HL Deb 07 May 2002 vol 634 cc161-2WA
Lord Hylton

asked Her Majesty's Government:

What instructions they have given to British military attaches to verify that licensed exports of arms and equipment are in fact used for the purposes for which they were approved; whether diversions have occurred; and whether they will strengthen the instructions and widen their application. [HL2323]

The Minister for Trade (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

Our overseas posts have standing instructions to report on allegations of misuse of any UK-origin defence equipment to take into account in the licensing process. Detailed guidance notes are provided to posts and FCO officials involved in licensing in London to help decide when to carry out end-use checks and to outline the kinds of questions that these checks should address. This advice applies to defence attachés as well.

We focus our efforts on assessment of potential end-use at the export licensing stage. Carrying out effective risk assessment on end-users before making the export licensing decision is the surest way to prevent UK arms falling into the wrong hands. We assess all export licence applications on a case-by-case basis against the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria in accordance with Criterion 7. In accordance with that criterion we will not issue an export licence where there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to an undesirable end-user.

The Government nevertheless remain committed to carrying out end-use monitoring in those circumstances where this will genuinely add value to our efforts to minimise the risk of misuse and diversion and where such monitoring is practicable.

The Government have introduced a number of safeguards in order to minimise the risk of diversion and those measures are under constant review. We can not disclose details of our safeguards or possible diversion to undesirable end users as much of the information is obtained from sensitive sources.