the policy of Prussia be permitted to pass unnoticed and uncensured.

I shall be asked what are the means we have, short of going to war, to check this ill-conditioned conduct on the part of Prussia? In my opinion there are means which deserve our consideration. At any rate there are circumstances connected with these affairs which demand our attention. We are connected with Denmark in respect to the very territory which is at present in question. We are connected with Denmark by treaty. Under that treaty we have entered into stipulations of a remarkable and stringent character.

It is of great importance that we should clearly understand the engagements into which we have entered. I know it is very easy to say—not that I impute the probability of his saying so to the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for, I am sure, he is animated by a very different feeling — that negotiations are going on, and that the best course is to pass over these matters in silence, and leave the people in ignorance of the existence even of engagements which they may be called upon suddenly to fulfil. I think, indeed, it is not desirable to take frequent opportunities of expressing opinions with the regard to the policy of the Government on external affairs, because it must be supposed that they have means of information upon passing circumstances which the House of Commons does not possess. Still I do not think it is wise that the House of Commons should be ignorant of the treaty stipulations into which this country has entered. Passing information, transient circumstances, events of the hour, communications with foreign Ministers, cannot alter the permanent character of such stipulations; and what happens if we neglect to make ourselves acquainted with their nature and substance? It is this, that sooner or later we are called upon in consequence of those stipulations to act. We then find an appeal made to an ignorant and confused assembly, necessarily in a position to be led by the Minister of the day, who is in possession of su perior information. Act we must, and act by the advice of a man better informed than ourselves; and it is only when the result has occurred, that we find we are involved in increased debt and increased expenditure.

We observe great impatience of taxation at the present day; we hear frequent complaints of the amount of the national debt; but if the House of Commons had only made itself well acquainted with the nature of the treaties which it entered into during the revolutionary war, do you believe that that debt would have reached half the sum at which it now stands? If the House of Commons had been then acquainted with the real state of Europe, do you think it would have been induced to enter into engagements, which were at the same time as disastrous in their political as lamentable in their financial consequences?

Now, by the treaty still in force, England has guaranteed this Duchy of Schleswig, its peaceable and complete enjoyment, to the King of Denmark. It is of great importance, at this moment, that we should clearly understand the nature of that engagement. I have been told by some persons that the treaty is of a very remote date. This is certainly a most extraordinary observation. The date, in point of fact, is no more remote than the accession of the present Family to the Throne, and it binds the heirs and successors of the King who signed and ratified it. We have not even a revolution or a change of dynasty intervening in the period; and if there are any treaties which ought to bind us, I think I shall be able to show the House that this is one of that character.

Since I gave notice of bringing forward this subject, I have received a pamphlet of no mean dimensions: it is 165 pages in length; but its size, though that is a fact which would attract attention—and its theme, though that is one at least interesting—are less remarkable than the circumstances under which it appears. It is called A Memoir of the Constitutional Rights of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, presented to Viscount Palmerston, by Chevalier Bunsen, on the 8th of April, 1848, with a Postscript of the 15th of April. Now in the first place I might remark, that it is a somewhat extraordinary thing for the Envoy Extraordinary of a great Power, the Minister Plenipotentiary of the King of Prussia, to draw up a memoir and present it to our Minister only a few days back, and then publish it as a pamphlet, in order to influence the opinions of the House of Commons. But knowing, as I do, the high reputation of the Prussian Minister, his distinguished abilities, his remarkable learning, and his great experience, I read his pamphlet last night with that care and attention which it unquestionably deserves. I have always considered that this case of the Duchies, as it now appears before Europe, to be one of a very simple character; but when I took up this pamphlet, I trembled for my conviction. Certainly the case, as it there figures, is manifold and complicated. But, as hon. Gentlemen well know from their own experience, after a time when research is exhausted, and when you have heard both sides, you take refuge in meditation; and the result of that process of study is, generally speaking, that, notwithstanding the theories and hypotheses that may have been placed before you, you at last touch the real point on which everything hinges: and the real point, in my opinion, in the present case, as I think the House will admit, is the guarantee which has been given by England to Denmark of that province which it is now sought to deprive her of.

