SPAIN.

HC Deb 10 March 1837 vol 37 cc223-86

On the Chairman putting the question,

Viscount Mahon

rose and spoke as follows:^* I now rise to call the attention of the Committee to the momentous subject of which I have given notice. Never, in my opinion was there a period when the foreign relations of this country called for a more watchful or more searching inquiry. Too long has this House remained indifferent to them—too long have they reposed in the noble Lord, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a confidence which has not been altogether justified by the prudence of his plans, or the success of his exertions. Even on the very first aspect of the question, I would ask, was there ever a position more anomalous, more unsatisfactory, or more destitute of all reasonable principles, than the present position of this country with regard to Spain? Do we even so much as know whether we are at peace or at war? That is a question I ventured to put to the noble Lord last year, and which has been also put by other hon. Members, but to that question we never could obtain any reply. I then said, and I say now, that I conceive it must be a very tortuous policy, which cannot give a plain answer to so plain a question. I conceive, that at no former period of our history could it have been a matter of doubt whether we were at peace or at war. But, Sir, the noble Lord was right in refusing to answer my question; for the truth is, that the policy in which he has plunged us is neither peace nor war. It is peace without tranquillity, it is war without honour!

In all discussions which have taken place on this subject, I have always most readily admitted that the Quadruple Treaty, and the additional articles, being once concluded, we are bound most honourably to fulfil them. Heaven forbid that any change of Government should make us unfaithful to any obligations solemnly contracted! But I do say, that succeeding events show more and more the impolicy of those additional articles. Those additional articles stand upon an entirely different ground from the Quadruple Treaty. I admit that there are several strong reasons to be urged in the defence of the Quadruple Alliance. It was a Portuguese rather than a Spanish treaty; the object being to appease the civil war ^* From a corrected report. that was raging in Portugal, and not to sanction any intervention in the affairs of Spain. But when Lord Grey's Government was dissolved, the noble Lord opposite, feeling the curb removed, went several steps further, and in August, 1834, signed the additional articles, stipulating an interference in the affairs of Spain. While I admit that we are bound to fulfil this treaty, and I have never wavered on this point, I lament the policy that conducted us to that obligation. I ask, why were we bound to interfere thus actively, and thus lavishly, in the affairs of Spain? Why could we not leave the affairs of the Spanish succession, if there was to be a civil war for it—why could we not leave it to be settled by that nation by which alone it ought to be settled—I mean the Spanish nation itself—and not force upon it the active interference of four foreign Governments? I could have readily understood, if Spain had been the powerful state she was 150 years ago—if the sun had never ceased to shine upon her conquests—if her dominions still extended over Italy and Flanders—then, indeed, I could have conceived that the question of Spanish succession would be an European question, deeply involving the balance of power. This was the ground upon which alone was defended the war of the succession 130years ago. But, now that Spain has sunk so low in the scale of European nations, from a long series of arbitrary and despotic governments, the question of the succession is no longer a question of importance in the balance of European power. I ask, then, why, after acknowledging the Queen, it is deemed necessary that we should afford assistance in arms and in money, to her Majesty's cause? I feel bound to say, I see no good reason for the policy of those articles, and I think there exist no grounds for these acts of "non-intervention;" for, according to the vocabulary of the noble Lord, nonintervention is the word we should, in future, make use of to express an active meddling in whatever does not concern us; there are no grounds, I think, for the non-intervention of the noble Lord in the affairs of Spain.

Well, then, Sir, in a few months after those articles had been signed, the Government to which the noble Lord belonged was dissolved, and it was succeeded by that of the Duke of Wellington at the Foreign Office. The Duke of Wellington, although disapproving of the policy of the noble Lord in the additional articles, yet, finding the faith of the country pledged to them, determined, with my right hon. Friend, who was then Prime Minister, to adhere most punctually and honourably not only to the letter but to the spirit of these additional articles. That was the course of the late Administration — a course which has been, in a highly honourable and candid manner, admitted more than once by the noble Lord himself, and by Lord Melbourne in another place. Thus, then, the conduct of the late Government, in maintaining existing treaties, stands even clearer, from the admission of the noble Lord, than it could from any declaration of mine. But that Administration having come to an end, and the noble Lord having returned to his former office, not satisfied with the additional articles—not satisfied with the strict fulfilment of those articles under a previous Government—the noble Lord, then, on the 10th of June, went several steps further, by suspending the Foreign Enlistment Act, and allowing a body of 12,000 Englishmen to enlist under the banners of the Queen of Spain. To that course I have always felt the most determined opposition. I ask any hon. Member who hears me, and who looks at this question on its real merits, and divested of all party feeling, whether succeeding events have not fully justified, and more than justified, the predictions which were made at the time, of the privations and sufferings to which the British Legion would be subjected, and of the probable final failure of that most ill-omened expedition? I may be told of the courage and gallantry which that body has displayed on several occasions. I willingly and cheerfully admit it. I have never doubted—I never could have doubted— that British soldiers, under any circumstances, and under any command, would be found to display most determined courage; nor have I any fault to find with them with reference to their conduct in Spain. But I do find fault with his Majesty's Government for placing them in such a position, in which English oldiers ought never to stand—a position in which their courage must necessarily be unavailing, in which privations and famine are to do the work of the enemy, and which affords no security either for their good treatment or their efficient command. It is difficult for a year-and-a-half to elapse in this sort of warfare, without considering how very different was the conduct of Government in the great struggle in which the noble Lord had the honour—for such it was—of rendering services to his country—I mean in the Peninsular war. If I mistake not, the noble Lord was the Secretary at War during that whole contest, and attended very carefully to the details of his duty. How very different was our position at that period! We then stepped in not to assist one party of Spaniards against another party of Spaniards—not for the purpose of settling a question for Spain, which Spain is entitled to settle for herself, but to assist— what Mr. Canning emphatically called— "the universal Spanish people." We stepped in not by suspending an Order in, Council—not by letting loose a party of marines—not by selling stores for which we have got no thanks, and shall get no money—no, we interfered as became the cause, manfully and openly; we assisted a noble cause by noble means; a cause worthy of Spaniards, by means worthy of Englishmen. How different from the late scenes we have unfortunately witnessed in the north of Spain! Was it really worth while, for such an object, to endanger the peace of Europe? Was there not danger, at the time the noble Lord projected that expedition, that other states might have interfered on behalf of Don Carlos, with a similar amount of money and a similar body of troops? Was it worth while, I will say, to send out such an expedition, for such an object; to run the risk of disturbing the tranquillity that happily prevailed in Europe? —Pax missa per orbem Fenea belligeri compescat limina Jani. But if the Noble Lord was determined to unclose the temple of war for peace, he should have thrown open the main portal, through which English soldiers could have walked upright; and not have sent them through a side door, by which they had to creep upon their hands and knees through the slimy and intricate intrigues of the court of Madrid. Such is the position in which the English soldiers stand at present—a position in which I maintain that his Majesty's Government had no right to place them. And what have we now to cheer us in the stead of those victories which used to make the heart of every Englishman leap within him, and which have raised the name of his country to the highest pitch of renown? What have we obtained in return for half a million of money? I really know not what satisfaction we have enjoyed from it, unless it consists in having been able to read twice a week in the Madrid Gazette "that the Carlists are utterly annihilated;" —that according to the last accounts the Carlists have yielded to the valorous Alaix, or the ever-pursuing Espartero! One person has taken the trouble of summing up the number of dead, from the official bulletins of the Spanish army, which have been brought down, I believe, to the 8th of November last; and I have found the total number of Carlists killed in bottle, according to this Madrid Gazette—most accurately given!—to be 313,129. Now, if the Carlist army be estimated, as I have heard it, at 30,000 men, it will follow not only that the British and Spanish soldiers have killed every Carlist soldier, but that they have killed him ten times over! We have all heard of the military powers of Alexander the great, and "thrice he slew the slain," but he has been most certainly outdone by the Queen's generals; for they not only have killed all the Carlists soldiers ten times over, but actually contrived to leave behind an army not much inferior to what it was at first! The hon. Member for St. Alban's (Mr. Ward) reminds me that there has been a similar exaggeration on the other side. But am I defending the other side? Am I proposing to assist the other side? No; but I am pointing out the errors and faults of that cause which the noble Lord has undertaken to defend, and upon which he has lavished his half million of money. I am no partisan of the other side, and not bound to vindicate any of its conduct. Following the order of time in the proceedings of the noble Lord, I think we are fairly entitled to consider, not only what the noble Lord has done, but also what he has attempted to do. On this point I find a very curious statement of what the noble Lord did, or attempted to do, exactly a year ago, in March, 1836. I beg to call the attention of the noble Lord to a speech lately delivered by Count Molé, the prime minister of France. Count Molé said, in March 1836, "that Lord Palmerston considered that circumstances justified his co-operation." I believe the new word "translimitation" was introduced on that occasion; a new word to express an old idea, and to cover the disgrace that was attached to it in the minds of the Spanish people —a new word which the noble Lord may, I believe, claim the honour to have invented. "In Match, 1836," says M. Molé, "Lord Palmerston announced to General Sebastiani that it was his intention to land a certain number of marines on the coast of Spain, and invited France to share in that co-operation. The English Cabinet offered France the occupation of the port of Passages, and even allowed her to limit herself the extent, and fix the mode of her co-operation. M. Thiers immediately returned a negative reply; and it was only when a handful of soldiers had revolted at La Granja, and compelled the Queen by brutal force, to accept the Constitution of 1812, that the policy of the Cabinet of the 22nd of February changed with regard to the Peninsula." Now, here we have, on the undoubted authority of the prime minister of France, the nature of the proposal of the noble Lord, upon which, I must say, I look with no feeling but that of unmitigated condemnation. For the last 150 years it has been the policy of all our statesmen, to whatever party they might belong, to keep the French out of Spain and Italy. It was the policy alike of the Walpoles and the Chathams, of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox. [Mr. Roebuck.—Not of Mr. Canning.] Yes, I will accept the contradiction of the hon. Member for Bath, and say, it was also the policy of Mr. Canning; for no man expressed greater concern, when, in 1823, the French passed the Bidassoa. I assert, therefore, that this has been the uniform policy of every British Minister, until the noble Lord, for the first time, departed from it. Thanks to the noble Lord, we have a French garrison in Ancona, and are threatened with another in the port of Passages. I consider this one of the very strongest facts of the present case. It is very true, that the prudence and forbearance of the French government, the statesmanlike policy of the French ministry, deciding the question in their own right, have rejected the proposals of the noble Lord. But does that excuse the noble Lord? Is he not as responsible for the advice which he has given, as he would have been if the French government had been misled by a culpable ambition; and may we not, without any injustice, ascribe to him the un- doubted evils which would have resulted had his proposal been adopted?

In the order of lime, the next important event is the military revolution of La Granja. A drunken serjeant, with a few mutinous soldiers of the body guard, burst in the evening, into her Majesty's apartment, and compelled her Majesty, by threats and brutal force, to sign a decree, establishing an entirely new constitution in Spain. After the noble Lord's praises of the "Estatuto Real," we might not unnaturally have looked for some degree of hostility, on the part of the noble Lord, to this constitution, which had risen on the ruins of one he so much approved. We might also have expected that the noble Lord, who presided so long over the War Department, would have been keenly alive to the evils of a revolution, springing from a military mutiny. As to the merits or demerits of a political revolution, I am not now going to speak; but I will say, that I never yet saw a statesman who entertained anything but a feeling of horror at military revolution. When troops like the Prætorian bands of Rome, take upon themselves to decide for the country, and to dispose of the crown, a feeling of abhorrence ought I think, to be strongly evinced in all, but strongest of all in one who has closely studied the laws of military subordination, and whose duty it was, for many years, to enforce them. But what has been the conduct of the noble Lord? Why, he has waited for that very moment to lavish new favours upon the government of Spain,—to show his increased partiality for, and to redouble his acts of kindness towards, that government. It was soon after this, that an increased force of marines were put on shore to co-operate in the defence of Bilboa. It was then that every imaginable exertion was made to assist the Government of revolutionary Spain; in short, it might have been supposed—were we only to judge by the conduct of the noble Lord— it might have been supposed that, up to the period of that revolution, the noble Lord had been less zealous in his endeavours, but that this admirable change was acted as a strong additional reason, with the noble Lord, for lending that assistance. I am quite sure that such was not, and could not be, the feeling of the noble Lord; but were we to judge from his conduct, and not from the feeling which we know he must entertain towards military crimes, we should undoubtedly come to that conclusion. It was at this period that an extension was given, in the greatest possible degree, to the additional articles. I disapprove of those articles, but I am prepared to stand by them so long as they are obligatory on this country. If my right hon. Friend the Member for Tarn-worth, or the Duke of Wellington, had fallen short of the performance of those articles, the noble Lord would have, no doubt, complained, and would have had a right to complain, of their having done so; and are we, then, to be satisfied, when we find the noble Lord going so far beyond those articles, and violating them, to the injury both of the country that gives and of the country that receives this additional succour,—for I assure him it will be injurious to Spain,—are we to be satisfied with this conduct of the noble Lord? The noble Lord has, as far as in him lies, attempted to extend the provisions of the additional articles, in converting the naval force into a land army. Not only has more than half a million of money 540,000l. been expended by the policy of the noble Lord, but I have some reason to doubt whether the Returns, from which I have taken that amount, comprised the whole of the expenses. I do not mean to say that there has been the slightest unfairness in making up this account. I will explain my meaning. The Return of the provisions issued from the British ships, and other assistance furnished, large in amount as it is, is still incomplete, from the purser's books not being made up till this period. Now, I may be asked what number of marines have been employed, and what stores have been issued. The subject is one of so much importance, that I feel it to be my duty to press even these details on the attention of the House. I am unable to state how large a force of marines have served, or what amount of stores have been furnished; and why am I unable to state it? Because the noble Lord opposite refuses to give the House and country any information on the subject. At the commencement of the present Session an hon. Friend of mine, whose unavoidable absence I regret—the hon. and learned Member for Oxford (Mr. Maclean)—moved for a Return on this subject; but the noble Lord opposite said, that such a Return would be inconvenient, and induced the hon. and learned Member to discharge the order for the return. I wish to know whether I have been rightly informed, that, besides this half million, at intervals stores and provisions have been furnished from the King's ships to the troops in her Catholic majesty's service? But I would also call the attention of the House to the largeness of the sums which we know to be thus expended. I cannot believe that the additional articles justify this expenditure; there must have been provided some limitation as to the time over which these supplies were to be extended. I repeat that as long as these articles are obligatory, I will support them by my vote to the fullest extent: but I should be glad to know whether those supplies are to extend over any number of years, or to any amount of stores that are asked; and whether, if another military mutiny arise again, or if this unhappy war should continue (which God forbid) many years longer, there would be no limitation of these unrequited sacrifices? If the noble Lord opposite has really entered into this large and indefinite agreement, it is high time the House should know the extent of the charge which has been thrown by it on this country; and I must say, that I expected more sympathy on this subject from those hon. Gentlemen, such as the hon. Member for Middlesex, who express so much zeal for economy, but who have allowed at least half a million to be lavished, and still remain perfectly quiet and unmoved.

