§ Sir Menzies CampbellTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what instructions and guidance have been given to members of the armed forces and other United Kingdom personnel and contractors in Iraq as to the obligations imposed by(a) the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and (b) the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and if he will make a statement. [183941]
§ Mr. Straw[holding answer 20 July 2004]: The UK armed forces are fully aware of their obligations under international law. They are given thorough mandatory training, which includes specific guidance on handling prisoners of war. All personnel must attend refresher training every year. Other UK personnel going to Iraq who are likely to be involved in activities that require an understanding of these international obligations are also given appropriate guidance.
542WUK staff seconded from HM Prison Service are deployed to Iraq solely to act as monitors and mentors within civil prisons run by the Iraqi Correctional Service, where all prisoners are held on remand or following conviction of criminal charges in civil courts. All HM Prison Service staff receive in-depth training on their roles and responsibilities and act at all times in accordance with international statutes and conventions.
There are no contractors employed by the UK in Iraq who have duties in detention facilities or who are involved in activities that may require an understanding of these international obligations.
§ Sir Menzies CampbellTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps have been taken since the occupation of Iraq to ensure that(a) members of the armed forces and other United Kingdom personnel and persons employed by contractors there comply with international human rights and humanitarian law, (b) there are effective safeguards and sanctions against abuse by contractors and (c) there are effective remedies for any victims of such abuse. [183942]
§ Mr. Straw[holding answer 20 July 2004]I refer the right hon. Gentleman to the answer I gave to him today (UIN 183941).
UK armed forces personnel are subject to UK law as they would be in the UK. As in the UK or in other operational theatres, the responsibility for enforcing the law lies with the Royal Military Police. Anyone found to have broken the law is dealt with appropriately, but of course it is important to establish the facts first. This is what we are now doing with regard to allegations against UK military personnel in Iraq.
The Coalition Provisional Authority put in place a number of regulations that apply to foreign contractors in Iraq. These regulations are set out in CPA Order 17 and CPA Memorandum 17, which can be found on the CPA website at www.cpa-iraq.org.
Any claims arising from actions attributable to UK military personnel will be considered against UK national law.
§ Harry CohenTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what discussions he has had with the security contractors his Department uses for operations in Iraq about them(a) being subject to Iraqi law and (b) being recipients of immunities subsequent to the transfer of sovereignty; and if he will make a statement. [184712]
§ Mr. RammellThe only security contractors that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office uses in Iraq are those involved in protecting the premises and staff of our missions there. The staff provided by those contractors are accredited to our embassy in Baghdad and our embassy of ices in Basra and Kirkuk and thus benefit from diplomatic status and immunities.
§ Lynne JonesTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1) whether the signals intelligence from GCHQ concerning a visit by an Iraqi official to Niger, referred to in Paragraph 89 of Cm 5972, relates to the UK Government claim that Iraq sought to procure uranium from Africa; [185176]
543W(2) pursuant to the answer of 19 May 2004, Official Report, column 1085W, and 30 January 2004, Official Report, column 581W, on Iraq, whet her the source upon which it based its claim in the September 2002 dossier, that Iraq sought to procure uranium from Africa, is the same information that it understands was discussed with the International Atomic Energy Authority before 7 March 2003; [185220]
(3) pursuant to the answer of 26 May 2004, Official Report, columns 1638—39W, on Iraq, between what dates the September 2002 source upon which the Government based its claim that Iraq sought to procure uranium from Africa indicated that the attempted procurement took place; [185221]
(4) pursuant to the answer of 26 May 2004, Official Report, column 1639W, on Iraq, whether the documentary evidence reported in June 2002, referred to in Paragraph 89 of the Intelligence and Security Committee Report, Cm 5972, upon which the Government did not rely to back up its claim that Iraq sought to procure uranium from Africa was found to be (a) forged and (b) the same as any of the documents described as forged by the International Atomic Energy Agency on 7 March 2003; [185222]
(5) pursuant to the answer of 26 May 2004, Official Report, column 1639W, on Iraq, whether the Government have established the origin and history of the documents referred to as under consideration in Paragraph 4 of the Further Supplementary Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Iraqi Attempts to Procure Uranium, of July 2003, Written Evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report, HC 813 -II; [185223]
(6) pursuant to the answer of 26 April 2004, Official Report, column 774W and 6 May 2004, Official Report, column 1733W, on Iraq, what form the second intelligence source reported in September 2002 took; [185226]
(7) pursuant to the answer of 26 April 2004, Official Report, columns 1733—34W, on Iraq, whether his reference to the intelligence that the Government understand was discussed with the International Atomic Energy Authority is to the second source referred to in paragraph 93 of the Intelligence and Security Committee's report, Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction. [185227]
§ Mr. StrawI have nothing further to add. However, my hon. Friend will be aware that Lord Butler's Inquiry reviewed the intelligence relating t o this matter in detail and concluded at paragraph 503 that
From our examination of the intelligence and other material on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa, we have concluded that:
- a. It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in 1999.
