§ Sir James Graham, in moving the further consideration of the Report on the Exchequer Receipt Bill, said, he should postpone his statement respecting the general scheme of the measure until the House resolved into a Committee for the purpose of considering the amount of compensation to be given to the officers who were affected by this Bill. The right hon. Baronet moved, that the House resolve itself into a Committee to consider of the compensation to be allowed for the abolition of certain offices in the establishment of his Majesty's Exchequer at Westminster, in consequence of the passing of any Act in the present Session for the reduction of the same.
§ The House resolved itself into a Committee.
194§ Sir James Grahamhad to thank the House for the courtesy it had shown in having allowed him to advance so far in a measure of so much importance as the present without calling on him at an earlier stage to state its principles and justify its details. The subject was of a very complicated nature, and though he was at the same time deeply convinced of its importance, and that it well deserved the gravest attention of the Committee, he was afraid that he might make it neither attractive nor clear. In the first place, he had to explain the circumstances under which he had been selected to bring the matter under the notice of the House. He had been called upon to introduce the measure on the part, of Government, having had the honour of serving on a Commission appointed by his Majesty to inquire into the Public Accounts, over which the right hon. Baronet, the member for Dundee, (Sir Henry Parnell) then a Member of his Majesty's Government, presided; but as his Majesty's Government had not now the honour to reckon that right hon. Gentleman as one of their colleagues, and as it was considered that a measure of such importance as the present should be brought forward by one of his Majesty's responsible advisers, although, in the presence of the right hon. Baronet. (Sir Henry Parnell), he deeply felt his unworthiness, yet, as it had been judged adviseable, he (Sir James Graham), being one of the Commission, had ventured to undertake the task. In the next place, he had to submit to the Committee some explanation of the circumstances which had led to the introduction of the measure itself, which had been contemplated, in its principle at least, by the predecessors of the present Government, and recommended in its details by the Commission to which he had alluded. First of all, then, he had to state to the Committee, that the importance of the measure had received the most mature and anxious consideration; and perhaps he might here be permitted to allude to a circumstance which would appear on the face of the Report—namely, that the late Auditor of the Exchequer, Lord Grenville, having entertained certain objections to the proposed alterations, the feeling both of the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer with respect to that distinguished individual had operated on their minds as an obstacle to the introduction of so extensive a change; but 195 considering the peculiar state of his health, and the subsequent death of that distinguished person, the original impediment had not only been removed, but the event itself had rendered some change indispensably necessary to the working of the Exchequer establishment, in which that noble Lord had held so distinguished a place. Having thus referred to the circumstances under which the measure was introduced, he would next briefly state to the Committee the provisions of the Bill under discussion; and in the outset he would beg leave to observe, as those who were acquainted with the proceedings of the Commission on public accounts must be aware, that the main provisions or the measure were founded on their published Report. For the sake of clearness, it might perhaps be expedient to point out to the Committee, first, what the Bill proposed to abolish,—next, the offices it would create,—and lastly, the objects of the change, and the means by which it was to be effected. It appeared to the Commission, and also to the Government, acting in conformity with the view of the Commission, that it was expedient to introduce so extensive a change into the whole frame of the Exchequer, as to abolish absolutely all the existing offices and the mode of conducting the public business in that great department. The Bill, therefore, would abolish the offices of Auditor of the Exchequer, of the Clerk of the Pells, and of each of the four Tellers of the Exchequer. Already he had opened to the Committee a very extensive change; and it, was only necessary for them to consider what had heretofore been the functions of the Exchequer, to be convinced of the importance of the measure now under discussion. From the earliest period of our history—he believed from the time of the Norman conquest—the Exchequer had been the great conservator of the public money, not only having to provide the safe custody and proper appropriation of the public Revenue, but exercising a direct and decided control over the office of the Lord High Treasurer, the Commissioners of the Exchequer, and the executive Government; and whatever might be the objections to the present Constitution of the Exchequer, he was bound in justice to say, although the operation of its machinery had been tardy, yet it had in the main effected its object. It had safely preserved the public Revenue 196 committed to its charge—no great frauds had been committed; on the contrary, many great frauds had frequently been detected and defeated; and more than that, on many occasions of great importance the Auditor of the Exchequer had exercised his control over the executive, and enforced a strict attention to the Appropriation and other Acts of Parliament regulating the expenditure of the country. He might be asked, having made so large an admission, why he should advocate so extensive a change? But if the Committee attended to what he was now about to state, they would see, that the machinery which the present measure was intended to supersede was so complex and inappropriate to the whole pecuniary transactions of the present day, that the time had arrived when, if means could be devised for providing equally efficient checks, it would be expedient to alter the forms and constitution of the Exchequer, for the purpose of facilitating the great objects which, as now existing, it had not failed to achieve. The present system had its origin in, and attained ninny of its characteristics from, that period, when all the facilities and securities now in operation for the transfer of money,—when banks, bank credit, bank checks, bank paper, were entirely unknown. All the machinery or the Exchequer and its entire constitution had reference to periods when the receipts were either made by weight or by tale; but now the checks necessary to such a state of monetary transactions had become useless, although the operations themselves had not changed their character. On this point it was only necessary to refer to the mode in which the receipts of the Exchequer were at present conducted. The numerals made use of were Roman, and the receipts were written in a species of Latin, which nothing but a knowledge of the Exchequer itself could understand, and its whole complicated machinery was so antiquated that even those who had the greatest respect for the wisdom of our ancestors must admit, that the time had arrived when a change should be effected. The object of the Bill under consideration was to abolish all those antiquated forms,—the Exchequer Latin with obsolete numerals, the forms of introitus, exitus, pells, complicated receipts, and all those intricate forms which it would be too tedious as well as useless to describe, and to place the whole system on an intelligi- 197 ble footing, observing the great principle of severing the duty of payment from the duty of control. The bill also abolished that part of the present plan to which the hon. member for Middlesex had so frequently objected—he meant the system of