§ Mr. TynanTo ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what assessment her Department has made of the effect of a failure of the continental gas interconnector on electricity generation in the United Kingdom. [132437]
§ Mr. TimmsThe DTI-Ofgem "Joint Energy Security of Supply Working Group" (JESS) monitors security of supply of gas and electricity in Great Britain. JESS's work has included discussion of NGT's "Winter Operations Report 2003/04" which assesses the outlook for electricity and gas supplies in the coming winter. The report was published on 14 October, and is available, with Ofgem's comments, on Ofgem's website (www.ofgem.gov.uk). It covered the interaction between electricity generation and gas supply.
NGT's overall assessment for electricity supply in the Great Britain (GB) for this winter was that while the generation margin has risen slightly, it was lower than in previous years, but there would be enough power to meet the forecast demand for electricity this winter under all but the most exceptional circumstances.
NGT's report noted that of the CCGT stations, all but 2.7 GW either have firm gas contracts or are able to use alternative fuels. This represents some 4 per cent. of the total generating capacity that NGT projected for this winter.
Since NGT's report was issued further generating plant has returned from mothball.
In prolonged severe winter weather, delivery of sufficient gas to meet demand (including for electricity generation) would depend on high production levels from the UKCS, and the availability of gas from storage and through the continental gas interconnector.
The interconnector has proved reliable when it is in import mode. As with any offshore infrastructure, the loss of a large supply source would reduce the resilience of the gas network and reduce the availability of gas-fired generation to the electricity network. However, there are strong financial incentives on parties to the 1421W interconnector to reduce the incidence and extent of any failures. Furthermore, in recent winters the interconnector has operated mainly in export mode.
NGT are taking a number of steps to reduce the risks to electricity supply that they have identified in the Winter Operations report. For example, they have recently undertaken a tender for additional reserve generating capacity.
§ Malcolm BruceTo ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what assessment she has made of the costs to(a) business and (b) consumers of the loss of electricity supply on (i) 28 August, affecting South London and parts of Kent and (ii) 5 September, affecting the East Midlands and West Midlands; and if she will make a statement. [139719]
§ Mr. TimmsThe Department of Trade and Industry has not conducted a formal assessment of the costs of these events on electricity consumers.
The London event affected some 476,000 consumers and the Midlands event affected some 201,000 consumers. In both cases power supplies were restored to all consumers within an hour.
The Department recognises that the consequences of these power failures were serious, with disruption to surface rail, underground street lights and traffic systems, water supply and sewerage systems as well as to electricity users in homes and workplaces.
The Department submitted a memorandum to the Trade and Industry Committee on 14 November 2003 which explains the Department's role in investigating the circumstances of these events, and includes a discussion on specific lessons to be learned from these events and from other recent major power interruptions in America and Europe.
1422W
Power Station Approved Size (MW) Type Status Enfield 26 February 1997 360 CCGT Operational Coryton 14 March 1997 720 CCGT Operational Winnington 10 April 1997 150 CHP GT Operational Seal Sands 10 April 1997 60 CHP GT Operational Sutton Bridge 20 May 1997 790 CCGT Operational Saltend 7 August 1997 1,200 CHP CCGT Operational Sandbach 21 August 1997 58 CHP GT Operational Port Talbot 22 October 1997 200 CHP GT Not built Fawley 22 October 1997 130 CHP GT Operational Great Yarmouth 23 October 1997 350 CCGT Operational Snodland 11 December 1997 60 CHP GT Operational Bury St. Edmunds 18 February 1998 80 CHP GT Operational Bridgewater 7 May 1998 65 CHP GT Operational Shoreham 5 August 1998 400 CCGT Operational Shotton 3 December 1998 215 CHP GT Operational Castleford 3 December 1998 55 CHP GT Operational York 15 February 1999 70 CHP GT Operational Stoke 14 May 1999 60 CHP GT Operational Baglan Bay 16 July 1999 525 CCGT Operational Blackburn 27 July 1999 60 CHP GT Operational Cantley 9 December 1999 70 CHP GT Unknown Runcorn 15 September 2000 250 CHP GT Unknown Spalding 15 November 2000 800 CCGT Under construction Partington 15 November 2000 380 CCGT Unknown Fleetwood 15 November 2000 1,000 CCGT Unknown Isle of Grain 15 November 2,000 1,200 CCGT Unknown Raventhorpe 15 November 2000 450 CCGT Unknown Langage 15 November 2000 1,010 CCGT Unknown South Killingholme 22 March 2001 700 CCGT CHP Under construction Halewood 4 April 2001 70 CHP GT Unknown The events are also being investigated by Ofgem. The main objective of Ofgem's investigation is to examine whether there has been a breach or breaches, of the statutory or licence obligations which apply to National Grid Company and the relevant distribution network operators involved.