There are only two pages, out of the 165, devoted in this pamphlet to that guarantee, and of them I will only read two lines. The House will understand the historical position of the case to be simply this:—In 1715 a war was taking place between Sweden and Denmark: on the part of Denmark one of the most righteous wars, a war of defence, ever undertaken by any nation. It was a memorable war, for it was the last war of Charles XII.; a desperate effort, after all his misfortunes, again to make a military reputation. England and France were alike the allies of Denmark. England, in the year 1715, the reign of George I., entered into a treaty, called "the Treaty of Gottorp," with Denmark. Denmark made territorial concessions to the King of England by that treaty, and gave our Sovereign the duchy of Bremen and other places. There was, therefore, a perfect quid pro quo, and England, in consequence of the general feeling towards Denmark as regarded the justice of the war, and in consideration of these territories conceded, which are still held by the King of Hanover, guaranteed to the King of Denmark the peaceable possession of the Duchy of Schleswig, part of which that monarch had inherited, and part of which he had conquered in the war, and then held in possession. The war went on for five years, and at last a general peace was negotiated, through the mediation of France and England, at Frideriksborg. France guaranteed to Denmark the peaceable and tranquil possession of Schleswig, referring to the guarantee of England; and in order that there might be no mistake, England, at the same time, in the year 1720, repeated that guarantee in language which seems to me not to admit of any doubt whatever, I may mention also, before I read that language, that the guarantee was renewed and repeated on a subsequent occasion. I may mention also that many years afterwards Russia threatening to invade this very Duchy of Schleswig, Denmark appealed to England in consequence of the treaty of guarantee with England; and England signified to Russia that if Schleswig were invaded, she would declare war, and despatch an English army and English fleet for its protection; and the effect of this intimation was, that Russia did not invade Schleswig.

I will now read the passage in the pamphlet—it is in page 54—and I beg the very particular attention of the House to this point. This point, the question of guarantee, is treated of in only two pages, though, in reality, it is, as far as we are concerned, the essence of the question. The Chevalier Bunsen deals principally, with great ingenuity and ability, with questions which have long occupied the attention of German professors—such as who is to be King of Denmark in case the male line ceases, the present King being only forty years of age, and there being a direct successor in the male line; but these are discussions which are without interest in England, and which do not touch the practical case before us. The author of the pamphlet introduces the guarantee in this sort of style:— It will now only be necessary to say a few words as to the often alleged pretended guarantee given by England; and then adds— The words of the English guarantee of the 25th of July, 1720, are to maintain in a continual and peaceable possession that part of the Duchy of Schleswig which His Danish Majesty has in his hands. There is, upon that, a good deal of reasoning to show that this was only a guarantee against the heirs of the Duke of Gottorp; and it would then be called a limited guarantee. And, reading the gua rantee, as I have this moment done, I admit there would be some foundation for that opinion. But what does the House think are the real words as I have copied them from the treaty?— The King of Great Britain, for his heirs and successors, agrees and binds himself to guarantee and maintain, in a continual and peaceable possession that part of the Duchy of Schleswig which His Danish Majesty has in his hands;"— (So far it agrees with the representation of the Prussian Minister, but what follows? —that which is omitted by the Prussian Minister)— and to defend it in the best manner possible against all and every one who may endeavour to disturb it, either directly or indirectly.

Now that is really the only point which ought to influence us in the consideration of this matter; and when I find that this guarantee is not even faithfully put before us—when I see a number of ingenious arguments used to show that it is a limited guarantee, referring only to the particular descendants of a particular prince—and when I observe the main words omitted, destroying at once all those arguments—I think the House will agree with me that it is not necessary to make a single remark on any other of the 164 pages of this production. I must add that I deeply regret that a man so distinguished as the Chevalier Bunsen—a man of such high character, of such eminent learning, and of a most amiable disposition—should have been so carried away by that dreamy and dangerous nonsense called "German nationality," as to draw up a memoir for presentation to an English Secretary of State, characterised by so much indiscretion and passion as that now before us.

The House, I think, now clearly understands the facts. I have not entered into the collateral considerations, because they have nothing to do with the business before us. What can it signify to us, at this moment, to discuss the possible contingencies of who may fill the throne of Denmark at the death of the present King, yet in the prime of manhood, and who, were he to die to-morrow, would still leave a successor in his family? It is probable that this question may have been at the bottom of all the disturbances, and that the Germans may have thought to have advanced the result they desire by taking the step which they are now most improperly pursuing.