fees, which would get rid of a great deal of complication and confusion, arising from the method of deducting from salaries and payments paid in with one hand and drawn out with the other, which was useless in practice, and most objectionable in principle. Although the principle of the highest function performed by the Exchequer was that of control, yet there was incident to it also the actual payment of money. For the management of this branch a general paymaster was proposed to be appointed, having the same control as the other paymasters of the navy, army, and ordnance. He had now stated all the parts of the present system which it was proposed to abolish by the present Bill; it remained, that he should shortly point out what offices were proposed to be created in lieu of them. And here he had also to observe, that this part of the measure was in exact conformity with the Report of the Commissioners. It was proposed to establish a Comptroller-general of the Exchequer, and inasmuch as he was to exercise the duties now performed by the Auditor and Clerk of the Pells, and to see that all payments paid were sanctioned by acts of that House, it was of vast importance that he should be altogether independent of the executive Government; and with this view it was proposed that he should hold his office by letters patent under the great seal for life, removable only on the Address of either House of Parliament. As, however, his duty would be daily, it became necessary to provide for the sickness and occasional absence of the Comptroller-general; under these circumstances, and in conformity with the recommendation of the Commissioners, the Bill provided that there should be an assistant-comptroller, who, in the absence of the Comptroller-general, should be enabled to perform without exception all his functions in the Exchequer. These were the only offices of a permanent character; the however, provided, that power should be given to the Treasury, subject to the cognizance of Parliament, of increasing their establishment, and generally of regulating the office; and in as much as there would be great incon- 198 venience in giving precise directions as to the strictly best mode of keeping their accounts, an extensive power should be given to the Treasury in this respect, over not only the new paymaster, but also in all the departments which the Bill would establish. The Bill then provided how the payments now made to the Exchequer should be regulated for the future. It provided that, under the sign-manual, the money should be deposited in the Bank to the credit of the Comptroller of the Exchequer; that no payment for the future should be made to the Exchequer, but that it should be directly lodged in the Bank; that, before any check or draft was issued or paid, the order of the Comptroller directing the payment should be issued. The Exchequer would have to operate under the royal order; and the Treasury warrant directing the transfer of any sum from the general fund of the Exchequer lodged at the Bank to the credit of the respective departments, that it must state the particular Act or vote of Parliament sanctioning such payment. The royal order was also to be deposited in the Exchequer as well as the Treasury-warrant. The monies were now paid by a circuitous mode through the Bank, but it was intended that there should be a general account kept at the Bank. The Comptroller of the Exchequer, previous to issuing his draft, would have the opportunity of examining the Royal warrant and Treasury-warrant, and he would have to see whether the money directed to be advanced or expended was within the provisions of the Appropriation Act or the authority granted by Parliament. He was very well aware of the difficulty of explaining the machinery of a Bill which was somewhat complicated; but he did not hesitate to say, that if the details of the Bill were followed, its working, would be successful. He had been assured by several gentlemen of great practical experience, that the measure would answer the expectations that had been formed of it; and that it would establish a simple and satisfactory mode of keeping the accounts, and at the same time it would give an efficient control over the executive as regarded the public expenditure. The Bill also provided that the paymaster should know from day to day the amount of the payments made into the Bank on account of the Exchequer, and that the Treasury should weekly have an account 199 specifying the monies paid out, and also a statement of the balance in the Bank. The Comptroller of the Exchequer should also be informed day by day of the money paid into and out of the Bank on the public account, and also that Parliament should have an annual account of the receipts, and also of the payments made on the general account, and by what authority they were appropriated, and would thus be aware of the state of the financial balance in the Bank at the end of each year. He should state to the House, that the order issued from the Treasury authorising the payment would specify the head under which the payment was made. A new system of keeping the accounts by double entry would be adopted, so that the balance taken from day to day both at the Exchequer and the Treasury would be constant checks on each other. He was not aware that there was any other important provision of the Bill which required to be stated; he should, however, be happy, as they were now in Committee, to give any further explanation if it should be required; and if any suggestion was offered in the spirit of fairness, it should be readily adopted, provided it were considered in the nature of an improvement. He had now a word or two to say as to the effect of the proposed measure, as to the pecuniary saving it would effect. The present establishment of the Exchequer amounted to sixty-five individuals, the cost being 41,900l. Now, although he could not pledge himself to the exact number of clerks which, especially at the commencement, would be required, the effect of the change would be, speaking in round numbers, that instead of 41,900l., the cost would be 11,000l.; thus saving effectually 30,900l. to the public, and instead of sixty-five only twenty-nine sub-ordinate officers would be required. [Mr. G. F. Young: Does that include the new Pay-office?] The estimate included all the departments, except the office of the Paymaster of the Exchequer-bills, and also that of the Teller of the Exchequer in Ireland, which were not interfered with in the present Bill. He had also no hesitation in stating, on the part of Government, that it would be their object in every case, consistently with a due regard to the efficiency of the public service, to select the twenty-eight or twenty-nine individuals to be employed in the new establishment out of the sixty-five at present 200 employed. It only remained for him to touch on that point to which the resolutions with which he should conclude more particularly referred—namely, the compensation which should be awarded to those individuals whose offices it was proposed to reduce; and he could not better state the principle on which the Bill in this respect was framed, than in the words of the Report of the Commission, which he had the honour of signing in conjunction with the right hon. Baronet the member for Dundee. "In proposing these changes in the establishment of the Exchequer, we trust it will not be supposed we mean to recommend that so many officers should be reduced without due consideration of their past services and present claims. We hope that none will suffer in their pecuniary circumstances, for we believe, that the most certain as well as the most satisfactory means of introducing great changes in the public establishments, with a view to economy, will be found to consist in as little interference as possible with the just claims of individuals." That was the principle laid down in the Report embodied in the Bill, and the foundation of the Resolutions with which he should conclude. With respect to the Auditorship of the Exchequer, the death