There is another point of great importance, to which I have not hitherto adverted; I mean the question whether, for these great sacrifices, the country has obtained any advantage or influence with the court of Spain? I should be glad to know if, after incurring these expenses to the amount of half a million (and I would willingly go before the country with this return in my hand, as a proof of the economy of the right hon. Gentlemen opposite), this country has obtained any weight or additional power with the court of Spain? So far from it, that at no period, whatever, has the British influence been less regarded by the Court of Spain than at the present moment. I make no complaint of the British Minister at that court. Of course, if the policy pursued by the Government at home has the effect of diminishing British interests, no fault can be found with the Gentleman who conducts that interest abroad. I, therefore, make no complaint against Mr. Villiers; but, at the same time, I cannot but lament that every effort that has been made to obtain redress from the Spanish court for the grievances affecting-British subjects resident in that country have failed of success. I have in my possession a copy of a memorial sent up to the noble Lord opposite by the principal merchants (with scarcely one exception), residents in Alicant, and dated March 16th, 1836. It complains of the great grievances under which they labour. The statement begins thus:—" It is notorious that British interests and British security have been, for many years past, totally neglected by our Representative at the court of Madrid, notwithstanding the representations repeatedly made by British residents in Spain. England carries off at least three fourths of the produce of Spain, and Spain takes very little from England in return. All our applications to the Ambassador at Madrid have been of no avail; on the contrary, seeing the little zeal displayed by our natural protectors, the local authorities conceive that we can be treated with the greatest impunity." Let the House note, that English subjects resident in Spain here represent to the noble Lord opposite that they are insulted with the greatest impunity. They then say, "We have the intolerable mortification to see, that especially the Ministers of France and America, when under the necessity of having to make complaints, obtain almost immediate satisfaction." So that it appears that France, which has done little in the contest, and America, which has done nothing at all, can obtain immediate satisfaction, while British merchants have to appeal to the Government at home for the restoration of that influence which the mere name of England could formerly command in Spain. Now, this is a document not proceeding from one or two obscure individuals, but from almost every British merchant and subject resident in Alicant. I believe this is not a solitary instance; but that similar complaints have been made from other towns, and will be urged in this and in another House of Parliament. For that reason, I now only refer to the extract I have just read, and will avoid further discussion upon it; but I cannot refrain from mentioning to the House a fact which I feel they will think incredible, and which I could scarcely myself have believed, except on the authority from which I have received it. The fact is, that one of the impositions and forced contributions of which the British subjects complain, is a tax which they paid so lately as last year, and is called a tax "por Liberation del Rey,"— for the deliverance of the King. When I first heard of it, I was at a loss to conceive who was called King in the reign of Isabella, or how this King was to be delivered. But I found that this tax was originally imposed during the captivity of king Ferdinand; and that, being very lucrative, it was kept up and demanded, not only after his deliverance, but after his death! I think that the English residents, who are now called upon to pay it, have just grounds of complaint. Without going more into detail upon these commercial grievances, I will only say, that from the last accounts I have received, it appears that several of these grievances are still matter of great complaint; and only one tax, or forced tax for military quarters (Paja y Utensilios), has been ceded to the British residents in Spain. If, then, all the large expenditure which this country has made has produced nothing to her commercial advantage, the next question is, has it done anything in aid of the objects for which it was urged and undertaken? In a word, has it accomplished anything for the cause of liberty? Surely, it will not be pretended that the cause of liberty has been promoted by these sacrifices and lavish exertions. Look to the government of Mendizabel, which murders its prisoners and defrauds its creditors; which, with peace in its mouth in Madrid, grasps nothing in its hands but gags and bayonets; which has such butchers for generals as Mina or Noguera;—and then say whether, in supporting such an administration, the cause of liberty can be assisted. It is not for such an object that the treasures of England should be lavished, or that brave Englishmen should be sent to the shores of Spain to encounter, not the hazards of the field, but, as was said on a former expedition against Spaniards,— Sent in this foul clime to languish, Think what thousands fell in vain! Wasting with disease and anguish,— Not in glorious battle slain. There remains another subject to which I have not yet alluded, but to which I must call the attention of the noble Lord opposite; I mean the rights and liberties of Biscay and Navarre. Can it be possible that this House is not yet aware that those two provinces are possessed of privileges as dear to them as the constitutional rights of England can be to Britons; privileges won by as glorious struggles and secured by as solemn compacts? If the House really is aware of these privileges, hon. Members will surely join with me in imploring the noble Lord to take the earliest opportunity of asking for the restoration and maintenance of rights which have existed for centuries, and are endeared to the Biscayans and the Navarrese by every tie that can bind the heart of man. I will not go into many details of them; I feel it the less necessary after the very full statement of them contained in the work published by my noble Friend the Earl of Carnarvon,— a work not less distinguished by its high talent than by its excellent feeling,—a work entitled to an enduring place in the literature of this country. I have seen a pamphlet, published in reply to that work, with respect to the authorship of which I do not think it right to repeat any mere vague rumours. I will say only this, that many supporters of his Majesty's Government are accustomed to refer to this pamphlet as containing their justification, and as expressing the views of their leaders. I think, therefore, I may fairly assume that the opinions, of this pamphlet are not uncongenial to the sentiments of the noble Lord opposite. The pamphlet, I admit, is written with ability, and pays a just tribute of respect to the work and to the character of Lord Carnarvon; but it attempts to refute his arguments with respect to the privileges of Biscay and Navarre. Now, if the House will bear with me, I will show that this refutation is unsupported by any solid grounds. The pamphlet first states, that the Biscayans are not entitled to those privileges, —that they are antiquated and obsolete, and have never been of any great value. It adds, that the Biscayans are, in truth, indifferent to these rights. And what proof does it allege of this indifference? Why, that many of the insurgent commanders, such as Villareal and Moreno, are not natives of these provinces, but come from other parts of Spain, so that they cannot be supposed to have any zeal for these peculiar privileges. Why, Sir, was ever such an argument attempted before? Does it follow that the sentiments of an army should always be identical with those of their commander? On the very same ground, it might be shown that, in the struggles against Napoleon, the Spaniards were not, in truth, animated by zeal for their independence. Were not Blake and O'Donnell of Irish parentage? Was not Reding a Swiss? And yet, was it ever pretended, because Reding headed the Spaniards at Baylen, and Blake and O'Donnell on other occasions, that the Spaniards had no more zeal for their national existence, than foreigners to their country may be supposed to have possessed? Why, Sir, I venture to think, with all deference to the noble Lord opposite, that when peasants are roused to arms by any wrong, and look round for a leader, their object is, not so much to find a general who shares their enthusiasm, as one who can direct it with the highest military skill. I maintain, therefore, that the choice of able commanders from other parts of Spain does not, in any degree, prove indifference on the part of the Biscayans, who entertain the keenest feelings on the subject of their freedom. This pamphlet does not deny the main facts of the case against the present government of Spain;—that, soon after the outset of the troubles, the liberties of Biscay were abrogated by a decree of General Castanon, and that, though his conduct was blamed, his decree was never cancelled by the court of Madrid. I ask, is not this a case to justify popular resistance? Nor does the writer of this pamphlet seem to be aware of the treaties in which the existence of these privileges is formally acknowledged. I believe that, in the fifteenth article of the Treaty of Commerce at Utrecht, will be found a clause to secure to the Biscayans their peculiar privileges with respect to the fisheries in Newfoundland. And of such importance was this privilege considered, that I have seen despatches, eight or nine years after that treaty, saying that, if this privilege could by any means be relinquished to England, it would form one of the main equivalents for the desired restoration of Gibraltar. But if I wanted proof that the privileges exist at the present time, I could find it in the very pamphlet, the object of which is to deny their existence. In page 19, of that pamphlet is contained a fact which not only proves this, but also shows the value of those privileges, It states, that in 1819, enrolments were made throughout Spain for the purpose of reconquering the South American colonies. The Biscayans claimed their privilege of being allowed to commute this duty for a payment in money. Now, after their recent conduct, nobody can ascribe this to cowardice on their part; for the fact is, that they were opposed to joining in an attack upon the independence of their fellow countrymen beyond the Atlantic. They, however, claimed exemption from furnishing troops; and the amount of money paid by them instead, was stated, in this pamphlet itself, to be 10,000,000 of reals, and was in fact, adjusted between the government and the local authorities. But, even supposing that those privileges are of no value, the question still remains,—are they or are they not endeared to the people by long habit, by ancient custom, by the antiquity in which they are enshrined and consecrated? Surely Englishmen, who are themselves possessed of ancient institutions, cannot doubt that other nations may have, like themselves, a regard for legislative antiquity, as well as for legislative wisdom. Surely, we should not expect that the Biscayans should surrender their old national coin—worn and defaced, perhaps, but found to be of sterling gold— for the same of the new money—very sharp and fresh, no doubt; but how long will it pass current?—from the constitutional mint at Madrid. I will not weary the House with long extracts from ancient writers; but there is one passage, which is mentioned neither by Lord Carnarvon nor by this pamphlet, but which expresses so noble a sentiment that I hope the House will allow me to read it. It is a quotation from Blancas, a Spanish writer from the acts of the Cortes of Arragon in 1451, nearly 400 years ago. The passage is as follows:—"We have always heard of old time; and it is found by experience, that, seeing the great barrenness of this land, and the poverty of the realm, the folk would go hence to live and abide in other realms and lands, if it were not for the liberties thereof." Look, in fact, to what liberty has done for Biscay! By nature it is the most barren of all the Spanish provinces; by its rights and consequent industry it has become the most fruitful in cultivation, and the most teeming of inhabitants. It is liberty which has cultivated their bleak mountains and barren valleys; it is liberty which has driven ste- rility before it to the very highest hills. I hate witnessed and can speak to the comfort, and happiness, and content, which prevail in those districts; and I only wish that I had the power to impress upon the House the same ardent persuasion which fills my own mind that this country will do great injustice if she fail to intercede in behalf of those free and brave mountaineers.

My argument, then, resolves itself to this:— I dislike and object to any interference at all in matters which properly belong to Spain; but if this country must interfere, I can see no object more worthy of engaging her attention, or that has a better claim upon her sympathies, than the rights and privileges of these Basque provinces. I believe that, if those privileges were duly restored and secured, one great cause of the war would be ended; and those districts might, not improbably, be restored to that tranquillity which they once enjoyed, and which they now so greatly need.

In conclusion, Sir, it will be perceived, that I have carried on my argument quite independently of the claims of Don Carlos. That is the very strength of my case; for even if I should admit that Don Carlos is a monster, a tyrant, a partisan of the Inquisition, it will not, so far as I can see, affect a single one of the arguments I have put forward. Admitting Don Carlos to be every thing hon. Gentlemen may choose to call him, it will not in-validate a single consideration which I have endeavoured to urge. I am no partisan of Don Carlos. In office I have taken my share, in a subordinate capacity, in the recognition of the rights of Queen Isabella; and I should not think it consistent with my character, as a man of honour, were I to cabal in private against those whom I have assisted and acknowledged in public. I shall not consider it a sufficient answer to the case I think I have made out, to be told of the decree of Durango, or to hear a recapitulation of faults of those on the other side—faults which I have not attempted to defend. The case which I put affects both the reputation of this country, and the tranquillity of Spain. The only chance for the restoration of that tranquillity is to avoid exasperating the civil war, by the introduction of a foreign force,—to interfere only to mitigate the horrors of the warfare, or to protect the liberties of a brave people struggling for their rights and privileges; at least, as much as for, the claims of Don Carlos. I have now laid my case before the House, and, in my opinion a stronger case—not resting on the inadequate manner in which it has been put forward, but upon facts and substantial charges— was never before brought forward against a foreign Minister of England. I know that the feeling throughout this country scarcely presents any variety of opinion on the subject of the foreign policy pursued by the noble Lord opposite. His own Friends designate the noble Lord's policy as the bad part of a system, the main principles of which they approve. Others, like myself, think that the present Government is generally bad, and, therefore, are still less willing to bear with the faults of the Foreign Department. In a word, the policy of the noble Lord is rather tolerated than approved even by his own party; and such, I believe, are the feelings of the country. I have felt it my duty to bring this matter forward—I hope I have not done so in any acrimonious terms— and I now call upon the House to lend its serious attention to a subject which involves, in no small degree, the honour of England and the welfare of Spain.

