HC Deb 11 July 1833 vol 19 cc570-83
Mr. Henry L. Bulwer,

on being called on by the Speaker, said, that before he proceeded with the Motion of which he had given notice, he wished to ask whether any Government existed?*

Lord Althorp

who had just entered the House and taken his seat, replied, "Here we are."

Mr. Henry L. Bulwer

said, it did not follow because they were there, that they constituted a Government; but, as he presumed, from the noble Lord's answer, that he must consider them as yet in power, he would proceed with the Motion which he rose to bring forward. He begged in the first instance, to assure the noble Lord, that he made his Motion without any hostility to the Government, since he had never heard one word from the noble Lord in the House which did not do honour to his situation, and because from every opportunity he had had of knowing what the noble Lord had done out of the House, he believed, the conduct of the noble Lord to have been all that could be desired. But whatever confidence he had in Government, he thought that when such great events took place as those which threatened a complete change of the political relations of Europe, it could not, be supposed that this country viewed them with indifference, nor that the House was not anxious to be acquainted with the policy of the * In consequence of the Ministers having been defeated in the House of Lords on the Local Courts' Bill, various rumours had prevailed during the week of changes in the Administration. Hence Mr. Bulwer's question. Government directing its affairs. What he had to say, he should say in a very few words. In the first place, he did not consider that it was the intention of Russia to take present possession of Turkey. The destinies of nations were not changed by a coup de main. He looked upon its conduct merely as a proof and a developement of its plans, and not as their completion. By the Treaty of Adrianople, Russia with the same consummate policy which had ever directed her affairs, showed a generous abnegation of territorial acquisition in Turkey, in order that she might more widely and safely extend her moral power over that country. She made her agents, however, independent of the Turkish authorities, and even assumed the right of naming for a time the Turkish authorities themselves. The Sublime Porte was degraded in the eyes of its subjects, and the prestige which formerly hung around it was gone. This was all that Russia wanted. A government that depreciates itself cannot stand by itself, and its territories must soon become the province of another. The disgrace of the Porte naturally occasioned a variety of insurrections among its subjects; Mehemet Ali, of those subjects, was at first the most powerful, and afterwards the most formidable, and on the part of France was his revolt stimulated, as it was said by some of no contemptible nature. His army, at first forced to retreat, vanquished the brave but imprudent Hussein Pacha. The fate of the Sultan and of his capital depended on a battle which his general was likely to lose; and Russia offered herself at once as his protector and supporter, and was accepted. Admiral Roussin arrived at Constantinople, and engaged for the retreat of the Pacha on certain terms, which included the refusal of Russian assistance. To this Russia refused her consent—" you have asked for me, and you shall have me," she says; her troops marched accordingly on Constantinople. It was impossible not to admire the talent of a cabinet which actually compelled the Power it was determined to destroy, to receive it to its bosom as its best and its dearest friend. But he begged the House to observe, that in all these transactions of France on one side, and Russia on the other, we appeared as cyphers, and as far as the public knew anything, the whole fate of the East was about to be changed without our knowing more of the matter than if we had been some petty German principality. But Russia excused herself, he understood, in this manner, and here it was that the House required a satisfactory explanation from the noble Lord. It was said, that some time previous to the Russian expedition, or consent of assistance, she informed us, and the Porte specially informed us, that events were taking place in Asia which would oblige the Porte to have recourse to foreign interference, and that we were asked by both parties to put a stop to Mehemet's progress, which a note from us—a mere note from us—would have been able to do. That this note we delayed writing, and that thus Russia was forced to take the part she took. He mentioned this, in order that the noble Lord might explain the fact, or that the papers might be produced which would afford the explanation. The affair ended by Mehemet accepting the conditions the public were acquainted with, and the Russians, he presumed, were to withdraw from Constantinople, as the noble Lord said, or he would not otherwise surely have struck so strong upon the string of non-interference. Russia was to retire from Turkey; but what of that? If Russia retreated home, the mischief was done. Her moral ascendancy over Turkey was increased—it was for the increase of this moral ascendancy that she marched into Turkey. She meant, and wanted at this moment nothing more. Since 1776, Russia had extended herself over two-thirds of the coast of the Black Sea. Of the eleven millions of inhabitants in Turkey, three millions of Greeks and Armenians were attached to her yoke. By her commercial relations with different parts of the Continent, she had endeavoured to connect their interests with her, and by her power and magnificence, which with an oriental people had great sway, she had also endeavoured to obtain a strong hold over their imagination. Working with such materials and such means, she expected that if the Turkish empire dissolved, it would naturally fall into her possession, and with the consummate policy for which she was remarkable, she understood the art of waiting upon events, the termination of which she contented herself with calmly and deliberately preparing. Ultimately looking to