§ Mr. Menzies CampbellTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence on how many occasions(a) coalition aircraft and (b) UK aircraft patrolling the southern no-fly zone in Iraq have (i) detected violations of the no-fly zones, (ii) a direct threat to coalition aircraft and (iii) released ordnance, in each quarter since January 1999 to date stating for each quarter the tonnage of ordnance released; in percentage terms what has been (A) the nature of the violation detected, (B) the nature of the threat detected and (C) the category of target attacked; and if he will make a statement. [31015]
§ Mr. IngramThe information is as follows:
(i) The numbers of southern NFZ violations by quarter since January 1999 are: 992W
1999 2000 2001 First quarter 35 3 3 Second quarter 9 0 2 Third quarter 6 4 4 Fourth quarter 3 1 1 Total 53 8 10 No-fly zone (NFZ) violations can be detected in several ways, including by tactical aircraft. 100 per cent. of violations were incursions into the NFZ by Iraqi military aircraft.
(ii) We do not hold information in the form requested about recorded threats prior to 2000. In 2000 and 2001 coalition aircraft recorded threats on a total of 918 occasions. Reports from UK aircraft indicated that they were threatened or attacked as follows, by quarter:
2000 2001 First quarter 4 73 Second quarter 8 71 Third quarter 36 45 Fourth quarter 28 15 Total 76 204 In 2000 and 2001, 7 per cent. of the total were radar threats; 6 per cent. were attacks by surface-to-air missiles; and 87 per cent. others, primarily attacks by anti-aircraft guns.
(iii) The tonnage of ordnance released by coalition aircraft in the no-fly zone, by quarter, is as follows.
1999 2000 2001 Coalition UK Coalition UK Coalition UK First quarter 120.5 31.5 35 3.5 50.5 8.5 Second quarter 79 21 45.5 6 11.5 2.5 Third quarter 135 23.5 42.5 5 39 13 Fourth quarter 45 12.5 32 6 6 1 Total 379.5 88.5 155 20.5 107 25 100 per cent. of ordnance released was in self-defence responses by coalition aircraft against military targets in the Iraqi Integrated Air Defence System.
§ Mr. Menzies CampbellTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence when, since January 1999, coalition aircraft patrolling the(a) northern and (b) southern no-fly zones in Iraq have hit targets that were different from the intended target, stating in each case (i) the nature of the intended target, (ii) the nature of the actual target hit, (iii) the estimated number of civilians killed and (iv) the reason why the unintended target was hit; and if he will make a statement. [31016]
§ Mr. IngramAll targets attacked in self defence by coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones are military elements of the Iraqi Integrated Air Defence System.
On the rare occasions where ordnance has failed to hit the intended target, it has almost invariably landed on open ground. It is extremely difficult to assess collateral damage, or numbers of civilian casualties caused by the remainder, despite the painstaking Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) that the coalition carries out every time ordnance is released. However, it is possible to 993W demonstrate categorically that many of the Iraqi claims of collateral damage and civilian casualties are untrue. There have, for example, been several instances when Iraqis have claimed civilian casualties when coalition aircraft have not been flying, or when BDA has confirmed that only military targets were hit. Indeed, there is good evidence that, on several occasions where Saddam has made claims of civilian casualties, it has been caused by Iraqi artillery shells or missiles, recklessly fired at coalition aircraft, falling to earth in built up areas.
In all cases of failure to hit the intended target by ordnance released from UK aircraft, the failure was caused by ordnance malfunction. We do not hold information for coalition partners.
Coalition aircraft only attack military targets in self-defence. We make every effort to select targets and to employ precision guided munitions in order to minimise the possibility of collateral damage and civilian casualties. Despite these efforts, regrettably, on occasions civilians may have suffered as a result of coalition activity. However, this would be completely avoided if the Iraqis desisted from attacking coalition aircraft.
§ Mr. Menzies CampbellTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of changes to the nature and strength of Iraqi air defences since January 1998; whether improvements to the Iraqi air defence system constitute a threat to coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones; what contribution strikes against Iraqi air defences by coalition aircraft in response to violation of the no-fly zones have made to his assessment; and if he will make a statement. [31017]
§ Mr. IngramSince January 1998, Saddam has continually sought to upgrade his air defence system. Developments since January 1998 include increased use of digital technology and greater mobility and dispersal of radars and weapons.
Its capability is very carefully monitored to assess the impact of any changes on coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones. The danger to our aircraft is demonstrated by the fact that the Iraqi air defence system has threatened coalition aircraft on around 1,000 occasions over the last two years. The coalition has on occasion responded purely in self-defence using high precision weapons against elements of the Iraqi Air Defence System. There is no doubt these self-defence responses do have an impact in terms of reducing the threat posed to aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones. Other important initiatives, including the UN-sponsored arms embargo on Iraq, also have an impact on the capability of Saddam' s air defence infrastructure.
As long as the Iraqis persist in attempts to shoot down our aircraft, the coalition will continue to take action in self-defence to ensure the safety of our aircrew.
§ Mr. Menzies CampbellTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what activities are deemed violations of the no-fly zones in Iraq; from what date every such activity has been deemed to be a violation; what changes have been made to the definition of a violation of the no-fly zones since January 1998; what changes have been made to authorised reaction to any particular violation since January 1998; and if he will make a statement. [31013]
§ Mr. IngramA violation of the no-fly zones is defined as entry into a zone by Iraqi military aircraft. These activities have been considered violations since the994W inception of the zones, in April 1991 (north) and August 1992 (south) respectively. There have been no material changes to this definition since January 1998.
From time to time minor adjustments are made to the authorised self-defence responses to violations of the no-fly zones. I am withholding details for reasons of operational security in accordance with Exemption 1 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information. However, the basis for any coalition response—self-defence—remains unchanged.
§ Mr. Menzies CampbellTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what activities are deemed to be threats to coalition aircraft in the no-fly zones in Iraq; from what date every such activity has been deemed to be a threat; what changes have been made to the definition of a threat in the no-fly zone since January 1998; what changes have been made to the authorised reaction to any particular threat since January 1998; and if he will make a statement. [31014]
§ Mr. IngramThreats to coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones in Iraq include attacks from Iraqi aircraft, Anti-Aircraft Artillery and/or Surface To Air Missile fire, and acquisition by radar. These activities have been considered threats since the inception of the zones, in April 1991 (north) and August 1992 (south) respectively.
Detailed procedures governing the operations conducted by coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones are reviewed and amended from time to time. I am withholding details for reasons of operational security under Exemption 1 of Part II of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information. But there have been no fundamental changes to the definition of a threat justifying a response in self defence since January 1998.