Mr. R. Cutlar Ferguson

said, he thought it impossible not to thank the noble Lord for the manner in which he had brought forward his subject. The noble Lord had done this in a manner which was free from all objection—in a manner which was never surpassed for the moderate and gentlemanly language which had pervaded the speech from beginning to end. At the same time, as he differed, almost in everything, from what the noble Lord had said, he must interrupt the proceedings of the evening for a short period, in order to stale his own opinions on one or two points. The noble Lord, as he understood, in the beginning of his speech, did not mean to say that the Quadripartite Treaty ought not to be observed; for, on the contrary, he stated that he joined the Administration which came in when the Government which now again held office went out, and that that Ministry determined to carry out the provisions and stipulations of that treaty. The only thing for the House to consider was, whether his Majesty's Government, in the fulfilment of the engagements by which they were bound by the treaty, merited the reproaches which had been cast upon them by the noble Lord. With respect to the treaty itself, it appeared to him that it was justified on every principle of justice, and policy, and national honour. He had never yet heard that the Queen's government was disapproved of, or that the change made by Ferdinand in restoring the ancient law of Spain, which was only departed from for French purposes—for the purposes of the Bourbon party—was hailed otherwise than by the general acclamation of the Spanish people, and with the unanimous approval of the Cortes. The hon. Gentleman opposite shook his head; but he wished him to listen to one or two arguments before he came to a conclusion on the question. The Queen's government, as he had already stated, was approved of by the Cortes. The claim of Don Carlos was never taken into consideration by the Cortes at all; he was regarded merely as] a pretender; and in point of fact, according to the restored and acknowledged law of Spain, he had no more pretension to the throne of that kingdom than any Gentleman whom he had then the honour to address. Under these circumstances, Great Britain having offered her aid and assistance to the Queen of Spain, the question arose, whether it was not necessary that the Government should enter into an alliance with some of the other powers of Europe, in order to enable it to carry its intentions into effect. First of all there was a treaty with respect to Portugal only, in which Don Carlos was regarded simply as pretender to the Spanish throne, and the object of which was to exclude him from the possession of the crown of that country. No sooner had the powers of Europe declared that they would not permit Don Carlos, as a pretender to the throne of Spain, to remain in Portugal for the purpose of opposing the government of the Queen, than Don Carlos, and Don Miguel put themselves under the protection of this country. Shortly afterwards, however, Don Carlos thought proper to abandon the asylum he had found here; and entering again into the field of contention in Spain, he published the infamous edict at Durango, under which many of the subjects of the King, and many of his own fellow countrymen were murdered in cold blood. The case then stood thus:— the British Ministry, acknowledging the government of the Queen of Spain, entered, as they had a perfect right to do, into an alliance with her and other Eu- ropean powers, to expel Don Carlos from the territory of Portugal; and having expelled him thence, an additional article, undoubtedly, a very important one, was appended to the treaty. It was in these terms:—"His Majesty, the King of Great Britain and Ireland, engages to furnish to the Queen of Spain such supplies of arms and warlike stores as the maintenance of her cause may require, and, if necessary, to furnish a naval force." If the British Government were right in acknowledging the government of the Queen of Spain— if they were right in the treaty they subsequently entered into with her, and with other European powers, to exclude Don Carlos from the Spanish throne—surely they were bound to furnish aid, if the necessity arose to the full extent engaged for under that treaty. The British Government had done nothing more. So far, indeed, from having exceeded the terms of the treaty, he thought the British Government would not have done its duty, if, supposing the necessity to have arisen, it had not gone much further for the purpose of carrying the additional article he had alluded to into full effect. Having agreed to the treaty, the question now was, whether the British Government had abandoned their duty in anything that had since been done? He did not know on what ground it could be said that they had abandoned their duty. It was said, that they had done more than was necessary. He did not know how that assertion could be maintained. Beyond the furnishing of arms and warlike stores, they had extended to the Queen of Spain, no aid that was not immediately connected with, and strictly confined to, a naval support. The noble Lord (Lord Mahon) said, that his noble Friend, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had taken advantage of the military revolution of La Granja to shower additional aid upon the Queen of Spain. Other nations, perhaps, might not have regarded that revolution in the same light as his noble Friend did; but he was sure, that no man could look upon the subject, without seeing that the mere fact of that military revolution, which he as much as any man detested—for nothing, in his opinion, could be more prejudicial to the best interests of a country, than a revolution carried on by military force—at the same time, he thought no man could calmly look upon the subject, without seeing that the British Government would not have been justified in abandoning the cause of the Queen of Spain, because she happened to be placed in the unfortunate situation occasioned by the revolution. The result of the military revolution of La Granja was, that the constitution of 1812, was restored with certain modifications. There had been a moderation on the part of the Cortes since, which had made them unpopular in Spain, but which entitled them to the praise of Europe; and he was ready to declare that Europe was infinitely indebted to the Cortes for having, by their discreet acts and increased spirit, made the cause of the Queen of Spain much better than it was. The noble Lord (Mahon) had indulged in some lengthened observations on the subject of the Basque provinces. The short reply to those observations was, that the British Government was obliged, under the treaty into which it had entered, to meet the war wherever the war arose. The fact of their having met and opposed Don Carlos in those provinces, did not show that they were inimical to them, or that they would do anything to prejudice their peculiar rights or privileges. The noble Lord also remarked upon the auxiliary force of British subjects, which the Government of Great Britain had allowed to enter Spain, to support the cause of the Queen. He, for one, could not see that there was ground of reproach or blame in so allowing British subjects to embark in the cause of the Queen of Spain. The cause of the Queen concerned all Europe—a cause which the Spanish people were not allowed to fight out between themselves, because the Northern Powers of Europe, in the absence of any foreign interference on the part of the Queen, were prepared to place Don Carlos on the throne. It was pretty well established, that a close communication was carried on between the Northern Powers of Europe and Don Carlos, and, by the aid of the former, the latter would have undoubtedly been placed on the throne of Spain, had it not been for the opportune interference of the subjects of Great Britain. The British Government had done nothing beyond that which it had engaged to do, and which it had a right to engage itself to do; and he thought the most unfortunate thing that could have occurred would have been, the defeat of the attempt to keep the Queen on the throne of Spain, such a defeat would certainly have taken place, had it not been for the gallant bearing of our brave countrymen at Bilboa. As an Englishman, he felt proud that they were his countrymen who took so decided and so distinguished a part in the relief of Bilboa, a part which the general himself declared, tended so directly and so materially to the success of the daring undertaking. The noble Lord had spoken rather lightly, rather disparagingly, of the conduct of the Spanish troops, yet it was impossible that any troops could have conducted themselves with greater courage, or greater perseverance, under severe privations, than the troops of the Queen of Spain did on that occasion; nor did the leader of any troops ever behave with greater gallantry than General Espartero; who, whilst he declared the bravery of his own soldiers, acknowledged in the most generous manner the obligations he was under to our own countrymen. But, at the same time, he agreed with the noble Lord, that a different course might perhaps have been adopted, if the ignorance and inactivity of the Spanish government—an ignorance and inactivity which left it matter of doubt, at one time, whether Don Carlos or the Queen should occupy the throne, could have been foreseen. Now, however, it was clear that the cause of the Queen had triumphed over the faction of Don Carlos; for he could call the supporters of that princely pretender by no other name. It was a faction seeking to usurp a throne, to which Don Carlos had no title. But he would not take up more of the time of the House. The noble Lord had brought forward nothing new that night—had advanced nothing but what had been alleged, and fully and completely answered on many previous occasions. He thought, therefore, that the few observations he had felt it his duty to make, would be considered by the House as a sufficient reply to what had been stated.

Mr. Gally Knight, dissenting entirely from the view taken of the subject by the noble Lord (Mahon) the Member for Hertford, wished to say a few words in order that his vote, if it were required, might not be misunderstood. The struggle that was going on in the Peninsula was not merely a struggle between the parties concerned—not merely a struggle between Don Carlos and Queen Isabella, but a struggle between two opposite principles, between the principle of despotism and the principle of freedom. He was of opinion, therefore, that the British Government was fully justified in extending its assistance to an ancient and distressed ally—to a great but unfortunate country; and to prevent, as far as possible, the growth of that engrossing despotism which had gradually reduced Spain from one of the most powerful to one of the weakest kingdoms in Europe. An interference to prevent the success of Don Carlos, and the re-establishment of despotic principles in Spain, was in his opinion, every way worthy of the British Government. The noble Lord had expressed his disapprobation of the two additional articles which were appended to the Quadruple Alliance. His conviction was, that the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in appending those articles to the treaty, was wholly actuated by an earnest desire to put an end to a war of this description, and the object he had in view fully justified the means by which he attempted to accomplish it. As to the auxiliary force that had been supplied, he was decidedly of opinion that it had been of the utmost benefit to the Queen of Spain, for if the British had not been present at Bilboa, Bilboa would have fallen; and if Bilboa had fallen, Don Carlos would have been on the throne of Spain. He was in Paris at the time; and he could state that in the estimation of the French, the British arms had been anything but tarnished by the conduct of our countrymen before the walls of Bilboa. If all the provinces of Spain were divided in opinion as to who should fill the throne, he admitted that a handful of British soldiers would not be sufficient to serve the liberal and legitimate cause in that country; but what he contended for was this, that up to the present moment the treasure of England had not been prodigally wasted, that the honour of the British army had not been stained, and that the noble Lord, the Foreign Secretary, had not deserved the censures which had been cast upon him, and of which he had no doubt the House would hear a great deal more. As he dissented in opinion from that noble Lord, and from the Ministry with which he acted, upon some domestic questions of paramount importance, he was more anxious to do him justice in an instance where he did not believe him to be wrong. He had risen, therefore, to offer his humble testimony to the correctness of the course that had been pursued.

Mr. Fector

declared that he was directly and fundamentally opposed to the policy of the noble Lord, because he was a supporter of that system of foreign policy under which he believed the real rights and privileges of the country could alone be maintained. He regretted the manner in which this question had been brought forward. He would rather have seen some substantial resolution submitted to the House. He gave the noble Lord credit for the purest motives; but he thought the House ought to be placed in a position to declare by its vote whether it sanctioned the policy of the noble Lord or not. He condemned the cruel spirit that had characterised the war, and could not enough reprobate the massacres at Barcelona and Madrid, but he should like to know what right this country had to interfere with the affairs of Spain at all? Suppose, for a moment, that a question respecting the succession was entertained in this country, how should we like Prussia, or Austria, or Fiance to interfere with us for the purpose of upholding either one or the other side of the question? What would be our feelings? Would not every man with the heart of an Englishman stand up and vindicate the independence of his country? He thought, too, that the course pursued would be ultimately ineffective. We might send out our tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of men, but he believed we should never settle the question of the government of Spain. Napoleon with all his military resources found that to be more than he could effect. He regretted, exceedingly, the course which had been taken by the British Ministry, because the effect of it had been to crush freedom of opinion among the people of Spain. As a friend to our national honour, he was compelled to say that he considered that it had been compromised. As a friend to liberty, he considered with his noble Friend that it had been interfered with and violated by the foreign policy of this country, and he only regretted that the question had not been brought before the House in such a manner as to enable it to give a distinct vote.

Lord Francis Egerton

had no intention of interfering in the discussion, but was induced to rise by one or two of the latter observations of the right hon. Member for Kirkcudbright. That right hon. Member had taken a course with respect to the privileges of the Basque provinces which was indeed consistent enough with the whole policy of his Majesty's Government, for it was one which led him to come to a judgment on the advantages of those privileges to the provinces to which they belonged, and to found the policy of this country on his own appreciation of their utility. He thought if that question were a fit one for the decision of that House, he might be induced to agree with the right hon. Member that those privileges might be abolished with advantage to those provinces, if they could be induced to forego them. On general principles he thought that when districts by geographical position, and a concurence of other circumstances, formed part of a monarchy or extended system, it was usually desirable that their institutions should merge in that general system. He went further, and thought that it would be a benefit to those provinces if their very singular and ancient language itself could be replaced by the Spanish. He agreed with M. Du-Pin that the use of the Basque language was an impediment to her civilisation; but were we the judges of these matters?—were we, in our judgments, to lend our aid for the remedy of such evils, while their existence was cherished by the parties themselves? He believed the Basques were in arms for the preservation of their privileges but not exclusively for that, for attachment to a particular succession, and to the person of their prince, was also among their motives. And were we to be called upon to forego and deaden all natural sympathy with a people thus fighting against superior forces, for a cause of those merits they were the sole and proper judges? It was not necessary to be a Carlist to feel that sympathy; it knocked at every bosom in England. He believed the very men who had lately been, if they were not at this moment, pointing the ponderous artillery of Britain against the party entrenchments of the mountaineer, felt that sympathy, that it penetrated into the very recesses of Downing-street itself, and that the noble Lord opposite was not proof against it. The right hon. Member for Kirkcudbright had next made what he (Lord Francis Egerton) considered an important admission; he admitted that he might have paused in the measure of repealing the Foreign Enlistment Act if he could have foreseen its results, and the utter failure of the expedition which had its birth in that repeal. "But," said the right hon. Gentleman, "how could we foresee that Spanish Generals would behave as they have?" How indeed! Had the noble Lord, then—had the Government— no means of forming a just anticipation of the assistance likely to be derived from Spanish arms and Spanish finances? If, indeed, the events of 150 years past had been blotted from history, and could we be carried back at once to the Spain of the sixteenth century, when her troops were led by an Elva, a Parma, in Europe — when they were led by Cortez to the conquest of another hemisphere—when their infantry was the first in Europe, the noble Lord might have well been excused for hopes deceived and prophecies refuted by events. But had nothing since occurred, had recent history no pages on which he might read the future? The noble Lord had been Secretary at War through the war of independence. Had its records taught him nothing of Spanish Generals and Spanish promises? If he looked for information in the ranks of that political party to which the noble Lord was a recent acquisition, was the name of Napier unknown in our literary annals? If he could condescend to borrow advice from a political opponent, but from one who never refused his counsel or his service when the interests of his country were at stake, a walk would have taken him to Apsleyhouse—a word would have brought the Duke of Wellington to Downing-street. The hon. Member for Nottinghamshire had thought fit to approve of the policy of Government on a simple and intelligible, but, a most questionable, ground. The hon. Members seemed to consider the contest in Spain as a simple one between the extreme of bigotry and despotism on the one hand, and rational liberty on the other. He (Lord Francis Egerton) doubted this conclusion. He considered that if it were true that the inquisition was ranged on one side as the inevitable consequence of success, which he thought beyond our knowledge to presume, it was at least as evident that the wildest extravagancies of Atheism and Jacobinism were ranged on the other. He wished to see an end to that contest. If the noble Lord could put forth his hand and raise up that edifice of national liberty which he gave the noble Lord credit for the wish to raise, he might rejoice; but, taking the history and condition of Spain into consideration, he doubted that the noble Lord could ever perform that exploit, and he still more questioned whether any of his measures had hitherto been calculated to lead to that result. But if the noble Lord, in the spirit of the conclusion of a pamphlet which had been much commented upon, had ulterior views — if, instead of dabbling with the confines of that country, of pursuing a warfare up to high-water mark, he seriously meant to launch a force into the interior, he warned him to beware. He might succeed for the moment, but the country which sanctioned the invasion of a moment must be prepared to sanction the expense of years of occupation, and to take upon itself the administration of the country. This was no new doctrine. If he objected to such interventions now on the part of this country he had done so in 1823 in the case of the French invasion. He had condemned it as dangerous to those who undertook it. Why did he then believe that France would find any military difficulty in invading that country? He well knew and believed they might inarch from Irun to Cadiz without a struggle. They did so; they took the Trocadero, they occupied Cadiz, and then their difficulties began. They found the difficulty was not to advance but to withdraw. With this example before him he warned the noble Lord to be cautious in listening to the advice contained in that pamphlet. On these grounds he could not join in the eulogy which the hon. Member for Nottingham had passed on the measures and policy of the noble Lord.