of Lord Grenville having vacated that office, the noble Lord who succeeded him had taken it on the complete understanding, that it was subject to the regulation of Parliament. The Tellers of the Exchequer, and the Clerk of the Pells were regulated by Statute in 1817. These offices were enjoyed by the present holders for life; and the Bill provided compensation for them until other offices of equal value were obtained. It was felt, that these retiring allowances ought to be made, because, the offices which the parties held, were considered to be of a permanent nature. As it was the object of preceding Parliaments to make the Auditor of the Exchequer the Clerk of the Pells, and the Tellers of the Exchequer independent of the executive, so it was proposed by the present Bill to render the Comptroller and the Assistant-Comptroller of the Exchequer, independent of the executive also, by declaring that they should hold their offices by patent for life. Since the introduction of the Bill, a circumstance had occurred, which rendered one of its provisions unnecessary. He alluded to the death of Mr. Yorke, one of 201 the Tellers of the Exchequer. The unexpected demise of that Gentleman, last night, would make it his painful duty to exclude his name from the list of those to whom compensation would be given by the Bill. When he stated, that he had long enjoyed the friendship of Mr. Yorke—had, on many occasions, received the advantage of his advice—and, on others, the encouragement of his approbation—when he stated, that there never was a more honourable a more independent man, nor one who ever brought greater ability and integrity to a faithful discharge of his public duty, the House would readily believe him, that it was with deep and sincere pain, that he excluded his name from this Bill. With regard to the case of the Marquess Camden, he considered it a very peculiar case—indeed, so very peculiar, that, he thought it right to set it forth fully and distinctly, in a separate clause, in order that it might be for ever known to his fellow-countrymen, that the noble Marquess, having as clear a right to the full and unabated fees and perquisites of his office, as any private gentleman had to the rents of his estate, had, from the best and purest motives of patriotism, contributed from those fees and perquisites to his Majesty's Exchequer no less a sum than 245,000l. He conceived, that no act would be more ungracious, no act more ungenerous, no act more prejudicial to the public interests, than to fetter such generosity of spirit, so long exerted for the public good; and his Majesty's Government had, therefore, deemed it expedient to reserve to the noble Marquess, for the remainder of his life, uncontrolled and unabated power over the profits of his office, leaving it to his generosity, on which, his past conduct proved, that the public might confidently rely, to deal with the public as he might think fit, and not fettering his free-will in any way or in the slightest degree. That was the least the House could do to mark its sense of the conduct of the noble Marquess. Less than that it would be unworthy of the House to do—more than that it could not do at present. With regard to other officers in the Exchequer, who did not hold patent offices, but who still had a permanent interest in their offices, he proposed that the Commissioners of the Treasury should be empowered to give them compensation, subject, however, to their laying the amount of that compen- 202 sation before Parliament, in order to enable it to judge of the manner in which the Lords of the Treasury exercised their discretionary power. He had also a list of the names of certain officers, who, under the Act of the 23rd of George 3rd, had pensions to the amount of 8,300l. charged upon the Fee Fund. These pensions, he proposed to charge in future upon the Consolidated Fund. As the lives of the holders dropped in, the amount of those pensions would diminish, till at last, there would be no charge at all upon the Consolidated Fund. As far as possible, the Government was disposed to fill up the new offices created under this Bill, from the old officers of the Exchequer, thereby diminishing the loss which the public would otherwise incur, by the amount of allowances which would be granted under it. He was not aware, that he had omitted any point of importance. He was sorry that he had been obliged to detain the Committee so long; but he could not avoid entering into the details of so extensive a change as that which he had now the honour to recommend to Parliament; a change, which was as extensive as the Government thought to be safe to make in the first instance. The right hon. Baronet concluded by moving his first resolution, to this effect; "That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the Comptroller-General of the receipt and issues of his Majesty's Exchequer should receive an annual salary of 2,000l.; that. the Assistant-comptroller should receive an annual salary of 1,000l.; and that the chief clerk, and the other clerks and assistants should receive such salaries as should be established and regulated from time to time by the Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury, to be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of Great Britain and Ireland."
§ Lord Granville Somersetwas sure, that if his right hon. friend had deemed it necessary to apologize to the Committee for detaining it with so dry a subject, while he submitted to the House an explanation of the details which he had offered to its consideration, it was still more necessary for him to offer the Committee a similar apology, for the demand which he was now about to make upon its attention. He was happy to find, that his Majesty's Government had at last brought before the House this very useful recommendation of the Commissioners appointed 203 to report upon the Exchequer. He regretted that so much time had been allowed to elapse since the Commission to which he had had the honour to belong, had ceased to act, and since the Commission which succeeded it had made its report, without any practical measure having been introduced into the House, as the result of their anxious and diligent labour. He availed himself, however, of the present opportunity, to say, that his right hon. friend had not, as it appeared to him, done Lord Grenville justice, in supposing that that distinguished nobleman had been desirous of throwing obstacles in the way of this Bill. In all the communications which the Commission to which he had belonged had deemed it necessary to make to that noble Lord, they had found him ready to give them his opinion, to afford them every information in his power, and to co-operate with them in obtaining an insight into all the forms and processes of the Exchequer. He was, therefore, confident that they would have experienced no difficulty in inducing that noble Lord to agree to any proposition which might have obtained the sanction and approbation of that House. He fully agreed with his right hon. friend opposite, that nothing but a sweeping abolition of the system at present adopted in the Exchequer, could be either useful or efficient He did not think that his right hon. friend had swept away one bit too much. Whilst he (Lord Granville Somerset) was in office, he was prepared to agree to as complete an abolition of the existing system, as that which he was going to agree to now. At the same time, he was of opinion, that some great constitutional check should be established upon the receipt and issue of public money, in lieu of that check which was now to be abolished. He thought, that his right hon. friend had not dwelt sufficiently upon the value of the check which existed at present, but which was to be done away with in the plan which he proposed for the adoption of Parliament. Indeed, he doubted whether his right hon. friend substituted so useful a check as that which he was abolishing. He conceived, that many of the forms now adopted in the Exchequer were useless; but he did not conceive that the constitutional