the Dardanelles, her next step would probably be to get possession of Trebizond, which would give a dépôt for her military stores, and open an easy access to Persia or Turkey for her armies. This being the state of things, it seemed pretty clear, that if they were allowed to continue, with the immense power and concentrated designs of Russia, the weak and divided government of Turkey, that important part of the world, unless other influences interfered to prevent it, would necessarily fall under her sway. With these important changes before the House, to which he presumed the Government had cast the considerate eye of statesmen, the country, he thought, in a matter so important to its interests, might fairly claim to know the general outline of the policy of Ministers. This became a still more reasonable expectation, since the views of another party, rival candidates for power, were well known. A noble Lord, with whose general views he disagreed, but of whose character he entertained a high opinion, and whose kindness he had personally to acknowledge, had stated on a former occasion, that he did consider the diminution of Turkey for the aggrandisement of Russia an object of serious alarm to this country, which it would be his duty to prevent; some persons, however, were of a contrary opinion, and seemed rather to favour the idea of Russian dominion in the East as favourable to the general civilization, and to the happiness of the people of that part of the world. He acknowledged that, of all ideas, this seemed to him the most singular of any that ever entered the brain of any man acquainted with history. But as his opinions were briefly explained in an able and eloquent passage of a pamphlet that had been written on the subject, he would read that passage to the House:—" Yet is this to be effected by Russia, by a nation which itself has just emerged from obscurity, scarcely possessing a complete legislature, and not yet free from the fetters of Gothic vassalage. Would Turkey (if conquered) adopt the manners and embrace the religion of the conquerors? Without this can such a change be effected?—will not a humane and beneficent modification of its own religion be more likely to improve its advantages? tinder the government of foreigners, to whom no allegiance is due but that of conquest, are we to expect the same coincidence in views, the same assistance in projects, as when national prejudice, religion, and duty—in fine, all the principles on which Turkish government is founded, unite? Observe, the precepts of the Koran are the rules of legislation as well as of moral conduct. Would Russia be able to dissolve the fabric of a religion so pleasing and gratifying to the passions of eastern nations, after it has stood eleven centuries? If they could not do this, what could they do?" The writer was actually speaking of the proposed plan of Turkish civilization. The dominion of Russia had not, he believed, in general been favourable to the civilization or happiness of the conquered; but even if Turkey could be civilized and rendered more happy under the dominion of Russia, was that the case with the other nations to which the possession of Constantinople would only open the way? If a nation had one particular point to gain, a natural frontier, a peculiar river or mountain, for which it would be always ready to wage war, it might be a question whether it would not be sound policy to yield that point. But was that the case with Russia? Let the House look to any part of the world in which Russia had not manifested the same grasping desire to add to her possessions—let them look at the map, and see what she had taken in the north, the south, the east, and the west. What power had not suffered from her fatal neighbourhood? Half a century ago Russia was not half European, now Europe was half Russian. But the dominion of Russia had not, he believed, in general, been favourable to the civilization or happiness of the conquered. Even the Crimea from 1770 to 1790 decreased in population from 250,000 to 60,000—a decrease of four-fifths in twenty years. He could conceive nothing more miserable than the lot of the Turks under the dominion of Russia. Shocked in every feeling, habit, and prejudice, and deeply imbued with the sentiment of predestination, revolts would be certain; the Russian punishments for revolts are known; and he thought humanity must pause before it would make even of Turkey another Poland. But it was not only by territorial increase that Russia had become formidable since the Treaty of Teschen, where she was first allowed to appear as a European power (a fault, said a diplomalist of the time, that it cost forty battles to efface). Since that period she had penetrated herself so deeply into the heart of all European affairs, that there was nothing which could take place in the smallest and most distant nook of Europe in which she did not take an active and decisive part. Bold, where anything was to be gained by force—crafty, where it was to be gained by intrigue—she took as much pains with her diplomacy as with her military force. Wherever an able man was to be obtained, she had rewards, and service, and distinctions at his disposal; wherever a secret was to be purchased, she had the money ready; whenever war was probable, her armies arrived at their destination before we were suspicious of their march. There was hardly a court in which she had not family alliances and secret agents. In Holland, in Portugal, in Spain, in all the states of Germany, and now in Turkey, her influence was predominant; uniform in her plans, she had never moved without an object, and, concentrated in her power, she never struck but with the whole force of her arm. Such was the Russia, which was slowly but steadily advancing towards Constantinople, and determined at no distant day to take possession of the Dardanelles, when all her energy, enterprise, and ambition would be directed to the extension of her maritime power. Such was the Russia, meditating upon which the greatest political and military genius of his age exclaimed, "Que l'Europe ait