Mr. R. Cutlar Ferguson

begged to explain. He had never justified the war in Spain on the ground of taking away the privileges of the Basque provinces. On the contrary, he admired the conduct of the people of those provinces. The war was found there, and was there encountered but it was never intended to make war against the privileges of the people. He certainly felt deep regret at seeing the blood of his countrymen shed for the support of the Spanish nation, unaided by the army of that nation.

Mr. Poulter

differed entirely from the views entertained by the noble Lord opposite, and protested against the term intervention being applied to the policy of the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. That term could be applied to those cases only where a state unappealed to interposed by its own authority in the concerns of another state. But what was the case here? Two constitutional governments, recognised as governments de facto and de jure, appealed to this country, in conjunction with France, in the most solemn manner, to afford their co-operation in working out the pacification of those two constitutional governments—Spain and Portugal. This the government of England had done honestly and bona fide; and if anything less had been done, it would have been an abandonment of the quadrupartite alliance. The noble Lord had argued in favour of some restriction being introduced upon this subject; but the noble Lord, before he could call for the adoption of any restriction, was bound to show that there existed some party capable of claiming the benefit of it. The British people, so far from calling for any restriction, most cordially supported the policy of the Government in granting naval assistance to Spain. Did the Spanish government complain that this country had given them a too generous assistance? What other party, then, could it be? The noble Lord (Lord Mahon) had thought proper to disclaim any right or interest on the part of Don Carlos: others, however, did not imitate the noble Lord. There were, then, behind the scenes, the friends of Don Carlos, whom they supposed to be entitled to the benefit of that restriction. But the rights of Don Carlos were utterly annihilated by the Quadruple Alliance. Don Carlos was either the sovereign of Spain, or he was nobody. He was aut Cæsar aut nullus. He was at the head of a national nuisance in Spain, and he trusted the Government would not cease their exertions till they had totally abated that nuisance. He deeply deplored what had taken place in Spain since the last prorogation of Parliament. They had seen a constitutional system stained with blood, one of the principles of that system being to prevent the shedding of blood. But they ought to look in common fairness at the causes which led to those misfortunes; they should remember the dismissal of Señor Mendizabal, a popular minister; the appointment of Isturitz in his place, a most unpopular minister; and the retaining of Cordova at the head of the army. These were circumstances which led to the re-establishment of the constitution of 1812, which he regarded more in the nature of a protest against the shameful intrigues of the administration than as evidence of any serious intention to adopt that form of government in all its objectionable features. This was proved by the fact, that when the modifications of that constitution were proposed they were adopted without a murmur. The French Government did all it could to foster and foment those lamentable intrigues which led to the establishment of that very constitution, and then took advantage of that circumstance to disband the troops which it had collected on the frontiers of Spain in compliance with the Quadruple Treaty. In adverting to the glorious achievement at Bilboa, he must congratulate the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on the very curious felicity which had attended him with regard to the gross inconsistency of those reproaches which had been made against him; for within four and twenty hours after his opponents had said of him that his policy was most trifling and most contemptible in the face of all Europe, they accused him of having proprio vigor relieved that important city, and dispersed the army of Don Carlos. What, meanwhile, had the French Government done? They had stopped in transitu a few barrels of gunpowder while crossing the Pyrenees. The duty of the French Government was to have hermetically sealed the Spanish frontier. But had the Quadruple Treaty been kept by all parties who had engaged in it? He had no hesitation in saying that the French Government had kept that treaty with punic faith, and nothing else. With respect to the constitution, the faults which attached to it were those which had continued from the old system of government in Spain. He had faith in the constitution of Spain, and he was satisfied that it was to that they must look for the real independence and improvement of the Spanish people. He would also observe, that if the Spanish people wished to make some atonement for the reproaches so justly cast on them for the proceedings in that war, he would recommend them to make a provision for the children of the unhappy and mistaken Quesada and others who had been sacrificed in the unfortunate outbreaks which had occurred.

Mr. Grove Price

could not help congratulating the noble Lord on the curious felicity of his foreign policy, which, at the same time, was a matter of reproach throughout Europe, and which had led to such results as had been described by the hon. Gentleman. Certainly in his opinion nothing could be more curiously felicitous than the compliment of the hon. Member. To proceed, however, to the subject-matter of debate. He felt in the first instance bound to declare that he was determined to support the cause of one whose title to the Crown of Spain was, in his mind, unquestionable, in spite of the language and vituperative expressions of the right hon. Member for Kirkcudbright. The character of the distinguished man to whom he had alluded had been most disgracefully slandered through the medium of the press and by means of libellous pamphlets. The right hon. Gentleman seemed only to have studied the character of Don Carlos through the press: he had evidently not made the law of succession in Spain a matter of enquiry, and notwithstanding this, the right hon. Gentleman had given his opinion as if he were the arbiter to decide between the various claimants to the Crown of Spain. He begged the right hon. Gentleman to suspend his judgment and to leave it to the country to determine who was the lawful heir according to the law and institutions of Spain, and that was all that he required. He could not, however, help expressing his surprise when he found that an hon. Gentleman disposed of the Crown of Spain without having quoted one word of any author that could be considered as a proper authority on the law of succession in that country. A pamphlet had been published within the last few days on the subject of Spain, which he would show before he sat down was one of the greatest tissues of absurdities and mistakes that had ever been set forth in this country. He acquitted the noble Lord of being the author of this pamphlet. It was one of the most fulsome and ridiculous strings of panegyrics on the noble Lord and the foreign policy of the Government as regarded Spain that had ever been published in this country, and therefore he would, on that ground alone, acquit the noble Lord of being its author. He knew, however, that it emanated from another quarter—from those who knew nothing of Spain except through the statements of those whose policy it was to deceive. He knew who had written this pamphlet. Certainly he should not name the author, but he would at once state that most assuredly it was not written by a statesman, or a man of any authority as regarded Spain, but by an underling in office, who received his instructions and information from a mentor in a higher station, but who, at the same time, was so ignorant of his subject, that, in almost every paragraph he made some egregious mistake, and who exaggerated to such an extent as to be the general laughing-stock of all who had read his production. In the first thirteen pages of this pamphlet he found not less than eight most absurd errors. He had not read the whole of it, as he had not time before he came down to the House, but he should call the attention of hon. Gentlemen to a few of those blunders that occurred in the early pages of it. The first statement to which he would allude respected two gentlemen, namely, Mr. Honan and Captain Henningsen. Within twenty-four hours of the publication of this pamphlet Mr. Honan challenged the writer to come forward and avow himself, and declared that the whole of the statement set forth was false as regarded himself. Captain Henningsen, an officer of high character and a gentleman of the utmost respectability, entered more fully into an examination of this pamphlet, and showed how little reliance was to be placed on it. In the first place it was stated that Zumalacarregui had sent a strong verbal message to Don Carlos, accompanying a dispatch that he had sent. Now, to this surprising statement. Captain Henningsen replied that Zumalacarregui never sent verbal messages with his dispatches, and that he never treated Don Carlos otherwise than with the greatest respect. Zumalacarregui was then charged with the horrid crime of ordering women and children to be shot. He never did so to either women or children. Captain Henningsen was with the Carlist army during the period specified by the author of the pamphlet as that when these alleged atrocities were committed; and he stated that there never were any executions of women and children. At the same time, however, he stated, that the children of Zomara, the Carlist General, having fallen into the hands of the Christinos, were, on their besieging a place, placed by them in the front ranks, that the first fire from the troops of the Carlist force under their father might destroy them. Captain Henningsen also stated that the infant child of Zumalacarregui, only nine months old, was seized by the monster Rodil, who solemnly declared that he would hold it as a hostage for the conduct of the father, and that its life depended on that conduct. The writer of this pamphlet also said that the news of his death was received with joy at the Court of Onate, and Don Carlos was congratulated by his courtiers upon being emancipated from the brutal despotism of his general. Now was it the fact that Don Carlos, if he did not rejoice, did not receive with regret the news of the death of this so-called austere chief? He had heard the scene described when Don Carlos went to visit Zumalacarregui on his death bed, and he was informed on undoubted authority, that that prince was most deeply affected, that he shed tears, and was torn away in an agony of suffering, and exclaimed, that he had lost the bravest and most loyal subject that monarch ever had. He did more; he broke through the most ancient law of Spain, and ennobled the females of the family of his brave General for ever. This he mentioned to show that Don Carlos was not that monster that he had been represented to be, and that the author of the pamphlet stood before Europe as guilty of the grossest and most infamous falsehoods. It might have been supposed that the author had read some works on the law of succession in Spain, but this evidently could not have been the case, for he confounded the law of succession of Philip of Anjou with the old Salique law of France, which had never existed in Spain. By the law of Philip the females of the royal family were provided for, but males always succeeded to the throne in preference to them as long as there were any males of the direct line; and on the failure of the latter, females could inherit it. By this law, then, the King of Naples would succeed to the Throne of Spain before Isabella, but the claim of Savoy was postponed to her claim. What, then, did the House think of a man who treated of the law of succession in Spain in the manner that he had described? He thought that he had done pretty well with that part of the subject. He had not thought that at his period of life he would have felt so much interest in a question as he did in that before the House. Every feeling and sympathy of his heart was mixed up in the cause; he had taken up the question from purely disinterested motives; and he had done so because he believed that the cause itself was just. He must beg the pardon and indulgence of the House for occupying so much time, but he had been almost forced to do that in consequence of the course pursued by the right hon. Gentleman, who spoke in a most authoritative manner, and as if he possessed a plenary power of papal authority on the subject of the succession to the throne of Spain. He should have been happy to have heard arguments instead of such statements as had been made by the right hon. Gentleman. Assertions he undoubtedly did hear, but nothing in the shape of argument. He had himself carefully looked into the law of succession in Spain. He had examined the old law with the aid of an able Spanish lawyer, and after turning over many learned works and voluminous documents, he came to the conclusion that there was no fixed law of descent, but that females as well as males inherited. The law, however, was made positive by Philip of Anjou, and it enacted that males should be preferred to females, provided they were direct descendants of Philip. The law of Spain could not be altered unless by consent of the Cortes, and also unless the subject-matter for the proposed new law was placed before the constituents who sent members to the Cortes, strengthened by the opinion of their constituents on the subject of the law, and unless this were done, the law was null and void. He stated this in reference to the alteration that was attempted in the law of succession by Charles4th. In 1789, when this was proposed, no such writ was issued to the constituents in directing them to choose the Cortes, but they were simply called upon to send representatives to pay homage to Ferdinand, then prince of the Asturias, and other matters which were not described. At that time both Ferdinand and Carlos were infants, and the king was anxious in case of their death to fix the settlement on his daughter, and therefore proposed a law for the abolition of that of Philip of Anjou, but it was necessarily informal in consequence of the defects in summoning the Cortes, as well as on other grounds. Under these circumstances the change then proposed could hardly be considered legal. The liberals who supported the cause of Queen Isabella, maintained that the ipse dixit of Ferdinand should set aside the ancient constitutional law of Spain. The will of Ferdinand, on the contrary, was a document which no one at all conversant with the laws of Spain and its monarchy could regard as valid for the purpose it was intended to effect; it was made in violation of every feeling of the Spanish people, and without those forms being observed which were indispensable to give it the force of law, even if its object had been one which came within the scope of the powers of the monarch. The people of Spain, if left to the free and unfettered exercise of their own judgment and inclination, would support Don Carlos. Every province, he was assured, would rise in arms for his cause, whenever a sufficient military force should appear in it, to protect the inhabitants, and to form the nucleus of an insurgent army. The right of Don Carlos to the throne was, in his opinion, indisputable; but this was a question to be decided by the Spaniards themselves, not by a mercenary band of foreign invaders. The noble Lord had endeavoured by his treaty of quadruple alliance to form a coalition of the great western Powers in opposition to the military empires of the north; but he thought the project likely to be signally unsuccessful. Portugal formed but a weak and inconsiderable state; Spain was bleeding at every pore, crushed by the policy of the noble Lord, and could not for a long time to come be expected to form an accession of strength; and France, the cherished of our bosom, had administered, in the speech delivered from the throne at the opening of the Chambers, the most bitter and sarcastic rebuke to British policy which any foreign power had ever dared to give. He lamented, deeply lamented, the course which the noble Lord had pursued towards Spain in authorising the enlistment of British troops in the service of that country. He admitted that the conduct of these auxiliaries had been marked in many instances by the spirit of daring enterprise and high-souled valour which characterized the British soldier; but he confessed that he entertained those old-fashioned English notions which taught that the man who shed blood, not in the cause of his country, or at the command of his king, but from misplaced and ill-directed activity, from the love of gain, from ambition, or curiosity to visit foreign countries, was not a man, but a murderer. He spoke not of those enthusiastic and high-minded spirits, who aspired to glory, dazzled by the splendour of military fame, and by the lustre of great achievements. Dangerous, he thought, was their moral position; but the man who heedlessly, and without an accurate knowledge of the grounds of quarrel, rushed into a contest, attracted more by a desire of spending his time abroad than by attachment to the principles of the cause which he was to support, was little better than an assassin; and the statesman who permitted it, had a deep and fearful crime to answer for. He was convinced that the present crude and rashly-formed constitution of Spain would soon fall to pieces by its own weakness; it contained within itself the seeds of dissolution, and would soon be replaced by intolerable anarchy, which would terminate by a union of all parties to restore to the throne of his ancestors the magnanimous and virtuous Don Carlos. [A laugh.] Perhaps those who laughed had no knowledge of him whom they ridiculed. He could assure them that this opinion of Don Carlos was formed, not solely from the testimony of his friends, but partly from that of his enemies. The leaders of his opponents at Madrid had acknowledged that his character was adorned by all the virtues of private life; and all that they alleged against him was, that he was a man of decided opinions, stern resolution, and dangerous to the liberal party. He must refer, in passing, to the story which had been got up by a female impostor, of an inquisitorial tribunal sitting in the city of London in support of Don Carlos; and to the monstrous insinuation that he himself (Mr. Price) presided over it. The noble Lord, the Secretary for the Home Department, had, however, credited this ridiculous rumour so far, as to cause the house which was indicated to be searched, to the great amusement of the police magistrates of the metropolis. As to the alleged anxiety of Don Carlos to re-establish the inquisition in Spain, who was now prime minister of Don Carlos? The bishop of Leon, who had spent his whole life in writing against it, and who had even obtained from his sovereign a decree for its abolition. Would any hon. Member deny that Don Carlos had consented to its abolition? [Mr. O'Connell, I deny it.] The hon. and learned Gentleman was, no doubt, an admirable judge, as he was acquainted with the bishop of Leon; and as the bishop of Leon knew him, he would only say, that if the hon. and learned Gentleman were supposed to be in the confidence of Don Carlos, or to share his councils, no English Protestant Gen- tleman would for a moment countenance the pretensions of that sovereign. He was fully convinced that these pretensions were founded in justice, and that they would ultimately prevail. History, he was sure, would honour the gallant soldiers who combated for their legitimate prince, and drew the sword in defence of the privileges which their native country had immemorially enjoyed, as it honoured the brave and self-devoted Highlanders of Scotland who upheld with romantic gallantry the standard of their ancient kings; as it honoured the chivalrous loyalists of La Vendee, who trampled on the banners of revolution. Their cause was just, and he prayed to God that it might be successful.

