§ Llew SmithTo ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what mechanisms exist to monitor whether end-use commitments entered into by countries importing military equipment and material 359W from the United Kingdom are kept; and how many instances have come to his attention since May 1997 of military equipment sold to one country that has subsequently been sold on to a third country. [75690]
§ Mr. MacshaneOur Overseas Posts have standing instructions to report on allegations of misuse of any UK-origin defence equipment to take into account in the licensing process. Detailed guidance is provided to Posts and FCO officials involved in licensing in London to help decide when to carry out end-use checks, and to outline the kinds of questions that these checks should address.
We focus our efforts on assessment of potential end-use at the export licensing stage. Carrying out effective risk assessment on end-users before making the export licensing decision is the surest way to prevent UK arms falling into the wrong hands. We assess all export licence applications on a case by case basis against the Consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria in accordance with Criterion 7. In accordance with that criterion we will not issue an export licence where there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to an undesirable end-user.
Proactive monitoring of defence exports is only carried out in those cases of greatest concern. The Government has introduced a number of safeguards in order to minimise the risk of diversion; and those measures are under constant review.
We can not disclose details of possible diversion to undesirable end users, as much of the information is obtained from sensitive sources.