§ Llew SmithTo ask the Prime Minister (1) if he will place in the Library a copy of the intelligence document
1344W2. The average salaries are for staff in grades Band A (AA) to Band G (Grade 6) before implementation of the proposed 2003 pay award, and current SCS salaries. Average salaries include allowances such as recruitment and retention allowance and the employer's occupational pension contribution, but exclude overtime. Data on Permanent Secretaries have been excluded from the table.
3. The figures above encompass all pay zones (national, inner and outer London, and specified locations).
Source:
DWP Payroll Systems (FAMIS and Rebus) as processed by DWP Financial Services (ASAP), October 2003.
§ Mr. WebbTo ask the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions if he will list the salary bands for full-time members of staff who are on(a) clerical support, (b) management, (c) senior management and (d) senior civil service grades in his Department and each of its agencies; and how many staff are employed in each of those bands. [151447]
§ Maria EagleThe information is in the table.
on which he based his conclusion, placed before the Hutton Inquiry by his former director of communications, that Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in between one and two years; [152532]
(2) pursuant to his answer of 2 February, Official Report, column 729, what the original intelligence to which he refers was that the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee relied upon in respect of his acceptance of the proposals made in his e-mail of 19 September 2002; and whether he had been informed of the contents of this intelligence when he authorised his former director of communications to press for changes in the Iraq weapons of mass destruction dossier. [153918]
§ The Prime MinisterThe conclusions on the dossier were those of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) as 1345W both Lord Hutton and the Intelligence and Security Committee have made clear. As Lord Hutton makes clear,
Mr. John Scarlett, the Chairman of the JIC, had the overall responsibility for the drafting of the dossier".It has been the practice of successive Governments not to publish intelligence material.
§ Llew SmithTo ask the Prime Minister what response he made to the queries posed by the right hon. Member for Dewsbury in her comments on the draft Iraq weapons of mass destruction dossier in September 2002; and if he will place a copy in the Library. [153929]
§ The Prime MinisterI refer my hon. Friend to the answers I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Newport, West (Paul Flynn) on 18 September 2003,Official Report, column 870W and on 15 October 2003, Official Report, columns 233–34W.
As Lord Hutton found in his report
the dossier was prepared and drafted by a small team of the assessment staff of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). Mr. John Scarlett, the Chairman of the JIC, had the overall responsibility for the drafting of the dossier. The dossier, which included the 45 minutes claim, was issued by the Government on 24 September 2002 with the full approval of the JIC".
§ Llew SmithTo ask the Prime Minister what the source was of the 45–minute claim about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; and whether this intelligence information was shared with allied intelligence services, including those of the United States, between its receipt by the United Kingdom and its use in the Iraq weapons of mass destruction dossier. [153980]
§ The Prime MinisterI refer my hon. Friend to the answer given to him by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 18 September 2003,Official Report, columns 952–53W.
§ Llew SmithTo ask the Prime Minister whether he was informed of the e-mail by Mr. Jonathan Powell, published on page 657 of Lord Hutton's Report, on the evidence of an imminent threat from Iraq contained in the Draft Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Dossier, dated 17 September 2002, before he authorised the publication of the final version of the dossier. [153996]
§ The Prime MinisterNo. As Lord Hutton said in his Report, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had overall responsibility for the dossier of 24 September and accepted only drafting suggestions which were consistent with the intelligence known to the JIC.
Lembit ÖOpikTo ask the Prime Minister whether(a) the Secretary of State for Defence and (b) other Ministers informed him (i) orally and (ii) in writing that they believed the weapons of mass destruction which could be deployed within 45 minutes were battlefield weapons; [154082]
§ Richard OttawayTo ask the Prime Minister pursuant to his oral answer of 4 February 2004,Official Report, column 772, when he indicated when it had come to his attention that the 45 minute assertion related to battlefield mortar shells or small calibre weaponry; [154017]
1346W
§ Sir John StanleyTo ask the Prime Minister on what date he first became aware to which Iraqi weapons the 45–minutes claim in the Iraq's weapons of mass destruction dossier applied. [154181]
§ The Prime MinisterNo. As my Official Spokesman said on Thursday 5 February, I first became aware of this around the time that the Intelligence and Security Committee had been examining the issue.
§ Glenda JacksonTo ask the Prime Minister whether the Iraqi regime was warned(a) before and (b) during the recent conflict that any use of battlefield chemical and biological weapons would meet with a response using (i) weapons of mass destruction and (ii) nuclear weapons. [154252]
§ The Prime MinisterNo. The Government have made clear in the past that we reserve the right to respond appropriately to any use of such weapons, using the range of options available to us. The UK does not possess biological or chemical weapons. We would never use our nuclear weapons in a manner contrary to international law.
I refer my hon. Friend to the answer my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence gave to the hon. Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) on 3 March 2003, Official Report, column 578.
§ Glenda JacksonTo ask the Prime Minister whether he was informed of the possible range of battlefield weapons of mass destruction; and what types of armament he understood to be defined as battlefield weapons. [154253]
§ The Prime MinisterYes. I refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave to the hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth) on 15 September 2003,Official Report, column 515W.