Viscount Palmerston

stated, that however he might differ from the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down—and differ from him he did—in every opinion that he expressed, and which could at all bear upon the subject then under discussion, yet he was still ready, and most happy to bear his testimony, that the opinions of the hon. Gentleman proceeded from feelings deeply implanted in his mind, that in his enthusiasm in promulgating these opinions he was perfectly sincere, and therefore entitled to the respect of all those who differed the most widely from him! The hon. Gentleman, he also felt bound to say, had paid great attention to the affairs of Spain, and had studied them deeply; and though he might differ from the hon. Gentleman as to the result of his inquiries, yet still he did justice to the attention which the hon. Gentleman had given to the subject. The hon. Gentleman had begun his speech by reviewing a pamphlet relating to the affairs of Spain. He admired the hon. Gentleman's review much.' It was certainly a better review than some that he had lately seen; it showed much more knowledge of the matter to be discussed, and it would have been better for the party who entertain the same views as the hon. Gentleman to have adopted his review of the subject instead of their own. The hon. Gentleman was quite right in saying, that he did not write that pamphlet. It certainly was a very able pamphlet, and he must say, that if he had written it, he should be proud to acknowledge it. He did not mean to follow the hon. Member through his review. The hon. Gentleman had gone into a dissertation upon the rights of Don Carlos, and he had favoured them with a history of the law of succession. The hon. Member was right in saying, that the Salique law, strictly so called, did not exist in Spain. By the law introduced by Philip, females were not eligible to succeed until all the male descendants of Philip had ceased to exist. Now, the hon. Member contended, that the recent change in the succession was not legally made. That was the point at issue. He apprehended, that in the change that was made, all the forms required by law had been gone through. It was made by the will of one King; it was sanctioned by the authority of the succeeding King; it was sanctioned by the Cortes, who were summoned by Ferdinand, and summoned expressly to give their sanction. It was sanctioned by their constituency, who were directly called upon to give their authority for that purpose. The change, then, was sanctioned in every manner, which the hon. Member contended to be necessary. The title of Isabella was recognised by the great majority of the Spanish nation, and by the Cortes of Spain. They, therefore, were entitled to look upon the title of Isabella as good. But that was a question which the House was not called upon to determine. That was a question which belonged to Spain, and not to Great Britain. They acknowledged Isabella as Queen de facto,—they acknowledged her to be Queen of Spain, just as the Government of the Duke of Wellington had acknowledged Louis Philippe to be King of France. The Government of the Duke of Wellington did not refuse to acknowledge Louis Philippe, because he was a king sprung from a revolution. They acknowledged the fact. It was, therefore, not for his Majesty's Ministers to discuss whether the claim of Carlos, is preferable to that of Isabella. It was not for them to adjudicate between the claims of the two parties. It was for them to act as another Government had acted, in the case of Charles the Tenth and Louis Philippe. All they did was to acknowledge the queen de facto; and, however good the arguments might be to show the superior claims of one person above another, they had nothing to do with them. What, then, was the Government to do with respect to Spain? They saw Isabella recognised. A change in the order of succession had taken place in Spain; it took place in perfect tranquillity—without disturbance, without resistance, and without violence. He apprehended, then, that the Government of England could not have done otherwise than acknowledge that order of succession which was thus established in Spain. He would next pass to the Quadruple Alliance. The hon. Gentleman stated, that they had endeavoured to found a Quadruple Alliance which would be a counterbalance to alliances between other powers. The hon. Gentleman stated, that that was a most unstable foundation, that Portugal was powerless, that they had reduced Spain to a miserable condition, and that they had no right to rely upon the steadiness of the alliance of France. He differed from him upon these points; for, although Portugal had hardly yet recovered from her struggle for free institutions, still she was a power, and, he took leave to say, a substantive power, in Europe. He said, too, that Spain, notwithstanding the confident predictions of the hon. Member, would become again what she had formerly been, and for a long time, a great and powerful state in Europe. The hon. Gentleman was facetious with respect to the alliance between France and England, and had assured the House that that alliance would be dissolved, and that the interests of the two countries would soon be found to conflict with each other. He could assure the hon. Member that he was exceedingly mistaken, that the alliance was one of interest between the two nations, and that it was certain long to continue. Whatever hopes, then, the hon. Member might found upon a separation of interests between the two countries, he could assure him, that they would prove to be exceedingly fallacious. The hon. Gentleman stated, that every province in Spain was ready to rise in favour of Don Carlos. The hon. Gentleman had made a similar declaration last Session, which events did not at all prove to be a true prophecy. Since that time, one of the most enterprising leaders of the Carlists, Gomez, had traversed the south of Spain, without producing any beneficial effects to his party, and without any such general rising having taken place as the hon. Member would teach them to expect. He believed that the present prediction of the hon. Gentleman would prove to be no better founded than that of the pre- ceding year. He said, that the Government would not last, that it would give way to some wild theories, and end in dismemberment or democratic confusion. Now if there were one thing more than another that authorised him in entertaining hopes with regard to Spain, it was the wisdom and the moderation exhibited by the Cortes, who were now sitting. The Cortes met under the most democratic auspices, and if its conduct were to be judged of by its origin, it might be supposed that it would have gone to considerable extremes; but the Cortes had proved itself on the contrary the most prudent, the most sensible, and the most right-minded assembly that ever yet met in Spain. He trusted that the result of the labours of the Cortes would be this— to combine with everything that was necessary to freedom, complete firmness, and strength, and to secure for the people that future happiness and rational liberty which all ought to desire, and which all on his side of the House did wish Spain to enjoy. It was curious to see the different reasons assigned by hon. Members opposite for the civil war then raging in Spain. The noble Lord who opened the debate declared that the people of the Basque provinces were contending for their privileges alone; but the hon. Gentleman, with more correct information on the subject, stated that they were fighting entirely for Don Carlos. The hon. Gentleman, said that the Carlist war arose before the question about privileges. It was therefore certain that the dispute was about the succession to the throne. An hon. Member reminded him that in the pamphlet of Captain Henningsen this was stated to be the cause of the war. If it were for their privileges that the people of the Basque provinces were contending, how did it happen that the great landowners of the country were for the Queen, and not for Don Carlos? If it was a mere question of privileges, how did it happen that the towns were for the Queen and not for Don Carlos? How did it happen, that Vittoria and Bilboa were upon the side of the Queen, if commercial privileges were at stake in which they must be more interested than the inhabitants of the mountains? Why was this? Because those privileges, they said, were of no value to them. The Basque provinces felt the advantages of those privileges when the rest of Spain was governed in an arbitrary and despotic manner; but when the rest of Spain became free, those privileges ceased to be of value to them. He knew that the inhabitants upon some former occasions had begged to be relieved from their privileges; for, however advantageous those privileges might be as to intercourse with other countries, yet still they separated the Basques from the rest of Spain, and made them as strangers and foreigners in their own country. However persons might feel a sympathy for men who were struggling for their ancient liberties, yet when they came to an examination of the real state of the case those sentiments must be altered, especially when it was recollected that they were men fighting against liberty, and not for it. The noble Lord had drawn a very beautiful description of the effects which liberty produced upon the Basque provinces—he had described comfort diffused amongst the population — villages secure — cottages smiling—hills covered with abundance— fields with plenty—roads in good order, and all different in appearance from the rest of Spain. But did the noble Lord investigate the causes that produced that contrast between the Basque provinces and the rest of Spain? If the noble Lord found those provinces so happy because they enjoyed a comparative state of liberty, why did he not feel anxious, as they on that side of the House did, to have the same benefits of liberty extended to the rest of the country? If the noble Lord was so fond of liberty in the abstract, why did he not. intercede with his party on behalf of privileges which were sought to be extended to his own country—why, if he were so anxious to benefit the Basque provinces, did he not intercede with his noble Friend, and follow up his own principles, by endeavouring to give municipal institutions to Ireland. Recollecting, as he did, that the noble Lord held an office of high confidence under the late Government, and that he had been connected with the foreign relations of the country, he confessed that it was not without regret that he had heard the noble Lord make the observations to which he had given utterance upon this question, because if the noble Lord's opinions were taken to be a true representation of those of the Administration of which he had been a Member, then there was to be found, as the pervading character of their thoughts and opinions, an indisposition to popular liberties, and a professed attachment to despotic and arbitrary Government. This was a feeling which persons would be sorry to think was entertained by the Government under which the noble Lord had acted, and which he should be sorry to believe would be likely to be acted upon by any Government to which the noble Lord hereafter might belong. The noble Lord had asked whether, under the treaty, the Government ought to have acted as they had done? The noble Lord had been for four months in office, he had acted under the treaty—he had furnished Spain with supplies of arms and ammunition; he had been liable, too, to be called upon under another article of that treaty, when the Queen of Spain required it, to give naval assistance. This, the noble Lord might have been called upon to do by the treaty; and it was calculated to excite especial wonder that the noble Lord did not seem to know the precise position in which the treaty placed England as to peace or war. But the noble Lord knew, as well as he did, that they were auxiliaries to the Queen of Spain, and not principals in the war. The noble Lord said that the original treaty was justifiable, but the additional articles were not. The original treaty, he said, contemplated assistance to Portugal in a civil war, but it did not contemplate assistance to Spain in such a case. Why, he would ask, did not the treaty as justly apply to Spain as to Portugal? It appeared to him, on the showing of the noble Lord, to be just as applicable to Spain as to Portugal. The treaty was concluded because there was a civil war in Portugal; and when the civil war was transferred to Spain, the same parties who took part with Portugal, by treaty, at an early period, were bound to extend its provisions to Spain. He denied that the treaty had so limited an object as the noble Lord contended for. Any one who looked at the preamble of the treaty would find that the object of it was the pacification of the Peninsula by the expulsion of the two Infants from it. Upon every principle they were bound to extend to Spain the operation of the articles of the treaty. By the articles of that treaty they engaged to supply arms and ammunition, and there was an article stipulating for naval co-operation. But then the noble Lord asked what was naval co-operation? His answer was that it mattered not how many marines or artillerymen were employed. The co-operation was strictly a naval one when the force employed, consisting chiefly of sailors and marines was under the command of naval officers, and depended upon their ships for protection and support as the basis of their operations. Any man who knew the history of the last war was aware that in many cases ships carried troops of the line, who acted as marines, and then, when there were occasions to employ the crews on shore, crews were so employed, with the same advantage to the cause in which they were engaged, and with the same distinction to themselves, as lately upon the northern coast of Spain. He contended, then, that there was nothing in the co-operation which England had given to the Government of Spain that was not demanded by the treaty by which this country was bound. The noble Lord said, that the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act was disgraceful to the Government of this country. Now, he took leave on the contrary to say, that it was highly honourable to the Government of this country. Examples of the same kind were to be found in the most brilliant and distinguished periods of the history of England. The age of Elizabeth, which Englishmen could hardly make light of, was full of instances of the precise kind of proceeding which the noble Lord complained of. That great and enlightened Sovereign frequently allowed her subjects to volunteer in support of the Huguenots in France and of the Protestants in the Low Countries; nay, even to interfere in the affairs of Scotland; and she acted wisely in so doing. He would repeat, that in his decided conviction, so far was the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act from being a just ground of complaint against the Government, it was a proceeding most wise and most honourable to the country. The noble Lord seemed to think that those of our countrymen who had engaged, in the contest in Spain, in consequence of the order in council alluded to, had not done so much as had been expected from them. He could not admit the justice of this imputation. The British auxiliaries on their arrival in Spain had had the most serious difficulties to contend with, and he would venture to say, that there was no instance of a body of men so circumstanced who had equally distinguished themselves. A body of seven or eight thousand men were thrown into a foreign country in the face of a superior, a disciplined, and organised force, and the manner in which they had conducted themselves under such circumstances appeared to him a proof of the most honourable zeal and exertion. They had eminently distinguished themselves on every occasion when they had had an opportunity of meeting the enemy, and he felt well assured that their future conduct would be equally gallant. The noble Lord said, how different were the proceedings in this case from those adopted by this country in the Peninsular war. The noble Lord should have considered how utterly different was that Peninsular war in its nature. The noble Lord asked, why had there not been sent out now, as then, a great general and a great army, instead of a small body of men acting in subordination to the Spanish force? Did the noble Lord see no difference between Napoleon and Don Carlos?