garde, ou en 50 ans, elle sera toute Cossacque." It was not such a Power as this that we could deceive by professions of friendship, or turn aside from her course by courteous remonstrances. If we wished to stop her—if we deemed it our policy to stop her while it was yet time, we must do so by employing the same language and maintaining the same bearing to her that she maintained to us. He would not insult or offend her, and he owned that the vote of the other night was, under all circumstances, a difficult one to decide upon; but, at the same time, he thought we should not shrink, or seem to shrink, from expressing an opinion fairly and openly upon her policy, and a determination to resist her further aggrandisement and aggressions. He thought we should not shrink from doing this, nor from averring that we did this; since, in spite of what might be said to the contrary, the great power of England on the Continent was a moral power, and she could influence the conduct of its sovereigns by influencing the opinions of their subjects. For this reason, also, he asked for the papers for which he should conclude by moving; and it seemed to him more especially his duty at the present time; because, while he felt the more dread at the progress of Russia—because, with her progress, her principles would advance also—he found that there were princes who, for the sake of those principles which they imagined favourable to their personal interests, winked at an ambition which must be finally fatal to the independence of their subjects. No longer ago than last Christmas, it was pretty generally reported that Count Appony, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, stated—in speaking on the affairs of the East—that his Court had a greater apprehension of French principles than Russian ambition. Here, then, was a new hinge for politics. It was no longer the power of a state, but the opinions of a state, which were dreaded; and those opinions were the opinions of an enlightened country, with whom, on account of corresponding views and ideas, we had entered into alliance. Moreover, he found, that the enlightened opinions to which Russia was inimical, had been combated, and combated successfully over different parts of Europe. They were put down in Italy, in defiance of the most able and energetic remonstrances of Mr. Seymour. They were put down in Germany, in defiance of the most solemn promises and the most binding treaties. They were put down in Poland under circumstances which exalted every humane feeling, appealed to every political interest, and aroused every sense of national honour. They were yet combated secretly in Belgium, openly in Holland, and even the expedition against Mehemet Ali, who, though a powerful and enlightened prince, did not chance to be a legitimate sovereign, seemed founded upon the same policy; and we might learn at Vienna and at St. Petersburg, that armies were equally ready to start for any part of the world, for Rome or for Constantinople, as it might be necessary, to rivet the loosening chains of Papal or Mahometan despotism. He could not think, with these circumstances passing before his eyes, that it was the part of a great Minister and a great statesman to turn the attention of the people from events which might endanger their dearest rights, their national power and existence, by a commonplace appeal to their pockets. It was the duty of a Government to curb, but not to put down the spirit of a nation—to avoid war as long as it was possible, but to keep alive the hearts of the people for any emergency. Gentlemen talked of war as if it were a thing which always depended upon ourselves, and which we had to choose as we might happen to like it, or the reverse; it was a thing only to be forced upon us; but when we saw it inevitably coming, then we need not wait for the rest, but take the best opportunity of meeting it; and, though he agreed in thinking that war was a great calamity to any country, this he would say, that if there were any country which, under the present condition of the world, could hope to wage a prosperous and successful war, it was that country which was at once mistress of the seas and possessed of the sympathies of the civilized portion of man-kind. He used this language, not because he thought there was any necessity for us now to go to war, or that there need be such necessity. He knew, if such a necessity were to arise, the people would be ready to meet, it; and he did not wish foreigners, who did not understand us, to take that grumbling at our poverty, and our debt, which had always existed since the days of Marlborough to be perfectly and literally true. The brave and gallant spirited people of England would shrink from no emergency in which their liberties and the liberties of Europe might require them to take a part. The burthens of the country had increased, but with the burthens of the country had also increased its resources; and though Russia had advanced from the Don to the Danube, from the Dneiper, to the Dneister, to the Pruth; though she had quartered herself in Moldavia and Wallachia, supplanted us in Holland, defied us in Germany and Poland, and entered, regardless of our diplomacy, the very gates of Constantinople, yet, notwithstanding, if Great Britain saw the necessity, or had the will, she never in a greater degree than at present, possessed the power to bid defiance to the armies and the principles of Russia. He hoped, therefore, we did not stand in disgraceful awe of a power which it would be equally as ridiculous to despise. He hoped that the noble Lord would explain frankly his views and feelings, such as would satisfy, both as to the course he might follow, and the policy he had pursued. For his own part, he had only to hope, that, however warmly he might have alluded to our political relations, he had indulged in no unbecoming personal remarks, and, thanking the House for its attention, he concluded by moving for "an humble Address to his Majesty for Papers respecting the Measures pursued by Russia, in her late interference with the state of Turkey."