check on the issue of the public money by the Auditor of the Exchequer and the Clerk of the Pells, was in any respect unnecessary. In placing that 204 check in the hands of a single individual, instead of placing it in the hands of two persons of high character and station, who were perfectly independent of each other, the House might do away with one of the most useful safeguards on the correct appropriation of the public money. The plan of his right hon. friend went to the establishment of a check in the hands of a single individual, to be styled the Comptroller-General of his Majesty's Exchequer—of a single individual, who was to be free, however, from all bias in the exercise of his office. As to the propriety of this last regulation, he fully agreed with his right hon. friend; but he should have liked his right hon. friend's scheme much better, if he had invented some secondary check upon the discretion of this individual Comptroller. He was of opinion, that no single individual would be able to resist the strong pressure which was occasionally brought into play against him, whenever he put his view of what was right in opposition to the wishes of the executive Government. The point which he was now raising was not visionary, was not imaginary; for there was on record a case in which, as many hon. Members knew, the Auditor of the Exchequer and the Clerk of the Pells had made strong remonstrances against the orders of the executive Government. He saw, by the gestures of noble Lord, that he disputed his last assertion so far as it regarded the Clerk of the Pells. Now, if the Committee would bear with him whilst he referred to some evidence which was given by Mr. Roberts, in 1830, he thought that he could convince the Committee, that he was not incorrect in his statement. The case was an old one, it was true, but not, he hoped, the less deserving of attention on that account. It was stated by the present Mr. Roberts, that many years ago, when his father was ordered by the executive Government to issue certain monies for purposes which he considered illegal, he had refused to do so—that he had gone to the Treasury, produced the key of his chest, laid it upon the table of the Commissioners, and offered to resign his office rather than comply with their request. He mentioned this fact, to show, that the Clerk of the Pells had sometimes made to the Treasury an opposition which was something more than theoretical. It was also stated, that Lord Grenville had, upon one occasion, strenuously resisted the 205 orders of the Treasury. He would not enter into the question of the legality or illegality of paying the interest on the Russian loan; but, without going further into that subject than was necessary to remind the House that the question had been raised within it, he would say, that it was clear, from what had transpired, that the representations of Lord Grenville, as Auditor of the Exchequer, had been of the most valuable kind. It was satisfactory to know, that that noble Lord, who, for many years had been unconnected with party, had represented to his Majesty's Government, in terms that could not be misunderstood, his opinion on that transaction. The new Comptroller, however independent he might be by his office, and however free from the trammels of politics, would scarcely have that weight which belonged to the Auditor of the Exchequer, from ancient prescription, and from the Gothic paraphernalia by which his office was surrounded. When he saw, under the old system, that the Auditor was supported by another officer, who was also uncontrolled, he could only arrive at one conclusion, and that was, that there ought to be two officers of independent position and situation, each exercising an independent control upon the issue of public money ordered by the Executive. He was as anxious as any man could be, that the person at the head of this department should be a real efficient officer, and that nothing approaching sinecurism should appear in the constitution of his department; therefore it was, that even if he had not stated other grounds which made him anxious for an establishment different from that contained in this Bill, this alone would make him object to it—that he found it provide for the Comptroller—General a Deputy-comptroller. It was clear, that it you had a Comptroller-General, and then a Deputy or Assisting-comptroller, and then again a Chief Clerk, that the Comptroller-General would do little, that his Deputy would do not much, and their Chief Clerk would do all the business of the establishment. He wished to prevent this species of abuse. Let it not be supposed that he wished to do this to advance some theory of his own. In the Report of the Commissioners he found a sort of programme of the duties to be performed in this new office, from which it appeared that the Comptroller would have the supervision of everything 206 that occurred in his department; but that the Deputy-comptroller would have to see all the work performed. The chief clerk in the absence of the Deputy-comptroller would have to perform all his functions. [Sir J. Graham: That was not in the Bill.] It would be the case in practice however. The Deputy-comptroller was to examine the receipts and payments of the day, and was specially charged with the examination of the Treasury warrants, and with the consideration of their legality. He was bound to see, that they were in conformity with the grants of Parliament, and with the royal orders of the Crown. Now, supposing that a Comptroller and a Deputy-comptroller were appointed, it was quite clear, that though the Comptroller had the chief office, the Deputy-comptroller would have to exercise the check which, in reality, was the only valuable part of the office. That being the case, he thought that the country could do without a Deputy-comptroller. He would leave the Comptroller to the full possession of all the duties which at present were to be performed by his deputy; for if either of these two officers was to be an efficient officer, he was convinced that it was necessary that that efficient officer should be the Comptroller. He was aware that he should be met with the practical objection, that it was impossible, if the accidents of illness, excessive fatigue, &c., were taken into consideration, for any man to perform all the duties of so responsible an office without a coadjutor. But allowing that to be the case, it, ought not to be forgotten that the Commissioners, in their report, had provided for the occurrence of these very incidents. In case the Comptroller was absent, the Deputy-comptroller was to act for him; and in case the Deputy-comptroller was disabled, the chief clerk was to perform his functions. The report referred to the schedule, containing an enumeration of the duties of the new offices. He objected to the office of Deputy-comptroller, and he could show from the Report that the division of labour which was to take place between his principal and him and his subordinates was not very business like. He conceived, that the Bill was drawn up in conformity with the Report, and was arguing accordingly upon the Report. It was his endeavour to show that there was no necessity for a Deputy-comptroller, and that he was an officer who might well be spared. He wished to sup- 207 ply the place of this officer by one who was perfectly independent, and therefore, calculated to act as a second check. If he had made himself understood by the House it would be clear that if the Deputy-comptroller were got rid of, there would be an office to spare with a salary of 1,000l. a-year. Now, upon such a salary an officer might be created as perfectly independent as the Comptroller; and by the word "independent" he did not mean independent of the Comptroller only, he meant independent of the Treasury also. That officer should also be a recording officer, but he should not record anything except what was in conformity with legal enactments. He was now merely stating the opinions which he had formed some years ago, when he was in office, and which