—no difference between the force of the enemy in the former case and the force to be provided against in this instance. The noble Lord said, if we were to have war, let it be on a grand and effective scale; but if it were found, as was the case, that much good was done by a small force, and a slight expenditure, surely this was matter rather for praise than for blame. The noble Lord had adverted to statements made in the French Chamber, relative to communications which had passed between the two Governments of France and England on a former occasion. The circumstances were these:—In 1835 the French Government asked us whether we thought it expedient that they should send a large army into Spain, for the purpose of co-operating on a great scale with the queen, and the reply stated that, in the opinion of the English Government, it would be inexpedient to take such a step. In 1836 the English Government stated that it appeared to them that if France, without embarking in any operations of great magnitude, would advance the cordon of her troops then stationed on the Spanish frontier, to prevent any intercourse between the two countries, two or three marches into Spain, this proceeding would effectually answer the purpose which France was bound by the treaty to accomplish, and that the English Government considered it expedient that this should be done. This was what had been alluded to by the noble Lord, and it was a proceeding quite distinct in its nature from interference or co-operation, for it merely advanced the cordon of French troops a few marches into the Spanish territory without necessarily embarking them in any hostile operations. The noble Lord declared himself justified in imputing to the Ministers, and particularly to him, all the evils which would have arisen from this operation had it been carried into effect. He was therefore justified in claiming for himself from the noble Lord credit for all the advantages which he conscientiously believed would have resulted from the operation had it been undertaken, for he was well convinced that, had it been adopted, things would have been at this moment in a very different situation. The noble Lord had said, that the Government of this country was so fond of revolutions that it had given the co-operation of a naval force to support the revolution of La Granja; but it so happened that the naval force began its operations several months before that revolt took place. It could not be supposed that the Government of this country viewed with pleasure a military revolution producing such consequences as that of La Granja; but at the same time it could not be maintained that on account of that revolt we were to withdraw from the execution of our past engagements, and to break faith with the Queen of Spain. Because she had been unfortunately coerced by an insurrection of her own subjects, was she also to be abandoned by her allies? Had this view been adopted and acted upon by the British Government, then, indeed, would it have justly exposed itself to the censures of the noble Lord. And what was this insurrection, and to what did it owe its origin? Why it sprung from the discontent of the Spanish people at the prolongation of the war, from their seeing—or at least believing they saw— that they were not faithfully served by their government, and that the war was not carried on with sufficient vigour by that government. He firmly believed that had the government of Senor Isturitz possessed more of the confidence of the people in reference to the conduct of the war and to the interior management of the country, the insurrection of La Granja would never have taken place. But the House would observe that it was not that particular insurrection which decided the adoption of the constitution of 1812. For there had previously been serious movements in all the great towns in Spain. Further let him remark, that constitution had not practically been adopted by Spain as its permanent constitution. The Cortes assembled under it had applied themselves with great judgment, calmness, and prudence, to the labour of remodelling and modifying that constitution; and though, doubtless, the constitution finally determined upon would not be the estatu to real, neither would it be, in many particulars, the constitution of 1812. It was highly inconsistent on the part of the noble Lord, while claiming for the Government of which he was a Member the merit of faithfully and fully executing the engagements by which this country was bound, in the same breath to blame the present Government for doing that which it would have been incumbent even upon the Government of which the noble Lord formed a part to have done had it remained in office and really acted up to those engagements. The noble Lord asked what had we gained by the assistance we had given to Spain; for had not our merchants been insulted and our commerce impeded. Now, if the noble Lord had applied, his remark to the period when Ferdinand was on the throne of Spain, it would have been well-founded enough; for though we were then, as now, in alliance with Spain, not only were our merchants trading there exposed to the greatest vexations, and compelled to submit to exactions from which by treaty they should have been exempt, but our commercial vessels were piratically seized upon by the Guarda Costas, and confiscated by judges interested in the division of the spoil, without our merchants having the slightest practical chance of redress. He did not mean to say that cases of injury to our traders had not occurred since the time of Ferdinand, for a system of this sort, when once established, was not easily got rid of, and it was the misfortune of Spain that the orders of its government were not obeyed as they ought to be by the local authorities; but of this he was sure, that the number of these cases had become very greatly diminished, and that the complaints of our merchants were now fully attended to; as an instance of which he might mention, that not two months ago our Minister at Madrid had obtained for British subjects an exemption from the tax levied for the support of the war. These advantages, however, were small in comparison with those which we might confidently expect to enjoy when a constitutional government should be permanently established in Spain. When Spain should have become one of the constitutional states of Europe, there was not the slightest doubt but that in a very few years we should enjoy a greater intercourse with Spain than had ever hitherto existed, and very much greater than could possibly have been expected had a government such as that of Ferdinand continued. The noble Lord said, that the commerce of France and America obtained from Spain a protection not accorded to England. He denied this position: our commerce was equally protected with that of any other country. The noble Lord further complained that England had not the influence with Spain which she ought to possess. This was a favourite topic with the opponents of Government. What did the noble Lord mean when he talked of our influence with foreign countries? Did he mean by "influence" the power of dismissing one minister of a foreign country by underhanded intrigues, and of substituting another by means equally discreditable? If that were the kind of influence contemplated by the noble Lord, he was happy to assure the noble Lord that the present Government of this country exercised no such influence over foreign governments. It was a species of influence, indeed, which he trusted no former Government had exercised. But if by influence the noble Lord meant respect for the English nation, readiness to redress any injury which might be complained of, continued acts of kindness, that was a species of influence which England had to the fullest extent with Spain; and the noble Lord had but to look at the papers to assure himself that, as far as good feeling and true respect went, our influence with Spain, was as great as any man could wish it to be. The noble Lord had asked whether the assistance afforded by England had been of any assistance to the liberties of Spain? This was a question satisfactorily answered in the deep gratitude which every good Spaniard felt to England for having granted that assistance. The noble Lord complained that the English forces were in Spain in a subordinate capacity. For his part, it appeared to him far best that the British forces in Spain should act in a subordinate capacity, for it was most desirable, if liberal principles and the cause of Isabella, were to be triumphant, that that success should be mainly the result of Spanish exertions; and that, if a constitutional government were to be established, it should not have the character of being imposed on the Spanish people by the forces of a foreign power. It was with this feeling that it had been determined by Government to confine its assistance to a naval force, because this was a species of force which could not exercise any interference in the interior of the country. A disputed succession had always been among European nations considered a matter not merely involving the interests of the particular kingdom, but also a question of general interest. In this case England had not interfered in the internal affairs of Spain, in the ordinary sense of the word, nor for the purpose of imposing on the Spanish people a government or constitution which they had not themselves adopted. The interference here was not of that kind which it was apprehended that the government of 1830 was about to exercise in Belgium, for the purpose of preventing the Belgians by an overwhelming force, from assuming that political condition which they were desirous of acquiring. It was a fact that the question who should be sovereign of Spain was one seriously involving European interests, as determining what should be the foreign tendencies, and who the foreign allies, of Spain. In former periods Spain had been connected with different countries; at one time with Austria at another time with France; the object was, that for the future there should be neither an Austrian Spain nor a French Spain, but a Spain which should be Spanish; and it appeared to him that those who did not regard this object as one of the highest importance, took but a very short-sighted view of the true interests of England and of Europe. If Spain was to be considered important in the balance of power, it was for the interest of Europe that she should be rich and independent. It was clear that under a government such as that which existed in the time of Ferdinand, Spain could not be rich, powerful, and independent. The noble Lord had stated, that the degradation which had fallen on Spain had been induced by the long continuance of arbitrary government, and he quoted this as a reason why it was vain for us to think that by any assistance which we might be able to offer, Spain could be retrieved from the abasement into which she had fallen, and regenerated as a distinct power which should be an ally of this country. He by no means despaired of seeing such a result accomplished. He saw a great progress made already towards its accomplishment; and he could tell the noble Lord that if Spain should establish herself as a free and constitutional government, and if she should be, substantially independent, then we should find her useful to the great interests of Europe in maintaining the balance of power; and a valuable friend of England with respect to our commercial relations. He could not help expressing his regret that Gentlemen on the other side of the House should, in all views of our foreign policy, seem to sympathise with arbitrary and despotic governments, that they should consider as extraordinary every endeavour to establish freedom, and that they should condemn those individuals who would afford any moral aid or give any co-operation to assist foreign nations in reforming their governments. Who was it that continued to favour Dom Miguel up to the last moment when it was possible to hope for his success? They stated, themselves, that Dom Miguel was a usurper, but cherished him because he was a despot. There was not one of the Gentlemen opposite that would venture to acknowledge in his seat that he respected Don Carlos. And yet they wished for his success. And why wtts it? Was it because he, too, would be an usurper if he could? He did not believe that this was the reason. Was it, then, because Don Carlos in his modest retirement—that expression seemed to give great satisfaction to the hon. Member for Sand-which—was it because in his modest retirement in Biscay, where he had remained for the space of three years, he had done no one thing that would hand down his name in history, except issuing the assassination decree of Durango? Was that the reason why Don Carlos was especially supported by the Gentlemen on the opposite side of the House? He did not believe it. He was sure that those hon. Gentlemen were as much disgusted as they said they were at that abominable proceed- ing, a proceeding which, he must be allowed to say, was not, as was sometimes represented, a dead letter, for it was only a fortnight ago that four British subjects were most barbarously murdered under that decree. Yes; four men of the British legion, who had wandered from their quarters, unarmed and defenceless, were surprised by a party of Car-lists, and shot within four and twenty hours. He must, however, state, and he hoped it was true, that, to the honour of the Carlist army, but to the disgrace and dishonour of the chiefs of that army, the two officers who commanded the Carlist detachment, and who, after much difficulty, had succeeded in persuading the men to execute this bloody murder—these two officers were compelled by the general indignation of the troops to go away to Bayonne, and to quit the army in which they had been guilty of such butchery. He did not believe that it was on this account—he should be ashamed to suppose that it was from any feeling in favour of Don Carlos—no, they opposed the endeavours of the government, because they strove to improve Spain by supporting the establishment of liberal and popular institutions. He called up on the people of England to look at the proceedings and opinions of the two sides of the House. If the people of England wished to know the opinions, the real sentiments of men in that House, let them look at their foreign policy. Gentlemen well knew that there were many circumstances which controlled sometimes the opinions and sentiments of parties, with respect to home politics, and compelled them to do things that they did not wish. Of this there were many examples, and none more so than the conduct of the Gentlemen opposite when last in power. They were then compelled to do many things they disliked, and if they had remained in office they would have been forced to do many more. When he saw Gentlemen on the other side of the House espousing the cause of the man who is endeavouring lo withhold the benefit of free institutions from Spain, he must say that he looked with a little distrust and caution at the assurances they gave of their extreme readiness to contribute towards doing away with ever-y proved abuse that existed in their own country. When he found those Gentlemen supporting that Prince who, as was believed by all Europe, intended to establish the Inquisition as soon as he should arrive at Madrid: what, could he think of the anti-Catholic cry which, on every occasion, they were ready to raise? Was this conduct, to say the least of it, consistent? The Ministers had been accused of favouring revolution. That accusation was entirely unfounded and unjust. They had", indeed, given their moral support to the Spanish nation, which was endeavouring, of its own accord, to improve its institutions, and to imitate the proud example of this country, by obtaining the inestimable privilege of a representative Government. They had given Spain that support which, they were bound to give, during the period they had had the honour of administering the affairs of this country: the principle of rational liberty had made great progress in the different countries of Europe; and this country had given its support to that principle. They might boast of the emancipation of the Greeks; for though another Administration had had a share in the arrangements, the present Administration had brought them to a conclusion. They might boast, that during the period they had been responsible for the conduct of the affairs of this country the people of Belgium had become free, independent, prosperous, and tranquil. That Portugal, which had been even worse governed than Spain, whose great natural resources were entirely crushed and rendered unavailing by a long continued system of misgovernment—that Portugal had at last established a free constitution, and was ready to profit, by her alliance with this country and Spain. Notwithstanding the discouraging prediction of the hon. Member for Sandwich, he might be allowed to hope that Spain might yet follow the example set by Belgium and Portugal, and that she might become, with the assistance of England, what she was in former times, a great and powerful member of the European community; and if she should do so, it would be, not from a system of revolution and anarchy but by regenerating her ancient institutions, modified by the altered state of society in the present times: and if in any degree, however humble, he should be instrumental in this great work, notwithstanding the taunts to which he had been exposed, and notwithstanding the condemnation of the noble Lord (Mahon) and the hon. Gentlemen on the opposite side of the House—if he could claim any part, however humble, in such a triumph he should feel it a high honour, and should find in it a source of proud satisfaction to the latest hour of his life.

