Qualified Majority Voting (Hansard, 9 September 2004)

§ Mr. Heathcoat-Amory
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether provisions concerning structured co-operation within the Common Foreign and Security Policy are to be decided by qualified majority voting under the European constitution. [187035]

§ Mr. MacShane
The voting procedures for Structured Cooperation are laid out in article III-213 of the constitutional treaty. Qualified Majority Voting in Structured Cooperation is only for procedural issues—how member states join and leave the group. The text makes clear that unanimity of participating states will be required for all other decisions.

Mr. Heathcoal-Amory
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether intellectual property or foreign direct investment moves from unanimity under article 133 TEC to qualified majority voting under article III-217(1) and III-217(2) of the European Constitution. [187036]

§ Mr. MacShane
Article 133 TEC established the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), allowing the Community to make trade agreements on behalf of the member states, covering trade in goods, services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual policy. Apart from a limited range of exceptions, decisions under it are taken by QMV.
Its successor in the European constitution, III-217, allows the EU also to make agreements covering foreign direct investment, and narrows slightly the scope of the exceptions from QMV covering intellectual property and trade in services.
The Government are content with this. They made clear in the White Paper published in September 2003 (Cm 5934) that they favoured moves to reduce barriers in international trade, provided that this did not lead to an increase in the internal powers of the Union, and 1383W that, as now, voting arrangements for such agreements mirrored those required for the adoption of equivalent rules internally. Both principles are set out in the treaty. The latter principle is set out at III-217(4). III-217(6) makes clear that the CCP does not affect the division of competences between the Union and the member states, and cannot in itself lead to legislative or regulatory harmonisation among the member states.