he knew had been adopted by the right hon. Baronet near him and the rest of his colleagues. Feeling them to be well founded, he considered that he should fail in his duty if he did not press them distinctly upon the Committee. Having referred to the leading features in the Bill before the Committee, and the principal objections which he entertained against it, he would add, that it seemed to him to be natural that the Clerk of the Pells should be continued and should be that independent second officer he had alluded to; he should receive the same salary as at present, but the same salary should not be continued to his successor. By such an arrangement you would consult economy, for you would save the superannuation allowance of the Clerk of the Polls, and, what was equally important, would have an experienced officer at your command, who would know something both of the old and the new system. He admitted, however, that this was a point entirely at the disposal of the executive Government. There was another point of considerable importance, to which, as it appeared to him sufficient weight was not attached in the Bill—he was alluding to the position of the Comptroller. There was no provision to prevent that officer from sitting. in Parliament or holding another office under the Crown. Now, if this office of Comptroller was worth keeping up at all, there ought to be a special enactment introduced into the Bill to prevent the holder of it from enjoying any other situation in the gift of the Crown. He threw out his observations not from any wish to impede the progress of the Bill, or to obtain a triumph 208 for his opinions, but from a sincere desire that they should be adopted by the Committee. He felt the force of his suggestions himself, and he hoped that they would meet with a candid consideration from his Majesty's Government. With regard to the preamble of the Bill, he was of opinion, that as allusion had been made to the meritorious labours of the one commission, some notice ought also to be taken of the no less diligent labours of the other. He also recommended that as the Roman numerals employed in the accounts of the Exchequer were now to be abolished, care should be taken that the knowledge of them should not be lost, and for that purpose he suggested that a small portion of the accounts should still be kept in those characters. He also wished to have the Bill recommitted pro formà, in order that such alterations as hon. Members might think expedient might be proposed and fully discussed. His right hon. friend had given little or no explanation as to the amount either of the salary of the Paymaster of the Exchequer, or of the establishment over which he was to preside. He reminded the Committee, that during the long series of years in which the Exchequer Rolls had been kept in their present form, no defalcation, no pecuniary loss, had been sustained by the State. It was, therefore, necessary that the Committee should proceed with caution in forming a new scheme in lieu of the old which he certainly thought ought to be abolished. It was not his intention to make any Motion on this subject. himself; but he hoped that what he had said that evening would be taken into the candid consideration of his right hon. friend.
§ Sir James Grahamthanked his noble friend for the great candour with which he had discussed this question. Some of the suggestions which his noble friend had made appeared to him to be so well founded in justice and common sense, that they appeared to his colleagues and himself to be worthy of adoption in the Bill. The suggestion which appeared to him to be the most important was that which prohibited the Comptroller from holding any other situation under the Crown. He would on a future occasion add to the Bill an enactment containing that prohibition. He had no objection to make in the preamble the insertion which his noble friend desired. With regard to what the 209 noble Lord had said respecting the deficiency of his explanations on the office of Paymaster of the Exchequer, he would endeavour to supply that deficiency. The noble Lord was aware of the number of payments made at the Exchequer—they extended to the payment of all public officers not provided for by the grants of the House. They amounted to 3,000,000l. or 4,000,000l. a-year. The Paymaster was therefore made a public accountant. It was intended that his office should form part of the Treasury, but that was a mere matter of local convenience. His noble friend had asked what was to be the extent of the establishment over which the Paymaster was to preside. When the Treasury had formed the establishment, an account of the expense of it would be found in the Estimates, and would be annually voted in the Committee of Supply. He had already stated, that the expense of these new offices would not amount to more than 11,000l. a-year; the expense of the existing offices amounted to 41,000l. He believed of that 11,000l. nearly one-half would be expended on the Paymaster's office. There would be a paymaster, a chief clerk, and ten or twelve subordinate clerks. With regard to the double check proposed by his noble friend, he would only observe that the opinion of the Clerk of the Pells was decidedly against that proposition. That Gentleman expressly said, that the two officers placing reliance on each other, weakened the sense of responsibility in both. That Gentleman had stated also, that such an alteration would be productive of great delay and impediment to business. The right hon. Baronet concluded by declaring that the Bill would be of great advantage to the public in the form of keeping their accounts at the Bank.
§ Sir Henry Parnellsaid, that the country had great reason to be well satisfied at the introduction of this measure, which was one step towards financial reform, and he hoped that the principles laid down in the Bill would sooner or later be extended to other branches of the public expenditure. He could not agree with the noble Lord (Lord Granville Somerset) in his notion of the advantage of a double check. On the contrary he entirely concurred in the view taken by his right hon. friend, and he could prove if it were necessary that the introduction of a double check was altogether owing to the impel- 210 fect manner in which the public accounts had been kept. The double check was only productive of expense, and of diminished responsibility. On the whole he approved of the measure, though one alteration recommended by the Commission, which he would have liked to see was, not introduced into it.
§ Mr. Humefelt great satisfaction at the proposal of the measure, for ten years, at least, had elapsed since the Chancellor of the Exchequer of that day had pledged himself to effect the alteration the present Bill was directed to accomplish. The plan laid down was a simple one, but he thought it might have been made more extensive. He wished, however, to ascertain one point, which was, whether Lord Auckland was to hold his present office in Greenwich Hospital and likewise the comptrollership specified in the present Bill? He hoped that under the present arrangement, no individual holding a plurality of offices would be entitled to superannuation allowances. He regretted that the measure, as he had said, did not go further, because he was convinced that, until the whole of the gross revenue was paid into the Exchequer, it would be quite impossible to check the extravagant expenditure of the Customs, Excise, Post, and Stamp Offices; which paid only the amount of the nett revenue raised by them into the Exchequer, making whatever deductions they pleased, if the Treasury chose to allow them. This system had led to great abuse in the expenditure of these departments. It was contrary to the spirit and principle of the English Constitution, that the House of Commons should have no control over this part of the expenditure of the country. He was anxious to hear from the right hon. Baronet what objection there could be to this additional 3,000,000l. or 4,000,000l. being paid into the Exchequer?