Sir Robert Peel

said, that the noble Lord had, on this occasion, pursued the course which he could say, from experience, the noble Lord had uniformly pursued, and with the same result, whenever the foreign policy of this country was brought under consideration. After having spent three-quarters of an hour defending his policy, and having put one-half of his supporters in a comfortable state of repose, and not having gained from the other half a single sympathetic cheer in favour of his acts, he then found it necessary to disturb the somnolency of some and to excite the enthusiasm of others, by imputing to his opponents a participation in the love of despotism, as if it were necessary to be partisans of Don Carlos because they disapproved of the policy of the noble Lord— as if it were not possible to entertain a doubt about the justice of the noble Lord's acts, and the result of his foreign policy, without, at the same time, wishing to check the career of improvement in Spain, and to blast her hopes of acquiring settled and constitutional institutions. He, for one, openly disavowed all participation in the principles, or sympathy with the cause of Don Carlos. He was only repeating language he had emphatically used before. If he acted in the fulfilment of a treaty, by which the Queen of Spain was recognised as the ally of this country, was it necessary to claim credit for not entering into any secret artifice for the purpose of preventing her success? He would not say that the objects of British policy would be advanced by the success of Don Carlos. He begged to state also, distinctly, that he wished to see Spain enjoy settled liberties, and that under such institutions as may be most conducive to her happiness, and best calculated by their slow progress to establish her settled freedom. But, while he entertained these opinions, at the same time, he must tell the House that he believed that our policy was defeating the cause of improvement—defeating it by our meddling and interference, and our deserting the principle of our support, namely, the principle of non-intervention; and by our having taken a course neither calculated to raise the character of England, nor to acquire the affections of Spain. The noble Lord had twice intimated that his noble Friend had regretted the gloomy prospects of despotism. His noble Friend had expressed no such regret. Had not the noble Lord himself, at the conclusion of his speech, stated that his noble Friend had declared that Spain had been reduced to the state of degradation into which it had fallen by the long continuance of arbitrary government? The noble Lord had twice repeated this passage in his noble Friend's speech. How then could the noble Lord feel regret at the partiality manifested by his noble Friend for despotism? The noble Lord had told them what were the objects of the Quadruple Treaty; he would like to hear the noble Lord declare whether the objects of that treaty had been fulfilled. At the same time, he must again repeat that that treaty having been ratified, must, in his opinion, be fulfilled; and that not only in the letter but in the spirit. But he must say, that it was competent for him to entertain different opinions from the noble Lord as to the original policy of that treaty. The noble Lord had told the House that the objects of that treaty were four or five in number. The first was to protect the interest of our commerce in the Peninsula. He would ask the noble Lord how far had he succeeded in that object? The noble Lord had stated, that the British merchants in Spain were all satisfaction. The noble Lord would have an opportunity of giving a distinct opinion on that head very shortly, as he believed that an hon. Friend of his intended to bring under the notice of the House, in a separate discussion, apart from politics, the present state of our commerce in Spain. Did the noble Lord mean to say, apart from the complaints of our merchants, that the general policy of Spain towards this country was favourable? Did the noble Lord mean to say, that the feelings of the inhabitants of the Peninsula had been improved very much towards this country? Look to Portugal. Did the noble Lord pride himself on our commercial prosperity there? Since the establishment of the noble Lord's free institutions in Portugal, since the triumph of the cause of Donna Maria, did the noble Lord mean to say, that the trade of this country had been put on a more favourable footing? There had been universal complaints on the part of the merchants of this country of the hostility manifested towards the commerce of England. The original object of the Quadruple Treaty was to furnish naval aid for the purpose of effecting a blockade. It was discovered that they had no right to establish a blockade, that it was against the law of nations. The aid to be afforded to Spain was simply naval aid; but how could the noble Lord reconcile with the treaty the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act, by which 10,000 of our own forces were sent to the armies of the Queen of Spain. They had afforded, therefore, military aid—but to one of the belligerent parties only. These forces were nominally in the pay of the Queen of Spain if they received any; but did not this country supply them with arms, ammunition, &c.? The noble Lord wanted to establish free institutions in Spain. Was the noble Lord delighted with the institutions he had established in Portugal? The noble Lord had afforded his moral aid as far as he could go. If the noble Lord was satisfied, what was the object of having six sail of the line in the Tagus? Was it to protect British merchants? There was an example of the prepossession in favour of the English name in Portugal. This was the affection and love which Portugal bore to the British name! In consequence of our former interference six sail of the line were requisite in order to protect the persons and property of British merchants. Another object of the noble Lord was the pacification of the Peninsula. Had the noble Lord succeeded in this object? No man of truth could assert at that moment that Spain was in a better state with respect to internal pacification than before we interfered at all. The noble Lord spoke of the horrors committed by Don Carlos, and of the application of the Durango decree to British soldiers; and he had introduced it for the purpose of eliciting a cheer from his own side of the House. Why did not the noble Lord inquire into the details of the abominations that had been committed on the other side? Why did he not mention the murder of the mother of Cabrera? He asked the noble Lord, and the House, whether these scenes were not the result of the noble Lord's own policy? He asked the noble Lord whether any man could rejoice in such abominable and sanguinary excesses? The noble Lord said, the object of our intervention in Spain was for the purpose of giving Spain an established and settled form of government. Had Spain, in consequence of our intervention, a greater prospect of obtaining established, settled, and permanent institutions. The noble Lord had talked of the universal respect entertained for the British name. Did the noble Lord mean to say, that the people of Spain cordially co-operated with General Evans? Had they not shown a manifest jealousy of the gallant troops of England? Had they not shown a manifest reluctance at their triumphs, and an aversion that her institutions should be established by their means? Their interference had been attended with no good result in Spain up to this moment, and had not in the slightest degree tended to the establishment of a settled form of government in that country. The noble Lord said, that our past policy had been most wise; that by confining our exertions to naval assistance, we had rescued ourselves from the risk of mixing this country up in the civil contests of Spain. If this were the opinion of the noble Lord, it was not the opinion of the author of this pamphlet on the affairs of Spain, of which the noble Lord, though he said he was not the author of it, at the same time avowed that he adopted all its sentiments. According to the policy of this writer, whose fame the noble Lord envied so much, as expressed in the concluding paragraph of this pamphlet, which would now derive additional weight and importance from the opinion expressed upon it by the noble Lord—according to the concluding paragraph of this pamphlet, the author appeared to be so distrustful of the success of our naval co-operation that he said— "A few troops sent to Spain, to which Spanish divisions would be attached, and a guarantee of a loan for which ample security would be given to us, are all that is wanted to make Spain tranquil, and England even more honoured and respected than she already is." Naval co-operation, it appeared then, was not sufficient; it was not so wise as the noble Lord had described it. If the noble Lord would but consult this pamphlet, of which he wished he was the author, he would find that a few troops, not acting by virtue of the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act, but marching under the flag of England, were required to form the nucleus of the Spanish army, and a loan for which England was to be the guarantee, in order to accomplish the tranquillity of Spain. The writer of this pamphlet then proceeded to observe: "We repeat the hope that such a measure may be proposed by the Government to Parliament, or by Parliament to the Government, and, that it may be executed with the energy and determination that should always characterize the policy of England." The noble Lord was of course waiting till this loan and this military co-operation were forced upon him by Parliament. He fancied that the noble Lord would have to wait a very long time before such would be the case; and if the noble Lord, tired of waiting, were, proprio vigore, to make such a proposition to Parliament, which had shown itself unwilling to originate the measure—if the noble Lord did so, he thought he could venture to assure him that, the same congratulations which he had to-night heard from the hon. Member for Shaftesbury, the same curiosa felicitas which had distinguished his labours on the present occasion, would attend him when he made his proposition for a levy of 10,000 men, and a large loan upon our guarantee. The noble Lord said, that one object of the Quadripartite Treaty was to consolidate and cement our alliance with France. He should rather gather from the language of the noble Lord tonight that this great and paramount object had not been altogether attained by it. The noble Lord further asserted, that our alliance with France was founded upon a consideration of mutual interests and an identity of institutions. [Mr. C. Wood, "He said nothing about that."] The hon. Gentleman declared that the noble Lord had said nothing about it. He feared that the Secretary for the Admiralty had been visited by that fit of somnolency to which he had already alluded during great part of the noble Lord's speech, reflecting, probably, that the estimates were the proper subject of debate, and that all the various topics which had sprung up on the occasion had very little to do with the matter. He begged to assure the hon. Member, however, that the hon. Gentleman was wrong. The noble Lord did state that an intimate alliance subsisted between the people of England and of France, founded upon institutions of a similar character and an identity of interests. He agreed in the hope expressed by the noble Lord. He sincerely trusted that the good understanding between England and France might be founded upon an intimate and sound feeling of good will and mutual interest. He did hope that the national jealousies which had so long subsisted between the people of these two countries were daily vanishing under the genial influence of a better knowledge of each other's character, and a proper regard for their respective commercial advantages. He believed that a good understanding with France was a matter of very great importance to this country, and he should be glad to see it promoted by every means in our power. But he did not think that with a view to confirm this friendly understanding it was necessary to adopt a treaty, binding this country to interfere in the affairs of Spain. There was some reason to fear that the treaty had not been religiously adhered to. At least there was, he must say, an extraordinary absence of all mention of the cooperation of France in the Speech of his Majesty at the opening of Parliament, while, on the other hand, there was a paragraph in the Speech of the King of the French, at the opening of the Chambers in Paris, which, without being intended to cast the least stigma upon our policy, certainly pointed in unequivocal terms to the inexpediency of any nation permitting its subjects to appear as soldiers in another country under any other colours than its own. That paragraph, to say the least of it, was calculated to awaken some unpleasant reflections in the minds of all Englishmen who read it; and added lo the marked silence of all mention of our good understanding with France in the Speech of his Britannic Majesty, and the strong terms of reproach on the conduct of the French government in respect to that treaty contained in this pamphlet, of which the noble Lord wished so much he had been the author; all these circumstances, taken into consideration, must lead one to the unwelcome suspicion, that, as far as our good understanding with France was concerned, this Quadruple Treaty had not been quite so successful as had been anticipated. He did not concur with those who complained of the conduct of France in this affair, or think that there was any just grounds of complaint against France for having violated the obligations which she took upon herself by that treaty. When the noble Lord proposed to France that she should march into Spain and occupy certain parts of that country, the noble Lord might argue that that did not amount to a co-operation with Spain; he might call it translimitation, or any other name be pleased; but he was rejoiced that France had not taken the noble Lord's advice, and had refused to march into Spain as the noble Lord desired. He rejoiced at it because the experience of all history, and that of Spain in particular, taught them that though France might march into the Spanish territories, and by so doing succeed in producing a temporary adjustment of hostilities, that adjustment could only be temporary, and would not end in the permanent establishment of good and independent government. That, however, was the object they ought to have in view—not such a system of government as they might fancy abstractedly the best, but such as might best suit the character and manners of the Spanish people. He wished to see as little despotism enter into the scheme of such a government, and as much liberty as the genius of the people would allow of; and, in fact, that the result should be to lay the foundations of liberty, concord and order. What he, (Sir Robert Peel) doubted was, whether this desirable consummation was likely to be attained by this treaty, which bound England to a certain line of policy; and least of all had he expected such a course to have been espoused by the noble Lord opposite, who had so frequently lauded the principle of non-intervention in that House. He thought it had been clearly laid down by Mr. Fox and all the other Whig authorities, that whatever might be our advantages in trade or our own domestic policy, we were not to attempt to impose them upon other countries, but to leave other people to judge what institutions were most congenial to their circumstances. He believed that this principle was a wise one, subject of course to certain exceptions. In Portugal, for instance, from our peculiar commercial arrangements with that country, and by our treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with her, we were bound to defend her from foreign attack; but even this arrangement gave us no right to interfere in the internal policy of that country. But with Spain we had no such treaty, and certainly had no right to interfere there in a question of succession to the crown. It might be very true that the inhabitants of the Basque "provinces were very unwise in choosing to retain their peculiar privileges to the exclusion of the rest of Spain; it might be desirable that they should entertain the same doc- trines on the subject of free trade as the right hon. President of the Board of Trade; but that was no reason why we should make war upon them. It was from no mercenary views that they rallied round the standard of him whom they conceived to be their legitimate sovereign, and every one must regret the obstacles which such conduct threw in the way of the peaceful settlement of Spain, he (Sir Robert Peel) must still regret, that foreigners and particularly countrymen of his should be engaged in destroying men who were acting upon conscientious motives, and in the discharge of what they conceived to be their duty. He did not believe that from a force so employed any ultimate good could result. If Spain was divided between two parties, the one perfectly contemptible in numbers, and occupying but a few square leagues, as was alleged, why could not the Queen's government by her own exertions establish its power? The noble Lord admitted that Gomez marched all through Spain, and that he met with no insurrection; but the noble Lord said he found no support. The noble Lord said, that when Don Carlos kept to the mountains he was secure, but when he ventured into the plains he was to be crushed at once; but Gomez had marched through the whole of Spain; and this was urged by the noble Lord as an argument that Spain was in favour of the Queen. Either he must think that Gomez was gifted with a military genius amounting almost to inspiration; or else, which seemed probable, he must have found efficient aid in some lurking attachment to the cause to which he was engaged. Be this as it might, either one party greatly preponderated over the other, or were pretending, in the language of churchwardens, "to abate a nuisance" in Spain. But we were first to determine what was a nuisance? And when we had done that, would the noble Lord state one reason why England should put itself forward to abate a nuisance in Spain? But if it were, a mere nuisance,—not a civil war, but something in the nature of one, —why could not the government of the Queen of Spain, with the good will, according to the noble Lord, of all the great towns and all the landed proprietors of the country in its favour,— why could not the government in possession put it down? Or would the noble Lord account for this phenomenon—would he tell the House how it was that 10,000,000 Spaniards did not rally, and, by a single effort crush the "rebel force" of 30,000 men? His noble Friend (Lord Mahon) had very sensibly asked how it happened, that, out of that army of 30,000 men, 313,000 should have been returned, on the authority of the Spanish government, as the number of the Carlists killed? He would tell his noble Friend why this was so. It was because this country had already supplied 313,000 muskets; and that was the precise number as he would find by the printed return,—and it was probably deemed but a decent compliment to give the credit of one death to each British musket. However, if the fact were, as they on that side of the House concluded, that Spain was at present unequally divided between two principal parties, one of which could not overcome the other except by assistance from Great Britain, of arms, and men, and military stores; he said, that the history of all European countries—but that of Spain in particular—led him to entertain the apprehension, that, although our arms might establish a temporary peace in Spain —although by the moral aid and joint political exertions of France and England, they might put down Don Carlos, and sweep the provinces of Navarre and Biscay of all the irregular troops which now occupied them, they would never by such means, establish permanent tranquillity in that country. He entertained, he repeated, the most serious apprehension, that the government which was to succeed, founded as it would be on the intervention of foreign bayonets, would not, in the end, lead to so settled and permanent an establishment—would not give such lasting securities for the preservation of liberty and order, as it would have combined if England had permitted these parties—relying on their own energies, and not taught to repose a false confidence in foreign interference and our assistance to settle their own disputes, and if England had allowed their government a period of twelve months to take root in its own soil, in the affections of its own people, without any attempt at intervention. In that case the stability of such a Government being founded upon the efforts, and sanctioned by the attachment of the people, would have supplied far greater security for liberty, and peace, and order, than any foreign intervention could ever afford.

