§ The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. David Blunkett):I have considered the current arrangements on the use of intrusive surveillance of prison cells during hostage incidents and have concluded that the current arrangements do not assist the Prison Service in bringing a hostage incident to a safe conclusion. As things stand, the Prison Service Incident Commander is required to obtain my authorisation of any hostage incident where he considers it necessary to use surveillance in the management of the incident. This can take an hour or more, which could be a dangerous delay.
It makes no sense that the Prison Service is hampered in its safe management of the incident through concerns about the hostage-taker's privacy. The Prison Service has taken advice of the Chief Surveillance Commissioner, who concluded that a hostage-taker forfeits his right to privacy by engaging in this activity. I agree with this approach and I have instructed the Prison Service to alter procedures accordingly.
This will mean that in future the Director General or Deputy Director General will authorise applications for covert surveillance in hostage incidents. The Prison Service will however be required to maintain an audit trail of each authorisation demonstrating that the use of 28WS surveillance was necessary, proportionate and consistent set out in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA).
Should the Prison Service require the use of intrusive surveillance of a prisoner's cell for any other purpose, those applications will still come to me, as they are likely to raise issues of privacy.