§ Sir James Grahamsaid, it was precisely because the measure was so extensive that his Majesty's Government was induced to think it went far enough. The most advisable course certainly was, to proceed cautiously, and to ascertain the effect of the present measure, before adopting a more extensive one. He was sure he might appeal to the high authority of his right hon. friend, the member for Dundee (Sir Henry Parnell), whether if the present measure were successful, it would not greatly facilitate the progress of those 211 more extensive measures which the hon. member for Middlesex required. In proposing such an important change as the overthrow of the existing system of the Exchequer, establishing an entirely new one, surely it became the Executive to see how the new system worked, before changes more extensive, more decisive, and involving more important consequences were effected. The hon. member for Middlesex said, that the cost of collecting the revenue of the Excise and Customs was not laid before this House. Why, an account, entering into the most minute details of that expenditure, and showing the difference between the gross and the nett amount of the revenue, was annually laid before the House, in compliance with the provisions of an Act of Parliament, and so far from his Majesty's Government not making the necessary inquiries upon this point, he begged to say, that the subject was now under the consideration of a Commission, over which his right hon. friend, the member for Dundee, was presiding. With reference to the noble Lord concerning whom a question had been asked, that noble Lord was now auditor of the Exchequer, and in the event of the Bill passing he would be Comptroller under it. That noble Lord, he could assure the hon. Member, had no intention of claiming or receiving any pension while he was Comptroller. The noble Lord (Lord Granville Somerset) had asked him (Sir James Graham) whether he would be able to hold any other office in addition to this Comptrollership, and he had told him in reply that he believed that could not be the case. At the same time he must observe, that the office to which the noble Lord alluded was not held during pleasure, though being himself connected with Greenwich Hospital, he could hardly express in terms sufficiently strong the loss that establishment would sustain by the retirement of the noble Lord, whose talents, experience, and integrity were so conspicuous.
§ Mr. Humehoped it might not be understood that in asking the question he should be supposed to be under-rating the talents of the noble Lord. No one was more ready than himself to acknowledge the noble Lord's talents for business. His only object was to enforce the principle of non-pluralities. On one point the right hon. Baronet had not understood his remarks. The Exchequer Office was constituted for the purpose of keeping an 212 account of the total revenue of the country, but it never exhibited that; it was an absurdity which existed in England alone, that the Exchequer, which ought to keep an account of all the receipts of revenue, never did so, for the officers who collected the money were allowed to deduct the expense of supporting their own establishments. He would mention an extraordinary instance, to show how necessary an alteration was. A loan to the amount of 7,000,000l. was contracted for, to supply the Emperor of Austria. One would have supposed that this would have been entered in the Exchequer account; but the money was paid into the Bank, from the Bank it was paid to the Emperor of Austria, and it never had been entered in the Exchequer account, although the country paid the interest on it to this moment.
§ Mr. Matthias Attwooddid not think it a matter of more importance to provide efficient checks on the public accounts than to lessen the amount of the public monies placed in the hands of public officers. As a measure of economy he approved of the present Bill, but he hoped that some alteration would be made in the clause which related to the appointments of the Comptroller and Assistant-comptroller of the Exchequer. He disapproved of public officers being appointed to their situations for life, and thought that no one should hold a public situation except during pleasure. The amount of the salaries at present paid was 40,900l.; but the right hon. Baronet had forgotten to state to them what the saving was which the proposed abolition of offices would effect in this branch of the public expenditure, or whether the amount now paid for salaries was to be continued to be paid under the name of pensions or retired allowances. He complained that it was on those who really did the work of the public that the reductions pressed most heavily; and he could not help saying, that the salaries of principal as well as those of subordinate clerks should be diminished in the same proportion. The measure proposed to abolish the office of Clerk of the Pells, but he saw no reason why the principle to which he had adverted should not be applied to the salary of the right hon. Gentleman who held that office as well as to the salaries of other persons. Indeed, he thought that, instead of allowing the right hon. Gentle- 213 man a retiring pension of 1,400l. a-year, it would be much better to retain his services by making him Assistant-Comptroller of the Exchequer. This course would not only be the wise one, but would have the advantage of economy to recommend it. The salary of the Assistant-Comptroller of the Exchequer was to be 1,400l., and if the right hon. Gentleman were appointed to fill that office, his pension as Clerk of the Pells being saved, the public would have the benefit of a reduction to that extent. The right hon. Gentleman was the only person who had ever held the office of Clerk of the Pells for life, or otherwise than at the pleasure of the Crown, and, therefore, he could see no hardship in pursuing the course which he had suggested with respect to transferring the right hon. Gentleman, who was comparatively new to the public service, to the Exchequer, instead of permitting him to enjoy a sinecure pension.