Mr. O'Connell

begged the House to spare him a few moments, and he would express his opinions as shortly as possible. The debate had wandered a good deal from the subject since the speech which had opened it, great part of which was taken up in discussing the nautical alliance. The right hon. Member for Tamworth rebutted the charge of having taken any part in the intervention carried on in Spain, and above all boasted of giving no countenance to Don Carlos. If the fact were so, the right hon. Gentleman gave a sentence of condemnation to many of his Friends, whose love for Don Carlos was open and undisguised. The right hon. Baronet, in the speech which he had just made, had thrown Don Carlos entirely overboard, and yet he was cheered in so doing by hon. Members whose love for that individual was such, that their desire to vindicate the purity of his character was the main cause of the present debate. The noble Lord, however, who began the debate had answered himself on many points; but he could not understand how it was that he should protest against intervention in the one case, and justify it in another. The hon. Member for Dover spoke of his love of monarchy as the origin of his interest in Don Carlos, and although the noble Lord, who opened the debate, praised the gallantry of the Spanish troops in former wars, and declared that they stood in no need of assistance from the Duke of Wellington, he did not think that the right hon. Baronet who last spoke acquiesced in that view of the case. The right hon. Baronet was perfectly silent on the subject of Belgium, which had grown and prospered under the principles of the present Administration. Portugal he did mention; but did he say anything of supporting the liberties of that country? No, there he was silent. But after all what was the great matter of regret? Was it the cruelty practised in this cruel warfare? All ought to combine to put an end to such outrages on both sides; they ought to regret the duration of the contest, and use every means to bring such cruel scenes to a close. The hon. Member for Sandwich dilated on the cruelties committed by the Christinos, forgetting the cruelties committed on the other side. He called to mind the atrocities committed at Barcelona, forgetting that 170 citizens had been flung from the top of a tower by the Carlists, and those who had still had life in them were stabbed to death. That was conduct which well entitled the hon. Member for Sandwich to display his enthusiasm for Don Carlos. He called to mind the execution of Cabrera's mother—a crime for which the memory of Mina ought ever to be held in detestation. But what did Cabrera do in revenge? He murdered thirty innocent women; and whatever might be the virtues of his mother this deed of cruelty proved that she was capable of producing a monster, and this monster was still in the service of his master—of that Don Carlos eulogised in a British Parliament, and whose walls were polluted with the praises of the master of Cabrera. The conduct of Zumalacarregui was no less atrocious. On one occasion he ordered a number of men who attempted to escape, to be shot, but he was told the reports of the muskets might alarm the Christinos who were in the neighbourhood. "Then (said he) put them to death with the bayonet;" and by the orders of the monster they were bayonetted; yet there were men who wept in tears over the death of such a monster. Oh! let it not go forth that in a British House of Commons the man should be eulogised who had been guilty of such barbarous cruelties. He did not blame his followers, so much as he blamed those who, in a set speech, displayed their enthusiasm for that barbarous chief. But there was another remarkable case, the murder of a young lieutenant who had fallen into the hands of Zumalacarreguy; that leader wished to spare him, but he received an order from Don Carlos to shoot him in a few minutes, and in half an hour he was shot by order of Don Carlos, and that was the man praised in a British House of Commons, that was the blood-stained monster who, however little title he had "would wade through slaughter to a throne." And were they to submit to a solemn speech of an hour's length, gravely dedicated to such a purpose? All were degraded who listened to such a speech. And whose fault was it that these atrocities were not put an end to? That despicable politician, the accidental King of the French—he who had no claims to legitimacy—he who was put on the throne by a revolt, and who had profaned that throne by trampling down the liberties of the people, and abolishing two of the constitutional rights on which his throne was established, and which were guaranteed by treaty—the freedom of the press, and trial by jury,— that was the man who prevented the termination of this unholy contest, and who, by his despotic conduct, showed that he was both treacherous to his Friends and useful to his enemies. He had not the manliness to take part with Don Carlos openly, he did it covertly. He signified through his minister, that if the coast were well guarded by British ships, the supplies of the Carlists would be stopped but he did not prevent them from passing the frontier of France. He sent troops to the foot of the Pyrenees—troops well armed and well disciplined, under pretence of sending them against Don Carlos. Did he order them to march against him? No—he ordered them to be disbanded, and they walked over the frontier and joined Don Carlos. If the King of the French had acted openly and manfully, he would not have blamed him; but he had the meanness to profess to assist the Queen, while his real object was to assist Don Carlos. But Louis Philippe was playing a double game, full of danger to himself— and any danger to him he should not regret—his regret was, that by any great convulsion in that country, a brave people should, by his despotic conduct, be driven into another revolution which might disturb the social state of all the kingdoms of Europe. But the hon. Member for Sandwich endeavoured to justify his enthusiasm for the cause, by saying that Don Carlos was a sincere Catholic and the Bishop of Leon was against the inquisition, and in the course of his remarks he had charged him with having paid his court to Don Carlos.

Mr. Grove Price

What I said was— Has not the hon. and learned Member had an interview with Don Carlos?

Mr. O'Connell

I never visited Don Carlos. I never saw him in my life. I saw the Bishop of Leon—and how? He wished me to call on him, and I declined. He then said he would call on me, and he did call, with an interpreter, who had only one fault as an interpreter, he knew neither Spanish nor English. The Bishop knew nothing of French, and be endeavoured to converse in Latin; but owing to the Spanish tone in which he pronounced the words, I could understand very little of what he said, and remember only the words religionem Catholicam et purgatorium. Well, I was asked to return the visit. I did not return it; but the bishop visited me again, and I certainly did everything to get rid of him as soon as possible, but not half so soon as I wished, and that was all the correspondence I had with the court and camp of Don Carlos. The hon. Member for Sandwich (continued Mr. Connell) in his enthusiasm for Don Carlos and the Bishop of Leon, boasted that they were both hostile to the inquisition. Now, what was the fact? Ferdinand, as well as Don Carlos, never gave up the idea of the inquisition. Ferdinand applied to three popes to get their sanction, and three popes successively refused, and they had the right of refusing, because the inquisition is a lay tribunal, and the pope could prevent any ecclesiastic from officiating; that was a fact which should excite the enthusiasm of the hon. Member, not for Don Carlos, but for the pope. In short, Don Carlos assumed the mask of great solemnity and regard for religion, and the hon. Member argued, that because he was so good a Catholic, the crimes which had been committed against the Christinos could not have been sanctioned by him. But had not the hon. Member heard only the other day, that four Englishmen, who had strayed out of their course, had been shot by order of Don Carlos? And yet an Englishman could talk of his enthusiasm for Don Carlos! Shame on such enthusiasm, and shame that it should go abroad that such things were praised amongst us! Some Gentlemen took great interest in the success of Don Carlos, the sincere Catholic in Spain, but refused justice to Irishmen because they are Roman Catholics; and why did they support the one and oppose the other? He would do them the justice to say they did it not out of love for Catholicism in Spain, but out of love for despotism. The hon. Member for Sandwich argued in favour of the right of Don Carlos to the throne, and contended that his title was beyond all doubt. Now nothing could be more unfounded. The Salic law was not originally the law of succession in Spain. The house of Austria founded its claim to the throne of Spain through the line of female succession. Philip of Anjou mounted the throne in the right of his mother, and Isabella was succeeded by Joanna. In 1713, Philip of Anjou abrogated the old law, and how? He did not summon the Cortes to decide the question, but he sent round circulars calling on them to give their votes for or against changing the line of succession. They did so, and how did the Monarch prove that they were in favour of his proposition? Why, by burning all the letters sent by the members of the Cortes. That was the origin of the Salic law in Spain, and compare that with the origin of the law which excludes Don Carlos from the throne. The female line of succession was sanctioned by the Cortes at various periods—it was sanctioned by the Cortes in 1812—it was sanctioned a short time before the death of Ferdinand—it was sanctioned by the last Cortes, and yet on such a title as that on which Don Carlos founds his claims he was to be justified in committing murder. The Kings of Spain were called the sons of the Church, and how did they treat that Church? Ferdinand during his reign, mulcted the Clergy of Spain 75 per cent. on their ecclesiastical revenues. That was the advantage of having the Church connected with the state—a connection which should be dissolved in every country for the purity of one and security of the other. In conclusion he would only say, that whether Don Carlos was Catholic, Presbyterian, or Protestant, he was not a good Christian.

Viscount Sandon

said, the hon. Member had complained of the kings of Spain for taking from the clergy seventy-five per cent. out of their incomes; but was there not a country nearer than Spain where the clergy were deprived of a great portion of their incomes, and reduced to the greatest distress, by the endeavours of the hon. and learned Member? Let him not throw all the blame of the atrocities of the Spanish war on Don Carlos, or ask in a triumphant tone why had not these instruments of cruelty been dismissed by Don Carlos? Had the Christino leaders, guilty of cruelty, been dismissed? He was no party man of either Don Carlos or Queen Isabella, neither did he think the interest of either was the compass by which they were to steer. He only considered the interests of his own country. But while the hon. and learned Member talked of the atrocities committing in Spain did he forget that the Government of this country had allowed British subjects to take part in a war in a country where they were without the protection of the British flag. The hon. and learned Member, whose humanity seemed to have taken the alarm, talked of nothing but atrocities and blood; but these were expressions with which he was familiar. He repeated, that blood and murder were words familiar to the hon. and learned Gentleman; but when he talked of Spain did he not recollect the unhappy condition to which his own country was reduced? Did he forget the death's head and cross bones? The hon. and learned Gentleman might not have encouraged atrocities, but certainly he had used language calculated to produce them. This was a departure from the debate, but he was not without a precedent for it. It only threw the hon. and learned Member's taunts back upon him, as he was himself in the habit of doing to others. He would not go further into the question than to say that he deprecated the policy of the Government in allowing English soldiers to be exposed to the horrors and atrocities which existed in Spain.

Mr. O'Connell

begged to be indulged for a moment. What the noble Lord talked of throwing back in his (Mr. O'Connell's) teeth, the noble Lord had created himself. The noble Lord had talked of his virtuous indignation. The noble Lord's indignation was the reverse. It was founded on a mistake. The noble Lord said, that he (Mr. O'Connell) had reduced the incomes of the Protestant clergy in Ireland 75 per cent. Now, did he not support the Bill which went to secure the Protestant Clergy 77½ of their income? But the noble Lord and his Friends prevented that settlement. But the noble Lord asked why he (Mr. O'Connell) insisted on the Carlists being turned out of their service, and not the Christinos. Now, he had never said a word of the kind. The statement of the noble Lord might, therefore be very dignified, but it was untrue; for he had condemned the conduct of the Christinos as well as that of the Carlists. The noble Lord had shown more heat than good sense.

Viscount Sandon

admitted, that the hon. and learned Gentleman had condemned both sides in the Spanish contest. But he had condemned his (Lord Sandon's) side of the House for praising the one party, and had not condemned his Majesty's Ministers for praising the other.

Mr. Villiers

observed, that the tendency of such speeches as those of the noble Mover of she Amendment, and the right hon. Baronet was only to cheer on the party they said they were unfavourable to. If any thing could promote the continuance of the civil war in Spain, it was the periodical debates in the House of Commons on the subject. Indeed he had remarked, that whenever the Carlist cause languished, some motion of tin's sort was always made to revive it.

Viscount Mahon

stated, that it was not his intention to bring forward any motion on the subject; he was contented with the discussion which had taken place.

The resolution moved by Mr. Wood was agreed to.

The House resumed.