§ Lord J. Russellsaid, that he was desirous of making; an observation upon the subject of a resolution which it appeared by the votes of the House of Lords had been come to that morning; by their Lordships. The resolution was this:—
That it is the duty of the Executive Government, when considering any case of conviction had before any of the Queen's judges with a view of remitting or commuting the sentence, to apply for information to the judge or judges who tried the case, and to afford such judge or judges an opportunity to give their opinion on such case, unless circumstances should exist which render any such application impossible or only possible with an inconvenient delay; but that it is not necessary that the Executive Government should be bound to follow the advice, if any, tendered by such judge or judges.3 He did not wish to argue the question; but as it was a question affecting the office which he held, he did wish to say, at once, that this resolution proposed a practice which was utterly inconsistent with that which had been hitherto pursued by Secretaries of State in their recommendations to the Crown, from which it would, in his opinion, be exceedingly inconvenient to depart, and in which it was not his intention to make any alteration whatever. If it were a bill instead of a resolution, and had gained the consent of Parliament then of course, he would be bound to obey it as law. But, until such were the case, he should consider himself justified in following the practice which had been hitherto pursued, not thinking that the prerogative of mercy could be, in any degree, altered by the resolution he had read to the House.