HC Deb 19 April 2004 vol 420 c319W
Mr. Lazarowicz

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the verification of the nuclear safeguard arrangements required under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. [165803]

Nigel Griffiths

The DTI provides the UK Governor to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and through membership of the IAEA Board of Governors the UK takes a full part in considering the implementation and development of IAEA safeguards. Since weaknesses in the then existing system of safeguards were exposed in the early 1990s, I am advised the IAEA has developed new and powerful safeguards measures, in particular to strengthen its ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities in non-nuclear weapon states. Such measures include those specified in the Model Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements, approved by the Board of Governors in May 1997. The UK has fully supported the work of the IAEA in this regard and our assessment continues to be that its safeguards verification activities are the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in combination with an additional protocol thereto, should be considered the new verification standard for non-nuclear weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

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