Viscount Palmerston

said, it was hardly necessary for him to state that he should consider it his duty to oppose the Motion, because the transactions to which the papers called for referred, were incomplete, and the character of the whole transaction would depend upon its termination. The papers asked for, related to the late interference of Russia with Turkey, and the part this country took with reference to that proceeding; and, as the results were not yet known, the House would at once perceive that the Motion of the hon. Member must be premature. The hon. Member had taken advantage of the Motion before the House, to express his opinion as to the general policy of his Majesty's Government with regard to Russia, and from the tendency of the hon. Gentleman's speech, he seemed to attach greater importance to the opportunity afforded him of declaring his sentiments on this subject, than to the production of the papers he moved for. There was always some inconvenience attending the entering into a detailed discussion on the conduct of the Government on foreign affairs, when the transactions to which it had reference were not, complete. The Ministers were, no doubt, responsible for their acts, but it was too much to expect that, while transactions were pending, Ministers should undertake to explain not only their own conduct, but the motives which influenced the conduct of others. It was probable that at the very time at which they were speaking the Russian troops had evacuated Turkey. The pledge to do so had been repeatedly and solemnly given, not only to this country, but to all the other Powers of Europe, and, it was certainly, premature to declare that Russia did not mean to keep her faith? The hon. Gentleman had urged it as an accusation against. Ministers that they had not interfered to defend the Sultan against Mehemet Ali, and prevent the advance of his army. He was not prepared to deny, that the latter part of last year an application was made on the part of the Sultan to this country for assistance, but the Government was at that time not prepared to afford it; Ministers, in short, did not think it fit to afford assistance to the Porte at that particular juncture. No doubt if England had thought lit to interfere, the progress of the invading army would have been stopped, and the Russian troops would not have been called in; but although it was easy to say, after events had happened, that they were to be expected, yet certainly no one could anticipate the rapidity with which they had succeeded each other in the East. From this reply, and the subsequent rapid progress of the Egyptian arms—a progress not to be anticipated from any preceding events—the Sultan felt himself called upon to apply for assistance to Russia, and from Russia he obtained it. The Russian government, in granting this aid to the Sultan, had pledged its honour, and in that pledge be reposed the most implicit confidence, to limit its assistance to the defence alone of the Sultan, and had promised to withdraw whatever force might be placed at the disposal of that sovereign, for the purpose of securing his defence, as soon as peace was established between the Porte and Egypt. The hon. Gentleman would find in these observations an answer to his question, as to the policy of his Majesty's Government with regard to Russia and Turkey. The hon. Gentleman also asked would his Majesty's Government allow the conquest of Turkey by Russia. He had no hesitation in saying, that it was of the utmost importance for the interest of England, and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe, that the Ottoman empire should remain entire, and be an independent State. Whether the inhabitants of this large empire were Mohammedans or Christians—though he wished they were Christians—was not the question, for the subject must be dealt with in reference to political, and not to religious interests; but if Russian conquest should lead to the Christianizing and civilizing the inhabitants of that country, such advantages—and no one could estimate them higher than he did—would be counterbalanced by the consequences which would result to Europe from the dismemberment of the Turkish empire. Undoubtedly, then, his