§ Mr. BerryTo ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what end-use documentation was provided with the export licence application from Hunting Engineering for the export of the BL755 cluster munitions (Batch No. 82529); and if she will make a statement on discussions her Department has had with the manufacturer366W and the Government in the original country of destination regarding the (a)diversion and (b)re-export of the original transfer to Ethiopia. [46149]
§ Nigel GriffithsInformation on end use documentation provided in support of an export licence application is confidential and exempt from disclosure under Part 2, Sections 1, 13 and 14 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.
The Department of Trade & Industry's Export Control Organisation maintains regular contact with exporters on a range of export control issues. Discussions with individual exporters on such issues are confidential and exempt from disclosure under Part 2, Sections 1, 13 and 14 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.
No discussions with overseas Governments have as yet taken place with regard to their possible re-export of this particular item, since it is not yet clear whether any country might have re-exported these items to Ethiopia.
§ Mr. BerryTo ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (1) what export licences were granted between 1972 and 1989 for the export of BL755 cluster munitions (Batch No. 62529); and if she will provide the(a)number of cluster munitions exported, (b)category codes, and (c)final end-use destination; [46154]
(2) what export licences were granted between 1972 and 1989 for the export of cluster munitions; and if she will provide (a)the number of cluster munitions exported, (b)category codes and (c)final end-use destination; [46159]
(3) what export licences were granted for the export of BL755 cluster munitions to Ethiopia between 1972 and 1989; and if she will provide the (a)number of cluster munitions exported, (b)category codes and (c)final end-use destination; [46151]
(4) what export licences were granted for the export of BL755 cluster munitions to Israel between 1972 and 1989; and if she will provide the (a)number of cluster munitions exported, (b)category codes and (c)final end-use destination; [46153]
(5) what export licences were granted between 1972 and 1989 for the export of BL755 cluster munitions; and if she will provide the (a)number of cluster munitions exported, (b)category codes and (c)final end-use destination. [46152]
§ Nigel GriffithsPrevious administrations have not considered it appropriate to publish information on individual licensing decisions. This information is not held centrally, and a manual search of all the case files would incur disproportionate cost.
§ Mr. BerryTo ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if an export licence is required for the refurbishment, and subsequent re-export, of cluster munitions. [46253]
§ Nigel GriffithsAn export licence is required from the Department of Trade and Industry's Export Control Organisation to export cluster munitions, controlled under entries ML3 and ML4 in Part III of Schedule 1 of the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994, as amended, from the UK.
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§ Mr. BerryTo ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will describe the end-use procedures in place to monitor and prevent the re-export and proliferation of British supplied cluster munitions. [46158]
§ Mr. BradshawI have been asked to reply.
There are no end-use controls applied specifically to exports of this equipment. Our overseas posts have standing instructions to report on allegations of misuse of any UK-origin defence equipment to take into account in the licensing process. We focus our efforts on assessment of potential end-use at the export licensing stage. Carrying out effective risk assessment on end-users before making the export licensing decision is the surest way to prevent UK arms falling into the wrong hands. We will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the equipment for export could be used for internal repression or international aggression, or where there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to an undesirable end-user.
In determining whether any such risk exists, we take into account all reliable information on proposed end-use and end-users of potential concern, including reporting from our overseas posts, other countries and nongovernmental organisations. We are pursuing improved information sharing with like-minded countries through the EU and the Wassenaar Arrangement.
The Government remain committed to carrying out end-use monitoring in those circumstances where this will genuinely add value to our efforts to minimise the risk of misuse and diversion and where such monitoring is practicable. The Government have the legal power to revoke export licences in the event of substantive misuse or diversion.