HL Deb 30 May 2002 vol 635 cc163-4WA
Lord Hylton

asked Her Majesty's Government:

How they assess the risks that exports of arms and equipment licensed to the following countries may be diverted:

  1. (a) from Hong Kong to mainland China (which is under existing European Union arms embargo);
  2. (b) from Jordan to Iraq;
  3. (c) from Paraguay to Brazil (illicit sales); and
  4. (d) from Singapore to other countries. [HL4350]

The Minister for Trade (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean)

We assess all export licence applications on a case-by-case basis against the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria. The consolidated criteria clearly state that we would not issue licences where there is a risk that exports might be diverted to undesirable end-users. The criteria were set out in the answer given by my right honourable friend the Member for Neath to my honourable friend the Member for Crawley on 26 October 2000 (Official Report, Commons; col. 199–203W).

To assess the risk of diversion we examine open and sensitive source reports, and classified reports from our posts overseas. We have introduced a number of safeguards in order to minimise the risk of diversion; and those measures are under constant review. We do not disclose specific details of our safeguards, as they largely depend on information obtained from sensitive sources which is exempt from disclosure under part 2 section 1 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.

With specific reference to the countries you name:

  1. (a) Officials from FCO, MoD, DTI and HM Customs & Excise undertake regular visits to Hong Kong to see how effectively its export control system is working. On the basis of their visits, we retain confidence in Hong Kong's independent strategic trade controls. Customs procedures are rigorously enforced. As the late Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Mr Derek Fatchett announced on 14 January 1998, in order to fulfil our obligations under the EU embargo on China, goods which we would not approve for export to the Chinese armed forces in mainland China will not be permitted for export for military end-use in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Official Report, Commons; col. 221W).
  2. (b) We do not believe it is in Jordan's security interests to divert arms to Iraq now. Although the Jordanian Government have close relations with Iraq, we do not believe they would divert military equipment there. Jordan has consistently supported implementation of UN sanctions.
  3. (c) When assessing small arms export licence applications for Paraguay, the risk of diversion is carefully considered. Our embassy in Asuncion is asked on each occasion for an assessment of the risk of diversion and, if necessary, to check the bona fides of the proposed end-user locally.
  4. (d) The Singaporeans are aware that we would be concerned over any diversion and that we would act if we found evidence of it. Our post in Singapore often carries out checks on proposed end-users when a licence application is being considered.