Majesty's Ministers would feel it to be their duty to resist any attempt on the part of Russia to partition the Turkish empire; and they would equally have felt themselves at liberty to interfere, and prevent the Pacha of Egypt from dismembering any portion of the dominions of the Sultan. The integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire were necessary to the maintenance of the tranquillity, the liberty, and the balance of power in the rest of Europe. At the same time, he had great doubts that any intention to partition that empire at all entered into the policy of the Russian government. Besides, he very much doubted also whether the Russian nation—properly so called—would be prepared to see that transference of power, of residence, and authority to the southern provinces, which would be the necessary consequence of the conquest by Russia of Constantinople. Such an event, too, would lead to a general war in Europe, for other Powers were as much, if not more, interested than ourselves in preventing such aggrandizement of the power of Russia. He therefore, thought, that sound policy, good faith, and every consideration of its own interest would induce the Russian government to abandon such a course, if it ever had the inclination to pursue it. He could assure the hon. Gentleman, that the British Government felt that the maintenance of the peace of Europe was an object of the greatest importance; and, as far as the Government of this country was concerned, without minding the taunts thrown out as to their pacific policy, they would do their utmost to preserve the peace of Europe. His Majesty's Government had been taunted with being afraid to go to war, and had been accused of truckling to other Powers in consequence of this fear. These accusations he (Viscount Palmerston) distinctly denied. If the present relations established between this country and France were pointed at in these sneers, he would only say, that he should look back with feelings of pride and satisfaction at the part he had acted in bringing about that good understanding. No apprehension could be excited in any reasonable mind on this score, for the circumstances of this connexion, both in France and in this country were greatly altered during the period that the present. Ministry had conducted the political affairs of Great Britain. At the same time he repudiated the idea that England was afraid of Russia. There certainly existed many reasons on both sides for the wish to avoid hostilities. Russia herself must wish for peace; she was a very large country, and immense commercial relations were established between her and this country. On what principle could she wish for war, or on what principle could those, who in this country were so loudly calling on the British Government to draw the sword, justify the appeal to arms at the present moment? Did they contemplate the calamities, the fatal and disastrous consequences, attendant upon a state of general warfare—consequences in which the conquerors, no less than the conquered, shared? The taunt of being afraid of war in any sense but this was puerile; for no country on the face of the globe was likely to suffer less than England from war. From all the unexampled sacrifices this country made during the last war with France, her internal resources and energies were such, she had recovered and repaired her means far sooner than any of the other nations which had been engaged in those hostilities. He had thus stated, to satisfy either the curiosity, or the anxiety, of the hon. Member, what had been the conduct of his Majesty's Government, and upon what principles they had proceeded. They had pursued the course which their duty to their country required; and if they had quietly beheld the temporary occupation of the Turkish capital by the forces of Russia, it was because they had full confidence in the honour and good faith of Russia, and believed that those troops would be withdrawn in a very short time, he believed he might almost say, before a few days had elapsed. On the ground of public convenience, therefore, and of the confidence he had in the fulfilment of her engagements by Russia, he thought the present Motion ought not to be agreed to.