- b. The British Government had intelligence from several different sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring uranium. Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of Niger's exports, the intelligence was credible.
- c. The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, as opposed to having sought, uranium and the British Government did not claim this.
544W - d. The forged documents were not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact of the forgery does not undermine it."
§ Llew SmithTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what the source was of the intelligence received by the United Kingdom in 2002 in respect of alleged attempts by Iraq to purchase uranium from Niger to which reference is made at paragraph 495 of the Butler Committee report on intelligence on weapons of mass destruction. [185189]
§ Mr. StrawI refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Lynne Jones) today in response to series of questions on the issue of this intelligence (UINs 185176, 185220, 185221, 185222, 185223, 185226, 185227).
§ Llew SmithTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether his Department was the source of the statement at paragraph 501 of the Butler Committee Report on intelligence on weapons of mass destruction in respect of the date on which the British Government first learned of the United States' and other states' receipt of documents alleging Iraqi attempts to secure uranium from Niger. [185190]
§ Mr. RammellThe Butler Review carried out its work independently of the Government. It would not be appropriate therefore for the Government to comment on who gave what evidence to the Review. However, the hon. Member may wish to consult the report of the Intelligence and Security Committee on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction—Intelligence and Assessments, paras 87–93 which also deals with this issue.
§ Lynne JonesTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs which members of the security services briefed the Leader of the Opposition prior to the vote in the House on 18 March regarding the invasion of Iraq. [185224]
§ Mr. StrawI refer my hon. Friend to the answer my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister gave to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Wood Green (Mr. Duncan Smith) in the House on 9 July 2003,Official Report, column 1151.
§ Lynne JonesTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs pursuant to his answer of 8 July 2004,Official Report, column 846W, on Iraq, whether Iraq's oil production was metered during Coalition Provision Authority rule; and how much oil was produced by Iraq during the Coalition's tenure. [185499]
§ Mr. RammellWhen the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) took office there were no functioning meters in the Iraqi oil system. The CPA oil team had been pressing for meters to be installed as a matter of urgency, but as of 28 June—when the CPA dissolved—the issue remained outstanding. However oil exports, either by pipeline to Ceyhan in Turkey or by tanker through the Arabian Gulf, were metered as they passed into the receiving tanks.
Oil production during the CPA's tenure for each month from June 2003 to April 2004 is shown in table 1. Weekly data from May to the beginning of July 2004 is shown in table 2.
545W
Table I: Iraq—average daily crude oil production Barrels per day (million) 2003 June 0.453 July 0.573 August 1.053 September 1.403 October 1.753 November 1.853 December 1.952 2004 January 2.103 February 2.003 March 2.203 April 2.303
Table 2: Iraq—average daily crude oil production Barrels per day (million) 2004 30 April to 6 May 2.4 7–13 May 1.9 14–20 May 1.8 21–27 May 2.25 28 May to 3 June 2.4 4—10 June 2.3 11–17 June 2.1 18–24 June 1.15 25 June to 1 July 1.3
§ Adam PriceTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether members of his departmental staff were informed in July 2003 that the Secret Intelligence Service in that month had withdrawn reporting from a source who claimed that the production of biological and chemical agents had been accelerated by the Iraqi regime, because the source of the reporting had subsequently been deemed unreliable. [185786]
§ Mr. StrawWe have nothing further to add to the remarks that were made in last Tuesday's debate on Iraq.