HC Deb 11 April 1809 vol 14 cc3-5

The conversation which Mr. Stuart states you to have had with the [] and the remonstrances with which you have followed it, are perhaps as much as can be done by you in your situation. The effect produced upon the and the measures which he said were determined, are very good, if we were looking to events six months hence; but the situation in which we are, calls for something more efficient and energetic; Madrid is threatened, the French have destroyed one army, have passed the Ebro, and are advancing in superior numbers against another, which from its composition and strength promises no resistance, but must either retire or be overwhelmed; no other armed force exists in this country; I perceive no enthusiasm or any determined spirit amongst the people. The French cavalry, even in parties so weak as eleven or twelve men, enter the villages in Leon and the neighbouring provinces, and raise contributions without opposition.—This is a state of things quite different from that conceived by the British government, when they determined to send troops to the assistance of Spain. It was not expected that these were to cope alone, with the whole force of France, but as auxiliaries to aid a people who were believed to be enthusiastic, determined and prepared for resistance. It becomes therefore a question, whether the British army should remain to be attacked in its turn, or retire from a country, where the contest, from whatever circumstances, is become unequal.—I wish to throw no responsibility off myself, which properly belongs to me; the question is not purely a military one, but belongs as much to you as to me to decide upon it. Your communications with the Spanish government, and the opportunities you have bad of judging the general state of the country, enable you to form as just an estimate of the resistance which is likely to be offered; you are perhaps better acquainted with the views of the British cabinet; and the question is, what would that cabinet direct, were they upon the spot to determine? It is of much importance that this should be thoroughly considered. It is comparatively of very little consequence, in whom shall rest the greatest responsibility; I am willing to take the whole or a part; but I am very anxious to have your opinion. The movements of the French give us but little time for discussion. As soon as the British army has formed its junction, I must, upon the supposition that Castanos either is beaten or retires, march upon Madrid, and throw myself into the heart of Spain, and thus run all risks, and share the fortunes of the Spanish nation, or I must fall back upon Portugal: in the latter case, I fall back upon my resources in Lisbon, cover a country where there is a British interest, act as a diversion in favour of Spain, if the French detach a force against me, and am ready to return to the assistance of the Spaniards, should circumstances again render it eligible.—By marching into Spain, I detach myself from my resources, and should probably be able to take with, me a small portion of the military stores I have brought forward; in which case I should not be equal for a time to much contest, but every thing would be sent from Lisbon to Cadiz, and from thence join me. Tike movement into Spain is one of greater hazard, as my retreat to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain; I should be entirely in the power of the Spaniards. But perhaps this is worthy of risk, if the government and people of Spain are thought to have still sufficient energy and means to recover from their defeats, and, by collecting in the south, be able, with the aid of the British army, to resist, and finally to repel the formida- ble attack which is prepared against them. It is impossible not to wish that the Spaniards may be at last successful in a struggle which does them so much honour. They are a fine people. But I much fear the opportunity is now passed, and no effort they are likely to make will be sufficient, or in time to stand the armies they must engage. Upon this subject however I cannot be very, decided, and shall be most happy to find myself mistaken.