Mr. Cullar Fergusson

declared, that he reposed no confidence in the pledges of Russia, and believed she would continue to violate them on every occasion, as she had already violated them, when it was her interest to do so. Had she not pledged herself to maintain the Constitution of Poland, pledged herself by Treaties, and had she not broken through them all? He would not trust her; for he was of opinion, that if she now retired from Turkey, it would only be for the purpose of rendering her return more easy, and her prey more sure. Such was her honesty in his estimation. He agreed with the noble Lord in his commendation of the present friendly relations between this country and France, and thought the interests of every free nation in Europe dependent on the continuance of that good understanding, for he was convinced a conspiracy was in operation against the free institutions of Europe, and that Russia, who was at the head of this conspiracy, would never rest satisfied until she had subjugated every country within her reach. When Poland was crushed, the thraldom of the German States, and afterwards of this country, was contemplated by that overbearing Power. The noble Viscount had informed the House, that the Government had remonstrated with Russia on the subject of her treatment of the Poles. But why did he, then, prevent the House of Commons from associating itself in that remonstrance? The discussion which took place on the subject the other night, would, however, go forth to Europe, and show what sentiments were entertained by the British Legislature of the conduct, of Russia towards Poland. With reference to the Motion he acquiesced in the statement of the noble Lord, that it would be improper to produce the papers till the negotiations were entirely at an end.

Colonel Evans

thought it, right on the part of his Majesty's Ministers to resist the taunts which had been thrown out against certain parts of their public conduct, but at the same time he could not help expressing his surprise at the confidence which the noble Viscount (Viscount Palmerston) seemed to place in the good faith of Russia. If they were to judge by its former acts, he would say, that there existed no grounds for such confidence, and that it was utterly unfounded; nay more, was altogether disproved by her conduct, not only towards Poland, but towards Turkey. With regard to Poland, she had been guilty of twenty years of infidelity and breach of faith; and with respect to Turkey, her conduct had been marked by want of faith and honesty. He was not anxious to see this country plunged into war, but he felt that if we, with France, had interfered immediately after the battle of the Pruth, we should have been right: but we allowed this opportunity to escape, and three months after the Russians had entered the Turkish territory as protectors, they declared that they had claims of their own, independent of the other Powers, which they were determined should be satisfied. The same conduct pursued by us in India, and by the Spaniards in South America, for increasing their territories was now about to be resorted to by Russia with respect to the States by which her territories were surrounded. The gallant Officer referred to the Treaty which existed between this country, France, and Russia, with respect to Turkey, and said that Treaty had been violated by the Russians. When the question of the conduct of Russia had been broached on a former occasion, the answer of Ministers was then, as now, that their noninterference was grounded on the fear of a war. But when the Russians had reached Adrianople, then the fear of war appeared to have ceased, and the English and French Governments gent fleets up the Dardanelles to check the progress of the Russians. There was no Power in Europe greater than England, and no opponent whom we had less reason to fear, great as was its power, than Russia; and if any such fear ever did exist, it must be done away with by the Reform which had taken place both in France and in this country, and the consequent amicable alliance between the two countries. He hoped his Majesty's Ministers would not place reliance on the faith of Russia, and, above all, that they would prevent the continued occupation of the Turkish capital by that overgrown Power. He hoped that the very fact of this occupation would be a lesson both to England and France, and induce them to take the necessary measures to preserve Turkey as an independent State. He wished to state, that he agreed with the general policy of his Majesty's Ministers, notwithstanding their conduct towards Poland, and that he wished to see a little more vigour thrown into their measures, and he felt sure that, in the event of our being obliged to go to war, they would not be found unprepared for the occasion.

Mr. Henry Lytton Bulwer,

in reply, said, that after what had fallen from the noble Viscount, he would not press his Motion. He was satisfied with the expression of opinion which had taken place, and would, with the leave of the House, withdraw the Motion.

Motion withdrawn.