§ Llew SmithTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what(a) scientific and (b) medical evidence was used as the basis of the statements in paragraph 4.10 of his Department"s report on first reflections on operations in Iraq, that there is no reliable scientific or medical evidence to suggest depleted uranium has previously been responsible for post-conflict incidences of ill-health. [126923]
§ Mr. HoonThe Royal Society's independent expert Depleted Uranium Working Group recently completed an extensive review of the scientific work on potential health and environmental effects of depleted uranium (DU) munitions. The findings of the review are detailed in two reports entitled "The Health Hazards of Depleted Uranium Munitions" (2001, 2002). They support the Ministry of Defence"s view that risks posed by DU to the health of soldiers on the battlefield are minimal except for a small number of extreme cases. The United States Government has carefully monitored the health of those US soldiers who were exposed in extreme circumstances when DU rounds accidentally hit their vehicles during the 1990–91 Gulf Conflict. Some seventeen of them have had DU shrapnel embedded in their bodies for the last twelve years. None of the groups shows signs of health problems attributable to DU. The offspring of the highly-exposed US veterans, amounting to some sixty children, are all healthy.
Some 53,000 British troops took part in the 1990–91 Gulf Conflict, and some 3,300 subsequently felt the need to attend the Gulf Veterans Medical Assessment Programme. The results of the first 3,000 patients to attend have been published: 75 per cent. were found to be well, no novel or unusual conditions were found and 348W the most common condition was found to be post-traumatic stress disorder. No evidence of ill-health due to DU exposure was found.
The findings of United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) studies in Kosovo (2001), Serbia and Montenegro (2002) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003) note very low levels of DU contamination which do not present immediate radioactive or toxic risks for human health. UNEP"s findings are consistent with MOD"s view that any DU contamination will be limited and localised and that actions to reduce any potential intakes will only be necessary in some extreme cases.
§ Mr. GrayTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) how many(a) camp beds and (b) NBC suits and respirators were used during Telic 1; and what shortfalls there were; [127109]
(2) how much body armour was issued during Telic 1; and what shortfall there was. [127108]
§ Mr. IngramI assume that Telic 1 relates to the period between initial deployment of troops to the Gulf region and the end of major hostilities. The quantities of camp beds, NBC suits, respirators and body armour deployed to theatre are detailed in the table. It is not possible to identify the quantities actually used during that time for which the information is not held centrally.
Equipment type Number issued Camp beds 25,280 NBC suits 218,000 S10 respirators 31,500 Enhanced Combat Body Armour (ECBA) sets 38,200 The S10 respirator, referred to in the table, is an item of personal issue to all Service personnel, to be retained at all times; the number shown deployed to theatre was to provide replacement stocks.
Although sufficient quantities of the equipments were supplied to theatre, I am aware that local supply difficulties may have resulted in shortfalls in some areas. In particular, some redistribution of ECBA ceramic plates was required, with priority given to front-line combat units. Supply difficulties will be addressed as part of the on-going departmental review of the operation.