§ Sir James Grahamstated, that this was, undoubtedly, a measure of economy, and calculated to create a considerable saving; but economy ought not to be considered as its primary object. It was a measure of still higher importance,—for the regulation and greater accountability of those intrusted with the public money, for affording easier access to the public accounts, and improving the mode of keeping them, and creating a more effectual control over the public expenditure. He could not admit the principle, that the selection of officers belonged to the House of Commons: it was the duty of the Government to charge itself with that responsibility. It was represented, that Mr. Ellis was only new in the public service. That was not the case: he had served his country in every part of the globe for twenty-two years. In 1812, Mr. Ellis entered the public service as Secretary to Lord Buckingham, then President of the Board of Trade. In 1814, he proceeded to Persia on a special mission, and concluded a treaty of importance with that country, to the satisfaction of the English Government. In 1815, Mr. Ellis was appointed one of the Commissioners for concluding a treaty with the United States of America. He subsequently proceeded with Lord Amherst on his embassy to China; and in 1817, on his return to this country, resumed his situation of Commissioner for the commercial treaty with the United 214 States. He continued in that situation till 1819, when he went out to the Cape of Good Hope as Secretary to the Governor-General. He remained at the Cape till 1822, when he returned home, and was appointed Secretary of Revenue Inquiry. In 1824, Mr. Ellis was appointed one of the Commissioners of Customs; and in 1825, he was selected, by the Earl of Liverpool (then at the head of the Government), not in consequence of any application from himself or others, but voluntarily selected by the noble Earl, to fill the office of Clerk of the Pells, under the new regulations fixed by the Act of 1817, which converted the office from something of a sinecure, into a complete and efficient and useful office. He had proved to the House, that, so far from being new to official life, Mr. Ellis had been twenty-two years in the employment of the public; and he now wished simply to state a point on which he would appeal to the generous feelings of Members of the House, as gentlemen and persons of liberal sentiments. The inducement which prevailed upon Mr. Ellis in 1825 to exchange the office of Commissioner of Customs for the Clerkship of the Pells consisted in this circumstance, that he changed a subordinate for an independent office, the salary of both being the same (1,400l. a-year), the Clerkship of the Pelts being during good behaviour, and the tenure of the office of Commissioner of Customs pretty nearly the same; for there was no instance of a Commissioner of Customs being removed, except for misconduct. Thus, the whole inducement to Mr. Ellis to remove from one situation to the other was, that he might fill an independent office. But what condition was it that the hon. member for Whitehaven called upon the Government now to exact from Mr. Ellis? Mr. Ellis was to be required, after twenty-two years of faithful service, and having filled various important public employments in different parts of the world, and being placed nine years ago in an independent situation by Lord Liverpool,—after this Mr. Ellis was required to accept a subordinate office. The hon. Member called upon Mr. Ellis to retire from a situation of perfect independence, co-equal with the Auditor of the Exchequer, and become Assistant-Comptroller. If there was any great public saving to be effected by this plan, it might be admitted to be justifiable on economical 215 grounds, although not upon any other principle; but no such saving would result from it, as there were four other individuals in the Exchequer receiving nearly equal salaries. One was the First Clerk of the Auditor; then came the First Clerk to the Clerk of the Pells, a person of long experience, whose salary was very nearly equal to that of the Comptroller, and who would be entitled to a retiring allowance of almost the same amount; then there were two Tellers of the Exchequer, who stood upon nearly equal grounds; so that Government had su cient choice of persons to enable them to fill up the Assistant Comptrollership without detriment to the public, and without imposing a hard and humiliating condition upon Mr. Ellis. He had drawn a distinction between the Tellerships of the Exchequer, which were sinecure offices, and performed by deputy, and the Clerkship of the Pells, which did not partake so much of a sinecure character, and was not performed by deputy; and he had stated, that Government proposed to deal differently with the two cases. To the Tellers it was proposed to grant retiring salaries unconditionally, for the reasons he had stated when first mentioning the subject, but to the Clerk of the Pells (who held office under a tenure different from that of the Tellers) a superannuation allowance was granted conditionally,—the condition being, 'that no such compensation shall be paid to any person holding an office in the present establishment of his Majesty's Exchequer (including the Clerk of the Pells) who shall be appointed to an office of equal or greater emolument under the Crown.' Under these circumstances, in the event of a fit office becoming vacant, it would be the duty of Ministers to offer such office to Mr. Ellis, with a view to save the superannuation allowance which he would enjoy as retired Clerk of the Pells. He had used no dissimulation with the House; and he now appealed to Members, as gentlemen and men of honour and liberality, whether Government would have been justified in dealing out so hard a measure as that proposed by the hon. member for White-haven to an individual after twenty-two years of valuable public services, and after nine years' possession of an important independent office? Would Gentlemen call upon Government to deal thus harshly with such an individual, when it could, 216 by acting generously and fairly towards him, without injury to the public, abstain from wounding the feelings of a man of high honour and acknowledged ability?
§ Sir George Staunton, as a colleague of Mr. Ellis, bore testimony to his valuable services in various diplomatic offices, and hoped that Parliament's sense of justice would not permit it to deprive that gentleman of the present small and inadequate reward for the labours of more than twenty years.
§ Mr. Matthias AttwoodIf Mr. Ellis had performed great public services, strike his name out of tile Bill, and address his Majesty to place him on the Pension-list. If this proposition were not acceptable to the House, let Mr. Ellis be called upon to fill the office of Comptroller-General, for which he was so eminently fitted by his talents and great public services.
§ Mr. Henry Bulwerwas sorry to find it necessary to appeal to the House, lest a man of eminent public services should be degraded by being reduced to an office of subordinate rank.
§ Mr. Charles Grantwished to express his opinion on the services of Mr. Ellis. He had been described as "new to the public service." Never was there a gentleman to whom that expression could be less justly applied. Perhaps there was no public man who, after such long and continued services, had gained so little. Mr. Ellis, for the last three years, had been one of tile unpaid Commissioners of the Board of Control. His intimate acquaintance with the whole system of our Indian policy (Mr. Ellis having been in India more than once) had proved extremely valuable; and he (Mr. Charles Grant) was bound, in common justice, to confess his obligations to his right hon. friend last year, on the question of the renewal of the East-India Company's charter.