I now come to the practical conclusion which I would wish to lay before the House. I began these observations by saying that my object in bringing the subject before the House, was to promote the cause of peace; I anxiously desire that; but I never can believe that the peace of Europe is to be maintained by hiding our heads in the sand and comforting ourselves with the conviction that nobody will find us out. We have entered into engagements, and there is no doubt that we shall be called upon to fulfil them. No doubt! Why the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston), the other day, in reply to a question which I put to him, acknowledged that the Danish Government had already demanded of us to fulfil our guarantee. We must either fulfil that guarantee, or we must give good reasons for refusing it; or, to take a third course, we may prevent the necessity for fulfilling it, and yet maintain the just interests of all. On the face of it, this is the alternative—either we must go to war on account of Denmark, which we all deprecate and wish to avoid, or we must practically announce to Europe that England no longer respects guarantees.

England, we must remember, has always been cautious in giving guarantees. I remember the noble Lord himself, last year, in the discussion on Cracow, reminding the House of that fact. We have been signatories to general treaties of peace for the settlement of Europe, and in consequence of being signatories when disturbances have occurred, we have been called upon to act as mediators between parties to the general treaty; but guarantees we have always avoided giving, except under circumstances of urgent and peculiar nature. I need not refer to the guarantee which, in very modern times, we gave to Belgium; the only one, with a single exception, in modern times, which I can recall. But, in modern times also, England has thought fit to give a guarantee, as stringent, as absolute, as illimitable, as the guarantee which, more than a century ago, we granted to Denmark. We have been chary of entering into these engagements, and chary because it has been the pride of England never to shrink from the fulfilment of such agreements; but we have nevertheless conceded a most important guarantee to a great European Power—a guarantee which, in any disturbance in the relations of Europe, would probably be the first we should be called upon to fulfil—one, I doubt not, of which the noble Lord has already been reminded, and probably by the author of this very pamphlet. England has guaran teed, by the Treaty of Vienna, the possession of a part of Saxony to Prussia. And I venture to say that, during the last thirty-three years, there would have been, at least on two occasions, revolts and insurrections in Saxon Prussia had it not been for that English guarantee. Is it not, then, most legitimate for us to warn Prussia of the coures she is now pursuing? Is it not legitimate for us, and most politic, to remind Prussia that if it be possible—and I only put the possibility for argument's sake—that England, at this moment, should not choose to fulfil the guarantee she has given to Denmark, she thereby announces to the world her intention to repudiate all other guarantees? I ask, how would Prussia feel then with respect to the guarantee we have given her of her Saxon territories? Why, if Prussia feels that by pursuing her present ill-conditioned course she would be effacing her best title-deeds to her Saxon provinces, you may rely upon it that she will hesitate yet before she will allow herself to be impelled by dreamy professors and hair-brained students to violate all public law, and all the rights of nations, by perpetrating, in the face of Europe, an act of such cruel injustice, and such flagrant wrong, as the invasion of Denmark.

I have thought it expedient, therefore, that the House should understand not only the engagements we have entered into with Denmark, but those also which we have entered into with Prussia; and I have that confidence in the noble Lord that I do not doubt he has already availed himself of such an arrow in his quiver as this. But it will not embarrass the noble Lord, it will not injure Denmark, and it may benefit Prussia, if we should let Europe know that the House of Commons is not indifferent to the engagements our Sovereign has contracted, and that it is aware of the treaties and guarantees which the Crown of England has entered into; and, if Prussia persists in this course—at least, I hope for this result from what I have seen of the temper of the House— that no Minister will ever dare to come forward to ask one single shilling in order to vindicate the guarantee we have given of part of Saxony to Prussia, and so to preserve the integrity of the King of Prussia's dominions. These are the reasons which have induced me to take the liberty of troubling the House to-day; and all I will say in conclusion is, may God defend the right, and may the peace of Europe be maintained by the justice and by the power of England!

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said: Sir, I am sure the hon. Gentleman need make no apology for having called the attention of the House to a question which, whatever may be the comparative magnitude of the dominions involved, is, nevertheless, as he has very properly explained, one of the utmost importance to the interests of the whole of Europe. There are, certainly, circumstances connected with the previous history of Denmark which might make everything affecting the welfare of that State a matter of peculiar interest to all men of high feeling and of liberal sentiment. There is no country which has suffered more seriously by preceding transactions in Europe. It has been the lot of England, at no very remote period, to be thrown by circumstances, which were deemed at that time unavoidable, into acts of hostility towards Denmark which were unquestionably alien to all our ordinary ideas of international relations, and therefore this is a question which is especially calculated to interest the feelings of the people of this country.

