§ Mr. CousinsTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what means other than the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty the Government are seeking to use to(a) strengthen the inspection and monitoring of uranium enrichment facilities and (b) restrict the extension of such facilities. [171037]
§ Mr. MacShane[holding answer 6 May 2004]: As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made clear in his statement of 25 February 2004, Official Report, columns 46–49WS, on Weapons of Mass Destruction, recent experience has shown there is a need for more wide-ranging inspections of national nuclear industries. The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Additional Protocol provides the basis for carrying out such inspections. We seek universal adherence to the Additional Protocol and believe suppliers of nuclear technology should increasingly see this as a key commitment when they judge export licence applications. We are working with partners to enhance the effectiveness of the IAEA and strengthen its ability to ensure that nations comply with their safeguards agreements.
There is a strong argument that states which fail to comply with their safeguards obligations should forfeit the right to develop the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly the enrichment and reprocessing capabilities which are of such proliferation sensitivity. This would not deprive them of the possibility of constructing and running civil nuclear power stations but would prevent a seemingly civil programme masking a weapons programme.
§ Mr. CousinsTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what action the UK Government have taken to(a) support and (b) implement the Proliferation Security Initiative. [171038]
§ Mr. MacShane[holding answer 6 May 2004]: Since the launch of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May 2003 the UK has been one of a core group of countries working to drive the initiative forward. This has involved intensive worldwide lobbying efforts in 123W support of the Statement of Interdiction Principles agreed at Paris in September 2003. To date, more than 60 countries have expressed their support for PSI and their intention to apply its principles.
We want the PSI to become an established, accepted and effective part of the international security architecture. To that end, we are working with partners in the context of the International Maritime Organisation to make it an internationally recognised offence to transport weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems and related materials on commercial vessels. To extend the legal base of interdiction operations we are opening negotiations with major commercial flag states to allow for the boarding of vessels which may be carrying cargoes which could be used in WMD programmes. We are currently examining a range of measures to deter proliferators and further raise the political and economic costs of trafficking in WMD.
We will continue to take the necessary steps to strengthen our capacity to act effectively as and when required to take action consistent with the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles.
§ Mr. CousinsTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent steps the Government have taken to prevent the proliferation of missile and nuclear weapon technology from North Korea. [171039]
§ Mr. MacShane[holding answer 6 May 2004]: The Government support fully the six-party talks process aimed at ensuring compliance by North Korea with the ideals of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, and persuading them to comply with their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
We are also playing a principal role in the Proliferation Security Initiative which, while it does not specifically target any particular state, aims to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and technology associated with such weapons.