§ Mr. Goulburnsaid, that there was not the slightest doubt or imputation on Mr. Ellis's merits and services; and he quite agreed with the right hon. Baronet (Sir James Graham), that it would not be justice to any gentleman who had filled such a situation as Mr. Ellis to place him in the subordinate situation of Assistant-Comptroller. What he (Mr. Goulburn) felt, was this,—that, knowing Mr. Ellis to be a man of business, who had been employed in important public transactions, and believing him to deserve the confidence of 217 Government, he thought him possessed of abilities which qualified him for the Comptrollership. Such being the case, he thought, when that office was created, that Mr. Ellis was the individual who had the fairest claim to the situation. He would not hesitate to vote for a reward to Mr. Ellis, if necessary; but he thought, that justice would be equally satisfied, and the public money would be saved, if that gentleman were appointed Comptroller-General of the Exchequer. The real difference between the right. hon. Baronet. (Sir James Graham), the noble Lord (Granville Somerset), and himself, consisted in this,—that the right hon. Baronet thought one Comptroller sufficient, whereas the noble Lord and he were of opinion, that two would be better. If two officers were appointed (as had been originally contemplated, in consequence of the Report of the Commissioners), the two would have salaries of 1,500l. a-year each, and the responsibility would be divided, which he thought preferable to having only one responsible officer. Who was the person that had made objections to the acts of the Treasury? Not the Clerk of the Pells, but the Auditor. Objections rarely proceeded from the Clerk of the Pells. Hence the utility of a system of double checks was apparent; and a complete answer was afforded to the paper drawn up by Mr. Ellis. The circumstance to which he had referred proved how desirable was a division of responsibility, which could only be obtained by having two Comptrollers. We had an example from the practice which formerly prevailed, that a double cheek was attended with security. Why depend upon a single check in future? He agreed with the right hon. Baronet as to the advantage of getting rid of the cumbrous machinery of the Exchequer; but he objected to endangering the public security by leaving the responsibility in the hands of one officer. If two such officers as had been proposed were created, Mr. Ellis was extremely fit to be one of them. The real point was, should there be two officers or one? He was decidedly in favour of the double check, thinking that what had already proved efficient for the maintenance of public security would continue so, whereas the system now proposed to be adopted might, or might not, turn out to be successful.
§ Lord AlthorpThe question raised by the right hon. Gentleman who spoke last 218 was, "whether it was expedient to have a double or single check?" The right hon. Gentleman said, that the double check had not proved bad in practice, but the contrary. This might be; but there was no reason to suppose, that a single check would not be sufficient. Was there any chance that a single check would not turn out amply sufficient for public security? If there were two independent officers, there must be two establishments; and, unless it was quite clear that there was greater advantage in two cheeks than in one, he must object to the proposition. As to the propriety of Government appointing Mr. Ellis Comptroller instead of another individual, Government was responsible for its appointments, and would naturally nominate persons such as they thought fit for the duties assigned to them. Government had a right to make its choice of officers free and unencumbered. He was happy to hear every one admit, that Mr. Ellis deserved compensation. The question having been raised, whether Government ought not to have appointed that gentleman Comptroller-General with a view to the saving that would accrue from the appointment, he could only reply, that he thoght it impossible to argue a point which it rested entirely with Government to dispose of on its own responsibility.
§ Mr. Goulburnagreed with the noble Lord in his general proposition, but thought that on occasion of the construction of a new class of officers, it involved no improper interference with the functions of Government or prerogative of the Crown to suggest the nomination of qualified individuals, who must otherwise be superannuated at some cost; neither could he see any impropriety in suggesting the adoption of the most efficient system of control over the expenditure of the public money.
Colonel Evanswas glad to see, that the general feeling of the House was, that Mr. Ellis should not be degraded by being offered a subordinate office. He did not think that Mr. Ellis had been treated with any extraordinary favour. The Tellers received compensation unconditionally, although their offices were perfect sinecures, while the Clerk of the Pells, whose situation was not a sinecure, received compensation subject to certain conditions. It appeared, that five or six years ago, Mr. Ellis made some economical 219 recommendations, and now it was proposed by the hon. member for White-haven to deprive him of his office, and place him in a subordinate situation. The hon. Member, however, had made the amende honorable, by suggesting Mr. Ellis's appointment as Comptroller-General. If any one would propose Mr. Ellis for that situation, he (Colonel Evans) would vote for the appointment.
§ The Resolution was agreed to.
§ Sir James Grahamthen proposed a Resolution to the effect, that as compensation to the Tellers of the Exchequer and Clerk of the Pells, whose offices would be abolished, the sum of 8,323l. should be paid to them annually, and that the said sum should be charged upon the Consolidated Fund of Great Britain and Ireland.
§ Mr. Humethought it would be prudent not to grant compensation to any individual while he was able to work, and to discharge the duties of some other office under Government. They should not agree to this Resolution without having a distinct pledge from his Majesty's Ministers, that if any of the individuals to whom those allowances should be given should be hereafter appointed to any situation under Government, the allowance should cease. If they could not any longer employ Mr. Ellis as Clerk of the Pells, why not take the earliest opportunity to give him some other employment?
§ Lord Althorpwould assure the hon. Member, that it was the wish of his Majesty's Government to give Mr. Ellis employment, and that their anxious desire was to find out some employment for a Gentleman of whose abilities they entertained the highest opinion.
Mr. Tennysonthought, that compensation should only be granted to Mr. Ellis on the condition of his accepting the first office offered to him.
§ Lord Althorpsaid, that it would not be just to deprive Mr. Ellis of all power of making a choice. He did not apprehend that Mr. Ellis had any wish to refuse the acceptance of an office, and from what he knew of his right hon. friend he was perfectly certain that it was his anxious desire to be employed. He had already stated, that his Majesty's Government would take the earliest opportunity to give him some employment.
Mr. Tennysonthought, that Mr. Ellis might very well discharge the duties of 220 Comptroller-General, which office, it appeared, with a salary of 2,000l. a-year, was to be given to Lord Auckland. By that means a saving would be made for the public, deducting any pension which Lord Auckland might give up on being appointed to this new office. It should be distinctly understood, that, if Lord Auckland should be appointed to the situation of Comptroller-General, he would give up his pension.
§ Sir James Grahamsaid, he had again to repeat the assurance which he had given on the part of Lord Auckland, that while he held the office of Comptroller-General, it was not his intention to receive that pension to which he possessed a vested right. As to Mr. Ellis, it was obvious that he had a right to be placed in an independent situation before they talked of giving him another appointment. If Mr. Ellis had no right, by the nature and tenure of his office, to compensation, then, indeed, the argument of the right hon. Gentleman might have some force. But on the abolition of his office, Mr. Ellis had a right to compensation; and when that matter was decided, then it would be for him either to refuse it, or accept any situation which the Government might offer him. On the part of Mr. Ellis, he would give this assurance, that if the Government should offer him a situation (which it was their intention to do at the first moment that it was in their power), he would not refuse it.
§ The Resolution was agreed to, and the House resumed.