With regard, however, to the question itself, as it is involved in recent transactions, I trust the House will excuse me if I abstain from following the hon. Gentleman with any arguments either on the one side or on the other. The question of right has arisen between the German Confederation, on the one hand, and the Government of Denmark, on the other, and that question of right confines itself simply to the Duchy of Schleswig. With regard to Holstein no difference exists; that duchy has long been a member of the Germanic Confederation; the King of Denmark has been a party to that Confederation in virtue of his capacity as Grand Duke of Holstein; and it is consequently with respect to Schleswig alone that any dispute has arisen. The Germanic Confederation, on the one hand, contend that, by ancient acts and recorded transactions, Schleswig is united to Holstein, and must, by treaty, follow Holstein, according to whatever succession may take place in that duchy. The Danish Government, on the other hand, pretends that it has a right to require that Schleswig shall follow the line of succession in Denmark. It is on this question chiefly that the difference arises; and as Her Majesty's Government have signified to the two parties, to the Government of Denmark, and to the Government of Prussia, which acts in this matter as the representative of the German Confederation, their willingness to undertake the task of endeavouring by their good offices to settle the dispute amicably, without further recourse to hostilities, it is obvious that it would be unfitting for me to express any opinion on the present occasion as to that side on which I may think the right preponderates.

The hon. Gentleman, no doubt, has exercised a very proper discretion in calling the attention of the House and of the country to the engagements which we have entered into with regard to the Duchy of Schleswig. I have here the original treaty by which the guarantee is given; but the hon. Gentleman has read the words so fully and correctly, that it will not be necessary for me to trouble the House with a recapitulation. Undoubtedly, however, I am perfectly ready to concur with him, and with what appeared to me to be the general sense and opinion of the House, with respect to what he said, that it is the duty of England, that it is essential to the honour of England, and, therefore, for her well-understood interests, that all her engagements should be made good. It is not fitting that a country like England should repudiate her existing engagements, and I agree with the hon. Gentleman that we ought to stand by them, and to take care that they are fulfilled. It is well, therefore, not only for this country, but for all parties, that the other Powers of Europe should understand what are the treaties by which England considers herself bound, in order that, on entering into the discussion of the question in which these engagements may be involved, it may be known beforehand that which we may fairly and justly be called upon to do. The hon. Gentleman is perfectly correct in saying that the guarantee which was given by this country to Denmark was also given on the same occasion by the Government of France.

The hon. Gentleman has animadverted upon the course pursued by a person for whom I have the honour to feel the greatest respect and attachment—the Prussian Minister at this Court, in publishing the pamphlet alluded to by the hon. Member in the course of his speech. I must say, however the hon. Member may differ from the arguments and style of reasoning of that pamphlet, that no man who will place himself in the position of the Chevalier Bunsen, sent over here to protect Prussian interests, will be disposed to blame him for having published what he considers to be a just statement of the case of his Government; and whether that case be denied or affirmed, I think no one is entitled to censure the Chevalier as having departed from his proper duty in laying before the public, at this crisis in the affairs of Europe, those arguments which, in his opinion, afford sufficient justification of the conduct of Prussia. I am not now entering into those arguments; but, altogether irrespective of them, I may remark that I think the censure cast by the hon. Member upon the Prussian Minister was not altogether well-founded.

I will say no more. I have stated my perfect concurrence in the observation of the hon. Gentleman, that former guarantees, given by treaty, ought to be respected; and I must remind the House of what I stated on a former occasion, that, in the present case, whatever may be the right on either side, the purpose for which the Prussian troops have entered Holstein, and the purpose for which they would cross the Eyder into Schleswig, is, not to wrest the Duchy of Schleswig from the Danish Crown, but to support a party in Schleswig who hold that the ancient constitution and laws of the duchy entitled them to be incorporated and attached to Holstein, instead of being incorporated and attached to Denmark. It is, therefore, no attempt to conquer Schleswig; it is, however, no doubt an intervention in the internal affairs of the duchy with reference to the future line of succession which ought to prevail. I can only express my hope that a matter which, if pursued to extremities, might lead to consequences seriously affecting the peace of Europe, may be adjusted by an amicable negotiation between the parties; and I should really trust that the statesmen of both countries, viewing the disturbed and dangerous condition of nearly all parts of the continent of Europe, would not allow a question which, as the hon. Gentleman has pointed out, has no immediate practical application, but which belongs more to contingency, arising only after the death of two living persons, to lead to results which every reasonable man would have deeply to deplore.

MR. URQUHART observed, that the present was not a question of right, but a matter of violent oppression—of an invasion, in fact—which had actually taken place.

Motion agreed to.